- A
- B
- C
- D
- E
- F
Belgium’s GI ranking in Band B places it in the low risk category for corruption in the defence and security sector. The highest risk areas are Procurement and Operations, which fell in Band C (moderate risk of corruption). Belgium performs well overall, yet there are shortcomings – often acknowledged by the government – that seem to be very much in Belgium’s interest to address. Belgium not only appointed a government reviewer for the GI 2015 but engaged in an honest, transparent and constructive manner that should be regarded as good practice by other governments.
Transparency and Public Debate
Belgium does well in terms of defence budget transparency, including the role of parliament and the detailed information available online. The Finance Inspector exerts a strong oversight role. Transparency is also strong as far as asset disposals are concerned, which feature planned disposals being announced in advance and being published publicly. Legally, the Ministry of Defence can only use resources that are registered and approved in the defence budget. The Chief of Defence has an independent audit service at his disposal, composed of 33 military officials, which is subject to parliamentary oversight. No more than 0.5% of the defence budget expenditure is dedicated to secret items. Yet this transparency is not matched with public debate on defence policy – although the latter is publicly available, we recommend that public consultations take place before it is next updated. Public consultations should also precede the overdue introduction of a dedicated anti-corruption policy – as of now it does not exist, but it could facilitate coordination between various anti-corruption activities and lead to an implementation plan.
Fixing Shortcomings: Whistleblowing, Appointments, Code of Conduct
There are a number of areas where targeted reform could produce very effective results. This includes whistleblowing mechanisms, which at the moment do not seem to ensure a timely process and that the information provided is actually used. More attention should be paid to the selection, time in post, and oversight of personnel in sensitive positions, including officials and personnel in defence procurement, contracting, financial management, and commercial management. Selection of military personnel at middle and top management level appears to be driven by political considerations at times. The same is true for promotions, notwithstanding Belgium’s particular focus on ensuring that personnel from all regions and language backgrounds are represented at all levels. While is seems unlikely that the chain of command would influence chains of payment, the government itself points out that it could if it wanted to. The internal Defence Code of Conduct should be made publicly available.
Adopting a Strategic Approach to Corruption Risks on Operations
Belgium should ensure that regular anti-corruption training takes place, building on the training already available for commanders and the professionals trained to monitoring corruption in the field that are regularly deployed. This is particularly important as part of operational pre-deployment training. Belgium should also introduce explicit doctrine regarding corruption on operations. Although Belgium has deployed troops to various missions in recent years (e.g. the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, Atalanta in the Mediterranean, and Operation Unified Protector in Libya), the overall numbers are limited. As a NATO Building Integrity (BI) ‘Lead Nation’ however Belgium will still want to improve in this area, particularly as NATO is about to confirm a BI policy in 2016 that will apply to all member states. Since 2013 the Belgium army can now use private military contractors, with what seems to be limited oversight.
Defence Procurement: Building on Solid Systems to Increase Transparency and Company Requirements
Public information on defence procurement seems to only be available in a very abbreviated or general way – this should change, particularly as oversight mechanisms are already in place, actual and potential defence purchases are made publicly available on the Ministry of Defence website, and defence purchases are usually based on clearly identified and quantified requirements. We recommend that higher standards be demanded from the companies bidding, and the same goes for subsidiaries and sub-contractors. As brokers and agents are used, a clear policy should be introduced.
Is there formal provision for effective and independent legislative scrutiny of defence policy?
Francis Delpérée, &quoute;La constitution : de 1830 à nos jours, et même au-delà&quoute;, Racine, Brussels, 2006.
&quoute;La Constitution coordonnée belge&quoute;, (last modification: January 6, 2014), accessed June 29, 2014, http://www.senate.be/doc/const_fr.html.
Chambre des représentants, http://www.dekamer.be/kvvcr/showpage.cfm?section=/pri/competence&language=fr&story=competence.xml, accessed July 2 2014.
Chambre des représentants, Competencies, 2014, http://www.dekamer.be/kvvcr/pdf_sections/pri/fiche/fr_11_00.pdf, accessed July 4 2014.
La Chambre des représentants, Political controls, 2014, http://www.dekamer.be/kvvcr/pdf_sections/pri/fiche/fr_11_09.pdf, accessed July 4 2014.
Chambre des Représentants, Service juridique, &quoute;Une première approche de la Chambre et de son règlement&quoute;, 54e législature, juin 2014, https://www.dekamer.be/kvvcr/showpage.cfm?section=/qrva&language=fr&cfm=/site/wwwcfm/qrva/qrvatoc.cfm?legislat=54&bulletin=B009, accessed 15 February 2015.
Chambre des représentants, Proposal to establish a parliamentary commission of inquiry to investigate the role of intelligence services in the cybersurveillance, Proposal of 3 November 2014, http://www.lachambre.be/FLWB/PDF/54/0552/54K0552001.pdf, accessed 15 February 2015.
Questions et réponses écrites N° B009 - Législature : 54, 2014, https://www.dekamer.be/kvvcr/showpage.cfm?section=/qrva&language=fr&cfm=/site/wwwcfm/qrva/qrvatoc.cfm?legislat=54&bulletin=B009, accessed 15 February 2015.
Chambre des Représentants, CR question on military budgets, , 2014, https://www.dekamer.be/kvvcr/showpage.cfm?section=qrva&language=fr&cfm=qrvaXml.cfm?legislat=54&dossierID=54-b009-872-0099-2014201501037.xml
Chambre des représentants, questions on military procurement, 2014, https://www.dekamer.be/kvvcr/showpage.cfm?section=qrva&language=fr&cfm=qrvaXml.cfm?legislat=54&dossierID=54-b009-872-0098-2014201501036.xml
EU trio be, Belgium's federal structure, http://www.eutrio.be/fr/structure-de-letat-federal-belge, Homepage
La Chambre, 2015 budget approval, 2014, https://www.lachambre.be/kvvcr/showpage.cfm?section=/flwb&language=fr&cfm=/site/wwwcfm/flwb/flwbn.cfm?lang=F&legislat=54&dossierID=0494
Transparency International Belgium, NIS report, 2012, http://www.transparencybelgium.be/fileadmin/templates/docs/Material/NIS/Final_NIS_report/NIS_FR_FINAL_19_04_13.pdf?PHPSESSID=3585af276336601ba6d0669ebdff289e
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Does the country have an identifiable and effective parliamentary defence and security committee (or similar such organisation) to exercise oversight?
Researcher4165: There are permanent, temporary, and special Commissions in Parliament.
The Defence Committee is a permanent Parliamentary Commission, composed of 17 members appointed by proportional representation of the political groups, with extensive formal rights. Its meetings are public, unless specifically decided otherwise.
The Defence Committee can challenge the government and the Defence minister on any matter related to defence as well as pass motions. The committee can summon the Defence minister and require expert witnesses to appear. It can run debate in plenary session and the CR can, on the basis of the deliberations of the Defence Committee, conduct votes of confidence or distrust. The committee has the power to scrutinise the performance of the defence ministry and, if applicable, of defence agencies.
Each of its meetings is recorded in minutes published by the CR and available online by every citizen.
Another committee is devoted to defence matters: the Committee on Defence Procurement (13 members). This is a special committee, invested with a special ad hoc mission (mainly administrative or quasi-judicial). Its meetings are also recorded in minutes published by the CR.
There is limited evidence of the CR's full power to scrutinise the performance of the defence ministry. For example, members of the Parliamentary commission were granted official access to secret data of the Sûreté de l’État and of SGRS only in July 2014.
Chambre des représentants de Belgique, Commission de la Défense nationale, &quoute;Compte rendu intégral&quoute;, CRIV 53 COM 968, Mercredi 02-04-2014.
&quoute;Une première approche de la Chambre et de son règlement&quoute;, Chambre des Représentants, Service juridique, 54e législature, juin 2014.
Transparency International Belgium, NIS report, 2012, http://www.transparencybelgium.be/fileadmin/templates/docs/Material/NIS/Final_NIS_report/NIS_FR_FINAL_19_04_13.pdf?PHPSESSID=3585af276336601ba6d0669ebdff289e
RTBF, 'Nouveau Conseil National de Sécurité', 2015, http://www.rtbf.be/info/belgique/detail_charles-michel-dirigera-le-nouveau-conseil-national-de-securite?id=8714251
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: The Defence Committee has limited effectiveness exercising its oversight powers, in particular vis-à-vis the recently created Conseil National de Sécurité (28 Janvier 2015). An example of this is the decision of the executive to keep military “on the streets” in sensible areas. The relevant protocol states that military forces will patrol the streets as long as the “OCAM” (Organe de Coordination pour l'Analyse de la Menace), the organization that coordinates the analysis of threats, maintains a level 3 threat analysis on a scale of 0-4, with 4 being the highest level of risk. On 16 June 2015, the OCAM level of threat was at 2. The military are still patrolling some sensible streets. This situation has created confusion among some actors.
http://www.lachambre.be/doc/CCRI/html/54/ic119x.html
http://www.presscenter.org/fr/pressrelease/20150605/adaptation-de-la-legislation-a-la-denomination-du-conseil-national-de-securite
http://www.rtbf.be/info/belgique/detail_maintenir-le-niveau-3-d-alerte-terroriste-l-ocam-se-prononce-ce-lundi?id=8926198
The Special Committee on Military Procurement does not sufficiently verify whether potential buyers are known by policy and the intelligence service. This is illustrated by the fact that Art. 151 on the ‘Control of the Arms Trade' (regulation relevant for the House of Representatives) is deemed to be in need of modification as it is not sufficiently addressing grey areas at the federal level. A proposition to modify Art. 151 has been deposed on 26 March 2015, with the specific aim to guarantee effective control of the arms trade by the Special Committee on Military Procurement.
http://www.lachambre.be/FLWB/PDF/54/0994/54K0994001.pdf
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Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: The Belgian Federal Parliament has a number of Committees on defence matters. There is the Defence Committee of the House of Representatives as well as the Committee for Military Purchases (House of Representatives), plus the Committee on Foreign Relations and Defence (Senate).
In January 2015, IES Assitant Director Alexander Mattelear briefed the Parliament on 'the future on the Belgian Armed Forces' and related defence issues - an example of a public briefing organised by the Defence Committee of the Belgian Parliament.
Source: Institute for European Studies, 2015, http://www.ies.be/node/2786
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Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: The Belgian Parliament has created Committees and Commissions.
A Committee performs a permanent audit function and serves as the point of contact in case of complaints. It is manned by professionals with juridical competencies. There are also Committees for Police matters and for Intelligence services that are separate from the Defence Committee.
While parliament discusses a broad range of topics, decisions in the Commissions are made by politicians who are experienced in the respective areas. Members of the Commission have the mandate to question the Minister regarding any aspects of his policies, ask for experts or senior leaders to appear in front of them, debate the subjects they deem to be important, and discuss proposals for laws and the appropriate budgets. Yet the Commissions only have an advisory role for the full parliament.
All political parties are represented in a Commission and take a vote to agree their advice to parliament. There are permanent Commissions on defence matters (open to the public), on (major) armament aquisitions (also open to the public) and a permanent Commission on operations involving the Belgian Defence Forces (not open to the public but 'closed doors'). According to the rules, the Chair of the Defence Commission and the Chair of the Acquisition Commission can decide to hold 'closed door' debates if a subject is considered sensitive - in reality, this is exceptional.
Theoretically, these commissions thus have a lot of power to control the Minister and the Department of Defence. Discussions can be intense, but at the end conclusions are voted upon. Those parties that form part of the government have a majority of votes and act as the majority.
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Is the country's national defence policy debated and publicly available?
Researcher4165: Each new government defines the defence policy in its formal &quoute;Government Policy Statement&quoute; which needs to be approved by parliament.
Afterwards there are recurring votes and debates on defence activities and reforms - at the moment these are often based on an updated policy document focusing on the future, published by the DoD (&quoute;Horizon 2030&quoute;).
Documents such as this one are publicly debated in parliament and by the national media, and they are available on the Ministry's of Defence's and on Parliament's websites.
At the government level, a CMR involving the PM, Deputy PMs and Ministers in charge of the relevant dossiers resolves any discrepancies - ultimately, this is where strategic decisions are made.
Some actors like the Palace, Parliament and the trade unions can also play a significant role as they each act as a sounding board, according to the legal rules regarding control and monitoring issues that are associated with the commitment of personnel for external missions.
The democratic debate is also influenced by the weight of public opinion through the media and through pressure groups; often focussing on the process of operational commitment or withdrawal. Influence is exerted before and after the final decision has been made.
In January 2015, Belgium set up a National Security Council that is in charge of improving the coordination between the various security services throughout the country, in response to global and national security threats.
A. Dumoulin, P. Manigart et W. Struys, &quoute; La Belgique et la Politique européenne de sécurité et de défense - Une approche politique, sociologique et économique&quoute;, Bruylant, Bruxelles, 2003.
&quoute;Déclaration de politique générale&quoute;, Gouvernement Di Rupo, 12 décembre 2011.
J. Rosiers, &quoute;Belgisch defensiebeleid: een missie voor de wereld?&quoute;, Internationale Spectator, Jubileumnummer, Jaargang 65 Nr 5, Mai 2011, p. 267-271.
V. Moyse, A. Dumoulin, &quoute;Le processus décisionnel belge en matière d'opérations civilo-militaires&quoute;, Courrier hebdomadaire du CRISP, n° 2086-2087, Bruxelles, 2011.
B. Delcourt, &quoute;Une Belgique ambiguë&quoute;, in Politique, revue de débats, décembre 2013, http://politique.eu.org/spip.php?article2856, accessed on July 5, 2014.
Ministry of Defence, The value of the Belgian Defence, 2014, http://www.mil.be/sites/mil.be/files/files_library/waarde_belgische_defensie_-_uk.pdf
Ministry of Defence, Horizon 2030, 2015, http://www.mil.be/sites/mil.be/files/files_library/250215_papers_wise_pen.pdf
Chambre des représentants, Defence committee, 2015, https://www.lachambre.be/kvvcr/showpage.cfm?section=/cricra&language=fr&cfm=dcricra.cfm?commID=U003&type=comm&cricra=cri&count=all&legislat=54
RTBF, 'Nouveau Conseil de Sécurité', 2015, http://www.rtbf.be/info/belgique/detail_charles-michel-dirigera-le-nouveau-conseil-national-de-securite?id=8714251
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Do defence and security institutions have a policy, or evidence, of openness towards civil society organisations (CSOs) when dealing with issues of corruption? If no, is there precedent for CSO involvement in general government anti-corruption initiatives?
Researcher4165: Defence institutions (i.e. the DoD and all unit commanders) are open towards organisations such as the Defence trade unions, protect them legally, and encourage their engagement. Defence institutions have specifically engaged with trade unions on corruption issues.
This happens both through a formal structure for consultation (a Negotiating Committee, a High Consultation committee, a Basic Consultation Committee) and in practice through regular social dialogue on defence issues which is, however, limited to labour and personnel issues.
Some examples provided by junior officers in the units seem to suggest, however, that these provisions are not always respected in the lower echelons since priority is given to the mission.
There is no evidence of CSOs (who are not trade unions) being consulted on corruption issues by defence and security institutions.
Loi du 19 Dec 74 organisant les relations entre les autorités publiques et les syndicats des agents relevant de ces autorités
Loi du 11 Jul 78 organisant les relations entre les autorités publiques et les syndicats du personnel militaire (Reg A 16-Z 40)
Loi du 23 Avr 10 portant exécution temporaire de l'organisation des relations entre les autorités publiques et les syndicats du personnel militaire (Reg A 16-Z41)
AR du 28 Sep 84 portant exécution de la Loi du 19 Dec 74
Loi du 28 février 2007 &quoute;fixant le statut des militaires du cadre actif des Forces armées et modifiant certaines dispositions relatives au statut du personnel militaire&quoute;
&quoute;Convention des Nations unies contre la corruption&quoute;, New York le 31 octobre 2003
Loi du 31 juillet 2013, modifiant la loi du 28 février 2007
DGHR-REG-SYNVAK-001, Relations entre les autorités militaires et les syndicats du personnel militaire (Original version: June 1st, 2004. Last version: July 6, 2009, signed by MoD De Crem.)
&quoute;Convention sur la lutte contre la corruption d’agents publics étrangers dans les transactions commerciales internationales et documents connexes&quoute;, OCDE 2011
- &quoute;Corruption in Belgium:a Policy Oriented Survey of Facts, Figures and Failures&quoute;, March 2015,
http://www.ecares.org/index2.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_view&gid=327&Itemid=204
- Geert Castryck, Sara DePauw, Nils Duquet, &quoute;The Flemish Arms Export Policy: An Analysis of the Legal Framework&quoute;, October 20, 2006. http://www.flemishpeaceinstitute.eu/sites/vlaamsvredesinstituut.eu/files/files/reports/flemish_arms_exports_policy_legal_framework.pdf
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: No evidence could be found regarding engagement between defence and security institutions and civil society. Nevertheless in Belgium, according to the Eurobarometer, 74% of people believe that NGOs can influence local and national level decision making. Similarly in across the EU, around 74% are of the same opinion. (&quoute;European's Engagement in Participatory Democracy&quoute;. Flash Eurobarometer 373. March 2013)
The Flemish &quoute;Strategic Goods Monitoring Unit&quoute; (Dienst Controle Strategische Goederen) or &quoute;Arms Trade Monitoring Unit&quoute; is the unit in charge of providing technical and legal advice as well as policy support to the monitoring authorities. It also offers informal services to the public, mainly through communicating legal provisions lists, procedures etc. via its website (see http://www.flemishpeaceinstitute.eu/sites/vlaamsvredesinstituut.eu/files/files/reports/flemish_arms_exports_policy_legal_framework.pdf).
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: There have been positive developments to improve transparency and openness towards NGOs/CSOs. Yet the TI NIS report finds the parliament and the executive to have only limited independence from party headquarters, and to some extent from civil society organizations (e.g. unions) on key decisions.
The extent to which information is transparent and easily accessible to NGOs for instance is considered quite poor in Belgium. The report also points out an occasionally strong impact of media, public opinion and political interference on judiciary judgments.
Source: &quoute;Corruption in Belgium:a Policy Oriented Survey of Facts, Figures and Failures&quoute;, March 2015,
http://www.ecares.org/index2.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_view&gid=327&Itemid=204
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Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: In my opinion, none of the answers is entirely correct.
According to the Belgian law, the so-called &quoute;social dialogue&quoute; is an obligation for the Authorities, including Defence and the Police, but only on labour or personnel matters, not for policy matters.
Strong trade unions can try to push issues at the policy level, but this is not the case vis-à-vis the Belgian Defence or Police forces. Depending on the background of the Minister and the willingness of senior leadership, there can be more or less openness regarding information. CSO and NGOs are not consulted on policy matters. Some CSOs are seen as having a (party) political agenda.
None of the answers is entirely correct because some CSO are indeed legally protected, have to be consulted and need to provide formal agreement - but never on policy matters, and never on anti-corruption.
Suggested score:
Has the country signed up to international anti-corruption instruments such as, but not exclusively or necessarily, UNCAC and the OECD Convention? (In your answer, please specify which.)
Researcher4165: Belgium signed the UNCAC on December 10, 2003 and ratified the Convention on September 25, 2008.
Belgium signed the &quoute;OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions&quoute; on December 17, 1997. The Senate ratified the Convention on April 20, 1999 and the Chamber of Representatives ratified it on 29 April 29, 1999. The AR was signed on June 9, 1999.
At the EU level, there are two binding legal instruments to fight corruption: the 1997 EU &quoute;Convention on the Fight against Corruption involving Officials of the European Communities or Officials of Member States of the EU&quoute; and the 2003 &quoute;Framework Decision on Combating Corruption in the Private Sector&quoute;.
Belgium signed the Council of Europe's &quoute;Criminal Law Convention on Corruption CETS No. 73&quoute; on April 20, 1999 and ratified it on March 3, 2004.
The Council of Europe has two binding policies against corruption: the Council of Europe's &quoute;Criminal Law Convention on Corruption&quoute; and &quoute;Civil Law Convention on Corruption&quoute; were both adopted by Belgium in 1998. They provides for compensation for damages resulting from corruption, invalidity of corrupt contracts and whistleblower protection.
Aside from the Council of Europe's two binding policies, GRECO is also an important institution in the fight against corruption. GRECO was established in 1999 by the Council of Europe to monitor states' compliance with the organisation's anti-corruption standards. Belgium joined GRECO on May 1st, 1999.
United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC), http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/signatories.html, homepage
OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, http://www.oecd.org/corruption/oecdantibriberyconvention.htm, Homepage
Council of Europe, &quoute;Criminal Law Convention on Corruption CETS No. 173&quoute;.
Council of Europe, &quoute;Civil Law Convention on Corruption CETS No. 174&quoute;.
EU Convention on the Fight against Corruption involving Officials of the European Communities or Officials of Member States of the EU, 1997.
&quoute;Convention des Nations unies contre la corruption&quoute;, New York, 31 October 2003
EU Framework Decision on Combating Corruption in the Private Sector, 2003.
“Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European parliament and the European economic and social committee on a comprehensive EU policy against corruption”, COM(2003) 317 final, Commission of the European Communities&quoute;, Brussels, May 28, 2003.
GRECO (Group of States against Corruption), “RULES OF PROCEDURE”, Greco (2012) 26E, last amended on 15-19 October 2012, Strasbourg, 19 October 2012
IMOLIN, https://www.imolin.org/imolin/en/uninstruments.html, accessed July 8, 2014.
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Recent work in the context of updating the TI &quoute;Exporting Corruption&quoute; report, which focuses on the OECD Convention Against the Corruption of Foreign Officials suggests that actual enforcement of anti-corruption legislation underpinning international conventions is weak. Essentially the Ministry of Justice lacks resources, and fighting corruption is not a current government priority.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: I could not find evidence that Belgium been covered by an UNCAC implementation review.
In March 2015, GRECO published a Third Evaluation Round Report on Belgium: http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/round3/GrecoRC3%282014%2920_3rd%20Interim_Belgium_EN.pdf.
The 2014 GRECO Report points to the need to continue improving preventive measures within
parliamentary and judicial institutions. GRECO welcomes the recent establishment of codes of conduct and a Federal Ethics Committee, as well as the introduction of preventive measures for federal parliamentarians - the latter includes a system for the declaration of donations, official appointments, other positions held and assets. Furthermore, it emphasizes the complexity of the ethics codes, the lack of a regulatory system and of a clear commitment to enforce the code - notably concerning gifts and other benefits as well as the poor publicity of information on income and assets for Members of Parliament. It also regrets the lack of rules regarding relations with interested third parties.
According to the OECD Working Group's phase-three report on the implementation of the OECD's Anti-Bribery Convention in Belgium, the country has had very few foreign bribery investigations and prosecutions. The OECD stated that in the 14 years since the entry into force of the foreign bribery offense in Belgium, only one case of bribery of foreign public officials has been concluded. Source: w.complianceweek.com/blogs/global-glimpses/oecd-anti-bribery-efforts-in-belgium-new-zealand-russia#.VXWiCNJ_Okp
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Re the GRECO initiative of the Council of Europe, Belgium has been reviewed by GRECO on the subject of incriminations and on the subject of transparency of political party funding. GRECO adopted the Third Interim Compliance Report on these subjects for Belgium at its 65th plenary meeting on 6-10 October 2014 - it concluded that Belgium made progress by implementing some additional recommendations, yet some recommendations remain only partly implemented or not implemented at all.
In October 2013, a report was published on Belgium's implementation of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. It refers to the GRECO reviews and asks that particular attention be paid to the introduction of an administrative integrity policy.
It seems unlikely that Belgium has been covered by an UNCAC review until now.
Suggested score:
Is there evidence of regular, active public debate on issues of defence? If yes, does the government participate in this debate?
Researcher4165: In Belgium, major defence questions are debated within academia and think tanks such as the Royal Higher Institute for Defence, which organises monthly conferences and seminars. Members of the government participate.
Debates also occur in Parliament and updated detailed reports can be accessed online (for the Defence Committee and the Committee on Defence Procurement).
There is also evidence of defence related debates in the media, as illustrated by &quoute;La Tribune&quoute; article under sources which comments on a decision by the Minister regarding military equipment.
RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 2: Score maintained as there appear to be some fora for exchanges.
Dumoulin, P. Manigart et W. Struys, &quoute; La Belgique et la Politique européenne de sécurité et de défense - Une approche politique, sociologique et économique&quoute;, Bruylant, Bruxelles, 2003.
Chambre des représentants de Belgique, Commission de la Défense nationale, &quoute;Compte rendu intégral&quoute;, CRIV 53 COM 968, Mercredi 02-04-2014.
Chambre des Représentants, Service juridique, 54e législature, &quoute;Une première approche de la Chambre et de son règlement&quoute;, June 2014.
Parliament, Defence committee, Last updated 2015, https://www.lachambre.be/kvvcr/showpage.cfm?section=/cricra&language=fr&cfm=dcricra.cfm?commID=U003&type=comm&cricra=cri&count=all&legislat=54
Ministry of defence, news, Homepage, http://www.mil.be/fr/communiques-presse
La Tribune, &quoute;Pourquoi le ministre de la défense belge veut le F-35 et pas le Rafale&quoute;, March 2014, http://www.latribune.fr/entreprises-finance/industrie/aeronautique-defence/20140324trib000821531/pourquoi-le-ministre-de-la-defence-belge-veut-le-f-35-et-pas-le-rafale.html
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: In my opinion, the debate between the public and the government is irregular.
To my knowledge there are no open forums or active websites.
A score of 2 would be more accurate.
Suggested score: 2
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: See the website of the Belgian Ministry of Defence http://www.mil.be/fr. However this lacks an active platform for discussion.
Debates and discussions of security and defence issues are present in the media, however the media mainly report on broader key security issues.
&quoute;Egmont&quoute;, the Royal Institute for International Relations (http://www.egmontinstitute.be/) is an independent think thank based in Brussels which provides interdisciplinary research, events, meetings and specialised training activities.
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Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: I am not aware of government websites to discuss defence and security issues, which was confirmed by our public relations agent. Debates happen mostly in the press. Some peace organisations organise public fora, but it is unclear whether that amounts to a 'debate'.
The Belgian Department of defence will be replacing key equipment in the coming years, and a public debate via the press has been organised by the Minister. The general public in Belgium does not seem to be particularly interested in defence and security issues.
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Does the country have an openly stated and actively implemented anti-corruption policy for the defence sector?
Researcher4165: Belgium has not developed a comprehensive national anti-corruption policy for the defence sector. However, the government has taken multiple anti-corruption initiatives at different levels which cover most areas what would be included in an anti-corruption policy.
Internal reports of the Court of Audits confirm that the DoD has an active service responsible for coordinating the integrity management and appointed certain persons in a support function for integrity.
In fact, anti-corruption is part of the Integrated Control System (ICS), implemented within all Defence bodies and units in accordance with the AR dated of 17 August 2007.
The Belgian Criminal Code criminalises public and private bribery, passive and active bribery, and bribery of national and foreign public officials. The Central Office for the Repression of Corruption (Office Central pour la Répression de la Corruption, or OCRC) has the legal power to carry out investigations across the entire Belgian territory and to investigate all serious cases of corruption.
&quoute;AR relatif aux activités d'audit interne dans certains services du pouvoir exécutif fédéral&quoute;, August 17, 2007.
&quoute;AR portant création du Comité d'audit de l'Administration fédérale (CAAF)&quoute;, August 17, 2007.
CC, Internal reports.
Business Anti-Corruption Portal, Homepage, http://www.business-anti-corruption.com/country-profiles/europe-central-asia/belgium/legislation.aspx
Belgium Criminal Code, 2012, http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=11657
Belgian Central Office for the Repression of Corruption, http://www.polfed-fedpol.be/org/djf_ocrc/pdf/OCRC_presentation_en.pdf, Homepage
Transparency International Belgium, NIS report, 2012, http://www.transparencybelgium.be/fileadmin/templates/docs/Material/NIS/Final_NIS_report/NIS_FR_FINAL_19_04_13.pdf?PHPSESSID=3585af276336601ba6d0669ebdff289e
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: The OCRC can currently be described as an 'empty shell' as actual investigations and the successful prosecution of cases of corruption are rare and very slow. In the most recent case of &quoute;Regie der gebouwen&quoute; (relating to the public works department), it took around seven years to conclude a trial and a reach a verdict, which was considered by many to be light in terms of the sentencing ( http://www.tijd.be/politiek_economie/belgie_federaal/Straffen_met_uitstel_in_proces_Regie_der_Gebouwen.9618344-3136.art).
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: The promotion of integrity, the management of conflicts of interest and the fight against corruption are not political priorities in Belgium - this was the conclusion of the National Integrity System (NIS) evaluation carried out by Transparency International in 2012: http://www.transparencybelgium.be/fr/etudes/nis-systeme-national-dintegrite.html
The fight against corruption did not appear in the coalition agreement of the Di Rupo government either, nor in the National Security Plan. The current Charles Michel government coalition agreement mentions the term corruption but does not define it, leaving what is meant by corruption unclear.
http://www.police.be/files/fed/files/ORG/INT/PNS2012-2015.pdf
http://www.premier.be/fr/accord-de-gouvernement
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are there independent, well-resourced, and effective institutions within defence and security tasked with building integrity and countering corruption?
Researcher4165: Within the DoD there are identifiable, independent, suitably staffed and funded institutions tasked with building integrity. These institutions apply the relevant legal provisions of the Military Penal Code and disciplinary regulations of the armed forces. The DoD has a department in charge of audits and has appointed individuals responsible for building integrity. The DoD has developed its own code of ethics, established after extensive consultation with personnel and trade unions.
The most representative organs are the IAG Def (General Inspector Defence) and the IAD (Internal Audit Defence). Art. 39/3 of the AR provides that IAG Def is competent for all services that are part of the armed forces, with the exception of IAD.
IAG Def carries out inspections ordered by the DoD or by CHOD, reports directly to the DoD and can formulate recommendations to MoD after any investigation (AR of 21 December 2001).
Art. 39/3 of the AR also stipulates that the IAG Def has a broad right of initiative as well as the right to general and permanent inspection to gather information or to investigate within the armed services - in the context of a formal mandate from Minister of Defence or CHOD.
As of 2014, the IAD is composed of 33 military officials. Two internal audits have been conducted in 2012 and 2013 but these documents are not publicly available.
RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 3: Agree with comments, score lowered to 3.
&quoute;Loi contenant le Code pénal militaire&quoute;, 27 May 1870, updated 7 May 2003.
&quoute;AR, portant mise à exécution du Code pénal militaire.&quoute;
&quoute;Politique d'intégrité au sein du pouvoir fédéral&quoute;, CC, Rapport interne, 2007, p. 7, 9.
&quoute;AR modifiant diverses dispositions relatives au statut des militaires&quoute;, 26 décembre 2013.
Circulaire du 21 juin 2010 &quoute;Marchés publics. - Déontologie. - Conflit d'intérêts. - Déclarations sur l'honneur&quoute;,
General inspector for Defence, AR 2010-04-06/24, art. 25, 2010, http://www.ejustice.just.fgov.be/cgi_loi/loi_a1.pl?language=fr&la=F&cn=2001122142&table_name=loi&&caller=list&F&fromtab=loi&tri=dd+AS+RANK&rech=1&numero=1&sql=%28text+contains+%28%27%27%29%29#LNK0022
Internal Audit defence, AR 2010-04-06/24, art. 24, 2010, http://www.ejustice.just.fgov.be/cgi_loi/change_lg.pl?language=fr&la=F&cn=2001122142&table_name=loi
CR, legislature 54 on the IAD, 2014, http://www.lachambre.be/kvvcr/showpage.cfm?section=qrva&language=fr&cfm=qrvaXml.cfm?legislat=54&dossierID=54-B002-872-0033-2014201500443.xml
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: The TI NIS Report 2012 states that the number of staff and the skill levels of staff involved in
anti-corruption points to an inadequate level of training at the parliamentary level. Staffing levels, in particular, are an issue at the Justice Department and the Central Office for the Fight against Corruption (OCRC). The report points to the absence of systematic audits of federal ministerial cabinets (the strategic cells). It emphasizes the inefficiency of complaints and disciplinary procedures among politicians and civil servants. Also, as per the report, the federal level has not yet managed to create a functioning whistleblowing system.
It is also highlighted that although Belgium has a well-developed legal framework, and the Criminal Code criminalises public and private bribery, passive and active bribery, and bribery of national and foreign public officials; the corruption prevention efforts vary greatly between country's regional governments.
Suggested score: 3
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Both the IAG and the IAD depend directly on the Minister and are well manned and funded.
I agree with the score because the individuals performing those jobs are well skilled and regularly evaluated.
There were difficulties auditing the Directorate of Budget due to substantial changes to the budget which were rather complicated. This appears to be a temporary issue which will also be resolved through new recruits.
The IAD reports to the Federal Audit Authority (ACFO) and is often mentioned as an example for other administrations.
The reports of IAD an AIG are treated as confidential however and are never published.
The chain of command is also trying to build integrity. All personnel involved in budget and finance matters has to sign a declaration of integrity and is briefed on the possible consequences of violations. This is also relevant for question 47 re codes of conduct.
As stated before, the OCRC is certainly a powerful instrument against fraud at the federal government level, but not within defence. They only work in a repressive manner, which means after a complaint has been made or another body has detected fraud. I am not aware of any audit or any preventive measures from OCRC.
Suggested score:
Does the public trust the institutions of defence and security to tackle the issue of bribery and corruption in their establishments?
Researcher4165: In 2012, a large-scale trial opened before the Criminal Court of Brussels concerning false invoices and bribes paid by military and private contractors within the army, amounting to 15 million Euros. After initial convictions and an appeal in 2013, all military and private contractors involved were sentenced to severe penalties and heavy fines. Large sums were confiscated.
Following this process, the DoD gave a special mandate to a high ranking officer to reinforce the budgetary and financial control within Defence, so as to avoid cases of fraud and to determine quickly if there have been fraud attempts.
According to the 2013 Global Corruption Barometer, 49% of the Belgian public think that the government's actions are ineffective in the fight against corruption, while 32% of respondents in Belgium felt that the military was corrupt/extremely corrupt. From the twelve institutions assessed on public perception, the military was the fourth least corrupt.
Internal prescription CHOD Nr200505957, October 20, 2005.
Code pénal, Art. 314, 2012
&quoute;Politique d'intégrité au sein du pouvoir fédéral&quoute;, CC, Internal report, 2007, p. 10.
Dépêche BELGA, &quoute;Appel Bruxelles: 7 millions d'euros confisqués au profit de l'Etat&quoute;, Jan 2012,
http://www.rtbf.be/info/regions/detail_fraude-au-sein-de-l-armee-31-personnes-devant-la-justice?id=7402093, accessed on July 21, 2014.
RTBF, 2013, &quoute;Fraudes à l'armée&quoute;, http://www.rtbf.be/info/belgique/detail_les-fraudes-a-l-armee-avaient-deja-ete-denoncees-selon-la-defence?id=7966765
Global Corruption Barometer, TI, Belgium, 2013, http://www.transparency.org/gcb2013/country/?country=belgium
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are there regular assessments by the defence ministry or another government agency of the areas of greatest corruption risk for ministry and armed forces personnel, and do they put in place measures for mitigating such risks?
Researcher4165: The IAD performs regular audits at all DoD levels, and delivers independent advice to the commanding officers. This includes measures to prevent or at least mitigate corruption risks.
RESPONSE TO ALL REVIEWERS: Agreed, score lowered to 3.
&quoute;Politique d'intégrité au sein du pouvoir fédéral&quoute;, CC, Internal report, 2007.
&quoute;AR relatif aux activités d'audit interne dans certains services du pouvoir exécutif fédéral&quoute;, August 17, 2007.
&quoute;AR portant création du Comité d'audit de l'Administration fédérale (CAAF)&quoute;, August 17, 2007.
&quoute;Rapport au gouvernement sur le fonctionnement du système de contrôle interne dans l'administration fédérale&quoute;, CAAF, July 2012.
Interview 5, Senior Auditor, July 3, July 8, July 17 and July 19, 2014
Opinion: Not Qualified
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: To my knowledge there is no specific regular assessment of the greatest corruption risk areas for defence institutions. For instance the court of audit in its 2013 report, released on the 24 october 2014, does not make any particular reference to corruption risks. In a similar fashion, the Audit Committee of the Federal Administration (CAAF for its abbreviation in French) in its annual reports for 2011-2014 sent no remarks to the Department of defence. Yet, the Ministry of Defence Internal Audit receives substantial resources and demonstrates great professionalism, as reported by the Court of Audit in its 2012 annual report.
In Belgium there is no specific assessment of corruption risks, which would correspond to a score of 0. However this score would disregard the work of the audit institutions. A score of 2 would better reflect the assessment of corruption risks, the mitigation of those risks and the fact that in Belgium the fight against corruption is not a priority for the government.
Sources:
http://www.comitedaudit.belgium.be/fr/publications
http://www.lachambre.be/kvvcr/pdf_sections/news/0000000229/170e_cahier_cours_des_comptes_note_presse.pdf
https://www.ccrek.be/FR/Publications/Fiche.html?id=489e9d9c-9ca3-4ae8-aab2-9b0d999f451e
http://www.transparencybelgium.be/fr/etudes/nis-systeme-national-dintegrite.html
Suggested score: 2
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: As per a 2014 report by the European Commission, Belgium does not have a comprehensive anti-corruption strategy at the federal level.The fight against corruption was seen as a matter
of security by the national police, and therefore was part of the security strategy of the government prior to 2011, but it is not mentioned as a priority area anymore. Source: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/organized-crime-and-human-trafficking/corruption/anti-corruption-report/docs/2014_acr_belgium_chapter_en.pdf
The investigating and enforcing authorities consist of members of the federal police, the prosecution office and investigating judges. Under article 29 of the Belgian Criminal Investigation Code, public officials must report all criminal offences, including bribery, which they are aware of, to the prosecutor. Source: http://www.allenovery.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/Bribery%20and%20Corruption%20in%20Belgium.pdf
Parliament passed a law to protect federal civil servants against sanctions, retaliation for reporting irregularities and legal offenses committed by their colleagues or supervisors in the federal public services. Source: http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2013&dlid=220258#wrapper
Suggested score: 3
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: After a substantial financial fraud in 2005, a general was tasked to identify all risks in the budget and finance processes and to conduct an audit of all services involved. This was a very important and useful but a one-off exercise.
Four years ago, the Chief of Defence created an internal control cell which is carrying our a situation analysis of all processes within defence, not only budget and finance. Every director or commander has to prepare his/her own process or workflow analysis and identify and scale his/her own risks.This work is not complete yet, but there is a firm intention to continue and to renew the work on a permanent basis. Every director or commander has to take the necessary measures to counter the risks and he/she has to provide an annual report to the IAD about this.
On top of this the IAD is continuing its audits, plus the federal Court of Audit has started auditing some subjects and to improve the process.
Nevertheless, a structure is being developed and there is still room for improvement. A score of 3 seems most realistic.
Suggested score: 3
Does the country have a process for acquisition planning that involves clear oversight, and is it publicly available?
Researcher4165: There is a clear process for acquisition planning in place, involving oversight at the defence, government (Ministerial Council, Inspector Finance) and parliamentary level. All major procurement programs are presented to the “Committee on Defence Procurement” that can require insight into the procurement procedure. All processes and acquisition planning can be publically discussed in the Parliamentary Defence Committee.
The 'Direction Générale des Ressources Matérielles' (DGMR or General Direction of Material Resources) is in charge of defence acquisition planning and manages the entire life cycle of acquired systems.
There is a presentation that is publicly available and which discusses the Belgian modernisation plan for 2000-2015, including various references to acquisition. It is not entirely clear who delivered the presentation, although it appears to be available via the Czech Ministry of Defence.
La Chambre, http://www.dekamer.be/kvvcr/showpage.cfm?section=/pri/competence&language=fr&story=competence.xml, accessed July 2 2014.
&quoute;Une première approche de la Chambre et de son règlement&quoute;, Chambre des Représentants, Service juridique, 54e législature, juin 2014.
Chambre des représentants de Belgique, Commission de la Défense nationale, &quoute;Compte rendu intégral&quoute;, CRIV 53 COM 968, Mercredi 02-04-2014.
Ministry of Defence, General Direction of Material Resources, homepage, http://www.mil.be/fr/equipements-et-materiels
N/A, Presentation: &quoute;The modernisation plan 2000 - 2015 of the Belgian Armed Forces&quoute;, delivered 2009. Available via the Czech(!) MOD, http://www.mocr.army.cz/images/Bilakniha/ZSD/Belgian%20Modernisation%20Plan%202000_2015%20of%20the%20Armed%20Forces.pdf
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is the defence budget transparent, showing key items of expenditure? This would include comprehensive information on military R&D, training, construction, personnel expenditures, acquisitions, disposal of assets, and maintenance.
Researcher4165: All budgetary documents are introduced by an exposé général (General Overview).
The Law imposes a budgeting cycle which extends over a period of three years, with three phases:
1.tthe preparatory phase (elaboration of the budget);
2.tthe phase of execution, in the course of the financial year concerned;
3.tThe closure phase, corresponding to the establishment of the final accounts fixed by the law on final settlement of the budget.
During the preparatory phase, the Defence budget, with all its subdivisions - including military R&D, training, construction, personnel expenditures, acquisitions, disposal of assets, and maintenance -, is proposed in extenso, defended and amended where appropriate by parliament, before being voted on. The fully transparent and detailed budget is also available online in the Excel format. The proposed budget for 2015 is also available online.
Chambre des représentants de Belgique, &quoute;Budgets des recettes et des dépenses pour l’année budgétaire 2014 Exposé général, DOC 53 3069/001, Chambre 5e session de la 53e législature, 2013-2014, 31 octobre 2013, http://www.begroting.be/NL/budgetOnline/AlgToelicht2014.pdf, accessed July 6 2014.
Chambre des représentants de Belgique, &quoute;Projet du Budget général des dépenses pour l’année budgétaire 2014&quoute;, Première partie, DOC 53 3071/001, Chambre 5e session de la 53e législature, 2013-2014, 31 octobre 2013, http://www.begroting.be/NL/budgetOnline/ontwerp_algem-uitgavenbegr1.pdf, accessed July 6 2014.
http://www.begroting.be/NL/Documents/eBudget-Recettes-Budget2014.xls.
CR, 2015 budget, http://www.begroting.be/NL/budgetOnline/AUB%202015ini%20deel%201.pdf, 2014
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is there a legislative committee (or other appropriate body) responsible for defence budget scrutiny and analysis in an effective way, and is this body provided with detailed, extensive, and timely information on the defence budget?
Researcher4165: The IF (Interfederal body of the Inspection of finance – Finance Inspector) is managed by an interdepartmental committee, composed of members of the federal government and the federated entities. They are independent of the public services.
The IF performs a quadruple role:
1.tProvides financial and budgeting support to accredited ministers and governments. The IF can issue recommendations to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of existing measures and to improve the functioning of public services. It may be responsible for inquiries in public or private subsidized institutions.
2. Exercises a supervisory jurisdiction on behalf of the Budget Minister or the Minister for the Civil Service.
3. Exercises an ex ante control on all major proposals for decisions with a budgetary impact, both on revenues and on spending.
4. Exercises direct supervisory authority over all the transactions planned by the authorising officers, with the exception of operations of low importance or of such a nature that their commitment gives no discretionary margin to the authorising officer.
The IF can exert a strong influence on decision making in financial and budgetary defence matters. It is not uncommon for the IF to provide negative feedback on certain expenses. The Minister of Finance and the Government often adopt the same attitude. They also report to the Interministerial Committee of Financial Inspection and to the Parliamentary Defence Committee. As mentioned in Question 2, the parliamentary Defence Committee is fairly empowered, although in practice, parliamentary oversight could be stronger.
Corps interfédéral de l’Inspection des finances, &quoute;Le Corps interfédéral de l’Inspection des finances : Conseil, Contrôle, Audit&quoute;, Brussels, July 2012.
http://www.demorgen.be/dm/nl/989/Binnenland/article/detail/1436166/2012/05/10/Inspectie-Financien-geen-geld-voor-investeringen-De-Crem.dhtml, accessed July 6, 2014.
AR du 28 avril 1998 portant organisation du Corps interfédéral de l'Inspection des finances (Dernière mise à jour le 23 juillet 2008).
Transparency International Belgium, NIS report, 2012, http://www.transparencybelgium.be/fileadmin/templates/docs/Material/NIS/Final_NIS_report/NIS_FR_FINAL_19_04_13.pdf?PHPSESSID=3585af276336601ba6d0669ebdff289e
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Some additional detail: the IF is responsible in the first instance for ex ante control of proposals for decisions with a budgetary impact. The IF intervenes before taking a decision.
In comparison, the Court of Auditors plays its role before making payments but after the decision has been taken. The IF intervenes in principle in the implementation of decisions taken, except, among others, in the following cases: - Investigations or audits; - Audits as part of the employment of European funds; - The use of subsidies; - When new decisions are made with a budgetary impact, e.g. during the execution, or amendments in cases of public procurement.
For its part, the Court of Auditors, delegated by parliament, controls the use of public funds. Its objective is to pay less attention to prior approval and to move towards ex-post audits and evaluation of performance. The court of auditors tasks includes: - A review of legality on revenues and expenditures, prior to the authorization of expenditure (&quoute;prior approval&quoute;) or a posteriori with regard to recurrent expenditure; - General control over the establishment and collection of entitlements owed by the State, including tax receipts; - A posteriori control the proper use of public money (economy, effectiveness and efficiency); - A check on the accounts; - Control over public accountants (judicial task of the Court).
As shown above, the powers of scrutiny are well outlined. For the sake of effectiveness and efficiency it was decided to apply a principle of &quoute;single audits&quoute;, to try to develop synergies between internal control and external controls. According to this principle, the administrative burden of the checks may be reduced when each level of control builds on the previous one.
source: https://448.fedimbo.belgium.be/fr/content/positionnement-de-lif-dans-le-paysage-de-controle
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: As per Report by European Commission &quoute;Compendium of the public internal control systems in the EU Member States 2012&quoute;, the federal supervisory authorities, in particular the Council of Ministers and the Ministers forthe Budget and the Civil Service, as well as the communities and regions can call on the
financial inspectors to carry out administrative and budget control.The Inspectorate of Finance reports directly to the ministers/governments. The independence of the financial inspectors is explicitly endorsed in the Act of 22 May 2003 for the organisation of the budget and the accounts of the federal state.
The primary task (ex ante control) concerns the following aspects: the budget, regularity, efficiency,
effectiveness, economy and desirability. In addition to those cases (draft resolutions) where control by the Inspectorate of Finance is mandatory (see above), any individual minister, the Minister for the Budget, the Minister for the Civil Service and the Council of Ministers can instruct the Inspectorate of Finance to carry out
specific assignments (audits, investigations, specific audits, etc. — often ex post).
Source: http://ec.europa.eu/budget/library/biblio/publications/2011/compendium_27_countries_en.pdf
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: I confirm that the Parliamentary Commissions (on Defence on the one hand and on Budget and Finance on the other hand) receive rather detailed information. The level of detail of the yearly budget presented to the Parliament is imposed by law. This is not at the very lowest level, but all departments add a rather detailed justification.
The Parliament and its Commissions are supported by the federal Court of Audit. The Court of Audit is analysing the budget proposals of all departments and reports to the Parliament. These reports are made public. In order to prepare the report, a representative of the Court discusses his findings with the administration and these reports are in general rather precise.
Although the Commissions and the Court of Audit do serious work, this rarely leads to changing the budget because the Commission takes a decision by voting.
The Financial Inspector is an agent of the Minister of Budget and every Department has an FI on a permanent base. According to the law he has to agree on all expenses (except for very small ones) and he has to approve the budget of the department. He is only reporting this very detailed information to his Minister of Budget, not to the Parliament. Some of his finding are made public, for example in the case of major public procurements, but most of them are confidential. According to the law, the FI can ask for any detail he/she wants, but care is taken to ensure it is manageable. Only the Minister of Budget can change the finding of a FI. The findings of the FI strongly influence the decision making. The FI can stop the procurement process if he/she doens't agree with the need or the procurement procedure. Although the FI could conduct his/her own audits, this rarely happens in practice.
The Interministerial Committee of Financial Inspection is only the formal chain of command for the FI's, but this committtee doesn't interfere with the content of the decisions and they play no role at all in the analysis of the budget or any procurement.
Suggested score:
Is the approved defence budget made publicly available? In practice, can citizens, civil society, and the media obtain detailed information on the defence budget?
Researcher4165: Parliament, its commissions and the press can obtain any information on the budget. Every citizen can consult the approved defence budget online, alongside other parliamentary documents and reports.
The full budget is published in the &quoute;Moniteur&quoute; and is also available online in the Excel format.
Public Federal Services, 2014 budget, http://www.begroting.be/NL/budgetOnline/ontwerp_algem-uitgavenbegr1.pdf, accessed July 21, 2014.
Moniteur belge (Belgian Official Journal).
Amanda Jacobsen, National Security and the Right to Information in Europe , April 2013, University of Copenhagen, Department of Political Science, Centre for Advanced Security Theory, http://www.right2info.org/resources/publications/national-security-page/national-security-expert-papers/jacobsen_nat-sec-and-rti-in-europe
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: There are open sources for the media and civil society to gain access to the budget information:
The Defence Budget is also available at the European Defence Agency Portal: http://www.eda.europa.eu/info-hub/defence-data-portal/Belgium/year/2013
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: The budget is easily accessible via the website of the Parliament, including the detailed justification added by the department and the comments of the Court of Audit on every departmental budget.
It is difficult to imagine how Belgium could do better. The budget is voted on and published alongside other laws - all laws can be consulted via the official website of the &quoute;Moniteur&quoute;.
Any person or organisation can ask questions. Every department has an email adress and you can easily find the telephone numbers of the spokespeople of the Minister. It depends on the individual minister as to whether they decide to give an answer - there are no formal rules on this.
The government receives many questions, mostly from journalists but also from individuals at times. The government prides itself on always delivering an answer.
Suggested score:
Are sources of defence income other than from central government allocation (from equipment sales or property disposal, for example) published and scrutinised?
Researcher4165: Legally, the Belgian DoD can only use resources that are registered and approved in the defence budget. Other sources of income than those provided by the government must be recorded in the defence budget, and are therefore fully published.
In the case of equipment or property sales, reports are published through the yearly Financial Statements of Defence, once approved by Parliament, and their income is officially recorded in the defence budget. When expenditures are made on behalf of partner countries or international organisations (UN, NATO or EU) they are not recorded in the defence budget, but they are indicated in the reports on the expenditure and revenue figures corresponding to the missions in question.
In these matters the IF (on behalf of the Minister for the Budget) and CC (for the benefit of Parliament) exert their usual control. Besides advising on the budget, CC performs financial audits, legality and regularity audits and examines the sound use of public funds. It checks the income and expenses of the Federal State, the Communities, the Regions, public service institutions depending on them and the provinces. The outcome of those audit activities are regularly reported to the legislative assemblies and the provincial councils.
J-M. MOTTOUL, &quoute;Le développement du contrôle interne et des activités d'audit interne dans l'administration fédérale&quoute;, Documentatieblad, 70e jaargang, nr. 3, 3e kwartaal 2010.
&quoute;AR déterminant la structure générale du Ministère de la Défense et fixant les attributions de certaines autorités&quoute;, 21 décembre, 2001 (mis à jour le 30-12-2013), Chapitre V, L'audit interne de la défense, Art. 39/1.
CAAF, Rapport au gouvernement sur le fonctionnement du système de contrôle interne dans l’administration fédérale, juillet 2012
Chambre des représentants de Belgique, Commission de la Défense nationale, &quoute;Compte rendu intégral&quoute;, CRIV 53 COM 968, 02-04-2014.
&quoute;Une première approche de la Chambre et de son règlement&quoute;, Chambre des Représentants, Service juridique, 54e législature, juin 2014.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is there an effective internal audit process for defence ministry expenditure (that is, for example, transparent, conducted by appropriately skilled individuals, and subject to parliamentary oversight)?
Researcher4165: For internal audit missions detailed in the AR of 17 August 2007, the Chief of defence has an independent service at his disposal, called IAD, which reports to the Federal Government Audit Committee (ACFO), accountable to the government, which is subject to parliamentary oversight.
The lAD is an independent and objective institution that oversees the activity of Defence institutions and formulates suggestions for improvement. As of 2014, the IAD is composed of 33 military officials. Two internal audits have been conducted in 2012 and 2013, but these documents are not publicly available.
The DoD has integrated control modules devoted to internal control in all statutory training.
Finally, the DoD has undertaken initiatives to develop internal control as a more elaborate working method for risk analysis.
&quoute;AR déterminant la structure générale du Ministère de la Défense et fixant les attributions de certaines autorités&quoute;, December 21, 2001 (mis à jour le 30-12-2013), Chapitre V, L'audit interne de la défense, Art. 39/1.
&quoute;AR relatif au système de contrôle interne dans certains services du pouvoir exécutif fédéral&quoute;, August 17, 2007.
&quoute;AR relatif aux activités d'audit interne dans certains services du pouvoir exécutif fédéral&quoute;, August 17, 2007.
&quoute;AR portant création du Comité d'audit de l'Administration fédérale (CAAF)&quoute;, August 17, 2007.
&quoute;Rapport au gouvernement sur le fonctionnement du système de contrôle interne dans l'administration fédérale&quoute;, CAAF, July 2012.
&quoute;Rapport d'activités 2012-2013&quoute;, CAAF,July 2013.
J-M. MOTTOUL, &quoute;Le développement du contrôle interne et des activités d'audit interne dans l'administration fédérale&quoute;, Documentatieblad, 70e jaargang, nr. 3, 3e kwartaal 2010.
Internal Audit defence, AR 2010-04-06/24, art. 24, 2010, http://www.ejustice.just.fgov.be/cgi_loi/change_lg.pl?language=fr&la=F&cn=2001122142&table_name=loi
CR, legislature 54 on the IAD, 2014, http://www.lachambre.be/kvvcr/showpage.cfm?section=qrva&language=fr&cfm=qrvaXml.cfm?legislat=54&dossierID=54-B002-872-0033-2014201500443.xml
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: I agree but to my opinion the control of public spending is not based on the internal audit decree of 2007. IAD can do audits but they don't analyse individual procurements.
There is a special Royal Decree on the control of public spending. In this RD has been defined the role of the Financial Inspector, of the Minister of budget and of the Council of ministers. The RD dates from 16 November 1994 - rather old but still valid. The RD is not specific for defence and security but for all public spending on the federal level. Because it is an older RD and the levels of control have not been adapted since (only converted into €) and for a big department like Defence most of the public procurements are controlled by the FI or even the Council of Ministers, which is a lengthy procedure.
I already elaborated on the role of the FI in previous questions, particularly their skills and the difficulty to bypass them. The involvement of the Council of Ministers is a more formal procedure but all decisions of the Council are prepared by specialists from different ministers, which leads to thoroughly controlled cases.
Suggested score:
Is there effective and transparent external auditing of military defence expenditure?
Researcher4165: Established by Article 180 of the Constitution, the CC (Court of Audit) is a collateral body of Parliament. It exercises external scrutiny of the budgetary, accounting and financial operations of the Federal State, the Communities, the Regions, the public service institutions depending upon them, and the provinces. This includes the scrutiny of defence expenditures.
The CC’s powers are defined in the law of 29 October 1846, which has been amended several times, and in the law of 16 May 2003. The law grants a large independence to the CC and a real autonomy to perform its missions.
Besides advising on the budget, the CC performs financial audits, legality and regularity audits and examines the sound use of public funds. It checks the income and expenses of the Federal State, the Communities, the Regions, public service institutions depending on them and the provinces. The outcome of those audit activities are regularly reported to the legislative assemblies and the provincial councils.
Finally, the CC carries out specific tasks of good governance (lists of mandates and declarations of assets filed by political representatives and senior officials, advice on financial reporting by the political parties and the campaign expenditure), as well as tasks regarding the distribution of resources between the Communities and Regions (school students counting, personal income tax honesty) and expertise (budgetary impact of bills, accounts of institutions which receive an appropriation).
The IF and the Minister of Budget also perform their roles as mentioned.
RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: Agree with comments, score amended to 3.
Cahiers d’observations de la Cour des Comptes, https://www.ccrek.be/FR/Publications/EtatFederal.html, Homepage
Cour des Comptes de Belgique, https://www.ccrek.be/EN/Presentation/Presentation.html, accessed July 2 2014.
&quoute;AR portant création du Comité d'audit de l'Administration fédérale (CAAF)&quoute;, August 17, 2007.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Disagree
Comment: The CC is clearly doing an excellent job and every year produces a whole book with dicrepancies and recommendations. There is no doubt that their findings are made fully public. The yearly book of findings and their audit reports are published on the website and picked up regularly by newspapers.
A score of 3 seems more accurate however as they only provide advice to Parliament. Most of the recommendations are taken serious by the government, but there is no obligation to follow their recommendations - a minister can argue that the CC is mistaken and leave it at that. This is unlikely to happen, but not impossible. Action taken by parliament is likely to require time and might also be affected by majority constellations.
Suggested score: 3
Is there evidence that the country's defence institutions have controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country's natural resource exploitation and, if so, are these interests publicly stated and subject to scrutiny?
Researcher4165: Since 1992, Belgium no longer has and thus does not exploit natural resources, and therefore does not have businesses associated with the country's natural resource exploitation anymore.
The assessor could not identify whether defence institutions are, by statutory or constitutional means, entirely removed from having controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country’s natural resource exploitation.
RESPONSE TO REVIEWER: Score changed to N/A, as Belgium no longer exploits natural resources.
Encyclopedia Britannica, Belgium,http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/59268/Belgium/24989/Resources-and-power, Last updated 2015.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Disagree
Comment: With the country no longer exploiting natural resources or with negligible resources the N/A criteria should apply. To the contrary, scoring this question as 4 would risk inflating the total overall score.
Suggested score: N/A
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: It is difficult to establish whether the defence institutions are entirely removed from having controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country´s natural resource exploitation.
The Security Council Report on Natural Resources and Conflict, an initiative of Belgium, held a debate on the relationship/issues between natural resources and conflict. Source: http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/update-report/lookup-c-glKWLeMTIsG-b-2822787.php?print=true
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: None of the answers appears to be entirely correct.
There is no statutary or legal interdiction for defence intsitutions to have financial interests in natural resources, but this would be of no interest to the Belgian DoD.
Since there is no formal interdiction this might change in the future.
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Is there evidence, for example through media investigations or prosecution reports, of a penetration of organised crime into the defence and security sector? If no, is there evidence that the government is alert and prepared for this risk?
Researcher4165: Reports confirm that organised crime, including a black market in arms smuggling, does exist in Belgium, although there is no evidence to indicate its linkage with or penetration of defence and security institutions.
The supervisory authorities (IAG Def) have a mandate to to pursue corruption, including organised crime.
In 2012, a large-scale trial opened before the Criminal Court of Brussels. It involved a large case of false invoices and bribes paid by contractors amounting to more than 15 million Euros to military officials. 31 people, mostly servicemen, had charged these expenses as DoD purchases between 1996 and 2005. Complicit civilian providers distributed bribes in money or equipment in order to obtain contracts and/or to cause unnecessary expenses. The fraud related to minor equipment. On appeal, the two officers considered to be the instigators of fraud and embezzlement were sentenced to 5 years of prison and a 55,000 euro fine. They were stripped of their military ranks. The main implicated private businessmen were also sentenced to 5 years suspended prison, had to pay heavy penalties and important sums were confiscated. The confiscations amounted to 7.618.425,67 Euros. While this is an interesting case, it cannot be considered one of organised crime. The follow up to it is useful for this question, however.
Following the fraud cases, the DoD mandated a high-ranking officer to reinforce budgeting and financial control within Defence so as to avoid cases of fraud as much as possible and to enable prompt detection of fraud attempts.
OSAC, Belgium 2012 Crime and Safety Report, 2012, https://www.osac.gov/pages/ContentReportDetails.aspx?cid=11979
RTBF, Fraude au sein de l'armée, http://www.rtbf.be/info/regions/detail_fraude-au-sein-de-l-armee-31-personnes-devant-la-justice?id=7402093, January 17, 2012, accessed on July 21, 2014.
&quoute;Appel Bruxelles: 7 millions d'euros confisqués au profit de l'Etat&quoute;, Dépêche BELGA, 201800 NOV 13
&quoute;Politique d'intégrité au sein du pouvoir fédéral&quoute;, CC, Rapport interne, 2007, p. 10.
Art. 39/3 of the AR, 2009
DoD internal regulations (not publically available).
Paris attacks: Belgium’s arms bazaar, 19 November 2015, www.ft.com/cms/s/0/33a2d592-8dde-11e5-a549-b89a1dfede9b.html#axzz3sKery45S
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: I agree that there is no evidence of organised crime in connection to the Ministry of Defence.
After the fraud cases in 2005 a general with a large experience in budget and administration was tasked to examine in detail all financial processes in the ministry of Defence. This study gave us a lot of material to improve and to safeguard the processes. Yet this was a one off exercise, and the budget and public procurement words move quickly.
Based on the audit rules, large efforts were made during the last years to produce a list of all processes and to evaluate the risk of each process, within the capacity constraints of IAG. It is impossible to guarantee that all risks are under control.
At the federal level, the OCRC is a very powerful instrument against fraud in the administration but acts repressively and not preventively, i.e. after the fraud has been discovered by somebody else.
Suggested score:
Is there policing to investigate corruption and organised crime within the defence services and is there evidence of the effectiveness of this policing?
Researcher4165: The IAG Def carries out inspections ordered by the DoD or by CHOD, reports directly to the DoD and can formulate recommendations to the MoD after any investigation (AR of 21 December 2001).
This includes a focus on corruption and organised crime but is not specifically targeted on these.
Art. 39/3 of the AR also stipulates that the IAG Def has a broad right of initiative and the right to general and permanent inspection to gather information, or to investigate within the armed services in the context of a formal mandate from the Minister of Defence or CHOD. Other services include Budget and Finance Control, Budget and Finance Support and the Criminal Investigation Police Department in Military Environment.
AR “déterminant la structure générale du Ministère de la Défense et fixant les attributions de certaines autorités&quoute;, 21 décembre 2001, Art 39/2 et 39/3.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: I refer to question 17. There is an audit team within Defence but it is not exclusively focused on corruption and fraud. Of course if an illegal act has been brought to their attention (which is not impossible despite the general integrity of personnel) they will start to investigate (with the support of experts). It would be difficult for them to discover fraud or corruption themselves.
Suggested score:
Are the policies, administration, and budgets of the intelligence services subject to effective, properly resourced, and independent oversight?
Researcher4165: There are two intelligence services in Belgium: a civil service, the Sûreté de l’État, dependent in most cases on the Minister of Justice, and a military service, the General Intelligence and Security Service of the Army (Service général du renseignement et de la sécurité de l'Armée or the SGRS) which reports to the Defence Minister.
It is the Belgian Standing Agencies Intelligence Services Review Committee's (Comité R) responsibility to supervise ex post the functioning of all intelligence services like the SGRS (General Intelligence and Security Service of the Army) and its civilian counterpart, the 'State Security'. Each year, Comité R reports to the Senate, the House of Representatives and to the relevant Minister.
Due to the classified nature of secret items, no official report is directly issued to parliament. However, Comité R has full authority to investigate every expenditure.
Two ministers have the tutelage of the intelligence services, but there is a political body at the executive level, the CMRS (Ministerial Committee on Intelligence and Security). It is responsible for determining the general policy of the intelligence services.
Recently, both commissions were merged into a single commission that includes monitoring of the parliamentary committees R and P (Police). The members of the commission have authorized access to &quoute;confidential&quoute;' and &quoute;secret&quoute; classified documents (but not &quoute;top secret&quoute;'). Reports of their activities can be found online.
However, there is limited evidence of parliamentarians exercising their power of control and management of information services. Members of Parliament who are part of the Parliamentary Committee were officially granted access to secret data of the Sûreté de l’État and of SGRS only in July 2014. Media have reported in January 2015 on the relative lack of transparency of the secret services budgets and frameworks and criticised budget cuts in the light that they might limit their activities and efficiency.
Loi du 30 novembre 1998, &quoute;Loi organique des services de renseignement et de sécurité&quoute;.
Loi du 11 décembre 1998, &quoute;Loi portant création d’un organe de recours en matière d’habilitations, d’attestations et d’avis de sécurité&quoute;.
AR du 24 mars 2000, &quoute;portant exécution la loi du 11 décembre 1998 relative à la classification et aux habilitations [attestations et avis] de sécurité&quoute;.
Loi du 10 juillet 2006, “relative à l’analyse de la menace&quoute;.
Central Office for the Repression of the Corruption, http://www.polfed-fedpol.be/org/djf_ocrc/pdf/OCRC_presentation_en.pdf, accessed March 2015
Belgian Standing Agencies Intelligence Services Review Committee, http://www.comiteri.be/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2&Itemid=53&lang=FR, accessed July 27, 2014.
Surêté de l'Etat, Homepage, http://justice.belgium.be/fr/service_public_federal_justice/organisation/services_et_commissions_independants/surete_de_l_Etat/
Comité R, reports, 2013, http://www.comiteri.be/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=40&Itemid=74&phpMyAdmin=97d9ae9d92818b6f252c014a4a05bdfb&lang=FR
A. LALLEMAND, &quoute;Renseignements : les élus ne font pas leur travail&quoute;, Le Soir, http://www.google.co.uk/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CCIQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.lesoir.be%2F600585%2Farticle%2Factualite%2Fbelgique%2F2014-07-16%2Frenseignements-elus-ne-font-pas-leur-travail&ei=TewTVZbCGYzuUIPHgHg&usg=AFQjCNH6l3YjqrGX4FUl0S4rSEeAuVYX7w&sig2=t1K5VlIoNxC7v5Yl1gAehg&bvm=bv.89217033,d.d24, July 16, 2014.
Tijd, &quoute;Politici mogen geheimen Staatsveiligheid zien&quoute;, http://www.tijd.be/, July 31, 2014.
RTBF, &quoute;Cheap Security&quoute;, January 2015, http://www.rtbf.be/info/chroniques/detail_la-securite-a-petit-prix-philippe-walkowiak?id=8765825
RTBF, &quoute;Secret services asking for more funds&quoute;, http://www.rtbf.be/info/belgique/detail_les-services-de-renseignement-et-de-securite-reclament-des-moyens?id=8864725, January 2015
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: The Standing Committee I is responsible for reviewing the activities and functioning of 'State Security' and the General Intelligence and Security Service. In addition, it reviews the functioning of the Coordination Unit for Threat Assessment and the various services that support this coordination unit - normally together with the Standing Police Services Review Committee, but sometimes alone.
As indicated, in principle, the review relates to the legitimacy (review of observance of the applicable laws and regulations), effectiveness (supervision of the efficiency of the intelligence services), and coordination (the mutual harmonization of the work of the services concerned).The Standing Committee is required to report to the Senate every six months on the application of the special methods of intelligence collection used by the intelligence services.
Source: Belgian Standing Intelligence Agencies Review Committee website http://www.comiteri.be/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=40&Itemid=74&phpMyAdmin=97d9ae9d92818b6f252c014a4a05bdfb&lang=EN
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are senior positions within the intelligence services filled on the basis of objective selection criteria, and are appointees subject to investigation of their suitability and prior conduct?
Researcher4165: Appointment of senior intelligence positions is subject to a centralised General Directorate Human Resources process, and the appointees are selected, based on objective criteria. Each senior appointee must have all necessary qualifications and receives the highest security classification after an extensive investigation.
Loi du 30 novembre 1998, &quoute;Loi organique des services de renseignement et de sécurité&quoute;.
Loi du 11 décembre 1998, &quoute;Loi portant création d’un organe de recours en matière d’habilitations, d’attestations et d’avis de sécurité&quoute;.
AR du 24 mars 2000, &quoute;portant exécution la loi du 11 décembre 1998 relative à la classification et aux habilitations [attestations et avis] de sécurité&quoute;.
Loi du 10 juillet 2006, &quoute;relative à l’analyse de la menace&quoute;.
Interview 6, Colonel, July 3, 2014
Belgian Standing Agencies Intelligence Services Review Committee, http://www.comiteri.be/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2&Itemid=53&lang=FR, accessed July 27, 2014.
Surêté de l'Etat, Homepage, http://justice.belgium.be/fr/service_public_federal_justice/organisation/services_et_commissions_independants/surete_de_l_Etat/
Comité R, reports, 2013, http://www.comiteri.be/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=40&Itemid=74&phpMyAdmin=97d9ae9d92818b6f252c014a4a05bdfb&lang=FR
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Does the government have a well-scrutinised process for arms export decisions that aligns with international protocols, particularly the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)?
Researcher4165: Belgium voted for the adoption of the treaty, signed on 3rd June 2013 and ratified the Treaty on 3 June 2014.
It is difficult to assess to what extent the treaty has been implemented in Belgium.
Belgium is also a member of the Wassenaar Arrangement.
Belgium adopted a number of laws and rules concerning arms control and disarmament, including a central register of arms put in place by national legislation. The DoD is actively involved in the follow up and the execution of the armament control treaties.
In this respect, a new agency called BACA has been established by Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg to ensure the management and control of arms.These countries are now transforming their national arms management agency in an international agency (although they remain responsible nationally for compliance with disarmament agreements). BACA members have already performed their first mission in April 2014 and took part in an international monitoring mission in Ukraine within the OSCE framework.
Regarding the political aspects of arms control, it is important to stress the fact that in Belgium the federal system is also reflected in arms exports - its control has been devolved since August 2003 to the three Regions (the Flemish Region, the Walloon Region and the Brussels Capital Region) for companies having their administrative headquarters in these Regions. Only imports and exports involving the Belgian armed forces and police force remain a competence of the Federal Government. It is also exempt from authorising any transaction of weapons and military equipment within the Benelux.
Since the legislative framework from 1991 no longer met the requirements of the European regulatory initiatives outlined, it was revised by the various competent authorities in 2012. In the Flemish region, the Government converted international and European agreements to a new regional control system. The Brussels Parliament copied the Flemish proposal to large degree. In the Walloon Region, the existing federal laws were largely taken over, but the procedures for applications were reviewed and, in line with EU Directive 2009/43/EC, procedures for transfers within the EU were simplified to facilitate transactions.
In particular, the Regional authorities strive to respect the eight criteria of the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports, in granting or denying export licence and in reporting.The Regional Governments have to report to their respective Parliaments semi-annually and annually, but currently the control is exercised primarily a posteriori.
Reports are often made public. Arms exports issues however are rarely debated in Parliament.
RTBF reported in 2011 how the Wallon region authorised the FN Herstal company to conclude a deal with the Libyan government in 2009, a decision that NGOs brought to the relevant authorities.
More recently, in 2013, La Libre Belgique reported shortcomings of the scrutiny mechanisms as between 2009 and 2012, 35 helicopters were sold to a company whose director was under investigation for corruption affairs.
Belgium exported major conventional weapons to Saudi Arabia in 2013, according to SIPRI.
&quoute;Loi relative à l'importation, à l'exportation, au transit et à la lutte contre le trafic d'armes, de munitions et de matériel devant servir spécialement à un usage militaire ou de maintien de l'ordre et de la technologie y afférente&quoute;, mise à jour le 21-06-2013, August 5, 1991.
Council directive 91/477/EEC of June 18, 1991, on control of the acquisition and possession of weapons, Official Journal N° L 256, 13.9.1991, p. 0051 – 0058.)
&quoute;AR réglementant l'importation, l'exportation et le transit d'armes, de munitions et de matériel devant servir spécialement à un usage militaire ou de maintien de l'ordre et de la technologie y afférente&quoute;, March 8, 1993.
&quoute;European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports&quoute;, The Council, 8675/2/98, EU, Brussels, 5 June 1998.
J. Seniora, &quoute;Transparence en matière de transferts d’armements - Quelles responsabilités pour les États ? Les procédures d’échange et de notification des informations&quoute;, Les Rapports du GRIP, Bruxelles, 2001/5.
&quoute;Resolution 1540 (2004) on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction&quoute;, adopted by the Security Council of the United Nations at its 4956th meeting, April 28, 2004.
COUNCIL JOINT ACTION 2008/230/CFSP of 17 March 2008, &quoute;on support for EU activities in order to promote the control of arms exports and the principles and criteria of the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports among third countries&quoute;, March 18, 2008, Official Journal of the European Union.
COUNCIL COMMON POSITION 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008, &quoute;defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment&quoute;, Acts adopted under Title V of the EU Treaty, December 13, 2008, Official Journal of the European Union.
K. Van Heuverswyn, &quoute;The Belgian regime for the control of brokering in military and dual-use items&quoute;, Report, Flemish Peace Institute, March 2010.
&quoute;Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 march 2012 implementing Article 10 of the United Nations&quoute; Protocol against the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, their parts and components and ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (UN Firearms Protocol), and establishing export authorisation, and import and transit measures for firearms, their parts and components and ammunition&quoute;, EU) No 258/2012, the European Parliament and of the Council of the European Union, Official Journal of the European Union, March 30, 2012.
&quoute;Council regulation of 5 May 2009 setting up a Community regime for the control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit of dual- use items&quoute;, (EC) No 428/2009, Council of the European Union, Official Journal, 15/06/2012. June 15, 2012.
&quoute;Décret de la Région wallonne relatif à l'importation, à l'exportation, au transit et au transfert d'armes civiles et de produits liés à la défense&quoute;, (Dispositions transposant la Directive 91/477/CEE du Conseil européen du 18 juin 1991 relative au contrôle de l'acquisition et de la détention d'armes, telle que modifiée par la Directive 2008/51/CE du Parlement européen et du Conseil du 21 mai 2008 modifiant la Directive 91/477/CEE du Conseil relative au contrôle de l'acquisition et de la détention d'armes Art. 2-4), 21 juin , 2012.
Arrêté du Gouvernement wallon du 22 mai 2013, &quoute;portant exécution, en ce qui concerne les licences de transfert, du décret du 21 juin 2012 relatif à l'importation, à l'exportation, au transit et au transfert d'armes civiles et de produits liés à la défense&quoute;.
Arrêté du Gouvernement wallon du 23 mai 2013, &quoute;portant exécution, en ce qui concerne les licences de transfert, du décret du 21 juin 2012 relatif à l'importation, à l'exportation, au transit et au transfert d'armes civiles et de produits liés à la défense&quoute;.
Ordonnance du 20 juin 2013.&quoute;relative à l'importation, à l'exportation, au transit et au transfert de produits liés à la défense, d'autre matériel pouvant servir à un usage militaire, de matériel lié au maintien de l'ordre, d'armes à feu à usage civil, de leurs pièces, accessoires et munitions (Ordonnance sur les armes)&quoute;.
Arrêté du Gouvernement de la Région de Bruxelles-Capitale du3 avril 2014, &quoute; portant exécution de l'Ordonnance du 20 juin 2013 relative à l'importation, à l'exportation, au transit et au transfert de produits liés à la défense, d'autre matériel pouvant servir à un usage militaire, de matériel lié au maintien de l'ordre, d'armes à feu à usage civil, de leurs pièces, accessoires et munitions&quoute;.
ATT signatories, Belgium, 2014, http://armstreaty.org/state/belgium/
Wassenaar arrangement, http://www.wassenaar.org/introduction/, accessed July 22, 2014.
Direction des Licences d'armes, http://www.wallonie.be/fr/guide/guide-services/1406, accessed July 22, 2014.
Benelux Arms Control Agency (BACA), 2014, http://www.avrm.nl/tag/benelux-arms-control-agency-baca/
SIPRI, Arms Trade Registers, http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/html/export_values.php
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
How effective are controls over the disposal of assets, and is information on these disposals, and the proceeds of their sale, transparent?
Researcher4165: The DoD routinely engages in asset disposal. This equipment is extremely varied, ranging from socks to weapon systems.
Small equipment is sold by DGMR, Procurement Division, Sales Department, which is responsible for sale, destruction or scrapping of all equipment withdrawn from active service in the DoD, except real estate.
There are six types of sales:
1. Cash & Carry Sales (Public sales of military equipment by direct auction) They are open to all.
2. Public sales (with publication in the BDA), Opened to all (subject to selection according to the specificity of the equipment), with an offer under envelope.
3. Sales to Municipalities, Provinces and CPAS, which can acquire equipment at their request.
4. Sales to youth movements (Sales at fixed price and limited quantities per item for sale)
5. Public relations (Sales of small military equipments taking place during festivities organized by DoD (Sales at fixed price and limited quantities per item for sale)
6. Sales of weapon systems (traded from state to state, negotiated with the candidates kept by the Administration (the only firms holding the required licenses)
For public sales, the BDA constitutes the only official publication channel. Since January 1st, 2011, the BDA is fully integrated into applications to be consulted via the Website of the public procurement.
The financial results of the different sales are published. The control of both &quoute;downgrading&quoute; of assets as the later &quoute;disposal&quoute; is strictly determined by law in Belgium. The existing international and national regulations are also further interpreted in internal regulations, procedures, and detailed instructions. During the process maximum publicity, openness and transparency is fully assured. The procedures of public procurement are fully applied and are controlled by the appropriate institutions, such as the CC, CAAF, IF and IAD.
Planned disposals are known in advance and published publicly in the PIDS.
La Libre Belgique however reported in 2013 that there had been shortcomings in scrutiny mechanisms between 2009 and 2012, with 35 helicopters being sold to a company whose director was under investigation for corruption affairs which indicates issues in the controls.
&quoute;Loi relative à l'importation, à l'exportation, au transit et à la lutte contre le trafic d'armes, de munitions et de matériel devant servir spécialement à un usage militaire ou de maintien de l'ordre et de la technologie y afférente&quoute;, mise à jour le 21-06-2013, August 5, 1991.
&quoute;AR réglementant l'importation, l'exportation et le transit d'armes, de munitions et de matériel devant servir spécialement à un usage militaire ou de maintien de l'ordre et de la technologie y afférente&quoute;, March 8, 1993.
&quoute;Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 march 2012 implementing Article 10 of the United Nations&quoute; Protocol against the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, their parts and components and ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (UN Firearms Protocol), and establishing export authorisation, and import and transit measures for firearms, their parts and components and ammunition&quoute;, EU) No 258/2012, the European Parliament and of the Council of the European Union, Official Journal of the European Union, March 30, 2012.
&quoute;Council regulation of 5 May 2009 setting up a Community regime for the control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit of dual- use items&quoute;, (EC) No 428/2009, Council of the European Union, Official Journal, 15/06/2012. June 15, 2012.
Public Procurement Belgium, Homepage, www.publicprocurement.be
DOD, Acquisitions services, http://www.mil.be/fr/service-des-ventes, accessed August 24, 2014.
DOD, Procurement sale, http://www.mil.be/fr/evenement/vente-du-navire-auxiliaire-a996-albatros-de-la-marine, accessed February 21, 2015.
DOD, Current sale, http://www.mil.be/fr/ventes-en-cours, accessed February 21, 2015.
DOD, Plan d'investissement, PIDS, http://www.mil.be/fr/article/plan-dinvestissement-de-la-defence-pour-2013-2014, accessed May 2015
DH.be, L’armée belge ignore à qui elle revend ses armes, http://www.dhnet.be/actu/belgique/l-armee-belge-ignore-a-qui-elle-revend-ses-armes-51b73a2fe4b0de6db9762372, 2013
DH.be, Vente d'armes: De Crem prêt à une réflexion sur la procédure, http://www.dhnet.be/actu/belgique/vente-d-armes-de-crem-pret-a-une-reflexion-sur-la-procedure-51b73a01e4b0de6db9761ee9, 2013
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is independent and transparent scrutiny of asset disposals conducted by defence establishments, and are the reports of such scrutiny publicly available?
Researcher4165: Within the DoD, the entire process of disposal strictly follows national and international laws and regulations. Regulatory controls are regularly performed by international authorities, as well as by national agencies. The disposal of assets are scrutinised by the CC, CAAF, IF, IAD, as well as the EU, NATO and OSCE. The new agency, Benelux Arms Control Agency, will also play a role once it will be entirely operational.
All reports are available to the public. Sales reports are published through the yearly DoD Financial Statements, upon approval of Parliament.
The recent audit performed by CC in its 169th Report on the management of ammunition including surplus ammunition is a good and specific example.
La Libre Belgique however reported in 2013 that there had been shortcomings regarding the scrutiny mechanisms between 2009 and 2012, with 35 helicopters being sold to a company whose director was under investigation for corruption affairs.
COUNCIL COMMON POSITION 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008, &quoute;defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment&quoute;, Acts adopted under Title V of the EU Treaty, December 13, 2008, Official Journal of the European Union.
COUNCIL JOINT ACTION 2008/230/CFSP of 17 March 2008, &quoute;on support for EU activities in order to promote the control of arms exports and the principles and criteria of the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports among third countries&quoute;, March 18, 2008, Official Journal of the European Union.
&quoute;European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports&quoute;, The Council, 8675/2/98, EU, Brussels, 5 June 1998.
http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/cfsp/sanctions/codeofconduct.pdf
Cour des comptes, 169e Cahier, Observations et documents soumis à la Chambre des représentants, Volume I – Commentaires, Bruxelles, décembre 2012.
DH.be, L’armée belge ignore à qui elle revend ses armes, http://www.dhnet.be/actu/belgique/l-armee-belge-ignore-a-qui-elle-revend-ses-armes-51b73a2fe4b0de6db9762372, 2013
DH.be, Vente d'armes: De Crem prêt à une réflexion sur la procédure, http://www.dhnet.be/actu/belgique/vente-d-armes-de-crem-pret-a-une-reflexion-sur-la-procedure-51b73a01e4b0de6db9761ee9, 2013
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
What percentage of defence and security expenditure in the budget year is dedicated to spending on secret items relating to national security and the intelligence services?
Researcher4165: Recurrent examination of the Defence budgetary documents shows that no more than 0.5% of the MoD budget expenditure is dedicated to secret items.
Chambre des représentants de Belgique, &quoute;Budgets des recettes et des dépenses pour l’année budgétaire 2014 Exposé général, DOC 53 3069/001, Chambre 5e session de la 53e législature, 2013-2014, 31 octobre 2013, http://www.begroting.be/NL/budgetOnline/AlgToelicht2014.pdf, accessed July 6 2014.
Chambre des représentants de Belgique, &quoute;Projet du Budget général des dépenses pour l’année budgétaire 2014&quoute;, Première partie, DOC 53 3071/001, Chambre 5e session de la 53e législature, 2013-2014, 31 octobre 2013, http://www.begroting.be/NL/budgetOnline/ontwerp_algem-uitgavenbegr1.pdf, accessed July 6 2014.
2014 Budget, http://www.begroting.be/NL/Documents/eBudget-Recettes-Budget2014.xls.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is the legislature (or the appropriate legislative committee or members of the legislature) given full information for the budget year on the spending of all secret items relating to national security and military intelligence?
Researcher4165: Together with the president of Comité R, the MoD is responsible for providing yearly (or when asked by the defence Committee or Parliament) information on all spending on secret items, with the exception of some particular items. In these cases, additional detailed description is given upon request or on a need-to-know basis.
It should be noted that as of July 31, 2014, members of Parliament who are part of the Parliamentary Committee will finally have access to secret data of the Sûreté de l’État and of SGRS. They will now get a security clearance, which means that they have to submit a genuine screening by the competent service.
Chambre des représentants de Belgique, &quoute;Budgets des recettes et des dépenses pour l’année budgétaire 2014 Exposé général, DOC 53 3069/001, Chambre 5e session de la 53e législature, 2013-2014, 31 octobre 2013, http://www.begroting.be/NL/budgetOnline/AlgToelicht2014.pdf, accessed on July 6, 2014.
DOD, statistics, http://finances.belgium.be/fr/statistiques_et_analyses/statistiques/Statistiques_depenses_pouvoir_federal_belge/, accessed on February 21, 2015.
CR, 2015 budget, http://www.budgetfederal.be/NL/budgetOnline/AUB%202015ini%20deel%201.pdf, accessed on February 21, 2015 and http://www.budgetfederal.be/NL/budgetOnline/AUB%202015ini%20deel%202.pdf, accessed on February 21, 2015.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Disagree
Comment: The Ministry of Defence is tasked to provide annual (or when asked by the Defence Committee or Parliament) information on all spending on secret items, with the exception of some particular items. However, there is no clear indication or evidence to be found of giving full information for the budget year on spending of all secret items relating to military intelligence andnational security.
Suggested score: 2
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: There are 2 laws that provide specifications on intelligence services, namely the law of 30 november 1998 on intelligence and the law of 11 december 1998 on the classifications.
Through its Committee I, the Parliament controls all secret spending. The Committee I, together with a representative of the minister of Defence, controls the accounts quarterly.
Because of the classification, not all members of the parliament have acces to the control reports of the Committee I, but those who have a classification, have full acces.
Suggested score: 4
Are audit reports of the annual accounts of the security sector (the military, police, and intelligence services) and other secret programs provided to the legislature (or relevant committee) and are they subsequently subject to parliamentary debate?
Researcher4165: Members of the Parliamentary commission were granted official access to secret data of the Sûreté de l’État and of SGRS only in July 2014.
During the preparatory phase, the defence budget, with all its subdivisions - including military R&D, training, construction, personnel expenditures, acquisitions, disposal of assets, and maintenance -, is proposed in extenso, defended and amended where appropriate at the parliament, before being voted on.
The media however have reported in January 2015 that there is a lack of transparency in terms of the secret services budgets and frameworks and denounced the budget cuts that limit efficiency.
Loi organique des services de renseignement et de sécurité, novembre 30, 1998.
http://www.comiteri.be/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2&Itemid=53&lang=FR, accessed July 27, 2014.
Loi du 30 novembre 1998, &quoute;Loi organique des services de renseignement et de sécurité&quoute;.
Loi du 11 décembre 1998, &quoute;Loi portant création d’un organe de recours en matière d’habilitations, d’attestations et d’avis de sécurité&quoute;.
AR du 24 mars 2000, &quoute;portant exécution la loi du 11 décembre 1998 relative à la classification et aux habilitations [attestations et avis] de sécurité&quoute;.
Loi du 10 juillet 2006, &quoute;relative à l’analyse de la menace&quoute;, créant l'OCAM.
Comité permanent R, &quoute;Code des Services de Renseignements. Fonctionnement, compétences et contrôle&quoute;, Bruges, la charte, 2006.
Anti-Corruption Body, Presentation, http://www.polfed-fedpol.be/org/djf_ocrc/pdf/OCRC_presentation_en.pdf, accessed 2014.
Rapport d’activités 2012, Comité permanent de contrôle des services de renseignements et de sécurité, 2013.
Chambre des représentants et sénat de Belgique, Rapport annuel 2012, 18 décembre 2013.
A. LALLEMAND, &quoute;Renseignements : les élus ne font pas leur travail&quoute;, Le Soir, July 16, 2014.
D. STANS, &quoute;Le Comité permanent R dans sa relation avec le Parlement et certains acteurs du pouvoir exécutif: cohérence ou incohérence&quoute;, PhD dissertation ULg-UGent, http://orbi.ulg.ac.be/handle/2268/172176, accessed on February 21, 2015.
RTBF, &quoute;Cheap Security&quoute;, January 2015, http://www.rtbf.be/info/chroniques/detail_la-securite-a-petit-prix-philippe-walkowiak?id=8765825
RTBF, &quoute;Secret services asking for more funds&quoute;, http://www.rtbf.be/info/belgique/detail_les-services-de-renseignement-et-de-securite-reclament-des-moyens?id=8864725, January 2015
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Off-budget military expenditures are those that are not formally authorised within a country's official defence budget, often considered to operate through the 'back-door'. In law, are off-budget military expenditures permitted, and if so, are they exceptional occurrences that are well-controlled?
Researcher4165: All defence expenditure is recorded in the official defence budget.
There is however one exception: when expenditures are made on behalf of partner countries or international organisations (UN, NATO or EU). In this case they are not recorded in the defence budget, but they are indicated in the reports on the expenditure and revenue figures corresponding to the missions in question.
Chambre des représentants de Belgique, &quoute;Budgets des recettes et des dépenses pour l’année budgétaire 2014 Exposé général, DOC 53 3069/001, Chambre 5e session de la 53e législature, 2013-2014, 31 octobre 2013, http://www.begroting.be/NL/budgetOnline/AlgToelicht2014.pdf, accessed July 6 2014.
Chambre des représentants de Belgique, &quoute;Projet du Budget général des dépenses pour l’année budgétaire 2014&quoute;, Première partie, DOC 53 3071/001, Chambre 5e session de la 53e législature, 2013-2014, 31 octobre 2013, http://www.begroting.be/NL/budgetOnline/ontwerp_algem-uitgavenbegr1.pdf, accessed July 6 2014.
2014 budget, http://www.begroting.be/NL/Documents/eBudget-Recettes-Budget2014.xls,accessed July 6 2014.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: I refer again to the laws of 30 November 1998 and 11 December 1998.
Like other documents, budget and spending information can be classified as confidential or secret.
The law of 11 December 1998 has been completed by a Royal Decree of 24 March 2000 on classification, which, for example, mentions who has the right to classify.
As I said before, the Commiitee I includes personnel with the necessary classification degree to have acces to the accounts. There is full control, but only through a restricted number of people.
Suggested score:
In practice, are there any off-budget military expenditures? If so, does evidence suggest this involves illicit economic activity?
Researcher4165: Expenditures made on behalf of partner countries or international organisations (UN, NATO or EU) are not recorded in the defence budget.
They are however mentioned in the reports on the expenditure and revenue figures corresponding to the missions in question, under the denomination &quoute;expenses for third parties&quoute;.
Chambre des représentants de Belgique, &quoute;Budgets des recettes et des dépenses pour l’année budgétaire 2014 Exposé général, DOC 53 3069/001, Chambre 5e session de la 53e législature, 2013-2014, 31 octobre 2013, http://www.begroting.be/NL/budgetOnline/AlgToelicht2014.pdf, accessed July 6 2014.
Chambre des représentants de Belgique, &quoute;Projet du Budget général des dépenses pour l’année budgétaire 2014&quoute;, Première partie, DOC 53 3071/001, Chambre 5e session de la 53e législature, 2013-2014, 31 octobre 2013, http://www.begroting.be/NL/budgetOnline/ontwerp_algem-uitgavenbegr1.pdf, accessed July 6 2014.
DoD, 2014 budget, http://www.begroting.be/NL/Documents/eBudget-Recettes-Budget2014.xls.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: The extent of the practice of off-budget military expenditures is unclear. There is no reliable evidence suggesting that it would involve illicit economic activity or trade.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: There is off-budget expenditure but it is very limited, at least for the military secret services.
Budget spending can be classified, which should not itself be seen as problematic.
A special Committee is responsible for the secret services including their (on or off) budget and spending.
A separate analysis would need to be undertaken for the civilian secret service.
Suggested score:
In law, are there provisions regulating mechanisms for classifying information on the grounds of protecting national security, and, if so, are they subject to effective scrutiny?
Researcher4165: Article 32 of the Belgian Constitution specifies that 'everyone has the right to consult any administrative document and to have a copy made'. However, there are exceptions at each level. In 2007, the Court of Brussels ruled that restricting access on information related to weapons deliveries, as had been done by the federal Ministers for Foreign Affairs, Agriculture and Economy, was wrongful. However, there were concerns about the weakening of access to information with the introduction of a new BIM law in 2010.
In terms of security clearances, these are regulated by law (Law of December 11, 1998, Chapter II) and therefore effectively subject to Parliamentary scrutiny. Following an investigation, the Security authority (SGRS or State Security) may revoke a security clearance based on information submitted to it by the intelligence and security services.
The notification of a refusal to withdraw a security clearance includes the reasons for the decision, with the exception of any information the disclosure of which would be likely to prejudice the defence of the integrity the country, the military defence plans to implement the tasks of the armed forces, the internal security of the State, including in the field of nuclear energy, the sustainability of the democratic and constitutional order, the external security of the State and international relations, scientific or economic potential of the country or any other fundamental interests of the State, security of Belgian nationals abroad, operation decision-making bodies of the State, the protection of sources or the protection of the privacy of third parties.
The confidentiality of the investigation reports must be ensured.
As with all administrative decisions, the prejudiced may introduce recourse to the ConsEtat.
Constitution of Belgium, Article 32.
Wobbing.eu, Belgium, Law on federal and provincial level, http://www.wobbing.eu/news/law-federal-and-provincial-level
Wobbing.eu, Belgium, Belgium: Government condemned for violating the Freedom of Information legislation, 25 June 2007, http://www.wobbing.eu/news/belgium-government-condemned-violating-freedom-information-legislation
Wobbing.eu, Belgium, Surveillance legislation reduces Freedom of Information, 19 February, 2010, http://www.wobbing.eu/news/surveillance-legislation-reduces-freedom-information
Loi du 11 décembre 1998, &quoute;Loi portant création d’un organe de recours en matière d’habilitations, d’attestations et d’avis de sécurité&quoute;, Chapitre II.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: The Law Relating to Classification and to Authorization of Security (1998) (Chapter III) outlines the general dispositions and authorizations of security in cases of classified information.
Source: http://www.legislationline.org/documents/action/popup/id/8510
An example from the media is the case in 2012 when the Belgian Foreign Ministry suspended a senior diplomat due to security breach and espionage. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs filed a complaint with Belgian prosecutors.
Source: http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/natosource/belgium-suspends-senior-diplomat-suspected-of-being-russian-spy
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Secrecy makes it difficult to establish whether there are problems.
There is a law on classification (11 december 1998) and a Royal Decree (24 march 2000).
The reports of the Committee I, controlling the secret services, are not open to public and receive little press coverage.
Suggested score:
Do national defence and security institutions have beneficial ownership of commercial businesses? If so, how transparent are details of the operations and finances of such businesses?
Researcher4165: The DoD does not own any commercial business. All the interviewees confirmed this, and there is no public evidence to the contrary available.
The assessor could not establish whether defence and security institutions are removed from such ownership by law.
As regards to government inspection of corporate trade practices and financial accounting in Belgium, this falls under the Federal Tax Inspection Services and the General Board for Economic Inspection of the Federal Public Service of Economy.
Interview 1, Army official, June 20, 2014
Interview 2, Army Official, June 25, 2014.
Interview 3, Army official, June and July 2014.
Interview 4, Retired army official, July 2014,
Interview 5, Senior Auditor, July 3, July 8, July 17 and July 19, 2014
Interview 6, Interview 6, Colonel, July 3, 2014
Interview 7, Army official, July 2014
Interview 8, Professor, July 2014
Interview 9, Army official, July 5, July 20 and July 25, 2014.
Interview 10, Army official, July 2014
Interview 11, Army official, July 2014
Interview 12, Director, July 2014
Interview 13, Research assistant, July 2014
Interview 14, Senior Civil servant, July 2014
Interview 15, Army official, July 25 and July 28, 2014
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: I could not find evidence of national security institutions having beneficial ownership of commercial businesses. There is no reliable coverage of this subject in the national or international media.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are military-owned businesses subject to transparent independent scrutiny at a recognised international standard?
Researcher4165: The DoD does not own any commercial business, according to army officials and a senior civil servant.
There is no public evidence to the contrary either.
Interview 1, Army official, June 20, 2014
Interview 2, Army Officials, June 25, 2014.
Interview 3, Army official, June and July 2014.
Interview 6, Colonel, July 3, 2014
Interview 7, Army official, July 2014
Interview 9, Army official, July 5, July 20 and July 25, 2014.
Interview 10, Army official, July 2014
Interview 11, Army official, July
Interview 14, Senior Civil servant, July 2014
Interview 15, Army official, July 25 and July 28, 2014
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Could not find any evidence of military-owned businesses.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is there evidence of unauthorised private enterprise by military or other defence ministry employees? If so, what is the government's reaction to such enterprise?
Researcher4165: The law referenced prohibits the military and civilians employed by the army to have other professional activities, except with the express authorization of the Minister. It is therefore not possible to have unauthorised private commercial or other activities.
There is no evidence of unauthorised private enterprise, nor through media reports for example.
Loi du 28 février 2007 &quoute;fixant le statut des militaires et candidats militaires du cadre actif des Forces armées&quoute;, remplacée par la Loi du 31 juillet 2013.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: It is correct that military personnel can only start a second job with DoD approval.
Most such requests tend to be innocent, e.g. soldiers that are voluntary fire fighters or those helping with a family business.
The DoD tends to accept requests for jobs that do not influence the capacity of the personnel to perform their work (so they e.g. cannot take up the majority of their time) and jobs that do not disgrace the role of the military (e.g. working in a bar at night).
Sanctions are only disciplinary.
Of course if any such role would lead to e.g. public procurement being influenced, that case is brought to the attention of the relevant authorities.
Suggested score:
Do the Defence Ministry, Defence Minister, Chiefs of Defence, and Single Service Chiefs publicly commit - through, for example, speeches, media interviews, or political mandates - to anti-corruption and integrity measures?
Researcher4165: Following corruption cases within the army, the corresponding prosecutions and sentences, the DoD, CHOD, all Component Commandants and senior army officers appeared to commit strongly to fighting corruption and other illegal behaviour.
There is however no public evidence available that this is reflected throughout the defence ministry and armed forces by similar commitments from senior ministry staff and senior armed forces officers.
In 2013, the Ministry of Defence also publicly committed to tackle corruption within the army and to promote better transparency.
Penal Code, Art. 314.
Internal regulation, Règlement interne prescription CHOD Nr 200505957, 20 Octobre, 2005.
&quoute;Appel Bruxelles: 7 millions d'euros confisqués au profit de l'État&quoute;, Dépêche BELGA, 201800 NOV 13, http://www.levif.be/actualite/appel-bruxelles-7-millions-d-euros-confisques-au-profit-de-l-etat/article-normal-51499.html
&quoute;Fraude au sein de l'armée: 31 personnes devant la justice&quoute;, Régions, mardi 17 janvier 2012, 1055 Hr, http://www.rtbf.be/info/regions/detail_fraude-au-sein-de-l-armee-31-personnes-devant-la-justice?id=7402093
&quoute;Des militaires belges jugés pour une fraude de 10 millions d'euros&quoute;, Dépêche BELGA, 16 janvier 2012, http://www.lalibre.be/actu/belgique/des-militaires-belges-juges-pour-une-fraude-de-10-millions-d-euros-51b8e412e4b0de6db9c523c9
DH.be, Vente d'armes: De Crem prêt à une réflexion sur la procédure, http://www.dhnet.be/actu/belgique/vente-d-armes-de-crem-pret-a-une-reflexion-sur-la-procedure-51b73a01e4b0de6db9761ee9, 2013
COMMISSIE VOOR DE LANDSVERDEDIGING, WOENSDAG 8 JULI 2015, https://www.dekamer.be/doc/CCRI/pdf/54/ic219x.pdf
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are there effective measures in place for personnel found to have taken part in forms of bribery and corruption, and is there public evidence that these measures are being carried out?
Researcher4165: In 2012, a large-scale trial opened before the Criminal Court of Brussels. It involved a large case of false invoices and bribes paid by contractors amounting to more than 15 million Euros to military officials. 31 people, mostly servicemen, had charged these expenses as DoD purchases between 1996 and 2005. Complicit civilian providers distributed bribes in money or equipment in order to obtain contracts and/or to cause unnecessary expenses. The fraud related to minor equipment.
On appeal, the two officers considered to be the instigators of fraud and embezzlement were sentenced to 5 years of prison and a 55,000 euro fine. They were stripped of their military ranks. The main implicated private businessmen were also sentenced to 5 years suspended prison, had to pay heavy penalties and important sums were confiscated. The confiscations amounted to 7.618.425,67 Euros.
It is important to note that in public procurement regulations, corruption of public officials is a ground for cancellation of public contracts. Article 314 of the Penal Code provides for sanctions when awarding a contract is vitiated by violence, threat, gifts, promises or other fraudulent behaviour.
Bribery of a person holding public office by an individual is punishable with a prison sentence of up
to 10 years and/or a fine of up to €1.1 million. For companies and other leg al entities, the maximum fine is €2.2 million. For companies and other legal entities, the maximum fine is €550,000.
For both public and private bribery, other sanctions include being debarred from certain offices and confiscation of the object and proceeds of the offence.
Following the fraud cases, the DoD mandated a high-ranking officer to reinforce budgeting and financial control within Defence so as to avoid cases of fraud as much as possible and to enable prompt detection of fraud attempts.
RTBF, Fraude au sein de l'armée, http://www.rtbf.be/info/regions/detail_fraude-au-sein-de-l-armee-31-personnes-devant-la-justice?id=7402093, January 17, 2012, accessed on July 21, 2014.
&quoute;Appel Bruxelles: 7 millions d'euros confisqués au profit de l'Etat&quoute;, Dépêche BELGA, 201800 NOV 13
Penal Code, Art. 314, 2012
Règlement interne prescription CHOD Nr 200505957, 20 Octobre, 2005.
Anti-Bribery and Corruption Law Multi-Jurisdictional Client Guide, 2012, http://www.mwe.com/files/Uploads/Documents/Pubs/Anti-Bribery%20Client%20Guide.pdf
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is whistleblowing encouraged by the government, and are whistle-blowers in military and defence ministries afforded adequate protection from reprisal for reporting evidence of corruption, in both law and practice?
Researcher4165: Parliament has considered several whistle-blowing initiatives, seven of which have failed. On September 15, 2013, Parliament adopted the “notification of suspected breaches of integrity in the federal administrative authorities by their employees.” It introduces a two-tiered approach, relating to internal and external whistle-blowing. With regards to the internal whistle-blowing, the employee must first alert his line manager of alleged corruption (article 6 §1). The line manager is supposed to ensure confidentiality and safeguard the employee against retaliation. If the employee wishes to not inform his head of department concerning the suspected breach of integrity, he can also notify the Confidential Advisor Integrity of his department (article 8 §1, 2nd para). With regards to external whistle-blowing, whistle-blowers can access the second tier if “there is no confidential advisor within the federal department where they work; if they do not wish to raise their concern internally; if the head of the department where they work is involved in the suspected wrongdoing; or 4) if the suspected wrongdoing takes place in a different federal department than the one they work in. In this external route, the whistle-blower reports to parliament as opposed to the executive government. For both internal and external tiers, the federal ombudsperson is responsible for providing broad protection for the whistle-blowers against “dismissal, demotion, missing promotion, disciplinary measures, denial of pay raise, unfavourable performance evaluation, withholding of access to facilities and training, and denial of annual leave.“
Despite the presence of formal legislation, whistle-blowing is not actively encouraged. Evidence suggests that the process takes a very long time and that would-be whistle-blowers are often sceptical about the effectiveness of their intervention. Alternatively, anyone can file a complaint in court.
Following a judgement of the ECHR, an expert military lawyer confirmed that the military enjoy freedom of expression, and that whistle-blowers are entitled to exert such freedom. However, he adds that the abuse of this freedom can be subject to disciplinary action. Based on the assessment criteria used by the ECHR, he also believes that the higher the military ranks, the more one has to be careful when issuing an opinion.
Penal Code, Law 8 June 1867
Military Penal Code, Law 27 may 1870
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, supplemented by Protocols Nos. 1, 4, 6, 7, 12 and 13
Loi du 14 janvier 1975 portant le règlement de discipline des Forces Armées (Reg A 16, Z 1)
Council of Europe, &quoute;Civil Law Convention on Corruption&quoute;, November 4, 1999.
&quoute;Politique d'intégrité au sein du pouvoir fédéral&quoute;, CC, Rapport interne, 2007.
ODIHR, Handbook on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Armed Forces Personnel, Warschau, OSCE/ODIHR, 2008, 58.
Rob Gerits, &quoute;Ook klokkenluiders bij Defensie: de vrije meningsuiting van militairen&quoute;, in Belgisch Militair Tijdschrift - Revue Militaire Belge, Nr/N° N° 3 – Jaargang/Année 2011 - December/Décembre 2011, pp. 105-109.
DGCO-APG-MEDPR-SSCC-001, &quoute;Droit du personnel de la Défense d’exprimer son opinion&quoute;, Politique générale, Ed 002 / Rév 000 – 04 février 2013.
DGHR-SPS-CARDI-003, &quoute;Transgressions disciplinaires liées à la liberté d'opinion et d'expression&quoute;, Procédure spécifique, Ed 001 / Rev 001 - 03 avril 2008.
Globe, &quoute;Interventions belges, comment aborder le problème de la corruption?&quoute;, 2015, http://www.glo-be.be/article-magazine/interventions-belges%E2%80%89-comment-aborder-le-probleme-de-la-corruption%E2%80%89/
Providing An Alternative To Silence: Towards Greater Protection And Support For Whistleblowers In Belgium. Transparency International Belgium. March 2013
http://www.transparencybelgium.be/fileadmin/templates/docs/Material/Whistleblowing/ATOS_Towards_greater_support
Whistleblowing Protection Laws – EU Member States Laws, http://journalism.cmpf.eui.eu/maps/whistleblowing/
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Please add the following source:
Providing An Alternative To Silence: Towards Greater Protection And Support For Whistleblowers In Belgium. Transparency International Belgium. March 2013
http://www.transparencybelgium.be/fileadmin/templates/docs/Material/Whistleblowing/ATOS_Towards_greater_support_and_protection_for_whistleblowers_in_Belgium.pdf
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is special attention paid to the selection, time in post, and oversight of personnel in sensitive positions, including officials and personnel in defence procurement, contracting, financial management, and commercial management?
Researcher4165: Special attention is paid to personnel in sensitive positions, where the DoD conducts background and personality checks. When recruiting new personnel, candidates are asked to provide a 'certificate of good living and morals'. The focus is rarely on integrity aspects explicitly.
Training programs do not always pay attention systematically to integrity, although topics such as ethics and code of conduct are addressed.
&quoute;Politique d'intégrité au sein du pouvoir fédéral&quoute;, CC, Rapport interne, 2007, p. 12-13.
DoD, internal reglementation (not publically available).
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: There is no reliable public evidence available that verifies that there is special attention paid to personnel deployed to sensitive positions.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: None of the answers seem to be entirely correct.
In Belgium, public procurement and public finance are very complex matters with many laws and rules - Belgian rules and European rules. In the Belgian DoD there is a special course lasting 1 full year to learn all about public procurement, finance and people management.
Suggested score: N/A
Is the number of civilian and military personnel accurately known and publicly available?
Researcher4165: The Constitution requires that the contingent of the army must be fixed each year.
The latest statistics, issued by DGHR, show at January 1, 2015 a total of 32.342 persons employed by Defence, 30.512 Military and 1.830 Civilians. All these figures were confirmed by the interviewee and are communicated to the press.
&quoute;AR déterminant la structure générale du Ministère de la Défense et fixant les attributions de certaines autorités&quoute;, 21 décembre 2001 (mis à jour le 30-12-2013), Chancellerie du Premier Ministre - Direction générale Communication externe, Conseil des ministres du 7 novembre 2013.
Press center. org, Army contingent, http://www.presscenter.org/nl/pressrelease/20141127/legercontingent-voor-2015, accessed on January 12, 2015.
DoD, Law on army contingent, 2015, http://www.dekamer.be/FLWB/pdf/54/0673/54K0673001.pdf, accessed on January 12, 2015.
Interview 6, Colonel, July 3, 2014
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are pay rates and allowances for civilian and military personnel openly published?
Researcher4165: As the military are civil servants, their basic salaries are aligned with those of their civilian counterparts.
For each category, there are several wage levels depending on the grade (levels B, C and D: primary school and high school degrees) or class (level A: university degrees). Some public services have specific salary ranges for their specific grades.
Allowances for the Defence personnel are aligned with those of their colleagues in the other ministries and civil administrations.
This information is available in the reports of all public administrations, and communicated to the press.
The characteristics of the military profession are taken into account by a specific AR covering at the same time, remuneration, bonuses and all their financial rights.
AR du 9 mars 2004 modifiant l'AR du 11 juillet 2001 &quoute;relatif à la pondération des fonctions de management et d'encadrement dans les services publics fédéraux et fixant leur traitement&quoute;
AR du 16 février 2006, modifiant l'AR du 18 mars 2003 &quoute;relatif au statut pécuniaire des militaires de tous rangs et au régime des prestations de service des militaires du cadre actif au-dessous du rang d'officier&quoute;.
AR du 22 février 2006, &quoute;modifiant plusieurs arrêtés royaux en vue de lier certains montants à l'indice des prix à la consommation&quoute;.
AR du 15 septembre 2006, modifiant l'AR du 13 août 1976 &quoute;fixant les échelles de traitement de certains grades du personnel enseignant civil du Ministère de la Défense nationale&quoute;.
AR du 19 novembre 2008, modifiant l'AR du 2 septembre 2004 &quoute;portant la réforme des carrières particulières des niveaux B, C et D et fixant les échelles de traitement des grades particuliers du Ministère de la Défense&quoute;.
AR du 20 novembre 2008, modifiant l'AR du 7 juillet 2003 &quoute;fixant les échelles de traitement des grades de certains agents civils du département d'état-major renseignement et sécurité&quoute;.
AR du 19 janvier 2011, modifiant l'AR du 2 septembre 2004 &quoute;portant la réforme des carrières particulières des niveaux A, B, C et D et fixant les échelles de traitement des grades particuliers du Ministère de la Défense&quoute;.
AR du 6 décembre 2012, &quoute;modifiant diverses dispositions relatives au statut des militaires&quoute;.
AR du 25 octobre 2013 &quoute;relatif à la carrière pécuniaire des membres du personnel de la fonction publique fédérale&quoute;.
AR du 25 octobre 2013 modifiant l'AR du 11 février 1991 &quoute;fixant les droits individuels pécuniaires des personnes engagées par contrat de travail dans les services publics fédéraux.&quoute;
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Do personnel receive the correct pay on time, and is the system of payment well-established, routine, and published?
Researcher4165: DG BudFin carries out payments on the basis of information transmitted by DGHR that manages the administrative careers of the personnel. This implementation work is followed by a procedure of internal control.
The use of software shared by central and local services ensure the coherence of the division of labour within the management of remunerations.
ESA (Elements of Administrative Support) indicate the accounting services of bases and camps. ESA works as a helpdesk for units and is the first line of contact for DG BudFin when the internal controls in the computer system of management of payments detect material errors. ESA then participates as an accountant service, in the management of salaries and allowances. It checks the regularity, calculates and pays the amount due.
An audit conducted by CC in five military bases and camps showed uniformity of division of labour human resources management at the local level, despite the specificities of the Marine, Land and Air components. No errors were found in the recognized payments rights in camps and bases visited. This was confirmed by the interviewees.
The assessor could find no evidence that the system is published. There is no information as to whether basic pay is non-discretionary or not.
RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: Score of 3 maintained, as there seem to be limits to the information regarding the payment system that is published.
AR du 21 décembre 2001 (mis à jour le 30 décembre 2013), &quoute;déterminant la structure générale du Ministère de la Défense et fixant les attributions de certaines autorités&quoute;.
CC, &quoute;Planification des effectifs et rémunération du personnel militaire de la Défense&quoute;, https://www.courdescomptes.be/Docs/2011_39_PersonnelMilitaireDefens..., accessed July30, 2014.
Interview 1, Army official, June 20, 2014
Interview 2, Army Official, June 25, 2014.
Interview 3, Army official, June and July 2014.
Interview 4, Retired army official, July 2014,
Interview 14, Senior Civil servant, July 2014
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: I could not find further information that this system is published.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: The score should be 4.
The Director of Budget and Finance pays on the last day of the month, which is not always the case for other civil servants.
All personnel receive a accounting statement every month, which they can check is correct. Of course there are adjustments. Budget and Finance does not always receive the correct information in time, but all changes are adjusted. Thes are definitely no discretionary adjustments. I have personally been in charge of paying salaries for two years.
Last year 'other rewards and payments' were added to the monthly pay slip. Trade Unions congratulated the government's openness.
Suggested score: 4
Is there an established, independent, transparent, and objective appointment system for the selection of military personnel at middle and top management level?
Researcher4165: The promotion system of the military is described and provided for in various legal and regulatory texts:
For subalterns officer ranks (from second lieutenant to captain-commandant, which is an intermediate rank between captain and major), promotion is by seniority at fixed intervals.
There are objective job descriptions in place; they are controlled by the existing auditing bodies.
The promotion of senior officers and generals, on the contrary, is not automatic and is determined by a file review of each candidate for promotion.
The detailed examination of these files is accomplished by promotion committees, which are internal to DoD. They formulate recommendations to the King for the nomination or promotion of candidates to a higher rank.
A note is released to each promotion committee,and brought to the attention of each candidate qualified for promotion. The whole procedure is disclosed including the list of candidates.
Furthermore, the law on the publicity of administrative acts applies to all administrative decisions, promotions of the military included. In accordance with this law, the motivations of the committees' decisions are disclosed to the candidates.
Despite the DoD procedures and the legislation in force, as well as the strict application of the law on the publicity of administrative acts, evidence indicates the promotion of generals and even some colonels is often based on a distribution of positions based on their political affiliation.
Some candidates do certainly not have any political agenda (i.e. are members or supporters of a political party) but appear to become politically affiliated to access a high ranked position. Political parties, members of the majority are distributing vacancies in proportion to their power following the elections. Some politicians criticize a system that allows nominations based on linguistic affiliation. Frequently when a new government comes to power, it promises to abolish - or at least greatly reduce - the system of political appointments.
RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: Agree, score increased to 3.
AR du 7 avril 1959 &quoute;relatif à la position et à l'avancement des officiers de carrière&quoute;.
AR du 25 octobre 1963 &quoute;relatif au statut des sous-officiers du cadre actif des forces armées&quoute;.
AM du 31 mars 1971 &quoute;relatif à la composition et au fonctionnement des comités d'avancement&quoute;.
AM du 23 septembre 1977 &quoute;relatif aux avis sur la candidature à l'avancement des officiers&quoute;.
AM du 28 juillet 1995, &quoute;modifiant l'AM du 31 mars 1971 relatif à la composition et au fonctionnement des comités d'avancement et modifiant l'AM du 23 septembre 1977 relatif aux avis sur la candidature à l'avancement et au signalement des officiers des forces terrestre, aérienne et navale et du service médical.
Loi du 29 juillet 1991, &quoute;relative à la motivation formelle des actes administratifs.
Loi du 11 avril 1994, &quoute;relative à la publicité de l'administration&quoute;.
AR du 21 décembre 2001 (mis à jour le 30 décembre 2013), &quoute;déterminant la structure générale du Ministère de la Défense et fixant les attributions de certaines autorités&quoute;, Chancellerie du Premier Ministre - Direction générale Communication externe, Conseil des ministres du 7 novembre 2013.
Loi du 28 février 2007, &quoute;fixant le statut des militaires et candidats militaires du cadre actif des Forces armées&quoute;.
Loi du 11 mai 2007, &quoute;modifiant la loi du 28 février 2007 fixant le statut des militaires du cadre actif des forces armées&quoute;.
LaLibre.be, &quoute;Belgique - Nominations politiques&quoute;, 8 december 2011, accessed on 17 february 2015, http://www.rtbf.be/info/belgique/detail_nominations-politiques-les-etiquettes-sont-toujours-mises-par-d-autres?id=7786882
D. BATSELÉ, T. MORTIER, M. SCARCEZ, Manuel de droit administratif, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 2010.
Le Vif, &quoute;La guéguerre des nominations politiques fait rage&quoute;, 20 avril 2012, http://www.levif.be/actualite/belgique/la-gueguerre-des-nominations-politiques-fait-rage/article-normal-163353.html
P-O de BROUX, De Camu à Copernic : l’évolution de la fonction publique en Belgique, Facultés universitaires Saint-Louis, http://www.usaintlouis.be/data1/publications/0/1197/6986.pdf, accessed on July 29, 2013.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: I agree that political influence is possible, but it is guaranteed that not all generals are politically appointed. Colonels certainly are not. This is exaggerated.
The appointment of generals is really not representative for all other appointments. As the assesor described the process, there is a lot of openness. In the past, some officers went to court because they were not appointed but during the last years, they have tended to lose their cases.
Language is an important criterion for Belgium. There has to be a balance between Dutch and French speaking officers (which has nothing to do with political party membership).
Suggested score: 3
Are personnel promoted through an objective, meritocratic process? Such a process would include promotion boards outside of the command chain, strong formal appraisal processes, and independent oversight.
Researcher4165: As described in question 41, nominations and promotions in the DoD are decided via internal promotion committees, under an open procedure, since the motivations of the committees' decisions are disclosed to the candidates.
As described in the previous question. Despite the DoD procedures and the legislation in force, as well as the strict application of the law on the publicity of administrative acts, evidence indicates the promotion of generals and even some colonels is often based on a distribution of positions based on their political affiliation.
Candidates who consider themselves unfairly treated can initiate a procedure at an independent Administrative Court, the ConsEtat, which can suspend or cancel nominations or promotions.
Senior officers of all three branches are subject to tough, professional exams to get the licence ('brevet') for GS, and beyond to get promotions (for instance naval Commanders, Lieutenant-Kolonels, Colonels). Promotions are dependent upon passing these examinations.
RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER:Agree with comments, score increased to 3 in light of additional evidence.
AR du 7 avril 1959 &quoute;relatif à la position et à l'avancement des officiers de carrière&quoute;.
AR du 25 octobre 1963 &quoute;relatif au statut des sous-officiers du cadre actif des forces armées&quoute;.
AM du 31 mars 1971 &quoute;relatif à la composition et au fonctionnement des comités d'avancement&quoute;.
AM du 23 septembre 1977 &quoute;relatif aux avis sur la candidature à l'avancement des officiers&quoute;.
AM du 28 juillet 1995, &quoute;modifiant l'AM du 31 mars 1971 relatif à la composition et au fonctionnement des comités d'avancement et modifiant l'AM du 23 septembre 1977 relatif aux avis sur la candidature à l'avancement et au signalement des officiers des forces terrestre, aérienne et navale et du service médical.
Loi du 29 juillet 1991, &quoute;relative à la motivation formelle des actes administratifs.
Loi du 11 avril 1994, &quoute;relative à la publicité de l'administration&quoute;.
C. DE VISSCHER et G. LE BUSSY, &quoute;La politisation de la fonction publique : quelques réflexions d’ordre comparatif&quoute;, Pyramides, Revue du Centre d'Études et de Recherche en Administration publique N° 3 2001, Bruxelles.
AR du 21 décembre 2001 (mis à jour le 30 décembre 2013), &quoute;déterminant la structure générale du Ministère de la Défense et fixant les attributions de certaines autorités&quoute;, Chancellerie du Premier Ministre - Direction générale Communication externe, Conseil des ministres du 7 novembre 2013.
Loi du 28 février 2007, &quoute;fixant le statut des militaires et candidats militaires du cadre actif des Forces armées&quoute;.
Loi du 11 mai 2007, &quoute;modifiant la loi du 28 février 2007 fixant le statut des militaires du cadre actif des forces armées&quoute;.
D. BATSELÉ, T. MORTIER, M. SCARCEZ, Manuel de droit administratif, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 2010.
Le Vif, &quoute;La guéguerre des nominations politiques fait rage&quoute;, 20 avril 2012, http://www.levif.be/actualite/belgique/la-gueguerre-des-nominations-politiques-fait-rage/article-normal-163353.html
P-O de BROUX, De Camu à Copernic : l’évolution de la fonction publique en Belgique, Facultés universitaires Saint-Louis, http://www.usaintlouis.be/data1/publications/0/1197/6986.pdf, accessed on July 29, 2013.
Le Conseil d'Etat, http://www.raadvst-consetat.be/?page=about&lang=en, accessed July 2, 2014.
LaLibre.be, &quoute;Belgique - Nominations politiques&quoute;, 8 december 2011, accessed on 17 february 2015, http://www.rtbf.be/info/belgique/detail_nominations-politiques-les-etiquettes-sont-toujours-mises-par-d-autres?id=7786882
DeStandaard online, &quoute;Defensie maakt nieuwe generaals bekend&quoute;, 05 March 2014, accessed on 4 September 2015. http://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20140305_01010148
Dries De Decker (DeWereldMorgen - blog uit de community), &quoute;Geen sancties voor liegende chef militaire inlichtingedienst&quoute;), 11 June 2015, last accessed on 4 September 2015. http://www.dewereldmorgen.be/blog/driesdedecker/2015/06/11/geen-sancties-voor-liegende-chef-militaire-inlichtingendienst
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: This question is similar to question 41. You can only become a general if you are a colonel already. It seems quite unlikely that officers are promoted again and again only to make them generals many years later. It takes at least 25 years between the rank of lieutenant and colonel.
Suggested score: 3
Where compulsory conscription occurs, is there a policy of not accepting bribes for avoiding conscription? Are there appropriate procedures in place to deal with such bribery, and are they applied?
Researcher4165: The compulsory military service, which had been established by a law signed December 14, 1909 by King Leopold II, was suspended by a decision of the Council of Ministers in 1992.
The last conscripts left the service on February 5, 1995.
Loi modifiant les lois sur la milice, coordonnées le 30 avril 1962, 31 décembre, 1992.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
With regard to compulsory or voluntary conscription, is there a policy of refusing bribes to gain preferred postings in the recruitment process? Are there appropriate procedures in place to deal with such bribery, and are they applied?
Researcher4165: There is no longer military conscription in Belgium. Over the last decade, some proposals were made in favor of a voluntary civil conscription of some kind, but they were not endorsed.
Loi modifiant les lois sur la milice, coordonnées le 30 avril 1962, December 31, 1992.
Loi modifiant les lois sur la milice, coordonnées le 30 avril 1962, décembre 31, 1992.
&quoute;AR déterminant la structure générale du Ministère de la Défense et fixant les attributions de certaines autorités&quoute;, 21 décembre 2001 (mis à jour le 30-12-2013), Chancellerie du Premier Ministre - Direction générale Communication externe, Conseil des ministres du 7 novembre 2013.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is there evidence of 'ghost soldiers', or non-existent soldiers on the payroll?
Researcher4165: There are no ghost soldiers or non-existent soldiers. The overall control, the accuracy and the strength of payment systems and oversight suggests that the phenomenon is very unlikely to occur. DG BudFin carries out payments on the basis of information transmitted by DGHR that manages the administrative careers of the personnel. This implementation work is followed by an internal control. The use of softwares shared by central and local services ensures the coherence of the division of labour within the management of remunerations.
The press never reported or published articles on the possibility of the existence of soldiers ghosts in Belgium. There is no such practice in other government departments.
&quoute;AR déterminant la structure générale du Ministère de la Défense et fixant les attributions de certaines autorités&quoute;, 21 décembre 2001 (mis à jour le 30-12-2013), Chancellerie du Premier Ministre - Direction générale Communication externe, Conseil des ministres du 7 novembre 2013.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: I could not find any evidence of ghost soldiers in the press or official documents.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are chains of command separate from chains of payment?
Researcher4165: Chains of command appear to not actually separated from chains of payment throughout DoD and the Armed Forces.
Payments to military and civilian members of Defence are carried out by a Directorate-General &quoute;Budget and Finance&quoute;, on the basis of information transmitted by DGHR that manages the administrative careers of the personnel. This implementation work is followed by internal controls by the CAAF, CC, IAD.
The interviewee confirmed this information.
&quoute;AR déterminant la structure générale du Ministère de la Défense et fixant les attributions de certaines autorités&quoute;, 21 décembre 2001 (mis à jour le 30-12-2013), Chancellerie du Premier Ministre - Direction générale Communication externe, Conseil des ministres du 7 novembre 2013.
&quoute;AR relatif aux activités d'audit interne dans certains services du pouvoir exécutif fédéral&quoute;, August 17, 2007.
&quoute;AR portant création du Comité d'audit de l'Administration fédérale (CAAF)&quoute;, August 17, 2007.
CC, Internal reports, not publicly available.
Interview 6, Colonel, July 3, 2014
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: The military and civilian members of the ministery of defence are paid by the ministry of defence and not by the federal state agency that is in charge for rhe payment of civil public agents. The Director of Budget and the Director of Human Resources are both generals, under the command of the Chief of Defence.
There is no evidence or allegations that undue influence has been exerted, but it would be possible.
As a former chief of the payment branch at the DoD Directorate of Budget I can confirm that the systems in use and the legislation are very complex and difficult for any auditor of IAD or IAG to control.
There has been an audit by the Federal Court of Audit on the payment of salaries by Defence in 2013. The audit report was transmitted to Parliament and published in November 2013. The audit took several months and at the end the recommandations were rather poor. A limited number of people are able to understand the payment chain.
Again: there is no indication that the chain of command has influenced payments, but it would be possible.
Suggested score: 1
Is there a Code of Conduct for all military and civilian personnel that includes, but is not limited to, guidance with respect to bribery, gifts and hospitality, conflicts of interest, and post-separation activities?
Researcher4165: In Belgium, all Federal Civil Servants are bound by a Federal Code of Conduct. In addition, DoD established a Code of Conduct for civilian and military personnel engaged in public procurement (see above). This Code of Conduct is revised regularly.
Both Codes address specifically items like bribes, fraud, conflicts of interest, are discussed within the appropriate commissions in parliament, are made available to the personnel and are partially the subject of publications in the press.
In the military units, everyone working in the procurement area must sign this Code of Conduct.
DoD also has a responsible department and appointed some people in a support function for integrity. DoD has developed its own deontological code, established after extensive consultation with personnel and trade unions. DoD is also using internal control and/or internal audit to examine obstacles to integrity.
The most representative organisms are CM, BFC, IAG Def and IAD. There is evidence of the effectiveness of their work. Trials are open to the public. The results of prosecutions are communicated to and by the press.
The Defence Code of Conduct, however, is not publicly available (but only on an internal website).
Response to Government Reviewer: Score 4 cannot be awarded as the Code is not public.
AR du 26 septembre 1994 &quoute;portant réforme de diverses dispositions réglementaires applicables aux agents de l'État&quoute;.
Prescription interne CHOD Nr200505957, octobre 20, 2005.
&quoute;Politique d'intégrité au sein du pouvoir fédéral&quoute;, CC, Rapport interne, 2007, p. 7, 9.
&quoute;AR modifiant diverses dispositions relatives au statut des militaires&quoute;, 26 décembre 2013.
Circulaire du 21 juin 2010 &quoute;Marchés publics. - Déontologie. - Conflit d'intérêts. - Déclarations sur l'honneur&quoute;, Service public fédéral Budget et Contrôle de la Gestion et Chancellerie du Premier Ministre.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: The OECD Report 2010 on &quoute;Post-Public Employment - Good Practices for Preventing Conflict of Interest&quoute; uses Belgium' s Code of Conduct as an example of how OECD recommendations of guidelines have been used to manage conflict of interest.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: There is a code of conduct which covers also gifts, hospitality and post-separation activities. All personnel in working in finance and public procurement has to sign personally the code and a copy of the signed document is registered in the personnel file.
The code of conduct is available on the internal Defence website and is considered as a military rule.
Belgium adopted the Treaty of New York of 31th October 2003 called the revolving doors with its law of 8th may 2007. This means that a company that wants to bid for a public procurement can't use military personnel that is retired to prepare the bid.
Recently (20 May 2014) the Government brought this principle again to everyone's attention via an internal rule for all federal departments.
Suggested score: 4
Is there evidence that breaches of the Code of Conduct are effectively addressed ,and are the results of prosecutions made publicly available?
Researcher4165: Breaches of the Code of Conduct are indeed effectively addressed and brought to justice.
The 2012 trial, mentioned above, reported important infractions resulting in significant convictions, which have been widely commented on by the press.
Such trials are open to the public. The results of prosecutions are communicated to and by the press.
RTBF, &quoute;Fraud within the army&quoute;, http://www.rtbf.be/info/regions/detail_fraude-au-sein-de-l-armee-31-personnes-devant-la-justice?id=7402093, January 17, 2012, accessed on July 21, 2014.
&quoute;Appel Bruxelles: 7 millions d'euros confisqués au profit de l'État&quoute;, Dépêche BELGA, 201800 NOV 13
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Does regular anti-corruption training take place for military and civilian personnel?
Researcher4165: A number of dilemma training sessions were organised some years ago, more specifically on conflict of interest, problem solving, and aimed at preventing corruption. However, these sessions do not appear to be covering exhaustively all subjects or situations with which the servicemen can be confronted.
As covered in Questions 53 and 55, there is training on corruption in operations.
Règlement interne prescription CHOD Nr 200505957, 20 Octobre, 2005.
Règlement interne DGMR (Réf. DGMR-SPS-GPOL-MGLX-001)
Circulaire du 21 juin 2010 &quoute;Marchés publics. - Déontologie. - Conflit d'intérêts. - Déclarations sur l'honneur&quoute;, Service public fédéral Budget et Contrôle de la Gestion et Chancellerie du Premier Ministre.
Interview 1, Army official, June 20, 2014
Prescription interne CHOD Nr200505957, octobre 20, 2005
Opinion: Not Qualified
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is there a policy to make public outcomes of the prosecution of defence services personnel for corrupt activities, and is there evidence of effective prosecutions in recent years?
Researcher4165: A well-known case, called the &quoute;Agusta-Dassault&quoute; case, was handled by the Court in the nineties, as politicians, officials and the French industrialist Serge Dassault, ministers were accused of corruption. A criminal trial was handled by the Court of Cassation. The CEO of the Dassault Group, implicated personally in this case, received a two year probationary sentence for bribery.
The 2012-2013 trial also revealed important infractions resulting in significant convictions, which have been widely commented on by the press.
Another case was reported in the DoD, significant frauds committed between 1996 and 2005. Thirty-one people, military and private contractors, have been accused of forgery, use of forgery, misappropriations of funds and embezzlement at the detriment of the Belgian army and DoD. The fraud was estimated at more than 15 million euros. The Court of appeal sentenced fifteen military and contractors.
Since 2003, the military tribunals (Court-martials and Military Court) no longer exist in peacetime in Belgium. The above mentioned cases were judged by the civil and criminal courts. As a consequence, all court proceedings were public from the beginning to the end and subject to lengthy analysis in the press.
There is no evidence whatsoever of cases being suppressed or inappropriately sanctioned.
RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 3: Score 3 has been awarded as lack of evidence of recent prosecutions makes it is unclear whether there is a policy to make public all prosecutions or if all prosecutions taking place in recent years have been effective.
&quoute;Appel Bruxelles: 7 millions d'euros confisqués au profit de l'État&quoute;, Dépêche BELGA, 201800 NOV 13
&quoute;Loi du 10 avril 2003 réglant la suppression des juridictions militaires en temps de paix (ainsi que leur maintien en temps de guerre)&quoute;, Moniteur Belge, May 7, 2003.
&quoute;&quoute;Comment l'affaire Agusta-Dassault a fait chuter Guy Spitaels et Co&quoute;, Archives de La Libre Belgique, 2003.
&quoute;Le Colonel Dewinne lance ses missiles sur Dassault&quoute;, Le Soir, 29-30 novembre 1997.
&quoute;Mai 1989 : La saga des 30 millions de Dassault selon Merry Hermanus&quoute;, Le Soir, 28 janvier 1997, p. 4.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: There is not enough reliable evidence to suggest other prosecutions that have taken place in recent years. In 2004, the Defence Minister pledged to address fraud in the Belgian Army following revelations of army fraud ring. Source: http://www.expatica.com/be/news/country-news/Flahaut-pledges-army-fraud-crackdown_117291.html.
Suggested score: 3
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: All major fraud cases in Belgium in the last twenty year have received substantial publicity.
Suggested score:
Are there effective measures in place to discourage facilitation payments (which are illegal in almost all countries)?
Researcher4165: Facilitation payments are not permitted in Belgium.
It is important to note that in public procurement regulations, corruption by public officials is a ground for cancellation of public contracts. Article 314 of the Penal Code provides for sanctions when awarding a contract is vitiated by violence, threat, gifts, promises or other fraudulent behaviour.
Bribery of a person holding public office by an individual is punishable with a prison sentence of up
to 10 years and/or a fine of up to €1.1 million. For companies and other leg al entities, the maximum fine is €2.2 million. For companies and other legal entities, the maximum fine is €550,000.
For both public and private bribery, other sanctions include being debarred from certain offices and confiscation of the object and proceeds of the offence.
Following the fraud cases, the DoD entrusted a high-ranking officer with a mission to reinforce budgeting and financial control within Defence so as to avoid cases of fraud as much as possible and to enable prompt detection of fraud attempts.
Following the aforementioned corruption cases, DoD entrusted a high-ranking officer with a to reinforce budgeting and financial control within Defence so as to avoid cases of facilitation payments or other fraud as much as possible and to enable prompt detection of fraud attempts.
General laws and existing regulations in the Military Penal Code and in disciplinary regulations of armed forces are applied in the context of existing control bodies, primarily CM, BFC, IAG Def and IAD.
Effective measures are thus in place against corruption and facilitation payments. Legal prosecutions that were conducted have been widely disseminated by the press and the general public is therefore well aware that they are severely prosecuted.
RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 1: Score maintained at 4. Facilitation payments are strictly illegal and mechanisms to punish offenders are in place and are effectively applied.
Code pénal, Art. 314.
Règlement interne prescription CHOD Nr 200505957, 20 Octobre, 2005.
Business anti corruption portal, Legislation, Facilitation payments, 2014, http://www.business-anti-corruption.com/country-profiles/europe-central-asia/belgium/legislation.aspx
CMS guide, 2012, http://www.cmslegal.com/Hubbard.FileSystem/files/Publication/867d81f9-25b2-49d3-9991-04a3a5e862d5/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/53cb5525-344f-4b8f-9bab-081aeacadd93/Guide-to-Anti-bribery-and-corruption-laws-final.pdf
&quoute;Appel Bruxelles: 7 millions d'euros confisqués au profit de l'Etat&quoute;, Dépêche BELGA, 201800 NOV 13
Penal Code, Art. 314, 2012
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: Facilitation payments are illegal, but at least outside the military they exist and there is little evidence of real prosecution - not least since the judicial authorities do not have the resources.
Suggested score: 3
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Do the armed forces have military doctrine addressing corruption as a strategic issue on operations?
Researcher4165: Internal regulation does effectively exist, although all risks in operations may not be distinctly addressed as a strategic issue. Corruption is addressed, but the regulation is internal and not publicly available.
RESPONSE TO REVIEWERS: Score changed to 2, the armed forces are aware of corruption as a strategic issue for operations; however, there is no explicit doctrine on this subject.
Règlement interne DGMR (Réf. DGMR-SPS-GPOL-MGLX-001).
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: With no military doctrine addressing corruption as a strategic issue on operations the score should be 2.
Suggested score: 2
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: The internal regulations are not publicly available.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: There is a code of conduct (see earlier questions), and the military that leave for a mission are briefed on finance and on the principles of public procurement. They have to sign the code of conduct. There is no special code for operations abroad, it is the same as for finance and public procurement in Belgium.
It is not clear that corruption on operations is a strategic issue. As far as I know we never had problems with military misconduct regarding finance and public procurement during a mission.
We try to always send an experienced fianancial officer with a detachment (except for very small detachments). If possible, we try to arrange and manage finance and public procurement with the help of our local military attaché who knows the local circumstances. We always open a local bank account via a Belgian bank in order to avoid cash money.
Suggested score:
Is there training in corruption issues for commanders at all levels in order to ensure that these commanders are clear on the corruption issues they may face during deployment? If so, is there evidence that they apply this knowledge in the field?
Researcher4165: There is training on corruption issues for commanders at all levels down to platoon level. There is evidence that they apply this knowledge in the field; even if there may be isolated incidences of corruption issues being mishandled by officers.
Règlement interne DGMR (Réf. DGMR-SPS-GPOL-MGLX-001)
Circulaire du 21 juin 2010 &quoute;Marchés publics. - Déontologie. - Conflit d'intérêts. - Déclarations sur l'honneur&quoute;, Service public fédéral Budget et Contrôle de la Gestion et Chancellerie du Premier Ministre.
Interview 1, Army official, June 20, 2014.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: I could not find any evidence of mishandling of corruption cases by commanders in the field. No mention of possible cases in the press either.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: This question is very similar to the previous one.
All detachment commanders and financial officers are briefed on finance and public procurement before they start their mission. They all sign the code of conduct. A briefing is not the same as training, but all high ranked officers have to go to a course where finance is one of the subjects taught.
We lack evidence to suggest that the Belgian systems are insufficient.
Suggested score:
Are trained professionals regularly deployed to monitor corruption risk in the field (whether deployed on operations or peacekeeping missions)?
Researcher4165: Professionals trained to monitoring corruption in the field are regularly deployed and report internally on fixed intervals on the state of corruption in the course of missions abroad.
This information was provided by the interviewee who also mentioned the existence of confidential reports on the topic. As this could not be publicly verified, score 2 has been selected.
BFC-S Controls (confidential reports).
Interview 11, Army official, July 2014.
Opinion: Not Qualified
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are there guidelines, and staff training, on addressing corruption risks in contracting whilst on deployed operations or peacekeeping missions?
Researcher4165: Following the guidelines, staff members are specifically trained in relation to corruption risk in contracting whilst in operations or deployed in peacekeeping missions. Mission commanders are tasked with giving instructions during briefings on “Contracting in Operations”, imposed by the CHOD's Operation Orders. During these personnel is informed about the Code of Conduct and the necessity of follow-up and control. They are requested to consult and sign the Code and are thus made aware of corruption risks.
The same staff members are tasked with the follow-up and control of the application of these rules.
AR du 26 septembre 1994 &quoute;portant réforme de diverses dispositions réglementaires applicables aux agents de l'État&quoute;.
Prescription interne CHOD Nr200505957, octobre 20, 2005.
&quoute;Politique d'intégrité au sein du pouvoir fédéral&quoute;, CC, Rapport interne, 2007, p. 7, 9.
&quoute;Circulaire du 21 juin 2010 &quoute;Marchés publics. - Déontologie. - Conflit d'intérêts. - Déclarations sur l'honneur&quoute;, Service public fédéral Budget et Contrôle de la Gestion et Chancellerie du Premier Ministre.
Opinion: Not Qualified
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: The detachment commander and his/her financial officer are briefed before leaving - not particularly on fraud or corruption but on the general principles of public procurement and on finance.
Up until now, we have not had problems with misconduct of an officer concerning finance or procurement.
Suggested score:
Private Military Contractors (PMCs) usually refer to companies that provide operational staff to military environments. They may also be known as security contractors or private security contractors, and refer to themselves as private military corporations, private military firms, private security providers, or military service providers.
Researcher4165: The Belgian army did not have recourse to private military contractors, and their employment was forbidden.
This changed in 2013: private security companies can now supply services to the army. For now maritime security companies can be used with the very limited scope of protecting merchant ships in regions with high risk of piracy, but given that the extent of the use of such companies is not clear and there is no experience of sanctions available suggest limited accountability.
RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 2: Score changed to 2 based on the developments since 2013.
Loi du 11 Jul 78 organisant les relations entre les autorités publiques et les syndicats du personnel militaire (Reg A 16-Z 40)
AR du 28 Sep 84 portant exécution de la Loi du 19 Dec 74.
AR du 21 décembre 2001, &quoute;déterminant la structure générale du Ministère de la Défense et fixant les attributions de certaines autorités&quoute;.
Loi du 28 février 2007 &quoute;fixant le statut des militaires du cadre actif des Forces armées et modifiant certaines dispositions relatives au statut du personnel militaire&quoute;.
&quoute;Convention des Nations unies contre la corruption&quoute;, New York le 31 octobre 2003.
Loi du 31 juillet 2013, modifiant la loi du 28 février 2007.
DGHR-REG-SYNVAK-001, &quoute;Relations entre les autorités militaires et les syndicats du personnel militaire&quoute;, original version June 1, 2001; last edition July 6, 2009.
Samuel Legros. La Belgique, à son tour, entame la privatisation de l’armée. La Coordination Nationale d’Action pour la Paix et la Démocratie (CNAPD) samedi 10 mai 2014.
http://www.cnapd.be/la-Belgique-a-son-tour-entame-la855.html
http://www.ejustice.just.fgov.be/cgi_loi/change_lg.pl?language=fr&la=F&table_name=loi&cn=2013011603
HUSKEY, K. A. (2012). Accountability for Private Military and Security Contractors in the International Legal Regime. Criminal Justice Ethics, 31(3), 193-212.
HEDAHL, M. (2012). Unaccountable: The Current State of Private Military and Security Companies. Criminal Justice Ethics, 31(3), 175-192.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: Belgium has for long time officially prohibited the use of these private militias. The use of force abroad has been a prerogative competence of the State, reserved for itself given the nature and objectives involved. However, since January 2013, private security companies can now supply the army, for now maritime security companies can be use with the very limited scope of protecting merchant ships in regions with high risk of piracy.
Given that the extent of the use of this companies is not clear. That there is no experience of sanctions available. The limited available information on operations (contracting, in-the-field, and post-conduct). The limited accountability of this type companies. I recommend a ‘2 Criteria’.
Sources:
Samuel Legros. La Belgique, à son tour, entame la privatisation de l’armée. La Coordination Nationale d’Action pour la Paix et la Démocratie (CNAPD) samedi 10 mai 2014.
http://www.cnapd.be/la-Belgique-a-son-tour-entame-la855.html
http://www.ejustice.just.fgov.be/cgi_loi/change_lg.pl?language=fr&la=F&table_name=loi&cn=2013011603
HUSKEY, K. A. (2012). Accountability for Private Military and Security Contractors in the International Legal Regime. Criminal Justice Ethics, 31(3), 193-212.
HEDAHL, M. (2012). Unaccountable: The Current State of Private Military and Security Companies. Criminal Justice Ethics, 31(3), 175-192.
Suggested score: 2
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Does the country have legislation covering defence and security procurement and are there any items exempt from these laws?
Researcher4165: The DoD pays particular attention to the risks existing in the field of public procurement and financial management and has taken various management measures in this regard.
First of all, all European directives regarding defence procurement have been transposed into Belgian law. Second, the statutory audit applies in its entirety via the aforementioned control and audit institutions.
There are exemptions from the Law of August 13, 2011, but they are in line with the European directives.
There is therefore a well-organized procurement control within DoD, which has implemented a systematic internal control of the acquisition process. Procedures are documented; delegations, flowcharts and control measures of the different stages of the procurement process are provided.
The corruption affairs mentioned elsewhere in this questionnaire attest to the effectiveness of these controls.
Few exceptions are allowed (depending on European budgetary thresholds). There is one exception, when it comes to orders for SGRS and this is for confidentiality reasons. MPs are provided with the audits. Most of them are also made public as abstracts or conclusions.
Regarding the Belgian Defence, the scope of procurement is generally limited. In DoD, a recent regulation, preventing any “revolving doors” setup, has been implemented in the “Request for tender” template which is to be used for proposed contracts.
Loi du 24 décembre 1963 relative aux marchés publics et à certains marchés de travaux, de fournitures et de services.
Loi du 24 décembre 1993 relative aux marchés publics et à certains marchés de travaux, de fourniture et de services.
AR du 6 février 1997 relatif aux marchés publics de fournitures et de services auxquels s'applique l'article 3, § 3, de la loi du 24 décembre 19963 relative aux marchés publics et à certains marchés de travaux, de fournitures et de services.
AR du 6 décembre 2001, modifiant l'AR du 6 février 1997.
Loi du 15 juin 2006 relative aux marchés publics et à certains marchés de travaux, de fournitures et de services.
Directive 2009/81/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council &quoute;on the coordination of procedures for the award of certain works contracts, supply contracts and service contracts by contracting authorities or entities in the fields of defence and security&quoute;, July 13, 2009.
Loi du 13 août 2011 relative aux marchés publics et à certains marchés de travaux, de fournitures et de services dans les domaines de la défense et de la sécurité
AR du 23 janvier 2012 relatif à la passation des marchés publics et de certains marchés de travaux, de fournitures et de services dans les domaines de la défense et de la sécurité.
AG CC (CONFIDENTIAL) 28 juillet 28, 2004.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: As per public procurement according to the law dated August 13th, 2011 (related to public
procurement in the defence and security domain (works, supplies, services), a supplier
needs to be in conformance with two major dispositions determined in Article 60 in the Royal Decree
dated January 23rd, 2012 related to the actual contract award procedures for public procurement
(works, supplies and services) in the defence and security domain. These dispositions are related to
the access to the public procurement procedure (Art 63 to 68 in this Royal Decree) and the
qualitative selection criteria of a financial, economic or technical nature or related to the
professional capability of the supplier (Art 69 to 84 in this Royal Decree).
Furthermore, as stated, should they require the production of certificates drawn up by independent bodies attesting to the compliance of the economic operator with certain quality assurance standards, contracting authorities shall refer to quality assurance systems based on the relevant European standards series certified by bodies conforming to the European standards series concerning certification. Source: European Defence Agency, 2014 https://www.eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/procurement-library/vademecum-of-pms-defence-procurement-practices-for-gateway.pdf.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: The Belgian legislation on public procurement is in line with European rules.
In my opinion, procurement for intelligence services (like the military SGRS) are not exempt from the law, but the law accepts that some information can be kept secret and that you don't have to publish the needs.
The European and Belgian law exempt only some cases like government to government procurement, procurement through international organisations (like EDA or NATO, which have their own rules) and there is a special law for material with a national security interest (the EU Treaty Art 346). If a company thinks that they are treated unfairly, they can go to court and stop the procurement procedure.
The last few years saw some cases of intervention by the court with decisions going both ways - most of the time complaints related to technical matters, not fraud or corruption.
For clauses of corruption, see question 61.
Suggested score:
Is the defence procurement cycle process, from assessment of needs, through contract implementation and sign-off, all the way to asset disposal, disclosed to the public?
Researcher4165: The entire procurement cycle is set up in conformity with procurement directives based on the European directives.
Defence procurement is not disclosed during negotiations, not even within other departments of the Ministry of Economic Affairs. Publication occurs only after signing the contract.
The government always provides the Parliament and the press with the outline of its PIDS (investment plan for defence and security). It gives them the type and number of materials provided, as well as an overall budget estimate for some of them. Outside Parliament, the various aspects of the defence equipment acquisition cycle, from assessment of needs to asset disposal are therefore always announced ex post.
The PIDS is reviewed and commented at all levels. The government considers nevertheless that details of this plan are politically sensitive, and it is difficult to acquire them, even within DoD departments, except for directly involved services (DGMR).
In practice, the public gets basic information from the media (equipment purchased, supplier, number, price, Belgian companies involved). Citizens may nevertheless find more detailed information in the annals of parliament (record of public meetings general or ad hoc commissions).
RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: Score of 1 maintained, as public information seems to only be available in a very abbreviated or general way.
COUNCIL DIRECTIVE (89/665/EEC) of December 21, 1989, &quoute;on the coordination of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the application of review procedures to the award of public supply and public works contracts&quoute;, OJ L 395, december 30, 1989, p. 33.
DIRECTIVE 2004/18/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of March 31, 2004 &quoute;on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts &quoute;, OJL, April 30, 2004.
Loi du 15 juin 2006, &quoute;relative aux marchés publics et à certains marchés de travaux, de fournitures et de services&quoute;.
DIRECTIVE 2007/66/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of December 11, 2007, amending Council Directives 89/665/EEC and 92/13/EEC &quoute;with regard to improving the effectiveness of review procedures concerning the award of public contracts&quoute; (Text with EEA relevance), Official Journal of the European Union, December 20, 2007.
BELGA, &quoute;L'armée va acquérir de nouveaux navires et de l'armement pour blindés et chasseurs&quoute;, Brussels, 081156 JUL 12.
La Dernière Heure, &quoute;490 millions pour équiper l'armée&quoute;, October 29, 2013.
Loi du 13 août 2011, &quoute;relative aux marchés publics et à certains marchés de travaux, de fournitures et de services dans les domaines de la défense et de la sécurité&quoute;.
Loi du 17 juin 2013, &quoute;relative à la motivation, à l'information et aux voies de recours en matière de marchés publics et de certains marchés de travaux, de fournitures et de services&quoute;.
Directive 2009/81/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of July 13, 2009, &quoute;on the coordination of procedures for the award of certain works contracts, supply contracts and service contracts by contracting authorities or entities in the fields of defence and security&quoute;, and amending Directives 2004/17/EC and 2004/18/EC (Text with EEA relevance), January 1st, 2014.
Vandeput, &quoute;Tactical Helicopters&quoute;, 2014, http://www.vandeput.belgium.be/fr/la-d%C3%A9fense-r%C3%A9ceptionne-son-dernier-nh90-dans-la-version-de-transport
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: To my opinion, a scale 1 is to severe. We have thousands of contracts, small and big, a year. Only procurement of major material is made public, including assessments of needs. These needs are approved by the Parliamental Commission and the Council of Ministers. Journalists write articles about them.
Most of the contracts are only published once we start looking for a bidder. As prescribed by European law, alle procurement is open for international bidding.
Suggested score: 2
Are defence procurement oversight mechanisms in place and are these oversight mechanisms active and transparent?
Researcher4165: Following the appropriate legal framework based on EU legislation, the entire procurement cycle is monitored by the control authorities, such as the IF, the Minister of Budget, the CC, the Parliamentary Commission on Defence Procurement and the Council of Ministers.
Established by Article 180 of the Constitution, CC (Court of Audit) is a collateral body of Parliament. It exercises external scrutiny of the budgetary, accounting and financial operations of the Federal State, the Communities, the Regions, the public service institutions depending upon them, and the provinces. It includes the scrutiny of defence expenditures.
CC’s powers are defined in the law of 29 October 1846, which has been amended several times, and in the law of 16 May 2003. The law grants a large independence to the CC and a real autonomy to perform its missions.
Besides advising on the budget, CC performs financial audits, legality and regularity audits and examines the sound use of public funds. It checks the income and expenses of the Federal State, the Communities, the Regions, public service institutions depending on them and the provinces. The outcome of those audit activities are regularly reported to the legislative assemblies and the provincial councils.
Finally, CC carries out specific tasks of good governance (lists of mandates and declarations of assets filed by political representatives and senior officials, advice on financial reporting by the political parties and the campaign expenditure), as well as tasks regarding the distribution of resources between the Communities and Regions (school students counting, personal income tax honesty) and expertise (budgetary impact of bills, accounts of institutions which receive an appropriation).
The IF performs a quadruple role:
1.tProvides financial and budgeting support to accredited ministers and governments. The IF can issue recommendations to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of existing measures and to improve the functioning of public services. It may be responsible for inquiries in public or private subsidized institutions.
2. Exercises a supervisory jurisdiction on behalf of the Budget Minister or the Minister for the Civil Service.
3. Exercises an ex ante control on all major proposals for decisions with a budgetary impact, both on revenues and on spending.
4. Exercises direct supervisory authority over all the transactions planned by the authorising officers, with the exception of operations of low importance or of such a nature that their commitment gives no discretionary margin to the authorising officer.
The IF can exert a strong influence on decision making in financial and budgetary defence matters. It is not uncommon for the IF to give negative advice for certain expenses.
Note also that DoD has devoted internal control modules in all statutory training.
Members of Parliament and especially members of the Defence Committee regularly ask and obtain these reports under the legislation on the advertising of public acts and documents. There is nevertheless reason to believe that there is some influence exerted by the government.
La Libre Belgique reported in 2013 that there were shortcomings of the scrutiny mechanisms as between 2009 and 2012, 35 helicopters were sold to a company whose director was under investigation for corruption.
RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: Score of 3 maintained as there appears to be some influence exerted by the government.
COUNCIL DIRECTIVE (89/665/EEC) of December 21, 1989, &quoute;on the coordination of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the application of review procedures to the award of public supply and public works contracts&quoute;, OJ L 395, december 30, 1989, p. 33.
DIRECTIVE 2004/18/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of March 31, 2004 &quoute;on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts &quoute;, OJL, April 30, 2004.
DIRECTIVE 2007/66/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of December 11, 2007, amending Council Directives 89/665/EEC and 92/13/EEC &quoute;with regard to improving the effectiveness of review procedures concerning the award of public contracts&quoute; (Text with EEA relevance), Official Journal of the European Union, December 20, .2007.
BELGA, &quoute;L'armée va acquérir de nouveaux navires et de l'armement pour blindés et chasseurs&quoute;, Brussels, 081156 JUL 12.
La Dernière Heure, &quoute;490 millions pour équiper l'armée&quoute;, October 29, 2013.
Loi du 15 juin 2006, &quoute;relative aux marchés publics et à certains marchés de travaux, de fournitures et de services&quoute;.
Loi du 13 août 2011, &quoute;relative aux marchés publics et à certains marchés de travaux, de fournitures et de services dans les domaines de la défense et de la sécurité&quoute;.
Loi du 17 juin 2013, &quoute;relative à la motivation, à l'information et aux voies de recours en matière de marchés publics et de certains marchés de travaux, de fournitures et de services&quoute;.
Directive 2009/81/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of July 13, 2009, &quoute;on the coordination of procedures for the award of certain works contracts, supply contracts and service contracts by contracting authorities or entities in the fields of defence and security&quoute;, and amending Directives 2004/17/EC and 2004/18/EC (Text with EEA relevance), January 1st, 2014.
amending Directives 2004/17/EC and 2004/18/EC (Text with EEA relevance), January 1st, 2014.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Disagree
Comment: I think that the assessor described rather well the oversight procedures and I can only conclude that they are highly active. Sometimes we wish that we had a little less control because all these controls slow down the procurement and something bring us in trouble at the end of the budget year.
I already described the role of the Inspector of Finance and the Council of ministers. Of course there is the Court of Audit also and there is a specifiic budget control for every procurement bij the Department of Budget. We added own controls in our informationsystem and you can only get in the system if you have the right to sign contracts.
These controls exist for many years and are independent of the government.
Suggested score: 4
Are actual and potential defence purchases made public?
Researcher4165: Actual and potential defence purchases are listed online on the DoD's website.
In general, intentions of DOD to acquire equipment are reflected in the press at the time when they are discussed in Parliament (Defence Committee and Committee on Defence Procurement).
The request for tender is published at a national and/or a European level. Few exceptions are allowed (depending on European budgetary thresholds). There is one exception, when it comes to orders for SGRS (General Intelligence and Security Service of the Army), and this is for confidentiality reasons. MPs are provided with the audits. Most of them are also made public as abstracts or conclusions.
BELGA, &quoute;L'armée va acquérir de nouveaux navires et de l'armement pour blindés et chasseurs&quoute;, Brussels, 081156 JUL 12.
Loi du 17 juin 2013, &quoute;relative à la motivation, à l'information et aux voies de recours en matière de marchés publics et de certains marchés de travaux, de fournitures et de services&quoute;.
La Dernière Heure, &quoute;490 millions pour équiper l'armée&quoute;, octobre 29, 2013.
DoD, Actual and potential purchases, http://www.mil.be/fr/page/la-vente & http://www.mil.be/fr/ventes-en-cours, 2015.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Actual and potential defence purchases are listed on the DoD's website.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: There are similarities to question 58.
All procurements are made public, and more than one company is made aware as prescribed by European rules. Major items are controlled by Parliament. Publication does not take place a very long time in advance.
Internal and external controls have to be passed regardless of publication (see also question 59).
Suggested score:
What procedures and standards are companies required to have - such as compliance programmes and business conduct programmes - in order to be able to bid for work for the Ministry of Defence or armed forces?
Researcher4165: The Belgian legislation is compatible with existing EU legislation. Indeed, it transposed Directive 2009/81/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of July 13th, 2009. Any candidate or tenderer having been the object of a condemnation pronounced by a court order for participation in a criminal organization, corruption, fraud or money laundering, terrorist offenses or offenses linked to terrorist activities or instigation, help, participation or attempting to commit such offences, are disqualified from bidding.
During the bidding process, the government refers to the Belgian legislation, which includes the obligation to respect the very foundation of a healthy and fair competition, and thus for the bidders to avoid corruption.
Apart from these restrictions, no other prerequisites are provided as far as compliance programs or business conduct programs are concerned.
There is recent evidence though that this is not always applied in practice. La Libre Belgique reported in 2013 that there were shortcomings of the scrutiny mechanisms as between 2009 and 2012, 35 helicopters were sold to a company whose director was under investigation for corruption.
Directive 2009/81/CE du Parlement européen et du Conseil du 13 juillet 2009 &quoute;relative à la coordination des procédures de passation de certains marchés de travaux, de fournitures et de services par des pouvoirs adjudicateurs ou des entités adjudicatrices dans les domaines de la défense et de la sécurité&quoute;.
Loi du 5 août 2011 &quoute;modifiant l'article 80 de la loi du 15 juin 2006 relative aux marchés publics et à certains marchés de travaux, de fournitures et de services&quoute;.
Loi du 5 août 2011 &quoute;modifiant la Loi du 15 juin 2006 relative aux marchés publics et à certains marchés de travaux, de fournitures et de services&quoute;.
Loi du 13 août 2011 &quoute; relative aux marchés publics et à certains marchés de travaux, de fournitures et de services dans les domaines de la défense et de la sécurité, Chapitre 4, Section 2, article 20&quoute;.
&quoute;Des achats militaires pour une quarantaine de millions d'euros&quoute;, Dépêche BELGA 251504 JUL 13.
&quoute;Accord du gouvernement à des achats pour la Défense, qui peut lancer 4 autres programmes&quoute;, Dépêche BELGA 131544 SEP 13.
DH.be, L’armée belge ignore à qui elle revend ses armes, http://www.dhnet.be/actu/belgique/l-armee-belge-ignore-a-qui-elle-revend-ses-armes-51b73a2fe4b0de6db9762372, 2013
DH.be, Vente d'armes: De Crem prêt à une réflexion sur la procédure, http://www.dhnet.be/actu/belgique/vente-d-armes-de-crem-pret-a-une-reflexion-sur-la-procedure-51b73a01e4b0de6db9761ee9, 2013
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Based on the Royal Decree of 15th July 2011, a company can be excluded for differents forms of misconduct, provided there is formal prove by authorities or convictions in court.
They have to sign a code of conduct, but there is of course no guarantee that everything declared is truth. Everyone is treated as innocent until proven guilty.
There is an audit team that is allowed to control companies but only on cost and price, not on integrity or conduct.
Suggested score:
Are procurement requirements derived from an open, well-audited national defence and security strategy?
Researcher4165: In Belgium, the defence and security strategy is determined by the government, discussed and voted in Parliament. The most important non-technical aspects of this strategy are published in the press.
Procurement programs are the result of an internal debate in the DoD Staff and are based upon the PIDS, which is part of a five-year plan approved by government.
All major procurement programs are presented to Parliament (Defence Committee and Committee on Defence Procurement). These commissions can ask for an insight into the requirements and the procurement procedure(s). All programs have to respect the strategic view of Defence.
&quoute;Une première approche de la Chambre et de son règlement&quoute;, Chambre des Représentants, Service juridique, 54e législature, juin 2014.
Chambre des représentants de Belgique, Commission de la Défense nationale, &quoute;Compte rendu intégral&quoute;, CRIV 53 COM 968, Mercredi 02-04-2014.
&quoute;Déclaration de politique générale&quoute;, Gouvernement Di Rupo, 12 décembre 2011.
V. Moyse, A. Dumoulin, &quoute;Le processus décisionnel belge en matière d'opérations civilo-militaires&quoute;, Courrier hebdomadaire du CRISP, n° 2086-2087, Bruxelles, 2011.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: The Procurement Planning process relies on the strategic plan, operational objectives, defence structures, capability objectives and missions and tasks.
Source: European Defence Agency, 2014 https://www.eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/procurement-library/vademecum-of-pms-defence-procurement-practices-for-gateway.pdf
I could not find any reliable evidence of opportunistic purchases, or those made outside of the national strategy.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Every year, the Department of Defence publishes its policy and strategy through the yearly budget. This is discussed in the Parliamental Commission and published on the website of the Parliament.
For major equipment, on top of this, all individual purchases are presented to the Parliamentary Commissions and to the Council of Ministers. There should be no doubt that purchases are in line with the policy.
The score of 3 seems accurate as it is not possible to present every single purchase to parliament, so it is fair to say that they are 'largely' derived from the strategy.
On the contrary every purchase, even small bits and pieces, are checked by the Inspector of Finance. Although he is part of the Government, he only obeys the Minister of Budget and is viewed as impartial.
There was a possibility in the past to buy equipment outside the policy through FMS, but for over twenty years a Special Audit has been conducted by the Court of Audit for all FMS purchases.
Suggested score:
Are defence purchases based on clearly identified and quantified requirements?
Researcher4165: The defence and security strategy is determined by the government, discussed and voted on in Parliament and communicated to the press.
Procurement programs are the result of an internal debate in the DoD and are based on all requirements gathered in a document called PIDS (Plan d'investissements pour la Défense et la Sécurité - Investment Plan for Defence and Security). The PIDS is approved by government. The formulation of a specific need for military equipment is issued by a “material manager” who is responsible for the accuracy of the requirement regarding the specific “goods, services or works” to be procured. The DoD Staff submits it to the government.
For major equipment, a three-phase process is generally implemented.
The Preparation Phase involves a first exploration of the market; it is initiated by the MoD and corresponds to a RFI (Request for Information).After the government has collected the responses to the RFI, the Programming Phase starts by a Request for Proposal and/or a Request for Tender. Finally, the Acquisition Phase concerns the formal approval process for the choice of a supplier, as well as the size of the program, including the budgetary frame. Negotiations can begin after an initial approval by the Council of Ministers. At the conclusion of these negotiations, the definitive agreement is submitted for approval to the Council of Ministers.
Chambre des représentants de Belgique, Commission de la Défense nationale, &quoute;Compte rendu intégral&quoute;, CRIV 53 COM 968, Mercredi 02-04-2014.
&quoute;Déclaration de politique générale&quoute;, Gouvernement Di Rupo, 12 décembre 2011.
&quoute;Des achats militaires pour une quarantaine de millions d'euros&quoute;, Dépêche BELGA 251504 JUL 13.
&quoute;Accord du gouvernement à des achats pour la Défense, qui peut lancer 4 autres programmes&quoute;, Dépêche BELGA 131544 SEP 13.
PIDS, news, http://www.mil.be/fr/article/plan-dinvestissement-de-la-defence-pour-2013-2014, 2013.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: I agree that the purchase procedure in the Belgian defence is well defined and starts with a justified quantification of requirements.
The procedure is followed by the information system - you have to be authorised to log in. Every addition or change is tracked in the system.
All purchases are checked by the Inspector of Finance regarding their need and the procedures, and again by the Department of Budget for the budget coverage. It is not impossible but very difficult to influence a purchase.
See the previous question re FMS.
Suggested score:
Is defence procurement generally conducted as open competition or is there a significant element of single-sourcing (that is, without competition)?
Researcher4165: Nowadays, when DoD purchases standard non-military items, the procurement is conducted as open competition based on national law and European directives (the 2004/18/EC directive and the Law of June 15, 2006).
A restricted procedure (mandatory above EU thresholds) or a negotiated procedure with publication could be used in order to implement selection criteria prior to sending out the request for tender.
In application of both 2004/18 and 2009/81 European directives, the negotiated procedure without prior publication (e.g. single sourcing) is still subject to legal justification, which means that a legal basis is mandatory prior to using this procedure.
There is a longstanding exception to the open competition in the case of FMS (Foreign Military Sales). The FMS program of the US DoD facilitates sales of U.S. defence equipment military training to foreign governments and international organizations when the US President formally finds that to do so will strengthen the security of the U.S. and promote world peace. This program appears however not to be used when it comes to sales to Allies with developed economies.
Article 346, paragraph 1 of the TFEU is the exception to the general rule of open competition in the EU. Initially, the application of this Article was required for security reasons in the still hostile environment of the Cold War. But over time, the narrow national sovereignty concerns, and even more the protection of the national defence equipment became the leitmotifs. The EU member countries still try to take advantage of this article 346, paragraph 1 of the TFEU:
“1. The provisions of the Treaties shall not preclude the application of the following rules:
(a) No Member State shall be obliged to supply information the disclosure of which it considers contrary to the essential interests of its security;
(b) Any Member State may take such measures as it considers necessary for the protection of the essential interests of its security which are connected with the production of or trade in arms, munitions and war material; such measures shall not adversely affect the conditions of competition in the internal market regarding products which are not intended for specifically military purposes.”Consequently, a State cannot invoke any longer article 346 of the TFUE to demand obligations of industrial participation by only invocation of the necessity of protecting its essential security interests, with the intention of economic or industrial protectionism.&quoute;
The extent of the use of single sourcing is unclear. A 2006 study stated the Belgian government had said that &quoute;non-competitive defence procurement data did not exist&quoute;. According to the information supplied for the study, single sourcing accounted for 10.3% of the value of all contracts. The score has been selected on the basis that it is unclear whether this proportion has stayed consistent.
Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of March 31, 2004 &quoute;on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts &quoute;, OJL, April 30, 2004.
Loi du 15 juin 2006, &quoute;relative aux marchés publics et à certains marchés de travaux, de fournitures et de services&quoute;.
Loi du 13 août 2011, &quoute;relative aux marchés publics et à certains marchés de travaux, de fournitures et de services dans les domaines de la défense et de la sécurité&quoute;.
W. Struys, Defence Economies in Small and Medium-Sized Countries: Are Ares and Hermes Still Compatible?, Editorial in Journal of defence Studies & Resource Management, June 2012, 1:1.
&quoute; Le Pentagone notifie la possible vente de 40 missiles air-air Sidewinder à la Belgique&quoute;, Dépêche BELGA, 280920 SEP 13, http://www.dhnet.be/dernieres-depeches/belga/le-pentagone-notifie-la-possible-vente-de-missiles-air-air-sidewinder-a-la-belgique-52466eff35703eef3a091e10
Directive 2009/81/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of July 13, 2009, &quoute;on the coordination of procedures for the award of certain works contracts, supply contracts and service contracts by contracting authorities or entities in the fields of defence and security&quoute;, and amending Directives 2004/17/EC and 2004/18/EC (Text with EEA relevance), January 1st, 2014.
Pyman, Regina Wilson and Dominic Scott, &quoute;The Extent of Single Sourcing in Defence Procurement: A First Look, 1 June 2009&quoute;, https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/4421-pyman-m-wilson-r-scott-dthe-extent-of-single
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: See the previous questions.
The Belgian defence strictly applies EU regulations that have been translated into Belgian law. Open competition is the general rule.
We can only apply FMS if the Inspector of finance allows us to do so. Of course once you apply FMS, there is no competition any more but we have to argue first why we want to use this procedure.
Government to Government purchases are exempted from open competition in EU regulations, we apply the law.
The Belgian defence uses some important US weapon systems (e.g. aircraft) and we use the FMS for rather significant amounts yearly, but this does not lead to the procedure being abused.
Purchases through international organisations (such as EDA or NATO) are also exempt from open competition because these organisations apply their own rules. But again, first the Inspector of Finance has to approve the use of an international organisation and more, we have to prove this is better than private companies (for example because of the price or because of the collaboration with other nations).
Since the EU directive 2009/81/EC has been translated into Belgian law (since 2011) the Art 346 of TFEU has not been used any more. The government tasked a working group with analysing the use of Art 346 and the aim is to have a special law on the use of this article in the coming months.
Suggested score:
Are tender boards subject to regulations and codes of conduct and are their decisions subject to independent audit to ensure due process and fairness?
Researcher4165: In Belgium, all Federal Civil Servants are bound by a federal Code of Conduct. In addition, DoD established his own Code of Conduct for civilian and military personnel engaged in public procurement. This Code of Conduct is revised regularly.
Members of tender boards or technical evaluation teams have also to sign the Code of Conduct prior to taking up their duties. Personnel involved in the public procurement process are obliged to inform their hierarchy in case a possible conflict of interest could arise from their participation in the process.
DoD also and appointed some people in a support function for integrity. DoD has developed its own deontological code, established after extensive consultation with personnel and trade unions. DoD is also using internal control and/or internal audit to examine attacks to the integrity.
The most representative organisms are IAG Def and IAD. Evidence of their activity can be found online, as shown by regular reports on their functioning, for instance by CAAF (Audit committee of the federal administration).
The results of the audits are communicated to the Parliament.
The tender boards, together with the programmes and contracts are under the scrutiny of the Parliamentary Defence Committee and the Committee on Defence Procurement.
AR du 26 septembre 1994 &quoute;portant réforme de diverses dispositions réglementaires applicables aux agents de l'État&quoute;.
AR du 6 février 1997 relatif aux marchés publics de fournitures et de services auxquels s'applique l'article 3, § 3, de la loi du 24 décembre 1993 relative aux marchés publics et à certains marchés de travaux, de fournitures et de services.
AR du 6 décembre 2001, modifiant l'AR du 6 février 1997 &quoute;relatif aux marchés publics de fournitures et de services&quoute; auxquels s'applique l'article 3, §3, de la loi du 24 décembre 1993 &quoute;relative aux marchés publics et à certains marchés de travaux, de fournitures et de services.&quoute;
&quoute;Politique d'intégrité au sein du pouvoir fédéral&quoute;, CC, Rapport interne.
Circulaire du 21 juin 2010 &quoute;Marchés publics. - Déontologie. - Conflit d'intérêts. - Déclarations sur l'honneur&quoute;,
Loi du 13 août 2011 &quoute; relative aux marchés publics et à certains marchés de travaux, de fournitures et de services dans les domaines de la défense et de la sécurité&quoute;.
&quoute;Rapport au gouvernement sur le fonctionnement du système de contrôle interne dans l’administration fédérale&quoute;, Comité d’audit de l’administration fédérale, Juillet 2012.
&quoute;AR modifiant diverses dispositions relatives au statut des militaires&quoute;, 26 décembre 2013.
Circulaire du 5 mai 2014 &quoute;Marchés publics Conflits d'intérêts - Mécanisme du tourniquet (`revolving doors'), Chancellerie du Premier Ministre et service public fédéral budget et contrôle de la gestion.
CAAF, http://www.comitedaudit.belgium.be/fr, accessed May 2015
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: The Audit Committee of the Federal Administration (ACFA) is an advisory body to the federal Government. It offers advice and recommendations to the Council of Ministers about the general operations of the federal public services.The rights, obligations, cooperation with other inspection bodies and the operation of the Audit Committee are determined by legislation, the charter, internal regulations and cooperation protocols.
Source: http://www.comitedaudit.belgium.be/en/regulations
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: I agree with the score but not with the intervention of IAD or AIG. Those audit bodies never audit tender boards.
As I said before, we have a special Royal Decree of 16 November 1994 for the control of expenditures. We don't call it purchase audit but purchase control and it's surely efficient. Every purchase is controlled two times, once before starting (on identifying the need and the procedure) and once on the choice of the provider. Depending on the amount the control can go up to the Council of Ministers. The decisions of the Council of Ministers are made public to a certain degree. All other choices of tender boards remain secret except if a company goes to court. At that moment we have to prove why we chose the company for the purchase.
As per previous questions the code of conduct is only available and published on the internal website of the Departmend of Defence, but it is based on rules that are published by the government.
Suggested score:
Does the country have legislation in place to discourage and punish collusion between bidders for defence and security contracts?
Researcher4165: In accordance with international law, Belgium took measures to prevent corruption involving the private sector and, in particular, to avoid a &quoute;revolving doors&quoute; situation leading to conflict of interests in the context of a procurement procedure or the execution of a public contract of the contracting authority. The recent regulation preventing “revolving doors” setups also strictly prohibits collusion or any agreement between different bidders for the same contract.
Belgian law prevents any conflicts of interests by imposing a two-year period in the course of which a former civil servant may not, after his resignation or his/her retirement, exercise new activities in the private sector where such activities are directly related to the functions exercised by the civil servant officials when s/he was in office.
A standard clause is inserted in the contracting documents in order to sensitise firms about the revolving doors mechanism and its possible consequences regarding public procurement contracts in which they wish to participate. It is brought to the attention of firms via the websites of the competent federal government services in public procurement and integrity checking. Dissuasive sanctions for non-compliance with those measures are planned.
Circulaire du 21 juin 2010 &quoute;Marchés publics. - Déontologie. - Conflit d'intérêts. - Déclarations sur l'honneur&quoute;, Service public fédéral Budget et Contrôle de la Gestion et Chancellerie du Premier Ministre.
Circulaire du 5 mai 2014 &quoute;Marchés publics Conflits d'intérêts - Mécanisme du tourniquet (`revolving doors'), Chancellerie du Premier Ministre et service public fédéral budget et contrôle de la gestion.
Loi du 8 mai 2007, &quoute;portant assentiment à la Convention des Nations unies contre la corruption&quoute;, faite à New York le 31 octobre 2003, article 12.
Public Procurement, Homepage, www.16procurement.be, www.public.procurement.be, accessed on August 21, 2014.
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: In the private sector, the case of the Regie der Gebouwen (http://www.tijd.be/politiek_economie/belgie_federaal/Straffen_met_uitstel_in_proces_Regie_der_Gebouwen.9618344-3136.art,) suggests that collusion does occur. In this case no sanctions were applied to the contractors who had been involved.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: I could not find reliable evidence on colluding companies in defence/public procurement.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: The revolving doors principle is valid for all public procurement, not only for defence.
To my opinion, collusion is broader. Based on European directives, Belgium applies rules against collusion and companies that do not respect competition can be brought to court. Competition is one of the basic principles of the EU public procurement directives.
The Department of Economy has a special full-time council trying to find offences against free competition. Punishments are high and are followed up by Justice. Collusion in general is frequently seen for works and infrastructure, less for services and goods. During the last few years it happened more on the regional and the local rather then the federal level. Defence has noticed any collusion cases in the last few years.
Suggested score:
Are procurement staff, in particular project and contract managers, specifically trained and empowered to ensure that defence contractors meet their obligations on reporting and delivery?
Researcher4165: In the DoD, having already acquired a basic university degree, leading officers responsible for projects and procurement contracts can follow postgraduate university studies leading to a Master of Arts in Public and Military Administration. Legally, leading officers are not required to have the latter university degrees, but the general policy in DoD is to put officers with these degrees in charge of projects and contracts. Their training focuses on Budget and finances, public accounting, Public contracts, Public management, Material resources and decision making techniques.
Other responsible officers and non-commissioned officers take a Contract Manager Course in order to prepare them for the entire procurement process.
In addition, the entire procurement staff regularly follows seminars on the evolution of all legal aspects of their function.
As mentioned by the Government Reviewer, an MPMA took place in 2015-2016.
Response to Government Reviewer: There is no clear evidence that staffing and resources are not an issue to award score 4.
Royal Military Academy, Master ès arts in Public and Military Administration (MPMA), http://www.rma.ac.be/en/rma-bam.html
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: The Belgian defence is investing substantially into training the personnel of its Procurement Division.
Apart from the MPMA we organise a course twice a year for warrant-officers and lower ranked officers to train and to refresh their knowledge of public procurement legislation.
The MPMA is organised every 2 years, for more than 60 years now. I was a cadet for the MPMA in 1990 and I used to teach budget and finance legislation for some years. For every course there is a theoretical part and a practical part with real life examples. For the MPMA you have to pass an exam in order to graduate.
Suggested score: 4
Are there mechanisms in place to allow companies to complain about perceived malpractice in procurement, and are companies protected from discrimination when they use these mechanisms?
Researcher4165: Legal provisions ensure that in all circumstances, firms are protected from any form of discrimination. In this domain, Belgian legislation is much stricter than in most other countries, according to the interviewee.
Complaints can be filed within DoD either to the Procurement Division itself, to the Legal Department or the Complaints Manage or to the Minister himself.
In addition, in all occasions, a firm that feels disadvantaged can initiate a procedure and challenge any administrative decision before the Council of State, which can suspend or annul all decisions.
&quoute;AR portant création du Comité d'audit de l'Administration fédérale (CAAF)&quoute;, August 17, 2007.
&quoute;AR relatif aux activités d'audit interne dans certains services du pouvoir exécutif fédéral&quoute;, August 17, 2007.
Internal prescription CHOD Nr200505957, October 20, 2005.
Le Conseil d'Etat, http://www.raadvst-consetat.be/?page=about&lang=en, accessed July 2, 2014.
Interview 5, Senior Auditor, July 3, July 8, July 17 and July 19, 2014
http://www.mil.be/fr/page/comment-introduire-une-plainte-0
http://economie.fgov.be/fr/litiges/plaintes/Ou_comment_introduire_plainte/
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Please add the following sources:
http://www.mil.be/fr/page/comment-introduire-une-plainte-0
http://economie.fgov.be/fr/litiges/plaintes/Ou_comment_introduire_plainte/
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: I could not find any evidence of companies attempting to file a complaint but being treated unfairly and denied justice.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Internal complains are possible of course, but they are of limited value.
For external complains there is the State Court, but this court only judges formal aspects of the procedure - this means the correct use of the legislation and the procedures.
The same kind of complains are possible with the European Court of Justice, only on the application on the law.
For corruption or fraud, there are regular courts.
The cost to call on the State Court is very low, and more and more companies make complains if they loose a bid.
Suggested score:
What sanctions are used to punish the corrupt activities of a supplier?
Researcher4165: Corruption is one of the exclusion criteria for public procurement contracts.
Belgian law prevents any conflicts of interests by imposing a two-year period in the course of which a former civil servant may not, after his resignation or his retirement, exercise new activities in the private sector where such activities are directly related to the functions exercised by the civil servant officials when he was in office. A standard clause is inserted in the contracting documents in order to sensitize firms about the revolving doors mechanism and its possible consequences regarding the public procurement contracts in which they wish to participate. Dissuasive sanctions for non-compliance with those measures are planned.
The recent regulation preventing “revolving doors” setups does also strictly prohibit collusion or any Agreement between different bidders for the same contract.
In the past, the so-called &quoute;Agusta-Dassault&quoute; case of the contract signed on June 7, 1989, by Belgium with the firm ESD (Electronics Serge Dassault) to equip the F-16 Air Force with 135 electronic countermeasures systems and their support (Carapace) revealed that Dassault reportedly paid 30 million BEF (744.000 EUR) in bribes to ministers, high dignitaries and senior officials and two political parties in Luxembourg secret accounts.
A criminal trial was handled by the Court of Cassation. The French industrialist Serge Dassault, CEO of the Dassault Group, implicated personally in this case, received a two year probationary sentence for bribery.
In the army, however, there are more recent cases. Significant frauds were committed within the Belgian Army between 1996 and 2005. After a hundred searches conducted in March 2004 by federal and regional prosecutors of Brussels, suspicions of fraud were formulated against the Ministry of Defence and the army.
Thirty-one persons, military and private contractors, were accused of forgery, use of forgery, misappropriations of funds and embezzlement to the detriment of the Belgian army. The fraud was estimated at more than 15 million euros. The Court of appeal finally sentenced fifteen people, military and contractors. Two officers considered being the instigators of fraud and embezzlement underwent a 5 years suspended sentence and a 55,000 euro fine. They were also displaced of their military ranks.
Six private contractors also underwent a 5 years suspended sentence, heavy fines and have also been confiscated large amounts. The confiscations totalled 7,618,425.67 Euros.
&quoute;&quoute;Comment l'affaire Agusta-Dassault a fait chuter Guy Spitaels et Co&quoute;, Archives de La Libre Belgique, 2003.
&quoute;Le Colonel Dewinne lance ses missiles sur Dassault&quoute;, Le Soir, 29-30 novembre 1997.
&quoute;Mai 1989 : La saga des 30 millions de Dassault selon Merry Hermanus&quoute;, Le Soir, 28 janvier 1997, p. 4.
&quoute;Loi du 10 avril 2003 réglant la suppression des juridictions militaires en temps de paix (ainsi que leur maintien en temps de guerre)&quoute;, Moniteur Belge, May 7, 2003.
&quoute;Appel Bruxelles: 7 millions d'euros confisqués au profit de l'Etat&quoute;, Dépêche BELGA, November 20, 2013.
&quoute;Code pénal&quoute;, 8 juin 1867, dernière version, July 9, 2014
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: I agree with the score. The Royal decree of 15 July 2011 (Art 61) gives the possibility to exclude bidders for different reasons like fraud, collusion, laundery of money, child working, social and fiscal fraude, etc.
Based on Art. 62 of the same RD they can even be excluded when the contract is ongoing already.
Especially for infrastructure works, based on the Royal Decree of 20 March 1991, the bidders have to be recognised officially by the government before they are authorised to bid for a public procurement.
Recognition can be refused for the same range of misconducts als mentionned in the Art 61 of the RD of 2011.
Suggested score:
When negotiating offset contracts, does the government specifically address corruption risk by imposing due diligence requirements on contractors? Does the government follow up on offset contract performance and perform audits to check performance and integrity?
Researcher4165: In Belgium it is not DoD but the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MAE) which is responsible for all aspects of the application of the offsets system, including negotiation, control and follow-up, including and especially for defence procurement.
Officially, offsets play only a secondary role in the awarding of contracts. Indeed, in principle, Belgium does not require offsets in an offer. It is only when the MAE is offered conditions with a comparable economic interest (when the price difference is less than 10%), and that at the same time DoD does not express a strong preference, that offsets can or will intervene in the decision process.
The Government then evaluates the offer by granting to the offsets criterion a weighted value of maximum 15% of the total market criteria.
There are contractual penalties for any breach by the contractor of the commitments in terms of offsets; they come at least to 10 % of the unrealized amount of offsets.
The CC is responsible for the control and performs each year a general audit. It conducts longer-term in depth audits, assessing the relevance, the regularity and the appropriateness of the offsets system.
Response to Government Reviewer: Offsets contracts do exist in Belgium. This is verified by media reports and a 2014 study by Martin Trybus which clearly states that Belgium has a policy for asking for offsets. Score maintained.
Loi du 14 juillet 1976, &quoute;relative aux marchés publics de travaux, de fournitures et de services&quoute;.
Loi du 24 décembre 1993, &quoute;relative aux marchés publics et à certains marchés de travaux, de fourniture et de services&quoute;.
AR du 6 février 1997 &quoute;relatif aux marchés publics de fournitures et de services auxquels s'applique l'article 3, § 3, de la loi du 24 décembre 1993 &quoute;relative aux marchés publics et à certains marchés de travaux, de fournitures et de services.&quoute;
AR du 6 décembre 2001, modifiant l'AR du 6 février 1997 &quoute;relatif aux marchés publics de fournitures et de services&quoute; auxquels s'applique l'article 3, §3, de la loi du 24 décembre 1993 &quoute;relative aux marchés publics et à certains marchés de travaux, de fournitures et de services.&quoute;
Jean-Paul MOERMAN, &quoute;Compensations économiques dans le cadre des achats militaires&quoute;, Rapport fait au nom de la Commission des Achats militaires, Chambre des représentants de Belgique, doc 50 1344/001, 8 juillet 2001.
&quoute;L'exécution de compensations économiques liées à l'achat de matériel militaire spécifique&quoute;, Rapport de la Cour des Comptes transmis à la Chambre des Représentants, Rapport adopté le 23 mars 2005.
W. Struys, &quoute;Pros and Cons of Offsets in a Small Country&quoute;, Communication at the Seminar “Obrambna Industrija v Evropski Uniji – Izzivi in Priložnosti za Slovenijo”, Gornja Radgona, September 21, 2006.
Policy on industrial participation in defence contracts. March 2008. FPS Ecoonmy.
http://economie.fgov.be/en/binaries/industrial_compensations_en_tcm327-58443.pdf
Press Release, European Commission, New Directive on Defence and Security Procurement Enters into Force (Aug. 25, 2009); http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-09-1250_en.htm?locale=en
Directive 2009/81, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on the
Coordination of Procedures for the Award of Certain Works Contracts, Supply Contracts, and Service Contracts by Contracting Authorities or Entities in the Fields of Defence and Security, and Amending Directives 2004/17/EC and 2004/18/EC, 2009 O.J. (L 216) 76.
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:32009L0081
European Geostrategy, &quoute;Belgium’s F-16 fighter-jet replacement,&quoute; 30th August 2014, http://www.europeangeostrategy.org/2014/08/belgiums-f-16-fighter-jet-replacement/
Martin Trybus, “Buying Defence and Security in Europe: The EU Defence and Security Procurement Directive in Context,” October 2014.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: It is important to consider that there is no international standard for how offsets work. Even the European defence Procurement Directive left the option open for member European nations to require offsets and countertrade in defence procurements, if those procurements “are so sensitive that even the new rules cannot satisfy their security needs” (press release, Aug. 25, 2009).
Sources:
Policy on industrial participation in defence contracts. March 2008. FPS Ecoonmy.
http://economie.fgov.be/en/binaries/industrial_compensations_en_tcm327-58443.pdf
Press Release, European Commission, New Directive on Defence and Security Procurement Enters into Force (Aug. 25, 2009); http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-09-1250_en.htm?locale=en
Directive 2009/81, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on the
Coordination of Procedures for the Award of Certain Works Contracts, Supply Contracts, and Service Contracts by Contracting Authorities or Entities in the Fields of Defence and Security, and Amending Directives 2004/17/EC and 2004/18/EC, 2009 O.J. (L 216) 76.
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:32009L0081
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: As per formal policy and procedures, should they require the production of certificates drawn up by independent bodies attesting the compliance of the economic operator with certain quality assurance standards, contracting authorities shall refer to quality assurance systems based on the relevant European standards series certified by bodies conforming to the European standards series concerning certification.
A supplier needs to be in conformance with two major dispositions determined in Article 60 in the Royal Decree dated January 23rd, 2012 related to the actual contract award procedures for public procurement
(works, supplies and services) in the defence and security domain. These dispositions are related to
the access to the public procurement procedure (Art 63 to 68 in this Royal Decree) and the
qualitative selection criteria of a financial, economic or technical nature or related to the
professional capability of the supplier (Art 69 to 84 in this Royal Decree).
Source: https://www.eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/procurement-library/vademecum-of-pms-defence-procurement-practices-for-gateway.pdf
There is no specific evidence that integrity is part of this procedure.
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Opinion: Disagree
Comment: I would prefer not to score this question.
Competition is a basic principle of the EU public procurement directives. Offsets are extremely limited, mainly forbidden and only in extremely limited circumstances can they play a role in chosing the contractor. Where it does happen it is impossible for the government to control or to regulate actions that should normally be avoided.
The legislation accepts that the government imposes onto the contractor to subcontract certain parts of the contract. Because the EU wants no national limitations in public procurement, we cannot benefit national subcontractors exclusively. These subcontractors, if there are any, are not controlled and they can be from anyone country. I do not think that we have statistics on subcontractors and their behaviour.
Suggested score: N/A
Does the government make public the details of offset programmes, contracts, and performance?
Researcher4165: Evidence indicates that for many years, offsets have been conducted with little transparency.
The EU member countries are indeed still able to take advantage of article 346 of the TFEU.
As a consequence, the European Commission reprimanded Belgium considering that it repeatedly justified its requests for offsets with arguments primarily based on the expected general economic benefits. Deviations from EU law, on the basis of article 346, are unacceptable on this basis.
The most important problem lies in the lack of communication and transparency even on the nature, choice, distribution and control of the offsets, as well as on imposed sanctions for non-compliance.
The public only gets some information on the overall amounts corresponding to the offsets and never on their distribution. Even in other MAE departments, this information does not circulate. The government does not make public copies of the contracts themselves and of planned offsets contracts to enable public and civil society comment before contract award.
Response to Government Reviewer: Offsets contracts do exist in Belgium. This is verified by media reports and a 2014 study by Martin Trybus which clearly states that Belgium has a policy for asking for offsets.
Loi du 14 juillet 1976, &quoute;relative aux marchés publics de travaux, de fournitures et de services&quoute;.
Loi du 24 décembre 1993, &quoute;relative aux marchés publics et à certains marchés de travaux, de fourniture et de services&quoute;.
AR du 6 février 1997 &quoute;relatif aux marchés publics de fournitures et de services auxquels s'applique l'article 3, § 3, de la loi du 24 décembre 1993 &quoute;relative aux marchés publics et à certains marchés de travaux, de fournitures et de services.&quoute;
Article 346 (previously Art.223 and 296 (Consolidated version of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community in force (and renamed) as of 1 December 2009, as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon (2007) and all preceding treaties).
W. Struys, &quoute;Stop aux compensations économiques ?”, Carte blanche, Le Soir, Bruxelles, le 3 avril 2001.
W. Struys, &quoute;Les compensations économiques en Belgique : passé et avenir&quoute;, École royale militaire, Département Économie et Gestion, Brussels, March 25, 2001.
W. Struys, &quoute;Country Survey XV : Defence Policy and Spending in Belgium”, in “Defence and Peace Economics”, Vol. 13 Nr 1, February 2002, pp. 31-53.
W. Struys, &quoute;Offsets in small countries: between Scylla and Charybdis?”, in J.Brauer and P. Dunne “Arms Trade Offsets: Theory, Policy, and Cases in arms trade offsets”, Routledge, New York, 2004.
NATO Conference on &quoute;Implications of offsets practices in defence procurement in the context of transatlantic relations&quoute;, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, April 26, 2005, Report ED/EC(2005)0012 of May 13, 2005, pages 1-1, 1-3, 1-5 and 1-7.
Article 346, Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, C 326/50, 26.10.2012.
V. Randazzo &quoute;Article 346 and the qualified application of EU law to defence&quoute;, EUISS, July 2014, p. 4.
European Geostrategy, &quoute;Belgium’s F-16 fighter-jet replacement,&quoute; 30th August 2014, http://www.europeangeostrategy.org/2014/08/belgiums-f-16-fighter-jet-replacement/
Martin Trybus, “Buying Defence and Security in Europe: The EU Defence and Security Procurement Directive in Context,” October 2014.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: I refer to the previous question. Offsets for national reasons are forbidden by the EU directives, except when applying Art 346 of the EUTreaty.
Since 2009 the use of Art 346 has been limited by a EU directive and has not been used in Belgium since.
There is no publicity on offsets because they are very limited or even forbidden.
Suggested score:
Are offset contracts subject to the same level of competition regulation as the main contract?
Researcher4165: Officially and theoretically, the answer is positive, since offsets are based on the same AR. But the practice may differ.
When offsets are required, they are part of the global package managed by the Government through the Ministry of Economic Affairs. They are awarded to companies in competitive tenders that have made an offer in the context of a Request for Tender and having been appointed by the government.
The choice whether to impose offsets or not, clearly has far reaching implications on macroeconomics, labour markets, Defence procurement, technological and Defence industrial policies.
As a tool offered by Government to Business, offsets can be used to shape a domestic defence market; therefore, offsets are not a neutral tool, which explains why they are considered with mixed reactions.
Response to Government Reviewer: Offsets contracts do exist in Belgium. This is verified by media reports and a 2014 study by Martin Trybus which clearly states that Belgium has a policy for asking for offsets.
AR du 6 février 1997 &quoute;relatif aux marchés publics de fournitures et de services auxquels s'applique l'article 3, § 3, de la loi du 24 décembre 1993 &quoute;relative aux marchés publics et à certains marchés de travaux, de fournitures et de services.&quoute;
Article 346 (previously Art.223 and 296 (Consolidated version of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community in force (and renamed) as of 1 December 2009, as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon (2007) and all preceding treaties).
Nackman, M. J. (2011). A critical examination of offsets in international defence procurements: policy options for the United States. Public Contract Law Journal, (2). 511.
Ben Magahy et al., Transparency Int’l-UK, Defence Offsets: Addressing the Risks of Corruption & Raising Transparency, http://old.acrc.org.ua/file_collection/TI_Defence_Offset_Report_20101.pdf
Policy on industrial participation in defence contracts. March 2008. FPS Ecoonmy.
http://economie.fgov.be/en/binaries/industrial_compensations_en_tcm327-58443.pdf
6 FEVRIER 1997. - Arrêté royal relatif aux marchés publics de fournitures et de services auxquels s'applique l'article 3, § 3, de la loi du 24 décembre 1993 relative aux marchés publics et à certains marchés de travaux, de fournitures et de services.
(NOTE : Consultation des versions antérieures à partir du 25-02-1997 et mise à jour au 20-12-2001).
http://www.ejustice.just.fgov.be/cgi_loi/loi_a.pl?language=fr&caller=list&cn=1997020634&la=f&fromtab=loi&sql=dt=%27arrete%20royal%27&tri=dd+as+rank&rech=1&numero=1.
European Geostrategy, &quoute;Belgium’s F-16 fighter-jet replacement,&quoute; 30th August 2014, http://www.europeangeostrategy.org/2014/08/belgiums-f-16-fighter-jet-replacement/
Martin Trybus, “Buying Defence and Security in Europe: The EU Defence and Security Procurement Directive in Context,” October 2014.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Supporting the Criteria, the Royal Decree of 6 Feb 1997, modified by the RD 6 Dec 2001, specifies how article 3, § 3 of the law dated 24 Dec 1993 is to be applied and establishes certain rules to be followed for the procurement of military equipment covered by Art 296 of the Treaty establishing the European Community. The provisions of this Decree are based on the work of the Parliamentary Investigation Commission on military procurements. This Commission recommended in particular more transparency in the criteria and procedures for awarding contracts.
Please add references:
Nackman, M. J. (2011). A critical examination of offsets in international defence procurements: policy options for the United States. Public Contract Law Journal, (2). 511.
Ben Magahy et al., Transparency Int’l-UK, Defence Offsets: Addressing the Risks of Corruption & Raising Transparency
http://old.acrc.org.ua/file_collection/TI_Defence_Offset_Report_20101.pdf
Policy on industrial participation in defence contracts. March 2008. FPS Ecoonmy.
http://economie.fgov.be/en/binaries/industrial_compensations_en_tcm327-58443.pdf
6 FEVRIER 1997. - Arrêté royal relatif aux marchés publics de fournitures et de services auxquels s'applique l'article 3, § 3, de la loi du 24 décembre 1993 relative aux marchés publics et à certains marchés de travaux, de fournitures et de services.
(NOTE : Consultation des versions antérieures à partir du 25-02-1997 et mise à jour au 20-12-2001).
http://www.ejustice.just.fgov.be/cgi_loi/loi_a.pl?language=fr&caller=list&cn=1997020634&la=f&fromtab=loi&sql=dt=%27arrete%20royal%27&tri=dd+as+rank&rech=1&numero=1
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Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: I could not find evidence that the degree of competition regulation of offset contracts is strongly less stringent.
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Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: I can agree with the assessor if 'offset' means 'subcontracting'. If we use the word offset in Belgium, it means domestic or national subcontracting, which is in principle not allowed in an open european competition (except when applying Art 346 of the EU Treaty, see question 70 and 71).
Subcontractors should follow the same rules as basic contractors but this is not controlled. We do not have statistics on this.
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How strongly does the government control the company's use of agents and intermediaries in the procurement cycle?
Researcher4165: The DoD pays particular attention to the risks existing in the field of public procurement and of financial management and has taken various management measures in this regard. The European directives in defence have been transposed into Belgian law, making companies responsible in case of any use of intermediaries.
DoD considers, however, that in some cases, for example when firms are not used to DoD or public procurement procedures, agents or intermediaries can be helpful. In this case, the latter must obtain an authorisation in order to assist the contractor.
Intermediaries or agents used in the procurement cycle have responsibilities with regard to their customers, the companies. In the cases where problems arise, it is the latter who would be would be the subject of an investigation.
AR du 6 février 1997 relatif aux marchés publics de fournitures et de services auxquels s'applique l'article 3, § 3, de la loi du 24 décembre 19963 relative aux marchés publics et à certains marchés de travaux, de fournitures et de services.
AR du 6 décembre 2001, modifiant l'AR du 6 février 1997.
AG CC (CONFIDENTIEL) 28 juillet, 2004.
Loi du 15 juin 2006 relative aux marchés publics et à certains marchés de travaux, de fournitures et de services.
AR du 23 janvier 2012 relatif à la passation des marchés publics et de certains marchés de travaux, de fournitures et de services dans les domaines de la défense et de la sécurité.
Circulaire du 5 mai 2014 &quoute;Marchés publics Conflits d'intérêts - Mécanisme du tourniquet (`revolving doors'),
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Indeed the control or oversight on agents and intermediates is weak. As the EU and Belgian legislation is complex, companies can ask for help from specialised agencies. This is not a problem, they can even assist in the deal.
I am not aware of any kind of recognition for agencies that provide information - if you are not good, you are probably likely to loose your clients.
Some agencies have a very good reputation, we know them and sometimes use them ourselves to clarify the law on difficult discussions.
One problem is when those agents become lobbyists. Based on the code of conduct, we have to differentiate between helping and trying to influence.
This is not strongly regulated, I agree with a score of 2.
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Are the principal aspects of the financing package surrounding major arms deals, (such as payment timelines, interest rates, commercial loans or export credit agreements) made publicly available prior to the signing of contracts?
Researcher4165: Any firm interested in participating in a public procurement contract has the possibility to consult European directives and the Belgian legislation.
In May 2014, an AR was issued: in order to better reflect the terms of payment set out in the directive 2011/7/EU and establishing the general terms of contract execution. This information is publicly available and allows companies to position themselves in relation to the needs and requirements of the contract in order to compete in knowledge of the facts.
Each firm is thus in a position to be completely aware of all terms and conditions set out in Belgian procurement legislation relating to all commercial and management issues.
AR January 14th, 2013.
Directive 2011/7/EU of the European parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 &quoute;on combating late payment in commercial transactions&quoute;, February 23, 2011, Official Journal of the European Union.
Directive 2009/81/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of July 13, 2009, &quoute;on the coordination of procedures for the award of certain works contracts, supply contracts and service contracts by contracting authorities or entities in the fields of defence and security&quoute;, and amending Directives 2004/17/EC and 2004/18/EC (Text with EEA relevance), January 1st, 2014.
AR du 22 mai 2014, &quoute;modifiant l'AR du 14 janvier 2013 établissant les règles générales d'exécution des marchés publics et des concessions de travaux publics.&quoute;, http://www.ejustice.just.fgov.be/doc/rech_f.htm, accessed on 20 February 2015.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: The legislation on public procurement is public, like all Belgian laws. All companies interested in bidding for a market can find it easily. This does not mean that the laws and procedures are easy to understand, but this is also the same for most laws. Specialised agencies exist to help potential bidders find their way in EU and Belgian law on public procurement.
The purchase of major equipment is discussed is the Parliamental Commission and these discussions are open to public or you can find easily the reports on the discussions on the website of the Parliament. The amount of the proposed purchase and the timelines of payment are part of the requirement.
The Department of Defence only provides information on its proper aspects of the purchase like cost, delivery, numbers, productspecifications, etc. There is no information provided on interest rates, commercial loans, export credit agreements or other similar aspects. Potential bidders have to contact the Department of Economy on these or their federations, banks or other public information on economic aspects.
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Does the government formally require that the main contractor ensures subsidiaries and sub-contractors adopt anti-corruption programmes, and is there evidence that this is enforced?
Researcher4165: Only prime contractors are controlled by the CA, who expects obligations to flow down to its subsidiaries and subcontractors. Confidential sources explained that efforts are being made to open up the supply chain and to impose on main contractors to put their subcontracts into competition. This would enable the main contractor to include the same exclusion criteria among others based on corruption and fraud. There are no public sources available to confirm this.
AR du 6 février 1997 &quoute;relatif aux marchés publics de fournitures et de services auxquels s'applique l'article 3, § 3, de la loi du 24 décembre 1993 &quoute;relative aux marchés publics et à certains marchés de travaux, de fournitures et de services.&quoute;
AR du 6 décembre 2001, modifiant l'AR du 6 février 1997 &quoute;relatif aux marchés publics de fournitures et de services&quoute; auxquels s'applique l'article 3, §3, de la loi du 24 décembre 1993 &quoute;relative aux marchés publics et à certains marchés de travaux, de fournitures et de services.&quoute;
AR du 22 mai 2014, &quoute;modifiant l'AR du 14 janvier 2013 établissant les règles générales d'exécution des marchés publics et des concessions de travaux publics.
RTBF, 2011, Libye: des armes FN d'Herstal à Benghazi, Rudy Demotte réagit, http://www.rtbf.be/info/belgique/detail_libye-des-armes-fn-d-herstal-a-benghazi-rudy-demotte-reagit?id=5657813
DH.be, L’armée belge ignore à qui elle revend ses armes, http://www.dhnet.be/actu/belgique/l-armee-belge-ignore-a-qui-elle-revend-ses-armes-51b73a2fe4b0de6db9762372, 2013
DH.be, Vente d'armes: De Crem prêt à une réflexion sur la procédure, http://www.dhnet.be/actu/belgique/vente-d-armes-de-crem-pret-a-une-reflexion-sur-la-procedure-51b73a01e4b0de6db9761ee9, 2013
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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How common is it for defence acquisition decisions to be based on political influence by selling nations?
Researcher4165: The basis for Belgian Defence Procurement is set out in the legal articles described above.
Since the acquisition process is subject to external checks (IF, Parliamentary Commission of Defence and Commission on Defence Procurement), political influence in the process is theoretically of no avail.
In practice, in the case of contracts for major weapon systems, there is evidence from the past of political influence. SIPRI most recent 2012 report mentions military equipment imports from European countries.
AR du 6 février 1997 relatif aux marchés publics de fournitures et de services auxquels s'applique l'article 3, § 3, de la loi du 24 décembre 19963 relative aux marchés publics et à certains marchés de travaux, de fournitures et de services.
AR du 6 décembre 2001, modifiant l'AR du 6 février 1997.
AG CC (CONFIDENTIEL) 28 juillet, 2004.
Loi du 15 juin 2006 relative aux marchés publics et à certains marchés de travaux, de fournitures et de services.
AR du 23 janvier 2012 relatif à la passation des marchés publics et de certains marchés de travaux, de fournitures et de services dans les domaines de la défense et de la sécurité.
SIPRI, Belgium, 2012, http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/transfers/transparency/national_reports/belgium/Belgium_2011%20Part%201.pdf
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
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Researcher4165: In Belgium, the DoD is controlled by the Parliament. Belgium is a parliamentary democracy with two independent legislative assemblies: the CR, Chambre des Représentants (Chamber of Representatives) and the Senate, guarantor of the quality of legislation.
The sixth State reform of 2014 amended the bicameralism and assigned new tasks to a completely transformed Senate, now a non-permanent assembly.
The CR has sole authority for most legislative matters as a &quoute;Government making power&quoute; (article 101 of the Constitution), including defence issues. In this respect, the CR controls the federal government. It alone can bring the government or a minister to order and, if necessary, withdraw its confidence in the government. Belgium's Defence policy, subordinate to the foreign policy, is voted, controlled, and amended if necessary by the CR.
The CR monitors the public finances of the federal state. It exercises budgetary power, it can review and veto budgets (article 74 of the Constitution). It can also request the Court of Audit's assistance in the execution of its control mission of public spending. The CR approved the 2015 budget in December 2014.
The CR reviews major defence related questions regularly, through the questioning process. The questioning process is a means of control available to the CR members, who develop hundreds of questionings every year, during which they also raise approximately 1.500 oral and 2.300 and written questions. They can set up Commissions of Inquiry; the recommendations of such committees may create legislative initiatives (see source on the role of secret services). Debates from 2014 on the military are included in the sources.