Sweden

Researcher3839: Firstly, the SAF must normally report the total cost of decommissioning surplus materials and the costs directly associated with their sale. This is partly handled by FXM. All costs are expected to be broken down, including costs of sale, disposal costs and storage settlement. When assets are sold, bidding is accessible to the public and has occurred online (see http://fxm.se/forsaljningar).

In practice, the Swedish defence sector has undergone some rapid organizational changes since 1998. The NAO report &quoute;defence - a challenge for the state&quoute; (RiR 2014:8) depicts how the transformation has been undertaken, and whether or not it has been satisfactory. One key point raised in the report is that the costs for the transformation have been much higher than expected. Overall the transformation has been unsatisfactory, and the defence sector expects some serious materiel deficiencies in coming years.

According to the report, disposal of assets has not been entirely effective and some serious shortcomings during the process have led to the current situation. Clarity over procedures and availability of information is limited.

Researcher3839: As was identified in the 2013 GI assessment, surplus materiel from the SAF is sold by the FXM and FMV. To a certain extent, FXM publishes various sales on their webpage. The NAO has not directly scrutinised any asset disposal sales over the past years, but have instead focused on the material supply process, which is connected to the scrutiny of asset disposals. The material supply process in Sweden has received heavy criticism, with empirical evidence showing systematic underestimation of the risk of lack of effectiveness in terms of delivery, coordination between the authorities involved, and a lack of financial transparency that prevents the parliament from exercising its financial powers.

It can be reasonably concluded from the extensive questioning of transparency within the material supply process that FMX and FMV lack the capability to scrutinise their own asset disposals.

Researcher3839: The allocations for the Defence Intelligence Commission, the National Defence Radio Establishment (FRA) and the Defence Intelligence Court constitute 0,01865% of the defence budget.

Response to TI Reviewer: Agree, score raised to 3.

Researcher3839: The Defence Intelligence Commission (SIUN) is the agency under the Ministry of defence that is tasked to control the defence intelligence of the Armed Forces, the Swedish Defence Materiel Administration (FMV), the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI) and the National Defence Radio Establishment (FRA). The commission's mandate is to ensure that these authorities' activities are carried out in compliance with Swedish laws and regulations. Its mandate stretches to &quoute;administrative scrutiny&quoute;, meaning that they investigate these institutions' spendings. The National Audit Office has made statements on the annual reports of these institutions, without any negative comments or requests for amendments (The Defence Budget 2013; 34).

The parliamentary defence Committee, consisting of 43 MPs from across the 8 different parties represented in the parliament (as detailed in Q2) receives all the necessary information on classified spending. According to regulation 2000: 605, the National Audit has the right to review all the items of any government agency. In addition, an interviewee at the National Audit stated that they regularly keep briefings for the defence Committee’s members on their findings.

Oversight over the Swedish Security Service - including budgets - is performed by the parliamentary
Committee on Justice. The Committee, however, has limited powers: it cannot summon intelligence officers to hearings or conduct control on the premises. The non-parliamentary Commission
on Security and Integrity Protection, which also oversees the services, possesses more powers, including access to information on intelligence operations.

MPs do have access to classified information, although it could not be established whether any restrictions apply and what the level of detail made available is.

There are some indications that intelligence services might not share the required information with oversight bodies. In December 2013, for example, it was revealed that the National Defence Radio Establishment (FRA), had been performing surveillance activities in collaboration with the American NSA and the British GCHQ without informing the defence Committee. The SIUN has been criticised for not sharing sufficient information with parliamentary committees.

Researcher3839: The legislators should be provided with audit reports under Law (2002:1022) on the Audit of State Activities and the National Audit has the right to do so according to Regulation (2000: 605) on Annual Report and Budget. The government and the Supreme Commander annually brief the defence agencies on requirements, including secret programmes. The defence Committee within the Parliament then considers the audits and debates them with the Parliament.

However, concerns have been expressed regarding the robustness and effectiveness of defence Committee oversight. While the government agency SIUN is mandated to exercise control over the defence agencies’ operational activities (which the public has limited access to), there have been concerns that SIUN does not fulfill its mandate and does not brief MPs as mandated. It is also not clear that the Committee possesses sufficient expertise and resources to provide oversight.

The defence Committees webpage provides information on the debates focusing on audits. None of these explicitly mention secret items.

Researcher3839: Off-budget military expenditure is against the law in Sweden. In cases where information has been classified, if possible annual accounting is made out of these cases in a way that is comparable to the financial statement in general.

Researcher3839: The National Audit has not found any off-budget expenditures in the audit for the Swedish Armed Forces in 2013. All defence related expenditures are recorded in the official defence budget and there are no record on off-budget military expenditures.

Researcher3839: There are clear provisions regulating mechanisms for classifying information on the grounds of protecting national security, which comprise four levels of secrecy. The process is legally regulated with provisions made for how the classifications should be made. According to security law, Säkerhetsskyddsförordningen 7 § (see above), in order for an employee of a state agency to receive access to classified information, the employee must be regarded as reliable in regards to national security as well as have sufficient need for access to the information.

It is not clear, however, how effective these regulations are. Besides the criticism against the MFA and MOD in relation to controversial arms and weapon exports to Saudi Arabia (2012) and China (2014), former member of the Parliamentary Defence Committee Rolf K. Nilsson wrote in 2013 that classified information can remain inaccessible to the members of the defence Committee. In 2013, the provisions allowing for classification of information were also extended to include the possibility of classifying information if and when it could be 'assumed' that that Sweden’s ability to participate in international cooperation 'deteriorates' due to the information becoming public.

Some oversight over the classification process is provided by the Parliamentary Ombudsman, who receives complaints if a request for access to information has been refused. The Ombudsman receives about 7,000 complaints per year and issues criticism or admonition in about 10% of cases. These are not legally binding, but the Ombudsman reports that state institutions tend to follow the rulings. No specific statistics on defence issues are available.

Researcher3839: The Armed Forces own large areas of land where it holds military exercises for mainly foreign customers; the business has a turnover of 150-170 million annually which is less than 1% of the defence budget. It is managed through the FMV (Försvarets materielverk). In the FMV's yearly report on the industry, the business is mentioned.

However, it is not mentioned in the annual report of state owned businesses because it is classified not as a business per se, but as a government income fee. This is scrutinized by the The Swedish National Financial Management Authority, ESV (See report p15).

Researcher3839: No military-owned businesses appear to exist. There is government fee income through enterprises owned by the defence agency FMV however. This is scrutinized by the The Swedish National Financial Management Authority, ESV. See report pp 15.

Researcher3839: The Law on public employees states that &quoute;an employee may not be employed or partake in an assignment or carry out any activity that could call into question his [sic] or another employee's impartial nature in their work or that could harm the agency's image.&quoute; However, it is unclear how strong enforcement is.

Researcher3839: There is some evidence of commitment to anti-corruption and integrity measures in general. In May 2014 the Secretary-General of the Swedish Anti-corruption Institute (IMM) wrote a critique of Swedish government leadership however, stating that the &quoute;management must practice what they preach&quoute;. In April 2014 the State Treasury was assigned to survey Swedish government agencies' work to prevent corruption and assess the need for new methods. This is the government's reaction to several reports that were released between 2012 and 2014 on state agencies and corruption.

It is difficult to assess this commitment in relation to the defence and security establishments specifically. Currently there is for example no training provided at any level on anti-corruption from SWEDINT, the SAF's training centre. When speaking to staff at the Home Guard, and the International Education centre, it was confirmed that no training on corruption was held. There has been no explicit comments made by the key staff at SAF with regards to commitment to anti-corruption.

A Code of Conduct is place, although there might be issues with its distribution and availability (see Q47) and a site for whistle-blowers has been initiated by the defence Material Agency (FMV). Although positive, this should be seen as a very limited action in the fight against corruption.

Researcher3839: Staff of the Swedish Armed Forces who are suspected of serious misconduct may be reported to the Armed Forces Personnel Administration (FPAN). This is currently working well and is regulated in (2007:1266) with instructions for the Armed Forces. Cases where FPAN has been involved can be found on the SAF’s webpage. This year so far, one soldier has been dismissed for serious misconduct, although the soldier’s case was not related to corruption.

Legislation on bribery for individuals is found in the Swedish Penal Code (Brottsbalken), either as bribe taking (chapter 20:2) or bribe offering (chapter 17).

The State Disciplinary Board (Statens Ansvarsnämnd, SA) handles cases involving civil servants in senior positions, and their 2013 annual report states how many cases were dealt with. Only other government agencies can report to SA, while individuals have to turn to the Chancellor of Justice (JK). Where employees have committed criminal acts that fall under the Swedish Penal Code, the crime must be reported to the Police.

Researcher3839: While Sweden does not have a dedicated whistleblower protection law, a significant degree of protection is bestowed by the general legal framework. Laws encourage citizens to encourage wrongdoing (public officials are also allowed to anonymously report to the media and the government is not mandated to attempt to learn their identity) and retaliation against whistleblowers is a crime. Labour Court rulings also illustrate a history of siding with employees who reported wrongdoing.

The Swedish defence Materiel Administration has put in place a whistleblower policy and has instituted reporting mechanisms.

In May 2014, a Ministry of Employment (MOE) investigation submitted a draft report to the Labour Minister. The investigation makes the following three recommendations:

1) Implement a new labour law to strengthen protection for employees reporting serious misconduct within an organization.
2) Implement a new rule in the Work Environment Act 1977(:1160), which will impose a duty on all employers to ensure that there are procedures to report serious internal misconduct.
3) Ensure policies exist to protect the identity of employees who report misconduct.

This has yet not been ratified and implemented.

RESPONSE TO REVIEWERS: Information incorporated. However, score 2 was retained due to lack of specific protection for whistleblowers.

Researcher3839: It is unclear whether special consideration is given to employees in sensitive positions and whether these positions are defined and declared. It is likely that employees are vetted, but this could not be verified. A 2012 by the Public Finance Expert Group (ESO) suggests that post-separation employment rules are lacking: although figures show that mobility from public to private sector is not a major problem in Sweden, the report states that there is reason to implement legislation as a preventive measure. Only one government agency has strict rules prescribing non-engagement and 1-year quarantines for personnel going from the public to the private sector- the Swedish Central Bank. The Swedish Defence Materiel Administration (FMV) was considered to be a vulnerable agency and one legislation on “revolving doors.” The report stated that approximately 20 staff members a year would go from FMV into the private sector.

Researcher3839: The number of civilian and military personnel is accurately known and publicly available. Information on personnel is presented in the SAF annual report on staff, and detailed demographics are presented (including age, gender, number of professional and reserve officers, civil servants, and soldiers, and others).

Researcher3839: The Principle of Public Access to official documents regulates public insight into the activities of the authorities. Salaries of personnel in the Swedish Armed Forces are included under the Public Access law.

They are not published online as such, but can be accessed by asking the relevant government employer for access. Once the request is received, the agency must deliver the documents as soon as possible (&quoute;as soon as possible&quoute; is how the regulation describes the desired timeline).

Researcher3839: Overall, the payment system appears routine and basic salaries are not subject to adjustments. However, the NAO has previously highlighted some shortcomings. The NAO's 2012 report shows that on several occasions in the previous year, the SAF had paid wages for vacant posts or individuals who were no longer employed at the agency. While recipients reported the error and SAF has corrected the mistake, the incident nevertheless implies that there is room for error within the system. During 2013 payments were also incorrectly made to staff on sick leave and individuals taking academic leave.

Researcher3839: The Armed Forces in Sweden enforce an independent and objective appointment system for the selection of military personnel at middle and senior levels. The system is interlinked with the formal education system, and in order for an individual to advance, he or she needs to go through the appropriate training and education. Along with objective job descriptions, positions in the public office have particular specifications attached to them (known as the &quoute;kravprofiler”). This means that individuals may only apply for positions for which they meet set requirements) and assessment processes this establishes an objective appointment system for the selection of military personnel at middle and top management level.

As with all government agencies, the Armed Force's decision to hire someone can be appealed to Kammarkollegiet, which forwards the errand to Administrative Services Agency. Statistics show that the appeals have become more frequent, and have gone from just a few to approximately 30 per year in 2010. However, the numbers are not specific for defence establishments, but government agencies in general.

For certain key positions, such as the Major General, the Rear Admiral, Colonel of the 1st degree and Commander of 1. degree as well as the civil chief legal officer at the HQ- the government handpicks candidates. This is in accordance with the Legal Act (1994:642).

Researcher3839: Personnel cannot be promoted without passing certain courses that lead to award of a title or degree, as the promotion system is linked to requirements in education.

For an individual to subsequently be appointed, they must apply for a job that has been openly posted, with an objective job description which they can demonstrate that they meet. Individuals may appeal decisions where they claim to have been judged on wrong premises.

As with all government agencies, the Armed Force's decision to hire or promote an individual can be appealed to Kammarkollegiet, which forwards the errand to Administrative Services Agency. Statistics show that the appeals have become more frequent, and have gone from just a few to approximately 30 per year in 2010. However, the numbers are not specific for defence establishments, but government agencies in general.

For certain key positions, such as the Major General, the Rear Admiral, Colonel of the 1st degree and Commander of 1. degree as well as the civil chief legal officer at the HQ- the government handpicks candidates. This is in accordance with the Legal Act (1994:642).

Researcher3839: Conscription was replaced by voluntary military training in 2010, and the Service Administration (Pliktverket) now only enrols volunteers into national military education. As identified in the 2013 GI, although conscription is over, it remains mandatory for all 18-year-old Swedish citizens to provide information about their personal circumstances in a web-based questionnaire for &quoute;emergency reasons&quoute; in case conscription is reinstated.

Researcher3839: As previously identified, there is no system of conscription in Sweden.

There is also a very clear recruitment procedure within SAF that makes it difficult to gain preferred postings. The Recruitment Agency provides sample testing of those applying for military training in the Armed Forces. The Agency carries out examination of the individuals and their personal background and relationships. They then enlist the applicants in their respective positions. All information is stored and registered in databases which are made publicly available through the Principle of Public Access. In addition there are strict rules against bribery that apply to all state officials at the Recruitment Agency (Rekryteringsmyndigheten).

Researcher3839: It is unlikely that one individual would be able to infiltrate the system as several persons along the way would have to approve the payment. Nevertheless, seeing to the Swedish National Audit Office's complaints as to the weaknesses in the payment system the phenomenon could possibly occur (see Q40).

Researcher3839: The management of salaries within the ministry and armed forces is unconnected to the chain of command. Trade unions also collaborate with employers and audit the issue of wages.

Researcher3839: In January 2011 the SAF established a Code of Conduct for its employees. The Code discusses grounds for disqualification, including bribery and corruption. However, it appears that there are no regulations on post-separation employment for staff who had worked for the Defence Materiel Organisation (FMV). The 2011 National Audit recommended SAF to train and inform its staff about the guidelines, however a NAO review found that staff conducting procurement had not been introduced to the ethical guidelines (see pages 16-17 of the report).

Researcher3839: The results of prosecutions are made publicly available, however there is no policy to specifically publish information on all offences. According to the Principle of Public Access that applies to all departments, this should be available to the public anyway, and if a request is made to the Agency to see the cases (not necessarily with detailed information about the prosecuted but, for instance, statistics of crimes dealt with), this must be handled by the Agency within three months.

If corruption is found, the matter is handed over to the Staff Disciplinary Board - Försvarsmaktens Personalansvarsnämnd, or FPAN. The board determines if the matter should be submitted to public prosecution. If no prosecution takes place then the FPAN decides on appropriate consequences. These could be disciplinary or requiring resignation.

There are several cases to be found online, where the FPAN has acted according to the regulations of &quoute;Myndighetsförordningen (2007:1266)&quoute; (see above). In March 2014, for instance, a military was fired from his position for expressing racist opinions publicly. Overall the FPAN has ruled over 50 cases in year 2012 and it has lead to nine dismissals.

Score 3 has been selected as shortcomings surrounding the distribution of the Code, as well as lack of regulations on post-separation employment, could weaken its effectiveness.

Researcher3839: There is some evidence that anti-corruption training is provided. The implementation of the Code of Conduct is mentioned in a short report by the Swedish Council for Strategic Human Resources Development (KRUS), a government agency that is no longer effective as of 2013.

A &quoute;Joint training module on Codes of Conduct for Seconded Staff in International Missions&quoute; has also been developed, lead by the Folke Bernadotte Academy responsible for civilian missions. The Armed Forces should however be more clear about who receives the training, and how it is implemented.

After a phone interview with key personnel at the International Training Centre for SAF, it was confirmed that none of the pre-deployment mission trainings include any sort of anti-corruption training. Also an interview with a previous military confirmed that there had been no references to anti-corruption during pre-deployment training for the mission to Kosovo.

Researcher3839: The Armed Force's Staff Responsibility Board’s (FPAN) mandate, as regulated in § 25 Authority Regulation (Myndighetsforordningen) and § 29 in (2007:1266), which involves instructions for the Swedish defence states that the Board must deal with all types of corrupt activities, including dismissals and termination.
This year one person has been dismissed, however not due to corrupt behavior but due to misbehavior. This case in particular was published online.
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For more serious cases such as procurement, the National Agency against Corruption (Riksenheten mot korruption, RMK) comes in. In 2011, there was a case where defence procurement personnel offered a contract to a media company. The defence was later fined to pay 270 000 SEK in fines.

There is no direct policy to publish or to make public outcomes of the prosecution processes by defence institutions. However, the State Disciplinary Board (Statens Ansvarsnämnd, SA) handles cases involving civil servants in senior positions, and their 2013 annual report states how many cases were dealt with. According to Myndighetsförodningen, each government agency can have their own established guidelines for how and if to deal with corruption (see RR pp.,11). There is currently no public policy to report all cases, although cases such as the one mentioned in the first paragraph are published online. Unless these cases are protected by the National Security Classification, however, according to the Freedom of the Press (2 Ch. 1 § Tryckfrihetsförordningen) these must be seen as public documents and information should be made available when requested. There is currently no evidence against defence re. not following the regulation on Freedom of the Press. Previous cases have been raised and dealt with by the Justitieombudsmannen (see decision on case from 2013). There is no evidence that prosecutions have been suppressed.

Score 3 has been selected as there does not appear to be a specific procedure mandating that cases are made public.

The Law on Bribes was updated in 2012 and was made more effective. Facilitation payments are illegal in
Sweden.

Researcher3839: SAF doctrine does not address corruption as a strategic issue on operations.

In 2011 the SAF commander-in-chief approved the Military Strategic Doctrine (MSD) as a first step in a new doctrine series. The MSD states on the issue of corruption that: &quoute;The Swedish Armed Forces personnel is required to actively distance itself from abuse and illicit traffic of drugs, discrimination, harassment and crime including corruption, trafficking as well as violence in all forms&quoute; (pp.91).

The next step is the Operational Doctrine (OPD), which will be supplemented by a number of appendices, including the management of operations. The OPD is a document that aims to comprehensively control and set goals for operational and tactical operations. The operational doctrine includes a purpose, goals, means and methods for the implementation and completion of military operations. Corruption is not addressed in the OPD, however.

Researcher3839: All commanders and military staff receive training before missions. Role playing activities, including civil-military exercises, are considered to be a very effective way of preparing staff, who are mainly trained in risks of everyday corruption within the local deployment context.

According to an interview with an officer who attended training prior to deploying to Kosovo, emphasis is put on interaction with the population (Source 2). Specific anti-corruption training, that focuses solely on corruption as an issue, or training and specific tools of how to prevent the risk are rare. There appears to be no follow up on how and if the training is implemented in the field.

RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 2: Score maintained as the depth and extent of training is not clear.

Researcher3839: A legal adviser is present within each mission. Although not explicitly stated, the advisors' tasks include reporting on corruption risks. Reports produced by the advisors are publicly available under the Principle on Access to Public Act, but it is unclear to what extent the advisors conduct assessments and no documents were found during research that indicated that this has actually taken place at any point.

Researcher3839: A code of conduct on corruption applies to all SAF personnel, including seconded personnel. Although it is not clear whether there are currently any detailed guidelines for military staff which address corruption risks in contracting whilst on deployed operations or peacekeeping missions, the Folke Bernadotte Academy does monitor how the code of conduct is implemented within SAF.

RESPONSE TO TI REVIEWER: Score raised to 1 to reflect existence of general guidelines.

Researcher3839: There are a few small Swedish companies that provide a variety of services in conflict or high-risk areas (eg Vesper Group and Scandinavian Risk Solutions). The Swedish Armed Forces use the services of private companies, both through direct contracts and subcontracts.

As previously identified in the 2013 GI report, national regulations such as the Security Company Act do exist in Sweden which can sanction PMCs. A National Defence College report identifies that &quoute;both security and training companies are subjected to supervision of the County Administrative Board. Security companies must account ex officio for their business each year in a formal report to the County Administrative Board in the county where they acquired their license. If security services are furnished without proper authorization it is an offence punishable with a fine or imprisonment for at most six months.&quoute; (Bergman, p. 9).

Sweden is signatory to the Montreux Document and the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers (ICoC), both of which lay out good practices and guidelines when it comes to employing PMCs. The Document stipulates that PMCs should be subject to the criminal laws of the country contracting them and the country on whose territory they are registered and operate. It stipulates that when hiring a PMC, the state employer should ensure that the PMC has not been involved in organised crime, bribery, and corruption, and that its staff are properly trained, which includes anti-corruption training. The Document further encourages employing states to ensure that PMCs have policies against corruption. (3)However, the provisions of the Document are not legally binding, although the International Code of Conduct Association assesses PMCs' suitability to join the Code and audits their performance. It is, however, unclear to what extent this is effective, particularly as standards are still being formulated.

The lack of internal transparency that continues to be demonstrated by PMCs however, as well as the ongoing absence of audits of their international activities, confirms that the scrutiny of PMCs is not as strong as that of the armed forces. The researcher, Berndtsson states in an interview with Nils Lundgren that he does not believe that the state can simply rely on the code of conducts that the firms have set up internally. Instead he encourages the government to lobby for international standardization of laws and regulations.

Researcher3839: Contracts within the defence sector that are subject to confidentiality with regard to national security are procured in accordance with LOU, SFS 2011:1091. All other procurements not subject to confidentiality are governed by the Swedish Competition Directives.

In 2012 the NAO released a report examining the parliament’s decision to cut the SAF budget for material acquisition. The audit criticized the way the government and SAF have implemented the parliament’s decision, and state that the governance and the approach taken to implement these savings has had a negative effect on transparency and accountability.

Parliamentary control of the defence establishment's equipment procurement is carried out through the Defence Decision which is adopted every 4-5 years. The procurement process is based on the Defence Agency's operational capabilities. It is also based on current security policy considerations and the economic frameworks.

Researcher3839: According to a government decision, all procurements for the SAF are to be conducted by the FMV under the MOD with effect from 1 January 2013 (the process is however delayed and is to be fully implemented first by 2015) (RAFD 78) . The SAF assigns procurement missions to the FMV which then handles the actual procurement. The FMV then collaborates with third parties for advertising procurements and for distribution the tender documents.

The Armed Forces draws a detailed stock plan for procurement, consisting of three parts and displaying the entire cycle of the stock, from planning and design through to decommission. The plan is approved internally by the SAF and externally by the government; though valid for ten years, it is revised annually. Many of the basic items, which the defence sector buys in to its organizations, can be viewed on the FMV's websites. Only 2% of the volume and 3% of the financial value of procurements are excepted from such transparency.

The process of defence procurement contains several phases. In a report in 2011, conducted by the Defence Structure Survey, it is stated that some of these phases are not fully disclosed - if these phases were taken into consideration, the transparency and understanding of the procurement cycle would become better. The following phases are lacking in the Armed Forces definition of procurement: research and development, the study phase, commissioning and procurement, verification and validations of new defence systems, and export assistance.

An investigation made by the FMV has suggested that the government should create a 12 year plan for procurements (Utredningen om investeringsplanering för försvarsmateriel, SVT Play, 06:30 min), which would allow for more transparency and long-term accountability.

Researcher3839: As identified during the 2013 assessment, Chapter 18 of the Law on Procurement in the Defence and Security Sector (2011:1029) specifies the relevant oversight mechanisms and obliges the FMV to find the most cost-effective procurements corresponding to SAF needs. Oversight is enforced by the Swedish Competition Authority (KKV), who also ensures a standardized application of national procurement rules and promotes compliance among actors. The Swedish Competition Directives do not govern contracts subject to confidentiality, which are instead procured in accordance with LOU, SFS 2007:1091.

Reports from 2004 onward have examined a fundamental concern regarding political control of defence procurement, after SAF was found to be unable to clearly demonstrate that procurements were being driven by operational capability requirements.

As part of its response the Government appointed a special investigator in May 2013 to propose a revised process for investments in armaments. The findings of the inquiry were presented in March 2014 and have suggested revised procedures for the government's control over SAF equipment acquirement. More importantly, the report has focused on parliamentary and government ability to make investment decisions at a strategic level. The aim is to improve the process and make it predictable, transparent and long-term and thus more efficient.

Researcher3839: All current procurement processes are published at the FMV website. As identified in the 2013 GI report, the Defence Agency has an extensive materiel plan which includes detailed information about orders scheduled over the planned period. However, both the ESV and NAO pointed out serious shortcomings in SAF financial planning, monitoring, and reporting of equipment purchases (2011). The government has taken this seriously and has been investigating other models that will allow more accountability and governance. One of the responses to the criticism included the independent investigation of the procurement process, &quoute;Investeringsplanering för försvarsmateriel: En ny planerings-, besluts- och uppföljningsprocess&quoute;, presented in March 2014.

Researcher3839: According to the law on procurement (2007:1091), no additional procedures or standards are required in order to bid for work at the Ministry of Defence. However, according to Chapter 10 of the same law, if corruption is somehow discovered in the bidding company, its bid must be excluded from the procurement process.

The FMV instruction guide for registering and checking the security of new companies does not mention ensuring companies have implemented a compliance programme. It is an extensive security agreement form which the companies need to fill out, and it focuses on information that might be classified in order to protect national security, in the context of procurement.

RESPONSE TO REVIEWERS: Score raised to 1 to reflect prohibition on companies convicted of corruption participating in bids.

Researcher3839: A 2011 report by FOI presents the results from its evaluation of the Defence Materiel Acquisition Strategy (MFS), a joint strategy between the SAF and FMV which was adopted in 2007. The purpose of the evaluation was to estimate to what degree the MFS is realized and to suggest how implementation can be improved.

The evaluation of the MFS was carried out as three interdependent studies; an organization analysis, analysis of key performance indicators and an analysis of external factors. The overall conclusion drawn from the evaluation is that the strategy is realized to a limited extent. Three key factors are identified:
undefined performance objectives, insufficient implementation of the MFS in the organizations, and the possible impact of the Government Bill (2008/09:140).

Reports from 2004 highlighted limited political control of defence procurement. In May 2013 a special investigator was appointed in order to come up with new procurement strategies. The findings suggest parliamentary and government ability to make investment decisions at a strategic level. The aim is to improve the process and make it predictable and transparent. The report was introduced in March 2014. Due to national elections in September 2014, the work of implementing the recommendations has come to a stall.

Researcher3839: In the annual regulatory letter provided by the government, the SAF are provided with the conditions for the next year’s mission. The appropriation states what goals the SAF are to achieve, how much money the authority has available and how the money should be allocated between different activities. In addition, the regulatory letter provides specific guidelines on which purchases must be approved and monitored by the government, and the size of the spending and object frameworks to guide the Defence Agency's stock planning. The FMV is responsible for procurement and implementation under this.

However, despite these formal processes in place, reports from 2004 have shown limited political control of defence procurement and indicated that rather than acting in accordance with long-term strategy, the Defence sector has purchased products based on operational needs. In May 2013, a special investigator was appointed in order to come up with new procurement strategies. The findings suggest parliamentary and government ability to make investment decisions at a strategic level.

Researcher3839: Swedish materiel procurement has historically been rooted in its own extensive development of technically complex materiel systems, leading to a high proportion of non-advertised procurement (FMV Annuals Report: pp31). The material procurement has gone through some changes in the past year, and FMV has carried out work in line with this to increase the percentage of competition in awards. Currently 61% of all the procurements are conducted through open competition, but the overall value is not clear.

Researcher3839: Tender boards are audited by the NAO. Members of these boards are also required to comply with relevant internal guidelines and codes of conduct such as the &quoute;Ethics: guidance and rules for FMV employees&quoute;. The equipment acquisition strategy also states that when contracts are established between the tender board and companies, a follow-up review should be undertaken by the NAO.

Researcher3839: It is clearly stated in both the forward and Chapter 2 of the Law on Competition that any type of collusion is forbidden. If a company violates the Law on Competition, it will suffer from sanctions such as fines or penalties, with the person leading such a company potentially banned from business operations.

Researcher3839: Sweden adheres to the European Commission's Security Procurement Directive (2009/81 EC) which states that staff working in procurement must be able to ensure that defence contractors meet their obligations. All staff at FMV dealing with procurement procedures have legal backgrounds. It is likely that training is in place, however, this could not be verified.

Researcher3839: A complaint to the Parliamentary Ombudsmen (Riksdagens ombudsmän) can be made by anybody who feels that he or she or a third party has been treated wrongly or unjustly by a public authority or an official employed. Companies are well protected against discrimination in procurements, as defined in Chapter 1 of the Procurement Law.

Researcher3839: Swedish legislation defines corruption mainly in terms of bribery, both as in the offering and the accepting of bribes. The Swedish legal system is based on the concept of individual guilt (“individuella skuldbegreppet”) – implying that only individuals, rather than judicial entities (such as firms or companies etc) can commit crimes.

However, in 1986, a ‘punitive sanctions legislation’ for individuals within judicial entities was introduced, meaning that crimes within business activities could be charged with corporate fine (“företagsbot”). The legislation was made more precise in 2006 (see the Swedish Economic Crime Authority for description of the regulation), specifying that the fine could be up to 10 million SEK. If a supplier, whether the individual or the entity he/she is representing, is convicted for crimes that in any ways involve corruption, the company must be excluded, according to Chapter 11 of the Act on Defence and Sensitive Security Procurement (2011:1029).

The Institute against Bribery (Institutet mot Mutor, IMM) has a search function on its webpage where it is possible to find convictions that have been made against any companies. Since 2000, there has been none. SOFF, which is the Swedish Security and Defence Industry Association, recently joined the IMM as a support member in order to actively work against bribery.

Researcher3839: A voluntary intergovernmental Code of Conduct on Defence Procurement has been drafted under the European Defence Agency (EDA) framework. The purpose of this Code is to enhance transparency and encourage competition at the area of public procurement covered by Article 346 TFEU. Additionally, in 2008, a code of conduct for offsets was developed. Sweden has signed both of the codes.

It is difficult to find information on how well implemented these codes of conducts are however, and whether &quoute;specific attention is paid to ensuring integrity as a part of this action&quoute;. Sweden is one of the member states that subscribes to the EDA code of conduct on offsets. On the EDA's webpage one can read that the &quoute;Swedish Defence Materiel Administration (FMV) does not apply any particular policy of offsets. Such issues will be dealt with on a case-by-case basis following the provisions of the Treaty and the relevant Directive.&quoute; As there are such loose regulations this increases the risk of loss of transparency, hence the awarded score of 2.

Researcher3839: There is no national legislation in Sweden that regulates competition with regard to offset contracts. The article quoted here emphasizes that Swedish tax payers cannot possibly know the profit from weapons sales as there are no official figures provided on offsets, and hence no information on the actual cost of Sweden's involvement in arms trading. Currently if the Swedish defence industry enters into a contract that includes offsets, the parliament has no official right to audit that contract due to the law on commercial confidentiality. In the book &quoute;Bribery, Power and Aid&quoute; which examines the JAS affair with South Africa, author and journalist Nils Resare writes that he is convinced that the offsets do not come close to the promised 70 billion SEK - four times more than the original value of aircraft deal. No official statistics are available; however, basic details of offset programmes are available.

RESPONSE TO REVIEWERS: Only basic details of offset contracts appear to be available. Score raised to 1.

Researcher3839: There is currently no national legislation in Sweden that regulates competition with regard to offset contracts; instead the relevant actors refer to the Code of Conduct developed by EDA, which prescribes competition.

Researcher3839: The government currently does not exercise any control over a company's use of agents during the procurement cycle, although the 2013 GI reports shows that it does subscribe to a wider European ethics policy initiated by the AeroSpace and Defence Industries Association of Europe (ASD) and strongly supported by the Swedish Security and Defence Industry Association (SOFF). The Trade Ban Law continues to offer the government its best means to regulate the use of intermediaries, but the government cannot otherwise influence this situation.

There is evidence that agents from the Swedish defence industry have been able to actively engage in corruption. In 2014 a former Greek MOD official admitted that during the 1990s and early 2000s he received a €240,000 bribe from an agent acting on behalf of Ericsson Microwave (now Saab Microwave) to win Greek arms contracts.

Researcher3839: Under Swedish freedom of information legislation (offentlighetsprincipen), the principal aspects of the financing package surrounding major arms deals must be made available freely or at minimal cost, with certain exceptions on the grounds of national security. The FMV publishes basic details of its projects on its website, but does not publish details of associated financing packages. Additionally, one case in 2011 shows grounds for concern however, where a journalist who asked MOD for access to the procurement reports regarding the import of a French helicopter system was accidentally provided both classified and de-classified versions of the same document. The situation indicated the MOD had abused its power to classify documents, noting the purchase was criticized as the helicopters failed to correspond to the identified needs of SAF. The purchase cost the state six billion, with delivery agreed to occur in 2009. By August 2011 the MOD had only received two of eighteen helicopters however, and had assessed the full system would not become fully operational until at least 2020. To cover this gap the MOD was forced to buy fifteen Black Hawk helicopters for an extra cost of 4.7 billion SKR. The incident was reported to the the Parliamentary Ombudsmen (JO).

Researcher3839: Section 14 of the Law on Defence and Security Procurement (LUFS) governs the engagement of sub-contractors; however nothing is regulated within it in relation to anti-corruption programmes.

Researcher3839: There is a continuous absence of a national reporting obligation applicable to defence materiel imports. It would be beneficial for the public if statistics could be easily obtained.

The defence Review Panel (Försvarsberedningen) stated in its 2013 report that Sweden’s national security centers on solidarity with other states. It is strengthened through confidence-building measures, through joint crisis management, as well as through active contribution to the various Nordic, European and global security initiatives. Such collaboration occurs through both civilian and military initiatives, including joint cooperation on defence materiel procurement.

The government agrees with the report and states that the previous desire to be self-sufficient in defence materiel has been replaced by a growing need for collaboration with like-minded states. The government further believes that it is in many cases more important that Sweden has equipment that is interoperable with its partner countries' stock and that it is technically reliable and accessible than that it has the highest technical performance.

This development is in no way new, however the explicit statement that the acquisition of defence materiel is influenced and guided by interoperability with other collaborating states, rather than technical advancement, shows that politics and the import of defence materiel are tightly intertwined and have become normalized. It is difficult to determine the extent to which this occurs in practice however as no statistics are available.