This country is placed in Band D

Russia’s GI ranking in Band D places it in the high risk category for corruption in the defence and security sector, one of the lowest ranked among G20 nations. Russia scored B and D across all risk areas of Political, Finance, Procurement, and Personnel Risks. The highest risk area is Operations in Band F (critically high risk).

Budget Transparency and Secret Items

Budget experts have calculated that more than a half of the defence-related expenditure is classified as confidential in Russia.  As a result, there is no way that defence expenses can be overseen in an effective and independent way by external bodies. Only a narrow group of individuals within parliamentary oversight bodies have access to secret items, while civil society has no visibility at all.  Although most countries keep some defence-related items secret on the grounds of national security, Russia’s exceptionally high overall level of secrecy undermines the national security rationale. We recommend that Russia reconsider the secrecy status of defence budget items and general defence-related information to allow greater scrutiny by Parliament and civil society organizations.

Civil Society and Government Engagement on Defence

Most defence policy decisions (e.g. sending Russian troops abroad, equipping the Armed forces) affect peoples’ lives in a dramatic way and depend on taxpayer contributions. The public does therefore have the right to be included in the defence policy debates. Expert civil society organisations should be given space to conduct independent oversight and suggest recommendations to the government.  To facilitate public engagement, we recommend that restrictive legislation on the NGO sector should be lifted. A foreign agent NGO law, “On undesirable organisations” currently severely impedes the activities of many independent NGOs by classifying them as “foreign agents” when they receive foreign funding. The label not only has a negative connotation, it limits the ability of NGOs to apply for foreign funding and imposes a burden of excessive reporting and accountancy which further inhibits their work.

To ensure that civil society does not fear reprisals in pursuing its anti-corruption efforts, we recommend that whistle-blowing be encouraged and protected by law and in practice. For defence sector cases, verbal and legal encouragement and protection are particularly important as the risks of a severe retaliation such as charges of state treason are likely to be highly discouraging for whistle-blowers as well as media or NGOs that pick up the information.

The government should additionally establish more dialogue between defence institutions and the public, in line with the Ministry of Defence “Plan for Combating Corruption in the Armed Forces for 2014 – 2015” as well as the “Declaration of Openness of Federal Executive Agencies." The Ministry of Defence -- as well as other security and defence institutions -- should involve independent media, NGOs, and other experts more actively in their work. This could be done by inviting them to briefings and other events, as well as by consulting with them on specific issues. 

Judicial Enforcement of Anti-Corruption Law

There should be no impunity and no selective enforcement of anti-corruption legislation. All cases of corruption in defense and security sector need to be investigated and prosecuted properly, including corruption by high-level officials. If some of the corrupt, especially high-level Ministry of Defence officials, fully or partially escape justice or punishment, this will crystallise an atmosphere of impunity for the corrupt.

Leadership 30
01.
score
1

Is there formal provision for effective and independent legislative scrutiny of defence policy?

Researcher4281: The Parliament is entitled to approve or reject legislation on defence and decide on a final defence budget (by Article 5 of Federal Law (FL) N 61-ФЗ &quoute;Об обороне&quoute;), however, in accordance with sentence (2), Paragraph 2, Article 4 of the same FL, the President decides on a military doctrine, and, since 2013, also approves the Defence Plan and the Statute on Military Planning. The Duma Defence Committee reports to have held 38 sessions in 2013 where about 60 draft laws have been discussed that had been sent to the Committee's consideration. Also, three parliamentary hearings in 2013 are mentioned in the report, two of which were closed for the public. At the same time, except from occasional media reports, there is no evidence from independent sources that debates on defence policy regularly take place in the Duma. The voting results for defence issues are available, but, again, it is not clear how regular and how extensive the preceding discussion usually is.

According to voting outcomes, legislation on defence has almost always been voted for by a vast majority or unanimously. Some evidence suggests the Parliament is not independent from the President when taking decisions on politically sensitive issues, including those related to defence and security. For instance, the Council of Federation (Upper Chamber) consented to the President's intention to send troops to Ukraine and later - to Syria. The 90 senators who were present at the session voted for the first decision unanimously and, as the investigation of Lenta.ru points out, in violation of the prescribed procedure. Sending troops to Syria was also reportedly voted for unanimously. There is no evidence of Parliament having influenced defence issues in the last year.

Response to TI Chapter Reviewer:
By law, the chairmen of the chambers and the special commissions do have access to secret defence budget items. The current question relates to provisions for the oversight of defence policy in general, however and oversight of secret budgets is discussed in Questions 25 and 26 . Although there are some indications of the legislature's activity in this domain, the main documents describing the defence policy are decided upon by the President, as described in the initial analysis. These considerations have led to the initial score being reconsidered.
Score changed from 2 to 1.

COMMENTS -+

1) Федеральный закон от 31 мая 1996 г. N 61-ФЗ &quoute;Об обороне&quoute;. http://base.garant.ru/135907/#block_300#ixzz38UwTOhUA;

2) Press office of the Communistic Party group in the Duma, &quoute;«Единая Россия» в Госдуме отказалась проводить парламентское расследование деятельности экс-министра обороны Сердюкова&quoute;, Official website of the Communistic party of the RF, February 26, 2014, accessed July 31, 2014, http://kprf.ru/dep/gosduma/activities/128736.html;

3) The Duma Defence Committee. &quoute;Отчет о работе комитета Государственной Думы по обороне в 2013 году.&quoute; http://www.komitet2-15.km.duma.gov.ru/site.xp/052049.html;

4) State Duma. &quoute;Результаты голосования по вопросам, вынесенным для открытого голосования за период с 21.12.2011 по текущую дату, где в теме содержатся ключевые слова &quoute;оборона.&quoute; http://vote.duma.gov.ru/?convocation=AAAAAAA6&keywords=%D0%BE%D0%B1%D0%BE%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%BD%D0%B0&sort=date_desc&page=1;

5) Constitution of the RF, Article 101. http://www.zakonrf.info/konstitucia/101/;

6) Регламент Государственной Думы, Глава 5, Article 37. http://www.duma.gov.ru/about/regulations/chapter-5/;

7) Федеральный закон Российской Федерации от 7 мая 2013 г. N 77-ФЗ &quoute;О парламентском контроле&quoute;. http://www.rg.ru/2013/05/14/kontrol-dok.html;

8) &quoute;Lenta.ru: Совет Федерации голосовал за ввод войск в Украину без кворума&quoute;, Корреспондент.net, March 13, 2014, accessed November 11, 2014, http://korrespondent.net/world/russia/3319119-Lentaru-sovet-federatsyy-holosoval-za-vvod-voisk-v-ukraynu-bez-kvoruma;

9) MK.RU, &quoute;Ввод российских войск в Сирию&quoute;, September 30, 2015, accessed October 6, 2015, http://www.mk.ru/stories/vvod-rossiyskikh-voysk-v-siriyu/page7/.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: Given that some 50 per cent of the military budget is secret even from the legislators, I would suggest a lower score. Score 2 fits the non-secret part well.

Suggested score: 1

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

02.
score
1

Does the country have an identifiable and effective parliamentary defence and security committee (or similar such organisation) to exercise oversight?

Researcher4281: Both chambers of the Parliament have defence and security committees with extensive formal rights, including the right to invite and question the head of the MoD and scrutinise budget spending. However, the committees lack strong legal instruments to exercise parliamentary control.

The Duma Defence Committee is currently comprised of 17 MPs and 11 staff members. Several Committee MPs are often mentioned in the press in relation to their initiatives or commentaries. According to the Committee's 2014 report on its activities, 39 Committee sessions were held in 2014, with the agenda available for each session. There is also an overview of draft laws in which the Committee has been involved. The report indicates of more than 80 official appeals submitted to the Russian government and about 70 to the President's Administration. No information is provided though on any details or outcome of those activities. The Committee's annual report on its activities in 2014 indicates that only one &quoute;governmental hour&quoute; with the Defence Minister was held throughout 2014 (a session when the Committee can potentially confront the Executive with questions). The meeting was held behind closed doors. Thus, while the Duma Committee seems to be very active on the whole, no clear and systematic evidence of it effectively fulfilling its oversight function can be found.

The Council of Federation Defence and Security Committee currently consist of 13 members. If judged by the reports on its website, its total level of activity is comparable to the Duma Defence Committee. Only limited evidence of oversight activities was found. For instance, the Committee's 2014 report gives evidence of three &quoute;governmental hours&quoute; being held.

Thus, although the two parliamentary structures are active on the whole, there is little to no public evidence of the Committees demonstrating effective scrutiny. Additionally, as discussed in the previous question, there are concerns over the effectiveness of Parliament.

COMMENTS -+

1) Council of Federation Defence and Security Committee. &quoute;О деятельности Комитета Совета Федерации по обороне и безопасности в период весенней сессии 2013 года&quoute;. Last modified December 26, 2013. http://council.gov.ru/structure/committees/2/plans/38209;

2) The Duma Defence Committee. &quoute;Отчет о работе комитета Государственной Думы по обороне в 2013 году.&quoute; http://www.komitet2-15.km.duma.gov.ru/site.xp/052049.html;

3) Регламент Государственной Думы, Статьи 4 и 6. http://www.duma.gov.ru/about/regulations/;

4) Федеральный закон Российской Федерации от 7 мая 2013 г. N 77-ФЗ &quoute;О парламентском контроле&quoute;. http://www.rg.ru/2013/05/14/kontrol-dok.html;

5) Official website of the Duma Defence Committee. Section on the Activities of the Committee. http://www.komitet2-15.km.duma.gov.ru/site.xp/049057.html;

6) Council of Federation Defence and Security Committee. &quoute;Итоги работы Комитета Совета Федерации по обороне и безопасности в 2014 году&quoute;. http://defence.council.gov.ru/plans/51543

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

03.
score
1

Is the country's national defence policy debated and publicly available?

Researcher4281: The main direction of the defence policy is given by the Military Doctrine and the “National Security Strategy to 2020”. They are both adopted by presidential decree. Both are publicly available on the President's official website. There is only evidence that Executive bodies have participated in the concept and text preparation of the Doctrine and Strategy, and there are no formal provisions for a public consultation process. The 'Foundations of the State Nuclear Deterrence Policy to 2020' was also adopted together with the latest Military Doctrine. The Nuclear Deterrence Policy and the Doctrine complement each other. In contrast to the Doctrine, the Nuclear Deterrence Policy is not publicly disclosed.

In 2014, it was announced that the 2010 Military Doctrine was to be amended given the changing political-military context in Russia. An inter-agency task force was created for this purpose. Mikhail Popov, the Deputy Secretary of the Security Council, gave several interviews to different media outlets almost four months prior to the adoption of amendments where he revealed some major planned changes to the Doctrine. Those plans were then commented on in the media by government officials and external experts. Thus, there has been some debate in the media on some of the planned amendments that had been officially disclosed to the public. No formal consultation process involving the public took place, however. After adoption, the amended Doctrine was made available to the public.

Additionally, there are experts who work within what is referred to as the ‘Open Government System’, who also comment on defence issues and, compared to other non-governmental actors, can access the government more easily.

Response to Peer Reviewer 2:
Relevant information has been added to the main answer. However, discussion of planned amendments cannot be considered debate on policy. The question relates to debate by the legislature, executive and the public and this does not take place. Score maintained.

COMMENTS -+

1) Указ Президента Российской Федерации от 5 февраля 2010 г. N 146 &quoute;О Военной доктрине Российской Федерации&quoute;. http://www.rg.ru/2010/02/10/doktrina-dok.html;

2) Указ Президента РФ от 12 мая 2009 г. N 537 &quoute;О Стратегии национальной безопасности Российской Федерации до 2020 года&quoute;. http://base.garant.ru/195521/#ixzz39OzvlKeV;

3) Алексей Демьянов, &quoute;Больше, чем доктрина,&quoute; Lenta.ru, September 20, 2006, accessed July 31, 2014, http://lenta.ru/articles/2006/09/19/doctrine;

4) &quoute;Новую военную доктрину РФ представят Медведеву до конца года,&quoute; Взгляд, October 22, 2009, accessed July 31, 2014, http://vz.ru/news/2009/10/22/340754.html;

5) Журнал &quoute;Огонёк&quoute; №7 от 22.02.2010, &quoute;Приголубить ястребов&quoute;, February 22, 2010, accessed July 31, 2014, http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/1326511;

6) Андрей Иванов, &quoute;Готовность ответить Западу&quoute;, Свободная Пресса, September 7, 2014, accessed November 23, 2014, http://svpressa.ru/war21/article/97170/;

7) Ольга Вандышева, &quoute;Новая военная доктрина России: противник уже обозначен&quoute;, Expert Online, September 2, 2014, accessed November 23, 2014, http://expert.ru/2014/09/2/protivnik-budet-oboznachen/;

8) Виктор Мартынюк, &quoute;Военная доктрина России: менять нужно, но с умом&quoute;, KM.ru, August 4, 2014, accessed November 23, 2014, http://www.km.ru/v-rossii/2014/08/04/otnosheniya-rossii-i-ssha/746696-voennaya-doktrina-rossii-menyat-nuzhno-no-s-umo;

9) Валерия Хамраева, &quoute;Общество позовут считать коррупционные миллионы Минобороны&quoute;, РБК Daily, December 6, 2012, accessed November 23, 2014, http://www.bbc.co.uk/russian/russia/2012/12/121205_transparency_index_2012;

10) Дмитрий Рогозин, &quoute;Рассматриваю это назначение как признание той большой работы, которая была проведена авторским коллективом Открытого Правительства&quoute;, Открытое правительство, May 21, 2012, accessed November 23, 2014, http://open.gov.ru/blogs/post/1499/?sphrase_id=69767;

11) &quoute;Военная доктрина Российской Федерации&quoute; (утв. Президентом РФ 25.12.2014 N Пр-2976). http://base.consultant.ru/cons/cgi/online.cgi?req=doc;base=LAW;n=172989;fld=134;dst=1000000001,0;rnd=0.22260699071921408;

12) &quoute;Совбез РФ: к концу 2014 года Россия уточнит военную доктрину&quoute;, RIA.ru, September 2, 2014, accessed September 27, 2015, http://ria.ru/interview/20140902/1022334103.html;

13) &quoute;Изменения в военной доктрине не означают перемен в политике&quoute;, Коммерсантъ FM, September 2, 2014, accessed September 27, 2015, http://www.kommersant.ru/Doc/2558291;

14) Роман Крецул, &quoute;Инвентаризация угроз&quoute;, VZ.ru, September 2, 2014, accessed September 27, 2015, http://www.vz.ru/society/2014/9/2/703520.html

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: The last versions of Military Doctrine of Russian Federation were partly (controlled leaks about nuclear weapon use) debated publicly in the media (but not in legislature) before formal presidential approval.

Suggested score: 3

Peer Reviewer-+

04.
score
1

Do defence and security institutions have a policy, or evidence, of openness towards civil society organisations (CSOs) when dealing with issues of corruption? If no, is there precedent for CSO involvement in general government anti-corruption initiatives?

Researcher4281: The general environment for civil society in Russia is restrictive in many ways, which include: burdensome and bureaucratic procedures for registration; strict legislation on internet censorship; restrictions on freedom of expression and freedom of assembly; huge fines on violations of rules relating to participation in public protest; and barriers to foreign funding which include the labelling of non-commercial organisations (NCOs) as NCOs out functions of a “foreign agents”.

The MoD 'Plan for Combatting Corruption in the Armed Forces for 2014 - 2015' (enacted by the MoD order) obliges the MoD to cooperate with CSOs in combatting corruption and to increase the effectiveness of its anti-corruption activities, if found necessary by individual citizens and CSOs. In practice, the main entry points for non-governmental actors are the Civic Council, which is a consultative body under the MoD including some CSO representatives, and the Experts Council of the Open Government.

While there is some evidence of the MoD’s commitment to engage with CSOs in general, evidence does not indicate any impact on policy. In terms of engagement with CSOs on anti-corruption specifically (which is what this question is attempting to capture), there is no evidence of any such dialogue. The work done with the MoD with CSOs relates to issues other than that of corruption.

Additionally, in April 2014 the President’s Council for Human Rights and Civil Society signed a formal cooperation agreement with the MoD. There is also a permanent commission within the Council for Human Rights and Civil Society which deals with military-civil relations. As the Council for Human Rights and Civil Society is comprised of among other representatives of a few independent CSOs, such cooperation does enable a dialogue between the CSOs and the government on defence issues. In practice, however, media reports confirm the President’s Council representatives actually meet either the MoD’s Council or MoD officials. The focus of such engagement is mainly in relation to the rights of soldiers. During meetings, the MoD has explicitly confirmed its commitment to openness. At the same time, the MoD reportedly tends to be unresponsive to CSO input and denies information in response to specific requests by CSO representatives (including those relating to the reasons why CSOs have received violations).

Another potential entry point for civil society is the Expert Council within the Open Government, through which there is opportunity to contribute to the work done on anti-corruption by executive bodies. However, there is no evidence of any dialogue or cooperation on anti-corruption between the Expert Council and the Defence Ministry.

The officially adopted &quoute;Declaration of Openness of Federal Executive Agencies&quoute; prescribes that agencies should involve civil society in their anti-corruption efforts. However, the MoD’s report on its implementation plan in 2014 provided little evidence of CSO involvement in any such efforts. A planned objective was to involve CSOs in the work of the MoD Anti-Corruption Council. However, despite there being external CSO actors (albeit a few) who could contribute to such dialogue, this took place through the involvement of the MoD Civic Council only. The report also provides evidence that the Ministry's draft legislative acts published at its official portal for public discussion were provided commentary, although it is not clear who exactly contributed and if the contributions were taken into account by the MoD.

Response to Peer Reviewer 1:
Agreed. Score raised from 0 to 1 and additional information added to the main answer. The final score reflects that while efforts have been made to engage with CSOs on defence issues, this appears not be meaningful and the general environment for CSOs is quite restrictive.

COMMENTS -+

1) Приказ Министра обороны Российской Федерации от 2 июня 2014 г. № 385 «Об утверждении Плана противодействия коррупции в Вооруженных Силах Российской Федерации на 2014–2015 годы». http://mil.ru/anti-corruption/docs/[email protected];

2) MoD. &quoute;Civic Council. About.&quoute; http://function.mil.ru/function/public_board.htm;

3) MoD. &quoute;Civic Council. Activities.&quoute; http://function.mil.ru/function/public_board/activities/events.htm;

4) BBC, &quoute;Мировой рейтинг коррупции: Россия - на 133-м месте&quoute;, December 5, 2012, accessed November 23, 2014, http://www.bbc.co.uk/russian/russia/2012/12/121205_transparency_index_2012;

5) Валерия Хамраева, &quoute;Общество позовут считать коррупционные миллионы Минобороны&quoute;, РБК Daily, December 6, 2012, accessed November 23, 2014, http://rbcdaily.ru/society/562949985272917;

6) Сергей Коновалов, &quoute;Минобороны берут под гражданский контроль&quoute;, Независимое военное обозрение, February 8, 2012, accessed November 23, 2014, http://nvo.ng.ru/nvo/2012-02-08/1_minoborony.html;

7) Дмитрий Рогозин, &quoute;Рассматриваю это назначение как признание той большой работы, которая была проведена авторским коллективом Открытого Правительства&quoute;, Открытое правительство, May 21, 2012, accessed November 23, 2014, http://open.gov.ru/blogs/post/1499/?sphrase_id=69767;

8) MoD. &quoute;Отчет о выполнении мероприятий, предусмотренных планом Министерства обороны Российской Федерации по реализации Концепции открытости федеральных органов исполнительной власти за 2014 год.&quoute; Last modified April 20, 2015. http://stat.doc.mil.ru/documents/quick_search/[email protected];

9) Георгий Иванушкин, &quoute;СПЧ подписал договор о сотрудничестве с Минобороны&quoute;, asi.org.ru, April 22, 2015, accessed on September 27, 2014, http://www.asi.org.ru/news/spch-podpisal-dogovor-o-sotrudnichestve-s-minoborony/;

10) Open Government. List of report by Expert Council. http://open.gov.ru/expert_sovet/;

11) President's Council for Human Rights and Civil Society. &quoute;Заседание комиссии по военно-гражданским отношениям с участием заместителя министра обороны Николая Панкова&quoute;. Last modified June 10, 2015. http://president-sovet.ru/events/work/groups/read/52/;

12) Общество и армия, &quoute;СПЧ провел встречу с Минобороны по проблемам военнослужащих в условиях информационной войны&quoute;, accessed October 4, 2015, http://nis-army.org/ru/news/spch-provel-vstrechu-s-minoborony-po-problemam-voennosluzhashchikh-v-usloviyakh-informatsionnoi;

13) President's Council for Human Rights and Civil Society. &quoute;В Минобороны не нашли подтверждений сведениям членов СПЧ Сергея Кривенко и Эллы Поляковой о мурманских контрактниках&quoute;. Last modified March 11, 2015. http://president-sovet.ru/presscenter/news/read/2283/;

14) Росбалт, &quoute;СПЧ совместно с Минобороны РФ проверяет ситуацию с дезертирами в 33-й Майкопской бригаде&quoute;, July 16, 2015, accessed October 4, http://www.rosbalt.ru/main/2015/07/16/1419643.html;

15) Радио Свобода, &quoute;СПЧ: Минобороны должно проверить информацию об отправке военных&quoute;, svoboda.org, February 14, 2015, accessed October 4, 2015, http://www.svoboda.org/content/article/26849693.html.

20) International Centre for Not-for-Profit Law, NGO Law Monitor: Russia, http://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/russia.html

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: While I agree with the assessor that meaningful cooperation between the MOD and CSOs is limited and is mainly a formality, there is still a public commitment and some dialogue taking place. I would suggest Score 1 as there has been some talk of engaging CSOs through the Civil Council and there is some evidence that suggestions on tackling corruption by NGOs have been discussed at official meetings. There is however room for doubt if independent NGOs, critical of the government, would be invited for such cooperation.


http://www.redstar.ru/index.php/daty/item/20164-minoborony-rossii-realizuet-kontseptsiyu-otkrytosti

Suggested score: 1

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

05.
score
3

Has the country signed up to international anti-corruption instruments such as, but not exclusively or necessarily, UNCAC and the OECD Convention? (In your answer, please specify which.)

Researcher4281: Russia has signed up to and ratified the UNCAC (though not all the articles) in 2006 and the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention came into force in April 2012. According to the latest report of April 2013 on Russia's compliance with the OECD Convention, Russia has made some progress but key recommendations of the Convention have not yet been met. According to Transparency International, as of 2015, Russia's enforcement level of the Convention remains at &quoute;little or no enforcement&quoute;.

The UN review of implementation of the UNCAC of May 2013 mentions successful steps taken as well as difficulties and shortcomings in Russia's state of compliance with the UNCAC. Among positive conclusions, the review stresses the participation of the country in various regional and international agreements on cooperation in combating corruption. An example of what needs to be improved, according to the report, is the existing system for recording and collecting information on corruption cases. The UNCAC Convention is marked by the UN as ratified by Russia, but a number of the UNCAC articles, including Article 20 on illicit enrichment, are not mentioned in the Russian Federal Law (FL) on Ratification among those provisions Russia obliges itself to implement.

COMMENTS -+

1) UNODC. &quoute;United Nations Convention against Corruption. Signature and Ratification Status as of 2 April 2014.&quoute; https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/signatories.html;

2) OECD. &quoute;OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions: Ratification Status as of 21 May 2014.&quoute; http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/WGBRatificationStatus.pdf;

3) OECD. &quoute;Despite certain progress, the OECD remains concerned with Russia’s compliance with key provisions of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention.&quoute; http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/despite-certain-progress-the-oecd-remains-concerned-with-russias-compliance-with-key-provisions-of-the-oecd-anti-bribery-convention.htm;

4) Implementation Review Group. &quoute;Review of implementation of the United Nations Convention against Corruption: Russian Federation.&quoute; Review presented at the fourth session of the Conference of the States Parties to the United Nations Convention against Corruption, Vienna, May 27-31, 2013. https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/WorkingGroups/ImplementationReviewGroup/ExecutiveSummaries/V1382896Ae.pdf;

5) Интерфакс, &quoute;Минюст предлагает ратифицировать 20-ю статью Конвенции ООН против коррупции,&quoute; Ведомости, December 12, 2013, accessed July 31, 2014, http://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/news/19854291/minyust-predlagaet-ratificirovat-chinovnikov-s-kapitalami;

6) Светлана Бочарова, Анастасия Михайлова и Иван Петров, &quoute;Чиновники уходят от конфискации,&quoute; РБК daily, May 27, 2014, accessed July, 31, 2014, http://rbcdaily.ru/society/562949991579117;

7) Федеральный закон от 08.03.2006 N 40-ФЗ &quoute;О ратификации Конвенции Организации Объединенных Наций против коррупции.&quoute; http://base.consultant.ru/cons/cgi/online.cgi?req=doc;base=LAW;n=59047.

8) Transparency International, Recent Developments, http://www.transparency.org/exporting_corruption/Russia.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: I agree with the assessor. Some organisations have criticised Russia for failure to implement the conventions or respective recommendations. In its 2013 report on the Phase 2 of the implementation of the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, the OECD states: &quoute;While Russia has undertaken efforts to implement the Convention, the Working Group remains concerned that Russia has not responded to key Phase 1 recommendations. These recommendations relate to the foreign bribery offence, the defence of effective regret and confiscation. In particular, provisions on the foreign bribery offence must be expeditiously expanded to address the Group’s concerns. While recognising that the Convention entered relatively recently into force in Russia, in April 2012, Russia must step up its efforts to raise awareness of and enforce the foreign bribery offence within both the public and private sector, as highlighted in this Report.&quoute;

http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/RussianFederationPhase2ReportEN.pdf

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

06.
score
2

Is there evidence of regular, active public debate on issues of defence? If yes, does the government participate in this debate?

Researcher4281: There is some evidence of the MoD's formal commitment to initiate a public debate on defence and to engage with it, as well as some evidence of the debate actually taking place. At the same time, evidence suggests this engagement tends to be at the surface level and civil society opinion is not likely to be taken into account by the government on issues, including contentious ones.

Interviewee 1 confirmed that the MoD meets with defence experts, the media and the MoD Civic Council regularly, and at least once a month. As the MoD Civic Council has a few independent media and think tank representatives among its members, one can imply that the MoD is not shielded from hearing independent voices on its policy and activities. The media are also invited to MoD conference calls once every two weeks. However, this format does not imply their active participation. The media appear to be invited to follow the discussion only.

Outside the government, the decisions of the MoD, especially the major ones, are actively discussed. Think tank experts and academics provide commentary for the press. On the most sensitive issues, the media commentators also take a clear position themselves. The debate outside the government has become more active since the Ukrainian crisis broke out, but also other defence issues are commented on. One such topic is the abolishment of the two MoD agencies, Rosoboronzakaz and Rosoboronpostavka, which had been created to contribute to the management of major defence purchases.

COMMENTS -+

1) &quoute;В Москве согласовали &quoute;Марш мира&quoute;, в Петербурге – нет,&quoute; Новая Газета, March 14, 2014, accessed July 31, 2014, http://novayagazeta.spb.ru/articles/8534/;

2) MoD. &quoute;Civic Council. About.&quoute; http://function.mil.ru/function/public_board.htm;

3) MoD. &quoute;Civic Council. Activities.&quoute; http://function.mil.ru/function/public_board/activities/events.htm;

4) Interview with Interviewee 1: Expert and Journalist Specializing in Political and Military Issues, Moscow, 31 July 2014;

5) Максим Солопов, &quoute;От Рогозина к Шойгу: контракты на поставки вооружений переходят в ведение силовых ведомств&quoute;, РБКdaily, September 8, 2014, accessed November 24, 2014, http://vpk.name/news/117181_ot_rogozina_k_shoigu_kontraktyi_na_postavki_vooruzhenii_perehodyat_v_vedenie_silovyih_vedomstv.html;

6) Юрий Гаврилов, &quoute;Министр уходит, служба идет&quoute;, Российская Газета, November 11, 2012, accessed November 24, 2014, http://www.rg.ru/2012/11/06/serdukov-site.html;

7) Сергей Машкин и Николай Сергеев, &quoute;Министерству обороны приносят жертвы&quoute;, Коммерсантъ, April 1, 2013, accessed November 24, 2014, http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2159774;

8) Георгий Иванушкин, &quoute;СПЧ подписал договор о сотрудничестве с Минобороны&quoute;, asi.org.ru, April 22, 2015, accessed on September 27, 2014, http://www.asi.org.ru/news/spch-podpisal-dogovor-o-sotrudnichestve-s-minoborony/;

9) President's Council for Human Rights and Civil Society. &quoute;Заседание комиссии по военно-гражданским отношениям с участием заместителя министра обороны Николая Панкова&quoute;. Last modified June 10, 2015. http://president-sovet.ru/events/work/groups/read/52/;

10) Общество и армия, &quoute;СПЧ провел встречу с Минобороны по проблемам военнослужащих в условиях информационной войны&quoute;, accessed October 4, 2015, http://nis-army.org/ru/news/spch-provel-vstrechu-s-minoborony-po-problemam-voennosluzhashchikh-v-usloviyakh-informatsionnoi;

11) President's Council for Human Rights and Civil Society. &quoute;В Минобороны не нашли подтверждений сведениям членов СПЧ Сергея Кривенко и Эллы Поляковой о мурманских контрактниках&quoute;. Last modified March 11, 2015. http://president-sovet.ru/presscenter/news/read/2283/;

12) Росбалт, &quoute;СПЧ совместно с Минобороны РФ проверяет ситуацию с дезертирами в 33-й Майкопской бригаде&quoute;, July 16, 2015, accessed October 4, http://www.rosbalt.ru/main/2015/07/16/1419643.html;

13) Радио Свобода, &quoute;СПЧ: Минобороны должно проверить информацию об отправке военных&quoute;, svoboda.org, February 14, 2015, accessed October 4, 2015, http://www.svoboda.org/content/article/26849693.html;

14) Дмитрий Гусев, &quoute;Правозащитник о засекречивании потерь российской армии в спецоперациях&quoute;, rfi, May 28, 2015, accessed October 4, 2015, http://ru.rfi.fr/rossiya/20150528-pravozashchitnik-o-zasekrechivanii-poter-rossiiskoi-armii-v-spetsoperatsiyakh.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

07.
score
2

Does the country have an openly stated and actively implemented anti-corruption policy for the defence sector?

Researcher4281: A Plan for Combatting Corruption in the Armed Forces for 2014-2015 exists, approved by the Defence Minister's decree. The plan supplements the National Anti-Corruption Plan for 2014-2015, dated June 2, 2014. In order to assess the implementation progress, the previous similar plan covering the years 2012-2013 has been assessed. The official website of the MoD publishes reports covering some aspects of the implementation of this plan: the statistical results of unscheduled inspections, the recommendations on filling in the declaration of income and on conducting anti-corruption explanatory sessions for the staff. Information on the income, expenses and property of the MoD military and civil personnel is also published here. A comprehensive report on implementation is not made publicly available however. At the same time, if independent commentary is considered, they are mostly critical towards the effectiveness of the plan and its implementation progress. One of the shortcomings of the plan mentioned by commentators is the absence of a few important provisions, like a comprehensive assessment mechanism for corruption in the sector (e.g. to control the effectiveness of the anti-corruption measures) and an improved system of data collection and data quality control. This makes the assessment of implementation difficult. Comparing the number of corruption-related offences remains unreasonable as one can never be sure if the changes in numbers reflect the real changes in the level of corruption-related offences or are due to increased or decreased activity of the oversight bodies. To sum up, the policy exists and is being implemented (although it is not clear to which extent); at the same time, the policy has shortcomings and its implementation is hard to measure.

Response to Peer Reviewer 1 and Peer Reviewer 2:
Accepted. Score changed from 3 to 2.

COMMENTS -+

1) Указ Президента РФ от 11.04.2014 N 226 &quoute;О Национальном плане противодействия коррупции на 2014 - 2015 годы.&quoute; http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_161699/;

2) Приказ Министра обороны Российской Федерации от 2 июня 2014 г. № 385 «Об утверждении Плана противодействия коррупции в Вооруженных Силах Российской Федерации на 2014–2015 годы». http://mil.ru/anti-corruption/docs/[email protected];

3) MoD. &quoute;Обзор внезапных проверок выполнения требований антикоррупционного законодательства и планов противодействия коррупции в органах военного управления и учреждениях Минобороны России в 2013 году.&quoute; http://mil.ru/anti-corruption/reports/[email protected];

4) MoD. &quoute;Обзор рекомендаций по осуществлению комплекса организационных, разъяснительных и иных мер по недопущению должностными лицами поведения, которое может восприниматься окружающими как обещание дачи взятки или предложение дачи взятки либо как согласие принять взятку или как просьба о даче взятки.&quoute; http://mil.ru/anti-corruption/reports/[email protected];

5) MoD. &quoute;Сведения о доходах.&quoute; http://mil.ru/anti-corruption/income_info.htm.

6) Валерий Елюшкин и Юрий Матвиенко, &quoute;Борьба с коррупцией как наука&quoute;, Военное обозрение, July 31, 2013, accessed November 24, 2014, http://topwar.ru/31488-borba-s-korrupciey-kak-nauka.html.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: I disagree with the score as it would suggest effective implementation. While the legal framework exists, there is a considerable doubt that it is being enforced or implemented in a consistent and non-biased fashion. Any viable evidence of such implementation is lacking. I would suggest score 2.

Suggested score: 2

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: The last sentence of the author's comment points clearly to score 2, not 3.

Suggested score: 2

Peer Reviewer-+

08.
score
2

Are there independent, well-resourced, and effective institutions within defence and security tasked with building integrity and countering corruption?

Researcher4281: The Main Military Prosecutor's Office (which forms part of the Prosecutor General's Office), as well as the Main Military Investigations Office under the Investigative Committee, are two institutions responsible for monitoring corruption in the defence sector, among other tasks. Both bodies are currently under the jurisdiction of the MoD, although the President signed a decree in 2014 to remove them from under the MoD to the jurisdiction of the Prosecutor General's Office by 2017.

Some evidence can be found on specific corruption-related cases they have initiated, which suggests that the institutions are active. At the same time, the MMPO has admitted that corruption remains very deeply rooted in the Russian Armed Forces in spite of some improvement in recent years. It is difficult to say to what extent the inspecting institutions are responsible for this and consequently to what extent their activities may be considered effective. There is also not enough information to establish if the two structures are resourced well enough.

The MMPO faced significant criticism for its lack of action during a major corruption scandal under a former minister of defence, despite having apparently been aware of corrupt activities reportedly taking place in one of the MoD agencies for months. Action only took place much later when Main Military Investigations Office instituted a criminal proceeding.

An Anti-Corruption Council has been created within the MoD. Its independence and effectiveness in countering corruption is questionable however, as the Council is established as a consultative structure and is a division under the MoD.

(Relevant information from Peer Reviewer 1 has been added to the main answer)

COMMENTS -+

1) &quoute;ГВП нашла нарушения при продаже 51 га земель Минобороны в Подмосковье,&quoute; РИА Новости, July 8, 2013, accessed July 31, 2014, http://ria.ru/incidents/20130708/948323385.html;

2) Main Military Investigations Office. &quoute;В Мурманской области бывший заместитель генерального директора ОАО «Заполярное военно-морское строительное управление» признан виновным в злоупотребление полномочиями.&quoute; http://gvsu.gov.ru/?p=3211;

3) Official website of the MMPO. http://gvp.gov.ru/;

4) Official website of the Main Military Investigations Office. http://gvsu.gov.ru/;

5) Регламент Совета при Министре обороны Российской Федерации по противодействию коррупции. http://recrut.mil.ru/career/soldiering/anti_corruption/council.htm;

6) Наталья Райбман, &quoute;Фридинский: В 2013 г. ущерб от коррупции в войсках вырос в 5,5 раза,&quoute; Vedomosti.ru, July 11, 2013, accessed July 31, 2014, http://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/news/14072141/v-2013-g-uscherb-ot-korrupcii-v-vojskah-vyros-v-55-raza;

7) Юрий Гаврилов, &quoute;Прокурор не промахнется,&quoute; Российская Газета, June 2, 2014, accessed July 31, 2014, http://www.rg.ru/2014/06/02/prokuror.html.

8) Военные следователи и прокуроры с 2017 года будут выведены из подчинения Минобороны России, June 5th, 2014, http://www.garant.ru/news/546378/

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: As the assessor highlighted, the Civil Council is formed under the MOD and therefore not independent.

Regarding the MMPO and MMIO, they are currently under the MOD jurisdiction, therefore also not independent. In June 2014, President Putin signed a decree on the removal of the MMIO and MMPO from the MOD's jurisdiction to the General Prosecutor's Office in 2017 (http://www.garant.ru/news/546378/)

Interviews with officials from the two institutions point to a significant number of investigations against military and civilians in the Armed Forces, with jail sentences in many cases. This means, as the assessor pointed out, that these bodies are active. At the same time the same officials called the scope of corruption in the security and defence public sector &quoute;cosmic&quoute;.

https://sledcom.ru/press/interview/item/507360/

https://russiandefpolicy.wordpress.com/tag/main-military-prosecutor/

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Both of the uppermost institutions mentioned by the assessor (the Prosecutor General's Office and Investigative Committee) are absolutely independent from other branches of state power. The first one is approved by Federal Assembly, the second - by the President (each according to separate law).

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

09.
score
1

Does the public trust the institutions of defence and security to tackle the issue of bribery and corruption in their establishments?

Researcher4281: According to the Global Corruption Barometer 2013, the military was perceived to be “corrupt or extremely corrupt” by 70 per cent of respondents, although of the twelve institutions assessed, it was the fourth least corrupt institution. Broader results from the same survey indicated that only 5 per cent of the Russian respondents thought the government had been effective in combating corruption (compared to 18 per cent in 2010). It is noteworthy that the survey took place when a major corruption scandal involving a former defence minister and other high-level defence officials was ongoing.

According to the Russian Levada Centre for public opinion research, 40 per cent of respondents believed that the former Defence Minister's dismissal was a first major step in the fight against corruption at the highest political level. Another 42 per cent considered the Minister's dismissal a consequence of a different elite group's fight for influence. The former Defence Minister avoided punishment under the amnesty law (which was later adopted), which was perceived negatively by 64 per cent of the Levada Centre respondents (compared to 14 per cent that welcomed the decision).

Another example that provoked strong public reaction and criticism is the release on parole of former head of MoD property department who had been charged with large-scale fraud. The Levada Centre found that 70 per cent of respondents disapproved of her release.

The VTsIOM Centre for public opinion research in 2013 assessed which institutions were perceived to be the most corrupt. Up to three answers could be selected and 6 per cent and 4 per cent of the respondents named defence-related departments, such as military enlistment offices and the army.

Response to Peer Reviewer 1:
Agreed. Score lowered from 2 to 1.

COMMENTS -+

1) Transparency International-R. &quoute;Коррупцию победит не правительство, а граждане.&quoute; http://www.transparency.org.ru/barometr-mirovoi-korruptcii/korruptciiu-pobedit-ne-pravitelstvo-a-grazhdane;

2) Levada Center. &quoute;Коррупционный скандал вокруг Сердюкова.&quoute; http://www.levada.ru/03-12-2012/korruptsionnyi-skandal-vokrug-serdyukova;

3) VTsIOM. «Коррупция в России: Мониторинг.&quoute; Last modified October 23, 2013. http://wciom.ru/index.php?id=459&uid=114572;

4) &quoute;Россияне не поняли амнистию,&quoute; Финам, December 27, 2014, accessed July 31, 2014, http://finam.info/news/rossiyane-ne-ponyali-amnistiyu/;

5) Transparency International. &quoute;Global Corruption Barometer 2013. Russia. &quoute; http://www.transparency.org/gcb2013/country/?country=russia;

6) Елизавета Фохт, &quoute;Против досрочного освобождения Васильевой высказались 70% россиян&quoute;, РБК, August 27, 2015, accessed October 4, 2015, http://top.rbc.ru/politics/27/08/2015/55deb3299a7947da6f5c8861http://top.rbc.ru/politics/27/08/2015/55deb3299a7947da6f5c8861http://top.rbc.ru/politics/27/08/2015/55deb3299a7947da6f5c8861.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: I agree with the assessor's analysis but not with the suggested score. The very low level of trust in the government's effort to combat corruption at a time when such investigation of the former Minister of Defence has already been initiated, illustrates that the public believes that the fight against corruption is simply rhetoric for the government. I would suggest Score 1.

Suggested score: 1

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

10.
score
1

Are there regular assessments by the defence ministry or another government agency of the areas of greatest corruption risk for ministry and armed forces personnel, and do they put in place measures for mitigating such risks?

Researcher4281: Conducting a systematic assessment of corruption risks is mentioned among the measures in the MoD Plan for Combating Corruption in the Armed Forces for 2014-2015 (part I, measure 6), as well as in the previous plan for 2012-2013, indicating that there is likely to be some awareness of risk areas. It is possible some assessment has occurred, but no tangible evidence has been found of this effectively taking place however.

General inspections do take place from within the Ministry (e.g. by the Inspection for Personnel, as well as by separate structures, e.g. by the Accounts Chamber), and different anti-corruption measures are taken. Another example is the report of the Main Military Prosecutor's Office on corruption-related crimes in 2013. The report covers areas and activities related to corruption in the Armed Forces. Nonetheless, the existence of specific activities such as assessments of corruption risks is not confirmed by any evidence.

COMMENTS -+

1) Приказ Министра обороны Российской Федерации от 2 июня 2014 г. № 385 «Об утверждении Плана противодействия коррупции в Вооруженных Силах Российской Федерации на 2014–2015 годы». http://mil.ru/anti-corruption/docs/[email protected];

2) Приказ Министра обороны РФ от 15.06.2012 N 1525 (ред. от 06.09.2013) &quoute;О мероприятиях по противодействию коррупции в Вооруженных Силах Российской Федерации на 2012 - 2013 годы.&quoute; http://base.consultant.ru/cons/cgi/online.cgi?req=doc;base=EXP;n=571877;fld=134;dst=4294967295;rnd=0.8957674743141979;

3) &quoute;В Минобороны РФ проводится масштабная антикоррупционная проверка генералов и офицеров,&quoute; Interfax, January 13, 2010, accessed July 31, 2014, http://www.interfax-russia.ru/main.asp?id=118032;

4) MoD. MoD decree giving the Inspection for Personnel the authority to monitor the Armed Forces personnel's compliance with the anti-corruption legislation. http://mil.ru/anti-corruption/docs/[email protected];

5) &quoute;СП: в Минобороны отсутствует контроль за бюджетными расходами,&quoute; Пронедра, October 24, 2013, accessed July, 31, 2014, http://pronedra.ru/money/2013/10/24/rashodovanie-sredstv-v-minoborony/;

6) Наталья Райбман, &quoute;Фридинский: В 2013 г. ущерб от коррупции в войсках вырос в 5,5 раза,&quoute; Vedomosti.ru, July 11, 2013, accessed July 31, 2014, http://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/news/14072141/v-2013-g-uscherb-ot-korrupcii-v-vojskah-vyros-v-55-raza.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

11.
score
1

Does the country have a process for acquisition planning that involves clear oversight, and is it publicly available?

Researcher4281: The 2011-2020 State Armament Programme (estimated at 19 trillion rubles) defines the acquisition planning process, annually implemented through state order “gosudarstvennyi oboronnyi zakaz” (GOZ) which covers purchases of new armament and military hardware, repair and modernisation of existing stock and research & development for new arms equipment. The GOZ is a state secret with no effective oversight. Additionally, of the four classified programmes, one relates to the development of defence industry.

There is a clear multiple-step procedure of budget adoption, which includes acquisition planning. After a number of the state executive actors have drafted and discussed the state budget, the draft is submitted to the Duma and to the Accounts Chamber. Within the Parliament, the budget draft is also examined by the relevant Duma committees.

There are concerns about the effectiveness of the oversight, however. According to the Open Budget Survey 2012, the legislative oversight in Russia could be improved by, for instance, giving the legislature the authority to amend the budget proposal of the executive. There is also evidence of the inability and reluctance of the oversight bodies to push for changes. The Duma Defence Committee points in its resolution to some major shortcomings and inconsistencies in the draft of the Budget for 2014-2016, for instance. The resolution also states that the classification of expenses is not detailed enough for the Committee to oversee and to assess all planned expenses, including acquisition plans. It is therefore of concern that the final recommendation of the Committee is &quoute;to adopt the draft ... in the first reading&quoute;. Additionally, some serious criticism by the Chairman of the Accounts Chamber has not prevented the latest Budget from being rapidly approved by the Duma.

Public oversight of the government's acquisition plans is not formally foreseen and is difficult to exercise. As the Open Budget Survey 2012 indicates, the public has very limited access to the Budget while it is being discussed by government. In addition a considerable share of budget expenses (especially defence-related) is kept secret, and the trend is towards more secrecy. This is confirmed by Interviewee 1. Recent calculations by the Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy indicate that the state defence acquisition (literally &quoute;order&quoute;) accounts for about 2/3 of all secret budget expenditure in 2014. Some procurement can be monitored by the public, however, as an official portal for public
procurement has been launched for this purpose. The portal was set into work on January 1, 2011. It covers all public procurement, including the non-secret military procurement. The portal is well-resourced and transparent.

(Relevant information from Peer Reviewer 1 has been added to the main answer)

Response to Peer Reviewer 2: Agreed. Score lowered from 2 to 1.

COMMENTS -+

1) Cooper, Julian. &quoute;Russian Military Expenditure: Data, Analysis and Issues.&quoute; FOI-R--3688--SE (September 2013). http://www.foi.se/Documents/foir_3688.pdf;

2) International Budget Partnership. &quoute;Open Budget Survey 2012. Russia: Country Info.&quoute; http://internationalbudget.org/what-we-do/open-budget-survey/country-info/?country=ru;

3) Вадим Вислогузов, &quoute;Бюджет прошел Думу в ударном прочтении,&quoute; Коммерсантъ, October 27, 2013, accessed July 31, 2014, http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2329675;

4) Военный пенсионер. &quoute;Заключение Комитета по обороне Государственной Думы по проекту федерального закона № 348499-6 &quoute;О федеральном бюджете на 2014 год и на плановый период 2015 и 2016 годов.&quoute; http://voenpens.com/public/admin/zakluchenie_KO_%207_10_13.htm;

5) &quoute;A Quarter of Budget Spending Until 2016 'Kept Secret',&quoute; The Moscow Times, October 15, 2013, accessed July 31, 2014, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/a-quarter-of-budget-spending-until-2016-kept-secret/487812.html;

6) Василий Зацепин, &quoute;О текущем федеральном бюджете,&quoute; Институт экономической политики имени Гайдара, March 27, 2014, accessed July 31, 2014, http://iep.ru/kommentarii/o-tekushchem-federalnom-biudzhete.html;

7) Official portal for public procurement. http://zakupki.gov.ru/epz/main/public/home.html;

8) Interview with Interviewee 1: Expert and Journalist Specializing in Political and Military Issues, Moscow, 31 July, 2014;

9) Мультитендер. &quoute;История создания портала zakupki.gov.ru.&quoute; http://multitender.ru/school/1-osnovi/373-istoriya-sozdaniya-portala-zakupki-gov-ru.

10) Julian Cooper, Military expenditure in the Russian Federation during the years 2012 to 2015: a
research note, Centre for Russian and East European Studies, University of Birmingham, http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/publications/unpubl_milex/military-expenditure-in-the-russian-federation-2012-2015

11) Transparency International UK, &quoute;The Transparency of National Defence Budgets&quoute; (2011) http://transparency.ge/sites/default/files/post_attachments/Report%20on%20Defence%20Budget%20Transparency_0.pdf

12) Russian Military Reform, Russian Air Force capabilities and procurement plans, January 27 2015, https://russiamil.wordpress.com/2015/01/27/russian-air-force-capabilities-and-procurement-plans/

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: I agree with the assessor's score.

Acquisition planning is currently guided by the 2011-2020 State Armament Programme, worth 19 trillion rubles. On an annual basis this is being implemented through a state defence order (gosudarstvennyi oboronnyi zakaz, known in Russia as the GOZ), covering new armaments and other military hardware, the repair and modernisation of the existing stock, and R&D for the development of new arms and equipment. Expenditure under the four classified programmes, covered by the budget, is not disclosed. One of these is the programme on the Development of the Defence Industry, therefore evidence on the acquisition process there is impossible to obtain. Expenditure and scope of the GOZ is considered a state secret with no viable oversight.

A recent SIPRI report reveals: &quoute;A main obstacle in making the GOZ system more effective is the lack of transparency regarding the procurement process. The annual GOZ comes under the Law on State Secrets, and details of the annual value and composition of procurements belong to the classified section of the federal budget. According to Anatoly Tsyganok, head of the Centre for Military Forecasting8 , as much as 70 per cent of the annual GOZ contracts are classified, whereas merely 6–7 per cent of US defence procurement is kept secret.&quoute;

http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/ICES2013/papers/archive/oxenstierna-russian-defence-budget-and-sap

http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/publications/unpubl_milex/military-expenditure-in-the-russian-federation-2012-2015

http://transparency.ge/sites/default/files/post_attachments/Report%20on%20Defence%20Budget%20Transparency_0.pdf

https://russiamil.wordpress.com/2015/01/27/russian-air-force-capabilities-and-procurement-plans/

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: The acquisition planning is accomplished in the form of the State armament program which is non-transparent and not published. Its planning order itself is secret. There are serious doubts over the quality of the process, its oversight and accountability.

Suggested score: 1

Peer Reviewer-+

12.
score
1

Is the defence budget transparent, showing key items of expenditure? This would include comprehensive information on military R&D, training, construction, personnel expenditures, acquisitions, disposal of assets, and maintenance.

Researcher4281: The defence budget cannot be considered transparent with independent coverage indicating around 58.8 per cent of the expenditure on national defence in 2014 was kept secret. This is an increase compared to the previous years. It is evident that even further classified defence expense is likely, as some expenditure falls under budget chapters other than &quoute;National Defence&quoute;. The state budget is broken down by items being funded, however research from the Gaidar Institute indicates that this division has become more general, undermining the transparency of the budget. The Duma Defence Committee has also noted the lack of detail in its resolution on the draft budget.

COMMENTS -+

1) &quoute;A Quarter of Budget Spending Until 2016 'Kept Secret',&quoute; The Moscow Times, October 15, 2013, accessed July 31, 2014, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/a-quarter-of-budget-spending-until-2016-kept-secret/487812.html;

2) Василий Зацепин, &quoute;О текущем федеральном бюджете,&quoute; Институт экономической политики имени Гайдара, March 27, 2014, accessed July 31, 2014, http://iep.ru/kommentarii/o-tekushchem-federalnom-biudzhete.html;

3) Cooper, Julian. &quoute;Russian Military Expenditure: Data, Analysis and Issues.&quoute; FOI-R--3688--SE (September 2013). http://www.foi.se/Documents/foir_3688.pdf;

4) Budget Code of the RF. http://base.garant.ru/12112604/;

5) Федеральный закон от 2 декабря 2013 г. N 349-ФЗ &quoute;О федеральном бюджете на 2014 год и на плановый период 2015 и 2016 годов.&quoute; http://base.garant.ru/70525334/;

6) Военный пенсионер. &quoute;Заключение Комитета по обороне Государственной Думы по проекту федерального закона № 348499-6 &quoute;О федеральном бюджете на 2014 год и на плановый период 2015 и 2016 годов.&quoute; Last modified October 7, 2013. http://voenpens.com/public/admin/zakluchenie_KO_%207_10_13.htm.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The defence budget is not transparent enough, neither is its implementation. Up to 70 per cent of the annual State Defence Order (GOZ) is classified and there is considerable room to doubt it receives meaningful and thorough legislative scrutiny.

A recent SIPRI report reads: &quoute;A main obstacle in making the GOZ system more effective is the lack of transparency regarding the procurement process. The annual GOZ comes under the Law on State Secrets, and details of the annual value and composition of procurements belong to the classified section of the federal budget. According to Anatoly Tsyganok, head of the Centre for Military Forecasting , as much as 70 per cent of the annual GOZ contracts are classified, whereas merely 6–7 per cent of US defence procurement is kept secret.&quoute;

http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/ICES2013/papers/archive/oxenstierna-russian-defence-budget-and-sap

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

12A.
score
1

Is there a legislative committee (or other appropriate body) responsible for defence budget scrutiny and analysis in an effective way, and is this body provided with detailed, extensive, and timely information on the defence budget?

Researcher4281: Within the legislature, the Duma Defence Committee is tasked with examining the draft budget. The Committee then issues a resolution with its opinion on the draft. The resolution for the latest budget has been published however it covers non-classified defence expenses only. The FL on the State Secret (Article 21.1) gives all Duma representatives access to the secret information, meaning that the Committee has the legal right to scrutinise the full budget. The Committee has nonetheless mentioned at least once in its resolution that the budget information available to them lacks detail, which hinders effective scrutiny. Moreover, the Committee has concluded its latest resolution with a recommendation to approve the budget despite the lack of detail and inconsistencies highlighted by it. This raises doubts about the real ability and effectiveness of the Committee.

Response to Peer Reviewer 1:
The law referred to in comments was adopted in June 2015 and took effect on September 1, 2015. The MoD has already reported on the implementation progress. Although this is a positive development towards preventing fraud in defence-related spending, the work of the interdepartmental commission only enables extra accountability of the defence budget spending and does not allow for more influence over the decision-making in the initial planning stage. The score is therefore maintained.

COMMENTS -+

1) Закон РФ от 21.07.1993 N 5485-1 (ред. от 21.12.2013) &quoute;О государственной тайне.&quoute; http://base.consultant.ru/cons/cgi/online.cgi?req=doc;base=LAW;n=156018;

2) Военный пенсионер. &quoute;Заключение Комитета по обороне Государственной Думы по проекту федерального закона № 348499-6 &quoute;О федеральном бюджете на 2014 год и на плановый период 2015 и 2016 годов.&quoute; Last modified October 7, 2013. http://voenpens.com/public/admin/zakluchenie_KO_%207_10_13.htm;

3) Cooper, Julian. &quoute;Russian Military Expenditure: Data, Analysis and Issues.&quoute; FOI-R--3688--SE (September 2013). http://www.foi.se/Documents/foir_3688.pdf;

4) International Budget Partnership. &quoute;Open Budget Survey 2012. Russia: Country Info.&quoute; http://internationalbudget.org/what-we-do/open-budget-survey/country-info/?country=ru;

5) РИА Новости, &quoute;Шевцова: первые платежи прошли по новой системе контроля оборонзаказа&quoute;, ria.ru, September 10, 2015, accessed October 4, 2015, http://ria.ru/defence_safety/20150910/1241379494.html;

6) Иван Сафронов, «Авансы просто обналичивались и тратились на покупку недвижимости», Коммерсант.ru, April 14, 2015, accessed October 4, 2015, http://kommersant.ru/doc/2708718;

7) REGNUM, &quoute;Совфед одобрил закон о межведомственном контроле за гособоронзаказом&quoute;, REGNUM, June 24, 2015, accesses October 4, 2015, http://www.regnum.ru/news/polit/1936509.html.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: I agree with the assessor.

In April 2015, President Putin submitted to the Duma a bill on the establishment of an interdepartmental oversight mechanism over the use of budgetary funds in the framework of the state defence order (GOZ). The mechanism will involve the Ministry of defence, the Federal Antimonopoly Service, Federal Financial Monitoring Service and the Central Bank.

It would be based on databases containing information on the implementation of the GOZ, the prime contractor for the supply of goods, contracts, etc. The bill also suggested that each GOZ will have a separate bank account to ensure transparency. There is no indication as to when such a mechanism could become operational.

http://www.gazeta.ru/business/news/2015/04/09/n_7093465.shtml

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

12B.
score
1

Is the approved defence budget made publicly available? In practice, can citizens, civil society, and the media obtain detailed information on the defence budget?

Researcher4281: The approved budget is consistently published on the official website of the President, in the Documents section; however only information on non-classified expenditure is made available. Less than a half of all expenses are made publicly available if expenses are taken from the &quoute;National Defence&quoute; chapter only. Experts have managed to uncover some secret clauses of the budget. This has become possible after the monthly report on the budget implementation was published in January 2014. Nonetheless, it appears only a small share of all secret information has been revealed. In addition, the calculations made required expertise that the general public does not have. Finally, no evidence has been found of any requests from the general public to disclose any budget details. The Open Budget Survey of 2012 indicates some relevant findings; namely that while some formal provisions for public participation do exist, real mechanisms for public participation are weak or non-existent and no feedback on public inputs is provided by the government.

There is an FL dated February 9, 2009, #8-ФЗ that obliges the government to answer all requests for information from both individuals and legal entities. There are a few exceptions though (Article 20 of the FL), including the data with restricted access, which includes the data falling under state secrecy. Requests must be considered within 30 days. Access to information for the media is regulated by the FL N 2124-1 on Mass Media. The request for information from the editorial office of a media agency must be considered within seven days (Article 40). Here again, the exception is made for information relating to state secrets.

COMMENTS -+

1) Official website of the Russian President. Documents section. http://www.kremlin.ru/acts;

2) Василий Зацепин, &quoute;О текущем федеральном бюджете,&quoute; Институт экономической политики имени Гайдара, March 27, 2014, accessed July 31, 2014, http://iep.ru/kommentarii/o-tekushchem-federalnom-biudzhete.html;

3) International Budget Partnership. &quoute;Open Budget Survey 2012. Russia: Country Info.&quoute; http://internationalbudget.org/what-we-do/open-budget-survey/country-info/?country=ru;

4) Российская Газета. &quoute;Федеральный закон Российской Федерации от 9 февраля 2009 г. N 8-ФЗ &quoute;Об обеспечении доступа к информации о деятельности государственных органов и органов местного самоуправления&quoute;. http://www.rg.ru/2009/02/13/dostup-dok.html;

5) Закон РФ &quoute;О средствах массовой информации&quoute; (о СМИ) от 27.12.1991 N 2124-1. http://www.consultant.ru/popular/smi/42_4.html#p696.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

13.
score
1

Are sources of defence income other than from central government allocation (from equipment sales or property disposal, for example) published and scrutinised?

Researcher4281: Appendix 4 of the FL on the current Federal Budget covers planned, non-state allocated sources of income, including those that defence structures and agencies administer. However, the appendix only describes the sources of income, but gives no information about the amounts that the defence institutions receive. Some information can be received from the reports published by companies related to the MoD. They disclose their financial information in case they are registered as open joint-stock companies, or if they go on IPO regardless of their entity type. So, on the whole, only some of the information on the income is published. The budget implementation of the MoD as a whole is scrutinized by the Accounts Chamber. Formally the Accounts Chamber is independent from the executive. However, its independence has been questioned on some occasions. For instance, some commentators point out that the President has a say in appointing the head, the deputy head and the auditors of the Accounts Chamber. Although the final decision is up to the Parliament, the Parliament has to present a number of candidacies to the President, who, if not satisfied with any of them, can put forward his own candidate.

COMMENTS -+

1) Федеральный закон от 2 декабря 2013 г. N 349-ФЗ &quoute;О федеральном бюджете на 2014 год и на плановый период 2015 и 2016 годов&quoute; (с изменениями и дополнениями), Appendix 4. http://base.garant.ru/70525334/5/#block_4000;

2) Центр раскрытия корпоративной информации e-disclosure. &quoute;ОАО &quoute;Оборонсервис.&quoute; http://www.e-disclosure.ru/portal/files.aspx?id=23874&type=2;

3) Федеральный закон от 5 апреля 2013 г. N 41-ФЗ &quoute;О Счетной палате Российской Федерации.&quoute; http://base.garant.ru/70353474/;

4) Тарас Фомченков, &quoute;Ружья на проверку,&quoute; Российская Газета, February 28, 2014, accessed July 31, 2014, http://www.rg.ru/2014/02/28/sredstva.html;

5) Федеральный закон &quoute;Об акционерных обществах&quoute; (Об АО) от 26.12.1995 N 208-ФЗ. http://www.consultant.ru/popular/stockcomp/29_14.html#p2629;

6) Федеральный закон от 05.04.2013 N 41-ФЗ (ред. от 04.11.2014) &quoute;О Счетной палате Российской Федерации.&quoute; http://base.consultant.ru/cons/cgi/online.cgi?req=doc;base=LAW;n=170581;

7) Наталья Чернышова, &quoute;Новый закон о Счетной палате&quoute;, Каспаров.ru, April 11, 2013, accessed November 26, 2014, http://www.kasparov.ru/material.php?id=51667837243E5.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The budget item &quoute;Defence&quoute; in the State Budget excludes extra-budgetary spending and sources. There is no evidence to suggest that these are publicly available or discussed. The appropriate parliamentary committees have access to this information but again there is no evidence of the level of detail or the quality of the scrutiny.

Also Information about Russia’s total arms exports are available from open sources and the data is regularly announced by Russian officials, although no information is revealed as to what percentage of the sum goes towards financing the Armed Forces or relevant institutions. Moreover, the money spent on the Russian military are accounted for under various articles of the national budget and other decrees, and the names of these articles do not always refer to defence in an obvious way. This makes public scrutiny almost impossible.

http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/ICES2013/papers/archive/oxenstierna-russian-defence-budget-and-sap (Page 7)

http://www.cast.ru/files/book/all-stats_eng_14_02_2012.pdf

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: There is lack of detail in the sources of defence spending at regional level. All income of the MoD (including equipment sales and property disposal) at the central government level is published in reports by the Federal Treasury (FT) in a quite detailed manner, but data relating to sales does not appear to be very reliable. For example, all MoD income in 2014 was about 32.4 billion RUB according to an FT report, but announced export of equipment from MoD inventory in 2014 amounted to $1,3 billion, at least 1.5 times more than all income.

(http://ria.ru/defence_safety/20150327/1054813502.htm)

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

14.
score
1

Is there an effective internal audit process for defence ministry expenditure (that is, for example, transparent, conducted by appropriately skilled individuals, and subject to parliamentary oversight)?

Researcher4281: According to the MoD official website, a number of MoD departments have some auditing functions. They are: the Inspection for Financial Control, the Department for Auditing of State Contracts and the Anti-Corruption Council under the Defence Minister. No information has been found on how their respective audit processes are organized however, nor is there any evidence that their auditing activities are subject to parliamentary scrutiny.

The media have cited the head of the Accounts Chamber (AC) as stating that in 2013 an internal auditing division was re-established within the MoD. On February 2014 it already had a staff of 350 experts; further measures were being planned to make the internal audit in the MoD more effective. According to the head of the AC, an internal auditing system had almost been destroyed during the previous years: there were no experienced experts left and the audit was hardly effective. She further went on to state that many financial violations in the MoD could have been avoided if it were not for poor internal auditing. In 2012 the AC assessed the effectiveness of the internal audit departments in state structures administering the state budget. The MoD ended up at 64th place from 111 institutions.

A positive change may be expected in the coming years due to the growth of the newly established internal audit division. The recent amendment of the Budget Code may also drive some change as it has added a new article on internal financial control and audit. Score 1 is assigned because active internal audit activities have been relaunched since very recently; the staff is said to be skilled; the auditing is scrutinized, although not by the Parliament; but no evidence of the audit department’s effectiveness is clear as yet.

COMMENTS -+

1) MoD. About Inspection for Financial Control. http://structure.mil.ru/structure/ministry_of_defence/[email protected];

2) MoD. About Department for Auditing of State Contracts. http://structure.mil.ru/structure/ministry_of_defence/[email protected];

3) MoD. About Anti-Corruption Council. http://mil.ru/anti-corruption/docs/[email protected]#txt;

4) Тарас Фомченков, &quoute;Ружья на проверку,&quoute; Российская Газета, February 28, 2014, accessed July 31, 2014, http://www.rg.ru/2014/02/28/sredstva.html.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

15.
score
2

Is there effective and transparent external auditing of military defence expenditure?

Researcher4281: Military expenditure is audited by the Accounts Chamber. Formally, it is a fully independent external audit agency. However, there is some doubt on the level of its independence. For instance, some commentators point out that the President has a say in appointing the head, the deputy head and the auditors of the Accounts Chamber, which is said to make the AC potentially dependent on the Executive. Although the final decision is up to the Parliament, the Parliament has to present a number of candidacies to the President, who, if not satisfied with any of them, can put forward his own candidate.

The AC reports are fully published on its website which makes the AC's findings transparent for the public. At the same time, classified information is not covered there. The AC's reports are also submitted to the Parliament and to the Executive.

There is evidence that the audit has uncovered some financial wrongdoing in the MoD. In 2012, several high-level defence officials were fired, and investigations were initiated by the law enforcement agencies based on the AC's reports. In 2013, the MoD took a number of significant decisions after the AC's audit, including to sign a new cooperation agreement with the AC and to revive the internal audit division. This indicates that the findings of the AC have been acted upon by the government. At the same time, there is no evidence of the government regularly reacting to the AC's findings. The government's actions described above relate to a large-scale corruption scandal.

Commentators have also questioned the effectiveness and the independence of the AC. According to one of them, a more competent AC would uncover much more wrongdoing.

COMMENTS -+

1) Budget Code of the RF, Article 264. http://www.consultant.ru/popular/budget/;

2) Федеральный закон от 5 апреля 2013 г. N 41-ФЗ &quoute;О Счетной палате Российской Федерации.&quoute; http://base.garant.ru/70353474/;

3) Accounts Chamber. &quoute;Audit of the Federal Budget.&quoute; http://audit.gov.ru/activities/audit-of-the-federal-budget/;

4) Тарас Фомченков, &quoute;Ружья на проверку,&quoute; Российская Газета, February 28, 2014, accessed July 31, 2014, http://www.rg.ru/2014/02/28/sredstva.html;

5) &quoute;По итогам проверок, проведенных Счетной палатой РФ в 2012 году, расследуются 17 уголовных дел,&quoute; Интерфакс, November 26, 2012, accessed July 31, 2014, http://www.interfax.ru/russia/277703;

6) &quoute;В Минобороны появится служба внутреннего контроля,&quoute; Сайт военных финансистов, November 12, 2013, accessed July, 31, 2014, http://vfeu.ucoz.ru/news/v_minoboronu_poyvitsy_slyjba_vnutrennego_kontrolia/2013-11-12-30;

7) Федеральный закон от 05.04.2013 N 41-ФЗ (ред. от 04.11.2014) &quoute;О Счетной палате Российской Федерации.&quoute; http://base.consultant.ru/cons/cgi/online.cgi?req=doc;base=LAW;n=170581;

8) Наталья Чернышова, &quoute;Новый закон о Счетной палате&quoute;, Каспаров.ru, April 11, 2013, accessed November 26, 2014, http://www.kasparov.ru/material.php?id=51667837243E5.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

16.
score
4

Is there evidence that the country's defence institutions have controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country's natural resource exploitation and, if so, are these interests publicly stated and subject to scrutiny?

Researcher4281: No evidence has been found of the defence institutions having controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the Russian national resources. At the same time, no statutory or constitutional provisions exist to prohibit this to them.

The only recent report linking the MoD with companies exploiting natural resources dates from 2011. The MoD rejected four requests of the state-owned oil corporation &quoute;Rosneft' that wanted to explore four pieces of land on the Arctic shelf.

Response to Peer Reviewer 1:
While the additional information provided on the increasing military presence in the Arctic is agreed with, it must be highlighted that there is no reliable evidence indicating that defence institutions or related individuals have controlling or financial interests in such businesses. Score maintained.

Response to Peer Reviewer 2:
Accepted. Score raised to 4.

COMMENTS -+

1) Нефтегазгрупп.рф. &quoute;Министерство Обороны не «пускает» Роснефть в Баренцево море. Стреляют, однако?&quoute; http://xn--80afbfao1bwaiqsf.xn--p1ai/?p=4028.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: Management of natural resources in Russia is under the purview of the Ministry of Natural Resources. Historically, high-ranking individuals from the army or MOD also have had vested interests in the country's natural resources, especially in the Arctic. Nowadays, there is no evidence to suggest that this is done systematically or on a large scale but it is likely that some of the control is retained within the army, even if not publicly stated. Officially, the army is involved in the protection of natural resources fields in Russia's mainland and more permanently in the Arctic, where militarisation is ongoing. The 2008 National Security Strategy through 2020 clearly identified the Arctic as a strategic region, mainly due to its presumed gas and oil deposits.

The SSI report reads: &quoute;During the Soviet period, the hierarchy of priorities was devoid of all ambiguity. The army controlled those zones of the High North that were considered strategic, and companies wanting to exploit resources were subject to the good will of the Ministry of defence. Thus in the 1980s, the idea of transforming Murmansk into a hub for Siberian oil bound for Western Europe was blocked by the army. Today, the situation has changed radically. In the 1990s, the army’s weakness in comparison to economic groups has altered power relations, and despite the renaissance of the Russian military sector, for the Ministry of defence there canbe no possibility of setting aside the interests of companies like Gazprom, Lukoil, or Norilsk Nickel, which have powerful backing within the administration and can counterbalance the military point of view.&quoute;

While the interests of economic groups close to the government is prevailing today, it is very likely that the army and specific high-ranking officials have retained some control of natural resources, given the strategic importance of the defence sector and the Arctic region. Therefore I would propose Score 0.

http://index.heritage.org/militarystrength/chapter/threats/europe/

http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1073.pdf

http://www.mk.ru/politics/2014/11/30/arkticheskuyu-neft-budet-okhranyat-armiya-rossii.html

Suggested score: 0

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: As there is no evidence or suspicion about the MoD being dependent upon private or state enterprises, I would suggest to state that the army in fact IS independent.

Suggested score: 4

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Not Qualified

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

17.
score
1

Is there evidence, for example through media investigations or prosecution reports, of a penetration of organised crime into the defence and security sector? If no, is there evidence that the government is alert and prepared for this risk?

Researcher4281: Reports indicate that there is penetration of organised crime in the military. These include reports on smuggling of arms, alcohol and cigarettes as well as drug trafficking from Central Asia and Afghanistan. Additionally, the MMPO's latest reports indicate a very high level of criminal activities in the defence sector (with a trend for some improvement, however). However, it is difficult to estimate which of these are linked with organised criminal groups.

In 2009, the then President appointed military chaplains (the first since 1917) to address the issue, although their main role appears to be to increase general ethical and moral conditions in the Army. There is evidence of the current President’s willingness to cooperate with the US and Central Asian governments to control drug trafficking.

However, it is not clear how successful these efforts have been nor is there evidence of related oversight.

Response to Peer Reviewer 1:
Accepted. The information provided has been incorporated into the main answer. Score lowered from 3 to 1.

Response to Peer Reviewer 2:
Score 1 has been awarded in line with the information provided by Peer Reviewer 2.

COMMENTS -+

1) Юрий Гаврилов, &quoute;Прокурор не промахнется,&quoute; Российская Газета, June 2, 2014, accessed July 31, 2014, http://www.rg.ru/2014/06/02/prokuror.html;

2) Наталья Райбман, &quoute;Фридинский: В 2013 г. ущерб от коррупции в войсках вырос в 5,5 раза&quoute;, Ведомости, July 11, 2013, accessed July 31, 2014, http://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/news/14072141/v-2013-g-uscherb-ot-korrupcii-v-vojskah-vyros-v-55-raza;

3) Interview with Interviewee 1: Expert and Journalist Specializing in Political and Military Issues, Moscow, 31 July 2014.

4) Eurasianet.org, Russia: Anti-Drug Trafficking Light Goes on in the Kremlin, but It’s Low Wattage, 4 February, 2013, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/66502

5) Wired, Accused Spies Charged With Smuggling Semiconductors for Russian Military, 10 April 2010, http://www.wired.com/2012/10/spies/

6) PIPSS, The Closure of the Russian Military Base at Akhalkalaki: Challenges for the Local Energy Elite, the Informal Economy and Stability, 2009, http://pipss.revues.org/3717

7) MSN NBC, Russian mob trading arms for cocaine with Colombia rebels, 9 April 2000, http://www.nbcnews.com/id/3340035/#.VU3Lj9pViko

8) Transparency International, Organised crime, corruption, and the vulnerability of defence and security forces, September 2011, https://www.google.co.uk/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=17&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CEUQFjAGOAo&url=http%3A%2F%2Farchive.ti-defence.org%2Fcomponent%2Fcckjseblod%2F%3Ftask%3Ddownload%26file%3Dpublication_file%26id%3D858&ei=3MlNVe2wJIOsU9ezgMgF&usg=AFQjCNEfuO3QTWC2do0KqWuRgoX9SF-lRg&sig2=Tu_VcQx5YWqfowASpkImVA&bvm=bv.92885102,d.d24

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: There is a considerable evidence of penetration of organised crime in the Russian Armed Forces, including drug-trafficking from Central Asia and Afghanistan, arms smuggling and counter-banding of alcohol and cigarettes. There is some indication that both the previous and current government is trying to tackle the issue. In July 2009 then President Medvedev announced the appointment of the first post-1917 military chaplains to counter the problem. President Putin is also keen to cooperate with the US and Central Asian governments on the issue of drug trafficking, however there is no evidence on how successful the implementation or oversight is. There is also no evidence of effective investigation or prosecution of such cases. I would suggest Score 1.

Eurasianet.org, Russia: Anti-Drug Trafficking Light Goes on in the Kremlin, but It’s Low Wattage, 4 February, 2013, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/66502

Wired, Accused Spies Charged With Smuggling Semiconductors for Russian Military, 10 April 2010, http://www.wired.com/2012/10/spies/

PIPSS, The Closure of the Russian Military Base at Akhalkalaki: Challenges for the Local Energy Elite, the Informal Economy and Stability, 2009, http://pipss.revues.org/3717

MSN NBC, Russian mob trading arms for cocaine with Colombia rebels, 9 April 2000, http://www.nbcnews.com/id/3340035/#.VU3Lj9pViko

Transparency International, Organised crime, corruption, and the vulnerability of defence and security forces, September 2011, https://www.google.co.uk/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=17&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CEUQFjAGOAo&url=http%3A%2F%2Farchive.ti-defence.org%2Fcomponent%2Fcckjseblod%2F%3Ftask%3Ddownload%26file%3Dpublication_file%26id%3D858&ei=3MlNVe2wJIOsU9ezgMgF&usg=AFQjCNEfuO3QTWC2do0KqWuRgoX9SF-lRg&sig2=Tu_VcQx5YWqfowASpkImVA&bvm=bv.92885102,d.d24

Suggested score: 1

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: There was published in the media evidence of a racket in military bases in Far East military district during the previous accession period. The racket was organized by former military servants. The MoD is prepared for the risk.

Suggested score: 4

Peer Reviewer-+

18.
score
2

Is there policing to investigate corruption and organised crime within the defence services and is there evidence of the effectiveness of this policing?

Researcher4281: The main and most active policing body that targets crime and corruption in the Armed Forces is the Main Military Prosecutor's Office. Its latest reports give some idea of the Office's extensive activities. Between June 2013 and June 2014 approximately, the military prosecutors forwarded over 570 corruption-related cases for further investigation where army officials were implicated. Nine high-level officers are now being tried for criminal offences. In terms of the agency's effectiveness, although it has reported some improvement during the last year, it also admits that crime and corruption remain major issues within the Armed Forces.

In addition, there is significant criticism of the agency's actions during a major corruption scandal under a former minister of defence, where the agency was apparently aware of the corruption for months before acting. It was only when the Main Military Investigations Office instituted a criminal proceeding that this was effectively looked into.

There was an agency tasked specifically with looking into organised criminal activities which was abolished in 2008. Later, there was some discussion on re-establishing the Departments for Combatting Organized Crime within the Ministry of Interior, but it was not supported by the President's Administration and some of the Interior Ministry's high-level officials.

Response to Peer Reviewer 2:
Both bodies mentioned are under the jurisdiction of the MoD, which is further discussed in Question 8.

COMMENTS -+

1) Юрий Гаврилов, &quoute;Прокурор не промахнется,&quoute; Российская Газета, June 2, 2014, accessed July 31, 2014, http://www.rg.ru/2014/06/02/prokuror.html;

2) Наталья Райбман, &quoute;Фридинский: В 2013 г. ущерб от коррупции в войсках вырос в 5,5 раза,&quoute; Vedomosti.ru, July 11, 2013, accessed July 31, 2014, http://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/news/14072141/v-2013-g-uscherb-ot-korrupcii-v-vojskah-vyros-v-55-raza.

3) Александр Шварев, &quoute;УБОПы не вернутся в Россию&quoute;, Росбалт, September 25, 2012, accessed October 4, 2015, http://www.rosbalt.ru/moscow/2012/09/25/1038624.html

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The Main Military Prosecutor's Office and Main Military Investigations Office are quite effective in investigating corruption and organized crime within the military, being independent of the MoD itself.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

19.
score
2

Are the policies, administration, and budgets of the intelligence services subject to effective, properly resourced, and independent oversight?

Researcher4281: According to the FL on Foreign Intelligence (Article 11), foreign intelligence work is conducted through two structures: the Foreign Intelligence Service and the foreign intelligence body within the MoD. The latter refers to the Main Office (&quoute;Главное управление&quoute;) of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces. Article 24 provides legal grounds for parliamentary oversight of both these agencies.

All information sharing between the intelligence services and members of the Parliament is conducted via special committees/subcommittees of the Chambers (one of them - the Duma Committee for Security and Combatting Corruption). Before that, the committee members have to be formally given access to secret information, in compliance with the FL on State Secrets. Another supervisory body is the Accounts Chamber. A special group within the AC exists to control the implementation of the budget for the maintenance of the intelligence services. The AC may request documents and hear the reports of the heads of the intelligence services in closed hearings. Additionally, Article 25 makes the Prosecutor General's Office responsible for monitoring the intelligence services' compliance with the federal laws. Finally, the activities of the intelligence services on the whole are controlled by the President, as Article 12 prescribes. No evidence of the oversight actually taking place has been found here, however.

Another intelligence body is the Federal Security Service which is responsible for different aspects of the country's security. The FL on the Federal Security Service (Articles 23 and 24) states that the FSS is overseen by the President, the Federal Council, the executive and judiciary. No further details follow. There is also a provision for control by the General Prosecutor's Office. No evidence of such control in practice has been found.

Response to Peer Reviewer 1:
Given there exist provisions for independent oversight of each of the agencies, the score is maintained.

COMMENTS -+

1) Федеральный закон № 5-ФЗ &quoute;О внешней разведке&quoute; от 10 января 1996 года. http://svr.gov.ru/svr_today/doc02.htm;

2) MoD. &quoute;About Main Office of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces.&quoute; http://structure.mil.ru/structure/ministry_of_defence/[email protected];

3) Положение о Комитете Государственной Думы Федерального Собрания Российской Федерации по безопасности и противодействию коррупции. http://www.komitet2-16.km.duma.gov.ru/site.xp/049056.html;

4) Николай Долгополов, &quoute;Защита от внешних угроз,&quoute; Российская Газета, December 20, 2010, accessed July 26, 2014, http://www.rg.ru/2010/12/20/svr.html;

5) Official website of State Duma Security and Anti-Corruption Committee. http://www.komitet2-16.km.duma.gov.ru/.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: Russia's intelligence services are not subject to external control due to their secrecy. Their financing allegedly grows each year, as is indicated by budget items and politicians' statements, given this information is not publicly disclosed.

There is an Internal Security department in the FSB structure responsible for the enforcement of compliance rules upon staff and for internal investigations. Information related to the FSB's expenditure on non-secret activities is available.

Suggested score: 1

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

20.
score
1

Are senior positions within the intelligence services filled on the basis of objective selection criteria, and are appointees subject to investigation of their suitability and prior conduct?

Researcher4281: The Director of the Foreign Intelligence Office is appointed by the President's decree of October 9, 2007, № 1349. It is now headed by a former prime-minister. During his civil service career (since 1973) the current head has changed a number of posts, many of them connected to external economic relations and trade. The official website states that the officials holding other senior posts in the FIO are not disclosed under the law.

The Federal Security Service's website contains information on both the Director and his deputies. The FSS director is also appointed by the President. The current director has served in the national security sector since 1975. Almost all his deputies are colonel generals. Article 16 of the FL on the FSS provides some general provisions for the personnel selection, but no specific objective criteria can be found.

According to the FL № 79- ФЗ of July 27, 2014, on public civil service (Chapter 4, Article 22), the civil servants are appointed on a competitive basis where their professional qualities are assessed. There are a number of exceptions, however, where the candidates are exempt from any competitive selection. The exception is made for positions appointed by the President, which means that, among other, the heads of the Federal Security Service and Foreign Intelligence Office are not legally required to compete for their position with other candidates. The law also makes an exception for the positions that imply dealing with data protected by the state secrecy law. It is up to state agencies to set up a list for such positions. The Federal Security Service also has one such list, adopted by a decree of November 12, 2010, № 560. The list includes some 20 positions, ranging from the most senior ones to that of a consultant or an expert.

COMMENTS -+

1) Указ Президента Российской Федерации 9 октября 2007 года № 1349 &quoute;О директоре Службы внешней разведки Российской Федерации.&quoute; http://svr.gov.ru/svr_today/doc21.htm;

2) Foreign Intelligence Service. &quoute;Структура и руководство.&quoute; http://svr.gov.ru/svr_today/struktur.htm;

3) Федеральный закон о Федеральной Службе Безопасности от 22 февраля 1995 года, Статья 16. http://www.fsb.ru/fsb/npd/more.htm%21id%3D10340801%40fsbNpa.html;

4) Федеральный закон от 27 июля 2004 г. N 79-ФЗ &quoute;О государственной гражданской службе Российской Федерации&quoute;, Chapter 4. http://base.garant.ru/12136354/4/#block_400#ixzz3KBudsW8X;

5) Приказ ФСБ РФ от 12 ноября 2010 г. № 560 “Об утверждении Перечня должностей федеральной государственной гражданской службы в органах федеральной службы безопасности, исполнение должностных обязанностей по которым связано с использованием сведений, составляющих государственную тайну, при назначении на которые конкурс может не проводиться”. http://www.garant.ru/products/ipo/prime/doc/55070246/#ixzz3KBwO7smK.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

21.
score
0

Does the government have a well-scrutinised process for arms export decisions that aligns with international protocols, particularly the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)?

Researcher4281: Russia has not signed or ratified the ATT. Media reports cite a government source saying that Russia does not plan to sign the treaty in the near future as the it is not satisfied with its provisions. For instance, Russia called for including a ban on arms delivery to the non-governmental actors (referring to opposition fighting against the national authorities), which was rejected by the other states.

At the same time, there are some general provisions for arms exports control in the FL on Military and Technical Cooperation of the RF with Foreign States. The law outlines the responsibilities of a number of government bodies in this domain. Some evidence of violations in the arms export exists, but the information lacks detail and the sources are not reliable enough.

COMMENTS -+

1) Armstreaty.org. &quoute;Universalisation of Act.&quoute; http://armstreaty.org/issue/tracking-the-universalisation-of-the-att/; (last updated: 18th August 2014)

2) &quoute;Россия не будет подписывать международный договор о торговле оружием,&quoute; Lenta.ru, May 17, 2014, accessed July 27, 2014, http://lenta.ru/news/2014/05/17/weapon/;

3) Федеральный закон от 19 июля 1998 г. N 114-ФЗ &quoute;О военно-техническом сотрудничестве Российской Федерации с иностранными государствами.&quoute; http://base.garant.ru/179054/;

4) Luke Harding, &quoute;WikiLeaks cables condemn Russia as 'mafia state'&quoute;, December 1, 2010, accessed July, 27, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/dec/01/wikileaks-cables-russia-mafia-kleptocracy.

5) Al Arabiya, Russia: We never ‘concealed’ giving arms to Syria, 7 September 2015 http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2015/09/07/Russia-says-it-never-hid-the-fact-it-sold-arms-to-Syria.html

6) The Economic Times, Russia says will not sign 'weak' arms trade treaty, 17 May, 2015 http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/articleshow/47317998.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Russia does not comply with many of the provisions of international arms trade control agreements. It has been accused of supplying arms to Syrian president Bashar al-Assad, used by his regime against civilians, as well as to Iraq. There is no evidence that arms trade are subject to viable parliamentary scrutiny.

http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2014_06/News_Brief/Russia-Undecided-on-Arms-Trade-Treaty

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Risk management 60
22.
score
2

How effective are controls over the disposal of assets, and is information on these disposals, and the proceeds of their sale, transparent?

Researcher4281: Legal documents exist for the defence sector describing the procedures and controls for asset disposals in some detail, such as the Government's decree of October 15, 1999, № 1165, which is available to the public.

There are significant indications of corrupt activity in the area of asset disposals under the former Defence Minister. There is evidence in the media about transgressions based on the results of the official and independent investigations (see sources 3, 4, 5, 8). In February 2013, the new Minister had initiated a full inventory of all assets before disposing them further. Mechanisms for control have been redistributed between MoD departments since 2012 in order increase efficiency. However, in a 2013 on the new measures, the head of the Centre for Military Prognostication questioned their efficiency, stating that the secrecy of the defence sector could still prevent the assets disposal from being truly transparent. The proceeds of the assets disposal are now reported on the website of the MoD as well as on the website of the Federal Agency for Managing State Property, although it is unclear what share of secret assets are still being disposed without the details being published. Score 2 is assigned to describe the following situation: controls exist for non-secret assets, which have been improved although some questions persist about their efficiency and transparency. Information on assets disposal is published, but again only for non-secret items.

COMMENTS -+

1) Приказ Министра обороны Российской Федерации от 23 декабря 2011 г. N 2650 г. Москва
&quoute;О мерах по выполнению в Вооруженных Силах Российской Федерации постановления Правительства Российской Федерации от 15 октября 1999 г. N 1165.&quoute; http://www.rg.ru/2012/02/08/voenimuschestvo-site-dok.html;

2) Постановление Правительства РФ от 15 октября 1999 г. N 1165 &quoute;О реализации высвобождаемого движимого военного имущества.&quoute; http://base.garant.ru/12117173/#block_1000;

3) Юрий Гаврилов, &quoute;Имуществом &quoute;Оборонсервиса&quoute; будет торговать специализированная организация,&quoute; April 28, 2014, accessed July 27, 2014, http://www.rg.ru/2014/04/28/oboronservis-site-anons.html;

4) Юрий Гаврилов, &quoute;За частью не числились,&quoute; January 21, 2014, accessed July 27, 2014, http://www.rg.ru/2014/01/21/imushestvo-site.html;

5) &quoute;Минобороны отсудит то, что продано,&quoute; INTERFAX.RU, December 6, 2012, accessed July 27, 2014, http://www.interfax.ru/russia/279507;

6) Federal Agency for Managing of State Property. &quoute;Продажа высвобождаемого недвижимого военного имущества.&quoute; http://www.rosim.ru/activities/sales/vvi;

7) Federal Agency for Managing of State Property. &quoute;Продажа высвобождаемого движимого военного имущества.&quoute; http://www.rosim.ru/activities/sales/vdvi?info_page=6;

8) &quoute;Шойгу вернул контроль за реализацией военной недвижимости финансовому департаменту,&quoute; PASMI.RU, February 11, 2013, accessed July 27, 2014, http://pasmi.ru/archive/71747.

9) Russian Ministry of Defence to auction 120,000 units of military kit, 6 August 2015, http://europe.newsweek.com/russian-ministry-defence-auction-120000-units-military-kit-328417

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

23.
score
2

Is independent and transparent scrutiny of asset disposals conducted by defence establishments, and are the reports of such scrutiny publicly available?

Researcher4281: Oversight of asset disposals is conducted by a number of the MoD departments. The Minister of Defence's decree of December 23, 2011, is one of the documents distributing controlling functions among the MoD's departments. However, the independence of internal controls is unclear as the departments are subordinate to the MoD. At the same time, according to media reports, the current Defence Minister has declared a clear intention to strengthen the internal control mechanisms.

The Accounts Chamber also scrutinises assets disposal. Information regarding scrutiny by the oversight bodies appears occasionally in the media and there is evidence of some actions being taken when any violations are found. However it is not clear how often and systematically controls are conducted and so far not all information on results is available to the public.

COMMENTS -+

1) &quoute;Счетная палата: Минобороны не ведет учет объектов неликвидного недвижимого имущества,&quoute; PASMI.RU, November 27, 2012, accessed July 27, 2014, http://pasmi.ru/archive/62894;

2) &quoute;Шойгу вернул контроль за реализацией военной недвижимости финансовому департаменту,&quoute; PASMI.RU, February 11, 2013, accessed July 27, 2014, http://pasmi.ru/archive/71747;

3) Приказ Министра обороны Российской Федерации от 23 декабря 2011 г. N 2650 &quoute;О мерах по выполнению в Вооруженных Силах Российской Федерации постановления Правительства Российской Федерации от 15 октября 1999 г. N 1165.&quoute; http://www.rg.ru/2012/02/08/voenimuschestvo-site-dok.html;

4) Юрий Гаврилов, &quoute;За частью не числились,&quoute; January 21, 2014, accessed July 27, 2014, http://www.rg.ru/2014/01/21/imushestvo-site.html;

5) &quoute;Минобороны отсудит то, что продано,&quoute; INTERFAX.RU, December 6, 2012, accessed July 27, 2014, http://www.interfax.ru/russia/279507;

6) &quoute;Шойгу вернул контроль за реализацией военной недвижимости финансовому департаменту,&quoute; PASMI.RU, February 11, 2013, accessed July 27, 2014, http://pasmi.ru/archive/71747.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

24.
score
1

What percentage of defence and security expenditure in the budget year is dedicated to spending on secret items relating to national security and the intelligence services?

Researcher4281: According to the latest calculations (based on official sources) of the Gaidar Institute in 2014, 58.8 per cent of the expenditure on national defence is kept secret. Twenty-nine per cent of the expenditure on the &quoute;national security and law enforcement&quoute; is classified, under which 99.8 per cent is secret expenditure on the security services. No official or other reliable statistics are available.

COMMENTS -+

1)Василий Зацепин, &quoute;О текущем федеральном бюджете,&quoute; Институт экономической политики имени Гайдара, March 27, 2014, accessed July 31, 2014, http://iep.ru/kommentarii/o-tekushchem-federalnom-biudzhete.html;

2) &quoute;A Quarter of Budget Spending Until 2016 'Kept Secret',&quoute; The Moscow Times, October 15, 2013, accessed July 31, 2014, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/a-quarter-of-budget-spending-until-2016-kept-secret/487812.html.

3) Bloomberg Business, The Secret Money Behind Vladimir Putin's War Machine, June 2 2015, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-06-02/putin-s-secret-budget-hides-shift-toward-war-economy

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Not Qualified

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

25.
score
2

Is the legislature (or the appropriate legislative committee or members of the legislature) given full information for the budget year on the spending of all secret items relating to national security and military intelligence?

Researcher4281: There are legal provisions in place for legislative oversight of secret spending. According to the Budget Code, Article 209, item 1, secret items of the Federal Budget are to be debated in closed sessions of both chambers of the parliament. Details the secret items may be disclosed to the chairmen of the chambers only, as well as to the special commissions. It was not possible to verify whether there are omissions in the information provided and the score has been selected accordingly.

COMMENTS -+

1) Budget Code of the RF. http://base.garant.ru/12112604/;

2) Роман Ошаров, &quoute;Секретный бюджет России&quoute;, Голос Америки, October 10, 2013, accessed November 26, 2014, http://www.golos-ameriki.ru/content/russia-budget/1769662.html;

3) Екатерина Алябьева, &quoute;Четверть бюджета России – это черная дыра&quoute;, Slon.ru, October 29, 2014, accessed November 26, 2014, http://slon.ru/insights/1176220/.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

26.
score
2

Are audit reports of the annual accounts of the security sector (the military, police, and intelligence services) and other secret programs provided to the legislature (or relevant committee) and are they subsequently subject to parliamentary debate?

Researcher4281: In the Budget Code, Article 241, item 9, there are general provisions for all &quoute;special secret programmes&quoute; according to which audit reports on the secret programmes expenses are submitted to the President for consideration, as well as to the chairmen of both Parliamentary chambers and to the Parliament's special commissions. Outside the legislature, a special group within the Accounts Chamber (AC) exists to control the implementation of the budget specifically for the maintenance of the intelligence services. The AC may request documents and hear the reports of the heads of the intelligence services in closed hearings.

In both cases, there is no information on how the findings on secret expenditure are handled in practice. In regard to the legislature, experts state that everything that concerns the secret part of military spending is kept in secret even from most of the parliament members, which corresponds to the legal provisions giving access to the secret information to specific units within the legislature only.

Response to all Reviewers:
The Rosoboronzakaz was abolished in January 1, 2015. Before that, the agency was accountable to the MoD.

Response to Peer Reviewer 2:
Select units within the Parliament have access to secret audit reports by law but it is not possible to verify how this provision is implemented in practice. Accordingly, the score has been raised from 1 to 2.

COMMENTS -+

1) Budget Code of the RF. http://base.garant.ru/12112604/;

2) Константин Богданов, &quoute;От кого скрывают военный бюджет&quoute;, Lenta.ru, October 24, 2014, accessed November 26, 2014, http://lenta.ru/articles/2014/10/23/topsecret/;

3) Роман Ошаров, &quoute;Секретный бюджет России&quoute;, Голос Америки, October 10, 2013, accessed November 26, 2014, http://www.golos-ameriki.ru/content/russia-budget/1769662.html;

4) Екатерина Алябьева, &quoute;Четверть бюджета России – это черная дыра&quoute;, Slon.ru, October 29, 2014, accessed November 26, 2014, http://slon.ru/insights/1176220/.

4) Федеральный закон № 5-ФЗ &quoute;О внешней разведке&quoute; от 10 января 1996 года. http://svr.gov.ru/svr_today/doc02.htm

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The Federal Service for defence Order (Rosoboronzakaz) reports to the MoD. These reports are submitted to the chairmen of the two chambers of the parliament, as the assessor pointed out, but there is no evidence that these reports are widely debated in the parliament or parliamentary committees are able to exercise any oversight. The level of detail legislators are presented with seems to be very limited.

http://www.gov.ru/main/ministry/isp-vlast44.html,
http://www.fsoz.gov.ru/

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: defence and security agencies provide only limited reporting to the legislature. In theory, the MoD is responsible for reporting to the Federal Agency for State Military procurement within the Government, but there is no evidence of control.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: There are secret parts in the report of Accounting Chamber on executed federal budget and on the projected new federal budget.

Suggested score: 3

Peer Reviewer-+

27.
score
1

Off-budget military expenditures are those that are not formally authorised within a country's official defence budget, often considered to operate through the 'back-door'. In law, are off-budget military expenditures permitted, and if so, are they exceptional occurrences that are well-controlled?

Researcher4281: The legal basis for off-budget expenditure is not clear.

All budgeted expenditures of the MoD and related agencies are recorded in the official defence budget. There are no special provisions covering off-budget military expenditures. However, there are a number of companies founded by the MoD that are not mentioned in the budget, but apparently do have expenses. Some of them do disclose financial information, the others do not. It depends on whether they are open-joint stock companies or not, and on whether they go on IPO. Score 1 is chosen as there are some military-related expenditures not being recorded or disclosed.

Response to Peer Reviewer 2:
Peer Reviewer refers to extra-budgetary spending which is different from off-budget spending. In regard to spending not included into the authorised defence budget, there is an unknown amount of money flows coming from the MoD-related companies, which may account for an undefined amount of off-budget spending.
As mentioned above, there does not appear to be any legislation regarding such expenditure.
No score fits this combination of law and practice. However, score 1 seems most appropriate to reflect a high possibility that the off-budget spending exists (although its scope is unclear), while it is not provided for by law and is thus not subject to oversight like authorised budget items are.
Score maintained.

COMMENTS -+

1) Федеральный закон от 2 декабря 2013 г. N 349-ФЗ &quoute;О федеральном бюджете на 2014 год и на плановый период 2015 и 2016 годов.&quoute; http://base.garant.ru/70525334/;

2) MoD. The list of the corporations controlled by the MoD, [search results]. http://doc.mil.ru/documents/quick_search/other.htm?f=76&fid=0&blk=11837880 (below), http://doc.mil.ru/documents/quick_search/other.htm?f=101&fid=0&blk=11837880 (above);

3) Федеральный закон &quoute;Об акционерных обществах&quoute; (Об АО) от 26.12.1995 N 208-ФЗ. http://www.consultant.ru/popular/stockcomp/.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Many of the state-owned companies in the defence industry are not properly supervised and fraud and corruption have been revealed in the past in relation to privatisations, outscoring and market speculations with property prices. The case of the defence company Oboronservis in 2012 is notorious as corruption was estimated to have reached over 3 billion rubles. The case was investigated and the Minister of Defence at the time fired, but the root causes of the problem- namely, lack of supervision and accountability- was not tackled properly. This means that the case is symptomatic for many companies in the sector.

Overall, in 2012 Rosoboronzakas reported that about 1 500 violations and infractions were uncovered in Russia's state defence spending, amounting to 16 billion rubles with a significant proportion of them suspected to involve off-budget expenditure. There is no indications that the situation has improved since.

http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/ICES2013/papers/archive/oxenstierna-russian-defence-budget-and-sap

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: All expenses by the MoD are listed in the budget, whether secret or public. Procurement procedures tend to be carried out on an open and competitive basis.
On the other hand, there is an unknown number of government-owned actors whose money flows are not disclosed. Mainly, these are state-owned corporations that produce, import and export arms, and various scientific institutions.
Some of them disclose financial information, some do not. Any any case, these institutions are not subject to parliamentary scrutiny.
Rosoboronexport official website: http://www.roe.ru/ - in this case we can find financial documentation and links to affiliated companies.
Oboronservice official website: http://www.oboronservice.ru/ - here, there are some enterprises disclosing outdated (2012 and older) data.
The main issue is that the full extent of military assets is not publicly disclosed.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: There are neither known events of off-budget defence expenditures in thecurrent assessment period nor any law regulations connected. The distinctive feature of Russia consists in having few defence-related expenditure in other budget divisions formally not connected to defence. There are from 52 to 78 governmental agencies and state corporations engaged in the fulfilment of National Defence Plan but only 28 of them do spend the defence budget. The MoD's companies are listed in defence budget if they do have budget loans or grants.

Suggested score: N/A

Peer Reviewer-+

28.
score
2

In practice, are there any off-budget military expenditures? If so, does evidence suggest this involves illicit economic activity?

Researcher4281: There are a number of companies founded by the MoD that are not mentioned in the budget, but apparently do have expenses. Some of them do disclose financial information, the others do not. It depends on whether they are open-joint stock companies or not, and on whether they go on IPO.

One of the companies, Oboronservis (an Open Joint-Stock Company), was found to be involved in illegal activities. According to the Investigative Committee, the then head of the Property Department of the MoD selected the most liquid assets belonging to Oboronservis and allegedly sold them out at deliberately lowered prices. It was also reported that there is evidence that the assets were sold to companies controlled by the then head herself, after which the money was laundered. The official prosecution resulted into 25 criminal cases and the dismissal of the then Defence Minister.

The decision to restructure the corporation has been taken recently because of its ineffectiveness. Oboronservis used to have a complicated structure including 9 sub-holdings and about 300 joint-stock companies. In the end of 2014 Oboronservis was replaced by a stock company Garnizon. Garnizon consists of 4 sub-holdings only which are intended to make the maintenance and control of the activities easier and more effective.

Response to TI Chapter Reviewer: Agree with score and justification. Score changed from 0 to 2.

Response to Peer Reviewer 2: Besides the example given by the reviewer there are a number of MoD-controlled companies some of which do not have to disclose the information on their money flows. This indicates of more than &quoute;occasional&quoute; off-budget expenditures, although the extent of such expenses is not quite clear. Thus, score 2 fits better.

COMMENTS -+

1) MoD. The list of the corporations controlled by the MoD, [search results]. http://doc.mil.ru/documents/quick_search/other.htm?f=76&fid=0&blk=11837880 (below), http://doc.mil.ru/documents/quick_search/other.htm?f=101&fid=0&blk=11837880 (above);

2) &quoute;Министр обороны отправит «Оборонсервис» в прошлое,&quoute; PASMI.RU, June 3, 2014, accessed July 28, 2014, http://pasmi.ru/archive/107046;

3) Евгений Калюков, &quoute;Славянку&quoute; уличили в причинении крупного ущерба ракетным войскам,&quoute; РБК, July 10, 2014, accessed July 28, 2014, http://top.rbc.ru/incidents/10/07/2014/935597.shtml;

4) &quoute;Оборонсервис&quoute; переименуют в &quoute;Гарнизон&quoute;, РБК, July 7, 2014, accessed on November 26, 2014, http://top.rbc.ru/economics/14/07/2014/936226.shtml;

5) Роман Крецул, &quoute;Укрощение Оборонсервиса&quoute;, Взгляд, June 3, 2014, accessed November 26, 2014, http://vz.ru/society/2014/6/3/689800.html;

6) Interfax.ru, &quoute;Оборонсервис&quoute; преобразовали в АО &quoute;Гарнизон&quoute;, December 29, 2014, accessed October 4, 2015, http://www.interfax.ru/russia/415956.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The budget item &quoute;Defence&quoute; in the State Budget excludes extra-budgetary spending and sources. There is no evidence to suggest that these are publicly available or discussed. The appropriate parliamentary committees have access to this information but again there is no evidence of the level of detail or the quality of the scrutiny.

Also Information about Russia’s total arms exports are available from open sources and the data is regularly announced by Russian officials, although no information is revealed as to what percentage of the sum goes towards financing the Armed Forces or relevant institutions. Moreover, the money spent on the Russian military are accounted for under various articles of the national budget and other decrees, and the names of these articles are not always refer to defence in an obvious way. This makes public scrutiny almost impossible.

A recent SIPRI report reads: &quoute;It may be noted that not all of the State Defence Order (GOZ) is directly financed from the budget: part is to be financed by state-guaranteed credits and as shown by the British specialist Julian Cooper (2012), as much as 22 per cent of the GOZ 2011–2015 is supposed to come from such credits. The same situation applies to the Federal Target Programmes (FTPs) for the development of the defence industry. If state-guaranteed credits are to supplement direct budget allocations, expenditure on the GPV becomes higher than the budget figures reveal, since the budget excludes extra-budgetary spending.

http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/ICES2013/papers/archive/oxenstierna-russian-defence-budget-and-sap (Page 7)

http://www.cast.ru/files/book/all-stats_eng_14_02_2012.pdf

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: In practice, the MoD owns a number of enterprises that have their own rules of information disclosure. Some of them that work in international markets are quite transparent and their procedures, descriptions, and reports are available.

Yet, experts from all fields and even authorised agencies find the the larger part of MoD-owned businesses and research institutions difficult to assess.

Suggested score: 2

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: Some evidence of occasional off-budget military expenditure has been observed in the previous accession period in the form of sponsorship on a local level (so-called patronage assistance mostly in kind to some units of Armed Forces).

Suggested score: 4

Peer Reviewer-+

29.
score
2

In law, are there provisions regulating mechanisms for classifying information on the grounds of protecting national security, and, if so, are they subject to effective scrutiny?

Researcher4281: The FL on State Secrets (Article 4, items 2 and 3) and the Government's Statute on the rules for assigning different degrees of secrecy to the information (Item 4) outline the procedure. The heads of the government bodies and state nuclear energy corporation Rosatom prepare a draft list of information to be classified. The Government then submits the list to the President for approval. No legal provisions for scrutiny exist, however.

There is some commentary from experts (although dating 2002) pointing out that as long as the state bodies profit from declaring an issue or case a state secret, the number of illegally assigned secrecy labels will continue to grow. Controls for activities falling under the state secret law are very limited. In addition to that, the officials dealing with secret issues appear to receive some financial benefits.

In May 2015 President Putin signed a decree classifying &quoute;peacetime&quoute; deaths which provoked a discussion on whether he violated the law by this action. There were several points of criticism, among which a claim made by some of the lawyers and human rights defenders that he went beyond his power by classifying the information. His defenders reacted, however, that it was not his own initiative, but he only agreed with an initiative coming from the executive bodies - as the law prescribes. This incident raised the issue of the President's undue influence over the decision-making on which data should be classified.


Response to Peer Reviewer 2: Agree with comments, but not with score 4. While there are formal mechanisms for classifying information, there is doubt whether these legal requirements are upheld in practice, as well as if there is any effective scrutiny on the decisions being made. In terms of scrutiny, as described above, no legal provisions and no evidence of it has been found.
Score changed from 1 to 2.

COMMENTS -+

1) Закон РФ от 21.07.1993 N 5485-1 (ред. от 21.12.2013) &quoute;О государственной тайне,&quoute; Статья 4. http://base.consultant.ru/cons/cgi/online.cgi?req=doc;base=LAW;n=156018;

2) Постановление Правительства РФ от 04.09.1995 N 870 Об утверждении Правил отнесения сведений, составляющих государственную тайну, к различным степеням секретности, Пункт 4. http://www.bestpravo.ru/federalnoje/xg-praktika/j4n.htm;

3) Юрий Шмидт, &quoute;Гостайна должна быть реальной, компактной и защитимой&quoute;, Фонд Свободы Информации, March 3, 2002, accessed November 26, 2014, http://svobodainfo.org/ru/node/156.

4) Reid Stendish, &quoute;Putin Signs Decree Classifying ‘Peacetime’ Deaths of Russian Soldiers&quoute;, Foreign Policy, May 28, 2015, accessed October 5, 2015, https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/05/28/putin-signs-decree-classifying-peacetime-deaths-of-russian-soldiers-ukraine-kiev-donetsk-luhansk/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_term=%2ASituation%20Report&utm_campaign=SitRep0529;

5) NEWSru.com, &quoute;Верховный суд признал законным указ Путина о засекречивании военных потерь в мирное время&quoute;, August 13, 2015, accessed October 5, 2015, http://www.newsru.com/russia/13aug2015/ukaz.html.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: A state secret, according to the definition in the Official Secrets Act of the Russian Federation, is information protected by the state on its military, foreign policy, economic, intelligence, counterintelligence, operational and investigative and other activities. The Federal Service for Technical and Export Control of Russia (FSTEC) is tasked with protection of sensitive information constituting a state secret, any other restricted data, prevention of its technical channel leakage, unauthorized access, special effects/impacts on the information (information medium) for reasons of gaining, destructing, corrupting and blocking access to such information in the territory of the Russian Federation.

There is no evidence for the effective legislative control on the activities of the FSTEC or mechanisms for tackling corruption. The website of the FSTEC features an anti-corruption commission but there is no information on its activities. Control over state secret protection is exercised by the President and the government.

http://sec4all.net/gostaina-russ.html

http://fstec.ru/obshchaya-informatsiya/polnomochiya

http://lawtoday.ru/razdel/biblo/info-prav/123.php

http://www.irbis.vegu.ru/repos/11246/HTML/159.htm

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: There is no single secret section in the national budget. Rather, for each of the main budget items, such as &quoute;National Economy&quoute;, &quoute;Governance&quoute;, &quoute;National defence&quoute;, &quoute;National Security&quoute; there is a secret part.
The secret parts of budget items are provided to the appropriate committees of both chambers of parliaments and the heads of both chambers. However, there is no information if actual spending is reported to anyone.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: There are provisions in law for classification of information but due to a violation of the Russian Constitution, the executive branch has extended own classification power. The Law &quoute;on state secrets&quoute; extended presidential power over the constitutional limit and then the president in his turn extended the list of classified information by decree.

Suggested score: 4

Peer Reviewer-+

30.
score
1

Do national defence and security institutions have beneficial ownership of commercial businesses? If so, how transparent are details of the operations and finances of such businesses?

Researcher4281: There is evidence that the MoD owns a considerable number of enterprises. For instance, the Open Joint-Stock Company (OJSC) Oboronservis owned by the MoD had 231 subsidiary enterprises in November 2012, according to the head of the MoD Property Department. The full list of all enterprises owned by defence and security institutions is not made publicly available and far from all of them disclose their finances. It is thus difficult to estimate how significant these businesses are in total.

COMMENTS -+

1) Павел Седаков, «Минобороны нужно стране не для того, чтобы имущество продавать,» Forbes.ru, July 3, 2014, accessed July 28, 2014, http://www.forbes.ru/sobytiya/vlast/260003-minoborony-nuzhno-strane-ne-dlya-togo-chtoby-imushchestvo-prodavat?page=0,0; 2) ОАО &quoute;Оборонсервис.&quoute; &quoute;Субхолдинги.&quoute; http://www.oboronservice.ru/Forms/Public/ContentForm.aspx?ID=544.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: I agree with the assessor. The Armed Forces own or control a number of businesses and properties. The disposal or privatisation of such entities from Soviet time, but also recently, has proved very prone to corruption and fraud, as demonstrated in the 2012 case of Oboronservis. In March 2015 a bill regulating the management of the sizeable property of the Russian army was submitted to the Duma. This area is currently not strictly regulated by any law.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/7291540.stm

https://defencerussia.wordpress.com/2015/03/13/complex-project-for-army-property-management/

http://izvestia.ru/news/561646

http://m.forbes.ru/article.php?id=202284

http://www.eurosmi.ru/435smi_kommercheskie_firmy_skupali_imuschestvo_minoborony_na_dengi_oboronservisa.html

http://kvnews.ru/news-feed/pozharnyy-vezdehod-omsktransmasha-prinyat-na-vooruzhenie-minoborony-rossii

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Not Qualified

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

31.
score
1

Are military-owned businesses subject to transparent independent scrutiny at a recognised international standard?

Researcher4281: Military-owned businesses are not subject to regular oversight. They are audited (or not audited) depending on the nature of the business. Auditing may also be conducted ad hoc if there are concerns about the business' financial activities. The details of such audits are not available to the public except in special cases when the audit reveals major corruption activities and a decision is made to bring the information to the public. An example is the revelation in 2012 of illegal corrupt activities by the Property Department of the MoD and by Oboronservis, a company controlled by the MoD. There have also been doubts about the audit's reliability, for example, the media highlighted a case of an auditing company whose auditors lacked updated certificates.

COMMENTS -+

1) Юлия Синяева, Евгений Новиков и Иван Петров, &quoute;Аудитор «Оборонсервиса» без боя не сдается,&quoute; РБК daily, October 14, 2013, accessed July 29, 2014, http://rbcdaily.ru/economy/562949989219113;

2) &quoute;Суд разъяснил, в каком аудите не могут участвовать специалисты без нового аттестата,&quoute; Audit-it.ru, June 9, 2014, assessed July 29, 2014, http://www.audit-it.ru/news/audit/737662.html;

3) &quoute;Инициирована проверка предприятий Минобороны, продавших самарский ТЦ по заниженной стоимости,&quoute; Волжская коммуна, June 20, 2013, accessed July 29, 2014, http://www.vkonline.ru/article/259782.html.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

32.
score
3

Is there evidence of unauthorised private enterprise by military or other defence ministry employees? If so, what is the government's reaction to such enterprise?

Researcher4281: There is no evidence of illegal private enterprise. The FL on the Status of the Military Personnel (Article 10, item 7) prohibits the military from any participation in such private enterprise. Further, the FL on the State Civil Service prohibits commercial activity for civil servants. If someone from the military participates in private enterprise and it is proven that the money that earned from the state is misused, that person may be prosecuted in accordance with the Criminal Code, Article 159 on Fraud. The sanctions differ from a fine to imprisonment depending on the nature of a given crime.

There is a well-known case involving private enterprise where a former Defence Minister was involved. On the one hand, the sanctions have been imposed, with 25 criminal cases against MoD and MoD-related employees initiated and Defence Minister dismissed. At the same time, later the Defence Minister was given amnesty, and the second major convict was released on parole - unjustified according to many critics.

A special commission focused on preventing conflicts of interest is also in place within the MoD although there is limited evidence of its effectiveness.

Response to Peer Reviewer 1 and TI Chapter Reviewer: Comments accepted. The case around corruption at Oboronservis provides mixed evidence and there is no other evidence of such cases in the MoD. Score changed from 4 to 3.

COMMENTS -+

1) Федеральный закон от 27 мая 1998 г. N 76-ФЗ &quoute;О статусе военнослужащих.&quoute; http://stat.doc.mil.ru/documents/quick_search/[email protected];

2) Criminal Code of the RF, Article 159. http://www.zakonrf.info/uk/159/.

3) FL on the State Civil Service (2004)

4) BBC News, Russian Defence Minister Anatoly Serdyukov fired by Putin, 6 November 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-20218216

5) Государственная гражданская служба, http://recrut.mil.ru/career/%D1%81ivil_service/crime/conflict.htm

6) 400 миллионов рублей Минобороны ушли в частные фирмы, 28 February 2013, http://sweet211.ru/400-millionov-rublei-minoboroni-ushli-v-chastnie-firmi.html

7) Конфликт интересов – основа коррупции, http://www.coldwar.ru/rvo/012011/konflikt-interesov-osnova-korrupcii.php

8) СМИ: в оборонном концерне вскрылись &quoute;факты кумовства&quoute;, April 30, 2013, http://polit.ru/news/2013/04/30/o/

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: While private enterprises by the military are outlawed, there is little evidence to suggest this has been successfully enforced, given the overall high level of corruption in the armed forces. Instances of conflict of interests have often emerged in recent years and some investigations has been launched by the authorities. Officials of the MoD or military have rarely, if ever, headed such enterprises but have rather provided unauthorised access to information to the CEOs or have signed fictive contracts for outsourcing. There is no indications whether the situation is improving.

A special commission on combatting conflicts of interest is functioning within the MoD, however there is very limited information on its activities so its effectiveness could not be confirmed. I would therefore suggest Score 3.

http://recrut.mil.ru/career/%D1%81ivil_service/crime/conflict.htm

http://sweet211.ru/400-millionov-rublei-minoboroni-ushli-v-chastnie-firmi.html

http://www.coldwar.ru/rvo/012011/konflikt-interesov-osnova-korrupcii.php

http://polit.ru/news/2013/04/30/o/

Suggested score: 3

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: Agreed, there are ground for doubts. Public officials have limitations to own or participate in private enterprises imposed by laws &quoute;On state civil service as of 27.07.2004 N 79-ФЗ&quoute; and federal law on Counteracting corruption #273. They are in fact implemented efficiently.
There have been allegations, however, of high-ranked officials abusing their office during privatisation of military property as well as using affiliated structures to conduct audit services. This involves a case involving a former defence minister http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-20218216

Suggested score: 2

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Any participation of military in business is forbidden by order of Minister of Defence and the penalties are strong. There is also no evidence in the media of unauthorised private entrepreneurship in defence and security sector.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Policies & codes 90
34.
score
2

Do the Defence Ministry, Defence Minister, Chiefs of Defence, and Single Service Chiefs publicly commit - through, for example, speeches, media interviews, or political mandates - to anti-corruption and integrity measures?

Researcher4281: There is evidence of the current Defence Minister's commitment to integrity and anti-corruption measures. After he replaced the former defence minister (who had been dismissed after a major corruption scandal), he has clearly started a major fight against corruption. This can be derived from the reports on the numerous anti-corruption measures he takes, although there are hardly any direct public statements and citations of him speaking on corruption. There is no direct evidence as to the personal commitment of other top officials to integrity. There is rather a message trending in the media of a general commitment to integrity by the defence sector since Shoygu has taken the office.

COMMENTS -+

1) &quoute;Шойгу продолжает борьбу с проблемами армии: &quoute;Оборонсервис&quoute; реорганизуют, а тестирование на наркотики начнут с министра,&quoute; NEWSru.com, June 3, 2014, accessed July 29, 2014, http://www.newsru.com/russia/03jun2014/shoig_nark.html;

2) &quoute;Минобороны возглавила команда Сергея Шойгу,&quoute; [Photo report], РБК daily, accessed July 29, 2014, http://top.rbc.ru/photoreport/09/11/2012/824244.shtml;

3) &quoute;Шойгу просят разобраться с долгом предприятий Минобороны в 1 млрд рублей,&quoute; PASMI.RU, December 12, 2012, accessed July 29, 2014, http://pasmi.ru/archive/64602;

4) Светлана Макунина, &quoute;Доклад Шойгу ускорит «посадку» Сердюкова,&quoute; РБК daily, May 22, 2013, accessed July 29, 2014, http://rbcdaily.ru/politics/562949987036172;

5) &quoute;Фонд Навального потребовал у Шойгу разъяснить «рыбалку» чиновников Минобороны на Сейшелах,&quoute; Forbes.ru, May 14, 2014, accessed July 29, 2014, http://www.forbes.ru/news/257229-fond-navalnogo-potreboval-u-shoigu-razyasnenii-rybalki-chinovnikov-minoborony-na-seishel;

6) &quoute;Друг Путина и сын соратника Шойгу кормят рыбой российскую армию,&quoute; Forbes.ru, April 23, 2014, accessed July 29, 2014, http://www.forbes.ru/sobytiya/biznes/255585-drug-putina-i-syn-soratnika-shoigu-kormyat-ryboi-rossiiskuyu-armiyu.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

35.
score
2

Are there effective measures in place for personnel found to have taken part in forms of bribery and corruption, and is there public evidence that these measures are being carried out?

Researcher4281: Personnel involved in forms of bribery and corruption are to be prosecuted according to the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (Articles 290 and 291 on Bribery, Article 160 on misappropriation or Embezzlement, Article 174 on Money-Laundering). The sanctions vary from fines to imprisonment.

There is mixed evidence on the application of sanctions on offenders.

The biggest corruption scandal in the defence sector dates from 2012 and an MoD company, Oboronservis, was heavily implicated in it. The then head of the MoD Property Department was accused of serious embezzlement and the then Defence Minister was found to have allowed the road to a private property belonging to his relative to be built using state budget money. A number of top officials lost their positions following investigations, including the former Defence Minister. He was convicted of negligence but avoided punishment as the broad amnesty of the end of 2013 (relating to the 20th anniversary of the Russian Constitution) was applied to him as well. The amnesty was devoted to and could be applied, on a few conditions, to individuals who had committed an economic crime. The minister was given amnesty as he was assessed to fall under the category of &quoute;defenders of the fatherland&quoute;. The appropriateness of this decision has been questioned a lot. The case of the former head of the MoD property department whowas found guilty of embezzlement and money laundering, has also created some controversy. She was sentenced to five years of imprisonment in May, 2015, but soon released on parole - a decision widely criticised by the public. This outcome provoked a discussion on the discrimination in the application of sanctions.

In another case, the former Commander in Chief of the Russian Army’s Ground Forces (in service 2012 – 2013) was in August 2015 convicted of bribery and sentenced to 5 years of imprisonment. It remains to be seen whether this will be another case of a high-ranking official who is not ultimately punished appropriately.

The reports available in the media provide mixed evidence: there are examples of measures being carried out, but this does not happen in a consistent way.

COMMENTS -+

1) РАПСИ. &quoute;Сюжет: Дело о мошенничестве в &quoute;Оборонсервисе.&quoute; http://rapsinews.ru/trend/oboronservis_26102012/;

2) &quoute;Сердюков попал под амнистию,&quoute; Lenta.ru, March 6, 2014, accessed July 29, 2014, http://lenta.ru/news/2014/03/06/amnisty/;

3) &quoute;Фигуранты дела &quoute;Оборонсервиса&quoute; решили повременить с показаниями,&quoute; РИА Новости, July 10, 2014, accessed July 29, 2014, http://ria.ru/incidents/20140710/1015433025.html;

4) &quoute;Новый скандал в Минобороны,&quoute; Business FM, December 19, 2013, accessed July 29, 2014, http://www.bfm.ru/news/240524;

5) &quoute;СМИ: суд признал законным уголовное преследование экс-главкома Чиркина,&quoute; РИА Новости, February 3, 2014, accessed July 29, 2014, http://ria.ru/incidents/20140203/992674524.html;

3) Criminal Code of the RF. http://zakonbase.ru/ugolovnyj-kodeks/;

4) Gabrielle Tétrault-Farber, &quoute;Fresh Corruption Scandal Hits Russian defence Ministry&quoute;, The Moscow Times, March 17, 2015, accessed october 6, 2015, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/fresh-corruption-scandal-hits-russian-defence-ministry/517566.html;

5) Анастасия Михайлова, &quoute;Евгения Васильева приговорена к пяти годам колонии общего режима&quoute;, rbc.ru, May 8, 2015, accessed october 6, 2015, http://top.rbc.ru/politics/08/05/2015/554c8f2c9a794742b635fc22;

6) Kommersant, &quoute;Former Russian army commander faces 7.5 years in prison on bribery charge&quoute;, meduza.io, August 4, 2015, accessed October 6, 2015, https://meduza.io/en/news/2015/08/04/former-russian-army-commander-faces-7-5-years-in-prison-on-bribery-charges.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Fresh Corruption Scandal Hits Russian defence Ministry
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/fresh-corruption-scandal-hits-russian-defence-ministry/517566.html

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

36.
score
0

Is whistleblowing encouraged by the government, and are whistle-blowers in military and defence ministries afforded adequate protection from reprisal for reporting evidence of corruption, in both law and practice?

Researcher4281: There is no legislation protecting whistle-blowers in Russia. One of the few relevant provisions states that a public official who has reported on corruption may have a disciplinary punishment on him/her after a special commission has expressed its opinion on the matter. A whistle-blower has the right for free state legal support. The National Anti-Corruption Plan for 2014-2015 does include the task of improving the legislation on whistleblowing, but it is too early to see any results. A draft law has been introduced recently on whistle-blower protection. While some said such law was not needed at all, some welcomed it, others described the law as superficial and ineffective. There is no evidence that the government takes any measures to encourage whistleblowing.

There are cases of whistle-blowers who have been convicted of serious fraud after they have reported corruption. This is likely to be an environment where officials and personnel are not confident they will not face retaliation if they report wrongdoing.

COMMENTS -+

1) Указ Президента РФ от 11.04.2014 N 226 &quoute;О Национальном плане противодействия коррупции на 2014 - 2015 годы.&quoute; http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_161699/;

2) Яна Яковлева, &quoute;Тем, кто борется с коррупцией, нужен не бесплатный адвокат, а защита от мести,&quoute; Slon.ru, April 4, 2013, accessed July 29, 2014, http://slon.ru/russia/tem_kto_boretsya_s_korruptsiey_nuzhen_ne_besplatnyy_advokat_a_zashchita_ot_mesti-926736.xhtml;

3) Transparency International - R. &quoute;Насколько защищены заявители о коррупции в России?&quoute; Last modified November 15, 2012. http://www.transparency.org.ru/zashchita-zaiavitelei/naskolko-zashchishcheny-zaiaviteli-o-korruptcii-v-rossii;

4) &quoute;Антикоррупционный заявитель остается без защиты,&quoute; PASMI.RU, April 9, 2012, accessed July 29, 2014, http://pasmi.ru/archive/18162;

5) T. Zabrodov, &quoute;Gone too far&quoute;, Lenta. ru, June 16, 2011, accessed October 6, 2015, http://lenta.ru/articles/2011/06/16/sulimcase/;

6) BBC, Russian army 'dog food whisteblower' Matveyev jailed, September 9, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-14858858;

7) &quoute;Галина Тарасова: «Прокуратура не может защитить прокурора, заявившего о коррупции», PASMI.RU, June 25, 2015, accessed October 6, 2015, http://pasmi.ru/archive/126228;

8) &quoute;Старшинов: Законопроект о защите заявителя о фактах коррупции несет здравое зерно&quoute;, ОНФ, September 24, 2014, accessed October 6, 2015, http://onf.ru/2014/09/24/starshinov-zakonoproekt-o-zashchite-zayavitelya-o-faktah-korrupcii-neset-zdravoe-zerno/.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: I agree with the assessor. Russia does not provide protection for whistleblowers and there is a considerable chance that those could suffer repression or other retaliatory measures. A number of anti-corruption activists have reportedly been actively repressed or prosecuted by the authorities.

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/11144899/Russian-anti-corruption-campaigner-seeks-UK-asylum.html

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Cases of whistleblowers getting into trouble. While these aren't very recent, one can see that there no signs of change.
T. Zabrodov, Gone too far, Lenta. ru, June, 16, 2011 http://lenta.ru/articles/2011/06/16/sulimcase/

Russian army 'dog food whisteblower' Matveyev jailed, BBC, September, 9 2011 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-14858858

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

37.
score
2

Is special attention paid to the selection, time in post, and oversight of personnel in sensitive positions, including officials and personnel in defence procurement, contracting, financial management, and commercial management?

Researcher4281: There is evidence that some officials in the MoD are to declare their annual assets and incomes, which are then published online. Further, there is a special commission in place to solve conflicts of interests. It appears that the selection of persons for this oversight is on the basis of the seniority of position, rather than the substance of work. It is assumed that the senior positions may be thus seen as sensitive enough to warrant this attention. The score has been selected accordingly.

Response to Peer Reviewer 2 and TI Chapter Reviewer:
Relevant information has been added to the main comments. Score raised to 2 as there is no information in relation to the mechanisms for selection for personnel in positions considered sensitive, nor does the definition of 'sensitive' here appear to include personnel in typically high-risk positions (related to defence procurement, contracting, financial management, and commercial management).

COMMENTS -+

1) Указ Президента Российской Федерации от 18 мая 2009 г. N 557 &quoute;Об утверждении перечня должностей федеральной государственной службы, при назначении на которые граждане и при замещении которых федеральные государственные служащие обязаны представлять сведения о своих доходах, об имуществе и обязательствах имущественного характера, а также сведения о доходах, об имуществе и обязательствах имущественного характера своих супруги (супруга) и несовершеннолетних детей&quoute;,Раздел II, Пункт 3. http://www.rg.ru/2009/05/20/ukaz557-dok.html;

2) Приказ Министра обороны Российской Федерации от 30 августа 2010 г. №1130 «О комиссии Министерства обороны Российской Федерации по соблюдению требований к служебному поведению федеральных государственных гражданских служащих и урегулированию конфликта интересов.» http://stat.doc.mil.ru/documents/extended_search/[email protected]#txt;

3) MoD. &quoute;Урегулирование конфликта интересов&quoute;. http://recrut.mil.ru/career/%D1%81ivil_service/crime/conflict.htm.

4) Decree #202 as of August, 22, 2011 regulating processing of applications received by MoD commission on conflict of interests: http://www.rg.ru/2011/10/12/gosslujba-site-dok.html

5) Legal basics of solving conflict of interests of civil servants of Ministry of defence http://recrut.mil.ru/career/civil_service/publication/[email protected]

6) Solving conflict of interests, Ministry of defence - http://recrut.mil.ru/career/%D1%81ivil_service/crime/conflict.htm&quoute;

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: There is very limited evidence of any anti-corruption training taking place.

http://function.mil.ru/news_page/country/[email protected]

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: Some military and civil servants holding positions in the MoD are obliged to submit annual asset and income declarations which are published online. They also ought to notify special commissions of conflicts of interests.

Decree #202 as of August, 22, 2011 regulating processing of applications received by MoD commission on conflict of interests: http://www.rg.ru/2011/10/12/gosslujba-site-dok.html
Legal basics of solving conflict of interests of civil servants of Ministry of defence http://recrut.mil.ru/career/civil_service/publication/[email protected]
Solving conflict of interests, Ministry of defence - http://recrut.mil.ru/career/%D1%81ivil_service/crime/conflict.htm

Suggested score: 2

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: There are provisions for oversight over income and spending levels of at least 600 top military and civil servants in MoD.

Suggested score: 3

Peer Reviewer-+

38.
score
1

Is the number of civilian and military personnel accurately known and publicly available?

Researcher4281: Official statistics are published online on the MOD website. The Federal Security Service is excluded from the list. The President's decree of 2008 establishes the personnel size for the Armed Forces (2,019,629 people, including 1,134,800 of the military personnel). A decree of President Medvedev dated December 29, 2008, sets the size of the Armed Forces as equal to 1 million people. According to the Accounts Chamber, the real size of the Armed Forces on January 1, 2013, equal to some 766 thousand, including about 10,000 civilian personnel. Some commentators stated in 2013 that the size of the Armed Forces was close to 1 million, but this figure included 70 thousand non-staff personnel and 300 thousand conscripts.

A media report dating from July 2015 stated plans to dismiss about 30,000 MOD civilian personnel. An older report, dating from May 2012, cites a source commenting on dismissal plans of the MoD, estimating the then size of MOD civilian personnel as 886,000. Figures cited in the media are usually provided by undefined sources or by officials (occasionally).

Therefore, the official information provided on the number of personnel is not reliable.

Response to Peer Reviewer 2: Accepted. Additional information has been added to the main comments. However, the score is lowered from 2 to 1, as information is made available from the establishment; but it is not accurate or reliable.

COMMENTS -+

1) Federal Agency for State Statistics. &quoute;Справка О численности и оплате труда гражданских служащих федеральных государственных органов
(центральных аппаратов министерств и ведомств) за 2013 год.&quoute; http://www.gks.ru/bgd/free/b04_03/IssWWW.exe/Stg/d03/plat28.htm;

2) Указ Президента РФ от 01.01.2008 N 1 &quoute;О штатной численности Вооруженных Сил Российской Федерации.&quoute; http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_141421/;

3) Сергей Юферев, &quoute;Сравнение вооруженных сил России и США&quoute;, Армейский вестник, April 1, 2013, accessed November 24, 2014, http://army-news.ru/2013/04/sravnenie-vooruzhennyx-sil-rossii-i-ssha/;

4) &quoute;Путин подписал указ о начале осеннего призыва в Вооруженные Силы&quoute;, Наша Планета, October 1, 2014, accessed November 24, 2014, http://planeta.moy.su/news/putin_podpisal_ukaz_o_nachale_osennego_prizyva_v_vooruzhennye_sily/2014-10-01-18516.

5) Офицеры России, &quoute;МИНОБОРОНЫ ПЛАНИРУЕТ НА ТРЕТЬ СОКРАТИТЬ ГРАЖДАНСКИЙ ПЕРСОНАЛ&quoute;, May 24, 2012, accessed october 5, 2015, http://oficery.ru/news/5430

6) Sibnovosti.ru, &quoute;Минобороны сократит почти 50 тысяч человек из-за новых арсеналов&quoute;,July 31, 2015, accessed October 5, 2015, http://fed.sibnovosti.ru/society/302239-minoborony-sokratit-pochti-50-tysyach-chelovek-iz-za-novyh-arsenalov?class=search-list-element

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: The assessor underestimates the number of civilian personnel in MoD in his/her comments. According to own estimate of this reviewer based on announced average pay rates and budget data the number of MoD's civilian personal in 2014 was about 610.5 thousand in total (2 561 federal civilian servants and 608 thousand of ordinary civilian personnel). But most of this data are not published officially. The same applies to military personnel where the published numbers are incorrect and incomplete. The information is intentionally concealed.

Suggested score: 0

Peer Reviewer-+

39.
score
3

Are pay rates and allowances for civilian and military personnel openly published?

Researcher4281: Pay rates for civilian personnel in the MoD are publicly known. According to the official statistics, the average salary of federal civilian servants equaled 85,180 rubles (about 2385 USD) in 2013.

A group of legal acts sets in place a new calculating mechanism for the military's salaries. The payment system has been changed recently by FL 306. The law lists in detail all allowances added to the core salary. For the military, the existing official documents allow to calculate the exact salary. There is an unofficial portal which has developed an online calculating mechanism to estimate military salaries based on the latest legal provisions.

Some allowances are awarded based on fully objective criteria (such as access to state secrets which would imply a higher level of clearance) while it is more difficult to determine what others are based on. Some examples are allowances for &quoute;special achievements in service&quoute; or a &quoute;bonus for proper and effective execution of one's duties&quoute;.

Response to Peer Reviewer 1: Information on civilian pay-rates has also been added.

COMMENTS -+

1) Federal Agency for State Statistics. &quoute;Справка О численности и оплате труда гражданских служащих федеральных государственных органов
(центральных аппаратов министерств и ведомств) за 2013 год.&quoute; http://www.gks.ru/bgd/free/b04_03/IssWWW.exe/Stg/d03/plat28.htm;

2) Правовой уголок офицера Вооруженных Сил РФ. &quoute;Расчет денежного довольствия офицера с 1 января 2014 года.&quoute; Last modified 2014. http://www.voen-pravo.ru/index.php/component/formcalc/formcalc/1;

3) Федеральный закон № 306-ФЗ от 07.11.2011 &quoute;О денежном довольствии военнослужащих и предоставлении им отдельных выплат. http://www.rg.ru/2011/11/09/voennie-dok.html.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The assessor overestimates the average salary data - used official statistics treats only MoD's federal civilian servants and not civilian personnel.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

40.
score
3

Do personnel receive the correct pay on time, and is the system of payment well-established, routine, and published?

Researcher4281: No widespread evidence has been found of incorrect or late payments, barring one large-scale incident dating back to March 2012 where a 3 month payment delay occurred. There is more recent evidence of some individual cases of late payments as well.

The payment system has been changed recently by the FL #306 applicable to the military salaries. The law lists in detail all allowances added to the core salary, thus making this information public. It allows the calculation of the final amount on provision for each type of allowances by category. This however is more problematic. There are both clear, quantifiable criteria for the calculation of allowances (such as the duration of service) and more opaque criteria, such as &quoute;proper and effective service&quoute;, which leave space for interpretation.

The Social Security Department within the MOD is responsible for the implementation of the state policy on salary payments and oversight over the allocation and payment of allowances.

COMMENTS -+

1) Сергей Смирнов, &quoute;Десятки тысяч военнослужащих так и не получили заработную плату за январь и февраль&quoute;, Газета.ру, March 27, 2012, accessed August 2, 2014, http://www.km.ru/v-rossii/2012/03/01/vladimir-putin/minoborony-rf-zaderzhalo-vyplaty-zarplat-voennym;

2) Федеральный закон Российской Федерации от 7 ноября 2011 г. N 306-ФЗ &quoute;О денежном довольствии военнослужащих и предоставлении им отдельных выплат&quoute;, http://www.rg.ru/2011/11/09/voennie-dok.html.

3) MoD. Ministry of defence Social Security Department. http://structure.mil.ru/structure/ministry_of_defence/[email protected]

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: There have been cases with non-payment or ill-treatment of soldiers reported, most notably in 2011 when fighter-jet pilots had their salaries skimmed by their commanding officers at a Russian airbase. Such instances are however the exception rather than the rule.

http://www.dailytelegraph.com.au/elite-figher-pilots-salaries-skimmed/story-e6freuyi-1226062348118

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

41.
score
2

Is there an established, independent, transparent, and objective appointment system for the selection of military personnel at middle and top management level?

Researcher4281: An established system for the appointment of military personnel is in place (Article 27, President's Decree 1237). It is based on regular attestations by attestation commissions in military units at every level. Appointments at the colonel level are made by the head of the agency (Article 10, 4б). In terms of mid-level positions, candidates are appointed by the head of a federal state body where the candidate is going to serve. Among the main criteria that play a role in the appointment are professional training, character traits, level of health and some others (Article 11, item 5). No objectively identifiable criteria for assessments are provided. Appointments appear to be made by the personal decision of agency heads which may provide ground for undue discretion.

The Defence Minister and his deputies are openly appointed by Presidential decree. There is no evidence of any prescribed selection procedure governing their appointments.

Response to Peer Reviewer 2: Agreed. Information added to the main answer and score raised from 0 to 2.

COMMENTS -+

1) Official website of the Russian President. &quoute;Президент произвёл ряд назначений в руководстве Министерства обороны.&quoute; Last modified November 9, 2012. http://www.kremlin.ru/news/16776;

2) &quoute;Архив рубрики Кадровые перестановки в Минобороны,&quoute; РИА Новости, accessed on August 2, 2014, http://ria.ru/Personnel_Ministry_defence_09112012/20121130/SPIEF_15052014;

3) MoD. Section on Management. http://structure.mil.ru/management.htm;

4) Указ Президента Российской Федерации от 16 сентября 1999 г. N 1237 г. Москва &quoute;Вопросы прохождения военной службы&quoute;. http://www.rg.ru/1999/09/29/voenslujba-dok.html.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: The is an established system for the appointment of military personnel based on regular attestations by attestation commissions in military units at every level.

Suggested score: 2

Peer Reviewer-+

42.
score
1

Are personnel promoted through an objective, meritocratic process? Such a process would include promotion boards outside of the command chain, strong formal appraisal processes, and independent oversight.

Researcher4281: According to Article 11, item 13, of the President's Decree 1237, appointments to senior positions are geared towards persons recommended by the attesting commission who demonstrated a high level of professionalism and organizing skills. There is no evidence of any independent oversight of the promotions process.

There is evidence of cases where established processes are undermined.

Response to Peer Reviewer 2: The Presidential Decree 1237 provides no further information than what has been mentioned above in the main answer. As such, there is not much information on the formal processes that appear to be in place. Further, given there is no evidence of independent oversight, score is raised to 1.

COMMENTS -+

1) &quoute;Коротченко считает кадровые перестановки в Минобороны РФ плановыми&quoute;, РИА Новости, October 10, 2013, accessed on August 2, 2014, http://ria.ru/defence_safety/20131010/969050412.html;

2) Иван Коновалов, &quoute;Генералы России Сибирским округом прирастать будут,&quoute; Коммерсантъ, January 14, 2010, accessed on August 2, 2014, http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/1302921;

3) Указ Президента Российской Федерации от 16 сентября 1999 г. N 1237 г. Москва &quoute;Вопросы прохождения военной службы&quoute;. http://www.rg.ru/1999/09/29/voenslujba-dok.html.

4) Closed Doors in Russia Mask Corruption, November 6 2012, http://blog.transparency.org/2012/11/06/closed-doors-in-russia-mask-corruption/

5) СМИ: в оборонном концерне вскрылись &quoute;факты кумовства&quoute;, 30 апреля 2013, http://polit.ru/news/2013/04/30/o/

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Cronyism in the army is reportedly wide-spread and promotions are often conducted on personal basis. This is the case in the entire defence sector and there is little to suggest that army appointments are immune to it.

http://blog.transparency.org/2012/11/06/closed-doors-in-russia-mask-corruption/

http://polit.ru/news/2013/04/30/o/

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: Personnel promotions should be effected though formal appraisal processes by attestation commissions for military and competitive vacancy commission for civilian. But the process is non-transparent and there are significant opportunities for its circumvention.

Suggested score: 2

Peer Reviewer-+

43.
score
1

Where compulsory conscription occurs, is there a policy of not accepting bribes for avoiding conscription? Are there appropriate procedures in place to deal with such bribery, and are they applied?

Researcher4281: Conscription in Russia is provided by the FL of March 28, 1998, N 53-ФЗ. Male citizens from 18 to 27 are called up for the military service, although certain circumstances the conscription may be postponed or an individual may be exempted from it (Articles 22-24). The service lasts for one year (Article 38, item 1).

There are no special anti-corruption policies or guidelines concerning conscription. General anti-corruption legislation and the Criminal Code do apply in this case. A few years ago, a decision was taken to reduce the number of the military personnel at the military enlistment office. This decision was discussed in the media and was confirmed by government sources. The measure was said to be implemented by the end of 2009. Still, there is no information on the exact results, besides some commentators mentioning that military personnel have indeed been replaced by the civilians to a large extent. Some media outlets state that one of the intentions was to reduce the scope of bribery. Others place this initiative within the government's broader plan to optimize the management of the Armed Forces. In any case, there is still a considerable amount of evidence of bribing to avoid conscription as reported by the media.

COMMENTS -+

1) &quoute;Начальник отделения военного комиссариата обвиняется в получении 32 взяток&quoute;, PASMI.RU, April 23, 2014, accessed August 2, 2014, http://pasmi.ru/archive/105534;

2) Юрий Гаврилов, &quoute;Призыв - в сроках и штрафах&quoute;, Российская газета, November 15, 2011, accessed August 2, 2014, http://www.rg.ru/2011/11/15/priziv.html;

3) &quoute;В Костромской области сотрудник военкомата оказался взяточником&quoute;, Росбалт, June 30, 2014, accessed August 2, 2014, http://www.rosbalt.ru/federal/2014/06/30/1286036.html;

4) &quoute;Работников военкоматов ждет скорый дембель&quoute;, Newsland, September 17, 2009, accessed November 24, 2014, http://newsland.com/news/detail/id/412219/;

5) Федеральный закон &quoute;О воинской обязанности и военной службе&quoute; от 28.03.1998 N 53-ФЗ. http://www.consultant.ru/popular/military/;

6) Criminal Code of the RF, Articles 290 and 291 on Bribery, Article 160 on misappropriation or Embezzlement, Article 174 on Money-Laundering. http://zakonbase.ru/ugolovnyj-kodeks/.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Bribe-giving to avoid conscription is very wide-spread and there are numerous social media and forum pages where people discuss how to avoid going to the army- bribes seem to be among the most common tactic.

http://www.prizyvanet.ru/kak_izbezhat_armii

http://mungaz.net/line/15879-nabor-srochnikov-v-armiyu-budet-kontrolirovat-voennaya-prokuratura.html

http://ru.publika.md/link_396941.html

http://www.vesti.ru/doc.html?id=1166845

http://inosmi.ru/inrussia/20071128/238079.html

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: There is much space for bribery in everything that concerns conscription. Payments are made in order either to avoid conscription or to choose a &quoute;better&quoute; place to serve. Certain steps are made (or at least promised to be made) by the MoD, such as augmentation of the share of soldiers serving in their home regions, but the situation remains troublesome.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

44.
score
1

With regard to compulsory or voluntary conscription, is there a policy of refusing bribes to gain preferred postings in the recruitment process? Are there appropriate procedures in place to deal with such bribery, and are they applied?

Researcher4281: There is no evidence of such a policy or any special procedures. There are numerous reports on cases of bribery at the enlistment office, although it appears bribes are usually given to avoid conscription and not to solicit a preferred posting. General anti-corruption legislation and the Criminal Code do apply in this case.

COMMENTS -+

1) &quoute;Начальник отделения военного комиссариата обвиняется в получении 32 взяток&quoute;, PASMI.RU, April 23, 2014, accessed August 2, 2014, http://pasmi.ru/archive/105534;

2) Юрий Гаврилов, &quoute;Призыв - в сроках и штрафах&quoute;, Российская газета, November 15, 2011, accessed August 2, 2014, http://www.rg.ru/2011/11/15/priziv.html;

3) &quoute;В Костромской области сотрудник военкомата оказался взяточником&quoute;, Росбалт, June 30, 2014, accessed August 2, 2014, http://www.rosbalt.ru/federal/2014/06/30/1286036.html;

4) Иван Громов, &quoute;Шойгу не отправит призывников подальше&quoute;, Российская газета, January 31, 2013, accessed August 2, 2014, http://www.rg.ru/2013/01/31/armiya.html;

5) Анна Скрипка, &quoute;Под Белгородом пятеро врачей попались на взятках от призывника&quoute;, Российская газета, June 23, 2014, accessed August 2, 2014, http://www.rg.ru/2014/06/23/reg-cfo/vrach-anons.html;

6) MoD. Section on conscription. http://recrut.mil.ru/career/conscription.htm.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Bribe-giving to avoid conscription is very wide-spread and there are numerous social media and forum pages where people discuss how to avoid going to the army- bribes seem to be among the most common tactic.

http://www.prizyvanet.ru/kak_izbezhat_armii

http://mungaz.net/line/15879-nabor-srochnikov-v-armiyu-budet-kontrolirovat-voennaya-prokuratura.html

http://ru.publika.md/link_396941.html

http://www.vesti.ru/doc.html?id=1166845

http://inosmi.ru/inrussia/20071128/238079.html

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: There is much space for bribery in everything that concerns conscription. Payments are made in order either to avoid conscription or to choose a &quoute;better&quoute; place to serve. Certain steps are made (or at least promised to be made) by the MoD, such as augmentation of the share of soldiers serving in their home regions, but the situation remains troublesome.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

45.
score
0

Is there evidence of 'ghost soldiers', or non-existent soldiers on the payroll?

Researcher4281: There is some, though little, evidence of ghost soldiers appearing on the payroll within the past five years. A report tells the story of a soldier who, after quitting the service, still remained in the list of a regional Financial Agency of the MoD. Payments worth more than one hundred thousand US dollars were made on his name, which he never received. Another case dates to 2013 when the Accounts Chamber found out that in the previous year the MoD had spent on the salaries of the military 88 billion roubles (almost 1, 9 billion USD) more than was appropriate according to the staff size. The head of the Duma Defence Committee assumed then that it was due to the new system of payment which had led to delays, confusion and other difficulties with the payment. Independent experts say that the extra money could have gone to some of the personnel.

No evidence has been found of any measures taken against this phenomenon.

COMMENTS -+

1) &quoute;Нижегородские военные следователи нашли в армии «мертвые души»&quoute;, Криминальная хроника, December 6, 2012, accessed August 2, 2014, http://kriminalnn.ru/2012/12/06/nizhegorodskie-voennye-sledovateli-nashli-v-armii-mertvye-dushi/;

2) &quoute;Мертвые души&quoute; Сердюкова&quoute;, FLB, June 26, 2013, accessed August 2, 2014, http://flb.ru/info/55130.html.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Мертвые души Российской армии
http://nvo.ng.ru/nvo/2012-01-18/1_armia.html

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

46.
score
2

Are chains of command separate from chains of payment?

Researcher4281: There Social Security Department within MoD is responsible for, among other things, the &quoute;implementation of the state policy on salary payments&quoute; and oversight over the allocation and payment of allowances in compliance with the law. A Unified Accountancy Centre within the MoD is responsible for executing the payments. In 2012, soon after the payment system was reformed by unification of all payments, it was criticized a lot for not working effectively.

Summing up, technically, the chains of payments are separate from the chains of command.
The FL # 306 defines the composition of the Armed Forces military personnel's payments. A considerable part of the salary is composed of different allowances and bonuses. A few of them are paid after the command issues a decree. They are the bonuses for working with secret data, for &quoute;proper and effective service&quoute; and for high-risk work in peacetime. The bonus for &quoute;proper and effective service&quoute; has no objective quantifiable indicators and thus may be freely interpreted by the command. According to the ordinance of the Government of 2011 № 993, its size depends on the quality of the individual's service and is defined by the head of the ministry or other state agency where the individual serves. For the other two bonuses, the amounts and categories are clearly described and there is therefore hardly any space for arbitrary allocation by the command.

Therefore, in terms of the distribution on the discretionary part of personnel salaries, the chain of command and payment are not separate.

COMMENTS -+

1) Федеральный закон от 7 ноября 2011 г. N 306-ФЗ &quoute;О денежном довольствии военнослужащих и предоставлении им отдельных выплат.&quoute; http://base.garant.ru/12191544/;

2) Постановление Правительства РФ от 5 декабря 2011 г. N 993 &quoute;О выплате военнослужащим премии за добросовестное и эффективное исполнение должностных обязанностей и ежегодной материальной помощи&quoute;. http://base.garant.ru/70102690/#block_4#ixzz3KE2K7g8v

3) MoD. Ministry of defence Social Security Department. http://structure.mil.ru/structure/ministry_of_defence/[email protected]

4) Роман Дорофеев, &quoute;Эксперименты Минобороны оставили военных без зарплаты&quoute;, KM.ru, March 26, 2012, accessed october 5, 2015, http://www.km.ru/v-rossii/2012/03/26/ministerstvo-oborony-rf/eksperimenty-minoborony-ostavili-voennykh-bez-zarplaty

5) MoD. Contacts. http://structure.mil.ru/contacts.htm

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

47.
score
2

Is there a Code of Conduct for all military and civilian personnel that includes, but is not limited to, guidance with respect to bribery, gifts and hospitality, conflicts of interest, and post-separation activities?

Researcher4281: There are separate published codes for civilian and military personnel. The Code of Conduct for the military is not a legal document and is published on the MoD website as &quoute;methodological recommendations&quoute;. It covers bribery, gifts and hospitality, conflicts of interest, and outlines a few other ethical norms. It may be considered comprehensive as it covers all main ethical issues. At the same time, it does not state how control of compliance with the recommendations is ensured. There is also no reference in the document to the obligatory nature of its provisions. Still, its anti-corruption provisions are more elaborate than in the code of conduct for the civilian personnel. The latter is prioritised in the scoring, as per the scoring guidelines.

The Code of Conduct for civilian personnel of the MoD is adopted by the MoD order #555 and it is published on the MoD website. The Code cannot be considered comprehensive enough as there are almost no anti-corruption provisions. For instance, a policy on gifts and hospitality is completely absent, in contrast to the code for the military personnel. The provisions also do not seem specific enough. Paragraph 11 only states that measures need to be taken to prevent conflict of interest, as well as to prevent corruption, with no further explanation or detail. A positive difference from the military's ethical recommendations is a chapter on sanctions for non-compliance with the code (paragraph 17). Cases of code violations are to be dealt with by the MoD Commission on Ethics and are to be taken into account when appointments to higher positions are made. There is evidence that the Commission publishes reports of its activities on the MoD official website, however its latest report dates from 2012. The Commission usually reports on a number of violations, without the identities of offenders being named, and issues a recommendation to the Defence Minister on which sanctions to apply.

COMMENTS -+

1) MoD. &quoute;Методические рекомендации военнослужащему по соблюдению этических требований к служебному поведению.&quoute; http://yandex.ru/clck/jsredir?from=yandex.ru%3Byandsearch%3Bweb%3B%3B&text=&etext=521.ke3JGcQjRiz1HK99qxs7_L50pAzE8vvBB2IxLmvX9YlxpHiy2h4bikPanUaL5F8ld24I5SyDmEQ_XI5x4e2TtU7AVNo8QgMTB2dqw6rh5mcQBCigkpxRiV_hpeccTB9c8IF5bte_ovl7omYHLoW6FAMCD8KFpqH1oCv1qKxtzyjsaVwZG2NoOiFdRNALxElTm_NtPEpVhnGZKiAWjyeKU5jAyKLYXSEMeqfjlgpmewjZGZbbsZpzo2mw0AM2M39qssN2LGPmnCccjsKDVw6J26801DeSCD7Q9ZchMh_IsF4Z57BouRU97Rkr7H6mGGvcuoBtw0i5xYFvqTZynLMqx6Hz3aaYbffIjQKL0dnov6tXe-aetuhZ16msOMgu2WSwZBIJmpi1XeIbf0GjU7zFXwxDw49s12RDGgk0hcyndqffLm05mFX06jxk0e4lJwIynVgTguVIZC4Zk1143Sc7VKAz8slx3FyzNR8CahY_OKkWVhIMWMBeE-DVDlJoICkZB15fF2fhdxeFx66M6eWfa-pzY8DTt9AwUcCQdc7vU6S4_ZbfbFm6mE7hC2CC7gNEmC-vUWZiSbhO5HYEBuRy6hOcbAABom3MFvtoiOA9X1qYuSgCog2uxEinPA2wEf7L3jPZlL1ab4Qp_hYAm2r7CZZhBR68IP1FKlAHAOqZvNm04EXYXgKpzGfl81hw57O8k587cUdDC1R2vk8E4t7Z2sYF8SBt_dHYanRlCCGGkFcamK4BoDiIw-RmgmFAFvaskcBU8bjEaErnRqcFjuj8Lw.db0956109fdb80f4da1571bef80f42972b69c719&uuid=&state=AiuY0DBWFJ4ePaEse6rgeAjgs2pI3DW9GQoIVjtsoO7iooTyKrIJ6nDKj7aRAxcrPeVOtWhxUw5VS-e_fWwyrFlUHN76FmO4C8McLQji5cRcUxVYBH_1KRLahJKjEJ0TZTUFWxhM_kCUMUpUvEgO7mOCIFAAjJlGKK05c2vE29M5OgGK-AE5mHK0Tnn-0Jg6QCZ8sYI1E3vi7csNVqqoAl_u34m868ROI8CiSEYIr9KgNgLBP-QyiB-XxH7yMub4CJU_YABsilTaPE_lNwD-u1JD8vdAtNAQ&data=UlNrNmk5WktYejR0eWJFYk1LdmtxbXU2b2lmd1A2YTJGaklBdjY0U1EwS1pXVjVIQkcxdXREM2d4cUNMNjN4YldkcUdfTDdGSUtTRGRTV1pfS0psNl84Sy1abl9lZ2JrdEM3enBxS2lDbWJlZ21aVTlNSFhJNWRvcHJxSUE5T05wYjNIZWFPNERRVTN3TFlIVHFSdjllM1JzdFZ5c0FtRXU5alQwNTE4WkVQc1gtM1FVWTU4UlZOQWpHRE1iZmJOc0xMTlVQQnBaNFhXWGRhdlBzbTNBbXU4UWdMV2s2UDZSUmhEc3cwQlVaVQ&b64e=2&sign=1296c70274584316fb453ba6000b25a5&keyno=0&l10n=ru&cts=1417049671254&mc=2.3219280948873626;

2) Приказ Минобороны РФ от 22 апреля 2011 г. № 555 “Об утверждении Кодекса этики и служебного поведения федеральных государственных гражданских служащих Министерства обороны Российской Федерации.” http://www.garant.ru/products/ipo/prime/doc/55071358/;

3) MoD. &quoute;К вопросу об этике и нормах служебного поведения федеральных государственных гражданских служащих Министерства обороны Российской Федерации.&quoute; http://mil.ru/anti-corruption/meth_materials/[email protected]

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

48.
score
1

Is there evidence that breaches of the Code of Conduct are effectively addressed ,and are the results of prosecutions made publicly available?

Researcher4281: For civilian personnel, a special commission exists to monitor compliance with ethical requirements listed in the Code of Conduct that pertains to them, including the conflict of interest clause. There is evidence that the Commission publishes reports of its activities on the MoD official website, however, its latest report dates back to 2012. The Commission usually reports on a number of violations, without the identities of offenders being named, and issues a recommendation to the Defence Minister on which sanctions to apply. There is no evidence of how closely the Commission's findings are followed. In regard to the military Code of Conduct, there is no reference to the obligatory nature of its provisions and no body with an oversight function is mentioned.

Response to TI Chapter Reviewer: This point has already been addressed in the analysis above. The scoring has been selected on the basis that breaches of the civilian Code are addressed and information on this is published. However, there is no such information on the breaches of the military Code. Information relating to the scope of both Codes is provided in Question 47.
The score has been lowered from 2 to 1 on the basis that information on breaches of the civilian Code has not been provided for the past three years.

COMMENTS -+

1) MoD. &quoute;Урегулирование конфликта интересов.&quoute; http://recrut.mil.ru/career/%D1%81ivil_service/crime/conflict.htm;

2) MoD. &quoute;Методические рекомендации военнослужащему по соблюдению этических требований к служебному поведению.&quoute; http://yandex.ru/clck/jsredir?from=yandex.ru%3Byandsearch%3Bweb%3B%3B&text=&etext=521.ke3JGcQjRiz1HK99qxs7_L50pAzE8vvBB2IxLmvX9YlxpHiy2h4bikPanUaL5F8ld24I5SyDmEQ_XI5x4e2TtU7AVNo8QgMTB2dqw6rh5mcQBCigkpxRiV_hpeccTB9c8IF5bte_ovl7omYHLoW6FAMCD8KFpqH1oCv1qKxtzyjsaVwZG2NoOiFdRNALxElTm_NtPEpVhnGZKiAWjyeKU5jAyKLYXSEMeqfjlgpmewjZGZbbsZpzo2mw0AM2M39qssN2LGPmnCccjsKDVw6J26801DeSCD7Q9ZchMh_IsF4Z57BouRU97Rkr7H6mGGvcuoBtw0i5xYFvqTZynLMqx6Hz3aaYbffIjQKL0dnov6tXe-aetuhZ16msOMgu2WSwZBIJmpi1XeIbf0GjU7zFXwxDw49s12RDGgk0hcyndqffLm05mFX06jxk0e4lJwIynVgTguVIZC4Zk1143Sc7VKAz8slx3FyzNR8CahY_OKkWVhIMWMBeE-DVDlJoICkZB15fF2fhdxeFx66M6eWfa-pzY8DTt9AwUcCQdc7vU6S4_ZbfbFm6mE7hC2CC7gNEmC-vUWZiSbhO5HYEBuRy6hOcbAABom3MFvtoiOA9X1qYuSgCog2uxEinPA2wEf7L3jPZlL1ab4Qp_hYAm2r7CZZhBR68IP1FKlAHAOqZvNm04EXYXgKpzGfl81hw57O8k587cUdDC1R2vk8E4t7Z2sYF8SBt_dHYanRlCCGGkFcamK4BoDiIw-RmgmFAFvaskcBU8bjEaErnRqcFjuj8Lw.db0956109fdb80f4da1571bef80f42972b69c719&uuid=&state=AiuY0DBWFJ4ePaEse6rgeAjgs2pI3DW9GQoIVjtsoO7iooTyKrIJ6nDKj7aRAxcrPeVOtWhxUw5VS-e_fWwyrFlUHN76FmO4C8McLQji5cRcUxVYBH_1KRLahJKjEJ0TZTUFWxhM_kCUMUpUvEgO7mOCIFAAjJlGKK05c2vE29M5OgGK-AE5mHK0Tnn-0Jg6QCZ8sYI1E3vi7csNVqqoAl_u34m868ROI8CiSEYIr9KgNgLBP-QyiB-XxH7yMub4CJU_YABsilTaPE_lNwD-u1JD8vdAtNAQ&data=UlNrNmk5WktYejR0eWJFYk1LdmtxbXU2b2lmd1A2YTJGaklBdjY0U1EwS1pXVjVIQkcxdXREM2d4cUNMNjN4YldkcUdfTDdGSUtTRGRTV1pfS0psNl84Sy1abl9lZ2JrdEM3enBxS2lDbWJlZ21aVTlNSFhJNWRvcHJxSUE5T05wYjNIZWFPNERRVTN3TFlIVHFSdjllM1JzdFZ5c0FtRXU5alQwNTE4WkVQc1gtM1FVWTU4UlZOQWpHRE1iZmJOc0xMTlVQQnBaNFhXWGRhdlBzbTNBbXU4UWdMV2s2UDZSUmhEc3cwQlVaVQ&b64e=2&sign=1296c70274584316fb453ba6000b25a5&keyno=0&l10n=ru&cts=1417049671254&mc=2.3219280948873626.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: The code of conduct applies only to civilian servants of the MoD. Consecutively, the MoD commission on compliance with the code of conduct and conflict of interests deals only with civilians rather than all MoD personnel. Their primary focus is declarations of income and assets, but there is no evidence of effective monitoring or enforcement procedures in place.

Suggested score: 1

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

49.
score
2

Does regular anti-corruption training take place for military and civilian personnel?

Researcher4281: The Anti-Corruption Plan for the Armed Forces for 2014-2015, as well as anti-corruption plans for previous years, do make provisions for anti-corruption training. However there is no evidence of this training having been held in practice. Given anti-corruption trainings are consistently mentioned in the anti-corruption plans, it can be reasonably assumed that they do take place, at least from time to time.

COMMENTS -+

1) Приказ Министра обороны от 02.06.2014 №385 &quoute;Об утверждении Плана противодействия коррупции в Вооруженных Силах Российской Федерации на 2014-2015 годы.&quoute; http://base.consultant.ru/cons/cgi/online.cgi?req=doc;base=EXP;n=588286;fld=134;dst=100014;rnd=0.34953474113717675.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: There is very little evidence to suggest any training at all is taking place. Some conferences have been organised by authorities in recent years but these have usually targeted civilian personnel.

http://function.mil.ru/news_page/country/[email protected]

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

50.
score
2

Is there a policy to make public outcomes of the prosecution of defence services personnel for corrupt activities, and is there evidence of effective prosecutions in recent years?

Researcher4281: There is no policy to make the outcomes of prosecutions public. There is however a lot of evidence of prosecutions for corrupt activities which include high-ranking officials. A good example of this comes as a result of a major corruption scandal in 2012, where a number of top officials lost their positions, including the former minister of defence, who was was convicted of negligence but avoided punishment after broad amnesty was extended to him at the end of 2013. The appropriateness of this decision has been significantly questioned by independent commentators. Another case involving the the former head of the MoD Property Department who was convicted of money laundering and embezzlement, but later released on parole. The latter decision provoked severe criticism from civil society as well as ordinary citizens, according to public opinion polls. While there is evidence that legal sanctions are sometimes applied to the offenders, other cases have raised scepticism and many doubts from independent commentators about effective prosecution. The outcomes of aforementioned cases have been considered by many commentators as evidence of a selective approach to the enforcement of sanctions.

COMMENTS -+

1) РАПСИ. &quoute;Сюжет: Дело о мошенничестве в &quoute;Оборонсервисе.&quoute; http://rapsinews.ru/trend/oboronservis_26102012/;

2) &quoute;Сердюков попал под амнистию,&quoute; Lenta.ru, March 6, 2014, accessed July 29, 2014, http://lenta.ru/news/2014/03/06/amnisty/;

3) &quoute;Фигуранты дела &quoute;Оборонсервиса&quoute; решили повременить с показаниями,&quoute; РИА Новости, July 10, 2014, accessed July 29, 2014, http://ria.ru/incidents/20140710/1015433025.html ;

4) &quoute;Новый скандал в Минобороны,&quoute; Business FM, December 19, 2013, accessed July 29, 2014, http://www.bfm.ru/news/240524;

5) &quoute;СМИ: суд признал законным уголовное преследование экс-главкома Чиркина,&quoute; РИА Новости, February 3, 2014, accessed July 29, 2014, http://ria.ru/incidents/20140203/992674524.html;

6) INTERFAX.RU, &quoute;Против УДО Васильевой выступили 70% россиян&quoute;, August 27, 2015, accessed October 5, 2015, https://news.mail.ru/incident/23105967/

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Control and prosecution is lax and at best, selective, often targeting people who have fallen out of grace with the political leadership. Such cases are likely to be made public, as indicated by the assessor. However this is on an ad hoc basis and rather inconsistent.

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

51.
score
2

Are there effective measures in place to discourage facilitation payments (which are illegal in almost all countries)?

Researcher4281: All bribes and facilitation payments are illegal in Russia under Article 290 of the Criminal Code. A press release from the Main Military Prosecutor's Office indicates that every fifth crime in the MoD in 2013 was corruption-related. More than 7,000 violations of the anti-corruption legislation have been detected and more than 1,100 offenders have been subject to administrative or disciplinary sanctions, while 505 criminal cases have also been opened. At the same time, the overall number of crimes of all types has fallen. It is unclear yet if the latter reflects a real improvement in the situation or ongoing ineffective control. In addition, the high number of corruption-related crimes identified does not offer certain indication that existing anti-corruption measures are effective.

According to Transparency International, there are inadequacies in Russia's enforcement of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention (which covers facilitation payments). Mainly, there is limited information on investigations and prosecutions to assess the effectiveness of the framework in place.

Response to Peer Reviewer 2: Given the mechanisms in place do not appear to address facilitation payments (here, assumed to be subsumed within the overarching numbers of corruption cases) sufficiently, the score is lowered from 3 to 2.

COMMENTS -+

1) Criminal Code of the RF, Chapter 30, Article 290. http://www.consultant.ru/popular/ukrf/10_41.html;

2) &quoute;Военная прокуратура отчиталась за коррупцию&quoute;, korrosia.ru, July 15, 2013, accessed August 2, 2014, http://korrossia.ru/rating/8283-voennaya-prokuratura-otchitalas-za-korrupciyu.html.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: No efficient mechanisms of avoiding facilitation payments can be named.

Suggested score: 2

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Training 60
52.
score
1

Do the armed forces have military doctrine addressing corruption as a strategic issue on operations?

Researcher4281: There is no evidence of an explicit doctrine addressing corruption issues on operations, nor has any evidence been found of the armed forces' awareness of corruption as an issue on operations. However, as mentioned in other questions, there is evidence of the forces recognising corruption as an issue in terms of governance, which would apply to operations. The score has been selected accordingly.

COMMENTS -+

1) MoD. &quoute;Участие России в миротворческих операциях.&quoute; http://structure.mil.ru/mission/peacekeeping_operations.htm.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The Military Doctrine, signed by President Putin, mentions the fight against corruption as a way to build a stronger army. However, this is only briefly mentioned at the bottom of a long list of provisions, indicating the importance which is attributed to it.

Anti-government activists, such as Boris Nemtsov, have claimed that the military doctrine not only fails to encourage the fight against corruption but is actually discouraging it.

http://www.mid.ru/ns-osndoc.nsf/72650a607696e34d432569fa003a71dd/2a959a74cd7ed01f432569fb004872a3?OpenDocument

http://www.facenews.ua/news/2014/259444/

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

53.
score
1

Is there training in corruption issues for commanders at all levels in order to ensure that these commanders are clear on the corruption issues they may face during deployment? If so, is there evidence that they apply this knowledge in the field?

Researcher4281: Research indicates no evidence that any relevant training on addressing corruption in operations takes place for commanders. There is no publicly available information on Russian commanders encountering corruption on operations.

COMMENTS -+

1) MoD. &quoute;Участие России в миротворческих операциях.&quoute; http://structure.mil.ru/mission/peacekeeping_operations.htm.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

54.
score
1

Are trained professionals regularly deployed to monitor corruption risk in the field (whether deployed on operations or peacekeeping missions)?

Researcher4281: There is no available information on this subject.

COMMENTS -+

1) MoD. &quoute;Участие России в миротворческих операциях.&quoute; http://structure.mil.ru/mission/peacekeeping_operations.htm.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

55.
score
0

Are there guidelines, and staff training, on addressing corruption risks in contracting whilst on deployed operations or peacekeeping missions?

Researcher4281: There are no guidelines in the existing Codes of Conduct for either civilian or military personnel which relate to corruption risks in contracting in operations specifically. However, Decree #555 &quoute;On Assertion of Code of Ethics and Conduct of Civilian Federal Public Servants of MoD of RF&quoute; (April, 22, 2011) does provide guidelines related to corruption risks in contracting more generally. The score has been selected given it is applicable to civilian personnel only and does not consider contracting in the context of operations.

Response to Peer Reviewer 1: As there is no evidence that the guidance in Decree #555 &quoute;On Assertion of Code of Ethics and Conduct of Civilian Federal Public Servants of MoD of RF&quoute; (April, 22, 2011) is applicable beyond civilian personnel only, the score is maintained. The anti-corruption trainings incorporated into the MoD's Anti-Corruption Plan for 2014-2015 do not explicitly cover corruption risks in contracting in general either, nor do they cover contracting during deployment missions.

COMMENTS -+

1) MoD. &quoute;Методические рекомендации военнослужащему по соблюдению этических требований к служебному поведению.&quoute; http://mil.ru/anti-corruption/meth_materials/[email protected];

2) Приказ Минобороны РФ от 22 апреля 2011 г. № 555 “Об утверждении Кодекса этики и служебного поведения федеральных государственных гражданских служащих Министерства обороны Российской Федерации.” http://www.garant.ru/products/ipo/prime/doc/55071358/;

3) MoD. &quoute;К вопросу об этике и нормах служебного поведения федеральных государственных гражданских служащих Министерства обороны Российской Федерации.&quoute; http://mil.ru/anti-corruption/meth_materials/[email protected]

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: Contracting and outsourcing in the Russian defence sector has traditionally been one of the areas most prone to corruption. Tackling corruption in expeditionary contracting is even more problematic by default.

No specific guidance on tackling corruption in course of contracting at deployment has been found. The available guidance is a generic one and primarily relates to civilian servants. It can be assumed that the generic guidance is applicable to personnel during deployment as well.

I would therefore suggest score 1.



Suggested score: 1

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: There do not seem to be special published guidelines for external missions. However, the guidelines that exist for civilian public servants of the MoD are applicable to all such servants regardless of their location.

As we can see from the title of decree #555, it only covers civilian public servants. It is worth mentioning that the draft that had been published a month before the adoption of the above mentioned decree also included military public servants.

Decree #555 &quoute;On assertion of Code of ethics and conduct of civilian federal public servants of MoD of RF&quoute; as of April, 22, 2011 http://www.mnogozakonov.ru/catalog/date/2011/4/22/68186/

Besides, Russian authorities do not even admit Russian troops are deployed in Ukraine. No further research needed to agree that no official rules apply.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: There is no evidence of attempts to address this sort of corruption.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

56.
score
1

Private Military Contractors (PMCs) usually refer to companies that provide operational staff to military environments. They may also be known as security contractors or private security contractors, and refer to themselves as private military corporations, private military firms, private security providers, or military service providers.

Researcher4281: All evidence to date indicates that PMCs have never been employed by the Russian authorities. Currently there is no evidence indicating any connections to the Russian authorities and no evidence of any corrupt activities.

Private military companies do not have a legal status in Russia, however they do exist in practice and specific examples are known; but they exist in the &quoute;grey zone&quoute;, as there is no legislation allowing them to register themselves as PMCs. Most appear to be registered, but as other forms of commercial entities. There is evidence to indicate some have been working actively in Iraq and Afghanistan, and are often employed by private companies, ship owners and large corporations such as Gazprom and Lukoil. There is no evidence of their direct employment by the state structures, however.

In the context of missing legislation, their work in conflict areas is legally very risky and there are some examples of PMCs being convicted for mercenary activity. Moreover, little transparency of their activities creates other risks, including that of corruption. The current situation has made legislators and the MoD start working on a law on PMCs in 2014. The draft was returned to its author for review and the latest update on the progress dates November 2014.

Response to Peer Reviewer 1 and Peer Reviewer 2:
Currently there are no regulations forbidding the use of PMCs. The draft bill on Public Military Security Companies that was introduced does not ban PMCs but is intended to introduce such companies into the legal framework and regulate their work.

There is evidence of PMCs, in fact, being employed, but as they act in the &quoute;grey zone&quoute; their activities are not subject to any scrutiny. Further it cannot be verified whether they are employed by the MoD or army. Given there is a good chance (but not strong evidence) of their employment by defence institutions and there are still no regulations associated with their use, the score has been lowered to 1.

(Please note that the scoring protocol for this question defines that if there are no regulations for PMCs but at the same time there is no evidence of their use by the MoD or army, score 2 must be awarded)

COMMENTS -+

1) Ольга Вандышева, &quoute;С кем будут сражаться частные военные компании в России&quoute;, Expert Online, June 28, 2014, accessed August 2, 2014, http://q99.it/X71zSLo&quoute; http://expert.ru/2014/06/28/chem-budut-zanimatsya-rossijskie-chvk/;

2) Владимир Неелов, &quoute;Частные военные компании в России: опыт и перспективы использования&quoute;, Центр стратегических оценок и прогнозов, 2013, http://www.csef.ru/files/csef/articles/4838/4838.pdf.

3) AiF.RU, &quoute;Генерал Балуевский: создание частных военных компаний нарушает законы РФ&quoute;, May 28, 2015, accessed October 5, 2015, http://www.aif.ru/society/army/general_baluevskiy_sozdanie_chastnyh_voennyh_kompaniy_narushaet_zakony_rf

4) State Duma. &quoute;Законопроект № 630327-6 О частных военно-охранных компаниях.&quoute; Last modified November 11, 2014, accessed October 5, 2015, http://asozd2.duma.gov.ru/main.nsf/%28SpravkaNew%29?OpenAgent&RN=630327-6&02

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: The bill on legalising and regulating the PMC was submitted to the Duma in October 2014 but has not been approved as of March 2015. The bill suggests that the PMCs will be licences and monitored by the FSB. There is no indication that the bill includes any corruption provisions.

While the employment of PMCs is outlawed in Russia for the time being, independent journalists have many times attributed various PMCs fighting on missions abroad to Russia and the FSB, in particular. These include the infamous Slavonic Corps (Hong Kong registered) which fought in the Syrian civil war, but also groups in Afghanistan and Libya. While Russia has denied this, the journalists have pointed to the fact that it is hardly possible for a small group of around 200 people to fight in a foreign country with no support of an intelligence agency of a state. Moreover, the ownership of the companies has led to former or current FSB officials.

As PMCs have been employed while regulation of their activities is non-existent for the time being, I would suggest Score 0.

http://www.inopressa.ru/article/01May2015/lefigaro/militaires.html

http://interpolit.ru/blog/k_voprosu_naemnykh_druzhin_zachem_rossii_legalizacija_chvk/2015-03-10-4522

http://inosmi.ru/world/20150210/226182259.html

Suggested score: 0

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: http://russian.rt.com/article/64190 - the Government approves the idea of creation of PMCs
http://inosmi.ru/world/20150210/226182259.html - Russia to enter the market of PMCs
The legislation on PMCs is still being drafted.

However, it is true that oil companies are in fact allowed to use private armed forces to protect pipelines.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: Attempts to push PMC legislation through parliament (State Duma) seem to have failed.

Suggested score: 4

Peer Reviewer-+

Personnel 50
57.
score
2

Does the country have legislation covering defence and security procurement and are there any items exempt from these laws?

Researcher4281: There are two laws relevant to the defence procurement. FL#44 covers all public procurement. It does not distinguish between the MoD and other procurement and is not applicable to secret (MoD or other) procurement. FL#275 on State Defence Order focuses specifically on defence procurement, covering both secret and non-secret items. When dealing with secret items, the law stipulates that the regulations of FL law 5485-I on State Secret must be followed. This law has been amended in July 2015.

An interdepartmental system was created to better control budget expenditure related to the implementation of FL#275. A number of amendments were aimed at preventing the unjustified price inflation. Other amendments introduce additional liability for administrative offences related to the execution of state defence order. Thus, the amendments actually target corruption risks, although this is not mentioned explicitly in the text of the law.

The new control and scrutiny mechanisms, just like the broader law, are applicable to both secret and non-secret items. In the case of secret-items, the amended clauses stipulate that the bodies involved (i.e. the Federal Anti-Trust Service officials entrusted with oversight power) must follow the procedure for receiving access to state secret information according to the FL on State Secret.

At the same time it should be noted that:
(1) The amendments are recent and no solid evidence exists yet on how the newly introduced oversight mechanisms work.
(2) For the procurement of secret items, although they are covered by the law on State Defence Order, it is hardly ever possible to establish how the legal provisions, including those for their scrutiny, are enforced as all secret-items related information falls under state secrecy. For the same reason, secret defence procurement is not covered by FL 44 which provides the legal framework for disclosure of and oversight of all sectors' public procurement.

The media has occasionally reported on corruption related to the execution of state defence order, but all examples are of a time prior to the introduction of new amendments.

In practice, although legal provisions have very recently improved, there is no evidence at this point of any major changes in defence procurement practices. Notably, in July 2013, a media report cited the Main Military Prosecutor Fridinsky stating that public defence procurement was officially acknowledged as the most corrupt domain in the armed forces in 2013. Legislative changes were implemented thereafter and the score has been selected accordingly.

Response to Peer Reviewers:
Information accepted and added to the main answer. The score has been raised from 1 to 2 which is reflective of the improvement in the legislative structure for defence procurement, with the consideration that this has been a major area of corruption in the past and the effectiveness of changes are yet to be seen.

COMMENTS -+

1) Закон о контрактной системе (закон о госзакупках). Федеральный закон от 5 апреля 2013 г. N 44-ФЗ &quoute;О контрактной системе в сфере закупок товаров, работ, услуг для обеспечения государственных и муниципальных нужд,&quoute; Статьи 110 and 111. http://base.garant.ru/70353464/7/;

2) Official portal for public procurement. http://www.zakupki.gov.ru/;

3) Федеральный закон от 29.12.2012 N 275-ФЗ (ред. от 28.12.2013) &quoute;О государственном оборонном заказе&quoute;. http://base.consultant.ru/cons/cgi/online.cgi?req=doc;base=LAW;n=182861;fld=134;from=156897-5;rnd=0.6268281482625753;

4) &quoute;Самой коррумпированной сферой в армии стало распределение гособоронзаказа,&quoute; РБК Daily, August 11, 2013, accessed August 2, 2014, http://pics-gt-mrr05.v4.rbcdaily.ru/society/562949987828212.

5) Echo.msk.ru, &quoute;Журналист Олег Кашин заявляет, что нападение на него финансировали из бюджета Гособоронзаказа&quoute;, October 4, 2015, accessed October 5, 2015, http://echo.msk.ru/news/1634254-echo.html;

6) Алиса Штыкина, Светлана Бочарова, &quoute;За нарушения при срыве оборонного заказа будет грозить национализация&quoute;, March 12, 2015, rbc.ru, http://top.rbc.ru/economics/12/03/2015/550062359a7947f2a1762d87;

7) Олег Одноколенко, &quoute;Рубль оборонного значения&quoute;, Независимое военное обозрение, July 17, 2015, accessed October 4, 2015, http://nvo.ng.ru/realty/2015-07-17/1_rubl.html;

8) Закон РФ от 21 июля 1993 г. N 5485-I &quoute;О государственной тайне&quoute; (с изменениями и дополнениями).http://base.garant.ru/10102673/#ixzz3nhmopQ5l

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: Military procurement is conducted through the state defence order (GOZ), adopted annually to allow for the smooth implementation of the over-arcing state armaments programme (GPV). The Federal Law On the State Defence Order establishes the general legal principles, procedures for forming, financing and fulfilling GOZ for supplies of armaments and military equipment, fulfilment of work and rendering of services, as well as for export–import supplies in the domain of the military-technical cooperation of the Russian Federation with foreign States. No items should be excluded under the law, however there is no evidence that this is complied with.

Numerous amendments and improvements have been introduced to the legal framework. In September 2014 President Putin ordered the abolishment of the two agencies responsible for placing and executing weapons orders for the military (Rosoboronzakaz and Rosoboronpostavka) and handed control over their functions to the defence Ministry, Finance Ministry and Audit Chamber. He also took personal control over the coordinating Military Industrial Commission, overseeing the implementation of GOZ, further centralising power. In January 2015 the government submitted a law which would allow the nationalisation of defence companies which fail to fulfil their contracts under the annual state defence order (GOZ).

In April 2015, Putin also submitted a draft bill amending the Federal Law. The bill suggested changes to Federation Administrative Offences Code to establish additional liability for violations pertaining to the state defence order, as well as the creation of a new departmental system to oversee the implementation.

As there is no hard evidence to suggest that the law is often bypassed and the government has also been actively working to improve the legislative framework, I would suggest Score 2.

http://www.janes.com/article/50906/russia-may-nationalise-companies-that-fail-to-honour-state-defence-order

http://rt.com/politics/185956-russia-arms-agency-abolition/

http://en.kremlin.ru/acts/news/49225

http://www.fas.gov.ru/fas-news/fas-news_36445.html

Suggested score: 2

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The MoD is the second biggest spender in Russia, according to clearspending.ru (an independent web-portal). Expenditure on procurement spending has two categories: secret and public spending. The former accounts for a substantial proportion of the total. The public portion is regulation by the FL on federal contract systems which does not distinguish between the MoD and other agencies in terms of the provisions they are subject to and the procedures that are to be followed. Experts estimate that the annual losses in procurement by the MoD can amountt o 1 trillion rubles.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: In addition to mentioned by the assessor FL # 44-FZ exists FL # 275-FZ &quoute;About state defence order&quoute; which concerns everything connected except corruption risks. After formal approval of the last by the Russian president in December 2012 the legislation is still established by issuing of governmental regulations. The last known is # 407 from April 28th, 2015 concerning initial contract prices on weapons and equipment. Fraudulent pricing prevails in list of known legislation violations. Any independent scrutiny is substantially handicapped by total secrecy of defence order.

Suggested score: 3

Peer Reviewer-+

58.
score
1

Is the defence procurement cycle process, from assessment of needs, through contract implementation and sign-off, all the way to asset disposal, disclosed to the public?

Researcher4281: Defence procurement is divided into secret and non-secret items. The procurement cycle of items falling under the FL on State Secrets may not be disclosed to the public. The share of this non-public secret procurement is estimated to be large. The annual GOZ comes under the Law on State Secrets, and details of the annual value and composition of procurements belong to the classified section of the federal budget. According to some estimates , as much as 70 per cent of the annual GOZ contracts are classified.

The non-secret part of defence procurement is subject to the FL 44 on all public procurement which covers all non-secret procurement regardless of the sector. This law has replaced the previous FL #94 and, amongst other aspects, it establishes a competitive transparent procedure for public procurement it is applicable to (Articles 7 and 8). According to this law, the information on procurement has to be published at an official portal (goszakupki.gov.ru). However, the information disclosed there does not cover the whole cycle; the system does not allow the public to track the assessment of needs as well as the implementation stage.

Response to Peer Reviewer 2:
Some elements of the procurement cycle are public as outlined in the analysis above. Score lowered to 1 on the basis that the procurement cycle of the vast majority of purchases (which are &quoute;secret&quoute;) is not public and the information in relation to the remaining purchases does not comprehensively cover the procurement cycle.

(Relevant information from Peer Reviewer 1 and the TI Chapter Reviewer has been added to the main answer)

COMMENTS -+

1) Закон о контрактной системе (закон о госзакупках). Федеральный закон от 5 апреля 2013 г. N 44-ФЗ &quoute;О контрактной системе в сфере закупок товаров, работ, услуг для обеспечения государственных и муниципальных нужд.&quoute; http://base.garant.ru/70353464/;

2) Закон РФ от 21.07.1993 N 5485-1 (ред. от 21.12.2013) &quoute;О государственной тайне.&quoute; http://base.consultant.ru/cons/cgi/online.cgi?req=doc;base=LAW;n=156018, http://base.consultant.ru/cons/cgi/online.cgi?req=doc;base=LAW;n=156018;fld=134;dst=4294967295;rnd=0.7682905797846615;

3) Постановление Правительства РФ от 26.12.2013 N 1255 &quoute;О Правилах разработки государственного оборонного заказа и основных его показателей.&quoute; http://base.consultant.ru/cons/cgi/online.cgi?req=doc;base=LAW;n=156691;fld=134;dst=100011;rnd=0.49203966255299747;

4) MoD. &quoute;Министр обороны России генерал армии Сергей Шойгу провел первое в новом году селекторное совещание.&quoute; Last modified January 14, 2014. http://function.mil.ru/news_page/country/[email protected];

5) &quoute;Минобороны: объем гособоронзаказа в 2014 г вырастет примерно на 25%,&quoute; РИА Новости, November 11, 2013, accessed August 1, 2014, http://ria.ru/defence_safety/20131120/978368325.html.

6) Oxenstierna & Westerlund “Arms Procurement and the Russian defence Industry: Challenges Up to 2020”, The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 28 Feb 2013, http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fslv20

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: I agree with the assessor. Some items are disclosed in details, especially those considered non-sensitive. However, a big part of process remains vague, presented in a highly abbreviated form or fully classified.

A recent SIPRI report reads: &quoute;A main obstacle in making the GOZ system more effective is the lack of transparency regarding the procurement process. The annual GOZ comes under the Law on State Secrets, and details of the annual value and composition of procurements belong to the classified section of the federal budget. According to Anatoly Tsyganok, head of the Centre for Military Forecasting, as much as 70 per cent of the annual GOZ contracts are classified, whereas merely 6–7 per cent of US defence procurement is kept secret.&quoute;

http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/ICES2013/papers/archive/oxenstierna-russian-defence-budget-and-sap

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The FL on the federal contracting system regulates MoD procurement and enforces it (as well as other government agencies) to publish all contract options at the goszakupki.gov.ru website, although actual contract implementation is not subject to public oversight.

It is not possible, however to evaluate the transparency of MoD-owned entities and enterprises which are not regulated by law. Additionally, the fact that a substantial portion of expenditure remains secret is also to be considered. There is also a lack of transparency in relation to the assessment of needs stage in the procurement process cycle.



Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: The defence procurement cycle is based on the state armament program which is non-transparent and not published. There are serious doubts in existence of any formalization in procurement planning.

Suggested score: 0

Peer Reviewer-+

59.
score
2

Are defence procurement oversight mechanisms in place and are these oversight mechanisms active and transparent?

Researcher4281: There are elaborate formal provisions for the oversight over all public procurement (with the exception of secret items) stated in Chapter V of the FL on Contracting System and supplemented by an additional legal act on the public procurement procedure. Both scheduled and unscheduled inspections are put in place. Many external controlling bodies are involved, each responsible for a specific domain, like the Federal Anti-Trust Agency and the Investigative Committee. There is some evidence of their activities and the results they achieve, as is indicated by the opening of criminal cases.

In addition to that, in July 2015 the FL 275 on State Defence Order was amended creating an inter-departmental system to better control the budget expenditure related to defence acquisition. The Federal Agency for State Defence Order (Rosoboronzakaz) had been abolished earlier and new amendments now divided some of its oversight functions between several agencies, with the Federal Anti-Trust Service being entrusted with main oversight. Other agencies (besides the MoD) involved in the new interdepartmental oversight mechanism are the AC and the Federal Agency for Financial Monitoring (Rosfinmonitoring). Those agencies are independent from the MoD, in contrast to Rosoboronzakaz which was controlled by the MoD.

As the amendment is very recent, no evidence can be found yet of how independent and effective its functioning is in practice. Existing evidence relates to the time prior to the amendments and provides both examples of effective oversight (by the Federal Anti-Trust Service and the Investigative Committee) as well as of ineffective oversight (by MoD units).

(Relevant information from Peer Reviewer 1 has been added to the main answer)

COMMENTS -+

1) Закон о контрактной системе (закон о госзакупках). Федеральный закон от 5 апреля 2013 г. N 44-ФЗ &quoute;О контрактной системе в сфере закупок товаров, работ, услуг для обеспечения государственных и муниципальных нужд, Глава V. http://base.garant.ru/70353464/5/;

2) Приказ Минобороны РФ от 8 декабря 2011 г. N 2350 &quoute;Об утверждении Положения о порядке организации работы по размещению государственных заказов на поставки товаров, выполнение работ и оказание услуг для нужд Вооруженных Сил Российской Федерации, заключению и контролю исполнения государственных контрактов.&quoute; http://www.garant.ru/products/ipo/prime/doc/70017976/ ;

3) Людмила Климентьева, &quoute;Шойгу предлагает упразднить Рособоронзаказ — «Коммерсантъ»,&quoute; Ведомости, June 3, 2014, accessed August, 1, 2014. http://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/news/27286191/shojgu-predlagaet-uprazdnit-rosoboronzakaz-kommersant;

4) &quoute;Происшествия: Неэффективная работа контролирующих органов Минобороны привела к сокрытию махинаций в ведомстве,&quoute; Daily Onine, February 21, 2013, accessed August 1, 2014, http://www.dailyonline.ru/news/proishestviya/neeffektivnaya-rabota-kontroliruyuschikh-organov-m/;

5) &quoute;Юрий Чайка: Проверки гособоронзаказа привели к открытию 48 уголовных дел,&quoute; РБК, January 29, 2014, accessed August 1, 2014, http://top.rbc.ru/politics/29/01/2014/902135.shtml;

6) Federal Anti-Trust Service. &quoute;ФАС возбудила дела в отношении поставщиков сырья по гособоронзаказу.&quoute; Last modified September 2, 2013. http://www.fas.gov.ru/fas-in-press/fas-in-press_37534.html;

7) Федеральный закон от 29.12.2012 N 275-ФЗ (ред. от 28.12.2013) &quoute;О государственном оборонном заказе&quoute;. http://base.consultant.ru/cons/cgi/online.cgi?req=doc;base=LAW;n=182861;fld=134;from=156897-5;rnd=0.6268281482625753.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: A recent SIPRI report reads: &quoute;A main obstacle in making the GOZ system more effective is the lack of transparency regarding the procurement process. The annual GOZ comes under the Law on State Secrets, and details of the annual value and composition of procurements belong to the classified section of the federal budget. According to Anatoly Tsyganok, head of the Centre for Military Forecasting , as much as 70 per cent of the annual GOZ contracts are classified, whereas merely 6–7 per cent of US defence procurement is kept secret.&quoute;

http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/ICES2013/papers/archive/oxenstierna-russian-defence-budget-and-sap

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

60.
score
2

Are actual and potential defence purchases made public?

Researcher4281: Under the FL on Contracting Systems (Article 4, item 3), all planned purchases, including those relating to the defence sector, are required to be published on the government's official public procurement portal. This provision will only enter into force for all public procurement in 2016 however, and in addition, a considerable share of purchases is currently exempt under the FL on State Secrets. As FL on State Secret stipulates, Presidential Decree 1203 introduces the list of types of information that is considered state secret, including the military-related information.

The MoD has already published the list of planned purchases for 2015 at the official portal for public procurement. The actual, non-security restricted, purchases can also be found there.

It is unclear whether the disclosure on non-classified purchases is verified through government audits.

Response to Peer Reviewers and TI Chapter Reviewer:
Accepted. Score lowered from 3 to 2.

COMMENTS -+

1) Закон о контрактной системе (закон о госзакупках). Федеральный закон от 5 апреля 2013 г. N 44-ФЗ &quoute;О контрактной системе в сфере закупок товаров, работ, услуг для обеспечения государственных и муниципальных нужд, Статья 4, Пункт 3. http://base.garant.ru/70353464/1/#block_1000;

2) Official portal for public procurement. http://zakupki.gov.ru; 3) Закон РФ от 21.07.1993 N 5485-1 (ред. от 21.12.2013) &quoute;О государственной тайне.&quoute; http://base.consultant.ru/cons/cgi/online.cgi?req=doc;base=LAW;n=156018.

3) Перечень сведений, отнесенных к государственной тайне (утв. Указом Президента РФ от 30 ноября 1995 г. N 1203). http://base.garant.ru/10105548/#block_1000#ixzz3nitU3Tnu;

4) Закон РФ от 21 июля 1993 г. N 5485-I &quoute;О государственной тайне&quoute;. http://base.garant.ru/10102673/#block_200#ixzz3nitZZDk9

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: As discussed previously, a big portion of the purchases are considered classified and not disclosed to the public. While this is a normal trend with regards to military purchases, in Russia's case this is a significant percentage. Information is often disclosed in a highly abbreviated form, such as info-grams. Therefore, I propose Score 2.

A recent SIPRI report reads: &quoute;A main obstacle in making the GOZ system more effective is the lack of transparency regarding the procurement process. The annual GOZ comes under the Law on State Secrets, and details of the annual value and composition of procurements belong to the classified section of the federal budget. According to Anatoly Tsyganok, head of the Centre for Military Forecasting , as much as 70 per cent of the annual GOZ contracts are classified, whereas merely 6–7 per cent of US defence procurement is kept secret.&quoute;

http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/ICES2013/papers/archive/oxenstierna-russian-defence-budget-and-sap

http://tass.ru/en/infographics/7274

Suggested score: 2

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: The proportion of secret spending in overall purchases must be taken into consideration in the scoring.

Suggested score: 2

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: The MoD's defence order is secret according to the law &quoute;On state secrets&quoute;. The same applies to security bodies.

Suggested score: 2

Peer Reviewer-+

61.
score
0

What procedures and standards are companies required to have - such as compliance programmes and business conduct programmes - in order to be able to bid for work for the Ministry of Defence or armed forces?

Researcher4281: The FL on Contracting Systems (Chapter III) does not require companies to have compliance programmes, anti-corruption programmes or any other ethics-related criteria to be fulfilled, in order for them to bid for defence contracts. There is no evidence of the government making references to anti-corruption or integrity either.

COMMENTS -+

1) Закон о контрактной системе (закон о госзакупках). Федеральный закон от 5 апреля 2013 г. N 44-ФЗ &quoute;О контрактной системе в сфере закупок товаров, работ, услуг для обеспечения государственных и муниципальных нужд, Глава III. http://base.garant.ru/70353464/3/#block_300;

2) Приказ Минобороны РФ от 8 декабря 2011 г. N 2350 &quoute;Об утверждении Положения о порядке организации работы по размещению государственных заказов на поставки товаров, выполнение работ и оказание услуг для нужд Вооруженных Сил Российской Федерации, заключению и контролю исполнения государственных контрактов.&quoute; http://www.garant.ru/products/ipo/prime/doc/70017976/.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

62.
score
1

Are procurement requirements derived from an open, well-audited national defence and security strategy?

Researcher4281: According to Article 4 of the FL on the State Defence Order (Procurement), defence purchases that are covered by the law have to be planned according to the Military Doctrine, the State Armament Programme and several other relevant regulations. The Doctrine is openly published. However, it is too abstract to establish any link between its provisions and planned purchases. The State Armament Programme is not disclosed to the public. The annual state defence order guided by the State Armament Programme is defined by the financial indicators that are stated in the budget. These figures are in the secret appendices to the budget, however.

As mentioned in Question 57, the Main Military Prosecutor reportedly stated in 2013 that that public defence procurement was officially acknowledged as the most corrupt domain in the armed forces in 2013.

COMMENTS -+

1) Федеральный закон от 29.12.2012 N 275-ФЗ (ред. от 28.12.2013) &quoute;О государственном оборонном заказе&quoute;. http://base.consultant.ru/cons/cgi/online.cgi?req=doc;base=LAW;n=156897;

2) Указ Президента Российской Федерации от 5 февраля 2010 г. N 146 &quoute;О Военной доктрине Российской Федерации&quoute;. http://www.rg.ru/2010/02/10/doktrina-dok.html;

3) Федеральный закон от 2 декабря 2013 г. N 349-ФЗ &quoute;О федеральном бюджете на 2014 год и на плановый период 2015 и 2016 годов.&quoute; http://base.garant.ru/70525334/

4) Самой коррумпированной сферой в армии стало распределение гособоронзаказа,&quoute; РБК Daily, August 11, 2013, accessed August 2, 2014, http://pics-gt-mrr05.v4.rbcdaily.ru/society/562949987828212.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

63.
score
1

Are defence purchases based on clearly identified and quantified requirements?

Researcher4281: Defence procurement is guided by a number of legal acts, starting from a more general Military Doctrine to the State Armament Programme (which is not published) which indicates the existence of a formal processs. However, the clarity of this procedure or the regularity with which it is conducted is difficult to verify as there is no public information on the subject.

There is also no evidence on the regularity of such assessment of needs.

COMMENTS -+

1) Федеральный закон от 29.12.2012 N 275-ФЗ (ред. от 28.12.2013) &quoute;О государственном оборонном заказе&quoute;. http://base.consultant.ru/cons/cgi/online.cgi?req=doc;base=LAW;n=156897;

2) Указ Президента Российской Федерации от 5 февраля 2010 г. N 146 &quoute;О Военной доктрине Российской Федерации&quoute;. http://www.rg.ru/2010/02/10/doktrina-dok.html;

3) Федеральный закон от 2 декабря 2013 г. N 349-ФЗ &quoute;О федеральном бюджете на 2014 год и на плановый период 2015 и 2016 годов.&quoute; http://base.garant.ru/70525334/;

4) Julian Cooper, &quoute;Military expenditure in the Russian Federation during the years 2012 to 2015: a
research note&quoute;, SIPRI, October 9, 2012, accessed October 5, 2015, http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/publications/unpubl_milex/military-expenditure-in-the-russian-federation-2012-2015.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

64.
score
1

Is defence procurement generally conducted as open competition or is there a significant element of single-sourcing (that is, without competition)?

Researcher4281: Article 93 of the FL on Contracting Systems outlines 28 specific situations allowing single-sourcing. Single-sourcing is permitted, for example, for purchases with a value less than 100 000 roubles (about 2820 US dollars), if the share of such purchases does not exceed 5 per cent of the year’s procurement budget.

The most recent figures available for the defence sector date back to 2010. The Ministry for Economic Development has calculated the share of single-sourcing for quarter I of 2010. According to one MoD official, the share of purchases made without competition amounts to more than a half of all purchases made however. It is not clear which share of the budget these comprised though. There have been reports of violations of the regulation establishing competition in defence procurement.

Given the level of classified purchases is very large and that regular procurement regulation does not apply to them, there is a strong likelihood of the proportion of single sourcing being higher than 50 per cent.

Response to Peer Reviewer 2:
Accepted. Score lowered from 2 to 1.

(Relevant information from Peer Reviewer 1 has been added to the main answer)

COMMENTS -+

1) Закон о контрактной системе (закон о госзакупках). Федеральный закон от 5 апреля 2013 г. N 44-ФЗ &quoute;О контрактной системе в сфере закупок товаров, работ, услуг для обеспечения государственных и муниципальных нужд.&quoute; http://base.garant.ru/70353464/;

2) www.pravo.ru, &quoute;Чиновники обходят закон о госзакупках с помощью одного поставщика,&quoute; МЦФЭР, August 8, 2010, accessed August 1, 2014, http://www.mcfr.ru/about/news/2426/25147/.

3) Federal Antimonopoly Service, Tenders for managing housing stock of the Ministry of Defence must be open, 18 July 2013, http://en.fas.gov.ru/news/news_33078.html

4) Sputnik News, Russia to hold tender for purchase of helicopter carrier - paper, August 19 2010, http://sputniknews.com/military/20100819/160257224.html

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Public offerings are often preferred by the MoD than open tenders, which limits the number of eligible companies and leads to single sourcing. For example in the case of Oboronservis, the investigators announced that the MoD's property department conducted the disputed sale not through a regular tender process but through public offering, where only two companies were eligible, both of which belonged to the same business group.

Public procurement in Russia is generally non-transparent with very little penetration of online tendering and this also holds true for the defence sector. Complains to the Federal Anti-monopoly Service (FAS) have been made both by local and foreign companies, notably in the purchase of Mistral ships from France. Tender requirements often are tailored in a too specific manner in order to allow for only few companies to bid (or a specific company).

http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/two-more-graft-cases-added-to-oboronservis-case/483513.html

https://www.controlrisks.com/en/newsletters/russia-cis-riskwatch/issue-1-june-2013/anti-corruption-drive

http://sputniknews.com/military/20100819/160257224.html

http://en.fas.gov.ru/news/news_33078.html

http://www.rulg.com/documents/Antitrust/country/Russia/index.html#1.3

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: As mentioned in the last sentence of the Assessor's comments, the secrecy level in Russian defence procurement is creates the risk of monopolistic powers of suppliers/producers.

Suggested score: 1

Peer Reviewer-+

65.
score
3

Are tender boards subject to regulations and codes of conduct and are their decisions subject to independent audit to ensure due process and fairness?

Researcher4281: Article 39, Item 6 of FL 44 on Contracting Systems defines requirements and limitations imposed on tender board members. According to them, the following categories of physical persons are not allowed to be on tender boards:

- those who have participated in the preparation of the tender documentation, or bids for the tender, or in the process of preliminary selection of participants on the basis of their correspondence to requirements;
- those having personal interest in the outcome of selection of suppliers, contractors, including persons that have submitted bids themselves or are employed by bidding organisations;
- physical persons that can be influenced by the participants of the procurement process, such as shareowners, founders, members of executive bodies, representatives of lenders to the bidders.
- close relatives of the tender participants (closed list)
- staff of the body that supervises procurement process.

The general auditing functions are fulfilled by the Federal Anti-Trust Service (FAS). The FAS reports to the Government on its activities on a quarterly basis. It also reports on the results of its auditing activities to the public, in the form of a news report or a digest of activities. Media reports on FAS audits on the MoD mostly cover cases in which the FAS has acted after a company competing for a contract complained against the MoD procurement commission. This indicates that it may be the case that the FAS audits tenders specifically after it receives a complaint from the company.

According to Article 98 of FL 44, tenders specifically are audited by the AC and several audit bodies at regional and municipal levels as well. It should be noted that only publicly available purchases are covered by the regulation of FL 44.

No evidence suggests the independence of the FAS and AC can be seriously questioned. At the same time, there is also little evidence that the government takes action to follow-up violations revealed by the FAS and AC.

Civilian personnel in the MoD are subject to the civilian Code of Conduct; there are also ethical regulations for the military personnel. Both Codes are publicly available. However, there is no specific code of conduct for tender boards.

(Relevant information from the Peer Reviewers and the TI Chapter Reviewer has been added to the main answer)

COMMENTS -+

1) Закон о контрактной системе (закон о госзакупках). Федеральный закон от 5 апреля 2013 г. N 44-ФЗ &quoute;О контрактной системе в сфере закупок товаров, работ, услуг для обеспечения государственных и муниципальных нужд.&quoute; http://base.garant.ru/70353464/;

2) Федеральный закон от 29.12.2012 N 275-ФЗ (ред. от 28.12.2013) &quoute;О государственном оборонном заказе&quoute;. http://base.consultant.ru/cons/cgi/online.cgi?req=doc;base=LAW;n=156897;

3) Постановление Правительства РФ О федеральном органе исполнительной власти, уполномоченном на осуществление контроля в сфере размещения заказов на поставки товаров, выполнение работ, оказание услуг для федеральных государственных нужд. http://fas.gov.ru/legislative-acts/legislative-acts_50324.html;

4) Приказ Минобороны РФ от 22 апреля 2011 г. № 555 “Об утверждении Кодекса этики и служебного поведения федеральных государственных гражданских служащих Министерства обороны Российской Федерации.” http://www.garant.ru/products/ipo/prime/doc/55071358/ ;

5) Federal Anti-Trust Service. &quoute;Дайджест решений Комиссии ФАС России по контролю в сфере размещения заказов.&quoute; Last modified December 9, 2013. http://fas.gov.ru/fas-news/fas-news_35076.html;

6) Рамиль Валеев, &quoute;ФАС удовлетворила жалобу фармкомпании на решение Аукционной комиссии Минобороны РФ,&quoute; РИА Ами, August 17, 2012, accessed August 2, 2014, http://ria-ami.ru/read/7997;

7) Федеральное государственное образовательное учреждение дополнительного профессионального образования «Институт повышения квалификации Федерального медико-биологического агентства.» &quoute;ФАС России: Минобороны необоснованно отклонило заявку на участие в аукционе.&quoute; Last modified January 1, 2012. http://xn----8sbufgda3bekug.xn--p1ai/news/20184/;

8) &quoute;Минобороны РФ нарушило закон при размещении заказа на оборудование,&quoute; РИА Новости, June 6, 2012, accessed August 2, 2014, http://ria.ru/justice/20120606/667151717.html;

9) Federal Anti-Monopoly Service. &quoute;FAS: tenders for managing housing stock of the Ministry of Defence must be open&quoute;. Last modified July 18, 2013, http://en.fas.gov.ru/news/news_33078.html;

10) Egorov Puginsky Afanasiev & Partners, &quoute;OVERVIEW OF ANTITRUST LAWS IN RUSSIA&quoute;. http://www.rulg.com/documents/Antitrust/country/Russia/index.html#1.3.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The assessment of qualifications is performed by special committees in accordance with the detailed procedures for the assessment of bids established by Law No. 94-FZ. The Federal Antitrust Service (FAS) and State Commercial Arbitration Courts may rule on review decisions. There is evidence that FAS audits tenders specifically, as it has issued statements against the holding of closed tenders by the MoD. There is no indications, however, on the follow-up measures taken by the authorities.

http://www.cls.ru/press-centre/publications/public-procurement-2013/

http://sputniknews.com/military/20100819/160257224.html

http://en.fas.gov.ru/news/news_33078.html

http://www.rulg.com/documents/Antitrust/country/Russia/index.html#1.3

http://defence-update.com/20100819_russian_helicopter_carriers.html#.VU6EdNpViko

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: http://sudact.ru/arbitral/doc/qNtO6FHV60LC/ - decision of arbitrage court ruling that the participant that has lost the tender did not have enough grounds to challenge the Board's decision.

http://recrut.mil.ru/career/civil_service/recruitment/archives/[email protected] - notifications about vacant positions in the MoD procurement departments.

http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_177655/?frame=4 - article 39, item 6 of Federal law on contracting system.

There are no special codes of conduct for MoD or the tender boards. However, article 39, item 6 of Federal law on contracting system defines requirements and limitations imposed on tender board members. According to them, the following categories of physical persons are not allowed to be on the tender boards:
- those that participated in preparation of the tender documentation, or bids fot the tender, or the process of preliminary selection of participants by the criteria of their correspondence to requirements;
- those having personal interest in the outcome of selection of suppliers, contractors, including persons that have submitted bids themselves or employed by bidding organisations;
- physical persons that can be influenced by the participants of the procurement process, such as shareowners, founders, members of executive bodies, representatives of lenders to the bidders.
- close relatives of the tender participants (closed list)
- staff of the body that supervises procurement process.

The Federal Antitrust service is seen as independent. They do supervise non-classified procurement, but only in case a complaint is received from one of the tender participants (usually those that lost the tender).

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Tender boards are subject to regulation by federal law # 44-FZ. Tenders themselves are audited by Accounting Chamber and audit bodies at regional and municipal levels. There was no evidence found in relation to formal codes of conduct in this area.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

66.
score
3

Does the country have legislation in place to discourage and punish collusion between bidders for defence and security contracts?

Researcher4281: Collusion between bidders is prohibited under the Code of Administrative Offences (Article 14.32), although there are no specific provisions for defence and security contracts. The FL 135 on Protection of Competition, as well as the Criminal Code (more specifically, Article 78 on Limitation of Competition) apply to collusion between bidders for contracts regardless of a sector.

Article 178 of the Criminal Code outlines penalties for cases where competition is eliminated or limited and if the damage amounts to over 1 million rubles to individuals, organisations or the government or over 5 million rubles for parties to the agreement. The Code further outlines sanctions which include fines, compulsory labour and imprisonment.

There is evidence of media reports on cases of collusion between the bidders for defence contracts that were uncovered by the Federal Anti-Trust Agency; the guilty companies have been fined according to the Code of Administrative Offences. For the cases when the collusion was evident, no evidence of impunity has been found. However, it is impossible to verify how cases of collusion have been taken up in cases of classified purchases.

COMMENTS -+

1) &quoute;Арбитраж подтвердил законность штрафа, назначенного участнику сговора на торгах Минобороны,&quoute; RegionFAS.ru, January 19, 2014, accessed August 2, 2014, http://www.regionfas.ru/58/47977;

2) Леонид Полозов, &quoute;Министерство обороны атаковали «колбасным сговором», Business FM, May 13, 2012, http://www.bfm.ru/news/180141;

3) Code of Administrative Offences of the RF, Article 14.32. http://www.consultant.ru/popular/koap/13_15.html;

4) Федеральный закон от 26.07.2006 N 135-ФЗ (ред. от 13.07.2015) &quoute;О защите конкуренции&quoute;. http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_61763/;

5) Article 179 of the Criminal Code of the RF. http://www.zakonrf.info/uk/178/;

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

67.
score
2

Are procurement staff, in particular project and contract managers, specifically trained and empowered to ensure that defence contractors meet their obligations on reporting and delivery?

Researcher4281: There is no evidence of specific training for procurement staff, however anti-corruption training for all personnel has been included in all recent Anti-Corruption Plans for the Armed Forces. Whether or not these trainings take place in practice is unclear, as are the quality, content and participants. The procurement staff are empowered to take action in case the contractors do not meet their obligations, according to the Defence Ministry's Regulation #2350. According to provisions 54 and 55 of the Regulation, in case of a violation the procurement unit reports on that to MoD Appeals and Legal Department. The Department then prepares to defend the interests of the MoD if the situation requires.

No evidence of the use of such mechanisms in action has been found. No information on staff rotation within the procurement unit is available either.

As mentioned in the comments for Question 57, defence procurement was highlighted as an area with significant corruption in 2013 and significant initiatives to improve practices have taken place after, which may impact on the training and empowerment of procurement officials as well.

COMMENTS -+

1) MoD website. План противодействия коррупции в Вооруженных Силах Российской Федерации на 2012-2013 годы, утвержденный Приказом Министра обороны Российской Федерации № 1525 от 15 июня 2012 г. http://mil.ru/anti-corruption/docs/[email protected];

2) Приказ Министра обороны Российской Федерации от 2 июня 2014 г. № 385 «Об утверждении Плана противодействия коррупции в Вооруженных Силах Российской Федерации на 2014–2015 годы.» http://mil.ru/anti-corruption/docs/[email protected];

3) Приказ Министра обороны РФ от 08.12.2011 N 2350 &quoute;Об утверждении Положения о порядке организации работы по размещению государственных заказов на поставки товаров, выполнение работ и оказание услуг для нужд ВС РФ, заключению и контролю исполнения государственных контрактов. http://base.consultant.ru/cons/cgi/online.cgi?req=doc;base=EXP;n=523759.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

68.
score
3

Are there mechanisms in place to allow companies to complain about perceived malpractice in procurement, and are companies protected from discrimination when they use these mechanisms?

Researcher4281: The FL 44 on Contracting Systems makes provisions for companies to complain about perceived malpractice in procurement. Articles 105 and 106 outline this procedure. The main agency supervising procurement procedures is the Federal Anti-Trust Service. Disadvantaged bidders may file review applications; a concluded contract may be cancelled or terminated following a review application of an unsuccessful bidder if the procurement procedure that led to its conclusion violated procurement law; and a concluded contract may be cancelled by a court decision if the court rules that the procurement procedure that led to conclusion of the contract violated procurement law. However, there are no formal protection mechanisms in place for complaining companies.

All these provisions are applicable to public defence purchases only. There is considerable amount of evidence in the media of companies lodging complaints to the FAS, including against the MoD. This may indicate that fear of discrimination is limited.

FL 275 on State Defence Order in its recent version (of July 2015) entrusts the Federal Anti-Trust Service with the authority to review the complaints about the violation of any of the law’s provisions. Chapter 5.2. outlines a detailed procedure for considering a report on a presumed violation. The FAS is required to create a special commission to deal with reports on malpractice. Although the appeal mechanism is profoundly described in the chapter, no specific protection mechanisms for complainants are offered.

Response to Peer Reviewer 2:
Score 3 fits better as there are no formal protection mechanisms for companies that lodge complaints. Score maintained.

COMMENTS -+

1) Закон о контрактной системе (закон о госзакупках). Федеральный закон от 5 апреля 2013 г. N 44-ФЗ &quoute;О контрактной системе в сфере закупок товаров, работ, услуг для обеспечения государственных и муниципальных нужд.&quoute; http://base.garant.ru/70353464/;

2) Рамиль Валеев, &quoute;ФАС удовлетворила жалобу фармкомпании на решение Аукционной комиссии Минобороны РФ,&quoute; РИА Ами, August 17, 2012, accessed August 2, 2014, http://ria-ami.ru/read/7997;

3) Федеральное государственное образовательное учреждение дополнительного профессионального образования «Институт повышения квалификации Федерального медико-биологического агентства.» &quoute;ФАС России: Минобороны необоснованно отклонило заявку на участие в аукционе.&quoute; Last modified January 1, 2012. http://xn----8sbufgda3bekug.xn--p1ai/news/20184/;

4) &quoute;Минобороны РФ нарушило закон при размещении заказа на оборудование,&quoute; РИА Новости, June 6, 2012, accessed August 2, 2014, http://ria.ru/justice/20120606/667151717.html;

5) CNews, &quoute;Коррупция при госзакупках ИТ: рецепты противодействия,&quoute; Torg94, January 12, 2011, accessed August 2, 2014, http://torg94.ru/stat.php3?dummy=1&nID=287.

6) Capital Legal Services LLC, &quoute;Public Procurement - Russia&quoute;, in Getting the Deal Through, &quoute;Public Procurement&quoute;, 2014.

7) Chapter 5.2. of FL on State defence Order. http://base.garant.ru/70291366/9/#block_5200

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: I agree with the assessor. There are indications that the Federal Anti-monopoly Service (FAS) has received complaints and have investigated them in the past. Protection from discrimination is however not offered in a viable way- tender requirements are sometimes narrowed down to make only a specific company eligible to bid.

http://sputniknews.com/military/20100819/160257224.html

http://en.fas.gov.ru/news/news_33078.html

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: The last sentence of the assessor's comment points clearly towards score 4 not score 3.

Suggested score: 4

Peer Reviewer-+

69.
score
2

What sanctions are used to punish the corrupt activities of a supplier?

Researcher4281: Corruption-related crimes can be severely punished, including by imprisonment, according to the Criminal Code. Media reports indicate a few cases of corrupt activities by an MoD supplier which were criminally prosecuted, however the results of most of these cases are unclear. More evidence exists of effectively implemented sanctions for other offences by suppliers not directly related to corruption; fines are common in this case. Sanctions such as debarment also exist; this can be applied when the contract is terminated by a court's decision or by the buyer because of serious violations by a supplier. In such cases, a supplier will be included in the special register of wrong-doers, which is available at the official portal for public procurement.

At the same time, there is a famous case of involving the former head of MoD's property department (also Board member of Oboronservis joint-stock company, a former contractor of the MoD) which contradicts the evidence on good enforcement of sanctions. She was found guilty of money laundering and embezzlement, but some time later, released on parole. This decision was met with a lot of criticism, with critics pointing at the discrimination in the application of sanctions.

Also, it should be noted that under FL 275 on State Defence Order, oversight powers are divided between external controlling bodies, instead of remaining within the procurement executive.

COMMENTS -+

1) &quoute;Поставщиков товаров для нужд Минобороны оштрафовали за сговор,&quoute; Клерк, February 19, 2014, accessed August 1, 2014, http://www.klerk.ru/law/news/357351/;

2) Federal Anti-Trust Service. &quoute;Апелляция признала законным решение ФАС России о картельном сговоре поставщиков колбасы для Минобороны.&quoute; Last modified April 12, 2013, http://www.fas.gov.ru/fas-news/fas-news_34157.html;

3) Полина Петрова, &quoute;У поставщика Минобороны задета честь жилета,&quoute; Коммерсантъ, August 16, 2013, accessed August 1, 2014, http://kommersant.ru/doc/2256200;

4) &quoute;Поставщик Минобороны задержан за мошенничество,&quoute; Lenta.ru, April 16, 2012, accessed August 1, 2014, http://lenta.ru/news/2012/04/16/fraud;

5) WebGround. Archive of media reports. http://webground.su/topic/2014/02/10/t12;

6) Official register of improper suppliers. http://zakupki.gov.ru/223/dishonest/public/supplier-search.html;

7) Criminal Code of the RF, Chapter 21. http://base.garant.ru/10108000/22/;

8) Закон о контрактной системе (закон о госзакупках). Федеральный закон от 5 апреля 2013 г. N 44-ФЗ &quoute;О контрактной системе в сфере закупок товаров, работ, услуг для обеспечения государственных и муниципальных нужд, Статья 104. http://www.rg.ru/2013/04/12/goszakupki-dok.html;

9) Анастасия Берман, &quoute;Россияне не отпустили бы Евгению Васильеву&quoute;, Kommersant.ru, August 27, 2015, accessed October 5, 2015, http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2797179/;

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

70.
score
N/A

When negotiating offset contracts, does the government specifically address corruption risk by imposing due diligence requirements on contractors? Does the government follow up on offset contract performance and perform audits to check performance and integrity?

Researcher4281: The question is not applicable to Russia. Russia mainly acts as a supplier, not a buyer, in such agreements, being one of the world’s leading arms exporting countries.

COMMENTS -+

1) Иван Сафронов, &quoute;Наша задача — сохранить за Россией второе место в области поставок вооружений,&quoute; [Интервью Анатолия Исайкина], Коммерсантъ, January 27, 2014, accessed July 31, 2014, http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2393070.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: There is no any published information about offset contracts.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

71.
score
N/A

Does the government make public the details of offset programmes, contracts, and performance?

Researcher4281: The question is not applicable to Russia. Russia mainly acts as a supplier, not a buyer, in such agreements, being one of the world’s leading arms exporting countries.

COMMENTS -+

1) Иван Сафронов, &quoute;Наша задача — сохранить за Россией второе место в области поставок вооружений,&quoute; [Интервью Анатолия Исайкина], Коммерсантъ, January 27, 2014, accessed July 31, 2014, http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2393070.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: There is no any published information about offset contracts.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

72.
score
N/A

Are offset contracts subject to the same level of competition regulation as the main contract?

Researcher4281: The question is not applicable to Russia. Russia mainly acts as a supplier, not a buyer, in such agreements, being one of the world’s leading arms exporting countries.

COMMENTS -+

1) Иван Сафронов, &quoute;Наша задача — сохранить за Россией второе место в области поставок вооружений,&quoute; [Интервью Анатолия Исайкина], Коммерсантъ, January 27, 2014, accessed July 31, 2014, http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2393070.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: There is no any published information about offset contracts.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

73.
score
0

How strongly does the government control the company's use of agents and intermediaries in the procurement cycle?

Researcher4281: There are no legal restrictions on the use of intermediaries. Intermediaries are not mentioned in the legislation on the procurement. There is also no evidence of any actual activity involving intermediaries.

COMMENTS -+

1) Гарант. &quoute;Влечет ли нарушение подрядчиком требования о личном выполнении работ недействительность договора с субподрядчиком?&quoute; http://www.garant.ru/consult/civil_law/468599/;

2) Закон о контрактной системе (закон о госзакупках). Федеральный закон от 5 апреля 2013 г. N 44-ФЗ &quoute;О контрактной системе в сфере закупок товаров, работ, услуг для обеспечения государственных и муниципальных нужд&quoute;. http://base.consultant.ru/cons/cgi/online.cgi?req=doc;base=LAW;n=165972;fld=134;dst=101643;rnd=0.02526913955807686;

3) &quoute;По делу о мошенничествах в Минобороны изъяли более 700 млн руб.,&quoute; РБК, November 20, 2012, accessed July 31, 2014, http://top.rbc.ru/incidents/20/11/2012/826018.shtml.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

74.
score
1

Are the principal aspects of the financing package surrounding major arms deals, (such as payment timelines, interest rates, commercial loans or export credit agreements) made publicly available prior to the signing of contracts?

Researcher4281: Defence purchases made under the FL on the Contracting System that are not qualified as secret are made publicly available on the official portal for public procurement. The main financial details of a contract are available and the public may trace the whole procurement cycle there.

In practice a considerable share of the arms deals are very likely to be categorised as secret and as such, are exempt from having related financial details disclosed. Some major deals which, in the past, have not been published are also revealed in statements by public officials; though in this case not many details are disclosed (for example, the value of the deal may be kept secret).

Response to Peer Reviewer 2:
It does not appear to be standard practice for major arms deals not to be disclosed to the public. As mentioned above, basic information relating to most contracts is public and as such, score 0 cannot be awarded. Score maintained.

COMMENTS -+

1) Federal Agency for Armament Delivery. Register of published purchases. http://rosoboronpostavka.ru/orders/reestr/?now=Y;

2) Иван Сафронов, &quoute;Минобороны и РСК «МиГ» подписали контракт на истребители МиГ-29СМТ,&quoute; Коммерсантъ, April 14, 2014, accessed July 31, 2014, http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2452739;

3) Official portal for public procurement. zakupki.gov.ru;

4) Иван Макаров, &quoute;Что Минобороны закупало и планировало закупить за рубежом,&quoute; Коммерсантъ, November 7, 2012, accessed July 31, 2014, http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2061689.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: The two last sentences in the assessor comment point clearly at score 0 not 1.

Suggested score: 0

Peer Reviewer-+

75.
score
0

Does the government formally require that the main contractor ensures subsidiaries and sub-contractors adopt anti-corruption programmes, and is there evidence that this is enforced?

Researcher4281: No formal anti-corruption requirements for sub-contractors exist. There is no evidence of the government encouraging this informally.

According to the Civic Code (Article 706, item 1) the supplier can hire sub-contractors unless stated differently in the contract. Additionally, the FL On Contracting Systems (Article 34, items 23 - 25) states that if the start (maximum) price of the contract exceeds the one approved by the Government, the supplier is required to provide the information on all subcontractors with which contracts worth more than 10 per cent of the main contract price have been signed. Violation of this requirement is punished financially but does not lead to a breach of the contract. So, in fact, there are no serious limitations on the use of subcontractors; the law covers only some very special cases.

A recent tragedy in Omsk where military barracks collapsed killing 25 people provides evidence of how corrupt a &quoute;chain&quoute; of defence contractors fact can be. Recently, the FL on State Defence Order has been amended to introduce a new control system to track and oversee each weapons order more easily and effectively than before. Each order is assigned a unique number and sub-contractors within the same order will all use the same assigned identification number. This is expected to facilitate distinguishing between a contractor's defence order-related money from the rest. However, commentators question whether state actors entrusted by the amendments with oversight authority will suddenly start to report on the violations when they have not done so before.

COMMENTS -+

1) Закон о контрактной системе (закон о госзакупках). Федеральный закон от 5 апреля 2013 г. N 44-ФЗ &quoute;О контрактной системе в сфере закупок товаров, работ, услуг для обеспечения государственных и муниципальных нужд.&quoute; http://base.consultant.ru/cons/cgi/online.cgi?req=doc;base=LAW;n=165972;fld=134;dst=101643;rnd=0.02526913955807686;

2) Alexander Golts, &quoute;Omsk Tragedy Shows Russia's defence Weakness (Op-Ed)&quoute;, The Moscow Times, July 20, 2015, accessed October 5, 2015, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/omsk-tragedy-shows-russias-defence-weakness-op-ed/525900.html;

3) Федеральный закон от 29.12.2012 N 275-ФЗ (ред. от 28.12.2013) &quoute;О государственном оборонном заказе&quoute;. http://base.consultant.ru/cons/cgi/online.cgi?req=doc;base=LAW;n=182861;fld=134;from=156897-5;rnd=0.6268281482625753.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

76.
score
3

How common is it for defence acquisition decisions to be based on political influence by selling nations?

Researcher4281: Russia is mainly an exporter, not an importer of arms.

In terms of arms imports, the only significant purchase in recent times is Russia’s decision to purchase Mistral ships from France, which had not been previously factored into its procurement planning. Some theories on why Russia decided to buy the ships related to political considerations, whileothers focus on changing threat perceptions and corruption.

Since the Russia's involvement in the Ukrainian conflict and the annexation of Crimea, the planned Mistral deal has been put into question. After a long period of negotiations and uncertainty, the contract was cancelled. The media coverage gives a good indication of the fact that anything but military needs was influencing the decisions of the parties involved. At this moment, France has agreed with Egypt to sell two Mistral ships previously intended for Russia to the country. Egypt, in turn, may decide to sell the ships to Russia, as both countries have engaged into closer cooperation on arms lately, as is suggested by the media. It does appear that decision-making is likely to be guided by political considerations.

The EU imposed embargo on Russia since the country's involvement in the Ukrainian conflict is worth mentioning here as well. Among other, the imposed sanctions ban any involvement in supplying military arms or services to Russia. In this context, it is very likely that any decisions made on arms deals are based on political considerations rather than military need.

Response to Peer Reviewer 1 and Peer Reviewer 2:
Agreed that given Russia is an exported and gives preference to its domestic industry. However, in the one significant case of procurement from the recent past, political considerations do appear to be factored into decision-making. Accordingly, a top score cannot be awarded. Score maintained.

COMMENTS -+

1) Иван Макаров, &quoute;Что Минобороны закупало и планировало закупить за рубежом,&quoute; Коммерсантъ, November 7, 2012, accessed July 31, 2014, http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2061689;

2) Илья Крамник, &quoute;Экспорт российского вооружения: стратегии влияния,&quoute; Военное обозрение, March 8, 2014, accessed August 1, 2014, http://topwar.ru/40965-eksport-rossiyskogo-vooruzheniya-strategii-vliyaniya.html;

3) Анатолий Дмитриевич Цыганок, &quoute;Зачем России «Мистраль»?&quoute;, www.tsiganok.ru, April 24, 2010, accessed October 4, 2015, http://www.tsiganok.ru/quoting/doc/615/

4) RIA.ru. &quoute;Судьба контракта по поставкам &quoute;Мистралей&quoute;. Last modified September 23, 2015. http://ria.ru/trend/Mistral_contract_05062014/

5) RIA.ru, &quoute;Financial Times: не исключено, что &quoute;Мистрали&quoute; в итоге попадут в Россию&quoute;, September 23, 2015, accessed October 5, 2015, http://ria.ru/world/20150923/1277488310.html

6) Kevin Drum, &quoute;France Threatens to Cancel Russian Ship Contract Over Crimea Annexation&quoute;, Mother Jones, March 18, 2014, accessed October 4, 2015, http://www.motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2014/03/france-threatens-cancel-russian-ship-contract-over-crimea-annexation

7) SIPRI. &quoute;EU embargo on Russia&quoute;. Last modified June 22, 2015. http://www.sipri.org/databases/embargoes/eu_arms_embargoes/Russia

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: As the assessor correctly pointed out, Russia is mainly an exporter rather than importer. The only large-scale import deal since the dissolution of the Soviet Union is the infamous deal with France on the acquisition of two Mistral-class amphibious assault ships.

While the purchase was surprising, as it was not envisaged under the national procurement programme through 2015, there is evidence to suggest that it was necessitated by changing threat perception and priorities rather than political pressure by France. This new threat perception involved the growing strategic importance of the Arctic, the disputed islands in the Far East by Japan and Russia's enclave of Kaliningrad. Russia has proved to be rather authoritative in its defence planning and acquisition and has traditionally given priority to its domestic industry. Therefore I would suggest Score 4.

http://english.pravda.ru/russia/economics/28-10-2010/115553-russia_mistral-0/

http://www.defenceindustrydaily.com/russia-to-order-french-mistral-lhds-05749/

Suggested score: 4

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: Despite some examples of defence acquisition decisions made on political base but not as result of foreign political influence (French Mistral ships, Augusta light helicopters, IVECO light armoured vehicles). It should be regarded as means of strengthening of bilateral relations with France and Italy.

Suggested score: 4

Peer Reviewer-+