- A
- B
- C
- D
- E
- F
Bangladesh’s GI ranking in Band D places it in the high risk category for corruption in the defence and security sector. The country’s highest scores, and lowest risk area, is Personnel (Band C). Bangladesh’s highest corruption risk areas are Finance, Procurement, and Political (Band E ). The Government completed a review of the GI 2015 research, which shows a willingness to open dialogue with an international NGO on defence corruption issues. To reduce corruption risk, TI suggests the following reforms of the security sector to minimize corruption risk.
Enhance Independent Oversight through Parliament, Audit, and Risk Assessments
There is some good evidence of the Government of Bangladesh’s commitment to an anti-corruption agenda: the national anti-corruption strategy applies to the defence sector, and the MOD has drafted an implementation plan. The Anti-Corruption Commission is somewhat active in nationwide investigations. The Government could further build on this anti-corruption strategy to address issues of parliamentary and independent external audit oversight of the defence sector and aim to make the sector more transparent overall to ensure civilian oversight.
While there are legislative provisions for parliamentary approval of defence budgets and oversight of policies and activities, these need to be stronger in practice to be more effective. A specific parliamentary standing committee overseeing defence issues has been formed but there is little evidence of Parliament’s impact on budgets, procurement decisions, or overall defence policy. We recommend that Parliament uses its prerogatives to the full, to further develop a comprehensive and robust process for defence oversight.
While a national anti-corruption plan is in place and an implementation plan for the MOD has been drafted, there is no evidence of an institutionalised and regular risk assessment process and there is little information on the effectiveness of the MOD’s internal audit unit. Instituting a systematic and comprehensive risk assessments would allow for a more tailored, effective approach to preventing corruption risks in the defence sector. Publishing internal and external audit findings would also contribute to improving the transparency and effectiveness of internal audit systems.
Make procurement procedures more efficient and effective
While some laws and procedures applicable to defence procurement exist, it is unclear to what extent they are applied in practice. Availability of procurement-related information is still quite low and it is generally not clear whether classifying procurement as confidential is always justified by reasons of national security. This lack of transparency extends to information on offset contracts: it is not clear whether offsets do occur as part of defence contracts and whether they are regulated at all. Given the likelihood of significant procurement expenditures in the near future, the MOD should consider making more information publicly available to parliament and the media and ensuring a robust audit process for procurement decisions to ensure that which will help ensure that the budget is spent on arms and equipment that actually meet Bangladesh’s strategic needs.
Train and prepare troops for peacekeeping deployments
With over 8,000 troops deployed in UN peacekeeping missions in 2015, Bangladesh remains the most significant contributor to the UN’s peacekeeping activities. It would be beneficial to both the Bangladeshi armed forces and to UN operations if the military were to adopt a comprehensive and detailed military doctrine addressing corruption issues for peace and conflict that is publicly available; provide comprehensive guidelines and staff training on addressing corruption risks, including in contracting, whilst on deployed operations or peacekeeping missions; deploy trained professionals capable of monitoring corruption in the field who regularly report while on mission, these reports could be made available to the public, at least in summary form.
Is there formal provision for effective and independent legislative scrutiny of defence policy?
1.tInterview with a former senior Army official, interviewed in April 2014.
2.tBangladesh Parliament, Rules of Procedure (2009), http://www.parliament.gov.bd/images/pdf/Rules_of_Procedure_Bangla.pdf
3.tOffice order regarding formation of the Defence Parliamentary Standing Committee, dated 3rd April 2014.
4.tNational Security of Bangladesh: Strategy and Cost Effectiveness in Background Papers of Sixth Five Year Plan of Bangladesh 2011-2015, published by Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies and General Economics Division of the Ministry of Planning, 2011
Opinion: Agree
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Opinion: Agree
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Opinion: Agree
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Opinion: Disagree
Comment: There is a written defence policy from 1974. A new draft defence policy has been formulated and parliamentary standing committee of 9th Parliament has scrutinized it and it is in the final stage awaiting approval.
Suggested score: 3
Does the country have an identifiable and effective parliamentary defence and security committee (or similar such organisation) to exercise oversight?
Under Section 246 and 247 of the Rules of Procedure of the Bangladesh Parliament, the Government is required to form several Parliamentary Standing Committees including the Parliamentary Standing Committee for the Ministry of Defence (PSCfMoD). The 10th Parliament which began its first session on 29 January, has formed a 10-member Parliamentary Standing Committee for the Ministry of Defence on 1st April 2014. The chair of the Committee is a Member of Parliament (MP), who is also a retired military General. The Prime Minister, who also holds the defence portfolio, is a member of this Committee as well. The Committee is yet to start its functioning.
An analysis on the proceedings of the 26 meetings of the previous 9th Parliament reveals that the Committee spent times discussing many issues, including the draft defence policy, but not the defence budget. The Prime Minister who held the portfolio of the Defence Ministry did not attend a single meeting of the last committee, but sent a variety of representatives. Among others, the chiefs of the three forces (army, navy and air) intermittently attended the meetings.
The Public Accounts Committee of the Bangladesh Parliament has the authority to scrutinise audit reports of the defence sector. However, the content of the discussion is not shared with the public and such meetings are not regular. For example, the defence audit report of 2003-2004 was discussed in the 28th meeting of the Public Accounts Committee on 21 June 2010. Similarly, an audit report on the accounts of Bangladesh Army, Air Force, Navy and Inter Services Organizations for the year 2006-2007 and 2003-2004 were discussed in the 96th meeting of the Public Accounts Committee on 30 May 2012.
Response to government reviewer: While a defence committee does exist and has convened meetings to discuss a draft defence policy, it has yet to discuss the defence budget and other key security issues. Score 1 maintained.
1.tBangladesh Parliament, 1st, 2nd and 3rd Reports of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on the Ministry of Defence. Publicly unavailable; accessed through a confidential source.
2. Dhaka Tribune, '26 parliamentary standing committees formed', 1 April, 2014, http://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/2014/apr/01/26-parliamentary-standing-committees-formed
3.tInterview with a serving Army official, interviewed in April 2014.
4. Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General, Public Accounts Committee meetings, http://www.cagbd.org/in.php?cp=pacmeet
Opinion: Agree
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Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: No doubt that there are instutional mechanisms to play oversight role over the defence forces. But the question of effectiveness of these institutions is not beyond debate. Despite we know that months ago, when Parliament Standing Committee called the armed forces chiefs in the backdrop of some volatile times when the opposition leader’s remark on the army, including that the armed forces would not play the role of “silent spectators when people are being killed” and that “it would play its role in due time” and the three armed forces chiefs met the committee and reiterated their oath-bound stand and allegience to the constitution and the elected government.
1. Tazakhobor, defence Chiefs Met Parliament Standing Committee, 15 April 2013. Retrieved from http://tazakhobor.com/politics/3788-defence-chiefs-met-parliament-standing-committee
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Opinion: Agree
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Opinion: Disagree
Comment: On 01 April 2014 Parliamentary Standing Committee for Ministry of Defence was formed. Till July 2014 it held three meetings. Second meeting was dedicated only to budgetary matters. All parliamentary standing committee meetings on defence are generally attended by the service chiefs.
Suggested score: 4
Is the country's national defence policy debated and publicly available?
A draft defence policy was drafted on 26 June 2011 by a committee headed by the Commandant of the National Defence College, with members from the Armed Forces Division, Navy and Airforce, including representatives from the Ministries of Defence, Finance, Foreign, Home, Information and Law.
The draft defence policy was discussed in the Parliamentary Standing Committees for Defence Ministry during the 9th Parliament (2009-2013). Despite several rounds of discussions, no consensus emerged from deliberations. The draft policy was never debated during the Parliament sessions of the 9th Parliament. It is not publicly available and the Committee members agreed not to disclose this to public.
Response to government reviewer: While the government drafted a defence policy in 1974, it has yet to be adopted and finalised. Score maintained.
1.tBangladesh Parliament, 3rd Report of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on the Ministry of Defence. Publicly unavailable; accessed through a confidential source.
2.tInterview with a former senior Army official, interviewed in April 2014.
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: There is no structured defence policy or strategy. Some issues of defence policy and military affairs are discussed (and even criticsed) in the media but there is no &quoute;debate&quoute; as such. There is no involvement of high-level political and military representatives in these discussions.
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Opinion: Agree
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Opinion: Agree
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Opinion: Disagree
Comment: There has been a written defence policy since 1974. The draft defence policy formulated by a committee has already been debated by the parliamentary standing committee on defence and based on their observation it has been finalized and is awaiting government approval. Like many countries of the world it is debated by appropriate authority at appropriate level.
Suggested score: 1
Do defence and security institutions have a policy, or evidence, of openness towards civil society organisations (CSOs) when dealing with issues of corruption? If no, is there precedent for CSO involvement in general government anti-corruption initiatives?
Two leading military training institutes, the Staff College and National defence College, occasionally invite CSO experts (who are very few in numbers) to deliver lectures on broader governance and anti-corruption issues. Transparency International Bangladesh (TI-B) is intermittently invited to deliver lectures on anti-corruption strategy in defence institutes. TIB is, from time to time, also involved in general anti-corruption initiatives of the government (3).
Response to TI Reviewer: Comments considered. Score 1 selected as it seems to reflect the level of engagement based on contact, but not deeper policy consultations.
1.tDefence Services Command and Staff College website, www.dscsc.mil.bd
2.tNational Defence College of Bangladesh website, http://www.ndc.gov.bd
3. Source at Transparency International Bangladesh
4. Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS), 'National Security and Civil-Military Relations in Bangladesh', November 16-19, 2009. http://www.biiss.org/seminar_2009/papers/cmrs.pdf, accessed September 2015.
Opinion: Agree
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Opinion: Agree
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Opinion: Disagree
Comment: There is no credible evidence of any genuine initiative to engage CSOs on any significant subject. Requests by CSOs to discuss or work with relevant authorities are rejected, considered inappropriate and even unauthorized intrusion if not conspiratorial.
Suggested score: 0
Opinion: Agree
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Has the country signed up to international anti-corruption instruments such as, but not exclusively or necessarily, UNCAC and the OECD Convention? (In your answer, please specify which.)
Bangladesh acceded to the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) in 2007. A report by TI Bangladesh in 2011 found that while Bangladesh’s legal regime is generally compatible with the standards and principles of the UNCAC, its application and enforcement remain far behind, affecting compliance with the commitments.
Bangladesh is not a member of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and can therefore not be signatory to the its Anti-Bribery Convention.
Transparency International Bangladesh, 'Civil Society Organisation Report in Support of the Implementation Review Mechanism of the UNCAC', 1st Year Review of UNCAC, Chapters III & IV, 2011 http://www.ti-bangladesh.org/oldweb/research/UNCAC-Review-FinRev.pdf
Iftekhar Zaman, 'Bangladesh: how UNCAC review helps build bridges with government', UNCAC Coalition, 16 May 2013, http://uncaccoalition.org/en/learn-more/blog/242-bangladesh-how-uncac-review-helps-build-bridges-with-government
OECD website, Members and partners, http://www.oecd.org/about/membersandpartners/
Opinion: Agree
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Opinion: Agree
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Opinion: Agree
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Opinion: Agree
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Is there evidence of regular, active public debate on issues of defence? If yes, does the government participate in this debate?
Public discussion on defence and security matters is irregular and periodical. Each year, the announcement of the defence budget in the month of June prompts questions regarding its various aspects and a discussion usually ensues publicly.
Apart from this, discussions regarding the military tends to be centred around controversial defence purchases. While the government normally does not participate, it did organise a rare press conference to defend and clarify its position in 2013 with regard to a defence deal with Russia.
After the release of the first global assessment of corruption risks in government defence and security establishments by Transparency International's (TI's) Defence and Security Programme in 2013, the media in Bangladesh organised talk-shows and interviewed prominent civil society personalities which included TI Bangladesh's Executive Director and some academics. Some security think-tanks occasionally organise roundtables and seminars to generate public debate on such topics, which tend to defuse soon after due to a lack of response from the government.
According to interviewees, both government functionaries and CSOs are hesitant to discuss or debate issues related to defence. The print media covers issues regarding defence cautiously. They further indicated that public debates on this issue are generally absent due to a lack of clarity within the public as to the decision-making and policy process of the government.
As noted by the peer reviewer, there are concessional debates in the news about defence matters (mostly about defence or foreign policy), however, this usually involves former military officers, defence enthusiasts, journalists and analysts; the political community is mostly not present in these debates.
Response to government reviewer: The defence budget is not discussed in the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence. During general discussion during 2013-14 budget session, the Finance Minister did assure the House that details will be provided in the future for the defence budget. (6) However, the Finance Minister's budget speech for 2015-16 fiscal simply talked about modernization efforts of the military and there was no mention about annual defence procurement or details about it. As one commentator put it: there is virtually no discussion on defence spending. (7) Score 1 maintained due to the government's lack of participation in the debate.
1. Interview with a former senior Army official, interviewed in April 2014.
2. Interview with a serving Army official, interviewed in April 2014.
3. Chowdhury & de Silva, 'Defence Expenditure in South Asia: Bangladesh and Sri Lanka', RCSS Policy Studies 11, March 2000, http://www.rcss.org/publication/policy_paper/RCSS%20Policy%20Studies%2011.pdf
4. Antifarid's Blog, 'Bangladesh’s Defence Spending: Puzzle of Reality', 18 January 2013, http://antifarid.wordpress.com/2013/01/18/bangladeshs-military-spending-puzzle-of-reality/
5. Ishfaq Choudhary, 'Some thoughts on the defence budget', The Daily Star, June 12, 2012, http://dspace.bracu.ac.bd/bitstream/handle/10361/1859/The%20daily%20star%2012th%20June%202012.pdf?sequence=1
6. 'TIB for disclosing defence budget details in current JS session', 10 June 2014. http://www.northbengaltimesbd.com/tib-for-disclosing-defence-budget-details-in-current-js-session/, accessed September 2015.
7. Air Cdre (Retd) Ishfaq Ilahi Choudhury, 'Rising trend continues', 16 June 2015.
http://www.thedailystar.net/op-ed/finance/rising-trend-continues-97510, accessed September 2015.
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: There are occassional debates in the news about defence matters (mostly about defence or foreign policy), however, this usually involves former military officers, defence enthusiasts, journalists and analysts; the political community is mostly not present in these debates.
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Opinion: Agree
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Opinion: Agree
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Opinion: Disagree
Comment: Parliamentary standing committee on defence regularly debates important issues of defence. In previous years during the budget session of 10th parliament, information on major developments and procurement decisions of the Armed Forces was provided to the House by the Minister responsible for defence and following that, discussion on these issues took place. There were talk shows in different television channels on Armed Forces Day and UN Peacekeepers Day where serving military officials participated. These talk shows cover more or less all areas of military issues.
Suggested score: 2
Does the country have an openly stated and actively implemented anti-corruption policy for the defence sector?
There is no separate government anti-corruption policy for the defence sector. However, the 2012 'Commitment for Golden Bengal' anti-corruption strategy applies to the defence sector, although it is not clear whether both civilian and military personnel are comprehensively covered by it. This is because the Strategy defines defence services as part of the executive supported by the public sector, not part of the public sector to which the Strategy mostly applies. However, an implementation plan for the MOD (5) suggests that ministry staff at at least some military issues (such as UN peacekeeping operations) are covered.
There are also legal standards that apply to the defence sector: Section 42 of the Bangladesh Army Act 1952 specifies a jail sentence up to five years for illegal gratification during duty. This Act doesn’t specify breaches of integrity including abuse of power, extortion, and bribery.
Response to Government Reviewer and Peer Reviewer 2: As there is no explicitly adopted anti-corruption policy for the defence sector, awarding the score of 4 is not possible. Score 2 reflects the (at least) partial applicability of the National Integrity Strategy.
1. THE ARMY ACT, 1952, http://bdlaws.minlaw.gov.bd/print_sections_all.php?id=248
2. Interview with a serving Army official, interviewed in April 2014.
3. Government of Bangladesh, 'Commitment for Golden Bengal. National Integrity Strategy of Bangladesh', October 2012. http://mofl.portal.gov.bd/sites/default/files/files/mofl.portal.gov.bd/page/099bb6fb_f251_4276_b748_ee690b874d92/NIS_English.pdf, accessed October 2015.
4. Transparency International Bangladesh, 'National Integrity System Assessment: Bangladesh.' 2014. http://www.ti-bangladesh.org/beta3/images/2014/fr_nis_NICSA_14_en.pdf, accessed October 2015.
5. National Integrity Strategy Work Plan for Ministry of Defence, January 2015-June 2016. http://mod.portal.gov.bd/sites/default/files/files/mod.portal.gov.bd/page/aa643ad3_7afd_43df_956c_925cf1f982a8/NISWofMOD.pdf, accessed September 2015.
Opinion: Agree
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Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: The National Integrity Strategy may be a relevant document in this regard which is applicable to the armed forces as well.
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Opinion: Agree
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Opinion: Disagree
Comment: Military acts on the principle of ‘Zero Tolerance’ in corruption. Though there is no openly stated anti-corruption policy for the defence sector but Manual of Bangladesh Military Law Army Act Sec 42 specifies sentence up to 5 years jail for illegal gratification during duty. More so military structural hierarchy act as in-built check on the procurement process. The Anti-corruption Committee can also investigate and sue military officials for corruption.
Suggested score: 4
Are there independent, well-resourced, and effective institutions within defence and security tasked with building integrity and countering corruption?
There are no independent, well-resourced, and effective institutions within the defence and security sector tasked with building integrity and countering corruption. Defence organizations have built-in internal auditing and reporting systems: the Defence Audit Directorate under the Office of the Controller General Defence Finance is tasked with carrying out audit of 25 defence institutions, but its effectiveness has been questioned (see Q14). While its website is currently not functioning, its Facebook page is regularly updated. However, the outcomes of these internal audits and processes are commonly not made public and are hence not subject to public scrutiny. According to the defence official interviewed, a total of 12947 audit reports are still unresolved as of April 2014.
However, the remit of the Anti-Corruption Commission of Bangladesh does include the defence sector: the Commission's website indicates that there has been at least one inquiry in the armed forces. (8) Furthermore, the MOD appears to have established an Ethics Committee pursuant to the adoption of the National Integrity Strategy, which indicates that some institutions are in the process of being formed: the Committee's responsibility would be to implement the integrity strategy. (see 7)
Response to government reviewer: While defence organizations have internal auditing and reporting systems, the outcomes of these internal audits and processes are not publicly available and their effectiveness has been questioned. That said, the existence of these systems, as well as the existence of the Anti-Corruption Commission and the Ethics Committee merits a score change from 0 to 2.
1.tInterview with a former senior Army official, interviewed in April 2014.
2. Interview with a serving Army official, interviewed in April 2014.
3.tInterview with a former senior political advisor in April 2014.
4. Controller General Defence Finance website, http://cgdf.gov.bd/cgi-sys/suspendedpage.cgi (defunct)
5. Controller General Defence Finance Facebook page, https://www.facebook.com/cgdf.gov.bd
6. Interview with a defence official, interviewed in May 2014.
7. National Integrity Strategy Work Plan for Ministry of Defence, January 2015-June 2016. http://mod.portal.gov.bd/sites/default/files/files/mod.portal.gov.bd/page/aa643ad3_7afd_43df_956c_925cf1f982a8/NISWofMOD.pdf, accessed September 2015.
8. 'Complain filed after enquiry against Brigadier General Jeeban Kanai Das, Army Head Office, Dhaka', Anti-Corruption Commission Bangladesh, 28 May 2015. http://www.acc.org.bd/enquiry-investigation/complain-filed-after-enquiry-against-brigadier-general-jeeban-kanai-das-army, accessed October 2015.
Opinion: Agree
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Opinion: Agree
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Opinion: Agree
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Opinion: Disagree
Comment: Any procurement/purchase is checked and counter checked from the beginning till end through a well-structured military system. Any breach of laws at any stage in the process is immediately identified and necessary preventive measures are applied. Parliamentary Standing Committee on defence as well as Comptroller and Auditor General, an independent constitutional body reviews and gives direction for unresolved reports. The numbers of audit objections mentioned in the comment is way too many than actual.
Suggested score: 3
Does the public trust the institutions of defence and security to tackle the issue of bribery and corruption in their establishments?
The military-backed caretaker government in 2007-2008 which initiated a massive anti-corruption drive lost public support due to its alleged abuse of power and involvement in corruption. A report by Transparency International Bangladesh (TIB) entitled 'Role of a Section of the Bangladesh Armed Forces during the Caretaker Government of 2007-8: A Review' found that a section of the members of the armed forces, taking advantage of their immunity from scrutiny and prosecution, were involved in malfeasance in office and corruption, which affected the rule of law and human rights conditions.
The study also reports that some armed forces' members involved in the anti-corruption drive used their positions to forcibly collect money from people who had allegedly amassed wealth illegally. Money was also collected for giving undue benefits to individuals, such as not including names in the 'corrupt persons’ list', arranging bail, influencing judges to reduce sentences and not charging individuals in corruption cases filed by the Anti-Corruption Commission Bangladesh (ACC).
During a meeting of the PSCfMoD in 2013, the former Chief General Hussein Mohammad Ershad who had imposed military rule in 1982, stated that corrupt military officers had tarnished the corporate image of the military through their activities. There is a strong likelihood that the history of corruption tarnishes the perception of the armed forces in society.
However, according to Global Corruption Barometer 2013 by Transparency International, the Bangladesh military received score of 1.5 (on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 indicates ‘not at all corrupt’ and 5 means ‘extremely corrupt) indicating that respondents in Bangladesh perceive there to be little corruption. Only 5% of respondents viewed the armed forces as 'corrupt' or 'extremely corrupt'; for comparison purposes, the police were viewed as corrupt or extremely corrupt by 64% of respondents.
Response to peer reviewer 1 and government reviewer: Evidence suggests that the public view the military more favourably than they do other government institutions. Their reputation was severely tarnished in 2007-2008 when they took advantage of their immunity from scrutiny and prosecution during the anti-corruption drive. Score 3 selected given the time elapsed and the additional sources cited, particularly the results of the 2013 Global Corruption Barometer.
1.tRole of a Section of the Bangladesh Armed Forces during the Caretaker Government of 2007-2008: A Review, http://www.transparency.org/gcb2013/English%20Executive%20Summary%20of%20TIB%20Study%20on%20Army.pdf
2.tBangladesh Parliament, 3rd Report of the Parliamentary Standing Committee for the Ministry of Defence. Publicly unavailable; accessed through a confidential source.
3. M. Chowdhury, 'Why The Military Intervened In Bangladesh Politics?' Countercurrents.org, 10 January 2014, http://www.countercurrents.org/chowdhury100114.htm
4. Majeed, Muhammad Tariq & MacDonald, Ronald, 2010. &quoute;Corruption and the Military in Politics: Theory and Evidence from around the World,&quoute; SIRE Discussion Papers 2010-91, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
5. Transparency International, Global Corruption Barometer 2013 Report, http://www.gla.ac.uk/media/media_184189_en.pdf
6. http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/7baf6f5c-ea74-11e4-a701-00144feab7de.html#axzz3ma9b9Zj5
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: &quoute;The Army especially is highly regarded in Bangladeshi society. While the public are largely wary about the level of corruption in various government sectors, the Army enjoys a relatively larger amount of goodwill. The police and politicians are commonly perceived to be more corrupt. (note- this comment is not indicative of the corruption level itself but of the perception).&quoute;
Suggested score: 2
Opinion: Agree
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Opinion: Agree
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Opinion: Disagree
Comment: The references mentioned in the first part of the comment paragraph is 6-7 years old while at the end of the same paragraph it rated Bangladesh military close to “not at all corrupt” from a source of 2013. Hence the score should have been within 4-3. In the recent past incidents of corruption were handled very strictly. There are many examples in the recent past where military personnel were sent to civil jail for misappropriation. However, these are not made public as a practice/policy.
Suggested score: 3
Are there regular assessments by the defence ministry or another government agency of the areas of greatest corruption risk for ministry and armed forces personnel, and do they put in place measures for mitigating such risks?
There is no known defence-specific assessment of corruption risks in Bangladesh carried out either by the Ministry of defence, the relevant parliamentary committee, or the Anti-Corruption Commission. It is unclear to what extent defence as a sector is included in the scope of a National Integrity Strategy that came into existence in October 2012: given the MOD's action plan, it appears that the Strategy is at least partly applicable. However, this does not change the score as neither the Strategy nor the Action Plan mention a defence-specific risk assessment and there is no evidence that one was carried out.
Response to government reviewer: The question relates specifically to anti-corruption risk assessments in the defence sector. Considering those assessments have not taken place, score 0 is maintained.
1.tInterview with a former senior Army official, interviewed in April 2014.
2. Interview with a serving Army official, interviewed in April 2014.
3.tInterview with a former senior political advisor in April 2014.
4. Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, Cabinet Division, Commitment for Golden Bengal, National Integrity Strategy of Bangladesh of the Government of Bangladesh, October 2012, http://www.google.com.bd/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CBwQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.cabinet.gov.bd%2Ffile_upload%2FCD_PUBLICATION_en_1_209.doc&ei=W46YU4rPL6HhywP6s4GwBA&usg=AFQjCNG5MeKYtO03inZbRTm-jILwg1PZRg&sig2=r9yQhHpv5hySvoDJ6k6WRg&bvm=bv.68693194,d.bGQ (accessed in June 2014)
5. National Integrity Strategy Work Plan for Ministry of Defence, January 2015-June 2016. http://mod.portal.gov.bd/sites/default/files/files/mod.portal.gov.bd/page/aa643ad3_7afd_43df_956c_925cf1f982a8/NISWofMOD.pdf, accessed September 2015.
Opinion: Agree
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Opinion: Agree
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Opinion: Agree
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Opinion: Disagree
Comment: Though defence as a sector was excluded from National Integrity Strategy but Military profession is based on the principles of integrity and honesty. Institutional training is imparted and professional excellence of military personnel is primarily based on these principles. The scope of breaching such principles are very low and defaulters within and outside military organization are dealt severely. However, these are not made public as a practice/policy.
Suggested score: 3
Does the country have a process for acquisition planning that involves clear oversight, and is it publicly available?
The Armed Forces have an acquisition planning process.
The General Staff Branch of the Army HQ determines the yearly/ long-term need for assets (based on several factors such as existing deficiency, wastage rate, induction of new technology etc). The Master General of Ordnance Branch and the Quarter Master General’s Branch are responsible for acquisition. The General Services Purchase Committee is responsible for forwarding all acquisition requests of the three services (army, navy and air force) to the Prime Minister for approval. After this approval, the Directorate General of Defence Purchase (DGDP) initiates the process of formal purchase. All acquisition is subject to auditing by Comptroller General of Defence Finance (CGDF). However, there is not much transparency relating to its working and its reports are not discussed during sessions of the Parliamentary Standing Committee of the Ministry of Defence. There is also no public information over asset disposal, which should form a part of the acquisitions process.
The Public Procurement Act 2006 and the Public Procurement Rules of 2008 are applicable to defence purchases, however, these are rarely followed, according to the interviewees. It is the Defence Purchase Regulation-35 (DP-35) of 1961 which is still being used by the Director General of Defence Purchase. The Armed Forces Division in 2010 initiated a process to introduce a new Defence Purchase Procedure.
Response to Government Reviewer: It is true that the military has a well laid-out acquisition plan on paper, however, in the absence of public information about the whole process, the effectiveness of the plan and its oversight mechanisms remain doubtful. For example, official orders obtained by this assessor of the air-force and navy for their shopping list for 2015-16 included items which are not included in the table of equipment, which is a clear violation of the existing procurement rules. Score 1 maintained.
1. Interview with a former senior Army official, interviewed in April 2014.
2. Interview with a serving Army official, interviewed in April 2014.
3. Directorate General of Defence Purchase website, www.dgdp.gov.bd
4. Bangladesh Parliament, 1st, 2nd and 3rd Reports of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on the Ministry of Defence. Publicly unavailable; accessed through a confidential source.
5. Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Public Procurement Act 2006 (English translation), http://www.bdtender.info/itrf/PPA_2006_E_V.pdf
6. Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Public Procurement Rules 2008, http://www.bdtender.info/itrf/PPR_B_V_2008.pdf
Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Ministry of Defence, Directorate General Defence Purchase, Form DP - 35, http://www.dgdp.gov.bd/dgdp_pdf/DP-35,ltr%20of%20-1961,SOP.pdf
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: There is a process but acquisition continues to be made on an ad-hoc basis. There is little inter-service planning and co-ordination.
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Opinion: Agree
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Opinion: Agree
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Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: There is a process of acquisition planning mentioned in the comment have changed for almost two years. All three services have formulated their own “Forces Goal 2030”, which was presented to and approved by the government. Armed Forces Division has formed a “Forces Goal Committee”, which verifies all the proposals of major defence purchase and forming new organisation or revising an existing organisation so that no disjointed acquisition takes place.
Suggested score: 3
Is the defence budget transparent, showing key items of expenditure? This would include comprehensive information on military R&D, training, construction, personnel expenditures, acquisitions, disposal of assets, and maintenance.
The total allocation for the defence sector is regularly shown during the annual budget. However, the actual heads of expenditure categories are not made public. The Finance Minister did told the House in 2014 that he would provide detailed breakdown of defence budget in future (7), but that did not happen during 2015-16 budget session.
The HQ of each of the forces provide budget reports to the Ministry of Defence with the following heads and detail: payments and allowances; supply and services (including pension, uniform, food etc); repairs and maintenance; procurement of weapons, arms and equipment, ammunition, vehicles, signal and communication equipment, medical stores and technical equipment including tools and accessories; construction (buildings, barracks, roads, etc) and local deployment; training (spanning training aids, training grounds and sheds, and field training exercise); shares and equity, foreign loan reimbursement; and costs pertaining to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations.
Some of the line items of defence budget are now available publicly in two government publications: a) a research background paper to the 6th five-year plan and b) the annual report 2012-2013 of the Ministry of Defence. It is likely that these two documents have escaped the attention of the local media due to limited circulation.
Response to government reviewer: While the defence budget is publicly available, the degree of detail is insufficient (more detail is only available in budget reports and other publications with very limited distribution). There is insufficient information on military R&D, training, construction, personnel expenditures, acquisitions, disposal of assets, and maintenance, for example. Comments by the Finance Minister also suggest that the military outspends its official allocation. Score 1 maintained.
1. Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Ministry of Finance, Annual Financial Statement 2013-14, Consolidated Fund - Receipts : Summary by Ministry/Division, http://www.mof.gov.bd/en/budget/13_14/afs/en/AFS_St_ii.pdf
2. Interview with a former senior Army official, interviewed in April 2014.
2. Interview with a serving Army official, interviewed in April 2014.
3. Sixth Five Year Plan of Bangladesh 2011-2015. Background Papers, Volume 1: Macroeconomic Issues by: Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies and General Economic Division of the Planning Commission, http://www.bids.org.bd/publication/SFYP/SFYP-01.pdf
4. DEFENCE BUDGET 2013-14, Trends and imperatives in the Daily Star on 14 June 2013, http://archive.thedailystar.net/beta2/news/trends-and-imperatives/ (online version accessed in June 2014)
5. Tk 145.655b defence allocation proposed in The Financial Express, 7 June 2013, http://www.thefinancialexpress-bd.com/old/index.php?ref=MjBfMDZfMDdfMTNfMV8yXzE3MjAzOA (online version accessed in June 2014)
6. &quoute;Defence services spend beyond budget: audit report', 9 September 2015. http://newagebd.net/47411/defence-services-spend-beyond-budget-audit-report/#sthash.Ux16kQnR.dpbs, accessed September 2015.
7. &quoute;Will provide defence budget breakdown: Muhith&quoute;, 9 June 2014. http://bdnews24.com/economy/2014/06/09/will-provide-defence-budget-breakdown-muhith, accessed September 2015.
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Budget documents can be accessed via the Ministry of Finance website with breakdown for every Ministry. [1] The year-end report on fiscal position reveals details of the allocated budget, revised budget, and total deficit for the Defence Ministry [2]. The breakdown is not very granular and only includes total figures of expenditures (developmental and non-developmental), revenue (developmental and non-developmental), for the entire Ministry of Defence.
1- Budget document can be downloaded, according to section, from http://www.mof.gov.bd/en/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=270&Itemid=1
2- Fiscal year-end report 2012-2013, http://www.mof.gov.bd/en/budget/year_end_fiscal/year_end_report_2012_13.pdf
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: All expenditures in the military are controlled by finance controller and are duly vetted by internal and external audit departments. Acquisition reports are sent to parliament on quarterly basis and are available for public reviewing.
Suggested score: 4
Is there a legislative committee (or other appropriate body) responsible for defence budget scrutiny and analysis in an effective way, and is this body provided with detailed, extensive, and timely information on the defence budget?
The committee exists; however, it is evident from the three reports of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on the Ministry of Defence that the defence budget was not discussed during the 26 meetings that took place between 2009 to 2013.
Response to government reviewer: While a defence committee exists, no evidence could be found to support the claim that it has publicly discussed the budget. Commentators generally agree that Defence budget in Bangladesh has always remained a taboo -- not to be discussed in public forum or in the Parliament. (3) The Finance Minister did told the House in 2014 that he would provide detailed breakdown of defence budget in future (4), but that too did not happen during 2015-16 budget session.
Score 1 maintained.
1. Interview with a serving Army official, interviewed in April 2014.
2. Bangladesh Parliament, 1st, 2nd and 3rd Reports of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on the Ministry of Defence. Publicly unavailable; accessed through a confidential source.
3. Daily Star, Defence Budget 2014-2015, http://www.thedailystar.net/defence-budget-2014-15-rising-trend-continues-26743.
4. &quoute;Will provide defence budget breakdown: Muhith&quoute;, 9 June 2014. http://bdnews24.com/economy/2014/06/09/will-provide-defence-budget-breakdown-muhith, accessed September 2015.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: On 01 April 2014 Parliamentary Standing Committee of 10th Parliament for Ministry of Defence was formed. Until July 2014, it held three meetings. Second meeting was dedicated to budgetary matters. Service chiefs and high officials of the Ministry generally attend these meetings. President of the committee declared in the first meeting that the committee would sit every month to scrutinize all activities of the ministry.
Suggested score: 3
Is the approved defence budget made publicly available? In practice, can citizens, civil society, and the media obtain detailed information on the defence budget?
The defence budget is shown in the overall budget, without any breakdown of line items. There is a Right to Information Act, but the detailed defence budget is considered ‘secret’ and cannot be obtained by citizens, civil society organizations (CSOs) or the media. The effectiveness of the Act itself does not appear to be high due to numerous exceptions, lack of awareness of the Act in society and lacking resources in the administration, which impedes the processing of requests. (4, 5, 6)
The usual practice is that the media is given copy of budget speech of the Finance Minister during budget session, which is also put on website by the Finance Ministry, in addition to live TV and radio coverage by the electronic media. Journalists are also given a ministry-wise allocation in a separate document, which does contain some information of the defence allocation, without, however, major or detailed break-up of expenditures. Given huge media interests on items which will rise and fall after the budget, only selected media and newspapers devote some space to defence budget allocation, highlighting key features only.
Response to Peer Reviewer 2: While the budget for the Ministry of Defence can be found online, it lacks detail. The more detailed budget cannot be obtained by citizens. Score 1 maintained.
Response to TI Reviewer: The defence budget may be insufficiently detailed; however, it is still available in a general form on the website for the Ministry of Finance. Score 1 maintained.
1. Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Ministry of Finance, Annual Financial Statement 2013-14, Consolidated Fund - Receipts : Summary by Ministry/Division, http://www.mof.gov.bd/en/budget/13_14/afs/en/AFS_St_ii.pdf.t
2. 'Chapter 5: National Security of Bangladesh: Strategy and Cost Effectiveness' in Background Papers of Sixth Five Year Plan of Bangladesh 2011-2015, published by Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies and General Economics Division of the Ministry of Planning, 2011.
3. Interview with a serving Army official, interviewed in April 2014.
4. Bangladesh Right to Information Act 2009. http://www.moi.gov.bd/RTI/RTI_English.pdf, accessed October 2015.
5. 'NGO Recommends Reforming Bangladesh Exemptions', 22 January 2015. http://www.freedominfo.org/2015/01/ngo-recommends-reforming-bangladesh-exemptions/, accessed October 2015.
6. 'Asia Foundation Report Finds Many Implementation Issues', 12 November 2014. http://www.freedominfo.org/2014/11/asia-foundation-report-finds-many-implementation-issues/, accessed October 2015.
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: Budget documents can be accessed via the Ministry of Finance website - the annual budget document contains breakdown for every Ministry. [1] The year-end report on fiscal position reveals details of the allocated budget, revised budget, and total deficit for the Defence Ministry [2]. The breakdown is not very granular and only includes total figures of expenditures (developmental and non-developmental), revenue (developmental and non-developmental), for the entire Ministry of Defence.
1- Budget document can be downloaded, according to section, from http://www.mof.gov.bd/en/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=270&Itemid=1
2- Fiscal year-end report 2012-2013, http://www.mof.gov.bd/en/budget/year_end_fiscal/year_end_report_2012_13.pdf
Suggested score: 2
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: The approved defence budget is not available in any meaningful way. It is practically impossible for citizens and CSOs to obtain any meaningful detail on the budget. Defence expenditures are also not only limited to approved budget. Large procurements take place outside the budget with practically no information on source and terms of funds used.
Suggested score: 0
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are sources of defence income other than from central government allocation (from equipment sales or property disposal, for example) published and scrutinised?
There is no publicly available information available with regard to this subject.
According to the interviewees, defence income cannot be funded by equipment sales or property disposal. Such income, if any, is to be deposited in the government treasury. Income from sources such as Canteen Stores Department, shopping malls, land leases, etc. are sent to the appropriate troops' welfare fund maintained by the respective HQ. Such funds are subject to internal audit and oversight.
Annual reports found on the website for the Ministry of Finance provide evidence that income sources from &quoute;foreign assistance,&quoute; &quoute;domestic borrowing,&quoute; and &quoute;loans and advances&quoute; are published. However, attribution of government income to the different ministries is not sufficiently detailed.
Response to peer reviewer 1: Agree - information verified and incorporated, and score changed to 2.
Response to government reviewer: Annual reports suggest that the score of N/A would not be appropriate.
1. Interview with a serving Army official, interviewed in April 2014.
2. Interview with a defence official, interviewed in May 2014.
3. Interview with a senior military official, September 2015.
4. Ministry of Finance Annual Fiscal year report 2012 - 2013. http://www.mof.gov.bd/en/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=197&Itemid=12
5. 2014 - 2015 Consolidated Fund Receipts for the Ministry of Defence, http://www.mof.gov.bd/en/budget/14_15/cfr/en/19_defence_en.pdf
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: Annual Fiscal Year reports from the Ministry of Finance include details about revenue from &quoute;foreign assistance&quoute;, &quoute;domestic borrowing&quoute;, &quoute;loans and advances&quoute;; however, these are not clearly attributed to the different Ministries. [1]
The 2014 - 2015 Consolidated Fund Receipts for the Ministry of Defence reveal some details about other sources of income such as &quoute;interest on loans&quoute;, &quoute;recovery of over-payment&quoute;, &quoute;non-commercial sales&quoute;, &quoute;examination fees&quoute;, etc for each service and every agency under the MoD.
1- Ministry of Finance Annual Fiscal year report 2012 - 2013, http://www.mof.gov.bd/en/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=197&Itemid=1
2- 2014 - 2015 Consolidated Fund Receipts for the Ministry of Defence, http://www.mof.gov.bd/en/budget/14_15/cfr/en/19_defence_en.pdf
Suggested score: 2
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: There is no income other than government allocation. Hence, there is no publication. There are some income through disposal of items beyond economic repair. Money received through these sources are returned to the government through treasury register.
Suggested score: N/A
Is there an effective internal audit process for defence ministry expenditure (that is, for example, transparent, conducted by appropriately skilled individuals, and subject to parliamentary oversight)?
There exists a department called the Controller General of Defence Finance (CGDF) which undertakes internal/primary audit as per individual service requirements, depending on their internal practices or authorized internal auditing systems. However, related information is not transparent and it is not discussed during sessions of the Parliamentary Standing Committee for the Ministry of Defence. When contacted with regard to information for this indicator, CGDF stated that ‘some government information is secured and is not authorized to be publicly shared.’
There is also evidence indicating that despite internal audit procedures, there are instances of the MOD not adhering to financial regulations, which suggests that effectiveness of internal audit might be low. (sources 5, 6, 7)
Response to TI Reviewer: agree that because auditing information is not transparent or openly discussed with Parliament, score should lowered to 1.
Response to Government Reviewer: Additional information was considered. However, the focus of the question is not on acquisition reports, but rather on the existence, effectiveness and transparency of activities of the MOD's internal audit. Given the publicly available evidence and in particular lack of parliamentary consideration of audits, score 1 appears justified.
1.tController General Defence Finance (CDGF) website, http://cgdf.gov.bd/cgi-sys/suspendedpage.cgi (defunct)
2. CDGF Facebook page, https://www.facebook.com/cgdf.gov.bd
3. Bangladesh Parliament, 1st, 2nd and 3rd Reports of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on the Ministry of Defence. Publicly unavailable; accessed through a confidential source.
4. E-mail response from the CDGF.
5. Interview with senior military official, September 2015.
6. Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General of Bangladesh, 'Report on accounts of the offices under Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces Division', 2005-6. http://www.cagbd.org/audit/130122574404.%20Report%20on%20accounts%20of%20the%20offices%20under%20Ministry%20of%20Defence%20and%20Armed%20Forces%20Division.pdf, accessed 20 September 2015.
7. Newage, 'Defence services spend beyond budget: audit report', 9 September 2014. http://newagebd.net/47411/defence-services-spend-beyond-budget-audit-report/#sthash.Ux16kQnR.dpbs, accessed on 23/9/2015.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: There is a process of internal audit. But there is practically no transparency or parliamentary scrutiny and there are risks of lack of accountability. Parliamentary or other possible means of control is largely ineffective.
Suggested score: 1
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: All expenditures in the military are controlled by finance controller and are duly vetted by internal and external audit departments. Acquisition reports are sent to parliament on quarterly basis and are available for public reviewing.
Suggested score: 4
Is there effective and transparent external auditing of military defence expenditure?
The Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General (OCAG) is responsible for auditing government receipts and public spending and ascertaining whether expenditure has yielded value for money in government offices, public bodies, and statutory organizations. Its reports are published.
The defence audit report is generally placed before the Public Accounts Committee of the Bangladesh Parliament. However, the content of the discussion is not shared with the public and such meetings are not regular. For example, the defence audit report of 2003-2004 was discussed in the 28th meeting of the Public Accounts Committee on 21 June 2010. Similarly, an audit report on the accounts of Bangladesh Army, Air Force, Navy and Inter Services Organizations for the year 2006-2007 and 2003-2004 were discussed in the 96th meeting of the Public Accounts Committee on 30 May 2012.
It is unclear whether the government takes the findings of the reports into account.
Response to government reviewer: Score 2 selected to reflect existence of audit and its partial transparency combined with doubts on effectiveness.
1. Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General of Bangladesh website, http://www.cag.org.bd/
2. Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General, Public Accounts Committee meetings, http://www.cagbd.org/in.php?cp=pacmeet
3. Office of the Controller General Defence Finance, Ministry of Defence, Defence Finance Department, http://www.cgdf.gov.bd/functions.php
4. A senior military official, interviewed September 2015.
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: The Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General (OCAG) is a formally independent organ that works as the supreme audit institution of Bangladesh. Its appointments are controlled by the President and the agency's autonomy is doubtful. Annual reports are available online.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: Finance controller duly vetted by Internal and External Audit Department controls all expenditure in military. Acquisition Reports are sent to Parliament on a quarterly basis for the information of the public.
Suggested score: 3
Is there evidence that the country's defence institutions have controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country's natural resource exploitation and, if so, are these interests publicly stated and subject to scrutiny?
No statutory ban on the armed forces exploiting natural resources could be located.
Media reports and the interviewees indicate allegations that military officials serving in three hill districts of the Chittagong Division of the army are involved with a lucrative timber business. Some of them have also allegedly acquired, through influence and coercion, parts of hill areas for setting up personal business ventures such as hill resorts and rubber gardens.
There are also allegations of military officials, both serving and retired, grabbing (including &quoute;purchase&quoute; by abuse of power) land and forest resources. Additionally, certain electricity companies are owned by former senior military officials.
Response to government reviewer: Evidence (additional evidence, 5-8) suggests that military officials have engaged in land grabbing. Score maintained.
1. CHT News Update, Protest against land acquisition for Ruma Cantonment and BDR Wing HQ in Ruma of CHT, November 13, 2010, http://chtnewsupdate.blogspot.com/2010/11/protest-against-land-acquisition-for.html
2. The Report24, 'Use of military might for grabbing land of a school!' 8 May 2014, http://english.thereport24.com/?page=details&article=63.6681#sthash.iTCmMR0P.dpuf
3. Interview with a former senior Army official, interviewed in April 2014.
4. Interview with a serving Army official, interviewed in April 2014.
5. Armed acted like Land-Grabbers, Daily Star, 7 February 2011. http://archive.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details.php?nid=173184, accessed September 2015.
6.Abid Azad, 'Iftekharuzzaman: State patronising festival of land grabbing in CHT', 17 February 2015. http://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/2015/feb/17/iftekharuzzaman-state-patronising-festival-land-grabbing-cht, accessed September 2015.
7. 'Call against land acquisition for army installations', 14 November 2014. http://www.en.prothom-alo.com/bangladesh/news/56263/Call-against-land-acquisition-for-army, accessed September 2015.
8. 'Armed forces a pride for the nation: PM', 21 November 2014. http://www.bssnews.net/newsDetails.php?cat=0&id=450072&date=2014-11-21, accessed September 2015.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: The military does not have the access to the country’s natural resources from the economic perspective rather it acts as a protector of those resources. No serving officers can grab any land. Any such allegation against any officer is seriously dealt by the military court.
Suggested score: 3
Is there evidence, for example through media investigations or prosecution reports, of a penetration of organised crime into the defence and security sector? If no, is there evidence that the government is alert and prepared for this risk?
The Rapid Action Battalion (RAB), composed almost entirely of military personnel including some veterans of UN peacekeeping missions, have earned a bad reputation due to the alleged killing of ‘criminals’ through crossfire by some of its members in disregard of precepts of due process and the rule of law. There have also been accusations against the RAB for a recent spate of abductions and disappearances of people. A journalist, who was investigating a case of the alleged patronization of the rise of Islamic militants by a section of military intelligence officials, was forced to flee the country as a result. The interviewees indicated that some members of the armed and police forces are involved in making quick profits through ‘contract killings’, and public evidence suggests that the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) are being used by powerful ruling elites to silence their political and economic rivals. (10, 11)
After the abduction and killing of seven people in Narayanganj allegedly by RAB officials, the Government initially took a tough stand, in response to public outcry and criticism. However, the most significant individuals among the accused were able to escape the country and take shelter in India. In addition, the Prime Minister's public criticism of the Court's order to arrest RAB personnel created suspicion among the public mind about the government's sincerity in ensuring the justice for the victims' family.
Response to Government Reviewer: Given the alleged involvement of security forces in kidnappings and other crimes the RAB is accused of, it is not possible to award a higher score. Score 1 maintained.
Response to TI Reviewer: Score 1 appears appropriate as it is unclear what the degree of penetration is and to what extent are problems caused by organised crime issues as opposed to political issues (or whether and how these are related). It also appears that the government is trying, at least in rhetoric, to react to the problems.
1. Liz Philipson, 'Bangladesh's fraying democracy', Open Democracy, 26 June 2006, http://www.opendemocracy.net/democracy-protest/bangladesh_3681.jsp
2. Asian Human Rights Commission, 'Fighting lawlessness with lawlessness (or) the rise & rise of the Rapid Action Battalion', August 2006, http://www.humanrights.asia/resources/journals-magazines/article2/0504/fighting-lawlessness-with-lawlessness-or-the-rise-rise-of-the-rapid-action-battalion
3. Amnesty International, 'Who will end impunity for the Rapid Action Battalion in Bangladesh?', Amnesty's global human rights blog, 8 June 2011, http://livewire.amnesty.org/2011/06/08/who-will-end-impunity-for-the-rapid-action-battalion-in-bangladesh/
4. The Daily Star, 'Why not ex-Rab men shown held for murder?' May 18, 2014, http://thedailystar.net/why-not-ex-rab-men-shown-held-for-murder-24603
5. Asian Human Rights Commission, 'Bangladesh: Chains of Corruption Strangle Nation', May 12, 2014, http://www.humanrights.asia/news/ahrc-news/AHRC-STM-085-2014
6. Interview with a defence official, interviewed in May 2014.
Interview with defence correspondent of a leading Bangla publication, May 2014.
7. None will be spared even if related to powerful men: PM, in Daily Bangladesh Observer, 15 May 2014, online version: http://observerbd.com/details.php?id=19516 (accessed in June 2014)
8. Govt protecting RAB: BNP, 14 May 2014, online newsportal BDNEWS24: http://bdnews24.com/bangladesh/2014/05/14/govt-protecting-rab-bnp (accessed in June 2014)
9. Abductions, murders in Narayanganj, A People In Panic in the Daily Star, online version : http://www.thedailystar.net/narayanganj-abduction-killing (accessed in June 2014)
10. Ellen Barry, 'Amid Political Confrontations in Bangladesh, a Search for a Missing Opposition Official', New York Times, 9 April 2015. http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/10/world/asia/amid-political-confrontations-in-bangladesh-a-search-for-a-missing-opposition-official.html?_r=0, accessed October 2015.
11. David Bergman and Muktadir Rashid, 'Salah Uddin disappearance: Bank raid suggests law enforcers involved', 6 May 2015. http://newagebd.net/117376/bank-raid-suggests-law-enforcers-involved/, accessed October 2015.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: There is considerable penetration of organised crime in the sector. But there is no credible evidence that government or the defence authority is actively trying to tackle the problem.
Suggested score: 0
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: Only 45% personnel of Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) forces are from Armed Forces where head of the RAB forces is from Police. Any allegation against the RAB forces does not testify the credibility of the Armed Forces. More so, Armed Forces Personnel when employed in the RAB forces are regulated by the laws and regulations of RAB forces.
Suggested score: 4
Is there policing to investigate corruption and organised crime within the defence services and is there evidence of the effectiveness of this policing?
There is no known policing to investigate corruption and organized crime of the defence services. There is no evidence to suggest the ACC is active with regard to issues relating to organized crime.
Corruption cases within the military are dealt with through Army Act. With regard to organized criminal activities within the defence forces, the government appears to have taken the recent (in 2014) killings allegedly by RAB members in Narayanganj seriously. Three members of the armed forces who were deputed in the RAB were arrested following a court order. However, the delay in the arrest process and the weakened charges brought against them suggest that this case is likely to not to be followed up adequately.
Response to Government Reviewer: I note the role of the Military Police and the Counter-Intelligence service. However, there is little publicly available evidence of their effectiveness or a mandate which specifically addresses corruption and/or organised crime. Score 1 appears appropriate.
1. The People's Republic of Bangladesh, The Army Act, 1952, http://bdlaws.minlaw.gov.bd/print_sections_all.php?id=248
2. bdnews24.com, 'N’ganj murder case IO show-caused', May 18 2014, http://bdnews24.com/bangladesh/2014/05/18/nganj-murder-case-io-show-caused
3. The Daily News,'Seven-murder culprits must be punished: PM', May 11, 2014, http://www.thedailystar.net/seven-murder-culprits-must-be-punished-pm-23670
4. Interview with a former senior Army official, April 2014.
5. Interview with a serving Army official, April 2014.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: The military has strong policing techniques to control corruption and crime through structured organizations like Military Police, Field Intelligence Unit at formation level and Army Security Unit at Army Level. Armed Forces also take the help of other intelligence organisations like Directorate General Forces Intelligence when needed.
Suggested score: 4
Are the policies, administration, and budgets of the intelligence services subject to effective, properly resourced, and independent oversight?
The Bangladeshi intelligence community consists of three major intelligence agencies: the National Security Intelligence (NSI), the Special Branch (SB) of the Bangladesh Police, and the Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI). Although their roles and structure are clearly defined and governed by law, there is widespread criticism of the intelligence community for their alleged ties to terrorist groups and foreign intelligence agencies.
There is no independent oversight of their actions. The effectiveness of these intelligence organizations has also been questioned given two Bangladeshi Presidents were assassinated and 57 military officers killed during the Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) revolt in 2009, reportedly due to massive intelligence failures.
Moreover, the intelligence communities also enjoy blanket immunity in terms of sharing of information with the public. For example, section 32 of the Right to Information Act provides immunity to eight national security and intelligence agencies from sharing information with the public [1. National Security Intelligence (NSI), 2. Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI), 3. Defence Intelligence Units, 4. Criminal Investigation Department (CID), Bangladesh Police, 5. Special Security Force (SSF), 6. Intelligence Cell of the National Board of Revenue, 7. Special Branch, Bangladesh Police and 8. Intelligence Cell of Rapid Action Battalion (RAB)].
Response to government reviewer: This information could not be substantiated through any publicly available sources. Score maintained.
1. Ali Ashraf, 'Intelligence reform in Bangladesh', The Daily Star, March 27, 2014, http://www.thedailystar.net/intelligence-reform-in-bangladesh-17363
2. Bangladesh Enterprise Institute, 'Public Information: The Role of Intelligence Agencies in Bangladesh, A Strategy Paper', June 2011, http://bei-bd.org/images/report/whc4f30f1db525c6.pdf, page 17
3. The People's Republic of Bangladesh, Director General of Forces Intelligence website, http://www.dgfi.gov.bd/
4. The People's Republic of Bangladesh, Right to Information Act, 2009, http://www.infocom.gov.bd/ic/forms/rti_english.pdf
5. Rezwan-ul-Alam, Military-media relations in Bangladesh 1975-1990, (Dhaka, Palok Publishers, 2008), page: 99
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: All policies, procurement and budget except a small portion of it dedicated for covert intelligence are subject to internal and external auditing.
Suggested score: 3
Are senior positions within the intelligence services filled on the basis of objective selection criteria, and are appointees subject to investigation of their suitability and prior conduct?
Publicly available evidence suggests that selection criteria for senior officials in intelligence agencies have been put in place, including the duty to consult the Public Services Commission (6); however, they have not been made public. The public is generally informed of changes in such positions through the media. The interviewees indicated that loyalty and party affiliations play a key role in selection.
Response to Peer Reviewer 1: Information incorporated.
Response to Government Reviewer: Since it appears that some criteria do exist, but there is no information on them as well as strong suggestion of bypassing, score 1 seems justified.
1. Security Risks, Security Trends South Asia, Bangladesh, Armed Forces Modernisation and Upgradation, Jul 24, 2012, http://www.security-risks.com/security-trends-south-asia/bangladesh/armed-forces-modernisation-and-upgradation-1672.html
2. Dr. Asif Nazrul, 'The Security and Emergency Related Laws in Bangladesh: Tools for Human Rights Violations', South Asian Rights, 2009, http://www.southasianrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/10/securitylaw_BD.pdf
bdnews24.com, 'New DGFI chief named', February 3, 2009, http://bdnews24.com/bangladesh/2009/02/03/new-dgfi-chief-named
3. Interview with a former senior Army official, interviewed in April 2014.
4. Interview with a serving Army official, interviewed in April 2014.
5. Interview with a senior military official, September 2015.
6. 'Legal notice over NSI promotion', BDNews, 20 September 2013. http://bdnews24.com/bangladesh/2013/09/20/legal-notice-over-nsi-promotion, accessed October 2015.
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: In broad terms, the Article 40 of the Constitutions stipulates that the President shall consult the Public Services Commission with respect to matters relating appointment, promotion and transfer of those who are in the service of the republic. In practice, the Prime Minister controls promotions and appointments. A news reports from August 2013 highlighted a case filed by an official of National Security Intelligence (NSI) challenging an appointment.
http://bdnews24.com/bangladesh/2013/09/20/legal-notice-over-nsi-promotion
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Disagree
Comment: Any employment in the Intelligence Services is done through a rigorous selection process taking into consideration individual’s family background, social and organizational behaviour etc. Usually persons with intelligence training in military intelligence institutes are selected for such jobs.
Suggested score: 4
Does the government have a well-scrutinised process for arms export decisions that aligns with international protocols, particularly the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)?
Bangladesh signed the the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) to control trade and use of weapons of mass destruction on September 26, 2013 at the UN headquarters. Information regarding compliance with the ATT articles 7.1.iv, 11.5, and 15.6 by Bangladesh has not been reported in the media, nor could such information could be obtained through interviews. Search for relevant UN documents yielded no results.
Bangladesh has a well-established process of exporting arms produced by the Bangladesh Ordnance Factory. Normally the decision to export locally-produced weapons is determined by the Armed Forces Division and endorsed by the Ministry of Commerce. One such recent proposal is lying with the Ministry of Commerce for as long as the policy stipulates exporting all items, except weapons.
So far, Bangladesh has acceded to Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, Geneva Protocol, Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Partial Test Ban Treaty, Protocol 1, 2, 3 and 4 on Non-Detectable Fragments and Mine Ban Convention. Bangladesh also ratified Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction.
Bangladesh signed several international treaties on anti-personnel mines, chemical, and biological weapons. It also provides information annually to the UN on its stock of weapons. However, the public has not been informed of government decisions on defence matters in general and the process of arms export decisions in particular.
Response to peer reviewer 1 and government reviewer: While Bangladesh has signed the ATT, it has yet to ratify it. Score changed to one to reflect our scoring criteria.
1. Bangladesh Ordnance Factories website,http://www.bof.gov.bd/
2. Weekly Probash, অস্ত্র-গোলাবারুদ রপ্তানি করতে চায় বাংলাদেশ, April 19, 2014, http://www.weeklyprobash.com/2014/04/19/%E0%A6%85%E0%A6%B8%E0%A7%8D%E0%A6%A4%E0%A7%8D%E0%A6%B0-%E0%A6%97%E0%A7%8B%E0%A6%B2%E0%A6%BE%E0%A6%AC%E0%A6%BE%E0%A6%B0%E0%A7%81%E0%A6%A6-%E0%A6%B0%E0%A6%AA%E0%A7%8D%E0%A6%A4%E0%A6%BE%E0%A6%A8%E0%A6%BF/
3.United Nations Regional Centre on Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific, 4. Bangladesh, http://unrcpd.org/region/bangladesh/
4. Sultana Yesmin, 'Arms Trade Treaty: How far from expectation', November 26 2013, http://www.thefinancialexpress-bd.com/2013/11/26/5784
5. Interview with a former senior Army official, interviewed in April 2014.
6. Interview with a serving Army official, interviewed in April 2014.
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: Bangladesh has signed but not ratified the ATT. Bangladesh has a very small local defence base and it is not an exporter. Smuggling of arms and border porosity are common problems.
Suggested score: 1
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Disagree
Comment: At present as per export policy arms export from Bangladesh is not permitted. Bangladesh is a signatory of ATT but yet to ratify it.
Suggested score: 4
How effective are controls over the disposal of assets, and is information on these disposals, and the proceeds of their sale, transparent?
Public information on this subject could not be found. According to the first three interviewees, the military has a well-established asset disposal process where a committee oversees the open bidding process in which selected enlisted bidders participate. The journalist interviewed (source 4) stated that there are nominal controls over the process, which are not effective and that information regarding the sales proceeds and related issues are not transparent or publicly available.
Response to Peer Reviewer 1: While there appears to be some degree of oversight of the asset control process and the source quoted indicates that some information is available, these controls can't be confirmed to be substantial and the information is minimal. Score 1 selected.
Response to Government Reviewer: Indeed, there may be procedures; however, public information about them, as well as about proceeds from asset disposal, is sparse at best. Score 1 maintained.
1.tInterview with a former senior Army official, April 2014.
2. Interview with a serving Army official, April 2014.
3. Interview with a defence official, May 2014.
4. Interview with defence correspondent of a leading Bangla publication, interviewed in May 2014.
5. Interview with a senior military official, September 2015.
6. 2014 - 2015 Consolidated Fund Receipts for the Ministry of Defence, http://www.mof.gov.bd/en/budget/14_15/cfr/en/19_defence_en.pdf.
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: There is no information available about asset disposals. There are acts governing accounting procedures including reporting mechanisms for disposals; this may just not be publicly available. The 2014 - 2015 Consolidated Fund Receipts for the Ministry of Defence has sparse details about &quoute;non-commercial sales&quoute; for each service and every agency under the MoD.
2014 - 2015 Consolidated Fund Receipts for the Ministry of Defence, http://www.mof.gov.bd/en/budget/14_15/cfr/en/19_defence_en.pdf
Suggested score: 1
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Disagree
Comment: There is a set procedure for asset disposal. An item is gradually classified down from class 1 to class 6 in course of its life span before finally declared unserviceable and recommended for disposal. The internal and external audit teams always scrutinize asset disposal. The asset is auctioned (if auctionable) by the auctioneer employed by the government through public tender notice and the money received by the auction is directly deposited to the government treasury. If not auction able for security reasons, (arms, ammunitions etc) are destroyed through approval of appropriate authority and surely being audited by both internal and external auditors.
Suggested score: 4
Is independent and transparent scrutiny of asset disposals conducted by defence establishments, and are the reports of such scrutiny publicly available?
The first interviewee declined to provide information on the subject, stating it was not publicly available. Source 2 stated that although defence officials preside over the asset disposal process, no information whatsoever relating to disposal is shared with the public, which was confirmed by source 3. This information could not be verified by government, media or other sources available on the internet.
Response to government reviewer: While evidence suggests that there is some degree of oversight in asset disposals, the degree of independence and effectiveness could not be confirmed. No audit reports were found. Score changed to 1.
1.tInterview with a former senior Army official, interviewed in April 2014.
2. Interview with a serving Army official, interviewed in April 2014.
3. Interview with a defence official, interviewed in May 2014.
4. Interview with a senior military official, September 2015.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Disagree
Comment: The internal and external audit team always scrutinizes asset disposal. The asset is auctioned (if auction able) by the auctioneer employed by the government through public tender notice and the money received by the auction is directly deposited to the government treasury. If not auctionable for security reasons, (arms, ammunitions etc.) are destroyed through approval of appropriate authority and surely being audited by both internal and external auditors.
Suggested score: 4
What percentage of defence and security expenditure in the budget year is dedicated to spending on secret items relating to national security and the intelligence services?
There is no public information available to verify the whether Bangladesh spends money on 'secret' items relating to military intelligence and national security, and if it does, how much this may constitute of the defence and security budget.
According to the first interviewee, there is a certain amount allocated towards 'source money' in the defence and security budget. This item is secret and unaudited, and the percentage is not available to the public.
According to the two other interviewees, the Bangladesh defence industry is highly dependent on foreign suppliers to satisfy its demand for military modernization. Of the annual defence budget, approximately 6 per cent is earmarked for the purchase of weapons.
Response to Government Reviewer: The percentage is not officially stated, therefore the score of 0 is maintained.
1. Interview with a defence official, interviewed in May 2014.
2. Interview with a former senior Army official, interviewed in April 2014.
3. Interview with a serving Army official, interviewed in April 2014.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Disagree
Comment: There is 0% expenditure dedicated to secret items. The source money mentioned in the comment is mainly sources employed by the intelligence organisations and are normally very meagre in amount.
Suggested score: 4
Is the legislature (or the appropriate legislative committee or members of the legislature) given full information for the budget year on the spending of all secret items relating to national security and military intelligence?
There is no public information available to verify the whether Bangladesh spends money on 'secret' items relating to military intelligence and national security, or whether this is subject to legislative scrutiny. According to the interviewees, such information is not accessible by anyone, including members of parliament or the members of the Standing Committee.
Response to Government Reviewer: Given lack of publicly available evidence on the issue and very limited budget transparency (as well as limited parliamentary scrutiny - see Q12-12B), it is not possible to verify the extent to which secret spending takes place. Score 0 maintained.
1. Interview with a former senior Army official, interviewed in April 2014.
2. Interview with a serving Army official, interviewed in April 2014.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Disagree
Comment: Since there is no expenditure on secret items this question is not applicable.
Suggested score: N/A
Are audit reports of the annual accounts of the security sector (the military, police, and intelligence services) and other secret programs provided to the legislature (or relevant committee) and are they subsequently subject to parliamentary debate?
Audit reports of police and the military (minus the intelligence services) are generally placed before the Public Accounts Committee of the Parliament. The proceedings of such meetings have limited circulation.
Response to Government Reviewer: Public information regarding auditing of security establishments is not available. However, some old audit reports, submitted to the parliament and available online suggests that internal control mechanism is very weak in various agencies under the ministry of defence (4). The previous score is retained as lawmakers are not known to have been provided with audit reports on secret items, or secret programs.
1. Interview with a serving Army official, interviewed in April 2014.
2. Ishfaq Choudhary, 'Some thoughts on the defence budget', The Daily Star, June 12, 2012, http://dspace.bracu.ac.bd/bitstream/handle/10361/1859/The%20daily%20star%2012th%20June%202012.pdf?sequence=1
3. The People's Republic of Bangladesh, Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General, Public Accounts Committee (PAC) meetings, http://www.cagbd.org/in.php?cp=pacmeet
4. Office of the Comptroller General and Auditor of Bangladesh, 'Report on accounts of the offices under Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces Division', 2005. http://www.cagbd.org/audit/130122519002.Report%20on%20accounts%20of%20the%20offices%20under%20Ministry%20of%20Defence%20and%20Armed%20Forces%20Division.pdf, accessed October 2015.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Disagree
Comment: All policies, procurement and budget except a small portion of it dedicated for covert intelligence are subjected to internal and external auditing.
Suggested score: 3
Off-budget military expenditures are those that are not formally authorised within a country's official defence budget, often considered to operate through the 'back-door'. In law, are off-budget military expenditures permitted, and if so, are they exceptional occurrences that are well-controlled?
Article 87 of the Constitution stipulates that an annual financial statement containing receipts and expenditure by the Government must be placed before the Parliament. However, there is no specific act or legislation regarding off-budget expenditure in Bangladesh.
According to the interviewees, there is no unauthorised defence budget in Bangladesh. However, they also state that defence budgeting has been influenced by UN peacekeeping operations. The money reimbursed as equipment costs through ‘wet lease’ agreements with the UN provides scope to revise defence budgeting without parliamentary approval, in order to comply with UN reimbursement. Therefore, while there may not be any provision for off-budget expenditure, its existence in practice cannot be ruled out given the lack of transparency with regard to the defence budget and its oversight.
(Here, 'wet lease' means a contingent-owned reimbursement system where the troop/police contributor provides and assumes responsibility for maintaining and supporting deployed major items of equipment, together with the associated minor equipment. The troop/police contributor is entitled to reimbursement for providing this support.)
Response to Government Reviewer: Due to lack of transparency and detail in the defence budget, it is not possible to ascertain with any degree of conviction that off-budget expenditures do not exist. No legal statute regulating the issue has been located and the status of UN-related financing is not clear. Score 2 thus appears appropriate.
1. The People's Republic of Bangladesh Constitution, http://bdlaws.minlaw.gov.bd/pdf_part.php?id=367
2. United Nations General Assembly, Manual on Policies and Procedures Concerning the Reimbursement and Control of Contingent - Owned Equipment of Troop/Police Contributors Participating in Peacekeeping Missions (COE Manual), A/C.5/66/827, October 2011, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/sites/coe/referencedocuments/COE_manual_2011.pdf
3. United Nations, INTRODUCTION TO THE CONTINGENT OWNED EQUIPMENT (COE) SYSTEM, 2009, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/sites/coe/referencedocuments/Booklet%20Handout%20Intro%20to%20COE.pdf
4. Interview with a former senior Army official, interviewed in April 2014.
5. Interview with a serving Army official, interviewed in April 2014.
6. Interview with a senior military official, September 2015.
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Budget breakdowns for the Ministry of Defence are not granular enough to make this judgement. There is no legislation or rule regarding off-budget expenditures. Monthly fiscal reports reveal details about expenditures (developmental and non-developmental) of the Ministry of Defence. This is not exhaustive and certain expenditures are classed as &quoute;other&quoute; without a proper definition for the category.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: There is no off-budget military expenditure. Budget related to UN deployment are adjusted from the annual budget of the organisation.
Suggested score: 4
In practice, are there any off-budget military expenditures? If so, does evidence suggest this involves illicit economic activity?
No public information was found on this subject; there is also no positive evidence of any illicit activity being translated into off-budget expenditure. According to the interviewees, Bangladesh doesn't have any provision for off-budget military expenditures. However, the first two interviewees (source 1 and 2) also stated that UN peacekeeping operations also affect defence budgeting given that money is reimbursed as equipment costs through 'wet lease' agreements with the UN. There is thus scope to revise the defence budget without the Parliament's approval. Therefore, while there may not be any provision for off-budget expenditure, its existence in practice be ruled out given the lack of transparency with regard to the defence budget and its oversight.
The military also generally overspends utilizing unspent money from other ministries which is later approved by the Parliament as a 'Supplementary Budget'.
Response to Government Reviewer: Due to lack of transparency and detail in the defence budget, it is not possible to ascertain with any degree of conviction that off-budget expenditures do not exist; moreover, the status of UN-related financing is not clear. Score 2 thus appears appropriate.
1.tInterview with a former senior Army official, interviewed in April 2014.
2. Interview with a serving Army official, interviewed in April 2014.
3. Interview with a defence official, interviewed in May 2014.
4. Ministry of Finance, Budget documents 2013 - 2014, http://www.mof.gov.bd/en/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=183&Itemid=1
5. Interview with a senior military official, September 2015.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Disagree
Comment: There is no off budget military expenditure. Budgets related to UN deployment are adjusted from the annual budget of the organisation.
Suggested score: 4
In law, are there provisions regulating mechanisms for classifying information on the grounds of protecting national security, and, if so, are they subject to effective scrutiny?
National security is often cited as pretext to withholding information from the public. Article 39 of the Right to Information Act prohibits the disclosure of information on state security matters; the Official Secrets Act (1923), the Bangladesh Army Act (1952), the Special Powers Act (1974) and the Right to Information Act (2009) also prohibit it. In addition, Section 28 of the Rules of Business 1996 spells out that no information acquired directly or indirectly from official documents or relating to official matters shall be communicated by a government official to the press, to non-officials of even officials belonging to other government offices, unless he has been generally or specially, empowered to do so.
The sources could not confirm the existence of an effective mechanism to scrutinize the veracity of claims for classifying information.
Response to Government Reviewer: The information provided was confirmed through interviews. Score raised to 2 as there are still concerns regarding oversight of the process.
1. Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Official Secrets Act, 1923, http://bdlaws.minlaw.gov.bd/pdf_part.php?id=132
2. Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Right to Information Act, 2009, http://www.infocom.gov.bd/ic/forms/rti_english.pdf
3. Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, The Army Act, 1952, http://bdlaws.minlaw.gov.bd/print_sections_all.php?id=248
4. Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, Cabinet Division, RULES OF BUSINESS 1996, (Revised up to January 2009), http://www.pmo.gov.bd/pmolib/legalms/pdf/rules-of-business-2009.pdf
5. Interview with a former senior political advisor in April 2014.
6. Interview with a senior military official, September 2015.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Disagree
Comment: In Joint Services Staff Duties Manual, a clear guideline is given on the subject of classification of information and who can request information to be classified.
Suggested score: 4
Do national defence and security institutions have beneficial ownership of commercial businesses? If so, how transparent are details of the operations and finances of such businesses?
Bangladesh directly or indirectly owns and operates a wide variety of commercial businesses. The Army has controlling stakes in a shoe/lather factory established on BMTF lands and a 50 MW power plant installed on Army land in Postogola on the outskirts of Dhaka [4].
The Bangladeshi military's interest in commercial businesses is advanced through a platform of retired personnel named the Sena Kalyan Sangstha (SKS): a trust, the Chair of which is a serving Major General from the military. The SKS's empire has a reported annual turnover of US $ 500 million through its industrial, commercial and consumer products. Many of their products such as processed wheat and flour are sold to the three defence forces (the army, navy and air) for the consumption of military personnel. Cement produced by them is also used for the military's construction works. This initiative appears to be a way for the Trust to provide stipends, and various allowances such as medical, education, distress and veteran support to its members.
All relevant units of the Trust pay taxes to the government and information about their activities are shared with the public through annual reports and websites.
Response to Peer Reviewer 1: Comments added. Score changed to 1.
Response to TI Reviewer: While details surrounding the military's commercial income is opaque, the military's ownership of commercial enterprises is declared. Score of 1 seems the most appropriate.
Response to Government Reviewer: One analyst estimated that the military's profit from commercial enterprises is equivalent to roughly 10% of the national budget (9). Given the lack of transparency regarding commercial revenue (which makes it impossible to verify details), score 1 is the highest possible in this case.
1. Kamal Ahmed, Bangladesh army's advancing business interests, BBC News, 15 August 2010, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-10801268
2. The Daily Kaler Kantho, সেনা কল্যাণ সংস্থার বিরুদ্ধে ২২ কোটি টাকার রাজস্ব ক্ষতির অভিযোগ, 22 June 2010, http://www.kalerkantho.com/print_edition/?view=details&archiev=yes&arch_date=22-06-2010&type=gold&data=news&pub_no=202&cat_id=1&menu_id=43&news_type_id=1&index=24#.U1p26Fca0YE
3. The Daily Janakantha, কল্যাণে অনন্য সেনা কল্যাণ সংস্থা, 17 September 2010, http://www.dailyjanakantha.com/news_view.php?nc=16&dd=2010-09-17&ni=33255
4. The Daily Star, 'Bangladesh Army becomes a big conglomerate over years', July 17, 2010, http://archive.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details.php?nid=147124
5. The Daily Star, 'Bangladesh Army following model of Pak Army', July 24, 2010, http://archive.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details.php?nid=148031
6. Sena Kanyan Sangstha website, http://senakalyan.org/index.aspx
7. BBC, &quoute;Bangladesh Army's Advancing Business Interests&quoute;, 15 August 2010, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-10801268
8. Bangladesh Defence Journal, &quoute;The Changing Role of Bangladesh Army-1971 to 2014&quoute;, March 2014, http://www.sheikhnews.com/2014/05/24/bdarmy-3/
9. Col. (Rtd) Mahmudur Rahman Choudhury, &quoute;The Changing Role of Bangladesh Army-1971 to 2014&quoute;, 24 May 2014. http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:http://www.sheikhnews.com/2014/05/24/bdarmy-3/&strip=1&vwsrc=0, accessed October 2015.
10. Bangladesh Military Forum, http://www.bdmilitary.com/forum/index.php?/topic/179166-bangladesh-army-commercial-assets-ventures-and-projects/. Accessed September 2015.
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: Based on comments above, I suggest the score of 1. In addition, Bangladesh directly or indirectly owns and operates a wide variety of commercial businesses. These are publicly declared but details are not transparent. Examples include operations of resorts, hotels, golf courses, real estate development, educational institutions, a Trust bank, supermarkets, to name a few. A separate Engineers organization (Special Works Organization) is probably operating under the Ministry of Communication for public sector infrastructure development [3]. Army also has controlling stakes in a shoe/lather factory established on BMTF lands and a 50 MW power plant installed on Army land in Postogola on the outskirts of Dhaka [4].
1- BBC, &quoute;&quoute;Bangladesh Army's Advancing Business Interests&quoute;&quoute;, 15 August 2010, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-10801268
2- Bangladesh Defence Journal, &quoute;&quoute;The Changing Role of Bangladesh Army-1971 to 2014&quoute;&quoute;, March 2014, http://www.sheikhnews.com/2014/05/24/bdarmy-3/
Suggested score: 1
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: Defence institutions have ownership of significant commercial businesses in multiple sectors. These businesses are publicly declared or otherwise known, though very little details of their operations are available in public domain. Their finances are far from transparent.
Suggested score: 0
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: Defence institutions do not own commercial business of any significant scale (equivalent to 1% of the defence budget or less). The company Shena Kalyan Sangstha (SKS) mentioned in the comment is a welfare trust for the retired personnel of the Armed Forces and is run by a trustee board form by Bangladesh Gazette Part 1, dated 25 October 1973. Reputed audit firm of the country audits this organisation. Yearly turnover of SKS is mentioned as USD 500 million in the comment, which is not correct and is highly over-estimated.
Suggested score: 4
Are military-owned businesses subject to transparent independent scrutiny at a recognised international standard?
The military in Bangladesh has a stake in commercial businesses through a retired officials' welfare association named Sena Kalyan Shangstha. The ventures of SKS span banking and insurance, cement and flower production, and manufacturing lamps. Its latest venture is a taxi cab service which was inaugurated by the Prime Minister. All business concerns of SKS are subject to Bangladesh's Company Act which requires the publication of activities through annual reports. As per the law, the financial statement of companies are to be audited by independent auditors. However, neither the annual reports nor financial audits are not proactively disclosed and the details are not available to the public. Oversight processes lack independence or reliability.
Response to Government Reviewer: Based on further analysis (5), score was raised to 2.
1.tInterview with a former senior Army official, interviewed in April 2014.
2. Interview with a serving Army official, interviewed in April 2014.
3. Company Act: http://www.mccibd.org/images/uploadimg/file/Trade%20&%20Commerce/Companies%20Act%201994.pdf
4. Annual Report of Trust Bank: http://www.trustbank.com.bd/sites/default/files/TBL%20Annual%20Report%202013.pdf
5. Bangladesh Military Forum, http://www.bdmilitary.com/forum/index.php?/topic/179166-bangladesh-army-commercial-assets-ventures-and-projects/. Accessed September 2015.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Military-owned businesses are claimed to be subject to some scrutiny, but credible details are not available to the public. It is widely believed to enjoy undue advantage compared to other businesses. Whatever little information are disclosed lack independence or reliability.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: Sena Kalyan Shangstha (SKS) is not an association of retired military personnel; rather it is a welfare trust run by a Board of Trustees appointed by Bangladesh Gazette Part 1, dated 25 October 1973. which oversees all activities of SKS. Trust Bank and other organisations under SKS are full scale business organizations which have a well circulated annual report. Besides, all these organizations have to meet all rules of company act and present their public audit documents to the government.
Suggested score: 3
Is there evidence of unauthorised private enterprise by military or other defence ministry employees? If so, what is the government's reaction to such enterprise?
As per the Conduct Rules of the Government, engaging in private enterprise during office hours is a punishable offence.
Recently, many serving military officials have entered the stock exchange business and undertake transactions during office hours. Officials serving in intelligence departments are also allegedly involved in securing business secrets to profit from the stock exchange business. There is no known monitoring from the government.
Response to government reviewer: While the government formally forbids military officials from engaging in the stock exchange in the Conduct Rules of Government, evidence suggests that it occurs anyway. Score changed to 2.
1. Jolshiri website, http://ahs.org.bd/t
2. Somewhere in Blog, রূপগঞ্জে সামরিক ভুমি আগ্রাসন:“দিনরাত লেফ-রাইট করলে ক’মণ শস্য ফলে এক গন্ডা জমিতে?”, October 5 2010, http://www.somewhereinblog.net/blog/dinmojurblog/29260934
3. Interview with a former senior Army official, interviewed in April 2014.
4. Interview with a serving Army official, interviewed in April 2014.
5. বেপরোয়া দুর্নীতির উপাখ্যান- ১ : শেয়ারবাজার লুটপাট কাওসার আলম, October 2 2013, http://www.w2.amardeshonline.com/pages/details/2013/10/02/219073#.U7r2a7GOM5Z
6. Col. (Rtd) Mahmudur Rahman Choudhury, &quoute;The Changing Role of Bangladesh Army-1971 to 2014&quoute;, 24 May 2014. http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:http://www.sheikhnews.com/2014/05/24/bdarmy-3/&strip=1&vwsrc=0, accessed October 2015
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Disagree
Comment: Stock business is prohibited for military personnel during office hours. All commanders are instructed to carry out periodical check on the issue.
Suggested score: 4
Do the Defence Ministry, Defence Minister, Chiefs of Defence, and Single Service Chiefs publicly commit - through, for example, speeches, media interviews, or political mandates - to anti-corruption and integrity measures?
The Prime Minister, Sheikh Hasina, who is also the Defence Minister, after assuming her office in January 2014 stated her government's commitment of zero tolerance towards corruption. Although her warning is assumed to be primarily meant for civil administration officials, it is implied that she also gave the same message to the defence personnel in her capacity as Defence Minister. She has also denounced corruption in front of a military audience at the Defence Staff College in 2013. Furthermore, the ruling Awami League's election manifesto also speaks of eliminating corruption from the country.
There is no public record of any of the chiefs of any of the three forces making public statements on corruption.
Response to Government Reviewer: Given the occasional nature of public commitments to anti-corruption measures in defence and lack of comment from service chiefs, score 2 has been maintained.
1. The Independent, 'Zero tolerance against graft', 17 January 2010, http://www.theindependentbd.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=200966:zero-tolerance-against-graft&catid=129:frontpage&Itemid=121
2. Election Manifesto of Bangladesh Awami League, 2014, http://albd.org/ebooks/manifesto2014en/
3. Interview with a former senior Army official, interviewed in April 2014.
4. Interview with a serving Army official, interviewed in April 2014.
5. Priyo News, 'Present govt didn’t spare anyone for irregularities, corruption: PM Sheikh Hasina', 19 February 2013. http://news.priyo.com/2013/02/19/present-govt-didn-t-spare-anyone-irregularities-co-67587.html, accessed September 2015.
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Public statements from Sheikh Hasina show some mentions of anti-corruption commitments, it is just not implemented to that degree in reality. For example, the most recent UN General Assembly address by Sheikh Hasina highlighted ongoing efforts to curb corruption. Also, she took an oath to reduce corruption right after she took oath as Prime Minister in 2014.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: Defence Minister occasionally makes such statements. As per present policy other than in the Parliamentary Standing Committee, Services Chiefs do not make public statement on such issues.
Suggested score: 3
Are there effective measures in place for personnel found to have taken part in forms of bribery and corruption, and is there public evidence that these measures are being carried out?
The Bangladeshi Penal Code (paras 161-165) foresees three years' imprisonment and/or a fine for active or passive corruption involving public officials. This is reinforced by the 1947 Prevention of Corruption Act. Strict measures are supposed to be taken in response to allegations of bribery and corruption as per the Army Act 1952 (art. 42), which foresees imprisonment for up to five years for servicemen convicted of obtaining or accepting 'illegal gratification'. Information relating to punitive measures taken against any personnel are published through the Government Gazette notification. However, it is generally difficult to obtain printed copies of the official gazette, because of its limited circulation.
According to a book written by a former Army Chief, actions were taken against some corrupt officers during the military-backed Caretaker Government in 2007-2009. The nature of the offences and types of punishments meted out were not elaborated.
Response to Government Reviewer: While it cannot be positively verified that punitive anti-corruption measures are consistently applied, evidence suggests that measures have been taken to punish personnel who have engaged in graft. Score raised to 3.
1. Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Army Act (1952), http://bdlaws.minlaw.gov.bd/print_sections_all.php?id=248t
2. The Daily Star, 'Gen Moeen explains how martial law was averted', February 3, 2009, http://archive.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details.php?nid=74172
3. The Daily Star, 'Army chief to write undisclosed events in history of army', January 30, 2009, http://archive.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details.php?nid=73582
4. Anti-Corruption Commission, Bangladesh, Legal Information, http://www.acc.org.bd/legal-info
5. Interview with a former senior Army official, interviewed in April 2014.
6. Interview with a serving Army official, interviewed in April 2014.
7. Interview with a senior military official, September 2015.
8. 'BD Army Chief Sacked Amid Graft Charges', Daily Times, http://archives.dailytimes.com.pk/main/13-Jun-2002/bd-army-chief-sacked-amid-graft-charges, accessed September 2015.
8. Bangladesh Penal Code, 1860. English translation available at http://bdlaws.minlaw.gov.bd/print_sections_all.php?id=11, accessed October 2015.
9. Prevention of Corruption Act of 1947. http://bdlaws.minlaw.gov.bd/print_sections_all.php?id=217, accessed October 2015.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: The notorious event of seven muders by the RAB officials occurred through bribery. It is reported the 60 million taka were given to a total of 11 RAB officials for this crime. The case is still on trial.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: Strict measures are taken against any military officer in response to allegations of bribery and corruption. These Gazette notifications are published by MOD regularly on such action.
Suggested score: 4
Is whistleblowing encouraged by the government, and are whistle-blowers in military and defence ministries afforded adequate protection from reprisal for reporting evidence of corruption, in both law and practice?
The Whistleblower Protection Act came into being in 2011 following active advocacy by TI Bangladesh. It applies to civilian personnel and by definition is also applicable to military personnel. However it is not well known, possibly as a result of government's inaction to popularize it.
According to the interviewee, within the military, the Act is not known at all and the provisions of the Army Act are seen as sufficient in dealing with perpetrators. The Ministry of Defence has not taken known steps to indicate that it is serious about raising awareness about the Act among the forces personnel.
Response to TI Reviewer and Government Reviewer: While formal whistleblower protections exist, evidence suggests they are not actively used or promoted. It's unclear how the structure of the military would encourage whistleblowing as the government reviewer suggests. Score changed to 1.
1. Disclosure of Information in the public interest (protection) Act, 2011 (Act 7 of Law No. 011), http://bdlaws.minlaw.gov.bd/bangla_all_sections.php?id=1072
2. The Financial Express, 'Enactment of Whistleblowers' Act to help combat corruption', August 14, 2012, http://www.thefinancialexpress-bd.com/old/more.php?news_id=140192&date=2012-08-14
3. Interview with a serving Army official, interviewed in April 2014.
4. Interview with a senior military official, September 2015.
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: 64% of citizens surveyed in the Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer 2013 revealed that they would not report cases of corruption for fear of retribution.
http://www.transparency.org/research/gcb/overview
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Though the Whistle-blower protection Act has been passed for the last 3 years, no effective measures have been taken to implement it. No steps have been taken yet on the part of government or military on how to apply, process, and implement the Act. So, in essence, no practice or culture of whistling blowing is seen or encouraged.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: Mechanisms applicable to military and official personnel exist to report corruption. But there is no evidence that they are made use of, nor is whistle-blowing actively encouraged. There is little trust among officials and personnel the possibility of being protected if they reported corrupt activity.
Suggested score: 1
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: Whistleblowing has long been strongly encouraged within the Military. Whistleblowers are also protected by the structural strength of military.
Suggested score: 3
Is special attention paid to the selection, time in post, and oversight of personnel in sensitive positions, including officials and personnel in defence procurement, contracting, financial management, and commercial management?
There is no publicly available information on this subject and the following is based on interviews:
Positions in defence procurement, contracting, financial management, and commercial management are considered as lucrative posts by aspiring candidates. The internal system of posting follows a certain guideline with regard to matching skills and competencies required for the positions (which are not openly declared) and specific rules of conduct for such positions are circulated internally. While it is possible that special care is taken to depute qualified staff, nonetheless, it could not be verified that selection is not subject to lobbying and persuasion.
Response to Government Reviewer: Given that the only evidence which could be gathered is from interviews and rules and codes of conduct are not made public, score 2 appears appropriate.
1. Interview with a former senior Army official, interviewed in April 2014.
2. Interview with a serving Army official, interviewed in April 2014.
3. Interview with a defence official, interviewed in May 2014.
4. Interview with a senior military official, September 2015.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: 1.tPersonnel selection in sensitive position like defence procurement, contracting, financial and commercial management is done through a rigorous selection process. More so, a number of checks and counter checks are exercised in their day to day activities through organizational set up.
2.tThe comments made indicate that requirement of criteria 3 is fulfilled. Persons placed in procurement desks are specially selected through internal SOPs and are constantly monitored. Posting criteria within any organization is the task of its HR and the HR policies are mostly internal and generally not circulated in public. Careful observation of the officers working in procurement channel and contract management in past few years will surely give an insight of good selection criteria. The Finance Controller, who are not defence personnel, are responsible for financial management.
Suggested score: 3
Is the number of civilian and military personnel accurately known and publicly available?
The exact number of civilian and military personnel is not publicly known nor does the Ministry of Defence annual report mention it. There is no evidence of this subject being discussed during the Parliamentary Standing Committee on the Ministry of Defence meetings in the last five years.
There is some information regarding the number of personnel available online. However, these figures vary and it is not possible to verify how often they are updated or whether they are correct.
Response to Government Reviewer: The focus of the question is on publicly available information. In keeping with your evidence that the exact number of civilian and military personnel is not made made public by official sources, but rather only known internally, score 0 has been selected.
1. Global Fire Power, Bangladesh Military Strength, http://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.asp?country_id=bangladesh, Last updated: 27 March 2014.
2. Nation Master. Bangladesh Military Stats, http://www.nationmaster.com/country-info/profiles/Bangladesh/Military
3. Bangladesh Parliament, 1st, 2nd and 3rd Reports of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on the Ministry of Defence. Publicly unavailable; accessed through a confidential source.
4. Interview with a former senior Army official, interviewed in April 2014.
5. Interview with a serving Army official, interviewed in April 2014.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: The number of civilian and military personnel is known to the Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Public Administration who are responsible for such tasks.
Suggested score: 4
Are pay rates and allowances for civilian and military personnel openly published?
Pay rates up to the rank of General are available. The current pay scale was introduced in 2009 and implemented, in three phases, by 2011 [1]. The pay scale, as set in 2009, is available on the websites of the individual services (links provided as sources [2], [3]); however, the Navy website does not have this published. It is likely that the Navy's pay scale was fixed at the same time in the same manner. In addition, job recruitment ads state the pay scale for respective jobs.
Pay rates for civilian staff are set by the Pay and Services Commission. The 2015 pay rates have been announced.[8]
Information on non-cash compensation which includes health care, retirement pay, childcare and free or subsidized food, housing and education of both serviceman and their children, is also available publicly. (7) However, benefits and allowances are not clear for all positions in the military and for defence ministry officials.
Response to Peer Reviewers and TI Reviewer: Given evidence that information on allowances of high level officials is still incomplete, score has been lowered to 3.
1.tThe Official Website of the Bangladesh Army, National Pay Scale, Army Commissioned Officers, http://www.army.mil.bd/node/417
2.tThe Official Website of the Bangladesh Army, Ration Scale JCO/OR, http://www.army.mil.bd/node/418
3.tBangladesh Air force, Facilities and pay and allowances, http://www.baf.mil.bd/recruitment/facilities.html
4- &quoute;New pay scale from January&quoute;, Newage BD, 19 June 2014, http://newagebd.net/22370/new-pay-scale-from-january/#sthash.r8kFnEd8.dpuf
5.- Army pay scale, http://www.army.mil.bd/node/417
6.- Air Force pay scale, http://www.baf.mil.bd/new/career/payandallowance.html and http://www.joinbangladeshairforce.mil.bd/index.php/main_controll/benifits_baf?1=1&pagemenu=benifits_baf&submenu=1
7. Army recruitment webpage, http://www.joinbangladesharmy.mil.bd/benefits/total-compensation. Accessed 21/9/2015.
8.'Salary structure approved on Sept 7 2015 - Pay Commission Report 2014'. http://www.mediabangladesh.net/pay-commission-report-2014-new-pay-scale/, accessed October 2015.
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: Pay rates are published for junior and mid-level positions; this does not include high level positions. Benefits and allowances are not clear for all positions in the military and for defence ministry officials.
The current pay scale was introduced in 2009 and implemented in three phases until 2011 [1]. The pay scale, as set in 2009, is available on the websites of the individual services (links provided as sources [2], [3]); however, the Navy website does not have this published. It is likely that the Navy's pay scale was fixed at the same time in the same manner. In addition, job recruitment ads state the pay scale for respective jobs.
1- &quoute;New pay scale from January&quoute;, Newage BD, 19 June 2014, http://newagebd.net/22370/new-pay-scale-from-january/#sthash.r8kFnEd8.dpuf
2- Army pay scale, http://www.army.mil.bd/node/417
3- Air Force pay scale, http://www.baf.mil.bd/new/career/payandallowance.html and http://www.joinbangladeshairforce.mil.bd/index.php/main_controll/benifits_baf?1=1&pagemenu=benifits_baf&submenu=1
Suggested score: 3
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Pay comprises monthly wage, compensation, logistic supports, employee-service support, in-kind supplies inclusive of all service benefits. There appears to be discrimination between civil and military pay and service benefit structure and not all benefits are open to public.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: Pay scales for military personnel are available; however, information on allowances is not believed to be credibly available.
Suggested score: 3
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Do personnel receive the correct pay on time, and is the system of payment well-established, routine, and published?
All officials and personnel receive payment on time through wire transfers and separate pay slips issued to them, containing details on gross pay, net pay and recoverable amounts. The officers and staff of the armed forces working in the defence wing of Bangladesh Missions receive their pay and allowances from the wing itself, which is reimbursed through the remittance of foreign currency.
Response to Peer Reviewer 1 and Government Reviewer: the information has been verified through an additional interview and it does appear that the pay system functions well and is publicly known; moreover, responses to the FAQs on the Controller General of Defence Finance appear to make the pay system publicly available. Score raised to 4.
1.tInterview with a former senior Army official, interviewed in April 2014.
2. Interview with a serving Army official, interviewed in April 2014.
3. Responses to FAQs by the Senior Finance Controller of the Army, 13 December 2009, available on the website of the Controller General of Defence Finance, http://www.cgdf.gov.bd/faq.php.
4. Interview with a senior military official, 23/9/15.
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: There is a well-established payment system. According to the FAQs section of the website of the Controller General of Defence Finance (last updated in December 2009), the payment system was also being computerised. During that time, the payment system was automated and computerised at the level of commissioned officers and was being expanded to include other ranks. There is a clear system in place for paying officials on foreign missions too. There are no reports of lapse in payments.
Responses to FAQs by the Senior Finance Controller of the Army, 13 December 2009, available on the website of the Controller General of Defence Finance, http://www.cgdf.gov.bd/faq.php
Suggested score: 4
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: Probably the military is one of the few organizations which pay correct amount in due time to its personnel. The basic pay is non-discretionary. Comment confirms that score should be 4 as statement given in the comment is correct.
Suggested score: 4
Is there an established, independent, transparent, and objective appointment system for the selection of military personnel at middle and top management level?
There is no official information provided by the Ministry of Defence regarding the system of selection for middle and top-level management appointments.
Two of the interviewees (sources 3 and 4) stated that while merit is taken into consideration when it comes to promotions up to the rank of Major, promotions from Colonel to Major General and above are decided through meetings with Generals, which are sometimes influenced by politicians and senior army officials. For higher positions, a selection board initially presided over by the Prime Minister (who is also the Defence Minister) is formed to provide guidelines for promotion. Thereafter, operational selection is conducted by the Board of Generals. This was confirmed by a media report regarding one such meeting of a selection board. According to the report, the Prime Minister also publicly issued the criteria for appointments, asking the board to focus on 'professional efficiency, the spirit of the liberation war, leadership, discipline, honesty, trust worthiness and loyalty as the criteria for promotion'.
According to two of the interviewees (sources 5 and 6), the Army Chief reportedly exerts pressure, at the behest of the political leadership, to promote generals of his choice. In a recent such promotion meeting, the incumbent said: &quoute;Gentlemen, I've two names, do not waste time discussing other proposals and there will be no comment or questions.&quoute; This information could not be verified.
Response to government reviewer: Given a lack of consistency regarding what merit entails in the promotion process, as well as no evidence of independent oversight over appointing bodies, score 2 maintained.
1. NewAge, 'PM lays out criteria for promotion in army', 2 July 2012, http://www.newagebd.com/detail.php?date=2012-07-02&nid=15794#.U3yvkSiOM5Z
2. Rahul Bhonsle, Security Trends South Asia, Bangladesh, Armed Forces Modernisation and Upgradation, Security Risks, Jul 24, 2012, http://www.security-risks.com/security-trends-south-asia/bangladesh/armed-forces-modernisation-and-upgradation-1672.html
3. Interview with a former senior Army official, interviewed in April 2014.
4. Interview with a serving Army official, interviewed in April 2014.
5. Interview with a defence official, interviewed in May 2014.
6. Interview with a journalist at a Bangla publication, May 2014.
7. Interview with a senior military official, September 2015.
8. 'Choose most qualified, honest officials for promotion in army: PM', 27 July 2015. http://newagebd.net/141145/choose-most-qualified-honest-officials-for-promotion-in-army-pm/#sthash.YXSjRdIV.H9dj3GtU.dpuf. Accessed September 2015.
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: There is a published system of appointment within recruitment ads. Promotion patterns are unclear; favouritism from army officers is common.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: Military promotion system is entirely based on seniority and merit and on professional competence. Up to the rank of Major promotion is based on time and formal examinations. From Lieutenant Colonel and above, selection board promotes/recommends promotions, which is practiced in most of the countries of the world.
Suggested score: 3
Are personnel promoted through an objective, meritocratic process? Such a process would include promotion boards outside of the command chain, strong formal appraisal processes, and independent oversight.
There are selection boards within the services which decide promotions in the higher ranks (for example the news report from early 2014 indicated an Army selection board meeting for promotions at colonel and lieutenant colonel level). However, the selection/promotion process itself is not clear. The consensus appears to be that promotions are awarded based on political allegiances to the ruling party to avoid coups. However, in late 2013, an analysis from IHS highlighted that, unlike previous trends, senior officials were promoted apolitically, based on merit, ahead of the elections.
There is also a case from 2004 when the former Chief of the Bangladesh Army had been stripped of his rank on the allegation that he had obtained the position by influencing the government. This was based on a recommendation by the Parliamentary Standing Committee to the Ministry of Defence. However, he was restored to the rank of a General in 2008 after the allegations were found to be baseless by the court, which also reportedly declared that the government's decision to take away the rank in the first place was politically motivated.
The interviewees and media reports indicate the existence of formal processes, boards and oversight processes for promotions. The interviewees further stated that such procedures are subject to pressure by the political leadership and cited an example of a case where the Army Chief pressured the board into considering two individuals for promotions over others. This information, however, could not be independently verified.
Response to Peer Reviewer: Comments added.
Response to Government Reviewer: While a formal appraisal system does appear to exist, the qualifications for merit-based promotions change too frequently to be reasonably anticipated or considered apolitical. It is also unclear whether independent oversight exists. Score maintained.
1. NewAge, 'More reshuffle, promotion in army, air force', November 13, 2013, http://www.newagebd.com/detail.php?date=2013-11-13&nid=72895
2. ThaiIndian News, 'Court restores rank to former Bangladesh Army chief', February 20, 2008, http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/uncategorized/court-restores-rank-to-former-bangladesh-armychief_10019315.html
3. Interview with a defence official, interviewed in May 2014.
4. Interview with defence correspondent of a leading Bangla publication, interviewed in May 2014.
5. 'Army selection board sits today', 1 June 2014. http://newagebd.net/16594/army-selection-board-sits-today/#sthash.7vk1gTQz.dpbs, accessed October 2015.
6. 'Promote dynamic, loyal army officers: PM', 26 May 2013. http://bdnews24.com/bangladesh/2013/05/26/promote-dynamic-loyal-army-officers-pm, accessed October 2015.
7.&quoute;Apolitical promotions in Bangladesh Army reduce likelihood of pre-election coup&quoute;, IHS Country Risk, http://www.ihs.com/products/global-insight/industry-economic-report.aspx?id=1065980117
8. 'For his father’s sins?', 18 July 2009. https://jrahman.wordpress.com/2009/07/18/for-his-fathers-sins/, accessed October 2015.
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: There are selection boards within the services which decide promotions in the higher ranks (for example the news report from early 2014 indicated an Army selection board meeting for promotions at colonel and lieutenant colonel level) [1]. However, the selection/promotion process itself is not clear. The consensus appears to be that promotions are awarded based on political allegiances to the ruling party to avoid coups [2]. However, in late 2013, an analysis from IHS highlighted that, unlike previous trends, senior officials were promoted apolitically, based on merit, ahead of the elections [3].
1- http://newagebd.net/16594/army-selection-board-sits-today/#sthash.7vk1gTQz.dpbs
2- http://bdnews24.com/bangladesh/2013/05/26/promote-dynamic-loyal-army-officers-pm
3- &quoute;Apolitical promotions in Bangladesh Army reduce likelihood of pre-election coup&quoute;, IHS Country Risk, http://www.ihs.com/products/global-insight/industry-economic-report.aspx?id=1065980117
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: A well laid out promotion policy is circulated to all personnel of the armed forces. Each individual can access his/her own standing with regards to others. There is strong formal appraisal process.
Suggested score: 3
Where compulsory conscription occurs, is there a policy of not accepting bribes for avoiding conscription? Are there appropriate procedures in place to deal with such bribery, and are they applied?
The interviewees and the sources consulted confirm that in Bangladesh defence services are voluntary services and there is no system of conscription at any level. Non-official online sources also state that there is no conscription in the country. Although there is a provision for conscription in times of emergency, it has not yet been used.
Response to Peer and Government Reviewers: Agree. Score N/A selected as there is no conscription.
1.tInterview with a former senior Army official, interviewed in April 2014.
2. Interview with a serving Army official, interviewed in April 2014.
3. Interview with a defence official, interviewed in May 2014.
4. ChartsBin website, http://chartsbin.com/view/1887
5. IndexMundi website, Bangladesh Military service age and obligation, Bangladesh, http://www.indexmundi.com/bangladesh/military_service_age_and_obligation.html
6. Interview with a senior military official, on 23/9/15
7. Child Soldiers International, 'Bangladesh'. https://www.google.pl/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CCgQFjABahUKEwid5MbwnLDIAhUTgxoKHUihDdk&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.child-soldiers.org%2Fuser_uploads%2Fpdf%2Fbangladesh2169891.pdf&usg=AFQjCNHIcPIzmX_KrHTRQufAMlotFuqisg, accessed October 2015.
8. Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook, 'Military Service Age and Obligation'. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2024.html, accessed October 2015.
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Bangladesh's military is a voluntary force.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: I'm not sure what the author means by saying that &quoute;defence services are voluntary services and there is not system of conscription at any level. In my understanding, in Bangladesh the Bangladesh National Cadet Corps (BNCC) is a para-military reserve defence force that work voluntarily and comprising the Army, Navy and Air Force. This is an established institution formed in the 1920s.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: There is no system of compulsory conscription in Bangladesh Armed Forces.
Suggested score: N/A
With regard to compulsory or voluntary conscription, is there a policy of refusing bribes to gain preferred postings in the recruitment process? Are there appropriate procedures in place to deal with such bribery, and are they applied?
The interviewees and the sources consulted confirm that in Bangladesh defence services are voluntary services and there is no system of conscription at any level. Non-official online sources also state that there is no conscription in the country. Although there is a provision for conscription in times of emergency, it has not yet been used.
Score N/A selected as there is no conscription.
Response to Government Reviewer: Despite legal prohibitions against the use of bribes, it still appears to be a common practice for those seeking promotions. However, in this case the score remains N/A as there is no voluntary or obligatory conscription in Bangladesh.
1.tInterview with a former senior Army official, interviewed in April 2014.
2. Interview with a serving Army official, interviewed in April 2014.
3. Interview with a defence official, interviewed in May 2014.
4. ChartsBin website, http://chartsbin.com/view/1887
5. IndexMundi website, Bangladesh Military service age and obligation, Bangladesh, http://www.indexmundi.com/bangladesh/military_service_age_and_obligation.html
6. Interview with a senior military official, on 23/9/15.
7. Child Soldiers International, 'Bangladesh'. https://www.google.pl/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CCgQFjABahUKEwid5MbwnLDIAhUTgxoKHUihDdk&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.child-soldiers.org%2Fuser_uploads%2Fpdf%2Fbangladesh2169891.pdf&usg=AFQjCNHIcPIzmX_KrHTRQufAMlotFuqisg, accessed October 2015.
8. Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook, 'Military Service Age and Obligation'. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2024.html, accessed October 2015.
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Bangladesh's military is a voluntary force. There are instances of bribery for volunteers to get preferred postings.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: There is no compulsory conscription in the armed forces. There is no incident known of bribery to be included in the recruitment process. Although there is no policy available separately on this issue but since recruitment in done by military personnel they are bound by the military law which has several acts on illegal gratification.
Suggested score: 4
Is there evidence of 'ghost soldiers', or non-existent soldiers on the payroll?
So far the issue of phantom soldiers in Bangladesh military has not been reported in the media or through any independent research or publicly available information. It was further confirmed by sources interviewed. However, a degree of uncertainty re. the separation of chains of command and payment, as well as lack of confirmation of independent oversight (see Q46), means that there is a slight risk of the ghost soldier phenomenon occurring.
Response to TI Reviewer: Following new analysis, score changed to 3.
1.tInterview with a former senior Army official, interviewed in April 2014.
2. Interview with a serving Army official, interviewed in April 2014.
3. Interview with a senior military official, September 2015.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: There is no specific vidence of ghost soldiers. However, considering deficit of transparency and accountability in payment systems the possibility of the phenomenon cannot be ruled out.
Suggested score: 3
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are chains of command separate from chains of payment?
Chains of payment and chains of command both at the MoD and armed forces appear to be mostly distinct and separated.
Members of the armed forces mostly receive payment through an automated computerised system which was put in place by 2009. Each service has a Senior Financial Controller (SFC) and other area financial controllers, who are all responsible for financial matters under the Defence Financial Department. For officers, payment is done through the financial controller while soldiers' pay, although done through the chain of command, is also maintained by the corps record office following the Field Imprest Holder's instructions. Soldiers' pay is also monitored and supervised by Finance Controller of Ministry of Defence, which is separate from chain of command. However, the FAQ section on the Office of the Controller General Defence Finance website suggests that the payment system is currently operated primarily by authorised field officers and the degree of supervision and audit is not clear.
Officers of the Office of the Controller General Defence Finance also appear to be responsible for the payment of civilian salaries and allowances.
Response to Peer Reviewer and Government Reviewer: Comments added. Score amended to 2 to reflect that the pay systems are mostly separated and, where they are not, should be audited by independent personnel. However, uncertainty over the magnitude of the role of officers and the extent to which the system is subject to audits warrants the score of 2.
1.Interview with a former senior Army official, interviewed in April 2014.
2.Interview with a serving Army official, interviewed in April 2014.
3. Interview with a defence official, interviewed in May 2014.
4. People's Republic of Bangladesh, Office of the Controller General Defence Finance, http://www.cgdf.gov.bd/faq.php. Accessed October 2015.
5. Interview with a senior military official, September 2015.
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: For the civilian staff, the Public Service Commission (PSC) is a quasi-judicial body mandated to ensure fair and transparent public sector recruitment. Members of the armed forces mostly receive payment through an automated computerised system which was put in place by 2009. Each service has a Senior Financial Controller (SFC) and other area fianancial controllers, who are all responsible for financial matters under the Defence Financial Department.
http://www.cgdf.gov.bd/faq.php
Suggested score: 3
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Disagree
Comment: Chain of command is strictly separate from the chain of payment. For officers payment is done through financial controller. Payments for soldiers, although done through chain of command, are also maintained by the corps record office following the Field Imprest Holder Instructions. Soldiers' payment are also monitored and supervised by Finance Controller of Ministry of Defence, which is separate from the chain of command.
Suggested score: 4
Is there a Code of Conduct for all military and civilian personnel that includes, but is not limited to, guidance with respect to bribery, gifts and hospitality, conflicts of interest, and post-separation activities?
The Army Act 1952 clearly sets out provisions regarding penalties for bribery, gift giving, and acceptance of hospitality. For civilian personnel, there are a number of protocols, which include: the Government Servant (Conduct) Rules 1979, the Government Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules 1985, and the Public Servants (Dismissal on Conviction) Ordinance 1985. There is however, no mention about post-separation activities in any of these protocols.
Additionally, information regarding the distribution and application of the aforementioned instruments could not be obtained from the interviewees or media sources.
Response to Government Reviewer: Neither the Army Act 1952 and the Government Servant (Conduct) Rules 1979 provide comprehensive guidance with respect to bribery, gifts and hospitality, conflicts of interest, and post-separation activities. For example, the concept of conflict of interest is absent from both legal instruments, while there is no definitive guideline for post-separation activities for either civilian or military officials. It is also unclear whether there is a detailed Code of Conduct that would apply to military officers.
1.tGovernment of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Army Act 1952, http://bdlaws.minlaw.gov.bd/print_sections_all.php?id=248
2. Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, the Government Servants (Conduct) Rules, 1979, http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/civilservice/govservantrules.pdf
3. Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Public Servants (Dismissal on Conviction) Ordinance 1985, http://bdlaws.minlaw.gov.bd/print_sections_all.php?id=680
4. Interview with a former senior Army official, interviewed in April 2014.
5. Interview with a serving Army official, interviewed in April 2014.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Disagree
Comment: As mentioned in the comment there are provisions regarding penalties for bribery, gift giving and acceptance of hospitality in Bangladesh Army Act 1952, which was ratified by the Parliament (post-separation).
Suggested score: 3
Is there evidence that breaches of the Code of Conduct are effectively addressed ,and are the results of prosecutions made publicly available?
Information regarding the process of action for breaches of the codes of conduct (outlined in Question 47) becomes available when public notices are printed in the newspapers. With regard to absconding or fugitive officials, such public pronouncements are mandatory by law. As for information regarding dismissal or termination, these are mentioned in the official Gazette of the Government. While Part III of the Gazette, published in eight parts, has notifications issued by the Ministry of Defence is not available online, hard copies of it can be obtained for a nominal price by interested persons.
Response to Peer Reviewer 1 and Government Reviewer: While there are some examples of Code of Conduct being effectively addressed, these are not published proactively - although it is noted that they can be obtained by request. Score changed to 2.
1. Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Bangladesh Government Press, Weekly Gazettes, http://www.dpp.gov.bd/bgpress/index.php/document/get_gazette_part/19/2014-05-08
2. Interview with a serving Army official, interviewed in April 2014.
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: As pointed in the comments above, information is published, but enforcement is doubtful.
Suggested score: 1
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Disagree
Comment: There are sufficient examples of Code of Conduct being effectively addressed. These are not published for public viewing, but can be obtained following proper procedure.
Suggested score: 4
Does regular anti-corruption training take place for military and civilian personnel?
Army training and doctrine command’s current guideline focuses on training recruits to develop desirable character traits where the violation of honesty and integrity is treated as ‘unacceptable’. The Bangladesh Military Academy’s (BMA) Standard of Nine (STA 9 in short) provides scopes for infusing a set of values and ethos among gentlemen cadets. The Bangladesh Military Academy (BMA) also has a honor code which states: &quoute;A Gentleman/ Gentlewoman Cadet shall lead a life of honor and integrity. He/she shall not lie, cheat or steal.&quoute; It is, however, difficult to measure the effectiveness of this code. Moreover, despite numerous courses on ethical behaviour, anti-corruption as a topic is not included in the military’s training module at any level.
The Special Bangladesh Army Order (SBAO) was recently introduced to attain the highest standards of integrity and ethical behavior. Commanding Officers during regular ‘darbar’ meetings with soldiers make references of ‘ill effects of corruption’ as passing remarks, without elaborating strategies to combat it.
For civil service officials, anti-corruption training has become mandatory following a recent initiative of the Anti-Corruption Commission. Following the adoption of National Integrity Strategy in 2012 by the government, all government offices have now geared up their anti-corruption training for respective officials. The Cabinet Division is the coordination body to oversee implementation of all NIS Work plan.(1) Under its work plan, the Defence Ministry is to set up ethics committee in all its departments, arrange good governance training and introduce integrity awards.(2)
Response to Peer Reviewer 2: Agree. Based on latest information (6, 7), the score is changed to 2.
Response to Government Reviewer: Given that there is no publicly available evidence of regularly repeated, systematic anti-corruption training in the armed forces, score 4 would be too high. Score 2 selected.
Source:
1.Accessed on 24/9/15 http://www.jica.go.jp/bangladesh/english/office/topics/speech150124.html
2.http://mod.portal.gov.bd/sites/default/files/files/mod.portal.gov.bd/page/aa643ad3_7afd_43df_956c_925cf1f982a8/NISWofMOD.pdf
1. Bangladesh Army Journal,' Ethics training for personnel of Bangladesh army: a pragmatic approach', 53rd Issue, June 2013, http://www.army.mil.bd/sites/default/files/Army%20Journal%2053%20Issue.pdf
2. Bangladesh Army Journal, 'Character training and assessment of recruits,' Bangladesh Army Journal, 49th Issue, June 2011, http://www.army.mil.bd/sites/default/files/Army%20Journal%2049%20issue_0.pdf
3. Bangladesh Military Academy, BMA Honour Code, http://bma.mil.bd/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=108&Itemid=126
4. &quoute;Inter agency Collaboration and Cooperation among the Office of Comptroller and Auditor General, Anti Corruption Commission, and Information Commission, Bangladesh”-http://www.bei-bd.org/newsevents-details.php?news_id=204
5. Denmark supports anti-corruption initiatives in Bangladesh in the Financial Express, online: http://www.thefinancialexpress-bd.com/old/more.php?date=2012-06-05&news_id=131905 (accessed in June 2014)
6. Chief Representative's Speech, Opening Ceremony of Training Program for National Integrity Strategy Support Project. 24 January 2015. http://www.jica.go.jp/bangladesh/english/office/topics/speech150124.html, accessed September 2015.
7. National Integrity Strategy Work Plan for Ministry of Defence, January 2015-June 2016.
http://mod.portal.gov.bd/sites/default/files/files/mod.portal.gov.bd/page/aa643ad3_7afd_43df_956c_925cf1f982a8/NISWofMOD.pdf, accessed September 2015.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Disagree
Comment: It is clear from the comments section that civil servants are provided training on anti-corruption. Therefore, the score should change a bit.
Suggested score: 2
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: I was invited by the Bangladesh Air Force authority once to take a session on corruption control in general (not in the defence sector). It was the only such event known, and was never followed up either by Air Force or other forces.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: Anti-corruption is not included as a topic in the training module. In 2010 Ethos and Values were introduced in Bangladesh Army. There are seven ethos and nine values to be remembered and followed by all members. Commanders at all level are ensuring that these are understood and followed by their subordinates. Commanding Officers and Officer Commanding are explaining these to their under command in “Darbar” elaborately and regularly and not as passing remarks. Some of these include anti-corruptions aspects also.
Suggested score: 4
Is there a policy to make public outcomes of the prosecution of defence services personnel for corrupt activities, and is there evidence of effective prosecutions in recent years?
Section 19 of the Army Act stipulates that a certificate on the termination of service will be issued for personnel highlighting reasons of termination. Prosecution takes place as per existing guidelines, and the outcomes of such prosecutions are mentioned in the official Gazette of the Government, which has limited circulation. There is, however, no policy that prosecutions must be publicly made available and there is no evidence or media reports of effective prosecutions in recent years - although cases do receive some media attention. (see 5)
Response to Government Reviewer: While an internal policy might exist, it does not satisfy the requirement that prosecutions be made publicly available. Score 1 maintained.
1. The Army Act, 1952, http://bdlaws.minlaw.gov.bd/print_sections_all.php?id=248
2. Bangladesh Government Press, Weekly Gazettes Vol-19 : May 08, 2014, http://www.dpp.gov.bd/bgpress/index.php/document/get_gazette_part/19/2014-05-08
3. Interview with a former senior Army official, interviewed in April 2014.
4. Interview with a serving Army official, interviewed in April 2014.
5. &quoute;Destiny Group President Harun-Ar-Rashid’s bail in two money laundering cases upheld.&quoute; 14 September 2015. http://bdnews24.com/bangladesh/2015/09/14/destiny-group-president-harun-ar-rashids-bail-in-two-money-laundering-cases-upheld, accessed October 2015.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Disagree
Comment: There is an internal policy to circulate the outcome of the prosecution of defence services within defence establishments.
Suggested score: 2
Are there effective measures in place to discourage facilitation payments (which are illegal in almost all countries)?
Section 42 of the Army Act (1952) stipulates 'rigorous imprisonment' for a term which may extend to five years for any person in uniform who 'directly or indirectly accepts or obtains, or agrees to accept, or attempts to obtain, from any person for himself, or any other person, any gratification whatever other than a legal remuneration'. This appears to encompass facilitation payments. Violation of this legislation is dealt by the Military Court Marshall.
The relevant authorities do not exercise a proactive disclosure policy with regard to the effectiveness of these measures and there is no public information available on the same either.
1.tThe Army Act 1952, Section 42: http://bdlaws.minlaw.gov.bd/print_sections_all.php?id=248
2.tInterview with a serving Army official, interviewed in April 2014.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Do the armed forces have military doctrine addressing corruption as a strategic issue on operations?
On the basis of a review of publicly available documents, it can be ascertained that there is no existing operational doctrine addressing corruption as a strategic issue. This was further confirmed by the sources interviewed.
Response to Government Reviewer: Bangladesh doesn't have approved military doctrine addressing corruption issues for peace and conflict. However, in light of the government reviewer's information that an operational doctrine is being prepared, score is modified to 1.
1.tInterview with a former senior Army official, interviewed in April 2014.
2. Interview with a serving Army official, interviewed in April 2014.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Disagree
Comment: Armed forces are aware of corruption as a strategic issue for operation. Presently we are working on an operational doctrine. However, every member before being employed in conflict situation are briefed adequately by concerned authorities about corruption issues.
Suggested score: 2
Is there training in corruption issues for commanders at all levels in order to ensure that these commanders are clear on the corruption issues they may face during deployment? If so, is there evidence that they apply this knowledge in the field?
There is no known specific anti-corruption training for commanders; commanders may become aware of corruption-related issues through media reporting. According to the interviewees, such public knowledge is sometimes imparted during 'darbar' meetings with soldiers. In the absence of formal anti-corruption training module and a mechanism in place to distinctly identify if commanders benefit from such informal sharing of information, their effectiveness cannot be be ascertained.
Response to Government Reviewer: Considering that no anti-corruption training has been given to commanders, score 1 is maintained. The focus of the question is on corruption as an issue on operations, not only domestically - in particular, the impact of corruption on military interventions and/or peacekeeping operations. This requires tailored training and doctrine.
1.tInterview with a serving Army official, interviewed in April 2014.
2.tBangladesh Traders Manual: Export-import, Trade, Investment, Ibp Usa, USA International Business Publications, Int'l Business Publications, Mar 3, 2008, http://books.google.com.bd/books?id=_m6_o0ldLLwC&pg=PA37&lpg=PA37&dq=anti-corruption+training+in+bangladesh+military&source=bl&ots=p-YacvgXAb&sig=jbQPQhxeInv41YxeNgKvzZLntl4&hl=en&sa=X&ei=DUxbU97PMenesATF5YH4CQ&ved=0CD8Q6AEwBA#v=onepage&q=anti-corruption%20training%20in%20bangladesh%20military&f=false
3. Interview with a defence official, interviewed in May 2014.
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Corruption training is not seen as a requirement by commanders as they are to be capable of maintaining discipline of their staff and picking up any indicator of corruption without any specific training.
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Disagree
Comment: There are no compulsory courses or training for commanders. However, an examination on Military Law is compulsory for every officer to be promoted to the rank of major or equivalent. Manual of Bangladesh Military Law is a compulsory subject in the military academies. Unless military officers are posted in few specific appointment or deputed to other organisations additional courses of training are not necessary. In those cases, they are given on-the-job training regarding corruption issues.
Suggested score: 3
Are trained professionals regularly deployed to monitor corruption risk in the field (whether deployed on operations or peacekeeping missions)?
There is no information was available on this subject from any public sources. The interviewees indicated that there are no corruption monitors deployed although there have been cases where several military personnel involved with sexual exploitation and abuse were sent back home during missions and were later dismissed. This may indicate some oversight of the actions of deployed troops, although it cannot be determined whether such scrutiny would extend to corrupt activities.
Response to Government Reviewer: While contingents have trained regimental police and intelligence personnel in the field during peacekeeping operations, sources could not confirm that they have specifically monitored corruption. An additional interviewee (2) confirmed that there are no clear guidelines in respect to deploying staff to monitor corrupt practices.
1. Interview with a defence official, interviewed in May 2014.
2. Interview with a senior military official, September 2015.
3. 'Four peacekeepers accused of sex abuse already repatriated – UN mission in Sudan', 4 January 2007. http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=21160, accessed September 2015.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Disagree
Comment: Contingents deployed are self-sustained. Contingents have trained regimental police and intelligence personnel to monitor corruption in the field when deployed on operations and peacekeeping missions. Apart from that, UN employed Contingent Owned Equipment (COE) Inspection team inspects the contingent on quarterly basis.
Suggested score: 3
Are there guidelines, and staff training, on addressing corruption risks in contracting whilst on deployed operations or peacekeeping missions?
Section 30 of the Defence Purchase Manual (DP-35) provides provisions for the cancellation of contracts in cases of bribery, commissions and gifts. However, the list of debarred firms is not available on DGDP’s website.
Furthermore, this provision is not used as Section 35 also disallows disclosure of contract-related information through the Official Secrets Act of 1923. The second interviewee indicated that such regulations apply to contracting during operations.
Response to Government Reviewer: Operational contracting is shaped by different pressures than regular procedures and it is advisable that regular procedures are reviewed to reflect any special requirements. Given that only general guidelines apply, score 2 was selected.
1. Directorate General of Defence Purchase website, http://www.dgdp.gov.bd
2. Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Ministry of Defence, Directorate General Defence Purchase, Form DP - 35, http://www.dgdp.gov.bd/dgdp_pdf/DP-35,ltr%20of%20-1961,SOP.pdf
3. Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Official Secrets Act, 1923, http://bdlaws.minlaw.gov.bd/pdf_part.php?id=132
4. Interview with a serving Army official, interviewed in April 2014.
5. Interview with a defence official, interviewed in May 2014.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Disagree
Comment: All the purchases relating to peacekeeping missions are done through Directorate General Defence Purchase (DGDP) following the normal purchase procedure. However, there is no special training for the staffs of DGDP. Normally, officers of logistic background who have knowledge on procurement procedure are posted to DGDP and given on-the-job training. Officers of logistic department attend courses which include procurement procedure in their courses at different stages of their career.
Suggested score: 3
Private Military Contractors (PMCs) usually refer to companies that provide operational staff to military environments. They may also be known as security contractors or private security contractors, and refer to themselves as private military corporations, private military firms, private security providers, or military service providers.
There are several private security companies (examples listed as sources 7-11), which operate in Bangladesh and are mostly formed by former military officials. There is no evidence of their performing military roles; it appears that they are mostly used to provide private security services such as manned security, guard service, VIP/Executive Protection, Convoy escort, cash-in-transit operations, background checking, CCTV surveillance, training etc. There are some news reports questioning their role. [6]
There is legislation to regulate private security companies, passed in 2006 [1]; the text of the legislation is publicly available. The legislation does not describe sanctions for corrupt companies. Depending on the offence/breach, the company and individuals can be tried under other criminal and labour laws.
Response to Peer Reviewer 1: Agree. Sources added and score 2 selected.
Response to Government Reviewer: While PMCs are subject to legislative scrutiny, no evidence could be found of those sanctions having been effectively applied.
1. 2006 Private Security Services Act, http://www.privatesecurityregulation.net/files/LawOnPrivateSecurity.pdf
2. Rangers Academy of Security and Defence website, http://www.rangersbd.com/training/home.html
3. Private Military Contractor(PMC) & Protective Security Detail (PSD) Assignments blog, http://pmcpsdassignments.wordpress.com/
4. Interview with a defence official, interviewed in May 2014.
5. &quoute;Private security service providers protest new rules&quoute;, BC News, 22 August 2006, http://bdnews24.com/bangladesh/2006/08/22/private-security-service-providers-protest-new-rules
6. &quoute;Viability of private security guards!&quoute;, editorial in the Daily Sun, 11 October 2014, http://www.daily-sun.com/details_yes_11-10-2014_Viability-of-private-security-guards_1002_1_5_1_2.html
7. 3rd Eye Consulting homepage, http://www.3rdeyeconsulting.org/about.php
8. CommandoGuards Bangladesh homepage, http://www.commandoguardsbd.com/index.php
9. Isslbd homepage, http://www.isslbd.net/
10. Sentry Security Bangladesh homepage, http://www.sentrysecuritybd.com/profile.php
11. Elite Bangladesh, https://www.facebook.com/elitebd/info
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: There are several private security companies (examples listed as sources 3, 4, 5, 6, 7) which operate in Bangladesh and are mostly formed by former military officials. There are no evidence of them performing military roles. There is a legislation to regulate private security companies, passed in 2006 [1]. The text of the legislation is publicly available [2]. There are some news reports questioning their role [8]; The legislation does not describe sanctions for corrupt companies. Depending on the offence/breach, the company and individuals can be tried under other criminal and labour laws. Based on my readings about the PMCs operating in Bangladesh, it appears that they are mostly used to provide private security services such as manned security, guard service, VIP/Executive Protection, Convoy escort, cash-in-transit operations, background checking, CCTV surveillance, training etc.
1- &quoute;Private security service providers protest new rules&quoute;, BC News, 22 August 2006, http://bdnews24.com/bangladesh/2006/08/22/private-security-service-providers-protest-new-rules
2- &quoute;&quoute;Private Security Services Act- 2006&quoute;&quoute;, http://psm.du.edu/media/documents/national_regulations/countries/asia_pacific/bangladesh/bangladesh_private_security_act_2006-bengali.pdf (published in Bangali).
3- http://www.3rdeyeconsulting.org/about.php
4- http://www.commandoguardsbd.com/index.php
5- http://www.isslbd.net/
6- http://www.sentrysecuritybd.com/profile.php
7- https://www.facebook.com/elitebd/info
8- &quoute;Viability of private security guards!&quoute;, editorial in the Daily Sun, 11 October 2014, http://www.daily-sun.com/details_yes_11-10-2014_Viability-of-private-security-guards_1002_1_5_1_2.html
Suggested score: 2
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Disagree
Comment: There is limited use of PMCs to provide some equipment to military environments and they are also subject to same level of scrutiny in case of their involvement with the armed forces.
Suggested score: 4
Does the country have legislation covering defence and security procurement and are there any items exempt from these laws?
While the Public Procurement Act 2006 (PPA) and the Public Procurement Rules 2008 (PPR) govern all official procurement in Bangladesh (the PPA contains specific anti-corruption regulations), the military is reported to bypass these regulations and mostly rely on the Defence Purchase Regulation-35 (DP-35) of 1961, which is a special ruling on military procurement. The PSCMoD reports indicate that the Armed Forces Division under the Prime Minister's Office has initiated a process of developing a comprehensive procurement regulation for the defence forces, including a separate secretariat.
The government preserves the power to exempt procurements from the operation of the PPA 2006 in the interest of national security and defence. Although defence purchases in Bangladesh are also subject to the PPA and PPR as well as internal audit at the Defence Services, there is inadequate information about them in general and about large, complex defence procurements in particular. It was thus impossible to ascertain the degree to which legislation is followed and exempt procurement scrutinised (particularly given the limited effectiveness of internal audit - see Q14) with the degree of confidence that would allow for a higher score.
Response to Government Reviewer: The comments and information of the government reviewer was verified and was found to be correct. (7) However, from the proceedings of the PSCoD of the 9th Parliament, it is evident that the some services chief strongly advocated in favour of DP 35, instead of adhering to PPR and PPA, because those regulations delay the whole process of acquisition. (8). Also, a great deal of skepticism exists among academia regarding the recent US$ 1 billion deal to purchase equipment from Russia. (9) Thus, score 1 was maintained.
1. Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Public Procurement Act 2006 (English translation), http://www.bdtender.info/itrf/PPA_2006_E_V.pdf
2. Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Public Procurement Rules 2008, http://www.bdtender.info/itrf/PPR_B_V_2008.pdf.
3. Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Ministry of Defence, Directorate General Defence Purchase, Form DP - 35, http://www.dgdp.gov.bd/dgdp_pdf/DP-35,ltr%20of%20-1961,SOP.pdf
4. ADB/OECD Anti-Corruption Initiative for Asia and the Pacific, Anti-corruption policies in Asia and the Pacific: Thematic review on provisions and practices to curb corruption in public procurement,
Self-assessment report Bangladesh, http://www.oecd.org/site/adboecdanti-corruptioninitiative/policyanalysis/35593493.pdf
5. Ridwanul Hoque, Public Procurement Law in Bangladesh: From Bureaucratisation to Accountability (2010), http://www.ippa.org/IPPC4/Proceedings/01ComparativeProcurement/Paper1-7.pdf
6. Interview with a defence official, interviewed in May 2014.
7. Interview with a senior military official, September 2015.
8. The 1st report of the PSCoD, June 2010. Accessed through a source.
9. Dr. Rashed Uz Zaman and Niloy Ranjan Biswas, 'Peacekeeping Contributor Profile: Bangladesh', May 2014. http://www.providingforpeacekeeping.org/2014/04/03/contributor-profile-bangladesh/, accessed September 2015.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Disagree
Comment: Defence procurement is governed through a set policy named DP-35 since independence while Public Procurement Act (PPA) entered into force only in 2006. DP-35 is a very well written document and customized for defence procurement. PPA gives scope for armed forces to formulate her own policy hence, Armed Forces Division formulated Armed Forces Procurement Policy 2010 while steps are also being taken to modernize DP-35. PPA and Public Procurement Rules (PPR) allow every office of government to procure its own requirements irrespective of its expertise in the field. Whereas, DP-35 ensures centralized procurement through experts, detailed inspection by a different organization and payment through finance controller. This makes defence procurement transparent. There is no exemption for any item from the existing rules.
Suggested score: 4
Is the defence procurement cycle process, from assessment of needs, through contract implementation and sign-off, all the way to asset disposal, disclosed to the public?
The Defence Purchase Regulation of 1961 known as DP-35 lays down the entire procurement cycle: from needs assessment to contact implementation and signing off. This regulation is available to the public online. Section 25 of DP 35 provides for free distribution of all publications, catalogs and Technical Manuals at the request of the Purchaser. The process also involves serving tender notification to enlisted contractors, public notices, request for proposal, request for quotations and two-state bidding: technical and financial proposals, comparative statements and so on. However, information on asset disposal is only available in the most cursory form (see Q22).
Response to Peer Reviewer 1: Agree. Score 2 selected.
1. Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Ministry of Defence, Directorate General Defence Purchase, Form DP - 35, http://www.dgdp.gov.bd/dgdp_pdf/DP-35,ltr%20of%20-1961,SOP.pdf
2. Interview with a former senior Army official, April 2014.
3. Interview with defence contractor, May 2014.
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: There are rules but in practice the various stages of procurement processes are not made public, especially with major military hardware. Most often, the procurement is made public in form of a news release after contract has been negotiated or around the delivery stage. All news stories about military procurement in the past 10 years are a good example of this. However, there are some RFT, RFP announcements for some smaller military purchases. Hence, the score of 2. There is no information about asset disposals.
Suggested score: 2
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Are defence procurement oversight mechanisms in place and are these oversight mechanisms active and transparent?
The Defence Purchase Regulation-35 (DP-35) provides the framework for dispute resolution, arbitration and contract termination in defence procurement contracts. Procurement oversight mechanisms do exist, with both the Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General and the Office of the Controller General Defence Finance, Ministry of Defence empowered to conduct procurement audits. The Parliamentary Standing Committee on the Ministry of Defence occasionally discusses some low-priced purchases. The Public Accounts Committee of the Parliament has also provisions to review audit results relating to defence purchases. However, an overview of parliamentary reports indicated that only a few meetings have taken place in the last five years and the content of those discussions were not made public.
According to the interviewee, a total 12947 audit objections have been recorded for 25 institutions under the MoD. As of April 2014, a total of 1553 audit objections are pending against the Army HQ, 514 against Naval HQ and 215 against Air force HQ. This large number of unresolved audit figures is indicative of the lack of activity and transparency of the system in place. While the accumulated amount with respect to cumulative audit objections could not be obtained, it is estimated to be billions of Bangladesh Taka.
Response to government reviewer: Score 2 selected to reflect the existence of audit and its partial transparency combined with lack of effectiveness. Large number of unresolved audit issues suggests that the government may be reluctant to take audit findings into account, which calls effectiveness into question.
1. Ishfaq Choudhary, 'Some thoughts on the defence budget', The Daily Star, June 12, 2012, http://dspace.bracu.ac.bd/bitstream/handle/10361/1859/The%20daily%20star%2012th%20June%202012.pdf?sequence=1
2. Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Ministry of Defence, Directorate General Defence Purchase, Form DP - 35, http://www.dgdp.gov.bd/dgdp_pdf/DP-35,ltr%20of%20-1961,SOP.pdf
3. Bangladesh Parliament, 1st, 2nd and 3rd Reports of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on the Ministry of Defence. Publicly unavailable; accessed through a confidential source.
4. Interview with a defence official, interviewed in May 2014.
5. Office of the Controller General Defence Finance, Ministry of Defence, Defence Finance Department, http://www.cgdf.gov.bd/functions.php
6. Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General of Bangladesh website, http://www.cag.org.bd/
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Disagree
Comment: Contrary to the comment, the unresolved audit objections are indicators of oversight mechanism and transparency. All the objections are given proper attention by the authorities and are cleared following the proper procedure, which is quite lengthy and complex.
Suggested score: 3
Are actual and potential defence purchases made public?
The DGDP publishes an annual report outlining all major purchases in a fiscal year which runs from July to June. This is not a public document; it is not available on the DGDP website and circulation is limited to only 20 selected officials. The 2012 - 2013 report listed all types of defence purchases made from abroad with details of the country of origin, price and a brief specification of the weapons/equipment.
In 2010, the government unveiled a 10 year defence purchase plan in the Parliament. Bangladesh signed a deal with Russia in January 2013 to purchase weapons worth $1 billion. Following media criticism against this ‘mystery deal’, the Prime Minister offered some justification for the procurement.
Further modernization is being carried out under the “Forces Goal 2030” plan to enhance the capability of the country’s armed forces. When the leading Bangla Daily Prothom Alo questioned such large purchases in the absence of a Defence Policy, the Armed Forces Division issued a media statement claiming that all such purchases were being made by ensuring the highest standards of transparency and accountability. It also criticized the publication of such a report stating it could jeopardize the country's national security and independence.
Response to Government Reviewer: Through Forces Goal 2030, Bangladesh for the first time publicly disclosed its plan for modernization of armed forces. (4) According to an analysis, Bangladesh's arms equipment imports are estimated to increase in coming days. (7) As verified (9), most of the government reviewer's remarks are found to be correct, however, the political economy issues behind major defence purchases will remain in the dark.(8) Issues surrounding past procurement remain, as discussed above. Score raised to 2.
1. Rahul Bhonsle, , 'Bangladesh – Arming Without Aiming?' Security Trends South Asia, January 31 2013, http://www.security-risks.com/security-trends-south-asia/bangladesh/bangladesh-%E2%80%93-arming-without-aiming-1808.html
2. Thematic review on provisions and practices to curb corruption in public procurement, Self-assessment report Bangladesh, ADB/OECD Report, http://www.oecd.org/site/adboecdanti-corruptioninitiative/policyanalysis/35593493.pdf (accessed in May 2014)
3. Defence Purchase: Transparency the answer, in the Daily Star on 31 January 2013, online: http://www.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details.php?nid=267196 (accessed in May 2014)
4. The Daily Star, Defence purchase govt’s priority, August 31, 2013, http://archive.thedailystar.net/beta2/news/defence-purchase-govts-priority/
5. Antifarid's Blog, Bangladesh’s Defence Spending: Puzzle of Reality, January 18 2013, http://antifarid.wordpress.com/2013/01/18/bangladeshs-military-spending-puzzle-of-reality/
6. Directorate General of Defence Purchase Annual Report 2012 - 2013, [not publicly available; accessed through source in May 2014]
7. Bharat Book Bureau, 'The Bangladeshi defence Industry - Procurement Market Dynamics to 2019: Market Profile', February 2015. https://www.bharatbook.com/defence-market-research-reports-485300/the-bangladeshi-defence-industry-procurement-market-dynamics-to-2018-market-profile.html, accessed September 2015.
8. The Times of India, 'Bangladesh procures defence hardware worth $ 2 billion in recent years', 24 August 2013. http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2013-08-24/news/41443946_1_defence-pact-air-force-hardware, accessed September 2015.
9. Interview with a senior military official, September 2015.
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Some ongoing procurements are acessible from the tender announcements. However, most defence equipment procurements are conducted in an open manner.
1- Tenders for the Army, Navy, and Air Force wings - http://www.dgdp.gov.bd/ten_not.php ; http://www.bnnssddhk.org.bd/index.php?option=com_nssdit&file=view_tender_all&Itemid=29
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Disagree
Comment: No defence purchase can be kept secret in this era of information; different website and newspapers are the evidence. List of important and major equipments purchased are also informed to the public through Parliament. The Directorate General Defence Purchase (DGDP) purchases are also published in the DGDP booklet. For big purchases through government-to-government deals, opinions of different ministries are taken. Any information asked by any appropriate authority regarding purchase is also considered.
Suggested score: 4
What procedures and standards are companies required to have - such as compliance programmes and business conduct programmes - in order to be able to bid for work for the Ministry of Defence or armed forces?
The DP 35 outlines rules of enlistment, eligibility criteria, documents to be submitted, and security clearance procedures, including the cancellation process with regard to bidding companies. However, companies are required to offer practically nothing in terms of compliance with business conduct, nor have any standards been defined.
Laws such as the Public Procurement Act, Contract Act and Companies Act (as well as Public Procurement Rules) require companies to refrain from corrupt and fraudulent practices.
Response to Government Reviewer: The explanation does not address the score criteria. Score 3 would not be appropriate as there is no evidence that the government requires companies to have compliance programmes.
Response to Peer Reviewer 1: Agreed that legal regulations are indeed in force; incorporated relevant information. However, the question asks about standards beyond what is in company law and there is no evidence that additional requirements are in place. Score maintained.
1.tInterview with a former senior Army official, interviewed in April 2014.
2. Interview with a serving Army official, interviewed in April 2014.
3. Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Ministry of Defence, Directorate General Defence Purchase, Form DP - 35, http://www.dgdp.gov.bd/dgdp_pdf/DP-35,ltr%20of%20-1961,SOP.pdf
4. Public Procurement Act 2006 (PPA) - section on ethics of procurement
5. Public Procurement Rules 2008
6. Contract Act of 1872, http://bdlaws.minlaw.gov.bd/print_sections_all.php?id=26
7. Companies Act of 1994 http://boi.gov.bd/components/com_businesslaws/attach/Companies%20Act%201994.pdf
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: The following laws and legislations that apply to all public procurement (including defence) have clauses against fraudulent practices, and require ethical processes. In practice these are not a requirement as such which suppliers are chosen.
1- Public Procurement Act 2006 (PPA) has a section on ethics of procurement
2- Public Procurement Rules 2008 required companies to not engage in corrupt, fraudulent, and coercive practices
3- The Contract Act of 1872 requires that parties do not engage in fraudulent activites
4 -The Companies Act of 1994 identifies fraud as a misconduct
1- Contract Act 1872, http://bdlaws.minlaw.gov.bd/print_sections_all.php?id=26 ;
2- PPR 2008 file:///C:/Users/PSubramaniam/Downloads/Public-Procurement-Rules-2008-English.pdf ; 3- Companies Act of 1994 http://boi.gov.bd/components/com_businesslaws/attach/Companies%20Act%201994.pdf
Suggested score: 1
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Disagree
Comment: This is kept simple in DP-35 so that the maximum number of companies can participate in Directorate General Defence Purchase (DGDP) tenders. DGDP has also enlisted firms/companies who regularly participate in DGDP tenders. The process of enlistment is so easy that any company/firm may apply.
Suggested score: 3
Are procurement requirements derived from an open, well-audited national defence and security strategy?
The interviewees stated that as Bangladesh doesn’t have a formal defence policy (and none has been located in public). The only guiding document for defence purchases is Force Goal 2030, which, however, is not quite identical to defence policy or security strategy.
Interviewees suggest that decisions of the Chiefs of the three forces and the Prime Minister determine what is ultimately purchased. According to the interviewees and media reports, on occasion pressure from nations having strategic relations with Bangladesh also determines such purchases. Under such circumstances, the possibility of opportunistic and unplanned purchases cannot be ruled out.
Response to government reviewer: The Forces Goal 2030 is a new phenomenon and has come under criticism for not articulating the military's goal objectively and is &quoute;nothing more than changes in the Army’s TO&E&quoute;.(8). The fact remains that Bangladesh doesn't have an open, well-audited national defence and security strategy. Score 1 reflects the absence of a well-audited strategy/policy, the existence of the Force Goal framework, and pressures which increase the risk of opportunistic purchases.
1.tInterview with a former senior Army official, interviewed in April 2014.
2. Interview with a serving Army official, interviewed in April 2014.
3. Bangladesh Defence, 'Army chief's India visit may cloud PM's Beijing trip', 2010,
http://www.defencebd.com/2010/11/army-chiefs-india-visit-may-cloud-pms.html#.U3X-5ygVcYE
4. Burma Times, 'Chinese Sale of Submarines to Bangladesh', February 18, 2014, http://burmatimes.net/chinese-sale-of-submarines-to-bangladesh/
5. Rahul Bhonsle, 'Bangladesh – Arming Without Aiming?', Security Risks, Jan 31, 2013 ,
http://www.security-risks.com/security-trends-south-asia/bangladesh/bangladesh-%E2%80%93-arming-without-aiming-1808.html
6. 'Force Goal 2030: Grant No, 16, Ministry of Defence Medium Term Expenditure'. http://mof.gov.bd/en/budget/12_13/mtbf/en/MBF_19_Ministry%20of%20Defence_English.pdf, accessed Octobert 2015.
7. Pushan Das, 'A ‘Three-Dimensional’ Bangladesh Navy in the Bay of Bengal', 12 February 2015. http://thediplomat.com/2015/02/a-three-dimensional-bangladesh-navy-in-the-bay-of-bengal/, accessed October 2015.
8. Col (Rtd) Mahmudur Rahman Choudhury, 'The Changing Role of Bangladesh Army-1971 to 2014', 24 May 2014. http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:http://www.sheikhnews.com/2014/05/24/bdarmy-3/&strip=1&vwsrc=0, accessed October 2015.
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: There is no defence strategy and procurements are mostly made in an ad-hoc manner. The 10-year defence purchase plan announced in 2010 was intended to act as a document to guide procurements, however, it is not clear if much has changed in practice.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Disagree
Comment: All three services have formulated their own “Forces Goal 2030”, which was presented to and approved by the government. Armed Forces Division has formed a “Forces Goal Committee”, which verifies all the proposals of major defence purchase and forming new organisation or revising an existing organisation so that no disjointed acquisition takes place.
Suggested score: 3
Are defence purchases based on clearly identified and quantified requirements?
Reports and interviews indicate that some internal exercises are done to base major purchases on clearly identified requirements and they appear to be settled within the modernisation framework of the 'Forces Goal 2030'. However, this is not always followed and thus there are likely to be prospects for opportunistic and unplanned purchases. There is also no evidence of audits or other strong processes that would
Response to Peer Reviewer 1: Agree. While there are internal exercises to base major purchases on clearly identified requirements, the processes in existence do not appear to be strong enough to guard against defence purchases being sometimes made in an ad hoc fashion. Score lowered to 1.
1.tInterview with a former senior Army official, April 2014.
2. Interview with a serving Army official, April 2014.
3. Bangladesh Sangbad Sanstha, 'Weapon deal with Russia was crucial for UN Peacekeeping: military', January 21, 2013, http://www1.bssnews.net/newsDetails.php?cat=0&id=307815$date=2013-01-21&dateCurrent=2013-01-28
4. Rahul Bhonsle, 'Bangladesh – Arming Without Aiming?', Security Risks, Jan 31, 2013 ,
http://www.security-risks.com/security-trends-south-asia/bangladesh/bangladesh-%E2%80%93-arming-without-aiming-1808.html
5. Interview with a senior military official, September 2015.
6. 'Force Goal 2030: Grant No, 16, Ministry of Defence Medium Term Expenditure'. http://mof.gov.bd/en/budget/12_13/mtbf/en/MBF_19_Ministry%20of%20Defence_English.pdf, accessed Octobert 2015.
7. Pushan Das, 'A ‘Three-Dimensional’ Bangladesh Navy in the Bay of Bengal', 12 February 2015. http://thediplomat.com/2015/02/a-three-dimensional-bangladesh-navy-in-the-bay-of-bengal/, accessed October 2015.
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: In the absense of a defence strategy and annual reviews, there is no evidence that the requirements are clear and quantified. Procurement is haphazard with the three services fighting for budgets. The 10 year defence purchase plan of 2010 defined capability gaps and defence priorities but there is no informaiton about the needs assessment process.
Suggested score: 1
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Is defence procurement generally conducted as open competition or is there a significant element of single-sourcing (that is, without competition)?
The Defence Purchase Regulation-35 provides provisions for open tender, but assessing the effectiveness of these guidelines is difficult. Annual reports published by the DGDP are not publicly available; moreover, the 2012 - 2013 DGDP Annual Report did not contain information on whether a purchase was made through open competition or on a single source basis. However, the list of contractors which contained designations clearly showed that retired military officials are owners of some defence contracting firms. This may be indicative of impropriety within the tender process, especially given the lack of transparency regarding the same - the government has not divulged detailed information regarding past procurement processes. (see 5)
Response to Government Reviewer: There is no research data to show the percentage of single source defence contract in Bangladesh. However, most of the government-to-government purchases fall under the single source category. Although such G2G purchase may be limited in number in a year, however, the amount spent of such purchases is likely cross the total of purchases of multiple items. (7; see also 5) The score thus cannot be higher than 2, as it is likely that at least 50% of major defence procurement is carried out through single-sourcing.
1. Interview with a former senior political advisor in April 2014.
2. Karotowa Enterprise, Company Profile, http://karotowaenterprise.com/files/Karotowa%20Company%20Profile.pdf
3. Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Ministry of Defence, Directorate General Defence Purchase, Form DP - 35, http://www.dgdp.gov.bd/dgdp_pdf/DP-35,ltr%20of%20-1961,SOP.pdf
4. Directorate General of Defence Purchase Annual Report 2012 - 2013, [not publically available; accessed through source (defence correspondent of a Bangla publication) May 2014]
5. The Times of India, 'Bangladesh procures defence hardware worth $ 2 billion in recent years', 24 August 2013. http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2013-08-24/news/41443946_1_defence-pact-air-force-hardware, accessed September 2015.
6. Tenders for the Army, Navy, and Air Force wings - http://www.dgdp.gov.bd/ten_not.php.
7. Interview with a senior military official, September 2015.
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Defence purchases are in principle made through an open process (tenders announced for goods and services [1]). However, single sourcing is common in procurement of major military platforms owing to Bangladesh's limited defence budget, a weak bargaining positions, and the need for financing arrangements. Most recent procurements are made on bilateral agreement through a defence pact. [2]
1- Tenders for the Army, Navy, and Air Force wings - http://www.dgdp.gov.bd/ten_not.php
2- The Times of India, &quoute;&quoute;Bangladesh procures defence hardware worth $ 2 billion in recent years&quoute;, 24 August 2013, http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2013-08-24/news/41443946_1_defence-pact-air-force-hardware
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Disagree
Comment: Procurement is done through open tender. Scope of single source procurement is very limited and these are normally avoided. Single source procurement is done only for exceptional cases where operational requirement warrants keeping equipment serviceable and after several tenders no other vendor/supplier participates.
Suggested score: 3
Are tender boards subject to regulations and codes of conduct and are their decisions subject to independent audit to ensure due process and fairness?
The Implementation, Monitoring and Evaluation Division (IMED) of the Ministry of Planning oversees public procurement and controls administration of the Public Procurement Act 2006 and the Public Procurement Rules 2008. There may be some loosely defined ethical code for the functioning of tender boards but it is not publicly available; there are no audits.
Response to Peer Reviewer: Agree. Comments added and score raised to 1.
Response to Government Reviewer: DP 35 provides scopes for arbitration, however, it couldn't be ascertained and verified if independent audit is allowed to determine fairness of the processes and the decisions of the tender board. Score 1 selected.
1. Interview with defence contractor, May 2014.
2. Interview with a journalist at a Bangla publication, May 2014.
3. Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Ministry of Defence, Directorate General Defence Purchase, Form DP - 35, http://www.dgdp.gov.bd/dgdp_pdf/DP-35,ltr%20of%20-1961,SOP.pdf
4. Directorate General of Defence Purchase Annual Report 2012 - 2013, [not publically available; accessed through source (defence correspondent of a Bangla publication) May 2014]
5. Implementation Monitoring and Evaluation Division, Government of Bangladesh. Homepage at http://www.imed.gov.bd/, accessed September 2015.
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: The Implementation, Monitoring and Evaluation Division (IMED) of the Ministry of Planning oversees public procurement and controls administration of the Public Procurement Act 2006 and the Public Procurement Rules 2008. There may be some loosely defined ethical code for the functioning of tender boards but these are not publicly available; there are no audits.
http://www.imed.gov.bd/
Suggested score: 1
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Disagree
Comment: For any procurement through Director General Defence Purchase (DGDP), demand/indent is placed by services Headquarters, Tender is floated by DGDP, Tender is evaluated by inspectorates/vetting committee, vetted tender terms and conditions are sent to DGDP, and finally it comes to Armed Forces Division for further scrutiny and financial approval. Financial aspects are also scrutinized by financial controller of defence purchase, an extension of Finance Ministry. Depending on the amount of the purchase, single envelope and double envelope methods are also followed to make the procurement more transparent. So there is no chance of play/unauthorized deals during the process and there are no such chances of backdoor negotiation.
Suggested score: 3
Does the country have legislation in place to discourage and punish collusion between bidders for defence and security contracts?
The Public Procurement Act 2006 and PPR 2008 state that public procurement should be carried out as a competitive process. The DP-35 also has a similar arrangement. The competition principle is strengthened by the 2012 Competition Act, which outlaws collusion. However, there is no information allowing for verification of the degree to which these laws are implemented effectively: application of the Competition Law, for example, was to be monitored by the Bangladesh Competition Commission, which took two years to be staffed and set up, and it is too early to assess its effectiveness. The absence of list of debarred firms on the DGDP website confirms this conclusion.
Response to Government Reviewer: Since the list of debarred firms are not publicly available, it is not possible to determine the reasons for their disqualification and thus draw conclusions specifically about collusion.
1. Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Ministry of Planning, IMED, Procurement Policy, Public Procurement Act 2006, http://www.cptu.gov.bd/http://www.cptu.gov.bd/
2. Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Ministry of
Planning, IMED, Procurement Policy, Procurement Rules, http://www.cptu.gov.bd/
3. Directorate General of defence Purchase website, http://www.dgdp.gov.bd/
4. Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Ministry of Defence, Directorate General Defence Purchase, Form DP - 35, http://www.dgdp.gov.bd/dgdp_pdf/DP-35,ltr%20of%20-1961,SOP.pdf
5. Rafia Afrin, 'Will Bangladesh’s New Competition Law Prove Effective?', July 2012. University of Liberal arts Bangladesh. http://www.ulab.edu.bd/CES/documents/Competition_law_07-12.pdf, accessed October 2015.
6. Bangladesh Competition Commission search results page at the Dhaka Tribune. http://www.dhakatribune.com/tags/Bangladesh%20Competition%20Commission, accessed October 2015.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Disagree
Comment: There are many cases where firms are debarred. Records of this kind of punishment are kept in DGDP. Information given in the DGDP website is general in nature and useful to all.
Suggested score: 3
Are procurement staff, in particular project and contract managers, specifically trained and empowered to ensure that defence contractors meet their obligations on reporting and delivery?
Defence procurement staff are organised into the Director General Defence Purchase (DGDP) and, within service Headquarters, the Procurement/Ordnance Directorate. Training in project and procurement management is provided by the Central Procurement Technical Unit and open to defence procurement staff as well. Anti-corruption training is uncommon for defence procurement staff and there is no evidence that there is any training undertaken.
The defence contractor interviewed (source 1) stated that while the DP-35 empowers the staff to check on contractors to meet reporting and delivery obligations, due diligence is hardly exercised with regard to the implementation of legal requirements. One of the reported reasons for non-compliance is the close network that the contractors have developed with influential generals. According to the interviewee and a publicly unavailable report published by the DGDP in 2013, many family members of high ranking military officials undertake business as defence contractors. According to both interviewees, it has also been alleged that procurement staff are involved in corruption.
Response to Peer Reviewer 1 and Government Reviewer: Relevant information incorporated. DGDP staff are capable of ensuring that contractors meet their basic obligations. Some training is provided, however, it is unclear whether this is sufficient and tailored to the defence sector. Furthermore, DGDP will require additional staff to meet increasing workload, following the introduction of the Forces Goal 2030.(6) Score 2 maintained.
1.tInterview with defence contractor, May 2014.
2.tDirectorate General of Defence Purchase website, http://www.dgdp.gov.bd
3. Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Ministry of Defence, Directorate General Defence Purchase, Form DP - 35, http://www.dgdp.gov.bd/dgdp_pdf/DP-35,ltr%20of%20-1961,SOP.pdf
4. Interview with defence correspondent of a leading Bangla publication, May 2014.
5. Directorate General of Defence Purchase Annual Report 2012 - 2013, [not publically available; accessed through a source, May 2014]
6. Interview with a senior military official, September 2015.
7. Central Procurement Technical Unit, Training. http://www.cptu.gov.bd/PMTSchedule.aspx, accessed October 2015.
8. Procurement trainers list, http://www.cptu.gov.bd/ListNTrainers.aspx, accessed September 2015.
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: The Central Procurement Technical Unit (CPTU), which provides technical know-how for public procurements, conducts regular training programmes in 2 areas - Procurement Management and Project Management. This also includes staff in the defence sector. Training includes issues such as compliance monitoring, contract management etc. The training schedule is publicly available [1]. List of government approved trainers (and their credentials) is available publicly [2].
1- Procurement Capacity building programmes schedules, http://www.cptu.gov.bd/PMTSchedule.aspx
2- Procurement trainers list, http://www.cptu.gov.bd/ListNTrainers.aspx
Suggested score: 3
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Disagree
Comment: The uniqueness in defence procurement is that the user, the inspector who checks and accepts stores and the procurement entity are different. Thus it is difficult for the contractors to establish link with all three set ups. Mostly, procurement is handled by Director General Defence Purchase (DGDP) and in Headquarters by Procurement/Ordnance Directorate. Officers and men of Procurement Directorate/corps of ordnance are well trained on procurement matters from the beginning of their military career. A complete package on procurement takes place in their training course held at Ordnance Centre & School. The package is further enriched by the guest lecturers serving in DGDP and related organization. DGDP has all legal tools supported by the contract deeds to compel the contractor to meet their obligations. Furthermore, DGDP has a legal wing to deal with arbitration at court.
Suggested score: 4
Are there mechanisms in place to allow companies to complain about perceived malpractice in procurement, and are companies protected from discrimination when they use these mechanisms?
Under the DP - 35, a complaints mechanism exists. According to the Annual Report 2012 - 2013 of the DGDP, some firms had filed civil cases against the DGDP for various reasons dating back to 1989, with proceedings for the same still on-going on. This indicates the usage of the complaint mechanism by companies. However, according to both interviewees, it is rarely followed by contractors for fear of being debarred from participating in the tender process in the future.
Response to TI Reviewer: As mentioned earlier, contractors have scope to file complaints, however, very few exercise this for fear of reprisal. Agree that score should be 2.
1.tInterview with defence correspondent of a leading Bangla publication, May 2014.
2. Interview with defence contractor, May 2014.
3.tDirectorate General of defence Purchase website, http://www.dgdp.gov.bd
4. Directorate General of Defence Purchase Annual Report 2012 - 2013, [not publically available; accessed through source, May 2014]
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: There is also a Review Panel for Complaints and Appeals under theImplementation Monitoring & Evaluation Division (IMED) of the Ministry of Planning.
Government constitutes review panel to investigate complaints and appeals, http://www.cptu.gov.bd/ProcurementPolicy.asp
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: Formal mechanisms exists for companies to complain about perceived malpractice in procurement. However, these are rarely used as companies see it as dangerous to complain.
Suggested score: 2
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
What sanctions are used to punish the corrupt activities of a supplier?
The following penalties are outlined in tender documents: forfeiture of security deposit, cancellation of contract, blacklisting, etc. The 2012 - 2013 annual report published by the DGDP shows 8 firms were blacklisted and 18 received permanent embargo for failing to deliver products as per schedule. The report also mentions some compensation collected from the firms through the forfeiture of their security deposits.
The Central Procurement Technical Unit publishes a debarment list (10 companies as at 26 October 2014) [8].
Apart from debarment, fraudulent suppliers are also liable to other civil penalties and criminal penalties including contractual penalties under the contract law [1]. Public procurement issues can be penalised according to the Contract Act 1872 [2], the Sale of Goods Act 1930, and the Arbitration Act 2001. So there are laws, however, since all procurement processes are not made public, it is unclear how often corrupt companies are punished.
Response to Peer Reviewer 2: Information incorporated.
Response to TI Reviewer: The DGDP annual report did show list of barred and embargoed companies, which indicates that despite lack of public information, the scheme does work. However, lack of publicly available information means that it is not possible to see how consistently and effectively the sanctions are applied over time. Score lowered to 2.
1. Directorate General of Defence Purchase website, http://www.dgdp.gov.bd/
2. Interview with a serving Army official, interviewed in April 2014.
3. Interview with defence correspondent of a leading Bangla publication, May 2014.
4. Directorate General of Defence Purchase Annual Report 2012 - 2013, [not publically available; accessed through source, May 2014]
5. Ridwanul Hoque, &quoute;Public Procurement Law in Bangladesh: From Bureaucratisation to Accountability&quoute;, p.10, http://www.ippa.org/IPPC4/Proceedings/01ComparativeProcurement/Paper1-7.pdf
6. Contract Act 1872, http://bdlaws.minlaw.gov.bd/print_sections_all.php?id=26
7. Arbitration Act 2001, http://biac.org.bd/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/The-Arbitration-Act-2001.pdf
8. Central Procurement Technical Unit, Debarment List, http://www.cptu.gov.bd/DebarmentList.aspx
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: The Central Procurement Technical Unit publishes a debarment list (10 companies as at 26 October 2014) [4].
Apart from debarment, fraudulent suppliers are also liable to other civil penalties and criminal penalties including contractual penalties under the contract law [1]. Public procurement issues can be penalised according to the Contract Act 1872 [2], the Sale of Goods Act 1930, and the Arbitration Act 2001. So there are laws, however, since all procurement processes are not made public, it is unclear how often corrupt companies are punished. Debarment decisions can also sometimes have political motives.
1- Ridwanul Hoque, &quoute;Public Procurement Law in Bangladesh: From Bureaucratisation to Accountability&quoute;, p.10, http://www.ippa.org/IPPC4/Proceedings/01ComparativeProcurement/Paper1-7.pdf
2- Contract Act 1872, http://bdlaws.minlaw.gov.bd/print_sections_all.php?id=26
3- Arbitration Act 2001, http://biac.org.bd/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/The-Arbitration-Act-2001.pdf
4- http://www.cptu.gov.bd/DebarmentList.aspx
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Disagree
Comment: Sanctions by the procurement executive, such as prosecution or debarment, formally exist. But there is very little information in public domain of application.
Suggested score: 1
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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When negotiating offset contracts, does the government specifically address corruption risk by imposing due diligence requirements on contractors? Does the government follow up on offset contract performance and perform audits to check performance and integrity?
Bangladesh does not have contract laws or policies relating to offsets. Information relating to offset obligations is not disclosed nor are due diligence or auditing requirements put in place to check on performance or integrity standards.
While the official position is that offsets are not practiced, interviews suggest that some offset-like transactions could occur in bilateral deals. The 2013 arms trade agreement with Russia, for example, occurred together with a deal in the energy realm. While the two are not officially related, there is sufficient lack of clarity to merit a 0.
Response to Government Reviewer: Given evidence that Bangladesh does not have contract laws or policies relating to offsets, plus lack of clarity surrounding their use, score changed to 0.
1. Research MOZ, 'Future of the Bangladeshi defence Industry - Market Attractiveness, Competitive Landscape and Forecasts to 2018', 19 December 2013, http://www.researchmoz.us/future-of-the-bangladeshi-defence-industry-market-attractiveness-competitive-landscape-and-forecasts-to-2018-report.html
2. Interview with a defence official, May 2014.
3. Interview with a senior military official, September 2015.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Disagree
Comment: Defence procurement is done as per defence procurement policy. In practice, major procurements are made through bilateral cooperation. Offset contracts are not in practice at present. Hence, scope and regulations relating to such contracts are not essentially spelled out in the policy. However, as we have ‘zero tolerance’ to corruption, offset contracts if made will be followed by necessary laws/regulations to minimize risks corruption and ensure transparency. It should also be mentioned here that presently Bangladesh Armed Forces does not produce any product that can be exported. Therefore, we consider this indicator does not apply for Bangladesh Armed Forces yet.
Suggested score: N/A
Does the government make public the details of offset programmes, contracts, and performance?
Bangladesh does not have contract laws or policies relating to offsets and no official information on offset deals is released.
While the official position is that offsets are not practiced, interviews suggest that some offset-like transactions could occur in bilateral deals. The 2013 arms trade agreement with Russia, for example, occurred together with a deal in the energy realm. While the two are not officially related, there is sufficient lack of clarity to merit a 0.
Response to Government Reviewer: Given evidence that Bangladesh does not have policies on offsets, plus lack of clarity surrounding their use, score changed to 0.
1. Research MOZ, 'Future of the Bangladeshi defence Industry - Market Attractiveness, Competitive Landscape and Forecasts to 2018', 19 December 2013, http://www.researchmoz.us/future-of-the-bangladeshi-defence-industry-market-attractiveness-competitive-landscape-and-forecasts-to-2018-report.html
2. Interview with a defence official, May 2014.
3. Interview with a senior military official, September 2015.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Disagree
Comment: Defence procurement is done as per defence procurement policy. In practice, major procurements are made through bilateral cooperation. Offset contracts are not in practice at present. Hence, scope and regulations relating to such contracts are not essentially spelled out in the policy. However, as we have ‘zero tolerance’ to corruption, offset contracts if made will be followed by necessary laws/regulations to minimize risks corruption and ensure transparency. It may also be mentioned here that presently Bangladesh Armed Forces does not produce any product that can be exported. Therefore, we consider this indicator does not apply for Bangladesh Armed Forces yet.
Suggested score: N/A
Are offset contracts subject to the same level of competition regulation as the main contract?
Bangladesh does not have contract laws or policies relating to offsets and no official information on offset deals is released.
While the official position is that offsets are not practiced, interviews suggest that some offset-like transactions could occur in bilateral deals. The 2013 arms trade agreement with Russia, for example, occurred together with a deal in the energy realm. While the two are not officially related, there is sufficient lack of clarity to merit a 0.
Response to Government Reviewer: Given evidence that Bangladesh does not have policies on offsets, plus lack of clarity surrounding their use, score changed to 0.
1. Research MOZ, 'Future of the Bangladeshi defence Industry - Market Attractiveness, Competitive Landscape and Forecasts to 2018', 19 December 2013, http://www.researchmoz.us/future-of-the-bangladeshi-defence-industry-market-attractiveness-competitive-landscape-and-forecasts-to-2018-report.html
2. Interview with a defence official, May 2014.
3. Interview with a senior military official, September 2015.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Disagree
Comment: Defence procurement is done as per defence procurement policy. In practice, major procurements are made through bilateral cooperation. Offset contracts are not in practice at present. Hence, scope and regulations relating to such contracts are not essentially spelled out in the policy. However, as we have ‘zero tolerance’ to corruption, offset contracts if made will be followed by necessary laws/regulations to minimize risks corruption and ensure transparency. It may also be mentioned here that presently Bangladesh Armed Forces does not produce any product that can be exported. Therefore, we consider this indicator does not apply for Bangladesh Armed Forces yet.
Suggested score: N/A
How strongly does the government control the company's use of agents and intermediaries in the procurement cycle?
Under the DP- 35, the use of agents and intermediaries is legal with provisions for control and scrutiny.
According to the interviewees, effectiveness of these provisions remains a key concern. The frequency of the use of agents in defence purchases depends on the type of items is being procured. With regard to commodity supplies, firms usually operate directly, without the help of intermediaries or agents. With large-scale weapons purchases, agents are reportedly used frequently and there is little clarity about the relevant policy.
Response to Government Reviewer: Noted. However, given lack of publicly evidence and interview content, score 1 appears more appropriate.
1.tInterview with a serving Army official, April 2014.
2. Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Ministry of Defence, Directorate General Defence Purchase, Form DP - 35, http://www.dgdp.gov.bd/dgdp_pdf/DP-35,ltr%20of%20-1961,SOP.pdf
3. Interview with a senior military official, September 2015.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Disagree
Comment: In cases of general items, agents are authorized for foreign procurement to ensure better management and communication between buyer and seller. The main procurement agency for defence is Directorate General of Defence Purchase (DGDP). Agent has to be enlisted in DGDP and duly security cleared for ensuring their authenticity. Agents are frequently forbidden/debarred for their poor performance and or non-compliance.
Suggested score: 3
Are the principal aspects of the financing package surrounding major arms deals, (such as payment timelines, interest rates, commercial loans or export credit agreements) made publicly available prior to the signing of contracts?
The terms of payment and its processes are outlined in Section 38 of the DP-35. While such information is technically to be disclosed, there is no public information available to suggest that this is, in effect, done.
It was only during a recent public controversy about a military deal with Russia that the public was informed of the relevant financing package details through a rare press conference by the Armed Forces Division. The 2013 annual report published by the DGDP (not publicly available) also contains information about the purchase value, name and other details of the contractors who supply items.
Response to Government Reviewer: Considering the public details surrounding terms of major arms contracts, score 1 is maintained.
1.tInterview with a serving Army official, interviewed in April 2014.
2. Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Ministry of Defence, Directorate General Defence Purchase, Form DP - 35, http://www.dgdp.gov.bd/dgdp_pdf/DP-35,ltr%20of%20-1961,SOP.pdf
3. The Daily Star, '$1b defence deal sealed', January 16 2013, http://archive.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details.php?nid=265372
4. Peter Custers, 'Bangladesh Arms Purchase From Russia: A Case of Disparate Exchange?' Countercurrents, 27 January 2013, http://www.countercurrents.org/custer270113.htm
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Disagree
Comment: The comment made has correctly quoted the authority of DP-35, which is publicly available. Moreover, in most of the procurement tenders are floated in the Directorate General of Defence Purchase (DGDP) website. However, for the procurement entailing bigger amount and necessitating government-to-government deal, the file is routed through several ministries for their scrutiny, like Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Law, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Finance. This ensures better transparency and right of public to know the details if asked for. The details of major procurement are also forwarded to national parliament on a quarterly basis for public information.
Suggested score: 3
Does the government formally require that the main contractor ensures subsidiaries and sub-contractors adopt anti-corruption programmes, and is there evidence that this is enforced?
A review of public sources available and the interview yielded no evidence that the main contractors are formally or informally required by the government to ensure that their subsidiaries/sub-contractors have appropriate anti-corruption programmes in place.
Response to government reviewer: Paragraph 27 of the DP-35 states that the main contractor shall not subcontract without the written permission of the DGDP Director. Therefore, it is possible that subcontractors may be employed, provided that consent is given. This gateway is not accompanied by a requirement for contractors to ensure that subcontractors adopt anti-corruption programmes, and there is no evidence that this is informally encouraged.
Response to peer reviewer 1: As stated, any regulations are mostly left to the main contractor and there is no evidence that anti-corruption programmes are informally encouraged. Furthermore, most defence procurement procedures are conducted under regulation DP-35.
1.tInterview with a serving Army official, interviewed in April 2014.
2. Review of publicly available sources
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: Both, the Public Procurement Act 2006 (PPA) and Public Procurement Rules 2008 (PPR) describe rules for sub-contractors and sub-consultants. These are broad and loosely defined and largely left to the prime contractors; this is likely not enforced either. The PPR 2008 states &quoute;The prime Supplier or Contractor or Consultant shall remain responsible for administering its subcontractors or subconsultants and the Procuring Entity’s review of subcontracts shall normally be confined to evaluating the prime Supplier’s, Contractor’s or Consultant’s management of the sub-contracts&quoute;.
1. Public Procurement Rules 2008 (PPR), Part 9, page 48, file:///C:/Users/PSubramaniam/Downloads/Public-Procurement-Rules-2008-English.pdf
Suggested score: 1
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Disagree
Comment: Defence procurement does not allow the main contractor to nominate any subsidiaries or sub-contractors. The main rules followed for defence procurement is called DP-35 (available online, open to the public, website: www.dgdp.gov.bd) which restricts any kind of subcontracting(Paragraph-27) by the contractor.
Suggested score: N/A
How common is it for defence acquisition decisions to be based on political influence by selling nations?
Bangladesh procures weapons and training support from different states. At least 20 countries sold weapons and equipment to the Bangladesh military between 2000-2013. It has been predicted that Bangladesh will spend some US$ 2.7 billion on weapons' purchases from 2014 to 2018.
The bulk of Bangladesh’s weapons supply is reported from China, at lower prices. The recent purchase of weapons from Russia with a US$ 1 billion loan was reportedly a surprise to China, Bangladesh’s first choice of military supplies. The then foreign Minister of Bangladesh defended the purchase and critics argue that Bangladesh is slowly tilting towards the India-Russia axis.
It is reportedly common that selling nations exert political influence on Bangladesh with regard to defence procurement. According to the interviewee, in 2001, Germany exerted tough diplomatic pressure on Bangladesh for procuring Mercedes Benz Army trucks when an internal military assessment found Sweden's Volvo truck to be suitable for the country. The Prime Minister eventually chose Germany, despite strong protest from the military.
In recent years Bangladesh has entered into a number of bilateral military partnerships and cooperation with many countries: the US, India, China, Russia, and the UK to ensure its security concern. According to sources, such collaborative efforts are not always benign.
Response to government reviewer: There is sufficient reported influence by seller nation to merit lowering the score to 2.
Response to TI reviewer: The degree of alleged political influence appears better suited to the score of 2. Score maintained.
1. Natalya Benyukh, Russian weapons are most appropriate for Bangladesh, The Voice of Russia, 17 January 2013, http://voiceofrussia.com/2013_01_17/Russian-weapons-are-most-appropriate-for-Bangladesh/
2. BD Military,Top Arms Exporting Countries to Bangladesh, March 18, 2014, http://www.bdmilitary.com/top-arms-exporting-countries-bangladesh/
3. Research MOZ, 'Future of the Bangladeshi defence Industry - Market Attractiveness, Competitive Landscape and Forecasts to 2018', 19 December 2013, http://www.researchmoz.us/future-of-the-bangladeshi-defence-industry-market-attractiveness-competitive-landscape-and-forecasts-to-2018-report.html
4. Interview with a former senior Army official, interviewed in April 2014.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Disagree
Comment: The government always justifies purchases by referring to military need. But there are reasons to believe that purchases are driven often by political influence by seller nations.
Suggested score: 1
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: Acquisitions are independent of political influence. Bangladeshi military forces procure hardware as per their needs. Involvement of selling government is appreciated in case of big purchases because of assurance in supply of product in good condition and without failure. Bangladesh has involved Chinese and Russian government for few purchases but had the full liberty to choose her own needs.
Suggested score: 4
There are provisions for legislative scrutiny of defence policy. Their effectiveness, however, is negligible as at this point Bangladesh doesn’t have a formal defence policy. There is a draft policy, which has been discussed in non-public sessions of the Defence Committee (see Q2 and Q3). Scrutiny through a defence committee is also currently ineffective (see Q2).
Parliament approves the annual budget, including defence appropriations; however, there is no evidence of substantial debate on the budget or influence over it.
Response to government reviewer: While a written defence policy was drafted in 1974, it was not approved by the Cabinet and is not publicly available on the Ministry of Defence's website. Score 1 maintained.