Ghana

Researcher + TI Reviewer1604: The Military has a Board that assesses any items for disposal, and makes recommendations for this based on its own control systems, which are well-documented. In addition, assets are usually disposed of at auction.

However, the military structures in place are so hierarchical that questions are not asked, even if there are suspicions of malpractice. This means that although the military authority exercises control over asset disposals, there is no adequate public information on these controls and procedures. Also, there is no evidence of independent oversight over such disposals, and there have been no instances of malpractices in the disposal of military assets, at least not in the public domain.

There remains controversy over the sale of assets and how proceeds are managed. There is no evidence to suggest there is adequate transparency and justification for the disposal of assets in Ghana. See for example, this news item in the most authoritative daily new paper in Ghana, in which asset disposals were described as &quoute;wanton' sales' by retired soldiers of Ghana, a claim later rebutted by those in charge (Sources 6 and 8).

This website also carries the original press release by the retired army officers, in which they list multiple concerns over unaccountable and unjustifiable sale of army properties, ranging from land properties to buildings and filling stations. Some legal analysts have also linked these sales to 'dangerously materialistic' appetite of the army (Source 7).

Researcher + TI Reviewer1604: There is no evidence of independent oversight over such asset disposals.

However, the Government set up a Committee in 2013 to manage the disposal of state assets. The Committee, which included a military officer, did not mention military assets.

Researcher + TI Reviewer1604: It is unclear what percentage of defence and security expenditure in the budget year is dedicated to spending on secret items relating to national security and the intelligence services. The National Security Council in Ghana oversees matters of counterintelligence as well as internal and external security, as established in the 1996 &quoute;Ghana Security and Intelligence Agencies Act&quoute;. Ghana's internal intelligence agency, the &quoute;Bureau of National Investigations&quoute;, is part of the National Security Council. Neither of them are referenced in the detailed &quoute;2015 Budget Volume&quoute;, nor any other intelligence&quoute;.

Researcher + TI Reviewer1604: It is believed that secret items are included in the budget of the Presidency and/or National Security, but they are not specifically listed.

The Public Accounts Committee of Parliament also scrutinises the audit reports of all state agencies, but again the reports of the military are not debated in public. In fact, the military, the politicians and former ministers of state are required by law (both the Constitution and the Official Secrets Act) to keep all information on national security confidential, even after they have left office.

Researcher + TI Reviewer1604: The Public Accounts Committee can get information on defence and security budgets and secret items only as far as it is contained in the Audit reports. The Audit Reports are produced by the Audit Service, which is headed by the Auditor General. The Audit Service is the independent audit institution in Ghana. The information in the audit report is not dis-aggregated enough and in any case, it is usually only the irregularities that are reported on. The Auditor-General can demand any information during his audits but he usually does not.

The Auditor General submits all its audit reports on public agencies to Parliament, including the defence audits. The Public Accounts Committee of Parliament scrutinises these reports and makes recommendations to the entire Parliament for approval (PAC).

Researcher + TI Reviewer1604: Although all defence-related expenditures are recorded in the official defence budget, these are not detailed enough for the public to understand and critique them.

There is also no law explicitly permitting off-budget expenditures and the interviewees 1 and 4, who have relevant knowledge and expertise, have indicated strongly that there are no off-budget expenditures.

Interviewees 6 and 8, however did indicate that there is a possibility that off-budget expenditures do occur in emergencies, with the space being available for it. Beyond this, however, no publicly available information was found which suggests there are off-budgets in military expenditure. A score of 2 has been awarded to reflect a lack of clarity.

Researcher + TI Reviewer1604: There is no evidence of off-budget military expenditures, but nor are they explicitly banned in law (see indicator 27 for more details). There is also no publicly available information to suggest that any off-budget military expenditure involves illicit economic activity. In fact, Interviewee 4 stated that all defence-related expenditures are recorded in the official budget.

However, Interviewee 5 hinted that the purchase of weapons and heavy equipments do not usually form part of the regular defence budget that goes to parliament. However, any major purchase or contract that is signed outside of the budget has to be approved by parliament separately.

Given these drawbacks, a score of 2 best fits the situation here.

Researcher + TI Reviewer1604: In law, there are mechanisms for classifying information, especially information that cannot be made public, and these mechanisms are complied with in practice. There are several laws on the classification of information and delineating what information can be made public and what cannot be.

These include the Evidence Act, 1975 (NRCD 323), the Whistleblower Act, 2006 (Act 720), the Armed Forces Act, 1962 (Act 105), the Anti-Terrorism Act, 2008 (Act 762); the Habeas Corpus Act, 1964 (Act 244); the Emergency Powers Act, 1994 (Act 472) and the Public Order Act 1994 (Act 491).

This law is one of the main reasons why it is often difficult to get information from public officials, including military personnel. Parliament has used the laws as grounds for not discussing military budgets on the floor of the House. Until the Right to Information Act is effectively passed, all requests for information from public agencies would be granted based purely on discretion (Interviewees 5 and 6).

Researcher + TI Reviewer1604: In Ghana, national defence and security institutions do not own commercial businesses (for more information, see Indicator 16).

However, in 2013, the government reactivated a commercial shoe factory in Kumasi and handed it over to the military to operate commercially and to supply shoes to the security agencies. The shoe factory is in the interim aimed at supplying boots for the military. This might be extended to other security services and government agencies depending on how successful they get. The new extended Defence Industries Holding Company and the CIMCSED as cited in response to question 16 earlier might is aimed at targeting civilian customers as well.

The military insists that these commercial projects are not funded by the government; and yet, no details of the source of finance have been declared publicly yet.

Researcher + TI Reviewer1604: The military appears to own a number of businesses, however it appears only limited details are available to the public, and it is unclear whether any appropriately independent or reliable scrutiny occurs.

The Ghana Armed Forces (GAF) have their own arms and technology manufacturer, DIHOC - the Defence Industries Holding Company. The DIHOC's mission is to &quoute;collaborate with the civil authority for for [SIC] socio-economic development in Ghana&quoute;, and its objectives range from providing &quoute;most of the logistics needs of the Ghana Armed Forces and other security services in an efficient and cost effective manner&quoute; and producing &quoute;items of strategic importance and value to the Ghana Armed Forces and other security services and Ghanaians in general&quoute; to undertaking &quoute;poverty alleviation programmes in support of the civil authority&quoute;. One strong focus is on footwear, including a joing venture with a Czech company (Knights AS).

In October 2015, the Minister for Defence inaugurated a seven-member board to oversee the operations of the DIHOC and to provide guidance to the management in line with the Companies Act of Ghana. It appears that only one of these seven board members has a private sector background.

The members of the board are Gilbert Kenneth Adjei, Deputy Defence Minister, Chairman, Vice Admiral Mathew Quarshie, Chief of Defence Staff, member, Brigadier General Anthony Komla Adokpa, Director-General, Defence Industry Department, member, Alidu Fuseni, Chief Director, Ministry of Defence, co-opted member, Colonel M’bawine Atintande, Director VAG Affairs, Ministry of Defence, member, Samuel Kwasi Anomah, CEO Osprey Int. Ltd, co-opted member and Colonel Moses Kofi Gyeke Asante, Director of Legal Affairs, Secretary.

The GAF also started operating its own bank in 2013, the &quoute;Universal Bank&quoute; located at Burma Camp. It is supervised by Chief Warrant Officer Owusu Dickson, Forces Sergeant Major of the GAF and serves both military officers and their civilian counterparts.

At the time, criticism that the military might be moving away from its core function of defending the country was rebuked by the then Director of Public Relations, but mainly through denying that this was the case and encouraging citizens to support the military, rather than through explanations as to why the military should operate its own bank.

Interviewee 5 believes that the military has adequate internal mechanisms to ensure that they operate their businesses by high standards. It appears however that no audits or annual reports are publicly available, and it also seems that the decision to introduce the new board to oversee DIHOC in 2015 was partly driven by oversight concerns and challenges identified.

Researcher + TI Reviewer1604: In Ghana, there is no law prohibiting the engagement of the military in private enterprises, as long as it does not conflict with the employee's official duties.

There is also a constitutional provision (Article 284 of the 1992 Constitution) which bars public officers from engaging in activities that will put them in a conflict of interest situation by allowing their personal interest to supersede or interfere with their official duties.

In practice, there is no actual action taken against the officers or employees who engage in private business as it is often difficult to prove that it conflicts with the person's official duties or puts him in a conflict of interest situation. Source 5 above may point to such a situation, however, where there is a conflict of interests in some of the business activities undertaken by the military.

Researcher + TI Reviewer1604: There appears to be little evidence of publicly available high-level comments (e.g. from the Minister or the Chief of Staff) that specifically address corruption. Research did find evidence indicating a strong and clear commitment to discipline, and that this has often been stated at military and defence ministry functions and events.

In concluding his presentation at a &quoute;Meet the Press&quoute; event, the Minister of Defence stated that &quoute;I can say confidently that the vision to produce professionally trained military officers and men who are subject to the Constitution of Ghana and equipped to function effectively to defend the territorial integrity of our dear country is on course&quoute;. Integrity, discipline and incorruptibility are mentioned by Ghana's military members. Utterances of existing and former military officers also depict this (see Source 4 above).

Research indicated that some scandals have nonetheless hit the military on several occasions. Source 5 implicated top military officials of aiding and abetting with shipping agencies to defraud personnel who had travelled for peacekeeping operations, for example.

The military appears to be conscious of its integrity however, and has released rejoinders to the press in seeking to uphold this. An example is a response to the press release by the retired soldiers cited earlier (Source 6).

Response to Peer Reviewer 2: Seeing as corruption scandals have undermined the credibility of public pronouncements against corruption in the defence sector, score lowered from 4 to 2.

Researcher + TI Reviewer1604: Although there are disciplinary sanctions in place for personnel found to have engaged in bribery and corruption, there is no public evidence that these measures are being carried out. There is no evidence that these measures are effective or consistent.

Research indicates the general assurance of ensuring that the vision of producing &quoute;a professional military that is subject to the Constitution of Ghana and well trained and equipped to function rightly to defend the territorial integrity of our dear country&quoute; is regularly emphasized. There is no specific emphasis on bribery and corruption however.

There is evidence of rare cases where prosecutions do occur, as in Source 4, for instance. Although this is an old example, it does demonstrate that some punitive measures have been taken against security personnel who flout the law. Interviewee 5 agreed that the courts of the Ghanaian armed forces are well equipped to deal with soldiers who break the law. Most indiscipline acts by security personnel appear to be handled internally however, with rare instances of public disclosure of the outcomes of proceedings.

Score changed from 4 to 2 in light of the CA's comments.

Researcher + TI Reviewer1604: There is national whistleblowing legislation, the Whistleblowers' Act, 2006 (Act 720). The available evidence suggests that whistleblowing rarely takes place in practice however, and that this is likely to often be due either to a fear of victimisation or a lack of confidence in the authorities to take action. Whistleblowing may be actively encouraged in the military in line with this, however the researcher suggests that the hierarchical nature of the military is such that, in practice, not much use is made of such mechanisms. This similarly appears to be the case across all sectors of society.

The Freedom House report on Ghana states that, &quoute;In addition, a Whistleblowers Protection Act was passed in 2006, but it has some significant operational limitations, particularly the absence of a credible reporting institution to receive complaints&quoute; supports the view that &quoute;Whistleblowing rarely takes place ...&quoute; (Freedom House, 2012).

Researcher + TI Reviewer1604: Although special attention is paid to the appointment, movements and oversight over personnel in sensitive positions, it is not very clear what mechanisms are used for such appointments and oversight as they are not made public. This is especially the case with the top hierarchy of the security agencies. However, the recruitment process is very rigorous, although one cannot rule out political interference.

Researcher + TI Reviewer1604: The Ministry of Defence does not publicly release details of numbers of personnel. The numbers of civilian and military personnel appear to be known to the institution, but the public is unable to access the details. The researcher found it is possible to request figures, but that it was unlikely that a request for this information would receive a positive response. These shortcomings in the official availability of accurate figures do not appear to reflect illicit motives however; rather it may reflect a desire to keep security information from the public for security reasons.

Some independent websites provide aggregate numbers with Ghana showing a total of 15,500 personnel as of 2011.

It is worth noting that Interviewees 5 and 6 assumed this information was public knowledge and available on the Ministry website (although research revealed this was not the case).

Response to peer reviewer 2: Given that employment figures are not publicly released, score changed from 2 to 0.

Researcher + TI Reviewer1604: Salaries in general, not just for the military, are not published, with the one exception to this being the minimum wage. In the case of the military, salary increases for military and civilian personnel are usually announced at meetings with the relevant personnel and picked up by the media, although no specifics are announced. In addition, none of the published documents on defence budget and expenditure mentions salaries for personnel.

Researcher + TI Reviewer1604: In general, salaries of the military and other employees are paid on time by the Controller and Accountant General's Department. Research found that on occasions there have been isolated delays due to problems with communication. There is no evidence of abnormal shortcomings and/or delays or discretionary adjustments to basic pay however. In cases where salary increases have been approved with retrospective effect, the arrears appear to have been paid either promptly or according to scheduled payment plans.

Researcher + TI Reviewer1604: Research found there appears to be an established system for the selection and/or promotion of military personnel based on objective job descriptions and assessment processes, although the available evidence suggests that the most senior appointments are based on the discretion of the political authorities.

Other than for these top positions, research indicates that all appointments are made based on an established system and it is applied when vacancies occur or personnel are due for promotion. This view was also supported by Interviewees 5 and 6. There is no significant evidence of appointments not made on merit and the systems in place specify the criteria for such appointments / promotions, which include performance, length of service and length of service on a rank, etc.

The Army normally sets up a Board to carry out the assessments of qualified personnel for promotion. The Boards comprise the heads of the various units in order to make the process transparent and open. There are indications of corruption but promotions/appointments to the topmost positions are usually done outside the chains of command.

RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 2: I disagree with Peer Reviewer 2. I have already demonstrated that some politics may be at play at top management appointments, and there may be some protocol manoeuvres to get people into the recruitment process. But generally, I assess that structures within the military adhere to institutions for promotion and appointments.

Researcher + TI Reviewer1604: There is evidence that formal processes exist to govern assessments for promotions in the military. The researcher nonetheless felt factors other than merit, including political interference and tribalism, cannot be ruled out as being used to chose candidates for promotion. The top-level positions are normally promoted by the President, who is also the Commander in Chief of the Ghana Armed Forces, on the recommendations of the Armed Forces Council. Even though these promotions are normally announced by the media, the grounds for such promotions are never made known.

The Army normally sets up a Board to carry out the assessments of qualified personnel for promotion. The Boards comprise the heads of the various units in order to make the process transparent and open. There are indications of corruption but promotions/appointments to the topmost positions are usually done outside the chains of command.

Researcher + TI Reviewer1604: There is no compulsory conscription into the Armed Forces in Ghana.

Researcher + TI Reviewer1604: There is no conscription in Ghana.

Researcher + TI Reviewer1604: The assessor was unable to get specific and current information to verify whether or to what extent this issue occurs in the Armed Forces. It is not clear how accountability is enforced in payment systems, and although no evidence was found of ghost soldiers, ghost employees on public payrolls are a common broader problem in Ghana. The government appears to have taken various steps to curb the problem but evidence suggests this not been very successful. The government has indicated that it has taken steps to remove ghost names but it does not appear to have imposed sanctions on or even revealed the names of those involved. A recent example of public debate about ghost employees can be seen in Source 4 above.

The Special Military Tribunal Law, though old, is still in force and states, among others, that, any person who uses a member of the Armed Forces of Ghana for any unauthorised purpose or act shall be subject to various sanctions, including removal from the Armed Forces and even prosecutions.

In addition, Interviewee 6 gave an interesting perspective, stating that since some security operatives work under cover, it is difficult to talk about ghost names on the defence ministry payroll. There may be some whose names are legitimately on the payroll, but which are nevertheless difficult to identify due to security reasons.

Researcher + TI Reviewer1604: Interviewee 9 indicated that chains of command have been strictly separated from chains of payment through financial administration processes within defence, however research indicates this is not a published policy. There is no evidence of exception in particular areas.

The 1992 Constitution of Ghana empowers the Chief of Defence Staff to make regulations in respect to the control and administration of the services of the Armed Forces and the conditions of service. These include those relating to the enrolment, salaries, pensions, gratuities and other allowances of officers and men of each service and deductions from them. The Regulations on Administration and Discipline further elaborate on the laws.

Researcher + TI Reviewer1604: There appears to be a Code of Conduct but its content, transparency, application and distribution is unclear or unknown. The GAF website has a page entitled 'Code of Conduct', but the content appears to be unavailable as at December 2015.

There is likely to be internal oversight within the military to offer scrutiny and oversight for its application. The Act that established the Armed Forces in Ghana and the accompanying Regulations spell out the rules and regulations that guide the conduct of the security forces. These laws do not use the terms bribery, gifts and hospitality as well as conflict of interest, although indiscipline more broadly encompasses all these acts. If one is not allowed to accept a bribe or give a bribe and the fellow gives or receives a bribe, it is tantamount to indiscipline and subjects the person to disciplinary procedures. Interviewee 5 stated that they believed that the Armed Forces Act, the Regulations and Code of Conduct provide adequate guidelines to instil discipline in all soldiers.

It must be noted that the Constitution and the Public Officers (Disqualification and Assets Declaration) Act, 1998 (Act 550), which requires certain categories of public officers to declare their assets and liabilities, does not include members of the Armed Officers.

Researcher + TI Reviewer1604: There is no evidence that the Code of Conduct is not effectively enforced but prosecutions at the sector level are not published, especially when the case may involve senior personnel. The above articles demonstrate the military's efforts at curbing corruption in the recruitment process.

Researcher + TI Reviewer1604: Anti-corruption training appears to be embedded in all aspects of military and civil service training but not handled as a subject on its own. An examination of the history of training in the Armed Forces similarly does not reveal any overall emphasis on integrity building or anti-corruption.

Most corruption acts are treated as indiscipline and so the training covers what constitutes indiscipline and the disciplinary procedures that would be followed if personnel engage in such acts; Interviewee 8 also concluded that 'Some form of anti-corruption training takes place, but this not done regularly.'However, there is no public information to support this. Interviewee 5 said that no such specific anti-corruption training takes place to the best of his knowledge.

Researcher + TI Reviewer1604: There is evidence that prosecutions of military personnel have taken place, even in the ordinary courts.

Defence services personnel are only prosecuted when they engage in criminal activity but most corrupt acts are considered indiscipline and dealt with internally. This tends to give the impression that prosecutions are suppressed.

Most prosecutions allowed in martial courts are those that border on indiscipline, whilst criminal cases are prosecuted in civil courts. When an offense is judged to be of merely a matter of indiscipline and are prosecuted in martial courts, these outcomes do not usually come into the public domain.

Researcher + TI Reviewer1604: Facilitation payments are not defined in law in Ghana and it is likely they would be prosecuted under broader laws. Section 240 of the Criminal Offences Act stipulates that a public officer is guilty of corruption who &quoute;directly or indirectly agrees or offers to permit his conduct ... to be influenced by the gift, promise, or prospect of any valuable consideration to be received by him, or by any other person, from any person whomsoever.&quoute; Section 241 applies the same finding to any individual who &quoute;endeavours directly or indirectly to influence the conduct of such public officer ... in respect of the duties of his office or in respect of his vote, by the gift, promise, or prospect of any valuable consideration to be received by such public officer&quoute;

Evidence from the wider public sector suggests that the occurrence of facilitation payments is likely to be common. The Minister of Trade and Industry, for instance, has faced controversy in recent weeks for asking Destination Inspection Companies (DICs) operating in Ghana to pay 35 million Ghana Cedis upfront as assurance that their contract would be renewed by government when it expires in some few months. This has also been described by some political commentators as 'a very veiled form of bribery' (Sources 3 and 4).

No information was found on what procedure takes place when officers are alleged to have solicited or received facilitation payments.

Researcher + TI Reviewer1604: There is no explicit doctrine that examines corruption as a strategic issue for operations. Interviewees with experience of the defence sector (Interviewees 5 and 8) also stated they were unaware of any relevant military doctrine.

Research found that corruption is not treated as a specific issue in the Armed Forces Act and Regulations, or in pronouncements by senior military and other public officials, but as part of dealing with indiscipline and other types of misbehaviours as the Criminal Code does. This issue has often instead been framed in emphasizing the need to build a professional military. The score has been selected on the basis that corruption is recognized as an aspect of governance.

Researcher + TI Reviewer1604: Corruption in general is embedded in the syllabus of all training in the military as part of all other types of malfeasance and indiscipline. According to my source, even though commanders are not trained on corruption issues, they do not turn a blind eye when corruption occurs in their mission areas. However, the above cited article seems to indicate that the military authorities sometimes do not act as expected of them.

&quoute;Malfeasance and indiscipline&quoute;, as quoted, are not broken down to show the type of corruption they refer to. One would assume that they would cover misuse and diversion of supplies for personal use, with indiscipline perhaps referring to a refusal to take orders, or so on. There is no evidence that officers do turn a blind eye to corrupt activities, nevertheless.

Researcher + TI Reviewer1604: There is no evidence of trained professionals monitoring corruption within the military in Ghana, and no corruption monitors are deployed. It is the supervising officers of each team that are responsible for ensuring discipline in deployment.

Otherwise, there is no public information on the monitoring of corruption in the military.

Researcher + TI Reviewer1604: Generally, officers engaged in procurement and/or contracting are trained to carry out their work but there is no special training in contracting in preparation for peace-keeping. However, the Armed Forces are very strict in dealing with malpractices and related acts that can be described as corrupt, whereby officers can be returned to home for investigations and disciplinary action.

There are general guidelines on conduct during deployed operations but they do not specifically refer to corruption. All officers go through general training in preparation for deployed operations. In fact, the Kofi Annan Peace Keeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) has been established to train officers in preparation for peace keeping operations. The course content of some trainings at the KAIPTC includes modules on contracting but it is unclear to what extent such training is ruled out.

Researcher + TI Reviewer1604: Research found that the Ghana Armed Forces does not use private military contractors. There is evidence that foreign governments such as the U.S. have used private contractors to help provide logistics and training to the military in Ghana however (see Source 2).

There are private security providers in Ghana but these do not provide operational staff to military environments, instead mainly offering protection against robbers for offices and private houses.

Researcher + TI Reviewer1604: There is some general procurement legislation, including the Public Procurement Act, 2003 (Act 663), as well as financial administration legislation such as the Financial Administration Act, 2003 (Act 654). Both of these apply to all public institutions, including the Ministry of Defence and the military.

Section 40(f) of the Public Procurement Act, 2003 (Act 663) provides for sole sourcing where concerns of national security determine that single-source procurement is the most appropriate method of procurement. The laws exempt imports of explosives and pyrotechnic products, arms, ammunition, weapons, implements of war imported by the Ghana Armed Forces and the Ghana Police Service, which means they will not be subject to tax and other import levies.

Evidence indicates that items exempt from procurement laws are not independently scrutinised. Said items are usually exempted only if they are of national importance, sensitive in nature and usually for security reasons.

Researcher + TI Reviewer1604: The procurement of goods and services go through an approval process from the military hierarchy (the Chief of Defence Staff) to ensure value for money. There is a Defence Tender Committee which examines the process and recommends for approval. Research found that the full procurement process itself is not disclosed to the public, particularly in cases with items classified for national security reasons.

While the full procurement cycle is not disclosed, there are clear guidelines that are followed. Interviewee 5 described the process as follows: 'The user branch writes a proposal, identifying a set of equipments to meet operational commitments. They specify particular attributes of particular equipments... through clear specific operational guidelines. It goes to the procurement committee..... they in turn puts up tender specifying the equipments for contractors to submit their interest...... Samples of the particular equipment, except for aircraft and ships, are brought for in-country trial.... Trial reports are written and submitted to the procurement department; evaluation is done which leads to a choice among the lot that were put on trial and which met the requirements of the user branch. The government goes through the process of acquisition [and] goes back to the unit in need to test and see whether the right equipment has been bought. An acceptance board is set up; and the equipment is inducted into service if approved.'

In terms of asset disposal, weapon disposals are done under strict control. They would usually be destroyed unless by country agreement to give it to another country. However, prudency tells that defence acquisition and disposal should go to parliament for approval. Purchases of troop carriers, trucks and the like only require budgetary allocation and approval.'

There is no indication that these processes are published for the attention of the general public however.

Researcher + TI Reviewer1604: Section 91 of the Public Procurement Act provides for independent audits of procurement. The Public Procurement Authority does not have oversight over defence procurement, except to grant approval for sole sourcing. This is not transparent, meaning that one can not be sure that the process is independent of government. Research also indicates that Parliament has to debate and approve purchases being made from loans but that debates are often done behind closed doors.

The Defence Tender Committee does have oversight over defence procurement. When goods and services are supplied, the military authorities have to issue acceptance letters to the contractors/suppliers in order for payment to be finalised. Reports show there have been some instances where items have been rejected because they were sub-standard. The DTC is not independent of the military structure however, or hence of the executive. Interviewee 5 indicated confidence that the structures in the military provide adequate oversight, and there is some evidence of GAF commitments to transparency expressed in the media (Source 5).

Response to Peer Reviewer 2: Agree with comments that oversight mechanisms for defence procurement are not fully transparent. Score changed from 3 to 2 as the oversight process itself is not transparent, and there is insufficient evidence to verify if oversight is consistent and effective.

Researcher + TI Reviewer1604: There is a general requirement to publish actual and potential procurement and normal procurement advertisements/notices are placed on the website of the Public Procurement Authority. Procurement of items that have security implications are not published. In addition, in situations where purchases are being made from loans, Parliament has to debate and approve such purchases. However, the debates are often done behind closed doors.

The PPA website is where procurement plans and contracts that have been awarded (including restricted awards) are published. Many state agencies, including the military, do not publish their contracts. Officially, no reason is given for this secrecy, although there is the general perception that it is for security reasons.

Researcher + TI Reviewer1604: The defence sector does not discriminate against companies based on issues of integrity, although there are strict rules for contractors and suppliers to comply with delivery conditions and contract terms. All contractors must also be certified by the appropriate national agencies before they can tender for contracts.

The military can sometimes ask for permission from the Public Procurement Authority to engage in single sourcing because of the fact that an area is within a security zone, which could raise concern. In case of equipment, additional requirements may be asked for and past track record may be a factor.

Public Procurement Act 663 of 2003 explicitly states in Article 22 (e)(i) that a tender in public procurement shall 'have directors or officers who have not in any country been convicted of any criminal offence relating to their professional conduct or to making false statements or misrepresentations as to their qualifications to enter into a procurement contract, within a period of ten years preceding the commencement of the procurement proceedings', meaning that there is legislation in place to safeguard this.

There are many other articles and clauses that suggest that compliance to national laws and certain legal provisions are met before one can submit a tender. Source 4 also alludes to this claim for the Ghana Armed Forces as well.

Researcher + TI Reviewer1604: The Ministry of Defence has a Medium Term Expenditure Framework from which the procurement needs are derived, although there does not appear to be a Defence Policy/Strategy that is in the public domain.

Although all government agencies are required to develop annual procurement plans which are usually published at the website of the Public Procurement Authority, the military has not provided any such information on this website.

Researcher + TI Reviewer1604: Procurement is based on requests from the various units of the defence sector. These requests usually have specified quantities and justification for such requests. The requests would be approved by the Chief of Defence Staff before the procurement process starts. These needs are also included in the MTEF.

Interviewee 5 described the process as follows: 'The user branch writes a proposal, identifying a set of equipments to meet operational commitments. They specify particular attributes of particular equipments... through clear specific operational guidelines. It goes to the procurement committee..... they in turn puts up tender specifying the equipments for contractors to submit their interest...... Samples of the particular equipment, except for aircraft and ships, are brought for in-country trial.... Trial reports are written and submitted to the procurement department; evaluation is done which leads to a choice among the lot that were put on trial and which met the requirements of the user branch. The government goes through the process of acquisition [and] goes back to the unit in need to test and see whether the right equipment has been bought. An acceptance board is set up; and the equipment is inducted into service if approved.'

Interviewee 5 also mentioned that 'logistic equipments like transport, decommissioned aircrafts, unserviceable ships, etc which are unuseable can be disposed off without parliamentary approval.

Researcher + TI Reviewer1604: Ghana's Public Procurement Act, 2003 (Act 663) and its accompanying Regulations provide for single or sole-sourcing in special cases, with permission from the Public Procurement Authority. However, there is a significant amount of sole sourcing and restricted tender by many government agencies, including the military, for various justifiable reasons. In particular, the procurement of military hardware is usually very restrictive, especially when it is funded by a donor, whereby the equipment has to be acquired from the donor country.

The Public Procurement Authority grants the permission for sole sourcing after it has been justified. When the government secures funding from a donor to acquire military hardware, the donor also has its conditionalities, which usually included acquiring the equipment from the home country. In most cases, the specifications are already spelt out in the Agreement and the total cost determined.

An example of sole-sourcing is the contract agreement signed between the Government of Ghana and Embraer Defence and Security company of Brazil, in which five jets are to be purchased for the Ghana Armed Forces (Source 4). This information is available on the official website of the Ghana Armed Forces, though no further procurement details were given. No public tender was issued for purchase, either.

Researcher + TI Reviewer1604: Like all public officers, members of tender boards also swear the Oath of Secrecy and are required to declare their assets under the Public Officers (Disqualification and Assets Declaration) Act, 1998 (Act 550).

There are general rules discouraging or forbidding conflict of interest situations by public officers, such as Article 284 of the Constitution and Section 86 of the Public Procurement Act, 2003 (Act 663) which deal with Code of Conduct. Section 93 of the Act deals with corruption in procurement. Section 91 of the PPA also provides for independent audits of procurement. Like all public officers, members of tender boards also swear the Oath of Secrecy and are required to declare their assets under the Public Officers (Disqualification and Assets Declaration) Act, 1998 (Act 550).

The Constitution and the Audit Service Act clearly state the independence of the Auditor-General and the Audit Service, already cited above. The Auditor General audits all Public Accounts of Ghana, including the military. However, this may not include all MoD tender board decisions although the Public Procurement Authority also has an oversight role of all public procurement in the country. All procurement is to be conducted through competitive bidding to ensure fairness.

The Audit Service is the custodian of Asset Declarations but the Commission for Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ), which has an anti-corruption mandate, is responsible for enforcing the law on Asset Declaration and can impose sanctions on defaulters. The Public Service Commission is responsible for enforcing the Oath of Secrecy.

Ghana has an independent audit institution that audits and reports on all public financial transactions, including those of the defence sector.

Researcher + TI Reviewer1604: The Ghana Public Procurement Act from 2003 outlaws collusion in specific respect to price inflation (Art. 92). Other forms of collusion that might damage the competitive process are not covered. There does not appear to be legislation specific to defence; the Ministry of defence is expected to adhere to general procurement procedures under public procurement law.

It is unclear whether the government or the defence institutions have taken active measures to address collusion in defence procurement. There is also a defence Tender Committee at the Public Procurement authority, although no public information could be found to assess what role they may play in targeting collusion or their effectiveness in doing so.

An official statement by the Ghana Armed Forces in 2012 states that “to qualify as a contractor, a prospective supplier is expected to register with the appropriate department. The applicant is vetted and the necessary inspections are conducted to ensure that the applicant has the capacity to deliver before they are listed as certified contractors with the Ghana Armed Forces.

“Bids for supplies are followed by quotation analyses and approval by the Defence Tender Committee and of contract. Supplies must follow the accepted procedures to include recommendation by duly-constituted Acceptance Boards, before supplies are delivered. It is, therefore, not possible that a person not registered as a supplier with the Ghana Armed Forces will be given contract.&quoute;

Researcher + TI Reviewer1604: The respondents confirmed that procurement staff in the military are well trained. The Public Procurement Authority offers training for procurement staff and tender committee members, and the military takes advantage of these offers. However, these staff can also be moved to other units for other duties, which requires new training any time such transfers are made.

The military is well staffed and equipped to carry out its tasks and the undergo regular training, some of which is mandatory. Ghana has a Military Academy and Training Schools devoted to training its employees.

There is no publicly available evidence of undue influence from higher grades although there is a general perception that it happens.

Researcher + TI Reviewer1604: Companies are not adequately protected against discrimination although the law provides for such protection. Any discrimination would usually be subtle, making it difficult to detect, protest and seek redress.

Section 79 of the Public Procurement Act, 2003 (Act 663) provides for a review process. There is also an Appeals and Complaints Panel at the PPA, chaired by a retired Appeals Court Judge, to deal with such appeals. However, because various suppliers and contractors would want to continue to obtain contracts, they are usually reluctant to complain.

Interviewee 5 however stated that it was difficult to establish the basis for complaints at times, and that processes for redress were available through the ministry, government or procurement machinery. He/She was of the view that companies would not be victimised for complaining.

No further public sources were found regarding this issue.

Researcher + TI Reviewer1604: The PPA has no power to prosecute and can only refer cases to the Attorney-General for possible consideration, or to the Economic and Organized Crimes Office (EOCO) for investigation if it is considered a criminal act. However, Entity Tender Committees may reverse contracts or compensate complainants if they are found to have a case and to have suffered any damages. There are also instances where the military has rejected supplies because they have not met the required standards.

However, although the Public Procurement Act, 2003 (Act 663) has provisions for sanctions such as debarment, they are generally never applied in practice.

Researcher + TI Reviewer1604: Ghana does not have any published offset contract policy, and there is no information on any such agreements. Thorough research did not uncover anything to indicate offset contracts have occurred or are being negotiated in the defence sector in Ghana. The two interviewees were also unaware of any offset contracts.

Researcher + TI Reviewer1604: Ghana does not have an offset policy and as such this is not applicable to Ghana.

As most military acquisitions are made from loans, the loan agreements are usually debated by Parliament, making the public aware of the intended purchases although the details are not made public.

Researcher + TI Reviewer1604: Ghana does not have an offset policy and as such this question is not applicable. Most acquisitions of military hardware are made with loans and grants, and even occasionally direct donations, without any choice of where and from whom to purchase the hardware.

Researcher + TI Reviewer1604: The government does not have any published policy of restrictions on agents and intermediaries of companies that the military engages with in procurement. The available evidence suggests that intermediaries have sometimes been used, especially in arranging for loans for such purchases.

Ghana's military hardware has in many cases been acquired through loans, grants and/or donations however, which in practice means the country has no choice as to the country or even company from which the military can acquire the equipment.

Researcher + TI Reviewer1604: Major arms deals, especially those involving foreign funding arrangements are normally debated in Parliament as the law requires that Parliament approves all loans granted to the government of Ghana. This is an opportunity for Ghanaians to know about these deals and intended purchases. However, the debates are not open to the public and the public does not get any detailed information about them, according to the Interviewees.

Researcher + TI Reviewer1604: The government does not formally require the main contractor to ensure that its subsidiaries and sub-contractors to adopt anti-corruption.

There are normally such requirements of the main contractors, but the main focus is on quality delivery of goods and services to be supplied. There is no evidence that such requirements are strictly complied with or that action is taken against any defaulters or of encouragement of main contractors to ensure subsidiaries / subcontractors adopt anti-corruption programmes.

Researcher + TI Reviewer1604: According to SIPRI, Ghana's biggest arms suppliers over the past decade have been China and Russia. There is precedent for military and security cooperation between China and Ghana and as such political influence cannot be entirely ruled out in arms purchases.

One cannot rule out political influence in defence acquisition decisions by seller nations, especially where the seller nation is also offering financial assistance for the purchase. In fact, in such cases, it is usually single source arrangements as the country virtually has no choice and the sale will most likely be part of other arrangements. Other seller nations also make direct donations, not giving the country any choice of type of equipment.

In most cases, government justifies military need when any arrangement is being debated in Parliament. In that case, the government needs to convince the legislators on the need to approve the purchase. Sometimes, the need is pressing such as equipping the military for peace keeping operations.