This country is placed in Band D

Tunisia’s GI ranking in Band D places it top of the league for the MENA region, but it is still classified as vulnerable to a “high risk” of corruption in the defence and security sector. Tunisia’s highest risk area is Procurement (Band E), followed by Operations (Band E) and then Personnel, Political and Financial risks (Band D), though Tunisia still ranked joint top in the MENA region for these three indicators.  

To reduce corruption risk and reduce state fragility, security sector reforms are urgently needed across the following areas:

Further transparency and scrutiny in procurement and budgeting

  • While Tunisia is one of only two countries in the MENA region to actually publish a defence budget, the level of detail varies, with only general information on military acquisitions provided. The government could build on this transparency by including more detailed information on expenditure in the next published budget, to allow for effective civilian and parliamentary oversight and to help ensure that the budget is spent on arms and equipment that meet Tunisia’s strategic needs. Formal provisions and two dedicated defence committees are a huge potential assets for ensuring independent scrutiny, but Tunisia’s parliament must be guaranteed access to the information they require in order to be effective.

Increase institutional oversight and accountability

  • Defence committees need adequate financial and human resources to carry out and coordinate their missions effectively. They should have the authority to scrutinise budgets and spending before and after it occurs, and the necessary powers to influence defence policy and strategic decisions.
  • Weak institutional oversight combined with a lack of anti-corruption enforcement can enable those in positions of power to manipulate systems for personal benefit.  All defence procurement requirements should be derived from an open, well-audited national defence and security strategy. To ensure public funds are appropriately spent, in addition to Parliament, Tunisia has three entities tasked with external auditing of expenditure: the Public Services General Control (presidency of Government), Finances General Control (Ministry of Finance) and the Court of Audit. However, only the Court of Audit publishes its findings, and these have not included defence in recent years.  The publication of regular independent external audits, combined with clear evidence that issues are acted upon by the appropriate state bodies, is essential for maintaining and increasing public confidence in these institutions.

Engagement with the Public

  • The Tunisian government completed a government review of the 2015 GI research, demonstrating a willingness to open dialogue with an international NGO on defence corruption issues. Tunisia has also shown good practice in the MENA region by protecting NGOS by law, publishing details of its activities on its website and holding media briefings. The government should build on these positive developments by holding regular media briefings to increase debate, and by encouraging further civil society interaction; this might include an official policy of engagement on the defence budget, policies and anti-corruption strategies. This would send a strong signal that the defence sector is there to serve the needs of the general population.

Leadership 30
01.
score
2

Is there formal provision for effective and independent legislative scrutiny of defence policy?

Researcher4104: There are some formal rights for the legislative power to review defence policy. The Constitution of the Republic of Tunisia (27 January 2014) provides that the army is structurally organised in accordance with the law (Article 18) and that laws relating to organisation of the national army are deemed organic laws (Article 65). Furthermore, Article 66 of the constitution provides that the state's (including the Ministry of National Defence) resources and expenses are determined by law. The budget of the Ministry of National Defence was approved by the National Constituent Assembly, this budget was disclosed in Chapter 4 of the State's budget (year 2014).

Otherwise, the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly of People's Representatives (articles 85 and 91), adopted on 2 February 2015, established two parliamentary committees responsible for the scrutiny of the defence and security sector. A legislative committee was established in order to scrutinise bills related to the armed forces and a special committee has to follow all issues related to defence and security.

The existing legislation allows the legislative to monitor the execution by the government of defence and security strategies and to scrutinise all issues related to defence and security. Furthermore, the legislative power is allowed to organise parliamentary sessions in order to discuss and control the action of the interveners in the areas of defence and security (Articles 85 and 91 of the Rules of procedure of the Assembly of people's representatives). Parliament also has veto powers, allowing it to refuse to adopt the defence budget, or to amend or reject bills related to defence sector.

Evidence indicates that these legislative powers are exercised and that defence matters are debated in Parliament.

Activity reports of the Assembly of People's Representatives made by the NGO Al Bawsala show that the committees in charge of security and defence met several times in order to discuss defence policy. In May 2015, the Organisation of Administration and Armed Forces Affairs Committee, met twice in order to examine articles related to armed forces related to fighting terrorism.

In June 2015, the Minister of Defence and a military delegation were heard by the Defence and Security Committee about the Bouchoucha Barrack incident (where a Tunisian soldier was shot dead after he killed seven of his colleagues at a military barracks in Tunis), the conditions in which the military do their duty and the security situation in general.

There is no evidence of parliament being unduly influenced by the executive.

COMMENTS -+

1) Constitution of the Republic of Tunisia (27 January 2014)
2) Law n° 67-20 dated 31 May 1967 on General Status of military
3) State's budget (2014) published on the website of the Ministry of finance (www.finances.gov.tn)
4) &quoute;Audition des ministres de l’Intérieur, de la Défense et de la Justice&quoute;, 23 June 2014
http://www.observatoire-securite.tn/Fr/detail_article/audition-des-ministres-de-linterieur-de-la-defence-et-de-la-justice/85/3700
5) &quoute;Rapport d'activité de l'Assemblée des Représentants du Peuple et statistiques de présence - Mai 2015&quoute;, 25 June 2015, http://www.albawsala.com/pub/558d244512bdaa4aabd3894a
6) &quoute;Rapport d'activité de l'Assemblée des Représentants du Peuple et statistiques de présence - Juin 2015&quoute;, 16 July 2015, http://www.albawsala.com/pub/55a80afb12bdaa4aabd38956
7) &quoute;Audition, en commission, du ministre de la Défense nationale&quoute;, 4 June 2015, http://directinfo.webmanagercenter.com/2015/06/04/tunisie-audition-en-commission-du-ministre-de-la-defence-nationale/
8) &quoute;Tunis : Audition du ministre de la Défense suite à la fusillade de Bouchoucha&quoute;, 26 May 2015, http://africanmanager.com/tunis-audition-du-ministre-de-la-defence-suite-a-la-fusillade-de-bouchoucha/
9) &quoute;La Commission de la sécurité et défense de l’Assemblée des Représentants du Peuple (ARP) et DCAF discutent des stratégies d’un développement efficace du contrôle du secteur de la sécurité&quoute;, 4 June 2015, http://www.dcaf-tunisie.org/Fr/activite-partenaires/la-commission-de-la-securite-et-defence-de-lassemblee-des-representants-du-peuple-arp-et-dcaf-discutent-des-strategies-dun-developpement-efficace-du-controle-du-secteur-de-la-securite/32/10209

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: http://www.mei.edu/content/security-tunisian-constitution

This publication will likely make some interesting contributions:

http://constitutionaltransitions.org/research-security-sector-oversight/

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

02.
score
2

Does the country have an identifiable and effective parliamentary defence and security committee (or similar such organisation) to exercise oversight?

Researcher4104: The Rules of Procedure of the National Constituent Assembly (Article 41) allow the creation of constituent, legislative and special committees. They furthermore allow any committee of the assembly to ask experts to appear in front of it (Article 59). Committees publish the minutes of their meetings on the website of the Assembly (www.arp.tn). However, some meetings of the committees are confidential.

Until 2015, the National Constituent Assembly did not have a defence committee or a committee specialised only in the oversight and scrutiny of defence sector. However, the tasks of the Rights, Freedoms and External Relations Committee included the oversight of projects and issues related to defence and security.

The Rules of Procedure of the Assembly of People's Representatives (Articles 85 and 91) which was formed after the October 2014 Legislative Elections to replace the National Constituent Assembly, adopted on 2 February 2015, has established two parliamentary committees responsible for the scrutiny of the defence and security sector.

The first is a permanent legislative committee (Organisation of the Administration and Armed Forces Affairs Committee) was established in order to scrutinise bills related to the armed forces (Article 85 of the Rules of procedure of the Assembly of People's Representatives).

The second is a special committee (Defence and Security Committee) which is esponsible for following all issues related to defence and security (as per Article 91 of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly of People's Representatives). This committee can monitor the execution by the government of defence and security strategies and scrutinise all issues related to defence and security. This committee can, in theory, organise sessions in order to discuss and control the action of the interveners in the areas of defence and security.

Evidence indicates that these legislative powers are exercised and that defence matters are debated in Parliament.

Activity reports of the Assembly of People's Representatives made by the NGO Al Bawsala show that the committees in charge of security and defence met several times in order to discuss defence policy. In May 2015, the Organisation of Administration and Armed Forces Affairs Committee, met twice in order to examine articles related to armed forces related to fighting terrorism.

In June 2015, the Minister of Defence and a military delegation were heard by the Defence and Security Committee about the Bouchoucha Barrack incident (where a Tunisian soldier was shot dead after he killed seven of his colleagues at a military barracks in Tunis), the conditions in which the military do their duty and the security situation in general.

COMMENTS -+

1) National Constituent Assembly Rules of Procedure,
(http://www.legislation-securite.tn/fr/node/30723)
2) National Constituent Assembly website (www.anc.tn).
3) Rules of Procedure of the Assembly of People's Representatives, January 2015 http://www.arp.tn/site/main/AR/docs/anc/reglement_interieur_anc.pdf
4) L'Economiste Maghrébin, &quoute;La composition de la commission des droits des libertés et des relations extérieures&quoute;, 02/02/2015
http://www.leconomistemaghrebin.com/2015/02/27/arp-la-composition-de-la-commission-des-droits-des-libertes-et-des-relations-exterieures/
5) &quoute;Rapport d'activité de l'Assemblée des Représentants du Peuple et statistiques de présence - Mai 2015&quoute;, 25 June 2015, http://www.albawsala.com/pub/558d244512bdaa4aabd3894a
6) &quoute;Rapport d'activité de l'Assemblée des Représentants du Peuple et statistiques de présence - Juin 2015&quoute;, 16 July 2015, http://www.albawsala.com/pub/55a80afb12bdaa4aabd38956
7) &quoute;Audition, en commission, du ministre de la Défense nationale&quoute;, 4 June 2015, http://directinfo.webmanagercenter.com/2015/06/04/tunisie-audition-en-commission-du-ministre-de-la-defence-nationale/
8) &quoute;Tunis : Audition du ministre de la Défense suite à la fusillade de Bouchoucha&quoute;, 26 May 2015, http://africanmanager.com/tunis-audition-du-ministre-de-la-defence-suite-a-la-fusillade-de-bouchoucha/
9) &quoute;La Commission de la sécurité et défense de l’Assemblée des Représentants du Peuple (ARP) et DCAF discutent des stratégies d’un développement efficace du contrôle du secteur de la sécurité&quoute;, 4 June 2015, http://www.dcaf-tunisie.org/Fr/activite-partenaires/la-commission-de-la-securite-et-defence-de-lassemblee-des-representants-du-peuple-arp-et-dcaf-discutent-des-strategies-dun-developpement-efficace-du-controle-du-secteur-de-la-securite/32/10209

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: L'Economiste Maghrébin, &quoute;La composition de la commission des droits des libertés et des relations extérieures&quoute;, 02/02/2015
http://www.leconomistemaghrebin.com/2015/02/27/arp-la-composition-de-la-commission-des-droits-des-libertes-et-des-relations-exterieures/

The members of the Rights, Freedoms and External Relations Committee have been approved in February 2015. The Committee is therefore slowly taking shape, although it has not been active yet.

The former system under President Ben Ali was not effective and has not any bearing on the current one, given the revolution that led to Ben Ali's departure from power in 2011 and the drafting of a new Constitution (2014).

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Sources:
The National Constituent Assembly no longer exists. After the 2014 (October) Legislative Elections, it was replaced by a Parliament, which is called &quoute;Assembly of the Representatives of the People&quoute;. It's website is the following: http://www.arp.tn/site/main/AR/index.jsp
The link to the Rules of Procedures (updated in January 2014) is the following: http://www.arp.tn/site/main/AR/docs/anc/reglement_interieur_anc.pdf

Article 41 (amended-page 19) of the Rules of Procedures allows the creation of constituent, legislative and special committees to accomplish specific tasks. The two existing committes in charge of security issues, and which were established in early 2015 are: the Defence and Security Committee (special) and the Organization of the Administration and Armed Forces Affairs Committee (fixed). They are the two committees working on the follow up of the security strategy and the anti-terrorism policies. The effectiveness of the two committees in terms of oversight and role cannot be judged at the moment as they are recent, however, the efforts they have made so far can be praised.

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: http://www.africaintelligence.com/MCE/power-brokers/2015/03/05/ennahda-angles-for-defence-panel,108064648-ART?CXT=CANP&country=TUNISIA

Will keep looking.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

03.
score
2

Is the country's national defence policy debated and publicly available?

Researcher4104: Various aspects of the defence policy have been debated publicly. Issues like transparency, security sector reform, national security strategy, and major threats such as as terrorism have been debated by media and civil society organisations.

Also, the agenda of the National Constituent Assembly shows that defence and security issues have been debated in some plenary sessions in presence of representatives of the ministries of defence and interior (June 23, 2014 ; June 12, 2014 ; August 6, 2013 ; May 8, 2013 ). However, there is no formal consultation of the public and there is no evidence that security policy is regularly updated. There is furthermore no evidence (yet) that the legislature has the kind of influence than can result in changes to the defence policy, partly because the new legislature is relatively new.

COMMENTS -+

1) Hafawa Rebhi, &quoute;Vers une stratégie nationale inclusive de sécurité globale&quoute;, l'économiste Maghrébin, 21 January 2013, http://www.leconomistemaghrebin.com/2013/01/21/vers-une-strategie-nationale-inclusive-de-securite-globale/ ;
2) Le DCAF discute la réforme du secteur de la sécurité dans un contexte de transition démocratique à l’Ecole supérieure de guerre, 8 November 2013,
http://www.dcaf-tunisie.org/Fr/activite-partenaires/le-dcaf-discute-la-reforme-du-secteur-de-la-securite-dans-un-contexte-de-transition-democratique-a-lecole-superieure-de-guerre/77/10081 ;
3) &quoute;Discussions à l'Institut de Défense Nationale et à l'Ecole Supérieure de Guerre sur la gestion de la réforme du secteur de la sécurité dans un contexte de transition démocratique&quoute;, 31 January 2013, http://www.dcaf-tunisie.org/Fr/activite-partenaires/discussions-a-l-institut-de-defence-nationale-et-a-l-ecole-superieure-de-guerre-sur-la-gestion-de-la-reforme-du-secteur-de-la-securite-dans-un-contexte-de-transition-democratique/77/180 ;
4) &quoute;DCAF discute de la transparence du secteur de la défense avec le Ministre tunisien de la défense nationale&quoute;, 14 December 2012, http://www.dcaf-tunisie.org/Fr/activite-partenaires/dcaf-discute-de-la-transparence-du-secteur-de-la-defence-avec-le-ministre-tunisien-de-la-defence-nationale/77/186
5) Agenda of the National Constituent Assembly, http://www.marsad.tn/fr/agenda#23

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The legislature is allowed to discuss policy, but most of the power in this regard remains in the realms of the government and the President. So far the debates have not resulted in changes in the policy, partly because the new legislature is relatively new.

-->The Tunisian Constitution, 27/01/2014

The Parliament votes organic laws related to the organisation of the army (art. 65).

The President appoints top military officials, within the boundaries of the law (art. 78).

The President is responsible for the general policies in the fields of defence, external relations and security, after consultation with the Prime Minister (art. 77).

The Prime Minister appoints all the Ministers himself, except the Ministers of Defence and the Foreign Secretary who are appointed jointly with the President (art. 89).

The Prime Minister can dismiss all the Ministers himself, except the Ministers of Defence and the Foreign Secretary who are dismissed jointly with the President (art. 92).

The Prime Minister is the head of the Ministers Council except in the fields of security and defence that are presided over by the President (art. 93).

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The legislature can indeed influence defence policies, and so can external experts (Civil society experts as an example, whether national or international). However, the final say remains the Government's, of course (the Prime Minister mainly)

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/12/04/tunisia-union-leader-s-questionable-trial-0

Haykel Ben Mahfoudh, Security Sector Reform in Tunisia Three Years into the Democratic Transition,
Arab Reform Initiative, July 2014.

http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS21666.pdf

I've seen little indicating that the legislature can influence defence policy; I would agree that discussion should not be conflated with effect.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

04.
score
2

Do defence and security institutions have a policy, or evidence, of openness towards civil society organisations (CSOs) when dealing with issues of corruption? If no, is there precedent for CSO involvement in general government anti-corruption initiatives?

Researcher4104: NGOs are protected by the Decree-law n° 2011-88 of 24 September 2011 on the organisation of associations. An NGO can only be sanctioned (suspended or dissolved) by the Court of Tunis. There is no evidence of an official policy in place for the defence ministry to engage with CSOs, though examples of engagement can be found.

A review of the Tunisian press showed that there have been some efforts to engage CSOs actively, and that meetings with CSOs have indeed taken place. For instance, there were some meetings held between the Ministry of Defence and non-Tunisian NGOs such as Transparency International, and the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), regarding the transparency of the defence sector.

However, there is no evidence of real openness towards a large number of CSOs nor any evidence of a formal process to involve civil society in defence and security issues. This suggests that the actual impact of CSOs on defence policy is highly uncertain.

COMMENTS -+

1) Le DCAF discute la réforme du secteur de la sécurité dans un contexte de transition démocratique à l’Ecole supérieure de guerre, 2013-11-08,
http://www.dcaf-tunisie.org/Fr/activite-partenaires/le-dcaf-discute-la-reforme-du-secteur-de-la-securite-dans-un-contexte-de-transition-democratique-a-lecole-superieure-de-guerre/77/10081 ;

2) &quoute;Discussions à l'Institut de Défense Nationale et à l'Ecole Supérieure de Guerre sur la gestion de la réforme du secteur de la sécurité dans un contexte de transition démocratique&quoute;, 2013-01-31, http://www.dcaf-tunisie.org/Fr/activite-partenaires/discussions-a-l-institut-de-defence-nationale-et-a-l-ecole-superieure-de-guerre-sur-la-gestion-de-la-reforme-du-secteur-de-la-securite-dans-un-contexte-de-transition-democratique/77/180 ;

3) &quoute;DCAF discute de la transparence du secteur de la défense avec le Ministre tunisien de la défense nationale&quoute;, 2012-12-14, http://www.dcaf-tunisie.org/Fr/activite-partenaires/dcaf-discute-de-la-transparence-du-secteur-de-la-defence-avec-le-ministre-tunisien-de-la-defence-nationale/77/186

4) Decree-law n° 2011-88 of 24 September 2011 on the organisation of associations, http://www.environnement.gov.tn/fileadmin/medias/pdfs/ong/decret_loi_88_2011.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: There is no official policy in place for the army to engage with CSOs, although there is proof of engagement between the former and the latter (see sources above).

There is no particular legislation to project CSOs involved, other than the legislation applying to every one.

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: There are no policies aiming to engage CSOs in the anti-corruption work of defence and Security. It is usually the CSOs who try to engage with the Government or with the governmental institutions and not the other way around. As for engaging with the Government, there are no policies in place to do that. The only way for CSOs to suggest any kind of reform is through lobbying MPs or related committees within the Parliament. There are no past and current channels to stand against corruption as a shared fight between CSOs and the Government. This might be changed with the new Government though.
The notion of engagement is not related to policies only; it is about the culture as well. The Security Apparatus is a taboo sector that has been untouched for a while, but with the events occuring in Tunisia, it might and has to change in the future.

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: I think there are token efforts to at least appease international civil society (http://www.dcaf-tunisie.org/Fr/accueil/index/92), but when we talk about real impact, I have seen nothing to indicate genuine accountability.

http://www.hrw.org/news/2015/01/12/tunisia-four-years-injustice-prevails

http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/Reforming_Tunisias_Troubled_Security_Sector.pdf

&quoute;Civil society is actively engaged
in advocating for SSR. There are at least three NGOs—
Tunisia Institutional Reform, Democracy Laboratory,
and Republican Police, established by police officers—
focused strictly on SSR. These NGOs work on research
and publications, advocacy and awareness, police
training, and police monitoring. Among the more
creative projects is Soccer for Reform, which organizes
soccer games between police officers and citizens in
order to create new channels of communication
between them.
As with the syndicates and the MoI, civil society and
SSR activists have their own definition of SSR. They are
calling for truth commissions, justice for previous
cases of torture and ill-treatment, civilian oversight of
the police, and an overhaul of the whole security
apparatus so that it is more transparent, democratic,
and professional.
The media, despite criticism for its lack of
professionalism in addressing important issues, is
putting a spotlight on the security sector by reporting
news on police work and airing debates between MoI
representatives and human rights activists.
Notably absent from the discussion are political
parties, whose platforms lack any SSR element because
most lack knowledge about the issue and hesitate to
challenge the MoI.&quoute;

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

05.
score
3

Has the country signed up to international anti-corruption instruments such as, but not exclusively or necessarily, UNCAC and the OECD Convention? (In your answer, please specify which.)

Researcher4104: Tunisia signed the UNCAC on 30 March 2004 and ratified it on 23 September 2008. However, there are shortcomings in complying with some parts of the convention. In fact, 16 gaps were identified by the team responsible for self-assessment of the implementation of the UNCAC in Tunisia, including the non-criminalisation of corruption in the private sector and the non-protection of whistleblowers. A civil society shadow report confirmed the 16 gaps and added specific recommendations to address the weak areas in the legal framework.

A government official involved in anti-corruption activities confirmed that legislation is being developed by the government to remedy these gaps but this has yet to be submitted to the legislative assembly. These bills will concern illicit enrichment, protection of whistleblowers, and the declaration of assets.

Also, Tunisia signed the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption on 27 January 2013 but has not ratified it yet. Tunisia is also a state party of the Arab Convention to Fight Corruption. It has signed on 21 December 2010. Evidence regarding if or when it has ratified it could not be found. Tunisia is also a founding member of the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFATF) and has submitted all updates and progress reports in line with MENAFATF regulations.

Tunisia is not a full participant in the OECD Working Group on Bribery in International Business Transactions, it has not signed of ratified the OECD Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption.

Tunisia signed the OECD's Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters on 16 July 2012 and ratified it on 31 October 2013. It entered into force on 1 February 2014 and there is no information about the assessment of its compliance thus far.

COMMENTS -+

1) United Nations Convention Against Corruption, 30 March 2004, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-14&chapter=18&lang=fr ;
2) Interview with Source 4, a government official involved in counter-corruption, 25 June 2014;
3) Status of the Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters and Amending Protocol, 25 June 2014, http://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-tax-information/Status_of_convention.pdf
4) &quoute;M. Anouar Ben Khalifa expose les programmes du gouvernement pour la prévention de la corruption&quoute;, 10 December 2014, http://www.pm.gov.tn/pm/actualites/actualite.php?lang=fr&id=7731
5) Lutte contre la Corruption : Trois projets de loi en cours d'étude, 10 June 2014, http://www.mosaiquefm.net/fr/index/a/ActuDetail/Element/38355-lutte-contre-la-corruption-trois-projets-de-loi-en-cours-d-etude?Source=RSS
6)http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/AFRICAN_UNION_CONVENTION_PREVENTING_COMBATING_CORRUPTION.pdf
7) Arab Anti-Corruption Convention, no date, https://star.worldbank.org/star/sites/star/files/Arab-Convention-Against-Corruption.pdf
8) Status List of the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, 28 January 2014, http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/Corruption_0.pdf
9) &quoute;A Glance at the Arab Convention to Fight Corruption&quoute;, 21 August 2012, blog.transparency.org/2012/08/21/a-glance-at-the-arab-convention-to-fight-corruption/
10) MENAFATF official website, http://www.menafatf.org/topiclist.asp?ctype=about&id=546
11) MENAFATF, &quoute;Sixth Follow-Up Report for Tunisia&quoute;, 17 June 2014, http://www.menafatf.org/MER/Tunisian_English.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: No other relevant regional instruments to combat corruption have been signed by Tunisia.

--> Econonostrum, &quoute;La Tunisie signe un accord de coopération fiscale&quoute;, 17/07/2012 http://www.econostrum.info/La-Tunisie-signe-un-accord-de-cooperation-fiscale_a11197.html.

In addition to the OECD treaty about tax assistance Tunisia signed an additional protocol with OECD in order to benefit from the tax expertise of the other member states.

So far there has not been evidence of its compliance.

--> Council of Europe website http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/economiccrime/corruption/Projects/SNAC/SNAC_default_fr.asp

Tunisia took part in a programme funded by the Council of Europe and entitled : South Programme - Component 2
Promotion of good governance: fight against corruption and money-laundering (SNAC).
In particular, Tunisian authorities took part in the following seminars:
- Joint activity with Venice Commission on the status of the new Tunisian anti-corruption Agency, 18-19 December 2014 in Tunis (Tunisia).
- Training on corruption proofing, 23-24 September 2014 in Tunis (Tunisia)
-Training on Basic Anti-corruption concepts, 24-25 September 2014 in Tunis (Tunisia)
- Seminar on the future National Instance of Good Governance and Fight against corruption, 24-25 June 2014 in Tunis (Tunisia)
- Seminar on GRECO methodologies, 12-13 June 2014 in Strasbourg.
- Risk Analysis conducted with the Ministry of Public Property, December 2013-March 2014
- Strengthening of the Tunisian anti-corruption Agency: assistance to the introduction of internal rules and case management of the Instance nationale de lutte contre la corruption, Autumn 2013- Spring 2014
- Training workshop dedicated to the methodologies of the Council Of Europe on risks assessment, 18 June 2013 (Tunis)

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: For the UNCAC, there was also a shadow report that I WATCH organization worked on. The report confirmed the 16 gaps that the Governmental Team identified, but it also added a set of recommendations covering the weak areas of the Tunisian legal framework (anti-corruption). As for the bills that the Government is working on, only the Whistleblowers protection bill was made public (11 March 2015), and the first impressions and comments made by national and international experts about the bill is that it is a weak legal text that needs a lot of improvements if the Government is willing to take whistleblowers protection seriously. Most importantly, the bill does not look like any international whistleblower protection standard and principle, and not even close to complying with the UNCAC's article 32 and 33.
Tunisia signed the African Union Convention on preventing and combating corruption on 27 January 2013, but it has not been ratified yet. The link to the Convention is the following:
http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/AFRICAN_UNION_CONVENTION_PREVENTING_COMBATING_CORRUPTION.pdf
Tunisia is also a state party of the Arab Anti-corruption Convention. There are no information about when it was signed, and no follow-up activity has been done. The link to the convention is the following: https://star.worldbank.org/star/sites/star/files/Arab-Convention-Against-Corruption.pdf
As for the OECD Convention on mutual administrative assistance in tax, it entered into force on 1 Fbruary 2014, and there are no information about the assessment of its compliance till now.

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: http://www.ilacnet.org/ilac-work/ilac-mena-programme-2013-2016/strengthening-the-tunisian-anti-corruption-agency/

http://www.business-anti-corruption.com/country-profiles/middle-east-north-africa/tunisia/initiatives/public-anti-corruption-initiatives.aspx

- They have signed onto the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (founding member).

Norad is asserting that Tunisia is not a signatory to the OECD Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption.

No evidence of compliance listed at the OECD (http://www.oecd.org/countries/tunisia/)

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

06.
score
2

Is there evidence of regular, active public debate on issues of defence? If yes, does the government participate in this debate?

Researcher4104: The Ministry of Defence has a website (www.defence.tn) in which some of its activities are published. The ministry also holds regular media briefings. Moreover, some seminars were organised with the participation of some components of civil society - for instance the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) is said to be engaging with the Ministry of defence on a continuous debate regarding democratic control of the Tunisian armed forces, and other issues related to security reform.

Defence issues are reported on in media reports. There is no evidence of meetings between CSOs without the government also being present and involved. The media and CSO debate is not continuous and does not cover all defence issues either.

COMMENTS -+

1) Website of the Ministry of defence (www.defence.tn)

2) Review of tunisian press (www.observatoire-securite.tn)

3) “Tunisie , Sécurité : Le ministère de la Défense explique pourquoi Châambi est décrété zone militaire fermée”, 17 April 2014,
http://www.tunivisions.net/51566/220/149/tunisie-securite-le-ministere-de-la-defence-explique-pourquoi-chaambi-est-decrete-zone-militaire-fermee---video.html,

4) Le DCAF discute la réforme du secteur de la sécurité dans un contexte de transition démocratique à l’Ecole supérieure de guerre, 8 November 2013,
http://www.dcaf-tunisie.org/Fr/activite-partenaires/le-dcaf-discute-la-reforme-du-secteur-de-la-securite-dans-un-contexte-de-transition-democratique-a-lecole-superieure-de-guerre/77/10081 ;

5) &quoute;Discussions à l'Institut de Défense Nationale et à l'Ecole Supérieure de Guerre sur la gestion de la réforme du secteur de la sécurité dans un contexte de transition démocratique&quoute;, 31 January 2013, http://www.dcaf-tunisie.org/Fr/activite-partenaires/discussions-a-l-institut-de-defence-nationale-et-a-l-ecole-superieure-de-guerre-sur-la-gestion-de-la-reforme-du-secteur-de-la-securite-dans-un-contexte-de-transition-democratique/77/180

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

07.
score
1

Does the country have an openly stated and actively implemented anti-corruption policy for the defence sector?

Researcher4104: After the 2011 revolution, corruption was included in the government's priorities. An anti-corruption strategy was created by the issuance of the Decree-Law 2011-120 dated November 4, 2012 on anti-corruption. The strategy does not exclude the defence sector but it is more geared towards the public administration.

There is no evidence of the existence of a specific anti-corruption policy for the defence sector. In fact, the review of the applicable legal framework showed that no specific provisions were dedicated to the issue of corruption in defence sector at all. No articles could be found that were dedicated to corruption in the defence sector.

COMMENTS -+

1) Review of Tunisian press (www.observatoire-securite.tn)

2) DCAF discute de la transparence du secteur de la défense avec le Ministre tunisien de la défense nationale&quoute;, 14 December 2012, http://www.dcaf-tunisie.org/Fr/activite-partenaires/dcaf-discute-de-la-transparence-du-secteur-de-la-defence-avec-le-ministre-tunisien-de-la-defence-nationale/77/186

3) Review of legal framework applicable to defence sector (www.legislation-securite.tn)

3) Decree-Law 2011-120 dated November 4, 2012 on anti-corruption, http://www.legislation-securite.tn/fr/node/30469

4) Gnet, &quoute;Tunisie, défis et progrès de la lutte contre la malversation&quoute;, 17 February 2015, http://www.gnet.tn/temps-fort/tunisie-defis-et-progres-de-la-lutte-contre-la-malversation/id-menu-325.html

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: In theory the defence sector is not explicitly excluded from the current strategy but in practice it has not been concerned so far (the current strategy applying mainly to the public administration).

--> Gnet, &quoute;Tunisie, défis et progrès de la lutte contre la malversation&quoute;, 17/02/2015 http://www.gnet.tn/temps-fort/tunisie-defis-et-progres-de-la-lutte-contre-la-malversation/id-menu-325.html

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The current strategy is said to be an anti-corruption strategy, but it does not specify the sector it covers, therefore, one assumes that it cover all sectors. However, it is not the case. The strategy was put in place by the Government and the Anti-corruption commission with the support of the United Nations Program in Tunis. The startegy was never shared neither with the public nor with CSOs working on anti-corruption. However, a few points of it were shared during a seminar held in Tunis in 2012.
Furthermore, the issue of corruption in defence was never discussed out loud. Besides the fact that corruption is a new issue to be tackled in Tunisia, there are no security issues experts. Even those that we have, are already affiliated with the defence sector (one can't be judge, jury and executioner). So tackling corruption in defence becomes a bit difficult as it requires one to know both sector, and have the required knowledge in both fields: defence and anti-corruption.

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/Reforming_Tunisias_Troubled_Security_Sector.pdf

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

08.
score
1

Are there independent, well-resourced, and effective institutions within defence and security tasked with building integrity and countering corruption?

Researcher4104: An anti-corruption commission with a certain number of prerogatives was established by Decree-Law 2011-120 dated November 4, 2012 on anti-corruption. However, the effectiveness of this commission is limited and, according to its President (in a media report), it suffers from 'financial and moral problems'.

Article 130 of CRT also provides for the establishment of a Good Governance and Anti-Corruption Commission whose role is to contribute to policies of good governance and to prevent and fight corruption. This commission is also responsible for following up the implementation and dissemination of the anti-corruption culture, and to strengthen the principles of transparency, integrity and accountability. This commission is independent but not effective, with the commission's president recognising that the results of the anti-corruption commissions are poor (as per a media report).

The Administrative Reform and Anti-Corruption Commission is also authorised to access all files and documents from all the public administrations. Reports published by this committee do not reference any activities related to the defence sector however. This indicates that the commission's activities focus on a few sectors such as confiscated assets, customs, competitions in order to integrate public service.

These commissions are not specialised in the defence sector and there is no evidence of existence of other independent specific institutions tasked with building integrity and countering corruption in the defence sector. None of the institutions in place in charge of fighting corruption expressed an interest in the defence sector and no activities related to this sector were reported.

Response to Reviewer: Agreed, there are no specific institutions within defence and security tasked with building integrity and countering corruption. More than that none of the institutions in place in charge of fighting corruption declared its interest within defence sector and no activities related to this sector were reported. Score changed from 1 to 0.

As per question 14, there is a process of internal audit, but there is no transparency or parliamentary scrutiny. There is likely to be evidence indicating that it is largely ineffective. As per question 15, while there are three entities that are tasked with ensuring external auditing of public expenditure in Tunisia: Public Services General Control (Presidency of Government), Finances General Control (Ministry of Finance) and the Court of Audit. Of these entities, only the Court of Audit publishes its findings. The reports of the Court of Audit do not mention activities within the Ministry of National Defence.

COMMENTS -+

1) Constitution of the Republic of Tunisia, 27 January 2014, http://www.businessnews.com.tn/bnpdf/Constitutionfrancais.pdf;
2) Decree-Law 2011-120 dated November 4, 2012 on anti-corruption, http://www.legislation-securite.tn/fr/node/30469;
3) Review of Tunisian press (www.observatoire-securite.tn) ;
4) Review of legal provisions applicable to defence sector (www.legislation-securite.tn) ;
5) Comité national de lutte contre la corruption confronté à des problèmes financiers, 27 June 2014, http://www.observatoire-securite.tn/Fr/detail_article/comite-national-de-lutte-contre-la-corruption-confronte-a-des-problemes-financiers/85/3759
6) « Le bilan des travaux des commissions de lutte contre la corruption est très maigre », 23 May 2013
http://directinfo.webmanagercenter.com/2013/05/23/samir-annabi-le-bilan-des-travaux-des-commissions-de-lutte-contre-la-corruption-est-tres-maigre/

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: The anti-corruption commission cannot be considered as an institution existing within defence and security tasked with building integrity and countering corruption. Even though the commission has built some expertise in the field of anti-corruption, it is still not effective in fighting corruption in general. Besides, defence and security are portfolios that require experts in defence and security already; let alone corruption in the two sectors. That's a double expert. The issue of corruption in these two sectors sure does require an independent institution tasked to oversee defence and security ONLY as it is a wide topic. The thing that might happen is to have a defence and Security anti-corruption Unit within the existing commission, but since that does not exist yet, one should say that there are no such institutions.

Suggested score: 0

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

09.
score
3

Does the public trust the institutions of defence and security to tackle the issue of bribery and corruption in their establishments?

Researcher4104: The military has historically been outside of the management of the affairs of the state, in roles that did not involve contact with the population. This, and their distance from the various human rights violations that occurred under the recent dictatorship mean that the public do not perceive them as corrupt. By contrast, the police force, which offers several public-facing services such as administration, security, and traffic management, and which was implicated in human rights atrocities committed by the dictatorship, have a much lower public standing.

This assertion is confirmed by the Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer 2013 which reveals that only 14% of respondents in Tunisia felt that military was corrupt/extremely corrupt (compared to 69% of respondents who felt that police were corrupt/extremely corrupt). According to this barometer, the military is in fact considered the least corrupt institution in Tunisia.

According to a study by the International Republican Institute released in May 2011, the army is the most trusted institution to protect its citizens (80-80%). In the same survey, the former Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces has an approval rate of 62% which is the highest of all public figures the respondents were asked about.

Another poll published by the Pew Research Centre shows that the military has a good image among 95% of Tunisians.

COMMENTS -+

1) Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer 2013, 9 July 2013, http://www.transparency.org/gcb2013/country/?country=tunisia ;

2) Amel Zaibi, 18 October 2014 ; Selon un sondage réalisé par Pew Research Center, un think tank américain : Les Tunisiens satisfaits de l’armée et des forces sécuritaires, http://www.lapresse.tn/09022015/89384/les-tunisiens-satisfaits-de-larmee-et-des-forces-securitaires.html ;

3) The International Republican Institute, Survey of Tunisian Public Opinion, 21-24 May 2011, http://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/2011%20July%2012%20Survey%20of%20Tunisian%20Public%20Opinion,%20May%2014-27,%202011(1).pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The defence sector is untouchable according to the public. even if there will be a proof that they might be corrupt from the inside, the view would remain the same because they are the protectors of the country, the same doesn't apply to the police.

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: International Republican Institute, “Survey of Tunisian Public Opinion: May
14-27, 2011,” http://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/2011%20July%20
12%20Survey%20of%20Tunisian%20Public%20Opinion,%20May%20
14-27,%202011(1).pdf: Tunisians consider security to be the single biggest problem facing the country, according to a study by the International Republican Institute released in May 2011

http://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/2014%20April%2023%20Survey%20of%20Tunisian%20Public%20Opinion,%20February%2012-22,%202014.pdf: public opinion is trending upwards vis-a-vis the police.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

10.
score
0

Are there regular assessments by the defence ministry or another government agency of the areas of greatest corruption risk for ministry and armed forces personnel, and do they put in place measures for mitigating such risks?

Researcher4104: There is no evidence of the existence of defence-specific assessments of corruption risk. Neither the press nor the website of the Ministry of Interior mentions such specific assessments. Also, the interviewee (listed above) was unable to confirm the existence of such an assessment.

COMMENTS -+

1) Review of Tunisian press (www.observatoire-securite.tn)
2) Website of the Ministry of Defence (www.defence.tn)
3) Interview with Source 3, a senior government official involved in anti-corruption activities, 25 June 2014

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

11.
score
1

Does the country have a process for acquisition planning that involves clear oversight, and is it publicly available?

Researcher4104: Article 8 of the Decree n°1039-2014 dated 13 March 2014 on organising public procurement provides that public purchasers must establish an annual procurement plan. However, procurement plans of the Ministry of Defence or the Ministry of the Interior are not in the public domain.

In accordance with Article 13 of Decree n° 79-735 dated 22 August 1979 on the organisation of the Ministry of National Defence, the General Directorate of Administrative and Financial Affairs is tasked with preparing the Defence Ministry's budgets, capital management and ensuring the implementation of all these plans. There is no information available assessing how effectively the General Directorate carries out these duties.

The Ministry of Defence's budget does mention the existence of acquisition plans, but no details about these plans are provided and there is no evidence of an oversight mechanism over acquisition planning.

COMMENTS -+

1) Decree n°1039-2014 dated 13 March 2014, 'Organising Public Procurement', http://www.legislation.tn/sites/default/files/journal-officiel/2014/2014F/Jo0222014.pdf, ;
2) Decree n° 79-735 dated 22 August 1979, 'The Organisation of the Ministry of the National Defence', http://www.legislation-securite.tn/fr/node/27851;
3) Decree n° 88-36 dated 12 January 1988, 'Special Procedure of Control of Expenditure of the Ministries of Defence and Interior', http://www.legislation-securite.tn/fr/node/27945;
4) 2014 Ministry of Defence budget, http://www.finances.gov.tn/index.php?option=com_jdownloads&Itemid=712&view=finish&cid=541&catid=1&lang=fr

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

12.
score
2

Is the defence budget transparent, showing key items of expenditure? This would include comprehensive information on military R&D, training, construction, personnel expenditures, acquisitions, disposal of assets, and maintenance.

Researcher4104: The budget of the Ministry of Defence is disclosed in a relatively detailed manner under Chapter 8 of the state's 2014 budget. Information about training, construction, personnel expenditures, acquisitions, salaries, maintenance is available. However, the level of detail of this information varies according to the nature of the expenditure. For example, while detailed informations concerning training and military hospitals exists, there is only general information about military acquisitions available. These facts were confirmed by an expert working on the Tunisian budget.

The government's budgets including the defence budget are reported on and discussed in the media.

COMMENTS -+

1) 2014 Budget of the Ministry of National Defence, http://www.finances.gov.tn/index.php?option=com_jdownloads&Itemid=712&view=finish&cid=541&catid=1&lang=fr;
2) Interview with Source 5, a budget expert in Tunisia, 24 June 2014;
3) &quoute;Tunisia: Budget 2015 - 845 MTD Allocated to Military and Security Institutions&quoute;, 24 October 2014, http://allafrica.com/stories/201410271719.html;
4) &quoute;Tunisia’s Newly Elected Parliament Passes State Budget and 2015 Finance Law&quoute;, 11 December 2014, http://www.tunisia-live.net/2014/12/11/tunisias-newly-elected-parliament-passes-state-budget-and-2015-finance-law/

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: http://allafrica.com/stories/201410271719.html

http://www.tap.info.tn/en/index.php/politics2/23251-mehdi-jomaa-calls-to-end-wait-and-see-policy-to-take-up-challenge-for-the-future

http://www.tunisia-live.net/2014/12/11/tunisias-newly-elected-parliament-passes-state-budget-and-2015-finance-law/
General budget figures provided, but, similar to author, cannot find specific expenditure allocation.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

12A.
score
1

Is there a legislative committee (or other appropriate body) responsible for defence budget scrutiny and analysis in an effective way, and is this body provided with detailed, extensive, and timely information on the defence budget?

Researcher4104: Under Article 67 of the NCA Rules of Procedure, the Finance Committee is in charge of projects and issues related to the budget, loans and financial affairs of the state including the Ministry of Defence. The Ministry of Defence budget is submitted to this committee.

However, this committee is provided with only highly aggregated information about the Ministry of Defence budget, especially regarding acquisitions, and there is no specialised committee responsible for defence budget scrutiny and analysis. There is no evidence that suggests the Finance Committee expressed any (dis)satisfaction with the degree of detail it is provided with and no evidence of the Finance Committee being overruled.

There is no evidence confirming the control of the Finance Committee on the defence budget is effective. According to an interviewee, the committee does not exercise effective control over the defence budget.

COMMENTS -+

1) Constitution of the Republic of Tunisia Article 66, 26 January 2014 (http://www.anc.tn/site/main/AR/docs/constit_proj_26012014.pdf) ;
2) NCA Rules of procedure Article 67, January 2014 (http://www.anc.tn/site/main/AR/docs/reglement_interieur_anc_tunisie.pdf)
3) Interview with Source 5, a budget expert in Tunisia, 24 June 2014.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: http://internationalbudget.org/wp-content/uploads/Tunisa-Budget-Consol-Note.pdf

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

12B.
score
2

Is the approved defence budget made publicly available? In practice, can citizens, civil society, and the media obtain detailed information on the defence budget?

Researcher4104: The approved defence budget is published on the official gazette of the Republic of Tunisia (official Gazette n°105, 31 December 2014) and on the website of the Ministry of Finance. Tunisia also began the process to join the Open Government Partnership (OGP) in January 2014 and is currently developing its first action plan.

The constitution provides that the state shall guarantee the right to information and the right to access to information (Article 32). Also, the Decree-law n°2011-41 allows citizens the right to access the administrative documents of public entities. Access to some parts of the budget of the Ministry of Defence can be denied if the administration judges that it affects public security or national defence.

Evidence indicates that in practice, requests of access to information made by citizens or NGOs may encounter delays or can be even ignored by the administration. The website marsoum41.org, a platform which is no longer available and whose website is defunct, showed in 2014 that only four out of nine requests have been answered by the Ministry of Defence thus far. There is no evidence suggesting that accessibility varies according to the identity of the individual or organisation requesting information.

The issue is not specific to the defence sector. According to media reports, the government's attitude towards access to information has been strongly criticised. The current government has decided to withdraw a draft law strengthening the right to access to information which indicates unwillingness to improve access to administrative documents.

COMMENTS -+

1) Website of the Ministry of Finance www.finances.gov.tn
2) Website of the Ministry of Defence www.defence.tn
3) Official Gazette n°105 dated 31 December 2013
4) Decree-law n°2011-41 dated 26 May 201, http://www.legislation-securite.tn/fr/node/30605
5) http://www.marsoum41.org/fr/body/ministre_de_la_dfense_nationale- (this source is no longer available)
6) Constitution of the Republic of Tunisia, 27 January 2014, http://www.legislation-securite.tn/fr/node/33504
7) 2014 Budget of the Tunisian Ministry of Defence, http://www.finances.gov.tn/index.php?option=com_jdownloads&Itemid=712&view=finish&cid=541&catid=1&lang=fr
8) &quoute;RSF exprime son incompréhension suite au retrait du projet de loi sur le droit d’accès à l’information&quoute;, 29 July 2015, http://www.businessnews.com.tn/rsf-exprime-son-incomprehension-suite-au-retrait-du-projet-de-loi-sur-le-droit-dacces-a-linformation,520,57830,3
9) Open Government Partnership, http://www.opengovpartnership.org/country/tunisia

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: No other platform similar to Marsoum could be found but similar-minded initiatives exist, such as Touensa (http://touensa.org/), OpenGovTn (http://www.opengov.tn/fr/) and Nawaat (http://nawaat.org/portail/). However, they do no provide as detailed information as Marsoum 41 does. Moreover, no article was found mentioning explicitly the defence budget.

Concerning Tunisia's involvment in the Open Government Partnership it is still in the process of developing its first action plan (source: Open Government Website, Tunisia page http://www.opengovpartnership.org/country/tunisia).

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: No similar platforms exist.
No helpful information from the OGP.
The defence budget is made public: http://www.finances.gov.tn/index.php?option=com_jdownloads&Itemid=712&view=finish&cid=798&catid=1&lang=fr

In regards to the access to information requests, the absence of answers could be blamed on the system that the administration has (archiving, process etc.). Also, the notion of access to information is still new and most of the people working within the different administartions still do not understand that it is a right.

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: OpenGovTn
www.opengov.tn

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

13.
score
1

Are sources of defence income other than from central government allocation (from equipment sales or property disposal, for example) published and scrutinised?

Researcher4104: The publication of sources of income is particularly limited. For example, concerning the incomes coming from the national service fund (funded by the contributions of conscripts), only total amounts of income are published (2014 Ministry of Defence budget, page 15). This fund is regulated by Law n°101-1974 dated 25 December 1974.

Equally, for the expenditure of this fund, only total amounts are published. Despite a review of other sources of information (media reports and website of the Ministry of Defence), no other details about income other than from central government allocation could be found. Equally, there is no evidence of oversight of sources of defence income other than from central government.

COMMENTS -+

1) 2014 Ministry of Defence budget, http://www.finances.gov.tn/index.php?option=com_jdownloads&Itemid=712&view=finish&cid=541&catid=1&lang=fr;
2) Website of the Ministry of Defence (www.defence.tn)
3) Law n°101-1974 dated 25 December 1974, http://www.legislation-securite.tn/fr/node/28205
3) Press review (www.observatoire-securite.tn)

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: No other source could be found mentioning non-central government allocation income.

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

14.
score
1

Is there an effective internal audit process for defence ministry expenditure (that is, for example, transparent, conducted by appropriately skilled individuals, and subject to parliamentary oversight)?

Researcher4104: Article 1 of Decree n° 88-36 dated 12 January 1988 on Special Procedure of Control of Certain Expenditures of the Ministries of Defence and Interior specifies that, to ensure the confidentiality of the Defence Ministry and the Interior Ministry, certain expenditures for the purchase of equipment and supplies are subject to a special, limited procedure of audit by the expenditures audit services, due to national security and confidentiality concerns. (Article 8).

Furthermore, decree n° 79-735, dated 22 August 1979, on the organisation of the Ministry of National Defence specifies that the General Directorate of Administrative and Financial Affairs is responsible for financial control and for keeping accounts (Article 13) but it does not specify the ways in which it is meant to do so.

Meanwhile, there is no evidence to suggest that the internal audit process is effective. There is no evidence to suggest the internal audit process is active, whether it it conducted by appropriately skilled individuals or if its findings are acted upon by the government.

COMMENTS -+

1) Decree n° 88-36 dated 12 January 1988 on special procedure of control of certain expenditures of the Ministries of defence and Interior ;
2) Decree n° 79-735 dated 22 August 1979 on the organisation of the Ministry of the National Defence

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

15.
score
1

Is there effective and transparent external auditing of military defence expenditure?

Researcher4104: There are three entities that are tasked with ensuring external auditing of public expenditure in Tunisia: Public Services General Control (Presidency of Government), Finances General Control (Ministry of Finance) and the Court of Audit. Of these entities, only the Court of Audit publishes its findings. The reports of the Court of Audit do not mention activities within the Ministry of National Defence.

There is no publicly available evidence commenting on the effectiveness of the auditing bodies in addressing defence issues. Research indicates these bodies are not allocated adequate financial and human resources to carry out their missions effectively however. There is also no information about the regularity of audits. Research indicated duplication of controls and a lack of coordination between the different bodies. These bodies also do not systematically publish the results of their controls.

Any intervention from these three boards is limited by article 8 of the decree n° 88-36 dated 12 January 1988 on the Special Procedure of Control of Certain Expenditures of the Ministries of Defence and Interior. This decree limits the scrutiny made by expenditure control boards as to the exact allocation of expenditure and the real availability of credit, making real oversight difficult.

COMMENTS -+

1) Review of the reports of the Court of Audit, www.courdescomptes.nat.tn;
2) Decree n° 88-36 dated 12 January 1988 on special procedure of control of certain expenditures of the Ministries of Defence and Interior, http://www.legislation-securite.tn/fr/node/27945;
3) Tunisian portal against corruption, www.anticor.tn
4) Évaluation du cadre d'integrité dans le secteur public, Tunisie, http://www.ministeres.tn/rapport_final%20.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: General overview (historical): https://books.google.com/books?id=VBTsVvY4S6IC&pg=PA45&lpg=PA45&dq=external+audit+tunisia+ministry+of+defence&source=bl&ots=BAqiyoU7pt&sig=rEy_Kz6Wgw3qktPjERZyhlKDaNw&hl=en&sa=X&ei=WEcUVa7vD4S_ggSo_IGQDQ&ved=0CEAQ6AEwBg#v=onepage&q=external%20audit%20tunisia%20ministry%20of%20defence&f=false

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

16.
score
4

Is there evidence that the country's defence institutions have controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country's natural resource exploitation and, if so, are these interests publicly stated and subject to scrutiny?

Researcher4104: According to the National Institute of Statistics, in 2013, the extraction of oil and gas added 4,623 billion Tunisian Dinars to the Tunisian GDP, while in 2011, Tunisia produced 2,479,000 tons of phosphate, 171,100 tons of iron ore and 1,480,000 tons of salt.

The legislature decrees that the armed forces remain apart from this industry, with Article 18 of the Constitution specifying that &quoute;the army undertakes the duty of defending the nation, its independence and its territorial integrity. It must remain entirely impartial&quoute;. Article 13 stipulates the ownership of natural resources: 'Natural resources belong to the people of Tunisia. The state exercises sovereignty over them in the name of the people. Investment contracts related to these resources shall be presented to the competent committee in the Assembly of the Representatives of the People. The agreements concluded shall be submitted to the Assembly for approval.'

There is no publicly available evidence that defence institutions or individual personnel within these institutions have controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country's natural resource exploitation.

COMMENTS -+

1) Constitution of the Republic of Tunisia 27 January 2014, http://www.legislation-securite.tn/fr/node/33504;
2) Press review (www.observatoire-securite.tn)
3) Website of the National Institute of Statistics (www.ins.nat.tn)

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: No issues of financial/controlling interests by individual personnel within the defence sector has been found either in the press or in NGO reports.

On the contrary, Tunisians have a generally very good opinion of the army, considered as the warrant of the continuity of the State during the revolution.
ex: Leaders, &quoute;Qui veut dénigrer l'armée nationale : les Tunisiens outrés réprouvent fortement&quoute;, 2/3/2011 http://www.leaders.com.tn/article/4321-qui-veut-denigrer-l-armee-nationale-les-tunisiens-outres-reprouvent-fortement

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Looking into specific personnel. Difficult query to get unambiguous information on. As for the general, structural issues regarding the military and the economy:

http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/Tunisiastandsout_kpfabian_311214.html

In Jobs or Privileges: Unleashing the Employment Potential of the Middle East, the others suggest that while the Tunisian armed forces did not &quoute;own businesses or engage in illicit economic activities, security forces have exploited their political power to own commercial businesses and attain licenses&quoute;, etc.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

17.
score
2

Is there evidence, for example through media investigations or prosecution reports, of a penetration of organised crime into the defence and security sector? If no, is there evidence that the government is alert and prepared for this risk?

Researcher4104: Neither media investigations nor prosecution reports mention penetration of organised crime into the defence sector. Some media reports indicate, however, that there is such penetration in the Ministry of the Interior.

There is evidence that border security personnel are involved in cross-border smuggling of weapons from Libya (small arms) and all kind of household goods (oil, clothing) as well as drugs and alcohol (cigarettes, Moroccan cannabis, and Hashish) but no clarity as to whether the armed forces are complicit in this activity. A media report suggests that 'Tunisian borders are guarded by a multiplicity of security actors, including the military (with the Ministry of defence as their supervisory authority), National Guards (affiliated to the Ministry of Interior), and Customs (under the Ministry of Finance)'.This suggests a possibility that the military might be involved in cross-border smuggling.

According to the interviewee, the military is involved in the cross-border smuggling of oil. This statement could, however, not be independently verified.

It should also be noted in this regard that Tunisia signed the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime on 13 December 2000 and ratified it on 19 June 2003. Also, Government officials often emphasise the need to fight organised crime in their media appearances.

COMMENTS -+

1) Review of Tunisian press, www.observatoire-securite.tn
2) United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-12&chapter=18&lang=en
3) Salah Ben Hamadi, &quoute;Le crime organisé menace les institutions tunisiennes&quoute;, 21-01-2012, http://www.turess.com/fr/letemps/62743
4) Salah Ben Hamadi, &quoute;Lutte commune contre le crime organisé, la violence, le terrorisme et la contrebande-Conférence conjointe entre le chef du Gouvernement et le premier ministre libyen- Le Temps 13 June 2013, http://www.turess.com/fr/letemps/76945
5) Interview with Source 6, a senior foreign diplomat with extensive experience with the Tunisian defence sector, 2 December 2014
6) &quoute;Rethinking Tunisian Border Security&quoute;, 30 May 2014, http://www.ssrresourcecentre.org/2014/05/30/rethinking-tunisian-border-security/
7) &quoute;Tunisia’s borders open ground for smuggling&quoute;, 22 September 2014, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/09/tunisia-border-smuggling-security-threat.html

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: There is indeed a lot of corruption cases regarding the smuggling of goods (mainly Libyan oil and Algerian cigarettes) into Tunisia.
Jeune Afrique, &quoute;Contrebande d'essence : tensions après la fermeture d'un poste frontalier en Tunisie&quoute; 03/04/2014, http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Article/ARTJAWEB20140403100027/
Huffington Post, &quoute;Dans le sud de la Tunisie, la contrebande d'essence libyenne demeure une activité lucrative et déstabilisatrice&quoute;, 02/04/2014, http://www.huffpostmaghreb.com/2014/04/02/contrebande-tunisie-libye_n_5074830.html?
Tunisie Numérique, &quoute;Saisie de 10940 paquets de cigarettes destinées à la contrebande&quoute;, 17/03/2015, http://www.tunisienumerique.com/tunisie-gabes-saisie-de-10940-paquets-de-cigarettes-destines-a-la-contrebande/249302
Le Monde, &quoute;La Tunisie en lutte contre la contrebande et le terrorisme&quoute;, 20/03/2015, http://abonnes.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2015/03/20/la-tunisie-en-lutte-contre-la-contrebande-et-le-terrorisme_4597816_3212.html

However the custom officials and the national guard come under the Ministry of Interior, and the armed forces have conducted several operations against smugglers in the past years.

The phenomenon remains important and must be taken into account, especially that it is very likely that the arms used in the Bardo attack in March 2015 were smuggled from Libya.

Suggested score: 1

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Any official that comes under the Ministry of Interior should not be mentioned here as the MOI and the MOD are two different powers having different problems (even though corruption is a shared problem). Having the MOI in an assessment for itself is preferable. That way we would be able to narrow the reforms we would like to see. Also, it would allow us to deliver the right messages and have one precise target group to approach.

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: I would definitely include an examination of MoI here. Obvious (though perhaps worth emphasizing all the same), on a host of different fronts and as consequence of Ben Ali (and Bourguiba's) unique method of consolidating power, MoD has never been quite as relevant on the Tunisian scene as MoDs are elsewhere in the region. MoI is far more implicated in a lot of the issues that are the concern of this report. And so, while I know we are talking about separate entities then that which is the explicit focus of inquiry here, I think reference to MoI helps paint a fuller picture.

http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/security/2014/11/tunisia-smuggling-finance-terrorism.html

http://www.ssrresourcecentre.org/2014/05/30/rethinking-tunisian-border-security/

http://econ.worldbank.org/external/default/main?pagePK=64165259&theSitePK=469382&piPK=64165421&menuPK=64166093&entityID=000158349_20131223113808

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

18.
score
1

Is there policing to investigate corruption and organised crime within the defence services and is there evidence of the effectiveness of this policing?

Researcher4104: An anti-corruption commission which can investigate corruption in public administration was established by Decree-Law 2011-120 dated 4 November 2012 on Anti-Corruption. However, the effectiveness of this commission is limited and, in the words of the commission's president, it 'suffers from financial and moral problems'. Concrete results of potential investigations have not been identified. Moreover, there is no evidence that this commission investigated corruption in the defence sector at all.

This being said, the Ministry of Defence contains a General Inspectorate which reports breaches of general discipline and carries out all surveys or special assignments expressly entrusted to it (Article 8 decree n° 79-735 dated 22 August 1979 on the organisation of the Ministry of Defence). The interviewee from the Ministry of Defence confirmed that the General Inspectorate can investigate corruption and organised crime. However, given that the General Inspectorate is placed under the authority of the Minister of Defence (Art. 8 of the same decree), its independence is questionable.

COMMENTS -+

1) Decree-Law 2011-120 dated November 4, 2012 on Anti-Corruption, http://www.legislation-securite.tn/fr/node/30469;
2) Comité national de lutte contre la corruption confronté à des problèmes financiers, 27 June 2014, http://www.mosaiquefm.net/fr/index/a/ActuDetail/Element/39014-comite-national-de-lutte-contre-la-corruption-confronte-a-des-problemes-financiers;
3) Decree n° 79-735 dated 22 August 1979 on the organisation of the Ministry of Defence, http://www.legislation-securite.tn/fr/node/27851;
4) Interview with Source 2, a senior civil servant in the Ministry of Defence, 27 June 2014

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: There is indeed a lot of corruption cases regarding the smuggling of goods (mainly Libyan oil and Algerian cigarettes) into Tunisia.
Jeune Afrique, &quoute;Contrebande d'essence : tensions après la fermeture d'un poste frontalier en Tunisie&quoute; 03/04/2014, http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Article/ARTJAWEB20140403100027/
Huffington Post, &quoute;Dans le sud de la Tunisie, la contrebande d'essence libyenne demeure une activité lucrative et déstabilisatrice&quoute;, 02/04/2014, http://www.huffpostmaghreb.com/2014/04/02/contrebande-tunisie-libye_n_5074830.html?
Tunisie Numérique, &quoute;Saisie de 10940 paquets de cigarettes destinées à la contrebande&quoute;, 17/03/2015, http://www.tunisienumerique.com/tunisie-gabes-saisie-de-10940-paquets-de-cigarettes-destines-a-la-contrebande/249302
Le Monde, &quoute;La Tunisie en lutte contre la contrebande et le terrorisme&quoute;, 20/03/2015, http://abonnes.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2015/03/20/la-tunisie-en-lutte-contre-la-contrebande-et-le-terrorisme_4597816_3212.html

However the custom officials and the national guard come under the Ministry of Interior, and the armed forces have conducted several operations against smugglers in the past years.

The phenomenon remains important and must be taken into account, especially that it is very likely that the arms used in the Bardo attack in March 2015 were smuggled from Libya.

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Any official that comes under the Ministry of Interior should not be mentioned here as the MOI and the MOD are two different powers having different problems (even though corruption is a shared problem). Having the MOI in an assessment for itself is preferable. That way we would be able to narrow the reforms we would like to see. Also, it would allow us to deliver the right messages and have one precise target group to approach.

The aforementioned institutions are tackling the problem effectively. Even though their role is very important, their effectiveness and presence is not that important. It is due to the lack of expertise, human and financial resources. Could be blamed on the lack of independence as well.

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: http://www.ssrresourcecentre.org/2014/05/30/rethinking-tunisian-border-security/

&quoute;Equally important is the question of who is in charge to deal with Tunisia’s border security challenges. Indeed, Tunisian borders are guarded by a multiplicity of security actors, including the military (with the Ministry of defence as their supervisory authority), National Guards (affiliated to the Ministry of Interior), and Customs (under the Ministry of Finance). With multiple controlling hierarchies, Tunisia’s new government must also deal with an uncertain level of cooperation within its security sector, a good example being the apparent tense relation between the Army and National Guards.&quoute;

I think to give the full picture, you need to reference the multiplicity of actors implicated here (beyond just MoD)

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

19.
score
0

Are the policies, administration, and budgets of the intelligence services subject to effective, properly resourced, and independent oversight?

Researcher4104: There are three entities that are tasked with ensuring external auditing of public expenditure in Tunisia: Public Services General Control (Presidency of Government), Finances General Control (Ministry of Finance) and the Court of Audit. Of these entities, only the Court of Audit publishes its findings. The reports of the Court of Audit do not mention activities within the Ministry of National Defence or Interior.

The Intelligence Agency is part of the Ministry of Interior, although the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs also have separate intelligence functions. Within the Ministry of Defence, there is an &quoute;agency of intelligence and security for the defence&quoute; (Decree n° 79-735 dated 22 August 1979 on the Organisation of the Ministry of National Defence as amended by the decree n° 2014-4209 dated 20 November 2014 ).

The role of this agency is not clearly defined and there is no reliable information about it. Generally, information on the intelligence sector is not widely available and the intelligence sector is not currently governed by any law. No evidence could be found even of internal controls within the intelligence services. In the absence of a sound legal framework it is not possible to talk of any independent oversight of intelligence services.

Civil society and the media have called for reform of intelligence agencies in order to ensure national security and the respect of human rights, necessary to &quoute;build public trust and confidence in a function intimately tied to the abuses of the previous regime&quoute; (Source 3) .

COMMENTS -+

1) Review of legal provisions applicable to defence and security (www.legislation-securite.tn)
2) Ministry of Interior website (www.interieur.gov.tn)
3) Querine Hanlon, &quoute;Security Sector Reform in Tunisia -A Year after the Jasmine Revolution-&quoute; United States Institute for Peace Special Report 304, March 2012, http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR304.pdf ;
4) Tunisie: «Les services de renseignement dans l'Etat de droit démocratique», thème d'une conférence à Tunis, 15 May 2013, http://www.babnet.net/cadredetail-65229.asp
5) &quoute;A quand la réforme des services de renseignement tunisiens?&quoute;, 22 May 2013, http://www.astrolabetv.com/fr/a-quand-la-reforme-des-services-de-renseignement-tunisiens/
6) Decree n° 79-735 dated 22 August 1979 on the Organisation of the Ministry of National Defence as amended by the decree n° 2014-4209 dated 20 November 2014, http://www.legislation-securite.tn/fr/node/34659;
7) Al Chourouk, &quoute;Tunisia creates the Intelligence and Securiy Agency for Defence&quoute;, 20 November 2014, (تونس تحدث وكالة الاستخبارات والأمن للدّفاع), http://www.alchourouk.com/79455/691/1/-%D8%AA%D9%88%D9%86%D8%B3_%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%AF%D8%AB_%D9%88%D9%83%D8%A7%D9%84

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: There seems to be three agencies: the home intelligence agency that comes under the Ministry of Interior, the external intelligence agency that comes under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the military intelligence agency that comes under the Ministry of Defence.

On November 20th 2014 the creation of the &quoute;Intelligence and Security Agency for Defence&quoute; (وكالة الاستخبارات والأمن للدّفاع) was announced after approval from the Ministers Council, in order to tackle terrorism issues. The precise names and functions of the two other agencies are not known.

Source: Al Chourouk, 20/11/2014, &quoute;Tunisia creates the Intelligence and Securiy Agency for Defence&quoute;, (تونس تحدث وكالة الاستخبارات والأمن للدّفاع) http://www.alchourouk.com/79455/691/1/-%D8%AA%D9%88%D9%86%D8%B3_%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%AF%D8%AB_%D9%88%D9%83%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A9_%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA_%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%86_%D9%84%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%91%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B9-.html

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The Intelligence Agency is part of the MOI. There is also an Intelligence Agency under the MOD. It is called &quoute;Intelligence, Security and Defence Agency&quoute;, which is a new name that was given to an old agency that existed within the MOD (This is a link to an article written about it: http://www.eurasiareview.com/29112014-tunisia-strengthens-intelligence-capacity/.)
The name was changed in November 2014 by a decree law after former Prime Minister Mehdi Jomaa thought about strenghthening Tunisian intelligence capacities. As for the role and how it overlaps with the MOI's Agency, there are no information about that. The functionning and the services are not known. Also, there are no accessible proofs that there is a system of oversight.

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: From what I can gather, the following intelligence agencies are operating in Tunisia:

MoI: 1.) General Directorate for Specialized Services 2.) General Directorate for Technical Services.
Regarding #2 (GD for Technical Services), it contains within it the General Directorate to Fight Terrorism and the General Information Directorate

MoD: Has its own intelligence services, but they have been lambasted as underfunded and ineffectual, and described as not in the business of proper &quoute;intelligence gathering&quoute;: http://www.tunisia-live.net/2013/08/02/attacks-raise-doubts-on-tunisian-intelligence-services/

See the following diagram for a layout of MoI organization. It is a bit out of date but helpful schematically all the same: http://nawaat.org/portail/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/organigram-ministere-interieur-tunisie-ennahdha.jpg

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

20.
score
1

Are senior positions within the intelligence services filled on the basis of objective selection criteria, and are appointees subject to investigation of their suitability and prior conduct?

Researcher4104: Information on the intelligence community is not widely available and the intelligence sector is not currently governed by any law. In the absence of a sound legal framework, any official communication about intelligence services, and media reports which discussed the filling of senior positions within intelligence units, we conclude that criteria for selection of senior positions are unclear.

COMMENTS -+

1) Review of legal provisions applicable to defence and security (www.legislation-securite.tn)
2) Ministry of Interior website (www.interieur.gov.tn)
3) Querine Hanlon, &quoute;Security Sector Reform in Tunisia -A Year after the Jasmine Revolution-&quoute; United States Institute for Peace Special Report 304, March 2012, http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR304.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

21.
score
0

Does the government have a well-scrutinised process for arms export decisions that aligns with international protocols, particularly the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)?

Researcher4104: Tunisia has an almost insignificant arms exports industry (estimated at $1,518 USD in 2011) and accordingly has little legislation in place for its regulation. It has not signed the Arms Trade Treaty. There is no evidence indicating the existence of a well-scrutinised process for arms export decisions that aligns with other international protocols such as UN Resolution 1540, the EU common positions or even non-binding agreements such as the Wassenaar Agreement or the UN Guidelines for International Arms Transfers.

There was also no publicly available information regarding the process and oversight relating to arms control decisions, or whether they are subject to parliamentary debate and approval. There is no evidence that suggests that the government recognises corruption as an issue in arms exports.

Tunisia has signed and adopted two regional agreements:
As a member of the League of Arab States, Tunisia adopted the Arab Model Law on Weapons, Ammunitions, Explosives and Hazardous Material in January 2002. In June 2006, as a member of the African Union, Tunisia adopted an African Common Position to take to the Conference to Review the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (UNPoA), held in June 2006.
The United Nations Arms Trade Treaty has not been signed by Tunisia

According to Gunpolicy:
Gun Trade and Trafficking
Regulation of Firearm Exports
CompareSmall Arms Exports (US$) - Customs
The annual value of small arms and ammunition exports from Tunisia is reported by Customs to be US$1,51815 (2011)

Regulation of Firearm Imports
CompareSmall Arms Imports (US$) - Customs
The annual value of small arms and ammunition imports to Tunisia is reported by Customs to be US$1,025,21115 (2011)

Smuggling Guns and Ammunition
Reports suggest that the level of firearm and ammunition smuggling in Tunisia is negligible.

Compare

Regulation of Arms Brokers
In Tunisia, the activities of arms brokers and transfer intermediaries are not specifically regulated by law.

UNPoA Commitment
-On 21 July 2001, Tunisia committed to a consensus decision of the United Nations to adopt, support and implement the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects.

In its UN small arms Programme of Action Implementation Monitor (PoAIM Phase 1), the Small Arms Survey scored Tunisia against its commitments to the PoA, then ranked it at No. 12526 27 28 29 among 159

Member States
Under the terms of its 2001 commitment to the United Nations small arms Programme of Action, Tunisia has submitted one or more national reports on its implementation of the UNPoA

National Point of Contact
In Tunisia, a National Point of Contact to deal with issues relating to the UNPoA has not been designated

In Tunisia, a National Coordinating Body to deal with issues relating to the UNPoA has not been designated

In National Reports of Tunisia submitted to the UN from 2001 to 2010, a history of substantive cooperation with civil society in support of UNPoA activities was not apparent.

COMMENTS -+

1) Arms Trade Treaty, Status of the Treaty, http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/att/deposit/asc
2) Gun Policy - Tunisia, http://www.gunpolicy.org/fr/firearms/region/tunisia
3) http://www.gunpolicy.org/firearms/region/tunisia

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The smuggling of weapons from Libya is a public concern. Moreover, it is very likely that the arms used in the Bardo Museum attack in March 2015 were smuggled from Libya, as the police have been regularly discovering weaponry stock linked to the attackers since then.

Jeune Afrique, &quoute;Contrebande d'essence : tensions après la fermeture d'un poste frontalier en Tunisie&quoute; 03/04/2014, http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Article/ARTJAWEB20140403100027/
Huffington Post, &quoute;Dans le sud de la Tunisie, la contrebande d'essence libyenne demeure une activité lucrative et déstabilisatrice&quoute;, 02/04/2014, http://www.huffpostmaghreb.com/2014/04/02/contrebande-tunisie-libye_n_5074830.html?
Tunisie Numérique, &quoute;Saisie de 10940 paquets de cigarettes destinées à la contrebande&quoute;, 17/03/2015, http://www.tunisienumerique.com/tunisie-gabes-saisie-de-10940-paquets-de-cigarettes-destines-a-la-contrebande/249302
Le Monde, &quoute;La Tunisie en lutte contre la contrebande et le terrorisme&quoute;, 20/03/2015, http://abonnes.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2015/03/20/la-tunisie-en-lutte-contre-la-contrebande-et-le-terrorisme_4597816_3212.html

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Risk management 60
22.
score
1

How effective are controls over the disposal of assets, and is information on these disposals, and the proceeds of their sale, transparent?

Researcher4104: The disposal of state assets is the remit of the Ministry of State's Properties and Land Affairs (Article 1 of decree n°999-1990 dated 11 June 1990 on Prerogatives of the Ministry of State's Properties).

In addition to the concerned department at the Ministry of Defence, specialised departments of the Ministry of State's Properties and Land Affairs are responsible of the asset disposal in terms of monitoring and follow-up and statistics of these properties as well as for selling them when they become unusable. The Public Services General Control (under authority of the president of the government) and the Court of Audit can also intervene in the scrutiny of such matters, but oversight by these bodies is limited (Decree no 88-36).

There was no publicly available information specifically addressing how assets from the Ministry of Defence are dealt with, nor on the proceeds of their sales. There is no evidence that planned disposals are known and publicly available and no evidence that financial results of disposals are avaialable. There is therefore also no information available on how effective these controls are, whether from official sources or media reports.

There is no evidence of speculation in the media and among civil society organisations about corruption in asset disposals.

COMMENTS -+

1) Website of the Ministry of State's Properties and Land Affairs, http://www.domainetat.tn/
2) Decree n°999-1990 dated 11 June 1990 on prerogatives of the Ministry of State's properties,
3) Decree n° 88-36 dated 12 January 1988 on Special Procedure of Control of Certain Expenditures of the Ministries of Defence and Interior, http://www.legislation-securite.tn/fr/node/27945

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Regarding disposal of assets beyond MoD (pp.17): https://books.google.com/books?id=sXp0AQAAQBAJ&pg=PA17&lpg=PA17&dq=disposal+of+government+assets+Tunisia&source=bl&ots=uBHo421878&sig=YCkyv3zT6cjC3D91-PJymcZZ0EI&hl=en&sa=X&ei=a1AUVcvfD8SogwToh4GIDg&ved=0CCYQ6AEwAg#v=onepage&q=disposal%20of%20government%20assets%20Tunisia&f=false

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

23.
score
1

Is independent and transparent scrutiny of asset disposals conducted by defence establishments, and are the reports of such scrutiny publicly available?

Researcher4104: The responsibility of asset disposal lies with the Ministry of State Properties and Land Affairs (Article 1 of decree n°999-1990 dated 11 June 1990 on Prerogatives of the Ministry of State's properties). In addition to the concerned department at the Ministry of Defence, specialised departments of the Ministry of State Properties and Land Affairs are responsible of the asset disposal in terms of monitoring, follow-up and keeping statistics of these properties, as well as for selling them when they become unusable. The Public Services General Control (under authority of the president of the government) and the Court of Audit can also intervene in the scrutiny of such matters.

The independence of these institutions is questionable, however, as they are placed under the authority of the Presidency of the Government. In terms of effectiveness, they face challenges due to lacking the necessary material means enabling them to better perform their duties (according to the OECD). There are no publicly available sources attesting to either independence or effectiveness in this instance, and the state's budget does not include detailed information about the disposal of assets.

Response to Peer Reviewer: Agreed. Score changed from 2 to 1.

COMMENTS -+

1) Website of the Ministry of State's Properties and Land Affairs http://www.domainetat.tn/ ;
2) Decree n°999-1990 dated 11 June 1990 on prerogatives of the Ministry of State's properties;
3) Decree n° 2013-3232 dated 12 August 2013 on the organisation of Public Services General Control, http://www.legislation.tn/fr/detailtexte/D%C3%A9cret-num-2013-3232-du-12-08-2013-jort-2013-067__2013067032323;
4) Law n° 68-8 dated 8 March 1968, on organisation of the Court of accounts as amended by law n° 70-17 dated 20 April 1970, organic law n° 90-82 dated 29 October 1990, organic law n° 2001-75 dated 17 July 2001 and by organic law n°2008-3 dated 29 January 2008, http://www.legislation-securite.tn/fr/node/28168;
5) 2014 Defence Budget, http://www.finances.gov.tn/index.php?option=com_jdownloads&Itemid=712&view=finish&cid=541&catid=1&lang=fr
6) Evaluation du cadre d'intégrité dans le secteur public en Tunisie, OCDE, June 2013, link : http://www.ministeres.tn/rapport_final%20.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: Based on the sources mentioned above, the Ministry of Defence departments tasked with asset disposal seems to be excluded from the general provisions. It would be assumed that they work under different rules, or that the findings of the departments are kept undisclosed to the public.

Suggested score: 1

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: They work under the same rule as there is nothing specific to them.

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Anecdotally, I would confirm that MoD operates under the same rules, but I have yet to find documented evidence in support.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

24.
score
0

What percentage of defence and security expenditure in the budget year is dedicated to spending on secret items relating to national security and the intelligence services?

Researcher4104: A review of the 2014 Ministry of Defence budget indicates that a significant number of its budget lines do not give details about the purpose of the expenditure; instead, often overall amounts for unexplained yearly programmes are given. Moreover, the published budget contains only general figures (for military equipment for example).

However, the Ministry of Defence budget does not refer explicitly to any secret items and there is no budget line explicitly dedicated to secret spending. Furthermore, documents concerning national security - a list of which must be established by decree, and which can include budget details - cannot be communicated to the public before sixty years have passed.

COMMENTS -+

1) 2014 Ministry of Defence budget, http://www.finances.gov.tn/index.php?option=com_jdownloads&Itemid=712&view=finish&cid=541&catid=1&lang=fr
2) Law n° 88-95 dated 2 August 1988 on Archives, http://www.legislation-securite.tn/fr/node/29035
3) Review of legislation applicable to defence and security sectors (www.legislation-securite.tn)
4) Interview with Source 5, a budget expert in Tunisia, 24 June 2014

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

25.
score
1

Is the legislature (or the appropriate legislative committee or members of the legislature) given full information for the budget year on the spending of all secret items relating to national security and military intelligence?

Researcher4104: The Finance, Planning and Development Committee is responsible for scrutiny of laws in relations with the budget (Art. 67 of NCA rules of procedure ). Theoretically, this committee can ask for explanations if it considers that it is necessary (Art. 59 of NCA rules of procedure). However, it is unlikely that this committee would ask for information about secret items - none of its reports mention such requests, and the interviewed expert has not heard about cases in which such requests were made.

The Administrative Reform and Anti-Corruption Committee used to be authorised to access all files and documents from all the public administrations. Reports published by this committee do not however, reference any activities related to the defence sector. This indicates that its activity touched only a few sectors such as confiscated assets, customs, competitions in order to integrate public service. This committee no longer exists.

The interviewee confirmed that the legislature is only given a summary of the budget of the various ministries.

COMMENTS -+

1) National Constituent Assembly Rules of Procedure, http://www.anc.tn/site/main/AR/docs/reglement_interieur_anc_tunisie.pdf;
2) Review of the reports published by the Finance, Planning and Development Committee, http://www.marsad.tn/docs/coms/4f426cebb197de1a23000003;
3) Report of the Finance, Planning and Development Committee on Finance Law 2014, http://www.marsad.tn/docs/52b7683412bdaa7f9b90eeaf;
4) Reports of the Administrative Reform and Anti-Corruption Committee, http://www.marsad.tn/docs/coms/4f426d12b197de1a23000004?after=518e5bfc7ea2c422bec252de
5) Interview with Source 5, a budget expert in Tunisia, 24 June 2014

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Perhaps confer with people from the Open Government Partnership (http://www.opengovpartnership.org/blog/blog-editor/2014/01/14/tunisia-joins-ogp) or the International Budget Partnership (http://internationalbudget.org/ibp_publication_categories/budget-oversight/) if looking for confirmation on any findings.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

26.
score
0

Are audit reports of the annual accounts of the security sector (the military, police, and intelligence services) and other secret programs provided to the legislature (or relevant committee) and are they subsequently subject to parliamentary debate?

Researcher4104: Audit reports on annual accounts of the State are performed by the Court of Audit. This court produces two types of reports : An annual report on its activities and an annual report on the execution of budget (that is transmitted to the legislature). A review of the reports published by the Court of Audit in the last five years shows no specific activity in relation with the Ministry of Defence. No other publicly available sources were found which discussed the annual accounts of the security sector.

COMMENTS -+

1) Website of the Court of Audit, http://www.courdescomptes.nat.tn/

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: No information whatsoever could be found about recent overview by the Court of Accounts on Ministry of Defence accounts.

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/transparency

In general, I would hedge any analysis with the following: &quoute;Data on military expenditures are not compiled using standard definitions and are often incomplete and unreliable due to countries' reluctance to disclose military information. Even in countries where the parliament vigilantly reviews budgets and spending, military expenditures and arms transfers rarely receive close scrutiny or full, public disclosure (see Ball 1984 and Happe and Wakeman-Linn 1994).&quoute;

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

27.
score
4

Off-budget military expenditures are those that are not formally authorised within a country's official defence budget, often considered to operate through the 'back-door'. In law, are off-budget military expenditures permitted, and if so, are they exceptional occurrences that are well-controlled?

Researcher4104: Article 66 of the new Constitution of the Republic of Tunisia provides that the law determines the state's resources and its expenses in conformity with the provisions set out in the organic budget law. Moreover, Article 1 of the Organic Budget Law provides that the finance law sets out and authorises, for each year, all expenditures and resources of the State, meaning that off-budget expenditure is strictly forbidden.

Interviewees familiar with the sector have no knowledge about the existence of such expenditures. There were no media sources found which discuss the issue of off-budget expenditure or suggest that it is common practice in Tunisia.

COMMENTS -+

1) Constitution of the Republic of Tunisia (26 January 2014), https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Tunisia_2014.pdf;
2) Organic law of budget N° 67-53 dated 8 December 1967 as amended by the organic law N° 2004-42 dated 13 May 2004, http://www.legislation-securite.tn/fr/node/35828;
3) Review of legislation applicable to defence sector (www.legislation-securite.tn)
4) Interview with Source 3, a senior government official involved in anti-corruption activities, 25 June 2014
5) Interview with Source 5, a budget expert in Tunisia, 24 June 2014

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: I would mitigate the score 4 because although off-budget expenditure is strictly forbidden, the absence of public communication around the control by the Court of Accounts of the Ministry of Defence's account forbids us from verifying that this off-budget expenditure does not exist indeed.

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

28.
score
N/A

In practice, are there any off-budget military expenditures? If so, does evidence suggest this involves illicit economic activity?

Researcher4104: Article 1 of the Organic Budget provides that the finance law sets out and authorises, for each year, all expenditures and resources of the State and no legislation governing the sector of defence authorises off-budget expenditures.

Furthermore, those interviewed have no knowledge about the existence of such expenditures and there are no media sources addressing the issue of off-budget military expenditures.

COMMENTS -+

1) Constitution of the Republic of Tunisia, 26 January 2014, https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Tunisia_2014.pdf;
2) Organic law of budget N° 67-53 dated 8 December 1967 as amended by the organic law N° 2004-42 dated 13 May 2004, http://www.legislation-securite.tn/fr/node/35828;
3) Review of legislation applicable to defence sector (www.legislation-securite.tn;
4) Interview with Source 3, a senior government official involved in anti-corruption activities, 25 June 2014;
5) Interview with Source 5, a budget expert in Tunisia, 24 June 2014
6) Press review (www.observatoire-securite.tn)

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

29.
score
1

In law, are there provisions regulating mechanisms for classifying information on the grounds of protecting national security, and, if so, are they subject to effective scrutiny?

Researcher4104: Law n°88-95 dated 2 August 1988 on Archives stipulates that exemptions to the obligation of transfer of documents to the National Archive may be made by decree for reasons related to security (Article 13). Furthermore, documents concerning national security cannot be communicated before sixty years have passed. The list of these documents relating to the national security must be established by decree.

This being said, after a review of legislation relating to the defence and security sector, such decrees could not be found. No other publicly available sources provided more details on this matter.There is no evidence about the effectiveness of these mechanisms. Furthermore, evidence that information is classified at the discretion of the individuals, parties, or groups in power with no specific or clearly defined legal basis could not be found.

An interview with a high-level civil servant confirmed the existence of non-published internal regulations dealing with the classification of information but this information could not be independently verified.

COMMENTS -+

1) Law n° 88-95 dated 2 August 1988 on Archives, http://www.legislation-securite.tn/fr/node/29035
2) Review of legislation applicable to defence and security sectors (www.legislation-securite.tn)
3) Interview with Source 1, a senior civil servant in the Ministry of Interior, 28 June 2014

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: No further public information about the existing regulations was found, and no public evidence of them being bypassed at the discretion of individuals/agencies was found.

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: No known information.

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

30.
score
4

Do national defence and security institutions have beneficial ownership of commercial businesses? If so, how transparent are details of the operations and finances of such businesses?

Researcher4104: There is no evidence that the Tunisian army owns commercial businesses. The website of the Ministry of Defence does not mention such ownership. The budget of the Ministry of Defence do not mention resources from commercial businesses. The interviewees had no knowledge of such ownership and a review of the Tunisian and international press did not result in evidence of ownership by the army of any significant commercial businesses.

Evidence suggests that during Ben Ali's mandates the defence institutions were systematically excluded from the political and economic life as they, unlike the Ministry of Interior and the police, were perceived as potential challengers by the President's entourage who financially benefited a lot from their position.

COMMENTS -+

1) Interview with Source 2, a senior civil servant in the Ministry of Defence, 27 June 2014
2) Interview with Source 3, a senior government official involved in anti-corruption activities, 25 June 2014
3) Website of the Ministry of Defence (www.defence.tn)
4) Isabelle Mandraud, &quoute;Un an après la chute de Ben Ali, l'armée s'occupe de tout&quoute;, 13 January 2012, http://www.lemonde.fr/tunisie/article/2012/01/13/en-tunisie-les-militaires-s-efforcent-de-garantir-la-perennite-de-la-revolution_1629331_1466522.html
5) Fayçal Cherif, &quoute;57e anniversaire naissance d’une armée républicaine&quoute;, 26 June 2013, http://www.realites.com.tn/2013/06/26/naissance-dune-armee-republicaine/#sthash.3xPhWhsu.dpuf
6) The calculations of Tunisia’s military, 20 January 2011, http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/01/20/the-calculations-of-tunisias-military/
7) Abandoned at the Palace: Why the Tunisian Military Defected from the Ben Ali Regime in January 2011, 27 February 2013, http://www.jonathanmpowell.com/uploads/2/9/9/2/2992308/brooks_2013jss_-_abandoned_at_the_palace_-_why_the_tunisian_military_defected_from_the_ben_ali_regime.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: During Ben Ali's mandates defence and security institutions were systematically excluded from beneficial ownership of commercial businesses. Indeed, they were perceived as potential challengers by the President's entourage who financially benefited a lot from their position.

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

31.
score
N/A

Are military-owned businesses subject to transparent independent scrutiny at a recognised international standard?

Researcher4104: There is no evidence that the Tunisian army owns commercial businesses. The website of the Ministry of Defence does not mention such ownership. The budget of the Ministry of Defence do not mention resources from commercial businesses. The interviewees had no knowledge of such ownership and a review of the Tunisian and international press did not result in evidence of ownership by the army of any significant commercial businesses.

COMMENTS -+

1) 2014 Budget of the Ministry of Defence, http://www.finances.gov.tn/index.php?option=com_jdownloads&Itemid=712&view=finish&cid=541&catid=1&lang=fr
1) Interview with Source 2, a senior civil servant in the Ministry of Defence, 27 June 2014
2) Interview with Source 3, a senior government official involved in anti-corruption activities, 25 June 2014
4) Website of the Ministry of Defence (www.defence.tn)
5) Isabelle Mandraud, &quoute;Un an après la chute de Ben Ali, l'armée s'occupe de tout&quoute;, 13 January 2012, http://www.lemonde.fr/tunisie/article/2012/01/13/en-tunisie-les-militaires-s-efforcent-de-garantir-la-perennite-de-la-revolution_1629331_1466522.html
6) Fayçal Cherif, &quoute;57e anniversaire Naissance d’une armée républicaine&quoute;, 26 June 2013,
http://www.realites.com.tn/2013/06/26/naissance-dune-armee-republicaine/#sthash.3xPhWhsu.dpuf,

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: Based on the comments of the Country Assessor score 4 seems more appropriate.

Suggested score: 4

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

32.
score
4

Is there evidence of unauthorised private enterprise by military or other defence ministry employees? If so, what is the government's reaction to such enterprise?

Researcher4104: Article 30 of the law n° 67-20 dated 31 May 1967 on the General Status of the Military states that it is forbidden for the military to practice a commercial profession, to do private remunerated activity or to take positions in commercial companies as directors, administrators or managers.

However, military and defence ministry employees are permitted to own shares in private commercial corporations, either directly or through their relatives. These shares are authorised only in instances where the corporations in question have no commercial relations with the ministries involved, due to the corruption risk, but in practice there could still be military or ministry employees involved in this. There is no evidence, however, that suggests military and defence ministry employees do own shares in unauthorised private enterprises.

COMMENTS -+

1) Law n° 67-20 dated 31 May 1967 on General Status of the Military, http://www.legislation-securite.tn/fr/node/27887;
2) Interview with Source 3, a senior government official involved in anti-corruption activities, 25 June 2014
3) Press review (www.observatoire-securite.tn)
4) Jobs or Privileges : Unleashing the Employment Potential of the Middle East and North Africa, 2015, https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/20591

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Looking into specific personnel. Difficult query to get unambiguous information on. As for the general, structural issues regarding the military and the economy:

http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/Tunisiastandsout_kpfabian_311214.html

In Jobs or Privileges: Unleashing the Employment Potential of the Middle East, the others suggest that while the Tunisian armed forces did not &quoute;own businesses or engage in illicit economic activities, security forces have exploited their political power to own commercial businesses and attain licenses&quoute;, etc.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Policies & codes 90
34.
score
1

Do the Defence Ministry, Defence Minister, Chiefs of Defence, and Single Service Chiefs publicly commit - through, for example, speeches, media interviews, or political mandates - to anti-corruption and integrity measures?

Researcher4104: The Ministry of Defence does not communicate on issues of corruption on its website.There is no evidence of any public announcements concerning anti-corruption from the Ministry of Defence. Also, a press review showed that only few articles were dedicated to the commitment of the Ministry of Defence to anti-corruption measures. This indicates that the only commitment by the Ministry of Defence could be its participation in some seminars on security sector reform.

COMMENTS -+

1) Ministry of Defence website (www.defence.tn);
2) Review of Tunisian press (www.observatoire-securite.tn)
3) &quoute;Discussions à l'Institut de Défense Nationale et à l'Ecole Supérieure de Guerre sur la gestion de la réforme du secteur de la sécurité dans un contexte de transition démocratique&quoute;, 31 January 2013, http://www.dcaf-tunisie.org/Fr/activite-partenaires/discussions-a-l-institut-de-defence-nationale-et-a-l-ecole-superieure-de-guerre-sur-la-gestion-de-la-reforme-du-secteur-de-la-securite-dans-un-contexte-de-transition-democratique/77/180 ;
4) &quoute;DCAF discute de la transparence du secteur de la défense avec le Ministre tunisien de la défense nationale&quoute;, 14 December 2012, http://www.dcaf-tunisie.org/Fr/activite-partenaires/dcaf-discute-de-la-transparence-du-secteur-de-la-defence-avec-le-ministre-tunisien-de-la-defence-nationale/77/186 ;
5) &quoute;Services de renseignements, entre respect des droits de l’Homme et efficacité de l’action-Une réalité délicate, une refonte à en définir les péripéties&quoute;, La Presse de Tunisie, 16 May 2013, http://www.observatoire-securite.tn/Fr/detail_article/services-de-renseignements-entre-respect-des-droits-de-lhomme-et-efficacite-de-laction-une-realite-delicate-une-refonte-a-en-definir-les-peripeties/85/813.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Anti-corruption is not on the agenda of the majority of ministries in Tunisia, and the MOD is not an exception.

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Further, more generally (Dor Srebernik, &quoute;Inequality and Corruption: Drivers of Tunisia's Revolution&quoute; ):

The new constitution attempts to address corruption and inequality in Tunisia. Article 10 of the constitution refers directly to corruption stating that Tunisia will work toward reducing corruption, tax evasion and working toward proper use of public funds (“Jasmine Foundation”). In Article 11, the constitution mandates the disclosure of earnings for any member of government and the Chamber of the People’s Deputies or lower house. Article 130 further elaborates on corruption, making a provision for the creation of a Commission for Good Governance and Anti-Corruption. This commission will consist of independent, impartial members “in charge of monitoring cases of corruption within the public and private sectors, investigating and confirming them, and submitting them to the relevant authorities.” Both Islamist and secularist constitution designers attempted to include ways to reduce corruption and the threat it presents to their new democracy.

However, the relevant articles do not outline clear mechanisms to ensure the impartiality of the new anti-corruption commission and the overall reduction of corruption. While investigative powers are granted, the language is not clear on whether the commission has the power to initiate a prosecution. As Transparency International highlights, both investigation and prosecution powers are essential for an anticorruption body to be effective (“Transparency International”). In addition, there is no specification of the crucial selection process of officials to this commission. Hence, while the commission may have powers to investigate a case, the ranks may be filled with president appointees and acquaintances. Thus, while the ideas embodied in the constitution are progressive in tackling corruption, clear language on how to attempt to secure these ideas is missing.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

35.
score
2

Are there effective measures in place for personnel found to have taken part in forms of bribery and corruption, and is there public evidence that these measures are being carried out?

Researcher4104: Law n° 67-20 dated 31 May 1967 on the General Status of the Military allows for the imposition of disciplinary sanctions against any military officer who commits 'offences against honour', such as bribery, theft or violence, when on service or outside of it (Article 17). In case a military officer is convicted of a criminal offence (like bribery), he is dismissed from his post (Article 26). Although these disciplinary measures are general in scope, they are applicable in cases of corruption.

Evidence about disciplinary measures taken against military personnel has not been published by the government. Furthermore, there is no evidence about such cases in the media. There is no publicly available and verifiable information that these measures are actually being carried out.

COMMENTS -+

1) Law n° 67-20 dated 31 May 1967 on the General Status of the Military, http://www.legislation-securite.tn/fr/node/27887
2) Press review (www.observatoire-securite.tn)

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Thorough media search did not provide any evidence of disciplinary measures taken against military personnel found to have taken part in forms of bribery and corruption.

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Measures do exist, however, they are not implemented. This could be blamed on the lack of will to build integrity within the MOD.

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

36.
score
0

Is whistleblowing encouraged by the government, and are whistle-blowers in military and defence ministries afforded adequate protection from reprisal for reporting evidence of corruption, in both law and practice?

Researcher4104: Tunisia currently has no mechanisms or laws that protect whistle-blowers in corruption matters. However, the Tunisian government is aware of the need to implement a law that protects whistle-blowers. Indeed, Article 11 of Decree-Law 2011-120 dated November 4, 2012 requires the implementation of laws and mechanisms to ensure the protection of victims, witnesses and whistle-blowers of corruption.

The Secretary of State in charge of Governance and Public Service stated that a law to protect whistle-blowers is being developed. Also, a website to report on cases of corruption has been created by the Presidency of the Government, which allows visitors to report cases of corruption anonymously, without the website registering the users' IP addresses. There is no evidence of the use and/or effectiveness of this website.

There are no explicit laws protecting whistle-blowers within the defence and security institutions. Furthermore, there is no evidence of any known cases of whistleblowers in defence.

Within the Ministry of Interior, however, there was one famous case of whisteblowing. The whistle-blower was a senior MOI employee who came to be known as the first whistle-blower in the post-revolutionary Tunisia. He sent two letters to Tunisia's Interior Minister that accused high-level ministry officials of having destroyed sensitive archives following the ouster of President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali on January 14. The whistle-blower also accused ministry officials of having killed protesters during the Tunisian revolution, and of other human rights abuses. He was then arrested for &quoute;harming the external security of the state&quoute;, &quoute;releasing and distributing information likely to harm public order&quoute;, and &quoute;accusing, without proof, a public agent of violating law&quoute;.In March 2012, he was acquitted of major charges, but fined for &quoute;accusing a public employee of violating law without proof&quoute;.

COMMENTS -+

1) OECD Tunisia integrity scan, June 2013, http://www.oecd.org/cleangovbiz/Tunisia-Integrity-ScanFR.pdf
2) Lutte contre la Corruption : Trois projets de loi en cours d'étude, 10 June 2014, www.mosaiquefm.net/fr/index/a/ActuDetail/Element/38355-lutte-contre-la-corruption-trois-projets-de-loi-en-cours-d-etude
3) Website to report on cases of corruption http://www.anticorruption-idara.gov.tn/
4) Decree law n° 2011-120 dated 14 November 2011 on Anti-Corruption, http://www.legislation-securite.tn/fr/node/30469
6) &quoute;Human Rights Watch : Libérez Samir Feriani&quoute;, 10 June 2011, http://www.tunisienumerique.com/human-rights-watch-liberez-samir-feriani/44146
7) &quoute;Tunisie. L’officier Samir Feriani s’en sort avec une peine très légère&quoute;, 27 March 2012, http://www.kapitalis.com/politique/9033-tunisie-lofficier-samir-feriani-sen-sort-avec-une-peine-tres-legere.html

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: No case was found of whistleblowers in defence and security institutions. However one case was found related to the murder of an employer from Ministry of State Property and Land Affairs, Anis Aziz, two months after he publicly revealed corruption cases within his Ministry. Despite requests from NGOs such as Article 19, no adequate legal protection of whistleblowers has been drafted so far.

Nawat, &quoute;Opening legislation and public perception to whistleblowers muckrackers principled leakers in Tunisia&quoute;, 13/06/2014, http://nawaat.org/portail/2014/06/13/opening-legislation-and-public-perception-to-whistleblowers-muckrakers-principled-leakers-in-tunisia/

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The website www.anticorruption-idara.gov.tn is not functional and was not known within the people. Besides, one cannot encourage people (public officials or other) to denounce corruption when there are no mechanisms to protect them. Whsitleblowers are not protected neither culturally nor legally. That is to say, people still regard reporting persons as &quoute;snitches&quoute;, which discourages one who is willing to report on a corrupt practice. Regarding the law that has been developed, it was made public in early MArch 2015, and it was criticized by national and international experts for how weak the law is.

As for cases of whistleblowers in defence and security institutions, there is one famous case that happened within the MOI. The whistleblower was a senior MOI employee (his name is Samir Feriani). He was arrested in May 2011 and came to be known as the first whistleblower in the post-revolutionary Tunisia. Before his arrest, Feriani sent two letters to Tunisia's Interior Minister, Habib Essid, that named high-level ministry officials who have been destroying sensitive archives following the ouster of President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali on January 14. Mr Feriani’s letter also charged that ministry officials bore responsibility for killing protesters during the Tunisian revolution, as well as for other human rights abuses. His accusations were reported in two independent Tunisian newspapers, El Khabir and l'Audace, days before his arrest, after his letters were ignored by both the Minister of Interior and the Prime Minister. Days after that, he was arrested for allegedly &quoute;harming the external security of the state&quoute;, &quoute;releasing and distributing information likely to harm public order&quoute;, and &quoute;accusing, without proof, a public agent of violating law&quoute;. During his arrest, his family went through a lot, he was called by different names, and was humiliated and tortured. On September 22, Feriani was released by a military court. In March 2012, he was acquitted of major charges, but fined for &quoute;accusing a public employee of violating law without proof&quoute;. Feriani was satisfied with the outcome, expressing his hopes that it will mark the start of a deeper investigation into the Ministry of Interior's corruption, and that he will be reappointed to his position within the Ministry. Indeed, he was reappointed, but the investigations never took place.

Sources: http://freetunisia.org/FreeTunisia/2011/06/12/release-samir-feriani/
http://www.tunisienumerique.com/human-rights-watch-liberez-samir-feriani/44146
http://www.kapitalis.com/politique/9033-tunisie-lofficier-samir-feriani-sen-sort-avec-une-peine-tres-legere.html



Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: http://www.studentpulse.com/articles/924/2/inequality-and-corruption-drivers-of-tunisias-revolution?utm_expid=22625156-1.JXOwidWBT9qABIv2oA58RQ.0&utm_referrer=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.studentpulse.com%2Farticles%2F924%2Finequality-and-corruption-drivers-of-tunisias-revolution

&quoute;Protection for whistleblowers must expand in Tunisia in order to reduce complainants’ fears of reprisal. Tunisians project government and politicians to be the most affected by corruption. However, current legislation in Tunisia does not provide whistleblower protection to public sector employees, only to private sector workers (“Tunisia Country Profile”). This legislation must expand in order to cover the prevalent occurrences of public officials demanding profits from private firms or determining appointments at state-owned firms. In addition, a third of households in Tunisia who chose not to report corruption stated fear of consequences as their reason. Procedures for reporting corruption should place anonymity as a top priority. In cases where a whistleblower suffers reprisal, courts must deliver highly severe sentences as a warning for potential criminals and a reassurance for potential whistleblowers of the state’s commitment to protect them.&quoute;

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

37.
score
1

Is special attention paid to the selection, time in post, and oversight of personnel in sensitive positions, including officials and personnel in defence procurement, contracting, financial management, and commercial management?

Researcher4104: Through review of the legislation applicable to the Ministry of Defence personnel, evidence of a special attention to personnel in sensitive positions could not be found. The Ministry of Defence did not communicate information about this issue on its website. Furthermore, media reports on the issue could not be found.

In November and December 2014, several training courses on &quoute;Good Governance in the Armed Forces&quoute; were organised by the Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of the Armed Forces (DCAF). Eighty officers of the Tunisian army and representatives from several other countries participated.

All personnel of the Ministry of Defence are subject to an investigation prior to recruitment but there is no evidence about the extent of this investigation and if it differs when a sensitive position is filled.

COMMENTS -+

1) Law n° 67-20 dated 31 May 1967 on the general status of the military, http://www.legislation-securite.tn/fr/node/27887;
2) Decree n° 72-380 dated 6 December 1972, on the particular status of the military, http://www.legislation-securite.tn/fr/node/27891;
3) Arrêté du ministre de la défense nationale du 8 Novembre 1973 portant application des dispositions du décret n° 72-380 du 6 décembre 1972, portant statut particulier des militaires, http://www.legislation-securite.tn/fr/node/28097;
4) Ministry of defence website (www.defence.tn)
5) Press review (www.observatoire-securite.tn)

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: No public recognition that some positions are more vulnerable to corruption than others was found
Source : Ministry of Defence's website (www.defence.tn).

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Nothing is neither recognized nor declared openly.

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Regarding internal MoD appointments, no information found.

Regarding MoI: http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2015/02/03/tunisia-opts-for-an-inclusive-new-government/

The Washington Post, in an article form January 2015 notes that the current Minister of Interior retained his post after government negotiations, despite accusations of corruption being made by two prominent civil society figures – representatives of the Association of Judges, and the Tunisian Observatory for Judicial Independence. The article states that if the allegations of corruption are true, and that corruption is continued in the Interior Ministry, this could seriously thwart much-needed security sector reform.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

38.
score
2

Is the number of civilian and military personnel accurately known and publicly available?

Researcher4104: The website of the Ministry of Defence does not mention the number of civilian and military personnel. However, the 2014 Budget of the Ministry of Defence provides information regarding the number of civilian personnel, the number of personnel who received a promotion and the number of new hires. The country report of the Institute for National Security Studies provides exact numbers of military personnel. The accuracy of these numbers is questionable as the number of personnel is unchanged since 2009. Multiple press reports also provide information about the number of civilian and military personnel.

COMMENTS -+

1) Website of the Ministry of Defence (www.defence.tn)
2) Press review (www.observatoire-securite.tn)
3) 2014 Budget of the Ministry of Defence, http://www.finances.gov.tn/index.php?option=com_jdownloads&Itemid=712&view=finish&cid=541&catid=1&lang=fr
4) Laurent Touchard, Cherif Ouazani, &quoute;Tunisie : ce que vaut vraiment l'armée, 9 December 2013, http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Articles/Dossier/JA2760p028.xml0/tunisie-terrorisme-ennahdha-rached-ghannouchitunisie-ce-que-vaut-vraiment-l-armee.html
5) &quoute;Quel est le poids réel de l’Armée tunisienne?&quoute;, 25 June 2013, http://www.observatoire-securite.tn/Fr/detail_article/quel-est-le-poids-reel-de-larmee-tunisienne/85/585.
6) Institute for National Security Studies, 2 May 2013 http://inss.web2.moonsite.co.il/uploadimages/SystemFiles/tunisia.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: There do not seem to be missing or withheld information. The number of military and support staff is known, as is the military equipment.

Source: Institute for National Security Studies http://inss.web2.moonsite.co.il/uploadimages/SystemFiles/tunisia.pdf

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Not Qualified

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Regarding the reasoning for withheld information, the residue of Ben Ali's management of domestic security as well as the military forces (and the public's continuing distrust), and the general obscurity of the relationship between MoI and MoD that persists on to this day, likely explains some of the lack of information.

As for estimated figures, this baseline could be useful (numbers advanced in regard to security for the elections last year): http://www.aawsat.net/2014/11/article55338763/tunisia-mobilizes-security-military-forces-ahead-of-presidential-elections

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

39.
score
2

Are pay rates and allowances for civilian and military personnel openly published?

Researcher4104: The 2014 Ministry of Defence budget gives general information about the overall amount of wages of civilian and military personnel.

Information about civil personnel pay rates and allowances is publicly available (for example the Decree n° 2013-2834 dated 9 July 2013 concerning increase in the specific allowance given to civilian personnel of the military high education published in the official gazette n°57, 16.07.2013).

Information about pay rates of military personnel is also published in the official gazette (for example Décret n° 2007-2408 du 2 Octobre 2007 modifiant le décret n° 79-96 du 11 janvier 1979 fixant la solde des militaires non classés dans la grille indiciaire de la fonction publique et le régime de l'alimentation dans l'armée, Décret n° 2014-1771 du 23 Mai 2014 portant modification du décret n° 67-158 du 31 mai 1967 fixant le régime des indemnités applicables aux personnels de l’Armée de Terre, Décret n° 2014-1772 du 23 Mai 2014 portant modification du décret n° 68-389 du 12 décembre 1968 relatif aux indemnités accordées aux militaires de l'armée de mer).

However, some details on allowances given to military personnel are not published in the official gazette (for example Décret n° 2011-225 du 22 Octobre 2011 fixant les montants de l'indemnité pour charges militaires servie aux officiers, sous-officiers, hommes de troupes des armées de terre, de l'air et de la mer (not published)), nor available elsewhere on a forum or website.

Media sources often discuss the issue of pay - specifically that military pay is low given the sacrifices that are demanded of the role - but do not go into details regarding facts and figures.

COMMENTS -+

1) 2014 Ministry of Defence Budget, http://www.finances.gov.tn/index.php?option=com_jdownloads&Itemid=712&view=finish&cid=541&catid=1&lang=fr
2) Decree n° 2013-2834 dated 9 July 2013 concerning the increase in the specific allowances given to highly educated civilian personnel of the military, http://www.legislation-securite.tn/sites/default/files/D%C3%A9cret%20n%C2%B0%202013-2834%20du%209%20Juillet%202013%20(Fr).pdf
3) Decree n° 2011-225 du 22 October 2011 fixant les montants de l'indemnité pour charges militaires servie aux officiers, sous-officiers, hommes de troupes des armées de terre, de l'air et de la mer (not publicly available)
4) Decree n° 2014-1772 du 23 Mai 2014 portant modification du décret n° 68-389 du 12 December 1968 relatif aux indemnités accordées aux militaires de l'armée de mer, http://www.legislation-securite.tn/ar/node/33758 (not available in French)
5) Decree n° 2014-1771 du 23 Mai 2014 portant modification du décret n° 67-158 du 31 May 1967 fixant le régime des indemnités applicables aux personnels de l’Armée de Terre, http://www.legislation-securite.tn/ar/node/33761 (not available in French)
6) Decree n° 2007-2408 du 2 Octobre 2007 modifiant le décret n° 79-96 du 11 January 1979 fixant la solde des militaires non classés dans la grille indiciaire de la fonction publique et le régime de l'alimentation dans l'armée, http://www.legislation-securite.tn/fr/node/29033

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

40.
score
4

Do personnel receive the correct pay on time, and is the system of payment well-established, routine, and published?

Researcher4104: The payment system is centralised, so it is the same for all the personnel of the state, local authorities and public institutions. It is a computerised system based on an application named INSAF.

The interviewee said that he never suffered from not receiving his pay on time. No media reports could be found which dealt with the issue of pay, so it is unclear whether all levels of the military are paid in a similarly timely manner.

COMMENTS -+

1) Interview with Source 2, a senior civil servant in the Ministry of Defence, 27 June 2014
2) National computer center website http://www.cni.nat.tn/FR/SCRIPT/insaf.asp
3) Decree n° 79-735 dated 22 August 1979 on the Organisation of the Ministry of National Defence, http://www.legislation-securite.tn/fr/node/27851

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The payment system is not published on the Internet. However it might be available in the administration offices in Tunisia. It is not now if it is in reality available, publicly displayed or available upon request.

However, the website of the Ministry of Defence lists a number of people to contact within the military administrative in order to get access to a number of documents, in compliance with Décret-loi n ° 41 de 2011 of 26 May 2011, Décret-loi n ° 54 de 2011 of 11 June 2011, Circulaire n° 25 of 5 May 2012 about access to public institutions's administrative documents.
Source : Ministry of Defence's website http://www.defence.tn/fr/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=540

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: No the payment system is not published.

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

41.
score
2

Is there an established, independent, transparent, and objective appointment system for the selection of military personnel at middle and top management level?

Researcher4104: There is an established system for the appointment of military personnel. Decree n° 72-380 dated 6 December 1972, on particular status of military and the Ministerial Order dated 8 November 1973 (Article 4) give the mandatory conditions for the selection of the officers and commissioned officers. Several articles of this decree (9, 9 (bis), 14) include conditions relating to the promotion to the rank of colonel or general. Appointments of officers and commissioned officers are published in the official gazette of the Republic of Tunisia (article 40 law n° 67-20 dated 31 May 1967 on the General Status of the Military). Senior military positions are appointed by the President of the Republic (Article 78 of the CRT January 2014).

Some press articles report on appointments of people as Chief of Defence Staff assessing, debating and sometimes criticising their adequacy. However, there are no press reports covering appointments at colonel level in the military and director at the Ministry of Defence. No objective job descriptions and assessment processes for the selection of military personnel at middle and top management level could be found. It might be available in theory in the human resources department of the Ministry of Defence but no mention of it was found on the Internet.

COMMENTS -+

1) Law n° 67-20 dated 31 May 1967 on General status of military as amended by the law Loi n° 2009-47 dated 8 July 2009, http://www.legislation-securite.tn/fr/node/27887;
2) Decree n° 72-380 dated 6 December 1972, on particular status of military as amended by decree n° 2009-3034 dated 12 October 2009 and decree n° 88-903 dated 26 April 1988, http://www.legislation-securite.tn/fr/node/27891;
3) Arrêté du ministre de la défense nationale du 8 Novembre 1973 portant application des dispositions du décret n° 72-380 du 6 Décembre 1972, portant statut particulier des militaires amended in 1991 and 1992, http://www.legislation-securite.tn/fr/node/28387;
4) Noureddine HLAOUI, L’Armée déstabilisée par Marzouki, 27 August 2013, http://www.businessnews.com.tn/tunisie--larmee-destabilisee-par-marzouki,519,40397,3 ;
5) Nizar Bahloul, Dans le détail : Comment Moncef Marzouki a déstabilisé l’appareil militaire tunisien, 21 July 2014, http://www.businessnews.com.tn/dans-le-detail--comment-moncef-marzouki-a-destabilise-lappareil-militaire-tunisien,519,48116,3 ;
6) Ridha Kéfi, L'armée tunisienne victime des manoeuvres de Marzouki, 31 July 2014, http://www.kapitalis.com/politique/23745-l-armee-tunisienne-victime-des-manoeuvres-de-marzouki.html

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: No objective job descriptions and assessment processes for the selection of military personnel at middle and top management level was found. It might be available in theory in the human resources department of the Ministry of Defence but no mention of it was found on the Internet.

The Ministry of Defence does openly publish job offers with a proper application process, but they concern non-management civilian positions.
Source : Ministry of Defence's website http://www.defence.tn/fr/index.php?option=com_wrapper

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: There are no information about the assessment processes and even the job descriptions are not always available. People are not necessarily appointed based on merit especially in middle and top management level.
No oversight mechanisms.

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: There are no publicly listed job descriptions and assessment processes to the best of my knowledge.

While the text below is more relevant to MoI, I believe it is relevant to this report. For more, review Alexis Arieff and Carla Humud (&quoute;Political Transitions in Tunisia&quoute;) as well as Haykel Ben Mahfoudh (&quoute;Security Sector Reform in Tunisia Three Years into the Democratic Transition&quoute;):

Transitional governments between 2011 and 2014 made little concrete progress in ensuring
greater transparency and public oversight of the Interior Ministry and its components.31 The
ministry oversees internal security, the intelligence services, and the police, and under Ben Ali it
was associated with abuses such as extrajudicial arrests, domestic surveillance, intimidation of
political opponents, and torture. Whether the Nidaa Tounes-led government will pursue reforms is
uncertain, given the party’s emphasis on cracking down on security threats and the fact that
several of its officials served in Ben Ali’s government. The National Constituent Assembly
initiated, but did not complete, an effort to amend the controversial 2003 anti-terrorism law,
which critics view as overly broad and insufficiently concerned with due process. Tensions
between the security forces and various civilian leaders also emerged during the transitional
period as pressures increased on the security forces to engage in high-risk counterterrorism
operations, in the absence of structural reforms and in an atmosphere of political distrust.32
Tunisia’s military, estimated at about 35,000 personnel, has historically received fewer state
resources than the internal security services, and many observers view it as relatively apolitical. It
reportedly played a key role in influencing Ben Ali’s decision to step down during the 2011
protests, and reportedly refused an order to open fire on demonstrators. Since 2011, the military
has taken on a more prominent role in counterterrorism and border security. The army remains
popular, but its expanded mandate may risk overstretch.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

42.
score
1

Are personnel promoted through an objective, meritocratic process? Such a process would include promotion boards outside of the command chain, strong formal appraisal processes, and independent oversight.

Researcher4104: The majority of promotions are decided by the Minister of Defence (Law n° 67-20 dated 31 May 1967 on the General Status of the Military, Decree n° 72-380 dated 6 December 1972, on the Particular Status of the Military and Ministerial Order dated 8 November 1973). Senior military positions are appointed by the President of the Republic (Article 78 of the CRT January 2014).

There are advisory committees, whose members are also appointed by the Minister of Defence (Article 14 Decree n° 72-380 dated 6 December 1972, on the Particular Status of the Military).

The promotion process seems to be discretionary despite the fact that promotions of officers and commissioned officers are published on the official gazette of the Republic of Tunisia (article 40 law n° 67-20 dated 31 may 1967 on General status of military). Beyond these legislative documents, there were no substantial media articles or civil society reports that looked into the issue on detail, especially at how well these laws are implemented.

The interviewee stated that in his experience promotions are not exclusively based on merit, asserting that this issue is an important problem. He also confirmed, however, that things have improved over the past year and that he has noticed a better enforcement of existing rules over the past few months. This statement could not be independently verified.

COMMENTS -+

1) Law n° 67-20 dated 31 May 1967 on the General Status of the Military, http://www.legislation-securite.tn/fr/node/27887
2) Decree n° 72-380 dated 6 December 1972, on the Particular Status of the Military, http://www.legislation-securite.tn/fr/node/27891
3) Arrêté du ministre de la défense nationale du 8 Novembre 1973 portant application des dispositions du décret n° 72-380 du 6 décembre 1972, portant statut particulier des militaires, http://www.legislation-securite.tn/fr/node/28097
4) Constitution of the Republic of Tunisia (26 January 2014), https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Tunisia_2014.pdf
5) Interview with Source 2, a senior civil servant in the Ministry of Defence, 27 June 2014

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

43.
score
2

Where compulsory conscription occurs, is there a policy of not accepting bribes for avoiding conscription? Are there appropriate procedures in place to deal with such bribery, and are they applied?

Researcher4104: Article 2 and Article 8 of Law n° 2004-1 of 14 January 2004 on national service decree that any citizen aged between 20 and 35 years must perform a year of national service. Tunisia also has an element of voluntary conscription. In accordance with the aforementioned laws and regulations, recruits can choose to go on &quoute;individual assignments&quoute;, agreeing to perform 21 days of training and then henceforth pay a monthly monetary contribution of 30 to 50 percent of their salary to the military.

The legislation applicable to the defence sector does not include a specific policy warning against accepting bribes for avoiding conscription. The Ministry of Defence does not refer to such a policy on its website or in interviews. Despite extensive research in the Tunisian media, no investigations looking at this issue were found; the score therefore is based on the absence of guidelines against bribery for the purposes of avoiding compulsory conscription.

Law n° 67-20 dated 31 May 1967 on the General Status of the Military allows for the imposition of disciplinary sanctions against any military officer who commits 'offences against honour', such as bribery, theft or violence, when on service or outside of it (Article 17). In case a military officer is convicted of a criminal offence (like bribery), he is dismissed from his post (Article 26). Although these disciplinary measures are general in scope, they are applicable in cases of corruption.

Evidence about disciplinary measures taken against military personnel has not been published by the government. Furthermore, there is no evidence about such cases in the media. There is no publicly available and verifiable information that these measures are actually being carried out.

COMMENTS -+

1) Law n° 2004-1 du 14 Janvier 2004 on national service, http://www.legislation-securite.tn/fr/node/27777;
2) Decree n° 2004-516 du 9 Mars 2004 fixant les modalités de désignation des incorporés pour accomplir le service national en dehors des unités des forces armées et le taux de la participation pécuniaire mensuelle à la charge des incorporés dans le cadre des affectations individuelles et dans le cadre de la coopération technique, http://www.legislation.tn/sites/default/files/fraction-journal-officiel/2014/2014F/010/Tf20145173.pdf;
3) Decree n° 2004-377 du 1er Mars 2004 fixant les conditions d'octroi du sursis et de la dispense de l'accomplissement du service national, http://www.legislation-securite.tn/sites/default/files/files/lois/D%C3%A9cret%20n%C2%B0%202004-377%20du%201er%20Mars%202004%20(Fr).pdf
4) Ministry of Defence website (www.defence.tn) ;
5) Review of legislation applicable to defence sector (www.legislation-securite.tn) ;
6) Review of Tunisian press (www.observatoire-securite.tn)

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

44.
score
2

With regard to compulsory or voluntary conscription, is there a policy of refusing bribes to gain preferred postings in the recruitment process? Are there appropriate procedures in place to deal with such bribery, and are they applied?

Researcher4104: Tunisia has an element of voluntary conscription. In accordance with the aforementioned laws and regulations, recruits can choose to go on &quoute;individual assignments&quoute;, agreeing to perform 21 days of training and then henceforth pay a monthly monetary contribution of 30 to 50 percent of his salary to the military. It is a very expensive alternative to one year's service.

In the legislation applicable to defence sector, however, there is no specific policy of refusing bribes to gain preferred postings in the recruitment process, and the Ministry of Defence does not refer to such a policy on its website. Extensive research in Tunisian media, returned no mention of this issue in the popular press. The score is based on the absence of guidelines against bribery for soliciting preferred postings. Due to said absence, it is possible that bribery occurs to gain preferred postings in the recruitment process.

Law n° 67-20 dated 31 May 1967 on the General Status of the Military allows for the imposition of disciplinary sanctions against any military officer who commits 'offences against honour', such as bribery, theft or violence, when on service or outside of it (Article 17). In case a military officer is convicted of a criminal offence (like bribery), he is dismissed from his post (Article 26). Although these disciplinary measures are general in scope, they are applicable in cases of corruption.

Evidence about disciplinary measures taken against military personnel has not been published by the government. Furthermore, there is no evidence about such cases in the media. There is no publicly available and verifiable information that these measures are actually being carried out.

COMMENTS -+

1) Law n° 2004-1 du 14 Janvier 2004 on national service, http://www.legislation-securite.tn/fr/node/27777;
2) Decree n° 2004-516 du 9 Mars 2004 fixant les modalités de désignation des incorporés pour accomplir le service national en dehors des unités des forces armées et le taux de la participation pécuniaire mensuelle à la charge des incorporés dans le cadre des affectations individuelles et dans le cadre de la coopération technique, http://www.legislation.tn/sites/default/files/fraction-journal-officiel/2014/2014F/010/Tf20145173.pdf;
3) Decree n° 2004-377 du 1er Mars 2004 fixant les conditions d'octroi du sursis et de la dispense de l'accomplissement du service national, http://www.legislation-securite.tn/sites/default/files/files/lois/D%C3%A9cret%20n%C2%B0%202004-377%20du%201er%20Mars%202004%20(Fr).pdf
4) Ministry of Defence website (www.defence.tn) ;
5) Review of legislation applicable to defence sector (www.legislation-securite.tn) ;
6) Review of Tunisian press (www.observatoire-securite.tn)

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

45.
score
3

Is there evidence of 'ghost soldiers', or non-existent soldiers on the payroll?

Researcher4104: There is no evidence of the existence of ghost employees in the Ministry of Defence. No cases regarding ghost soldiers have been reported in the media, and the interviewee confirmed that he has no knowledge of the existence of ghost employees in the Ministry of Defence.

Furthermore, the payment system is centralised and computerised which significantly reduces the risk of existence of such ghost soldiers.

However, multiple cases of ghost employees were revealed in other public entities which suggests that the phenomenon could occur in the defence sector too.

COMMENTS -+

1) Review of the Tunisian press;
2) Interview with Source 3, a senior government official involved in anti-corruption activities, 25 June 2014
3) &quoute;Tunisie: Ouvriers de chantiers et emplois fictifs, une charge de 231 milliards pour l’Etat&quoute;, 11 July 2012, http://www.espacemanager.com/tunisie-ouvriers-de-chantiers-et-emplois-fictifs-une-charge-de-231-milliards-pour-letat.html
4) &quoute;Affaire des &quoute;emplois fictifs&quoute; : 4 anciens directeurs généraux de Tunisair devant la justice&quoute;, 6 March 2014, http://www.mosaiquefm.net/fr/index/a/ActuDetail/Element/34109-affaire-des-emplois-fictifs-4-anciens-directeurs-generaux-de-tunisair-devant-la-justice ;
5) National computer center website, http://www.cni.nat.tn/FR/SCRIPT/insaf.asp

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

46.
score
4

Are chains of command separate from chains of payment?

Researcher4104: In accordance with article 13 of Decree n° 79-735 dated 22 August 1979 on the organisation of the Ministry of National Defence, the General Directorate of Administrative and Financial Affairs is responsible for mandating or authorising the expenditure of personnel, and for the administrative and financial affairs of the personnel of the Ministry of Defence.

The Directorate of Personnel and Training is responsible for other aspects of military personnel management (Article 18 of the same Decree).

Despite extensive research, no other sources related to this issue, such as reports from the media, or from civil society, could be found.

COMMENTS -+

1) Decree n° 79-735 dated 22 August 1979 on the Organisation of the Ministry of National Defence, http://www.legislation-securite.tn/fr/node/27851

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: After further search on the English, Arabic and French-speaking, no information about payment process in the armed forces was found. Perhaps it is available upon physical request to the military administration.

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Sayigh touches on this issue, as well as the past four years of SSR in Tunisia, in the report I have copied below. Could be a useful reference for this as well as many other of the questions here.

http://carnegie-mec.org/2015/03/17/missed-opportunity-politics-of-police-reform-in-egypt-and-tunisia

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

47.
score
2

Is there a Code of Conduct for all military and civilian personnel that includes, but is not limited to, guidance with respect to bribery, gifts and hospitality, conflicts of interest, and post-separation activities?

Researcher4104: There is no Code of Conduct for Defence Ministry personnel in particular, but a Code of Conduct for Public Officials was approved by the decree dated 3 October 2014 which is a code setting the behavior of all Public Officials in all Ministries. The code includes, but is not limited to, bribery, gifts and hospitality, conflicts of interest, parallel and political activities. No evidence could be found regarding its application and distribution, or about whether there is a robust oversight mechanism.

COMMENTS -+

1) Review of legislation applicable to defence sector (www.legislation-securite.tn)
2) Review of Tunisian press (www.observatoire-securite.tn)
3) Website of the Ministry of Defence (www.defence.tn)
4) Decree n° 2014-4030 du 3 octobre 2014 approving the Code of Conduct for Public Officials, http://www.legislation-securite.tn/fr/node/34576
5) Code of Conduct for Public Officials, 3 October 2014, http://www.consultations-publiques.tn/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&id=70&layout=blog&Itemid=196

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: According to article 133 of the Military Justice Code, the detailed provisions of the Criminal Code (including art 82 to 94 about the penalization of corruption) is applicable to the military.

Source - Criminal code promulgated by Decree dated 9 July 1913 (http://www.legislation.tn/sites/default/files/codes/Penal-1.pdf)
Source - Military Justice Code promulgated by Decree dated 31 may 1967 https://www.icrc.org/ihl-nat/a24d1cf3344e99934125673e00508142/0ac6383761727da7c12576b20039921e/$FILE/D%C3%A9cret%2010%20Janvier%201957%20-%20Code%20de%20justice%20militaire%20%28Fr%29.pdf

Suggested score: 3

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: There is no Code of Conduct for defence Ministry personnel in particular, but there is the Code of Conduct and Ethics of Public Officials (ratified on 3 October 2014), which is a code setting the behavior of all Public Officials in all Ministries. This definitely means that a Code of Conduct does exist. The Code includes, but is not limited to, bribery, gifts and hospitality, conflicts of interest, parallel and political activities. In regards to whether the Ministry of defence has taken the Code into consideration or not, it is a no for the previous Government, and still not clear for the new one as they just started their work.
This is a link to the Code of Conduct:
http://www.consultations-publiques.tn/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&id=70&layout=blog&Itemid=196

As for the criminal code, its official name is the &quoute;Penal Code&quoute;. The link to the Code is: http://www.legislation.tn/sites/default/files/codes/Penal-1.pdf
The source is Section II - Article 83-94 of the Penal Code.
The source is still relevant as it is still among the few text incriminating corruption in the public sector. However, the date indicated (9 July 1913) is wrong. The latest version of the Code was reviewed and amended on 15 June 2013.

Suggested score: 2

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Yes, I believe it is relevant to this question (establishing that yes, a code of conduct is operational and legally relevant, at least in theory, at MoD). As concerns whether this code carries any weight in the day to day activities of the military, I have not found any evidence to date that would confirm such a claim.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

48.
score
1

Is there evidence that breaches of the Code of Conduct are effectively addressed ,and are the results of prosecutions made publicly available?

Researcher4104: A Code of Conduct for Public Officials was approved by the decree dated 3 October 2014 which is a code setting the behavior of all Public Officials in all Ministries. The code includes, but is not limited to, bribery, gifts and hospitality, conflicts of interest, parallel and political activities. However, there is no specific Code of Conduct for the defence sector. Since the Code of Conduct was approved so recently, it is difficult to say if breaches are effectively addressed. There is no evidence of communication from the Ministry of Defence on this issue and no evidence of any prosecutions.

COMMENTS -+

1) Review of legislation applicable to defence sector (www.legislation-securite.tn)
2) Review of Tunisian press (www.observatoire-securite.tn)
3) Website of the Ministry of Defence (www.defence.tn)
4) Decree n° 2014-4030 du 3 octobre 2014 approving the Code of Conduct for Public Officials, http://www.legislation-securite.tn/fr/node/34576
5) Code of Conduct for Public Officials, 3 October 2014, http://www.consultations-publiques.tn/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&id=70&layout=blog&Itemid=196

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

49.
score
1

Does regular anti-corruption training take place for military and civilian personnel?

Researcher4104: The Ministry of Defence does not communicate on this issue and a review of the Tunisian press did not provide any evidence regarding the existence of this kind of training. The interviewee could not confirm the existence of such training and the website of the Ministry of Defence does not mention the existence of such training.

In November and December 2014, several training courses on &quoute;Good Governance in the Armed Forces&quoute; have been organised by the Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of the Armed Forces (DCAF). Eighty officers of the Tunisian army and military representatives from several other countries participated in the module. Other training sessions are planned for the future.

COMMENTS -+

1) Interview with Source 2, a senior civil servant in the Ministry of Defence, 27 June 2014
2) Review of the Tunisian press (www.observatoire-securite.tn)
3) Ministry of Defence website (www.defence.tn)
4) Le DCAF dirige le premier module d’un cycle de formation intitulé «La bonne gouvernance dans les forces armées » à l’École supérieure de guerre (ESG), 17 November 2014, http://www.dcaf-tunisie.org/Fr/activite-partenaires/le-dcaf-dirige-le-premier-module-dun-cycle-de-formation-intitule-la-bonne-gouvernance-dans-les-forces-armees-a-lecole-superieure-de-guerre-esg/77/10168
5) Le DCAF complète le second volet d’un cycle de formation à l’École supérieure de guerre en traitant la question du droit d’accès à l’information dans le domaine de la défense, 27 November 2014,
http://www.dcaf-tunisie.org/Fr/activite-partenaires/le-dcaf-complete-le-second-volet-dun-cycle-de-formation-a-lecole-superieure-de-guerre-en-traitant-la-question-du-droit-dacces-a-linformation-dans-le-domaine-de-la-defence/32/10173.
6) Le DCAF complète son cycle de formation à l’Ecole supérieure de guerre avec un troisième et dernier volet sur la planification budgétaire et la lutte contre la corruption, 1 December 2014,
http://www.dcaf-tunisie.org/Fr/activite-partenaires/le-dcaf-complete-son-cycle-de-formation-a-lecole-superieure-de-guerre-avec-un-troisieme-et-dernier-volet-sur-la-planification-budgetaire-et-la-lutte-contre-la-corruption/77/10174

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The trainings that took place are training initiated by international organizations and not by the Tunisian Government or the MOD itself. This shows the absence of will to fight corruption.

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: http://carnegie-mec.org/2015/03/17/missed-opportunity-politics-of-police-reform-in-egypt-and-tunisia

More relevant to MoI, but I think essential reading all the same.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

50.
score
1

Is there a policy to make public outcomes of the prosecution of defence services personnel for corrupt activities, and is there evidence of effective prosecutions in recent years?

Researcher4104: Outcomes are not made public. Otherwise, despite an intensive research through media and official statements of the Ministry of Defence we could not find any evidence proving the existence of a policy of making public outcomes of the prosecution of defence services personnel for corrupt activities. In fact, the Military court does not communicate any statistics of prosecutions.

The interviewee had no knowledge of such cases in the defence sector.

Through a review of the Tunisian press, cases of prosecutions of defence services personnel for corrupt activities could not be found, and neither could public speculation surrounding the topic. However there has been speculation over other issues not related to the defence sector such as the release by the ordinary courts of former ministers under the dictatorship accused of corruption. It is worth noting that the military is one of the most trusted institutions in Tunisia and generally not perceived to be corrupt.

However, it is worth noting that rare cases of prosecution and conviction of members of the police force for corruption have been found.

COMMENTS -+

1) Review of the Tunisian press (www.observatoire-securite.tn);
2) Interview with Source 3, a senior government official involved in anti-corruption activities, 25 June 2014
3) &quoute;Un agent de police échappe à une accusation d’espionnage mais écope de six ans de prison pour corruption&quoute;, 6 May 2014, http://www.businessnews.com.tn/un-agent-de-police-echappe-a-une-accusation-despionnage-mais-ecope-de-six-ans-de-prison-pour-corruption,520,46170,3
4) Website of the Ministry of Defence (www.defence.tn)
5) Global Corruption Barometer 2013, http://www.transparency.org/gcb2013/country?country=tunisia

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Again, more relevant to MoI, but I don't think you can talk about defence services in Tunisia in a meaningful way without examining MoI:

&quoute;Complicating matters was the insistence of Ennahdha, supported by the Congress for the Republic, on excluding former regime members from public office. Although the so-called political immunization law—similar to the political isolation laws debated in Egypt in Libya—was never passed, it cast a long shadow over the transition. The security sector vehemently opposed applying immunization to its ranks even when human rights organizations and some police unions as well agreed that Ben Ali loyalists still held senior positions within the Interior Ministry.67
In reality, Ennahdha could not easily dismiss incumbent officers and officials unilaterally, without independent vetting or the support of its governing coalition partners. Indeed, when then interior minister Larayedh tried in early 2012 to dismiss the commander of the intervention forces who was on trial for ordering the use of live fire against unarmed demonstrators during the 2011 uprising, he was forced to retract following a walkout by the force, which was responsible for securing public spaces and facilities....

government in the second half of 2014, Tunisia’s political parties retreated still further from a security sector reform agenda. The result was an increasingly permissive environment, leading to police abuses reminiscent of the Ben Ali era.
Riot police still lacked appropriate crowd-control equipment and training over a year after the parliamentary commission was formed to investigate the use of lethal force against protesters in April 2012. The forces killed three civilian bystanders during protests in May 2013 and then attacked a peaceful sit-in in July, for example. The police remained legally able to hold suspects for six days without pressing charges or processing them in the prison system, according to Human Rights Watch, which additionally gathered testimony showing that detainees were subjected to abuse “during arrest and interrogation” ranging from “threats of rape, shoving, slaps, punches, kicks, and beatings with sticks and batons.”73 And several suspects died due to mistreatment while in police custody between December 2013 and October 2014.
An emboldened security sector became less tolerant of open challenges or criticism. Rappers performing a song disrespectful of the police were arrested and beaten in late August 2013, for example. And in April 2014 two revolutionary activists were given prison sentences for posting a video online accusing members of police and judges’ unions of corruption; the video was deemed a threat to national security.74 In March 2014, armed police forcibly took over the regional offices of the national elections committee in Kairouan that they wished to use as a station, and in April others besieged a regional court in which a fellow officer was on trial for unlawfully killing a citizen, demanding his release.75
The culture of police impunity revived in the context of the growing counterterrorism campaign in which the government has resorted to outdated legislation to justify authoritarian measures. In August 2014, Jomaa ordered the suspension of 157 Islamist associations for alleged links to terrorism, basing his decree on a 1975 law that had in fact been amended after the 2011 uprising to limit this power to the judiciary. The government also shut down several radio channels and mosques that it accused of promoting religious extremism without judicial orders, while in parallel police assaults on journalists multiplied.76 And the 2003 antiterror law used by Ben Ali to criminalize domestic opposition was once again put to use with the arrest of some 1,500 suspected jihadists in the first nine months of 2014 alone.77&quoute;


Read more at: http://carnegie-mec.org/2015/03/17/missed-opportunity-politics-of-police-reform-in-egypt-and-tunisia

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

51.
score
2

Are there effective measures in place to discourage facilitation payments (which are illegal in almost all countries)?

Researcher4104: Facilitation payments are punished according to Articles 82 to 94 of the Criminal Code, penalising the corrupter, the corrupted and the intermediary between the two. It punishes both positive and negative acts which include donations or promises of donations and gifts or advantages of any kind, whether for the purpose of active or passive corruption. Similarly, the Criminal Code penalises acceptance of donations by corrupted individuals. This includes cases where officials are receiving to carry out an activity that is within the remit of their official duties, or to refrain from carrying out said duties.

According to article 133 of the Military Justice Code, the provisions of the Criminal Code are also applicable to the military.

Despite these provisions and the severity of sanctions (up to twenty years of imprisonment), corruption is increasing in Tunisia. The legal mechanisms do not seem to give tangible results and the occurrence of facilitation payments is common. For instance, evidence indicates that small bribery has tripled in Tunisia after the revolution.

This situation can perhaps be explained by the transition period that Tunisia is currently experiencing. The country is living through political instability and security problems, with the rationale being that the fight against terrorism, security and the organisation of elections take priority over fighting corruption. The country's economy is characterised by rising prices and declining purchasing power, which could also contribute to the rise of small bribery. Civil society organisations in the country denounce the government's lack of political will in the fight against corruption, urging it to uphold and enforce the existing legislation.

COMMENTS -+

1) Criminal code promulgated by Decree dated 9 July 1913, http://www.legislation.tn/sites/default/files/codes/Penal-1.pdf (or http://www.jurisitetunisie.com/tunisie/codes/cp/cp1000.htm);
2) Law n° 67-20 dated 31 May 1967 on the General status of the Military, http://www.legislation-securite.tn/fr/node/27887;
3) Military Justice Code http://www.anticor.tn/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/Tunisie-Code-justice-militaire-2010.pdf;
4) Prolifération de la petite corruption, 27 May 2014, http://www.anticor.tn/news-anticortn/proliferation-de-la-petite-corruption/;
5) Fighting corruption and promoting competition, OECD Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs, Competition Committee, 7 February 2014, http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DAF/COMP/GF/WD%282014%2928&docLanguage=En

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/12/tunisia-smuggling-trade-poses-security-risk-201412237244616426.html

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Training 60
52.
score
0

Do the armed forces have military doctrine addressing corruption as a strategic issue on operations?

Researcher4104: The Military Justice Code and the Law on the General Status of the Military do not mention corruption.

The sanctions for corruption that can be incurred by the military are established by the Criminal Code. There is no evidence that a doctrine addressing corruption as a strategic issue on operations exists, and the Ministry of Defence does not communicate on this issue. If such doctrine exists it is not published and it is not known to the public. There were also no available sources from media or NGOs talking about corruption within the army when on operations, nor any evidence suggesting that corruption is recognised as a strategic issue in operations.

Therefore, it is not possible to speak about corruption as a strategic issue on operations in Tunisia.

COMMENTS -+

1) Criminal code promulgated by Decree dated 9 July 1913, http://www.legislation.tn/sites/default/files/codes/Penal-1.pdf or http://www.jurisitetunisie.com/tunisie/codes/cp/cp1000.htm
2) Law n° 67-20 dated 31 May 1967 on the General Status of the Military, http://www.legislation-securite.tn/fr/node/27887
3) Military Justice Code, http://www.anticor.tn/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/Tunisie-Code-justice-militaire-2010.pdf or https://www.icrc.org/ihl-nat/a24d1cf3344e99934125673e00508142/0ac6383761727da7c12576b20039921e/$FILE/D%C3%A9cret%2010%20Janvier%201957%20-%20Code%20de%20justice%20militaire%20(Fr).pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

53.
score
1

Is there training in corruption issues for commanders at all levels in order to ensure that these commanders are clear on the corruption issues they may face during deployment? If so, is there evidence that they apply this knowledge in the field?

Researcher4104: The Ministry of Defence does not communicate on this issue and a review of the Tunisian press does not provide extensive evidence of the existence of this kind of training. Both interviewees had no knowledge about such training on a regular basis.

In November and December 2014, several training courses on &quoute;Good Governance in the Armed Forces&quoute; have been organised by the Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of the Armed Forces (DCAF). Eighty officers of the Tunisian army and military representatives from several other countries participated the module. Other training sessions are planned in the future. However, these courses did not deal with corruption on deployment specifically.

There is no evidence of mishandling of corruption cases by commanders or of them turning a blind eye to corrupt activities in the field.

COMMENTS -+

1) Interview with Source 2, a senior civil servant in the Ministry of Defence, 27 June 2014
2) Interview with Source 1, a senior civil servant in the Ministry of Interior, 28 June 2014
3) Review of the Tunisian press (www.observatoire-securite.tn)
4) Le DCAF dirige le premier module d’un cycle de formation intitulé «La bonne gouvernance dans les forces armées » à l’École supérieure de guerre (ESG), 17 November 2014, http://www.dcaf-tunisie.org/Fr/activite-partenaires/le-dcaf-dirige-le-premier-module-dun-cycle-de-formation-intitule-la-bonne-gouvernance-dans-les-forces-armees-a-lecole-superieure-de-guerre-esg/77/10168
5) Le DCAF complète le second volet d’un cycle de formation à l’École supérieure de guerre en traitant la question du droit d’accès à l’information dans le domaine de la défense, 27 November 2014,
http://www.dcaf-tunisie.org/Fr/activite-partenaires/le-dcaf-complete-le-second-volet-dun-cycle-de-formation-a-lecole-superieure-de-guerre-en-traitant-la-question-du-droit-dacces-a-linformation-dans-le-domaine-de-la-defence/32/10173.
6) Le DCAF complète son cycle de formation à l’Ecole supérieure de guerre avec un troisième et dernier volet sur la planification budgétaire et la lutte contre la corruption, 1 December 2014,
http://www.dcaf-tunisie.org/Fr/activite-partenaires/le-dcaf-complete-son-cycle-de-formation-a-lecole-superieure-de-guerre-avec-un-troisieme-et-dernier-volet-sur-la-planification-budgetaire-et-la-lutte-contre-la-corruption/77/10174

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The DCAF conducted a three-part training cycle about corruption at the High School for War that was completed last December.

Source : Le DCAF complète son cycle de formation à l’Ecole supérieure de guerre avec un troisième et dernier volet sur la planification budgétaire et la lutte contre la corruption, 1 December 2014,
http://www.dcaf-tunisie.org/Fr/activite-partenaires/le-dcaf-complete-son-cycle-de-formation-a-lecole-superieure-de-guerre-avec-un-troisieme-et-dernier-volet-sur-la-planification-budgetaire-et-la-lutte-contre-la-corruption/77/10174

Since then it has focused on the implementation of law in the fight against terrorism (with a seminar in February 2015). The attacks on the Bardo Museum may increase focus on the fight against terrorism in the forthcoming months and years.


Source : Le DCAF participe à une table ronde sur le renforcement des capacités de contrôle des services de renseignement, 22 January 2015, http://www.dcaf-tunisie.org/Fr/activite-partenaires/le-dcaf-participe-a-une-table-ronde-sur-le-renforcement-des-capacites-de-controle-des-services-de-renseignement/77/10184
Le DCAF contribue à un atelier régional sur « Le contrôle des services d’application de la loi et des autres services de sécurité en matière de lutte contre le terrorisme », 27 February 2015, http://www.dcaf-tunisie.org/Fr/activite-partenaires/le-dcaf-contribue-a-un-atelier-regional-sur-le-controle-des-services-dapplication-de-la-loi-et-des-autres-services-de-securite-en-matiere-de-lutte-contre-le-terrorisme/77/10187

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: There are no updates neither about the outcome of the trainings nor about the occurence of corruption in operations. The issue of corruption in defence in a taboo subject that even if it happens, people would turn a blind eye and never stand against it. This might be blamed on the fact that there are no laws protecting whistleblowers in any sector, and the culture of fighting and denouncing corruption is brand new.

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

54.
score
1

Are trained professionals regularly deployed to monitor corruption risk in the field (whether deployed on operations or peacekeeping missions)?

Researcher4104: The Ministry of Defence does not communicate on this issue and a review of the Tunisian press does not provide evidence of the existence of this kind of training, whether from media or civil society reports. The interviewee had no knowledge about such trained professionals.

COMMENTS -+

1) Interview with Source 2, a senior civil servant in the Ministry of Defence, 27 June 2014
2) Review of the Tunisian press http://www.observatoire-securite.tn/

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

55.
score
0

Are there guidelines, and staff training, on addressing corruption risks in contracting whilst on deployed operations or peacekeeping missions?

Researcher4104: The Ministry of Defence does not communicate on this issue and a review of the Tunisian press does not provide evidence of the existence of this kind of training, whether through news articles or civil society reports. The interviewee had no knowledge about such guidelines. A training organised by the Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of the Armed Forces (DCAF) in December 2014 was related in part to contracting issues but there is no evidence to suggest that this was specific to contracting on mission.

COMMENTS -+

1) Interview with Source 2, a senior civil servant in the Ministry of Defence, 27 June 2014
2) Review of the Tunisian press http://www.observatoire-securite.tn/
3) &quoute;Le DCAF complète son cycle de formation à l’Ecole supérieure de guerre avec un troisième et dernier volet sur la planification budgétaire et la lutte contre la corruption&quoute;, 1 December 2014, http://www.dcaf-tunisie.org/Fr/activite-partenaires/le-dcaf-complete-son-cycle-de-formation-a-lecole-superieure-de-guerre-avec-un-troisieme-et-dernier-volet-sur-la-planification-budgetaire-et-la-lutte-contre-la-corruption/77/10174

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Not Qualified

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

56.
score
4

Private Military Contractors (PMCs) usually refer to companies that provide operational staff to military environments. They may also be known as security contractors or private security contractors, and refer to themselves as private military corporations, private military firms, private security providers, or military service providers.

Researcher4104: Private military contractors are not allowed in Tunisia. Article 17 of the constitution decrees that &quoute;only the State may establish armed forces and internal security forces, according to the law and to serve public interest&quoute;, prohibiting the existence of any armed group that does not belong to the State. Although there are private security companies operating in Tunisia, they are contracted for guarding purposes only, and not by the military, and there is a law that sanctions the illegal holding of weapons. For its staff to carry weapons,the private security company needs a special permit from the Ministry of Interior. In addition, staff from private security companies have to undergo regular and mandatory training.

Furthermore, a review of the Tunisian press did not provide any evidence of the existence of private military contractors, nor does budget of the Ministry of Defence include expenditures connected with private military contractors. The interviewee also confirmed that there are no private military contractors operating in Tunisia.

Response to Peer Reviewer 1: The source used cannot be considered as reliable. No cases of corruption have been reported by media.

COMMENTS -+

1) Constitution of the Republic of Tunisia, 27 January 2014, http://www.businessnews.com.tn/bnpdf/Constitutionfrancais.pdf
2) Interview with Source 2, a senior civil servant in the Ministry of Defence, 27 June 2015
3) Review of the Tunisian press http://www.observatoire-securite.tn/
4) 2014 Budget of the Ministry of Defence, http://www.finances.gov.tn/index.php?option=com_jdownloads&Itemid=712&view=finish&cid=541&catid=1&lang=fr
5) United Nations Annual report of the Working Group on the use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination, 30 June 2014, http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:x4L1sirm3kUJ:www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session27/Documents/A_HRC_27_50_
6) PMCs are governed by the following provisions :
- Loi n° 2002-81 du 3 Août 2002 relative à l'exercice des activités privées de contrôle, de gardiennage, de transport de fonds et de métaux précieux et de protection physique des personnes
- Loi n°2008-14 du 18 Février 2008 modifiant et complétant la loi n° 2002-81 du 3 août 2002, relative àl’exercice des activités privées de contrôle, de gardiennage, de transport de fonds et de métaux précieux et de protection physique des personnes
-Décret n° 2003-1090 du 13 Mai 2003 déterminant les modalités, procédures et droits dus sur la délivrance de l'autorisation d'exercice des activités privées de contrôle, de gardiennage, de transport de fonds et de métaux précieux et de protection physique.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Under the previous regime there has been allegations in the media that foreign security contractors were employed to tackle the anti-regime demonstrations (mainly snipers).

Source : Tunisie Secret, &quoute;Tunisie : selon un ancien officier français, les snipers étaient des mercenaires étrangers&quoute;, 7 June 2013, http://www.tunisie-secret.com/Tunisie-selon-un-ancien-officier-francais-les-snipers-etaient-des-mercenaires-etrangers_a449.html

Since the revolution, no known cases of corruption of the operation of private security firms was found. Moreover, the regulations relating to their operation were not found on the Internet. They might be only locally available.

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: No known cases of corruption.
Nothing public.

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The UN has published a report on PMCs in Francophone Africa, detailing Tunisia's policies amongst many others. The report is worth reviewing at length:

http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:x4L1sirm3kUJ:www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session27/Documents/A_HRC_27_50_ENG.doc+&cd=10&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us

&quoute;25.tThe laws of Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Tunisia provide for authorizations and licences to be granted by or registered with the ministry responsible for internal security. In other countries, it is an intergovernmental body under the ministry in charge of internal security or the local government that is responsible for licensing and monitoring PSC activities. Morocco’s law provides for a “competent administrative authority” in charge of reviewing the requests for authorization, but does not specify further responsibilities or the relationship with a supervising or monitoring ministry or other government body.
26.tAs a precondition for granting a licence, Burkina Faso requires a “review of the moral standards of the company’s managers”, while in Senegal, the authority in charge of authorizing private security activities conducts an “investigation of the moral standards” of the applicant, and in Tunisia, potential employees of PSCs must “be known to be of good behaviour.” Nowhere is reference to human rights standards or training stated as being a prerequisite for managers or personnel in order for a PSC to obtain authorization for a licence.
27.tWith regard to national registration of PSCs, only Cameroonian law requires the relevant authority to “maintain a national record of security companies”. Morocco has a self-registration system that obliges PSCs to establish and maintain an internal registry of the identity of employees and other data necessary for monitoring their activities and Tunisian law contains a similar provision, obliging the holder of the authorization to keep a register within the Ministry of the Interior. Legislation of the remaining countries do not make any reference to national or self-registration systems.&quoute;

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Personnel 50
57.
score
1

Does the country have legislation covering defence and security procurement and are there any items exempt from these laws?

Researcher4104: General legislation covers general defence and security procurement. Decree 3158-2002 dated 17 December 2002 Organising Public Procurement was criticised for its lack of transparency by donors such as the African Development Bank, and even the services of the Presidency of the government (see Source 4). There were also media reports showing public criticism of purchasing decisions made by direct agreement, including a consignment of helicopters bought from France (see Source 6).

A new Decree n°1039-2014 dated 13 March 2014 organising public procurement was issued and is now applicable to most defence and security procurement. This new decree is expected to bring more transparency. However, there has not been any evidence of its effectiveness yet. Article 49 of the same decree provides that procurement can be made by direct negotiation for public security and national defence reasons.

Meanwhile, some purchases within defence and security procurements are governed by Decree n° 88-36 dated 12 January 1988 on the special procedure of control of certain expenditure of the Ministries of Defence and Interior. This decree established a specific procedure, namely a &quoute;Special Committee&quoute; in each of those two ministries, chaired by the concerned minister or his representative. This committee is responsible for multiple phases of exempted procurement, which relates to sensitive equipment and supplies. These, for security reasons, do not follow the general defence procurement protocols, but appear only on a secure list established by the President of Government. The Special Committee receives limited scrutiny from external services.

COMMENTS -+

1) Decree n°1039-2014 dated 13 March 2014 on Organising Public Procurement, http://www.legislation.tn/sites/default/files/journal-officiel/2014/2014F/Jo0222014.pdf;
2) Decree 3158-2002 dated 17 December 2002 organising public procurement, http://www.legislation-securite.tn/fr/node/28703;
3) Decree n° 88-36 dated 12 January 1988 on special procedure of control of certain expenditure of the Ministries of Defence and Interior, http://www.legislation-securite.tn/fr/node/279450;
4) Rapport final sur l’évaluation du système national de passation des marchés publics en Tunisie, Commission supérieure des marchés, June 2012, http://semed.ppl.ebrd.com/materials/fra_afdb_assessment_report.pdf
5) Imed Bahri, Défense: La France vend à la Tunisie 6 hélicoptères Caracal pour 300 millions d'euros, 30 April 2014,
http://www.kapitalis.com/politique/22034-defence-la-france-vend-a-la-tunisie-6-helicopteres-caracal-pour-300-millions-d-euros.html ;
6) Wicem Souissi, 6 February 2014, Tunisie-France : entente très amicale pour une commande d’hélicoptères z’ailés ? http://www.tunisiefocus.com/politique/tunisie-france-entente-tres-amicale-pour-une-commande-dhelicopteres-zailes-79265/

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

58.
score
1

Is the defence procurement cycle process, from assessment of needs, through contract implementation and sign-off, all the way to asset disposal, disclosed to the public?

Researcher4104: The needs assessments of only two agencies within the Ministry of Defence (the National Mapping and Remote Sensing Centre and the Topography and Cadastral Office) are published on the website of the Tunisian National Observatory of Public Procurement. There is no mention of the procurement cycle process on the website of the Ministry of Defence itself.

A review of the Tunisian press showed that only few articles are dedicated to major procurement. Indeed, some purchasing decisions of military equipment made by direct agreement have been actively criticised, such as a consignment of helicopters from France.

COMMENTS -+

1) Website of Ministry of Defence (www.defence.tn)
2) Review of the Tunisian press (www.observatoire-securite.tn)
3) Website of the Tunisian procurement observatory (www.marchespublics.gov.tn).
3) Imed Bahri, Défense: La France vend à la Tunisie 6 hélicoptères Caracal pour 300 millions d'euros, 30 April 2014,
http://www.kapitalis.com/politique/22034-defence-la-france-vend-a-la-tunisie-6-helicopteres-caracal-pour-300-millions-d-euros.html ;
4) Wicem Souissi, 6 February 2014, Tunisie-France : entente très amicale pour une commande d’hélicoptères z’ailés ? http://www.tunisiefocus.com/politique/tunisie-france-entente-tres-amicale-pour-une-commande-dhelicopteres-zailes-79265/

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

59.
score
2

Are defence procurement oversight mechanisms in place and are these oversight mechanisms active and transparent?

Researcher4104: Specific oversight mechanisms are provided for defence procurement by Decree n° 88-36 dated 12 January 1988 on the special procedure of control of expenditure of the Ministries of Defence and Interior. This decree established a &quoute;Special Committee&quoute; in each of these two ministries that oversee even sensitive items. However, these committees can not be considered as truly independent because they are chaired by the concerned minister or his representative. Moreover they are only subject to a limited audit by the expenditures audit services (Art 8 of the decree).

For more general non-exempted purchases, general legislation applies (Decree n°1039-2014 dated 13 March 2014 organising public procurement), and for these purchases, oversight mechanisms exist (High Committee of Procurement, committees of procurement control). However, the OECD Integrity Scan (June 2013) considered that these control bodies lack the human and financial resources and the independence needed properly to exercise these control operations.

In 2014, a National Council of Procurement was established by the decree n°1039-2014, which aims to solve some of these issues, there is no evidence regarding its effectiveness.

Response to Peer Reviewer 1: Agree, score increased from 1 to 2. Sources added.

COMMENTS -+

1) Decree n° 88-36 dated 12 January 1988 on the special procedure of control of expenditure of the Ministries of Defence and Interior, http://www.legislation-securite.tn/fr/node/27945;
2) Decree n°1039-2014 dated 13 March 2014 organising public procurement, http://www.legislation.tn/sites/default/files/journal-officiel/2014/2014F/Jo0222014.pdf;
3) Tunisia Integrity Scan, OECD, June 2013, http://www.oecd.org/cleangovbiz/Tunisia-Integrity-ScanEN.pdf
4) Tunisia: Reform of Public Procurement System Under Focus, 29 May 2014, http://allafrica.com/stories/201405300125.html
5) Medias24, &quoute;Les nouvelles règles de la commande publique au Maghreb&quoute;, 25 November 2014, http://www.medias24.com/chro150756Les-nouvelles-regles-de-la-commande-publique-au-Maghreb.html

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The National Council of Procurement has come into effect through the implementation of Decree n°1039-2014 dated 13 March 2014 organising public procurement on June 1st 2014.

Source: Medias24, &quoute;Les nouvelles règles de la commande publique au Maghreb&quoute;, 25 November 2014, http://www.medias24.com/chro150756Les-nouvelles-regles-de-la-commande-publique-au-Maghreb.html

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The National Council of Procurement seems to be effective, however, this is only for general and basic purchases only (paper, printers and such). For other purchases, they do not have the prerogative to oversee them. However, one of the duties of the Security and defence Committee, which is a parliamentary committee, is to oversee all the operations whithin the MOD and MOI, and procurement should be covered. Whether the committee is effective or not, one cannot tell as it was created in late March 2015, thus, its effectiveness cannot be measured at the moment.

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: http://allafrica.com/stories/201405300125.html

http://nawaat.org/portail/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/2_TN_Urban-Dev-and-Local-Governance.pdf
pp.32-33

https://www.google.tn/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=9&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CEgQFjAI&url=http%3A%2F%2Fsemed.ppl.ebrd.com%2Fmaterials%2Feng_tunisia.ppt&ei=-wgYVZr8C4ukNpSohLgE&usg=AFQjCNHJAwknnAi_jR-t6DlnzcTLH2mj2g

The ERB has not published a new report since 2014 from what I can assess.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

60.
score
1

Are actual and potential defence purchases made public?

Researcher4104: The Ministry of Defence rarely provides information on defence purchases and its website does not mention such purchases. The 2014 budget of the Ministry of Defence includes very limited information about equipment purchases. A review of the Tunisian press showed that only few defence purchases are published by the media, such as the purchase of six helicopters or the purchase of American military equipment (see sources 4,5,6). There are also articles criticising the silence of the authorities on these purchases (see source 6).

In April 2015, the Ministry of Defence announced that US helicopters would soon be delivered to Tunisia. Since then, there have been no media reports about this purchase.

Generally, the Ministry of Defence's secrecy is justified by citing security reasons. The large number of non-published purchases suggests that this may be being overused.

COMMENTS -+

1) Website of the Ministry of Defence (www.defence.tn)
2) Review of the Tunisian press (www.observatoire-securite.tn)
3) 2014 Budget of the Ministry of Defence, http://www.finances.gov.tn/index.php?option=com_jdownloads&Itemid=712&view=finish&cid=541&catid=1&lang=fr
4) La Tunisie achète du matériel militaire américain, 26 September 2013, http://www.businessnews.com.tn/la-tunisie-achete-du-materiel-militaire-americain,520,411133
5) La Tunisie conclut un accord avec la France pour l’achat de 6 hélicoptères militaires, 4 November 2013 http://www.tuniscope.com/index.php/article/34133/actualites/societe/militaires-562509
6) Imed Bahri, Défense: La France vend à la Tunisie 6 hélicoptères Caracal pour 300 millions d'euros, 30 April 2014,
http://www.kapitalis.com/politique/22034-defence-la-france-vend-a-la-tunisie-6-helicopteres-caracal-pour-300-millions-d-euros.html
7) Wicem Souissi, 6 February 2014, Tunisie-France : entente très amicale pour une commande d’hélicoptères z’ailés ? http://www.tunisiefocus.com/politique/tunisie-france-entente-tres-amicale-pour-une-commande-dhelicopteres-zailes-79265/
8) Farhat Horchani: Des Helicopteres de combat US bientot livres a la Tunisie, 28 April 2015, http://pajti.com/article/270841-Farhat-Horchani-Des-helicopteres-de-combat-US-bientot-livres-a-la-Tunisie

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Actual purchases are sometimes made public generally through the media. That is applicable for major purchases especially. However, for potential defence purchases, which depend on the needs sometimes, they are not made public, and this is applicable in most of the countries around the world. One can see that there is X budget allocated for procurement for instance, but it doesn't specify the exact items that will be purchased. This information could be shared with the concerned parties within the Government and the MOD, but being open to the public before the purchase is not necessary.

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

61.
score
1

What procedures and standards are companies required to have - such as compliance programmes and business conduct programmes - in order to be able to bid for work for the Ministry of Defence or armed forces?

Researcher4104: Decree n° 88-36 dated 12 January 1988 on the Special Procedure of Control of Expenditure of the Ministries of Defence and Interior does not require that any anti-corruption procedures or standards are demanded. Furthermore, a review of Decree n° 1039-2014 dated 13 March 2014 on organising public procurement does not provide evidence that discrimination is made between companies on the grounds of integrity. A review of the applicable legislation confirms the absence of such discrimination.

However, Articles 177, 178, 179 of Decree n°1039-2014 dated 13 March 2014 provide that companies can be excluded from the tender in case of corruption. However, this does not apply specifically to defence procurement, and it is too soon to properly assess how effectively these are being implemented.

COMMENTS -+

1) Decree n°1039-2014 dated 13 March 2014 Organising Public Procurement, http://www.legislation.tn/sites/default/files/journal-officiel/2014/2014F/Jo0222014.pdf;
2) Review of legislation applicable to defence and security (www.legislation-securite.tn)
3) Decree n° 88-36 dated 12 January 1988 on the special procedure of control of expenditure of the Ministries of Defence and Interior, http://www.legislation-securite.tn/fr/node/27945

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

62.
score
1

Are procurement requirements derived from an open, well-audited national defence and security strategy?

Researcher4104: Article 8 of the Decree n°1039-2014 dated 13 March 2014 organising public procurement provides that public purchasers must establish an annual procurement plan, and publish it on the procurement website. However, the article also allows for exemptions in the case of defence and security procurement. In fact, only annual plans of two agencies of the Ministry of Defence - the National Mapping and Remote Sensing Centre and the Topography and Cadastral Office - are published on the Tunisian procurement website.

Decree n° 88-36 dated 12 January 1988 on the Special Procedure of Control of Expenditure of the Ministries of Defence and Interior does not mention a defence and security strategy at all. The Ministry of Defence budget, meanwhile, mentions the existence of some procurement plans, but give no substantial details; instead aggregating budget allowances and not allowing the public to determine whether purchases fall within or outside of planned expenditure. It is therefore difficult to determine the proportion of purchases outside the national strategy.

COMMENTS -+

1) Decree n°1039-2014 dated 13 March 2014 Organising Public Procurement, http://www.legislation.tn/sites/default/files/journal-officiel/2014/2014F/Jo0222014.pdf;
2) Review of legislation applicable to defence and security (www.legislation-securite.tn)
3) Website of the Tunisian National Observatory of Public Procurement (www.marchespublics.gov.tn);
4) 2014 Budget of the Ministry of Defence, http://www.finances.gov.tn/index.php?option=com_jdownloads&Itemid=712&view=finish&cid=541&catid=1&lang=fr;
5) Decree n° 88-36 dated 12 January 1988 on the Special Procedure of Control of Expenditure of the Ministries of Defence and Interior, http://www.legislation-securite.tn/fr/node/27945

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

63.
score
0

Are defence purchases based on clearly identified and quantified requirements?

Researcher4104: A review of 2014 Ministry of Defence budget confirms the existence of annual plans on which purchases are based. However only very general details are given. No other evidence (neither the website of the Ministry of defence nor the Tunisian press) could be found regarding those requirements. Therefore, it is not possible to affirm that these plans exist and/or are followed in practice.

COMMENTS -+

1) Ministry of Defence website (www.defence.tn)
2) 2014 Ministry of Defence budget, http://www.finances.gov.tn/index.php?option=com_jdownloads&Itemid=712&view=finish&cid=541&catid=1&lang=fr
3) Review of the Tunisian press (www.observatoire-securite.tn)

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: No formal procedure was publicly found (no traces of it on the government's websites and no mention of it by the press or NGOs in French, English or Arabic, although some call to tenders emanating from the military may be available.

As an example, call to tenders Avis D\'A/O N° 03/2015/DGM for the construction of a diving training centre for the Navy is publicly available but no mention is made of the needs for it (source : http://www.defence.tn/fr/index.php?option=com_wrapper1).

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: No formal procedures or requirements are in place. The general legal framework of procurements does not apply on the MOD, thus, it is up to the MOD leaders to decide for the quality, quantity, timing, company etc. The same goes for the MOI. The two institutions seem to be excluded from the general legal framework.

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Yeah, I am struggling to find procedural/institutional regulations here:

http://www.finances.gov.tn/index.php?option=com_jdownloads&Itemid=712&view=finish&cid=798&catid=1&lang=fr

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

64.
score
1

Is defence procurement generally conducted as open competition or is there a significant element of single-sourcing (that is, without competition)?

Researcher4104: Article 2 of Decree n° 88-36 dated 12 January 1988 on the Special Procedure of Control of Expenditure of the Ministries of Defence and Interior provides that certain purchases of these two ministries can be made by direct negotiation. This special procedure is justified by security matters.

Moreover, while article 6 of Decree n°1039-2014 dated 13 March 2014 Organising Public Procurement provides that procurement must be conducted as open competition, Article 49 of the same decree provides that procurement can be made by direct negotiation for public security and national defence reasons.

A review of the Tunisian press suggests that major purchases are single sourced (for example the purchase of six helicopters for 350 millions dinars, the purchase of 12 Black Hawk helicopters, or the purchase of American military equipment for 60 millions dollars.

It is not possible to assess what percentage are single-sourced.

COMMENTS -+

1) Decree n° 88-36 dated 12 January 1988 on the Special Procedure of Control of Expenditure of the Ministries of Defence and Interior, http://www.legislation-securite.tn/fr/node/27945;
2) Decree n°1039-2014 dated 13 March 2014 organising public procurement, http://www.legislation.tn/sites/default/files/journal-officiel/2014/2014F/Jo0222014.pdf;
3) Website of the Ministry of Defence (www.defence.tn) ;
4) La Tunisie achète du matériel militaire américain, 26 September 2013, http://www.businessnews.com.tn/la-tunisie-achete-du-materiel-militaire-americain,520,41113,3
5) La Tunisie conclut un accord avec la France pour l’achat de 6 hélicoptères militaires, 4 November 2013, http://www.tuniscope.com/index.php/article/34133/actualites/societe/militaires-562509
6) Farhat Horchani: Des hélicoptères de combat US bientôt livrés à la Tunisie, 28 April 2015, http://www.kapitalis.com/politique/29103-farhat-horchani-des-helicopteres-de-combat-us-bientot-livres-a-la-tunisie.html

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: http://www.ansamed.info/ansamed/en/news/nations/france/2013/11/04/Tunisia-France-buys-helicopters-fight-against-terrorism_9564443.html

http://www.dsca.mil/major-arms-sales/tunisia-uh-60m-black-hawk-helicopters

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

65.
score
1

Are tender boards subject to regulations and codes of conduct and are their decisions subject to independent audit to ensure due process and fairness?

Researcher4104: Article 3 of Decree n° 88-36 dated 12 January 1988 on the Special Procedure of Control of Expenditure of the Ministries of Defence and Interior established in each of those two ministries a committee responsible of the opening of tenders, price negotiation and preparation of contract clauses. This applies to cases of defence expenditure that do not fall under the general laws of procurement due to their sensitive nature (as defined by the President). According to Article 5 of the same decree, this work is overseen by a special committee chaired by the concerned minister or his representative.

However, despite extensive research we have not been able to find other information on the functioning of the commission or its effectiveness.

For other purchases, general legislation applies (Decree n°1039-2014 dated 13 March 2014 Organising Public Procurement). For these purchases decisions are subject to an independent control, for example by the High Committee of Procurement and the committees of procurement control.

However, the OECD Integrity Scan (June 2013) considered that these control bodies lack the human and financial resources and the independence needed to exercise these control operations properly.

In 2014, a National Council of Procurement was established by the decree n°1039-2014 which may seek to address some of the flaws in the pre-existing system. There is no evidence of it taking measures or publishing reports yet. It is however referred to on the governement's procurement website (www.marchespublics.tn). Given that it is a relatively new body, its effectiveness can not yet be assessed). No further information could be found.

COMMENTS -+

1) Decree n° 88-36 dated 12 January 1988 on the Special Procedure of Control of Expenditure of the Ministries of Defence and Interior, http://www.legislation-securite.tn/fr/node/27945
2) Decree n°1039-2014 dated 13 March 2014 on Organising Public Procurement, http://www.legislation.tn/sites/default/files/journal-officiel/2014/2014F/Jo0222014.pdf
3) Tunisia Integrity Scan, OECD, June 2013, http://www.oecd.org/cleangovbiz/Tunisia-Integrity-ScanEN.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The National Council for Procurement has come into effect on June 1st 2014. So far it has not taken any measures or published any report. It is however referred to on the governement's procurement website (www.marchespublics.tn).

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The National Council of Procurement is working and is effective except that it only covers the basic purchases (papers, printers and such) of the MOD and MOI. When it comes to other kinds of purchases, the Council does not have a say. However, the Parliamentary Committee for Security and defence has a monitoring role to anything related to defence and security whether at the organizational level or the strategic level.

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: See previous slide regarding National Council of Procurement.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

66.
score
1

Does the country have legislation in place to discourage and punish collusion between bidders for defence and security contracts?

Researcher4104: A review of regulations applicable to the defence and security sector confirms the absence of specific provisions for collusion in defence and security. However collusion between bidders is punished by Law n° 64-1991 dated 21 July 1991 on Prices and Competition. Also, Article 177 of Decree n°1039-2014 dated 13 March 2014 organising public procurement imposes that the public purchaser cancels the tender if the bidder is convicted of malpractice like collusion during the bidding process. As stated previously, these general laws apply to any purchase including defence purchases. They do not include, however, defence purchases listed as sensitive by the President. There is no information as to how collusion in these purchases is dealt with.

Furthermore, Article 177 of Decree n°1039-2014 dated 13 March 2014 on Organising Public Procurement states that: the National Council for Procurement will issue the list of the tenders who have been temporarily or permanently excluding from bidding. The modalities of the drafting of this list as well as the sanctions applicable must be published by decree.

There is no other publicly available information on how collusion is punished and discouraged in the defence sector. Evidence about collusion of bidders and the consequences could not be found in media reports or other publications.

COMMENTS -+

1) Law n°64-1991 dated 21 July 1991 on Prices and Competition, http://www.intt.tn/upload/txts/fr/loi_193.pdf
2) Decree n°1039-2014 dated 13 March 2014 on Organising Public Procurement, http://www.legislation.tn/sites/default/files/journal-officiel/2014/2014F/Jo0222014.pdf
3) Review of regulations applicable to the defence and security sector (www.legislation-securite.tn)

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: No sources were found about collusion when it comes to purchasing the exempt goods.

Article 177 of Decree n°1039-2014 dated 13 March 2014 on Organising Public Procurement states that: the National Council for Procurement will issue the list of the tenders who have been temporarily or permanently excluding from bidding. The modalities of the drafting of this list as well as the sanctions applicable must be published by decree.

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Not Qualified

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Indirect linkages: http://www.icij.org/project/swiss-leaks/banking-giant-hsbc-sheltered-murky-cash-linked-dictators-and-arms-dealers

Regarding the special committees, I haven't seen anything specifically.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

67.
score
1

Are procurement staff, in particular project and contract managers, specifically trained and empowered to ensure that defence contractors meet their obligations on reporting and delivery?

Researcher4104: The Ministry of Defence does not provide information on this issue, and a review of the Tunisian press did not bring any evidence of the existence of specific training in order to ensure that defence contractors meet their obligations on reporting and delivery. The interviewee did not have knowledge of such training either.

As previously mentioned, for more general non-exempted purchases, oversight mechanisms do exist (High Committee of Procurement, Committees of Procurement Control). However, the OECD Integrity Scan (June 2013) considered that these control bodies lack the human and financial resources and the independence needed properly to exercise these control operations.

COMMENTS -+

1) Website of the Ministry of Defence (www.defence.tn) ;
2) Interview with Source 2, a senior civil servant in the Ministry of Defence, 27 June 2015
3) Review of the Tunisian press (www.observatoire-securite.tn)
4) Decree n°1039-2014 dated 13 March 2014 Organising Public Procurement, http://www.legislation.tn/sites/default/files/journal-officiel/2014/2014F/Jo0222014.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

68.
score
2

Are there mechanisms in place to allow companies to complain about perceived malpractice in procurement, and are companies protected from discrimination when they use these mechanisms?

Researcher4104: Article 181 of Decree n°1039-2014 dated 13 March 2014 Organising Public Procurement provides that companies can complain before the Committee of Monitoring and Review of Procurement. This committee can ask the public purchaser to review the tender if it is established that there is malpractice in procurement. Companies can also complain to the Committee of Amicable Settlement of Litigations. However, this committee only exercises an advisory role and its decisions are not binding.

Companies can also complain before the Administrative Court. However, the effectiveness of this system has yet to be proven and going before the Administrative Court takes a long time. In fact, appeals to the Administrative Court are often very slow and cumbersome. The OECD 2013 Tunisia Integrity scan highlights the inefficiency of this system.

It should be noted that defence purchases are governed by Decree n° 88-36 dated 12 January 1988. This decree provides in a general way that &quoute;the Committee examines any problems or disputes relating to the preparation, execution or settlement of contracts and agreements submitted to it&quoute;. In this decree, there is no special mention to the right for companies to complain about perceived malpractice in procurement.

Evidence of past complaints could not be found.

COMMENTS -+

1) Decree n°1039-2014 dated 13 March 2014 organising public procurement, http://www.legislation.tn/sites/default/files/journal-officiel/2014/2014F/Jo0222014.pdf;
2) Law n°72-40 dated 1 June 1972 on the Administrative Court, http://www.legislation-securite.tn/fr/node/28167;
3) Decree n° 88-36 dated 12 January 1988 on the special procedure of control of expenditure of the Ministries of Defence and Interior, http://www.legislation-securite.tn/fr/node/27945;
4) Tunisia Integrity Scan, OECD, June 2013, http://www.oecd.org/cleangovbiz/Tunisia-Integrity-ScanEN.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: No cases of complaints were found to have been reported. The reasons could be that the market in Tunisia is very small and that there are therefore not a lot of tenders. Moreover, Tunisia underwent a major political change with the 2011 revolution leading to the departure of the President and his relatives who were controlling an important part of the country's biggest companies. Since the assets of Ben Ali, his associates and family have been partly frozen and are going through a process of restitution to the Tunisian state or other economic actors it is possible that theses companies have not been able or allowed so far to take part in calls for tenders, thus limiting further the number of tenders.

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: No cases have been reported, the reasons behind it could be whether that the companies think it would be dangerous to complain, or simply because the company itself is not against the malpractice and the corrupt practice in general.

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: http://www.pm.gov.tn/pm/article/article.php?id=180&lang=en:

&quoute;The committee of amicable settlement of litigations established within the Prime Ministry has as a mission to search for the equity elements likely to be adopted in order to find an amicable solution of the litigations related to the public procurements.

The opinion of the committee is advisory and confidential. It may not be produced or used by the parties before the courts.&quoute;

OECD has not published anything regarding the Committee of Monitoring and Review of Procurement in two years.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

69.
score
1

What sanctions are used to punish the corrupt activities of a supplier?

Researcher4104: Article 178 of Decree n°1039-2014 dated 13 March 2014 organising public procurement gives the possibility to temporarily or even permanently exclude companies convicted of corruption in procurement. As the decree has only been in place for a short period of time, no evidence is available yet of its effectiveness as no cases of sanctioning have been reported.

Meanwhile, the media regularly calls for sanctions on suppliers that are known to have dealt in corruption but in the health or infrastructure sectors, talking about the building and maintenance of roads and hospitals, rather than address defence specifically.

Several reports issued in 2012 and 2013 criticised the absence of administrative sanctions and pointed the necessity to build an effective, complete and proportionate sanctions system. Corrupt activities are severely punished according to articles 82 to 94 of the Criminal Code. However, these sanctions are only applicable to natural persons and not to legal entities - i.e, punitive action can be pursued only against individuals and not corporations.

COMMENTS -+

1) Decree n°1039-2014 dated 13 March 2014 organising public procurement, http://www.legislation.tn/sites/default/files/journal-officiel/2014/2014F/Jo0222014.pdf;
2) Criminal Code promulgated by decree dated 9 July 1913, http://www.e-justice.tn/fileadmin/fichiers_site_francais/codes_juridiques/Code_penal_12_07_2010_fr.pdf;
3) OECD, Tunisia Integrity Scan, June 2013, http://www.oecd.org/cleangovbiz/Tunisia-Integrity-ScanEN.pdf
4) Rapport final sur l’évaluation du système national de passation des marchés publics en Tunisie, Commission supérieure des marchés, June 2012, http://semed.ppl.ebrd.com/materials/fra_afdb_assessment_report.pdf ;

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

70.
score
0

When negotiating offset contracts, does the government specifically address corruption risk by imposing due diligence requirements on contractors? Does the government follow up on offset contract performance and perform audits to check performance and integrity?

Researcher4104: Article 22 of decree n°1039-2014 dated 13 March 2014 Organising Public Procurement generally encourages foreign bidders to engage the services of Tunisian companies. However, given the fact that details of the contracts negotiated by the Ministry of Defence are not published, it is difficult to affirm that this Ministry negotiates offset contracts with its foreign contractors. Moreover, no legislation on the subject mentions this practice and a review of the Tunisian press does not provide any evidence of the existence of such a practice.

However, 2015 issues of the QB Countertrade and Offset publication provide information on Tunisian offset guidelines, which has been taken here as evidence that the country does engage in offsets.

The Ministry of Defence has not made an explicit statement confirming that there are no offset contracts. Tunisia's main providers in the military sectors are the USA and France. Research in the press and NGOs reports emanating from these countries found no evidence of recent offset contracts.

COMMENTS -+

1) Decree n°1039-2014 dated 13 March 2014 Organising Public Procurement, http://www.legislation.tn/sites/default/files/journal-officiel/2014/2014F/Jo0222014.pdf
2) Website of the Ministry of Defence (www.defence.tn) ;
3) Review of the Tunisian press (www.observatoire-securite.tn)
4) Review of legislation applicable to the defence and security sector
5) QB Countertrade and Offsets, Volume 2015, Tunisia Offsets, http://cto-offset.com/tunisia/offset-guidelines/

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Sources indicate that offset contracts were widely used in Tunisia. However no recent offset contract seem to have been taking place recently. Tunisia's main providers in the military sectors are the USA and France. Research in the press and NGOs reports emanating from these countries found no evidence of recent offset contracts.

Source: Sauvin Thierry. La compensation, nouvelle voie de développement des relations industrielles Nord/Sud. In: Tiers-Monde. 1988, tome 29 n°113. Multinationales et développement (sous la direction de Wladimir Andreff). pp. 101-119 http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/article/tiers_0040-7356_1988_num_29_113_3622?_Prescripts_Search_tabs1=standard&

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: There are no information available about offset contracts.

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Anecdotal but perhaps useful.

http://www.dsca.mil/major-arms-sales/tunisia-uh-60m-black-hawk-helicopters

&quoute;The principal contractors will be Sikorsky Aircraft Company in Stratford, Connecticut; and General Electric Aircraft Company in Lynn, Massachusetts. There are no known offset agreements in connection with this potential sale.&quoute;

https://www.defenceindustrydaily.com: worth reviewing



Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

71.
score
0

Does the government make public the details of offset programmes, contracts, and performance?

Researcher4104: Article 22 of decree n°1039-2014 dated 13 March 2014 Organising Public Procurement generally encourages foreign bidders to engage the services of Tunisian companies. However, given the fact that details of the contracts negotiated by the Ministry of Defence are not published, it is difficult to affirm whether this Ministry negotiates offset contracts with its foreign contractors. Moreover, no legislation on the subject mentions this practice and a review of the Tunisian press does not provide any evidence of the existence of such practice.

The Ministry of Defence has not made an explicit statement confirming that there are no offset contracts. Tunisia's main providers in the military sectors are the USA and France. Research in the press and NGOs reports emanating from these countries found no evidence of recent offset contracts.

However, 2015 issues of the QB Countertrade and Offset publication provide information on Tunisian offset guidelines, which has been taken here as evidence that the country does engage in offsets.

COMMENTS -+

1) Decree n°1039-2014 dated 13 March 2014 organising public procurement, http://www.legislation.tn/sites/default/files/journal-officiel/2014/2014F/Jo0222014.pdf;
2) Website of the Ministry of Defence (www.defence.tn);
3) Review of the Tunisian press (www.observatoire-securite.tn);
4) Review of legislation applicable to the defence and security sector
5) QB Countertrade and Offsets, Volume 2015, Tunisia Offsets, http://cto-offset.com/tunisia/offset-guidelines/

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Sources indicate that offset contracts were widely used in Tunisia. However no recent offset contract seem to have been taking place recently. Tunisia's main providers in the military sectors are the USA and France. Research in the press and NGOs reports emanating from these countries found no evidence of recent offset contracts.

Source: Sauvin Thierry. La compensation, nouvelle voie de développement des relations industrielles Nord/Sud. In: Tiers-Monde. 1988, tome 29 n°113. Multinationales et développement (sous la direction de Wladimir Andreff). pp. 101-119 http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/article/tiers_0040-7356_1988_num_29_113_3622?_Prescripts_Search_tabs1=standard&

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: No information available.

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Not Qualified

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

72.
score
0

Are offset contracts subject to the same level of competition regulation as the main contract?

Researcher4104: Article 22 of decree n°1039-2014 dated 13 March 2014 Organising Public Procurement generally encourages foreign bidders to engage the services of Tunisian companies. However, given the fact that details of the contracts negotiated by the Ministry of Defence are not published, it is difficult to affirm that this Ministry imposes offset contracts on its foreign contractors. Moreover, no legislation on the subject mentions this practice and a review of the Tunisian press does not provide any evidence of the existence of such practice.

The Ministry of Defence has not made an explicit statement confirming that there are no offset contracts.

However, 2015 issues of the QB Countertrade and Offset publication provide information on Tunisian offset guidelines, which has been taken here as evidence that the country does engage in offsets.

COMMENTS -+

1) Decree n°1039-2014 dated 13 March 2014 Organising Public Procurement, http://www.legislation.tn/sites/default/files/journal-officiel/2014/2014F/Jo0222014.pdf
2) Website of the Ministry of Defence (www.defence.tn) ;
3) Review of the Tunisian press (www.observatoire-securite.tn)
4) Review of legislation applicable to the defence and security sector
5) QB Countertrade and Offsets, Volume 2015, Tunisia Offsets, http://cto-offset.com/tunisia/offset-guidelines/

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Sources indicate that offset contracts were widely used in Tunisia. However no recent offset contract seem to have been taking place recently. Tunisia's main providers in the military sectors are the USA and France. Research in the press and NGOs reports emanating from these countries found no evidence of recent offset contracts.

Source: Sauvin Thierry. La compensation, nouvelle voie de développement des relations industrielles Nord/Sud. In: Tiers-Monde. 1988, tome 29 n°113. Multinationales et développement (sous la direction de Wladimir Andreff). pp. 101-119 http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/article/tiers_0040-7356_1988_num_29_113_3622?_Prescripts_Search_tabs1=standard&

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: No information available.

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

73.
score
0

How strongly does the government control the company's use of agents and intermediaries in the procurement cycle?

Researcher4104: There are no provisions regulating the use of agents and intermediaries in procurement in the decree organising public procurement nor in the other laws and regulations governing the defence and security sectors.

COMMENTS -+

1) Decree n°1039-2014 dated 13 March 2014 Organising Public Procurement, http://www.legislation.tn/sites/default/files/journal-officiel/2014/2014F/Jo0222014.pdf;
2) Decree n° 88-36 dated 12 January 1988 on the Special Procedure of Control of Expenditure of the Ministries of Defence and Interior, http://www.legislation-securite.tn/fr/node/27945;
3) Website of the Ministry of Defence (www.defence.tn) ;
4) Review of the Tunisian press (www.observatoire-securite.tn)
5) Review of legislation applicable to the defence and security sector

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

74.
score
0

Are the principal aspects of the financing package surrounding major arms deals, (such as payment timelines, interest rates, commercial loans or export credit agreements) made publicly available prior to the signing of contracts?

Researcher4104: Details of the financing package are not publicly available. A review of official sources of information confirm that the Ministry of Defence does not officially communicate principal aspects of the financing package surrounding major arms deals. Through the Tunisian and international press, some details about this matter are published but such information is not reliable and was sometimes denied by the authorities (see Mehdi Jomâa,14 May 2014)

COMMENTS -+

1) Ministry of Defence website, www.defence.tn;
2) Website of the observatory of procurement, www.marchespublics.gov.tn;
3) Review of the Tunisian press (www.observatoire-securite.tn)
4) M. Ben Nasr : Les hélicoptères achetés par l'Armée couteront moins que ce qui a été annoncé, 7 May 2014,
http://www.mosaiquefm.net/fr/index/a/ActuDetail/Element/36894-m-ben-nasr-les-helicopteres-achetes-par-l-armee-couteront-moins-que-ce-qui-a-ete-annonce
5) La Tunisie achète du matériel militaire américain, 26 September 2013, http://www.businessnews.com.tn/la-tunisie-achete-du-materiel-militaire-americain,520,41113,3
6) Mehdi Jomâa: Aucun hélicoptère n'a été acheté de la France, 14 May 2014, http://www.mosaiquefm.net/fr/index/a/ActuDetail/Element/37243-mehdi-jomaa-aucun-helicoptere-n-a-ete-achete-de-la-france-video

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

75.
score
0

Does the government formally require that the main contractor ensures subsidiaries and sub-contractors adopt anti-corruption programmes, and is there evidence that this is enforced?

Researcher4104: Article 88 of Decree n°1039-2014 dated 13 March 2014 Organising Public Procurement provides that if the main contractor uses sub-contractors, he must obtain the authorisation of the public purchaser. However, no formal provision requires that the main contractor must adopt anti-corruption programmes.

No other legislation applicable to defence and security sectors provides such requirement and the Ministry of Defence does not provide any information on this issue. Moreover, a review of the Tunisian press did not lead to evidence of the existence of such requirement.

COMMENTS -+

1) Decree n°1039-2014 dated 13 March 2014 organising public procurement, http://www.legislation.tn/sites/default/files/journal-officiel/2014/2014F/Jo0222014.pdf;
2) Website of the Ministry of Defence, www.defence.tn;
3) Review of the Tunisian press, www.observatoire-securite.tn;
4) Review of legislation applicable to the defence and security sector, www.legislation-securite.tn

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

76.
score
2

How common is it for defence acquisition decisions to be based on political influence by selling nations?

Researcher4104: A review of the Tunisian press showed that there are recurrent allegations of political influence from France in order to sell arms to Tunisia. However this influence was denied by the Tunisian authorities and there is no proof that the expenditures made are not justified by military needs.

The Institute for National Security Studies' 2013 Tunisia Report lists the number of goods purchased from foreign powers by the Tunisian government. France and the USA are the main sellers of military goods. No evidence was found that the government provides an appropriate justification for its purchases from France and the USA, however there is no evidence that the equipment was purchased despite not fulfilling minimum standards or operational relevance.

COMMENTS -+

1) Review of the Tunisian press, www.observatoire-securite.tn
2) Imed Bahri, &quoute;Défense: La France vend à la Tunisie 6 hélicoptères Caracal pour 300 millions d'euros&quoute;, 30 April 2014, http://www.kapitalis.com/politique/22034-defence-la-france-vend-a-la-tunisie-6-helicopteres-caracal-pour-300-millions-d-euros.html
3) François Gouyette : l’armée tunisienne a besoin de nos hélicoptères, 14 May 2014, http://www.mosaiquefm.net/fr/index/a/ActuDetail/Element/37217-francois-gouyette-l-armee-tunisienne-a-besoin-de-nos-helicopteres
4) Institute for National Security Studies, Tunisia Report, 2 May 2013, http://inss.org.il/uploadimages/SystemFiles/tunisia.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The Institute for National Security Studies's 2013 Tunisia Report lists the number of goods purchased from foreign powers by the Tunisian government (http://heb.inss.org.il/uploadimages/SystemFiles/tunisia.pdf). France and the USA are indeed the main sellers of military goods.

Also, the detailed list of Tunisia's military equipment informs us about the nationality of the arms manufacturers.

However, the price at which each equipment was paid is not published.

No evidence was found that the government provides an appropriate justification for its purchases from France and the USA. There are no speculation that the equipment was purchased despite not fulfilling minimum standards or operational relevance.

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Not Qualified

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Arms procurements from American companies come under the same level of scrutiny. Especially as the specter of some globally diffuse ISIS-ification of jihadism gains public traction, and in the wake of the museum attacks in Tunis just a few weeks back, speculation of political influence in arms/surveillance procurement are likely to increase.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+