Tunisia

Researcher4104: The disposal of state assets is the remit of the Ministry of State's Properties and Land Affairs (Article 1 of decree n°999-1990 dated 11 June 1990 on Prerogatives of the Ministry of State's Properties).

In addition to the concerned department at the Ministry of Defence, specialised departments of the Ministry of State's Properties and Land Affairs are responsible of the asset disposal in terms of monitoring and follow-up and statistics of these properties as well as for selling them when they become unusable. The Public Services General Control (under authority of the president of the government) and the Court of Audit can also intervene in the scrutiny of such matters, but oversight by these bodies is limited (Decree no 88-36).

There was no publicly available information specifically addressing how assets from the Ministry of Defence are dealt with, nor on the proceeds of their sales. There is no evidence that planned disposals are known and publicly available and no evidence that financial results of disposals are avaialable. There is therefore also no information available on how effective these controls are, whether from official sources or media reports.

There is no evidence of speculation in the media and among civil society organisations about corruption in asset disposals.

Researcher4104: The responsibility of asset disposal lies with the Ministry of State Properties and Land Affairs (Article 1 of decree n°999-1990 dated 11 June 1990 on Prerogatives of the Ministry of State's properties). In addition to the concerned department at the Ministry of Defence, specialised departments of the Ministry of State Properties and Land Affairs are responsible of the asset disposal in terms of monitoring, follow-up and keeping statistics of these properties, as well as for selling them when they become unusable. The Public Services General Control (under authority of the president of the government) and the Court of Audit can also intervene in the scrutiny of such matters.

The independence of these institutions is questionable, however, as they are placed under the authority of the Presidency of the Government. In terms of effectiveness, they face challenges due to lacking the necessary material means enabling them to better perform their duties (according to the OECD). There are no publicly available sources attesting to either independence or effectiveness in this instance, and the state's budget does not include detailed information about the disposal of assets.

Response to Peer Reviewer: Agreed. Score changed from 2 to 1.

Researcher4104: A review of the 2014 Ministry of Defence budget indicates that a significant number of its budget lines do not give details about the purpose of the expenditure; instead, often overall amounts for unexplained yearly programmes are given. Moreover, the published budget contains only general figures (for military equipment for example).

However, the Ministry of Defence budget does not refer explicitly to any secret items and there is no budget line explicitly dedicated to secret spending. Furthermore, documents concerning national security - a list of which must be established by decree, and which can include budget details - cannot be communicated to the public before sixty years have passed.

Researcher4104: The Finance, Planning and Development Committee is responsible for scrutiny of laws in relations with the budget (Art. 67 of NCA rules of procedure ). Theoretically, this committee can ask for explanations if it considers that it is necessary (Art. 59 of NCA rules of procedure). However, it is unlikely that this committee would ask for information about secret items - none of its reports mention such requests, and the interviewed expert has not heard about cases in which such requests were made.

The Administrative Reform and Anti-Corruption Committee used to be authorised to access all files and documents from all the public administrations. Reports published by this committee do not however, reference any activities related to the defence sector. This indicates that its activity touched only a few sectors such as confiscated assets, customs, competitions in order to integrate public service. This committee no longer exists.

The interviewee confirmed that the legislature is only given a summary of the budget of the various ministries.

Researcher4104: Audit reports on annual accounts of the State are performed by the Court of Audit. This court produces two types of reports : An annual report on its activities and an annual report on the execution of budget (that is transmitted to the legislature). A review of the reports published by the Court of Audit in the last five years shows no specific activity in relation with the Ministry of Defence. No other publicly available sources were found which discussed the annual accounts of the security sector.

Researcher4104: Article 66 of the new Constitution of the Republic of Tunisia provides that the law determines the state's resources and its expenses in conformity with the provisions set out in the organic budget law. Moreover, Article 1 of the Organic Budget Law provides that the finance law sets out and authorises, for each year, all expenditures and resources of the State, meaning that off-budget expenditure is strictly forbidden.

Interviewees familiar with the sector have no knowledge about the existence of such expenditures. There were no media sources found which discuss the issue of off-budget expenditure or suggest that it is common practice in Tunisia.

Researcher4104: Article 1 of the Organic Budget provides that the finance law sets out and authorises, for each year, all expenditures and resources of the State and no legislation governing the sector of defence authorises off-budget expenditures.

Furthermore, those interviewed have no knowledge about the existence of such expenditures and there are no media sources addressing the issue of off-budget military expenditures.

Researcher4104: Law n°88-95 dated 2 August 1988 on Archives stipulates that exemptions to the obligation of transfer of documents to the National Archive may be made by decree for reasons related to security (Article 13). Furthermore, documents concerning national security cannot be communicated before sixty years have passed. The list of these documents relating to the national security must be established by decree.

This being said, after a review of legislation relating to the defence and security sector, such decrees could not be found. No other publicly available sources provided more details on this matter.There is no evidence about the effectiveness of these mechanisms. Furthermore, evidence that information is classified at the discretion of the individuals, parties, or groups in power with no specific or clearly defined legal basis could not be found.

An interview with a high-level civil servant confirmed the existence of non-published internal regulations dealing with the classification of information but this information could not be independently verified.

Researcher4104: There is no evidence that the Tunisian army owns commercial businesses. The website of the Ministry of Defence does not mention such ownership. The budget of the Ministry of Defence do not mention resources from commercial businesses. The interviewees had no knowledge of such ownership and a review of the Tunisian and international press did not result in evidence of ownership by the army of any significant commercial businesses.

Evidence suggests that during Ben Ali's mandates the defence institutions were systematically excluded from the political and economic life as they, unlike the Ministry of Interior and the police, were perceived as potential challengers by the President's entourage who financially benefited a lot from their position.

Researcher4104: There is no evidence that the Tunisian army owns commercial businesses. The website of the Ministry of Defence does not mention such ownership. The budget of the Ministry of Defence do not mention resources from commercial businesses. The interviewees had no knowledge of such ownership and a review of the Tunisian and international press did not result in evidence of ownership by the army of any significant commercial businesses.

Researcher4104: Article 30 of the law n° 67-20 dated 31 May 1967 on the General Status of the Military states that it is forbidden for the military to practice a commercial profession, to do private remunerated activity or to take positions in commercial companies as directors, administrators or managers.

However, military and defence ministry employees are permitted to own shares in private commercial corporations, either directly or through their relatives. These shares are authorised only in instances where the corporations in question have no commercial relations with the ministries involved, due to the corruption risk, but in practice there could still be military or ministry employees involved in this. There is no evidence, however, that suggests military and defence ministry employees do own shares in unauthorised private enterprises.

Researcher4104: The Ministry of Defence does not communicate on issues of corruption on its website.There is no evidence of any public announcements concerning anti-corruption from the Ministry of Defence. Also, a press review showed that only few articles were dedicated to the commitment of the Ministry of Defence to anti-corruption measures. This indicates that the only commitment by the Ministry of Defence could be its participation in some seminars on security sector reform.

Researcher4104: Law n° 67-20 dated 31 May 1967 on the General Status of the Military allows for the imposition of disciplinary sanctions against any military officer who commits 'offences against honour', such as bribery, theft or violence, when on service or outside of it (Article 17). In case a military officer is convicted of a criminal offence (like bribery), he is dismissed from his post (Article 26). Although these disciplinary measures are general in scope, they are applicable in cases of corruption.

Evidence about disciplinary measures taken against military personnel has not been published by the government. Furthermore, there is no evidence about such cases in the media. There is no publicly available and verifiable information that these measures are actually being carried out.

Researcher4104: Tunisia currently has no mechanisms or laws that protect whistle-blowers in corruption matters. However, the Tunisian government is aware of the need to implement a law that protects whistle-blowers. Indeed, Article 11 of Decree-Law 2011-120 dated November 4, 2012 requires the implementation of laws and mechanisms to ensure the protection of victims, witnesses and whistle-blowers of corruption.

The Secretary of State in charge of Governance and Public Service stated that a law to protect whistle-blowers is being developed. Also, a website to report on cases of corruption has been created by the Presidency of the Government, which allows visitors to report cases of corruption anonymously, without the website registering the users' IP addresses. There is no evidence of the use and/or effectiveness of this website.

There are no explicit laws protecting whistle-blowers within the defence and security institutions. Furthermore, there is no evidence of any known cases of whistleblowers in defence.

Within the Ministry of Interior, however, there was one famous case of whisteblowing. The whistle-blower was a senior MOI employee who came to be known as the first whistle-blower in the post-revolutionary Tunisia. He sent two letters to Tunisia's Interior Minister that accused high-level ministry officials of having destroyed sensitive archives following the ouster of President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali on January 14. The whistle-blower also accused ministry officials of having killed protesters during the Tunisian revolution, and of other human rights abuses. He was then arrested for &quoute;harming the external security of the state&quoute;, &quoute;releasing and distributing information likely to harm public order&quoute;, and &quoute;accusing, without proof, a public agent of violating law&quoute;.In March 2012, he was acquitted of major charges, but fined for &quoute;accusing a public employee of violating law without proof&quoute;.

Researcher4104: Through review of the legislation applicable to the Ministry of Defence personnel, evidence of a special attention to personnel in sensitive positions could not be found. The Ministry of Defence did not communicate information about this issue on its website. Furthermore, media reports on the issue could not be found.

In November and December 2014, several training courses on &quoute;Good Governance in the Armed Forces&quoute; were organised by the Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of the Armed Forces (DCAF). Eighty officers of the Tunisian army and representatives from several other countries participated.

All personnel of the Ministry of Defence are subject to an investigation prior to recruitment but there is no evidence about the extent of this investigation and if it differs when a sensitive position is filled.

Researcher4104: The website of the Ministry of Defence does not mention the number of civilian and military personnel. However, the 2014 Budget of the Ministry of Defence provides information regarding the number of civilian personnel, the number of personnel who received a promotion and the number of new hires. The country report of the Institute for National Security Studies provides exact numbers of military personnel. The accuracy of these numbers is questionable as the number of personnel is unchanged since 2009. Multiple press reports also provide information about the number of civilian and military personnel.

Researcher4104: The 2014 Ministry of Defence budget gives general information about the overall amount of wages of civilian and military personnel.

Information about civil personnel pay rates and allowances is publicly available (for example the Decree n° 2013-2834 dated 9 July 2013 concerning increase in the specific allowance given to civilian personnel of the military high education published in the official gazette n°57, 16.07.2013).

Information about pay rates of military personnel is also published in the official gazette (for example Décret n° 2007-2408 du 2 Octobre 2007 modifiant le décret n° 79-96 du 11 janvier 1979 fixant la solde des militaires non classés dans la grille indiciaire de la fonction publique et le régime de l'alimentation dans l'armée, Décret n° 2014-1771 du 23 Mai 2014 portant modification du décret n° 67-158 du 31 mai 1967 fixant le régime des indemnités applicables aux personnels de l’Armée de Terre, Décret n° 2014-1772 du 23 Mai 2014 portant modification du décret n° 68-389 du 12 décembre 1968 relatif aux indemnités accordées aux militaires de l'armée de mer).

However, some details on allowances given to military personnel are not published in the official gazette (for example Décret n° 2011-225 du 22 Octobre 2011 fixant les montants de l'indemnité pour charges militaires servie aux officiers, sous-officiers, hommes de troupes des armées de terre, de l'air et de la mer (not published)), nor available elsewhere on a forum or website.

Media sources often discuss the issue of pay - specifically that military pay is low given the sacrifices that are demanded of the role - but do not go into details regarding facts and figures.

Researcher4104: The payment system is centralised, so it is the same for all the personnel of the state, local authorities and public institutions. It is a computerised system based on an application named INSAF.

The interviewee said that he never suffered from not receiving his pay on time. No media reports could be found which dealt with the issue of pay, so it is unclear whether all levels of the military are paid in a similarly timely manner.

Researcher4104: There is an established system for the appointment of military personnel. Decree n° 72-380 dated 6 December 1972, on particular status of military and the Ministerial Order dated 8 November 1973 (Article 4) give the mandatory conditions for the selection of the officers and commissioned officers. Several articles of this decree (9, 9 (bis), 14) include conditions relating to the promotion to the rank of colonel or general. Appointments of officers and commissioned officers are published in the official gazette of the Republic of Tunisia (article 40 law n° 67-20 dated 31 May 1967 on the General Status of the Military). Senior military positions are appointed by the President of the Republic (Article 78 of the CRT January 2014).

Some press articles report on appointments of people as Chief of Defence Staff assessing, debating and sometimes criticising their adequacy. However, there are no press reports covering appointments at colonel level in the military and director at the Ministry of Defence. No objective job descriptions and assessment processes for the selection of military personnel at middle and top management level could be found. It might be available in theory in the human resources department of the Ministry of Defence but no mention of it was found on the Internet.

Researcher4104: The majority of promotions are decided by the Minister of Defence (Law n° 67-20 dated 31 May 1967 on the General Status of the Military, Decree n° 72-380 dated 6 December 1972, on the Particular Status of the Military and Ministerial Order dated 8 November 1973). Senior military positions are appointed by the President of the Republic (Article 78 of the CRT January 2014).

There are advisory committees, whose members are also appointed by the Minister of Defence (Article 14 Decree n° 72-380 dated 6 December 1972, on the Particular Status of the Military).

The promotion process seems to be discretionary despite the fact that promotions of officers and commissioned officers are published on the official gazette of the Republic of Tunisia (article 40 law n° 67-20 dated 31 may 1967 on General status of military). Beyond these legislative documents, there were no substantial media articles or civil society reports that looked into the issue on detail, especially at how well these laws are implemented.

The interviewee stated that in his experience promotions are not exclusively based on merit, asserting that this issue is an important problem. He also confirmed, however, that things have improved over the past year and that he has noticed a better enforcement of existing rules over the past few months. This statement could not be independently verified.

Researcher4104: Article 2 and Article 8 of Law n° 2004-1 of 14 January 2004 on national service decree that any citizen aged between 20 and 35 years must perform a year of national service. Tunisia also has an element of voluntary conscription. In accordance with the aforementioned laws and regulations, recruits can choose to go on &quoute;individual assignments&quoute;, agreeing to perform 21 days of training and then henceforth pay a monthly monetary contribution of 30 to 50 percent of their salary to the military.

The legislation applicable to the defence sector does not include a specific policy warning against accepting bribes for avoiding conscription. The Ministry of Defence does not refer to such a policy on its website or in interviews. Despite extensive research in the Tunisian media, no investigations looking at this issue were found; the score therefore is based on the absence of guidelines against bribery for the purposes of avoiding compulsory conscription.

Law n° 67-20 dated 31 May 1967 on the General Status of the Military allows for the imposition of disciplinary sanctions against any military officer who commits 'offences against honour', such as bribery, theft or violence, when on service or outside of it (Article 17). In case a military officer is convicted of a criminal offence (like bribery), he is dismissed from his post (Article 26). Although these disciplinary measures are general in scope, they are applicable in cases of corruption.

Evidence about disciplinary measures taken against military personnel has not been published by the government. Furthermore, there is no evidence about such cases in the media. There is no publicly available and verifiable information that these measures are actually being carried out.

Researcher4104: Tunisia has an element of voluntary conscription. In accordance with the aforementioned laws and regulations, recruits can choose to go on &quoute;individual assignments&quoute;, agreeing to perform 21 days of training and then henceforth pay a monthly monetary contribution of 30 to 50 percent of his salary to the military. It is a very expensive alternative to one year's service.

In the legislation applicable to defence sector, however, there is no specific policy of refusing bribes to gain preferred postings in the recruitment process, and the Ministry of Defence does not refer to such a policy on its website. Extensive research in Tunisian media, returned no mention of this issue in the popular press. The score is based on the absence of guidelines against bribery for soliciting preferred postings. Due to said absence, it is possible that bribery occurs to gain preferred postings in the recruitment process.

Law n° 67-20 dated 31 May 1967 on the General Status of the Military allows for the imposition of disciplinary sanctions against any military officer who commits 'offences against honour', such as bribery, theft or violence, when on service or outside of it (Article 17). In case a military officer is convicted of a criminal offence (like bribery), he is dismissed from his post (Article 26). Although these disciplinary measures are general in scope, they are applicable in cases of corruption.

Evidence about disciplinary measures taken against military personnel has not been published by the government. Furthermore, there is no evidence about such cases in the media. There is no publicly available and verifiable information that these measures are actually being carried out.

Researcher4104: There is no evidence of the existence of ghost employees in the Ministry of Defence. No cases regarding ghost soldiers have been reported in the media, and the interviewee confirmed that he has no knowledge of the existence of ghost employees in the Ministry of Defence.

Furthermore, the payment system is centralised and computerised which significantly reduces the risk of existence of such ghost soldiers.

However, multiple cases of ghost employees were revealed in other public entities which suggests that the phenomenon could occur in the defence sector too.

Researcher4104: In accordance with article 13 of Decree n° 79-735 dated 22 August 1979 on the organisation of the Ministry of National Defence, the General Directorate of Administrative and Financial Affairs is responsible for mandating or authorising the expenditure of personnel, and for the administrative and financial affairs of the personnel of the Ministry of Defence.

The Directorate of Personnel and Training is responsible for other aspects of military personnel management (Article 18 of the same Decree).

Despite extensive research, no other sources related to this issue, such as reports from the media, or from civil society, could be found.

Researcher4104: There is no Code of Conduct for Defence Ministry personnel in particular, but a Code of Conduct for Public Officials was approved by the decree dated 3 October 2014 which is a code setting the behavior of all Public Officials in all Ministries. The code includes, but is not limited to, bribery, gifts and hospitality, conflicts of interest, parallel and political activities. No evidence could be found regarding its application and distribution, or about whether there is a robust oversight mechanism.

Researcher4104: A Code of Conduct for Public Officials was approved by the decree dated 3 October 2014 which is a code setting the behavior of all Public Officials in all Ministries. The code includes, but is not limited to, bribery, gifts and hospitality, conflicts of interest, parallel and political activities. However, there is no specific Code of Conduct for the defence sector. Since the Code of Conduct was approved so recently, it is difficult to say if breaches are effectively addressed. There is no evidence of communication from the Ministry of Defence on this issue and no evidence of any prosecutions.

Researcher4104: The Ministry of Defence does not communicate on this issue and a review of the Tunisian press did not provide any evidence regarding the existence of this kind of training. The interviewee could not confirm the existence of such training and the website of the Ministry of Defence does not mention the existence of such training.

In November and December 2014, several training courses on &quoute;Good Governance in the Armed Forces&quoute; have been organised by the Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of the Armed Forces (DCAF). Eighty officers of the Tunisian army and military representatives from several other countries participated in the module. Other training sessions are planned for the future.

Researcher4104: Outcomes are not made public. Otherwise, despite an intensive research through media and official statements of the Ministry of Defence we could not find any evidence proving the existence of a policy of making public outcomes of the prosecution of defence services personnel for corrupt activities. In fact, the Military court does not communicate any statistics of prosecutions.

The interviewee had no knowledge of such cases in the defence sector.

Through a review of the Tunisian press, cases of prosecutions of defence services personnel for corrupt activities could not be found, and neither could public speculation surrounding the topic. However there has been speculation over other issues not related to the defence sector such as the release by the ordinary courts of former ministers under the dictatorship accused of corruption. It is worth noting that the military is one of the most trusted institutions in Tunisia and generally not perceived to be corrupt.

However, it is worth noting that rare cases of prosecution and conviction of members of the police force for corruption have been found.

Researcher4104: Facilitation payments are punished according to Articles 82 to 94 of the Criminal Code, penalising the corrupter, the corrupted and the intermediary between the two. It punishes both positive and negative acts which include donations or promises of donations and gifts or advantages of any kind, whether for the purpose of active or passive corruption. Similarly, the Criminal Code penalises acceptance of donations by corrupted individuals. This includes cases where officials are receiving to carry out an activity that is within the remit of their official duties, or to refrain from carrying out said duties.

According to article 133 of the Military Justice Code, the provisions of the Criminal Code are also applicable to the military.

Despite these provisions and the severity of sanctions (up to twenty years of imprisonment), corruption is increasing in Tunisia. The legal mechanisms do not seem to give tangible results and the occurrence of facilitation payments is common. For instance, evidence indicates that small bribery has tripled in Tunisia after the revolution.

This situation can perhaps be explained by the transition period that Tunisia is currently experiencing. The country is living through political instability and security problems, with the rationale being that the fight against terrorism, security and the organisation of elections take priority over fighting corruption. The country's economy is characterised by rising prices and declining purchasing power, which could also contribute to the rise of small bribery. Civil society organisations in the country denounce the government's lack of political will in the fight against corruption, urging it to uphold and enforce the existing legislation.

Researcher4104: The Military Justice Code and the Law on the General Status of the Military do not mention corruption.

The sanctions for corruption that can be incurred by the military are established by the Criminal Code. There is no evidence that a doctrine addressing corruption as a strategic issue on operations exists, and the Ministry of Defence does not communicate on this issue. If such doctrine exists it is not published and it is not known to the public. There were also no available sources from media or NGOs talking about corruption within the army when on operations, nor any evidence suggesting that corruption is recognised as a strategic issue in operations.

Therefore, it is not possible to speak about corruption as a strategic issue on operations in Tunisia.

Researcher4104: The Ministry of Defence does not communicate on this issue and a review of the Tunisian press does not provide extensive evidence of the existence of this kind of training. Both interviewees had no knowledge about such training on a regular basis.

In November and December 2014, several training courses on &quoute;Good Governance in the Armed Forces&quoute; have been organised by the Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of the Armed Forces (DCAF). Eighty officers of the Tunisian army and military representatives from several other countries participated the module. Other training sessions are planned in the future. However, these courses did not deal with corruption on deployment specifically.

There is no evidence of mishandling of corruption cases by commanders or of them turning a blind eye to corrupt activities in the field.

Researcher4104: The Ministry of Defence does not communicate on this issue and a review of the Tunisian press does not provide evidence of the existence of this kind of training, whether from media or civil society reports. The interviewee had no knowledge about such trained professionals.

Researcher4104: The Ministry of Defence does not communicate on this issue and a review of the Tunisian press does not provide evidence of the existence of this kind of training, whether through news articles or civil society reports. The interviewee had no knowledge about such guidelines. A training organised by the Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of the Armed Forces (DCAF) in December 2014 was related in part to contracting issues but there is no evidence to suggest that this was specific to contracting on mission.

Researcher4104: Private military contractors are not allowed in Tunisia. Article 17 of the constitution decrees that &quoute;only the State may establish armed forces and internal security forces, according to the law and to serve public interest&quoute;, prohibiting the existence of any armed group that does not belong to the State. Although there are private security companies operating in Tunisia, they are contracted for guarding purposes only, and not by the military, and there is a law that sanctions the illegal holding of weapons. For its staff to carry weapons,the private security company needs a special permit from the Ministry of Interior. In addition, staff from private security companies have to undergo regular and mandatory training.

Furthermore, a review of the Tunisian press did not provide any evidence of the existence of private military contractors, nor does budget of the Ministry of Defence include expenditures connected with private military contractors. The interviewee also confirmed that there are no private military contractors operating in Tunisia.

Response to Peer Reviewer 1: The source used cannot be considered as reliable. No cases of corruption have been reported by media.

Researcher4104: General legislation covers general defence and security procurement. Decree 3158-2002 dated 17 December 2002 Organising Public Procurement was criticised for its lack of transparency by donors such as the African Development Bank, and even the services of the Presidency of the government (see Source 4). There were also media reports showing public criticism of purchasing decisions made by direct agreement, including a consignment of helicopters bought from France (see Source 6).

A new Decree n°1039-2014 dated 13 March 2014 organising public procurement was issued and is now applicable to most defence and security procurement. This new decree is expected to bring more transparency. However, there has not been any evidence of its effectiveness yet. Article 49 of the same decree provides that procurement can be made by direct negotiation for public security and national defence reasons.

Meanwhile, some purchases within defence and security procurements are governed by Decree n° 88-36 dated 12 January 1988 on the special procedure of control of certain expenditure of the Ministries of Defence and Interior. This decree established a specific procedure, namely a &quoute;Special Committee&quoute; in each of those two ministries, chaired by the concerned minister or his representative. This committee is responsible for multiple phases of exempted procurement, which relates to sensitive equipment and supplies. These, for security reasons, do not follow the general defence procurement protocols, but appear only on a secure list established by the President of Government. The Special Committee receives limited scrutiny from external services.

Researcher4104: The needs assessments of only two agencies within the Ministry of Defence (the National Mapping and Remote Sensing Centre and the Topography and Cadastral Office) are published on the website of the Tunisian National Observatory of Public Procurement. There is no mention of the procurement cycle process on the website of the Ministry of Defence itself.

A review of the Tunisian press showed that only few articles are dedicated to major procurement. Indeed, some purchasing decisions of military equipment made by direct agreement have been actively criticised, such as a consignment of helicopters from France.

Researcher4104: Specific oversight mechanisms are provided for defence procurement by Decree n° 88-36 dated 12 January 1988 on the special procedure of control of expenditure of the Ministries of Defence and Interior. This decree established a &quoute;Special Committee&quoute; in each of these two ministries that oversee even sensitive items. However, these committees can not be considered as truly independent because they are chaired by the concerned minister or his representative. Moreover they are only subject to a limited audit by the expenditures audit services (Art 8 of the decree).

For more general non-exempted purchases, general legislation applies (Decree n°1039-2014 dated 13 March 2014 organising public procurement), and for these purchases, oversight mechanisms exist (High Committee of Procurement, committees of procurement control). However, the OECD Integrity Scan (June 2013) considered that these control bodies lack the human and financial resources and the independence needed properly to exercise these control operations.

In 2014, a National Council of Procurement was established by the decree n°1039-2014, which aims to solve some of these issues, there is no evidence regarding its effectiveness.

Response to Peer Reviewer 1: Agree, score increased from 1 to 2. Sources added.

Researcher4104: The Ministry of Defence rarely provides information on defence purchases and its website does not mention such purchases. The 2014 budget of the Ministry of Defence includes very limited information about equipment purchases. A review of the Tunisian press showed that only few defence purchases are published by the media, such as the purchase of six helicopters or the purchase of American military equipment (see sources 4,5,6). There are also articles criticising the silence of the authorities on these purchases (see source 6).

In April 2015, the Ministry of Defence announced that US helicopters would soon be delivered to Tunisia. Since then, there have been no media reports about this purchase.

Generally, the Ministry of Defence's secrecy is justified by citing security reasons. The large number of non-published purchases suggests that this may be being overused.

Researcher4104: Decree n° 88-36 dated 12 January 1988 on the Special Procedure of Control of Expenditure of the Ministries of Defence and Interior does not require that any anti-corruption procedures or standards are demanded. Furthermore, a review of Decree n° 1039-2014 dated 13 March 2014 on organising public procurement does not provide evidence that discrimination is made between companies on the grounds of integrity. A review of the applicable legislation confirms the absence of such discrimination.

However, Articles 177, 178, 179 of Decree n°1039-2014 dated 13 March 2014 provide that companies can be excluded from the tender in case of corruption. However, this does not apply specifically to defence procurement, and it is too soon to properly assess how effectively these are being implemented.

Researcher4104: Article 8 of the Decree n°1039-2014 dated 13 March 2014 organising public procurement provides that public purchasers must establish an annual procurement plan, and publish it on the procurement website. However, the article also allows for exemptions in the case of defence and security procurement. In fact, only annual plans of two agencies of the Ministry of Defence - the National Mapping and Remote Sensing Centre and the Topography and Cadastral Office - are published on the Tunisian procurement website.

Decree n° 88-36 dated 12 January 1988 on the Special Procedure of Control of Expenditure of the Ministries of Defence and Interior does not mention a defence and security strategy at all. The Ministry of Defence budget, meanwhile, mentions the existence of some procurement plans, but give no substantial details; instead aggregating budget allowances and not allowing the public to determine whether purchases fall within or outside of planned expenditure. It is therefore difficult to determine the proportion of purchases outside the national strategy.

Researcher4104: A review of 2014 Ministry of Defence budget confirms the existence of annual plans on which purchases are based. However only very general details are given. No other evidence (neither the website of the Ministry of defence nor the Tunisian press) could be found regarding those requirements. Therefore, it is not possible to affirm that these plans exist and/or are followed in practice.

Researcher4104: Article 2 of Decree n° 88-36 dated 12 January 1988 on the Special Procedure of Control of Expenditure of the Ministries of Defence and Interior provides that certain purchases of these two ministries can be made by direct negotiation. This special procedure is justified by security matters.

Moreover, while article 6 of Decree n°1039-2014 dated 13 March 2014 Organising Public Procurement provides that procurement must be conducted as open competition, Article 49 of the same decree provides that procurement can be made by direct negotiation for public security and national defence reasons.

A review of the Tunisian press suggests that major purchases are single sourced (for example the purchase of six helicopters for 350 millions dinars, the purchase of 12 Black Hawk helicopters, or the purchase of American military equipment for 60 millions dollars.

It is not possible to assess what percentage are single-sourced.

Researcher4104: Article 3 of Decree n° 88-36 dated 12 January 1988 on the Special Procedure of Control of Expenditure of the Ministries of Defence and Interior established in each of those two ministries a committee responsible of the opening of tenders, price negotiation and preparation of contract clauses. This applies to cases of defence expenditure that do not fall under the general laws of procurement due to their sensitive nature (as defined by the President). According to Article 5 of the same decree, this work is overseen by a special committee chaired by the concerned minister or his representative.

However, despite extensive research we have not been able to find other information on the functioning of the commission or its effectiveness.

For other purchases, general legislation applies (Decree n°1039-2014 dated 13 March 2014 Organising Public Procurement). For these purchases decisions are subject to an independent control, for example by the High Committee of Procurement and the committees of procurement control.

However, the OECD Integrity Scan (June 2013) considered that these control bodies lack the human and financial resources and the independence needed to exercise these control operations properly.

In 2014, a National Council of Procurement was established by the decree n°1039-2014 which may seek to address some of the flaws in the pre-existing system. There is no evidence of it taking measures or publishing reports yet. It is however referred to on the governement's procurement website (www.marchespublics.tn). Given that it is a relatively new body, its effectiveness can not yet be assessed). No further information could be found.

Researcher4104: A review of regulations applicable to the defence and security sector confirms the absence of specific provisions for collusion in defence and security. However collusion between bidders is punished by Law n° 64-1991 dated 21 July 1991 on Prices and Competition. Also, Article 177 of Decree n°1039-2014 dated 13 March 2014 organising public procurement imposes that the public purchaser cancels the tender if the bidder is convicted of malpractice like collusion during the bidding process. As stated previously, these general laws apply to any purchase including defence purchases. They do not include, however, defence purchases listed as sensitive by the President. There is no information as to how collusion in these purchases is dealt with.

Furthermore, Article 177 of Decree n°1039-2014 dated 13 March 2014 on Organising Public Procurement states that: the National Council for Procurement will issue the list of the tenders who have been temporarily or permanently excluding from bidding. The modalities of the drafting of this list as well as the sanctions applicable must be published by decree.

There is no other publicly available information on how collusion is punished and discouraged in the defence sector. Evidence about collusion of bidders and the consequences could not be found in media reports or other publications.

Researcher4104: The Ministry of Defence does not provide information on this issue, and a review of the Tunisian press did not bring any evidence of the existence of specific training in order to ensure that defence contractors meet their obligations on reporting and delivery. The interviewee did not have knowledge of such training either.

As previously mentioned, for more general non-exempted purchases, oversight mechanisms do exist (High Committee of Procurement, Committees of Procurement Control). However, the OECD Integrity Scan (June 2013) considered that these control bodies lack the human and financial resources and the independence needed properly to exercise these control operations.

Researcher4104: Article 181 of Decree n°1039-2014 dated 13 March 2014 Organising Public Procurement provides that companies can complain before the Committee of Monitoring and Review of Procurement. This committee can ask the public purchaser to review the tender if it is established that there is malpractice in procurement. Companies can also complain to the Committee of Amicable Settlement of Litigations. However, this committee only exercises an advisory role and its decisions are not binding.

Companies can also complain before the Administrative Court. However, the effectiveness of this system has yet to be proven and going before the Administrative Court takes a long time. In fact, appeals to the Administrative Court are often very slow and cumbersome. The OECD 2013 Tunisia Integrity scan highlights the inefficiency of this system.

It should be noted that defence purchases are governed by Decree n° 88-36 dated 12 January 1988. This decree provides in a general way that &quoute;the Committee examines any problems or disputes relating to the preparation, execution or settlement of contracts and agreements submitted to it&quoute;. In this decree, there is no special mention to the right for companies to complain about perceived malpractice in procurement.

Evidence of past complaints could not be found.

Researcher4104: Article 178 of Decree n°1039-2014 dated 13 March 2014 organising public procurement gives the possibility to temporarily or even permanently exclude companies convicted of corruption in procurement. As the decree has only been in place for a short period of time, no evidence is available yet of its effectiveness as no cases of sanctioning have been reported.

Meanwhile, the media regularly calls for sanctions on suppliers that are known to have dealt in corruption but in the health or infrastructure sectors, talking about the building and maintenance of roads and hospitals, rather than address defence specifically.

Several reports issued in 2012 and 2013 criticised the absence of administrative sanctions and pointed the necessity to build an effective, complete and proportionate sanctions system. Corrupt activities are severely punished according to articles 82 to 94 of the Criminal Code. However, these sanctions are only applicable to natural persons and not to legal entities - i.e, punitive action can be pursued only against individuals and not corporations.

Researcher4104: Article 22 of decree n°1039-2014 dated 13 March 2014 Organising Public Procurement generally encourages foreign bidders to engage the services of Tunisian companies. However, given the fact that details of the contracts negotiated by the Ministry of Defence are not published, it is difficult to affirm that this Ministry negotiates offset contracts with its foreign contractors. Moreover, no legislation on the subject mentions this practice and a review of the Tunisian press does not provide any evidence of the existence of such a practice.

However, 2015 issues of the QB Countertrade and Offset publication provide information on Tunisian offset guidelines, which has been taken here as evidence that the country does engage in offsets.

The Ministry of Defence has not made an explicit statement confirming that there are no offset contracts. Tunisia's main providers in the military sectors are the USA and France. Research in the press and NGOs reports emanating from these countries found no evidence of recent offset contracts.

Researcher4104: Article 22 of decree n°1039-2014 dated 13 March 2014 Organising Public Procurement generally encourages foreign bidders to engage the services of Tunisian companies. However, given the fact that details of the contracts negotiated by the Ministry of Defence are not published, it is difficult to affirm whether this Ministry negotiates offset contracts with its foreign contractors. Moreover, no legislation on the subject mentions this practice and a review of the Tunisian press does not provide any evidence of the existence of such practice.

The Ministry of Defence has not made an explicit statement confirming that there are no offset contracts. Tunisia's main providers in the military sectors are the USA and France. Research in the press and NGOs reports emanating from these countries found no evidence of recent offset contracts.

However, 2015 issues of the QB Countertrade and Offset publication provide information on Tunisian offset guidelines, which has been taken here as evidence that the country does engage in offsets.

Researcher4104: Article 22 of decree n°1039-2014 dated 13 March 2014 Organising Public Procurement generally encourages foreign bidders to engage the services of Tunisian companies. However, given the fact that details of the contracts negotiated by the Ministry of Defence are not published, it is difficult to affirm that this Ministry imposes offset contracts on its foreign contractors. Moreover, no legislation on the subject mentions this practice and a review of the Tunisian press does not provide any evidence of the existence of such practice.

The Ministry of Defence has not made an explicit statement confirming that there are no offset contracts.

However, 2015 issues of the QB Countertrade and Offset publication provide information on Tunisian offset guidelines, which has been taken here as evidence that the country does engage in offsets.

Researcher4104: There are no provisions regulating the use of agents and intermediaries in procurement in the decree organising public procurement nor in the other laws and regulations governing the defence and security sectors.

Researcher4104: Details of the financing package are not publicly available. A review of official sources of information confirm that the Ministry of Defence does not officially communicate principal aspects of the financing package surrounding major arms deals. Through the Tunisian and international press, some details about this matter are published but such information is not reliable and was sometimes denied by the authorities (see Mehdi Jomâa,14 May 2014)

Researcher4104: Article 88 of Decree n°1039-2014 dated 13 March 2014 Organising Public Procurement provides that if the main contractor uses sub-contractors, he must obtain the authorisation of the public purchaser. However, no formal provision requires that the main contractor must adopt anti-corruption programmes.

No other legislation applicable to defence and security sectors provides such requirement and the Ministry of Defence does not provide any information on this issue. Moreover, a review of the Tunisian press did not lead to evidence of the existence of such requirement.

Researcher4104: A review of the Tunisian press showed that there are recurrent allegations of political influence from France in order to sell arms to Tunisia. However this influence was denied by the Tunisian authorities and there is no proof that the expenditures made are not justified by military needs.

The Institute for National Security Studies' 2013 Tunisia Report lists the number of goods purchased from foreign powers by the Tunisian government. France and the USA are the main sellers of military goods. No evidence was found that the government provides an appropriate justification for its purchases from France and the USA, however there is no evidence that the equipment was purchased despite not fulfilling minimum standards or operational relevance.