- A
- B
- C
- D
- E
- F
Germany’s GI ranking in Band B places it in the low risk category for corruption in the defence and security sector. Germany performs well overall, yet there are shortcomings that would be very much in Germany’s interest to address. Germany is graded in Band A across three risk areas: Political, Finance, and Personnel, Band B for Procurement, and in Band D for Operations. With 3,000 troops deployed at the moment, Germany should want to properly constitute itself as a responsible power and approach operations risks accordingly. In other areas there is good defence anti-corruption practice that Germany could chose to share with G20 states, for example if it is confirmed to host the G20 summit in 2017.
Adopting a strategic approach to corruption risks on operations
The Bundeswehr has no specific operational doctrine that focuses on corruption, although the latest Weissbuch and Defence Policy Guidelines mention corruption risks indirectly. It seems that while the Bundeswehr is aware of corruption risks in theatre, for example in Afghanistan, it might consider taking an active stance against corruption as too risky. We recommend that the Bundeswehr introduces specific anti-corruption doctrine, which could facilitate useful corruption risk analysis even where Germany is not a lead nation. While commanders are trained on corruption issues more broadly in line with the relevant “Federal Government Directive” (which also covers activities abroad), Germany would benefit from specific anti-corruption pre-deployment training that is not just limited to a small number of personnel.
Regulating the use of Private Military Companies
There are legal restrictions limiting the use of Private Military and Security Companies, but the European Parliament noted that the German government does not have an official definition for either. Evidence indicates that “private business entities that provide military and/or security services, irrespective of how they describe themselves” (as defined in the 2008 “Montreux Document”) have been used, including security personnel in Afghanistan and at other locations to protect German embassies and for a wide range of services from transport to garbage disposal. The German Defence Minister stated in 2010 that Private Military Companies were responsible for their own protection, which suggests armed contractors are used. We recommend that Germany clarifies the legal status of Private Military and Security Companies and creates a transparent framework that regulates their use. A thorough consultation on this important issue that touches on the very role and nature of the state seems overdue.
Effective defence procurement driven by needs
Germany has some good defence procurement systems and practices in place. But as far as anti-corruption mechanisms are concerned it could rank in Band A for this risk area. Ursula von der Leyen has clearly identified defence procurement as a priority area in need of reform. We suggest that Germany takes a number of actions that would align with the “Transparency Initiative” announced by the Ministry of Defence: this should include making additional budgetary information from the “Einzelplan 14” publicly available, as the Federal Audit Office had recommended in light of missing data for life-cycle costing for the Eurofighter procurement. We also recommend that exceptions for defence procurement from the Federal Government Directive are minimised. A more strategic approach to defence procurement should be adopted, as outlined by government audit findings.
Robust arms export controls
The German Ministry of Defence remains an important customer for major German defence companies, who at the same time have a strong focus on export markets. TI’s “Defence Companies Anti-Corruption Index” 2015 analysed five of these companies, with only one scoring in Band “B”, three in Band “D” and one in Band “F”. This is worrying, particularly if considered in conjunction with the poor anti-corruption systems of some major clients of German defence companies active in the MENA region, as was highlighted in TI’s 2015 GI MENA report. It is encouraging to see Germany’s commitment to the UN Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) and its relevant corruption provisions, and we look forward to seeing German leadership in this area. This will need to include thorough anti-corruption risk assessments before arms export licenses are being granted – if good practice emerges, this could be shared with others implementing the ATT. It could also demonstrate to allies and German citizens alike that lessons have been identified from past cases.
Is there formal provision for effective and independent legislative scrutiny of defence policy?
- Bundesrechungshof, “Bundesrechnungshof“ Last modified 2014. http://www.bundesrechnungshof.de/en/bundesrechnungshof
- Deutscher Bundestag, “Defence Committee” Last modified 2014. http://www.bundestag.de/htdocs_e/bundestag/committees/a12/index.jsp
- “Grundgesetz für de Bundesrepublik Deutschland” (Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany), including the amendment(s) to the Act by the Act of 21.7.2010 (Federal Law Gazette I p. 944), May 23, 1949.
- Kröter, Thomas, “Regeln für Auslandseinsätze werden geprüft“, Frankfurter Rundschau, April 10, 2014.
- Schulte, Ulrich, “Minderheitenrechte im Bundestag. 12 Minuten für die Oppositionszwerge”, taz, April 02, 2014, accessed May 03, 2014, http://www.taz.de/!136064/
- SWP-Berlin. “Recalibrating German Security Policy three years after Libya.” Last modified March 17, 2014. http://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publications/point-of-view/recalibrating-german-security-policy-three-years-after-libya.html
- Deutscher Bundestag, &quoute;Wie das Parlament die Regierung kontrolliert.&quoute; Last modified September 7, 2015. https://www.bundestag.de/dokumente/textarchiv/2015/kw37_untersuchungsausschuss/386702
- Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, &quoute;Der Verteidigungsausschuss des Deutschen Bundestages.&quoute; Last modified October 30, 2012. http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/!ut/p/c4/NYs9E4IwEET_US6x0bGDoZHCwgahCyETTvM1x4GNP96kcHfmFftmYYLSqA90mjFF7eEJo8Hr_BFzOJx4pZ3KKjY0q6XVIm85eWR8w1CvixUmRcuVbCNjoSPNiUROxL6anagYgQuMUnWtVPIf9b1Mfd_c5fnU3doH5BCaHytT4gg!/
- Informationsstelle Militarisierung e.V., &quoute;Frontalangriff auf die Parlamentskontrolle.&quoute; Last modified March 27, 2015. http://www.imi-online.de/2015/03/27/frontalangriff-auf-die-parlamentskontrolle/
- Deutscher Bundestag, &quoute;Namentliche Abstimmungen&quoute; (Politikfeld: Verteidigung). https://www.bundestag.de/bundestag/plenum/abstimmung/grafik
- Friederichs, Hauke, &quoute;Ruehe-Kommission: Umstaendlich ist gut&quoute;, Die Zeit, 16 June 2015, accessed 29 September 2015. http://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2015-06/ruehe-kommission-bundeswehr-parlamentskontrolle
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Government Update March 2015:
Link update: http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/!ut/p/c4/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP3I5EyrpHK9pNyydL3y1Mzi4qTS5Az9gmxHRQBg2ftX/
BehördenSpiegel newsletter z. Thema Weißbuch Bundeswehr (Nr. 123 vom 12.03.2015):
http://www.behoerden-spiegel.de/Newsletter/Verteidigung,-Streitkraefte-und-Politik/
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Does the country have an identifiable and effective parliamentary defence and security committee (or similar such organisation) to exercise oversight?
Parliamentary control of government and Ministry of Defence's work is provided by Paragraph (1) of subsection (a) of Article (45) of the German Basic Law which stipulates the establishment of the Defence Committee in the German Bundestag. The Committee has two main tasks: the preparation of decisions taken by the Parliament, and providing major support to Parliament in scrutinising the governmental bodies responsible for defence.
For the latter task, the Committee can convene itself as a 'committee of inquiry' (the only committee to do so in the German Bundestag). Up until 2014, 25% of members votes were needed to convene as an inquiry commission; a number that could not be achieved due to the large majority of the 'Grand Coalition' parties, which features the two parties with the largest number of MPs. This threshold has since been changed to a flexible threshold depending on the size of the Grand Coalition, in order to guarantee the rights of the minority parties.
The &quoute;Bilanz der Arbeit des Verteidigungsausschusses&quoute; (Summary of the Work of the Defence Committee) also includes specific sections re (a) the defence committee's contribution to laws being passed and (b) its investigatory function.
- Deutscher Bundestag, “Defence Committee” Last modified 2014. http://www.bundestag.de/htdocs_e/bundestag/committees/a12/index.jsp
- “Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland” (Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany), including the amendment(s) to the Act by the Act of 21.7.2010 (Federal Law Gazette I p. 944), May 23, 1949.
- Schulte, Ulrich, “Minderheitenrechte im Bundestag. 12 Minuten für die Oppositionszwerge”, taz, April 02, 2014, accessed May 03, 2014, http://www.taz.de/!136064/
- Deutscher Bundestag, &quoute;Bilanz der Arbeit des Verteidigungsausschusses in der 17. Wahlperiode&quoute;. Last modified October 22, 2013. http://www.bundestag.de/blob/194764/9d1ae2569ee9838b9e23e7327577f9a5/bilanz_verteidigungsausschuss_17wp-data.pdf
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Is the country's national defence policy debated and publicly available?
Germany has two main policy documents: (1) the 'Weissbuch Bundeswehr', which gives an overview of the geostrategic position of Germany and its allies and outlines conclusions for the capability development of the Bundeswehr, and (2) the more specific Defence Policy Guidelines (Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien).
While the publication of both of these documents often leads to a lively public debate, it is problematic that they are both published irregularly. The Weissbuch was published five times in the 1970s and two times in the 1980s, but since then has only been renewed twice, in 1994 and in 2006. The Defence Policy Guidelines, which in contrast to the Weissbuch are only intended to be published every 10 to 15 years, have been published five times since 1972, most recently in 2003 and 2011. The last Defence Policy Guidelines acknowledged that the political situation needs to be reviewed more often, and it is expected that new guidelines will be published more frequently than previously. Yet no plans have been released for a current update, and it is unlikely that the MoD will itself commit to an updated schedule for new guidelines.
The publication of the Weissbuch in 2006 has led to several public discussions, particularly whether the strategic objectives in the document stretch the definitions of German Basic Law regarding foreign engagements of the Bundeswehr too far. There was a fierce debate over a statement by then German President Horst Köhler, who quoted a sentence from the Weissbuch about the role of the Bundeswehr as far as Germany's (maritime and other) global transport interests need to be safeguarded to ensure prosperity. The controversy that ensued contributed to the president's resignation in 2010.
Overall there is a strong focus on transparency, and the bulk of these documents are publicly available and are widely discussed - with the exception of the Defence Committee's closed sessions. Especially during the last few years, one of the reasons for the lively defence policy debate was the relatively quick change of command in the Ministry of Defence: current Minister von der Leyen is the fourth Minister of Defence within the last five years. On the one hand, this has led to a large number of discussions about the overall strategic alignment of the Bundeswehr. On the other hand, it may end up delaying the process of reviewing the Defence Policy Guidelines as a result.
RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: While it is true that an irregular publication of the defence policy documents does not have to be problematic per se, it does show that the policy review process is rather ad hoc and not institutionalised. This hampers regular public consultation before the publication of the documents. Overall, it seems that while other ministries are included in the review of the policy beforehand (see for example the Article on the new Weissbuch 2016), larger public consultations are not taking place (criteria for a score of 4). Score maintained.
- IISS. “Sarah Brockmeier: Will Berlin clear the way for more common defence?” Last modified January 9, 2014. https://www.iiss.org/en/politics%20and%20strategy/blogsections/2014-d2de/january-1f44/german-common-defence-2846
- Gardner, Andrew. “New German government prepares to promote EU defence co-operation.”, European Voice, December 05, 2013, accessed April 27, 2014, http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/imported/new-german-government-prepares-to-promote-eu-defence-co-operation/78977.aspx
- “Die Verteidigungspolitischen Richtlinien, May 27, 2011”
- Young, Thomas-Durell. “Trends in German defence Policy: The defence Policy Guidelines and the Centralization of Operational Control.“, June, 1994, accessed April 27, 2014, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/summary.cfm?q=176
- Korge, Johannes, “Bundeswehr in Aufregung: Blitz-Reform verunsichert Soldaten.”, Der Spiegel, August 08, 2012, accessed April 27, 2014, http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/bundeswehrreform-de-maizieres-probleme-mit-dem-umbau-der-bundeswehr-a-846438.html
- Kröter, Thomas, “Neue Bundeswehr-Doktrin bis 2016.”, Frankfurter Rundschau, October 29, 2014, accessed November 01, 2014, http://www.fr-online.de/politik/-weissbuch--neue-bundeswehr-doktrin-bis-2016,1472596,28889320.html
- Deutscher Bundestag. “Der Wehrbeauftragte des Deutschen Bundestages.” Last modified 2014, http://www.bundestag.de/bundestag/wehrbeauftragter/
- REDAKTION, “Horst Köhler – sofortiger Rücktritt nach Äusserungen zur Rolle der Bundeswehr.”, May 31, 2010, accessed April 29, 2014, http://www.hintergrund.de/20100531915/politik/inland/horst-koehler-sofortiger-ruecktritt-nach-aeusserungen-zur-rolle-der-bundeswehr.html
- Interview with Senior Defence Researcher, May 12 2014.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Disagree
Comment: Statement by German MoD with the aim to raise the score to level 4:
The MoD doesn’t consider it as a problem that both main policy documents, the Bundeswehr concept [Weißbuch Bundeswehr] and the Defence Policy Guidelines [Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien - VPR] are not published on a regular basis. Both documents are revised and published whenever the need arises, whether this be due to strategic adaptations or a reorientation of the Bundeswehr.
Documents relating to Germany’s defence and security policy - provided they are not subject to classification - are as a rule openly accessible via the official web pages of either the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the MoD. Furthermore the government’s coalition agreement issued in 2014 addresses the current security policy environment and defines relevant targets for the current legislative period.
The MoD and Bundeswehr continuously seek discourse with the public through open days and initiatives such as seminars and lectures in schools or universities in order to promote wide public discussion on security issues.
Additional source to be added:
http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/!ut/p/c4/DcLBDYAgEATAWmzg7u_PLtQf4AErCAQQE6vXzPDOv6QGnOrISUVeeTOY9UP6Go4ajJfqBb2VHNERSCUnOneh83aSjmwtXkgVLmGZPsEz42M!/ (accessed August 8, 2014)
Government Update March 2015:
According to the new &quoute;Weißbuch-drafting-process&quoute;, presented by the Minister of Defence von der Leyen on 17 February 2015, the new 2016 Weißbuch other than in former years shall be compiled with participation not only of military experts and politicians, but also scientists, NGO's , the general population and Germany's allies. Other than in former years when the Weßbuch was drafted more or less behind closed doors, a broad consensus is intended with the new Weißbuch, especially as nowadays security issues can no longer be seen a purely military task but rather call for a comprehensive approach .
Link update: http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/!ut/p/c4/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP3I5EyrpHK9pNyydL3y1Mzi4qTS5Az9gmxHRQBg2ftX/
BehördenSpiegel newsletter z. Thema Weißbuch Bundeswehr (Nr. 123 vom 12.03.2015):
http://www.behoerden-spiegel.de/Newsletter/Verteidigung,-Streitkraefte-und-Politik/
http://www.behoerden-spiegel.de/icc/Internet/nav/f68/f6810068-1671-1111-be59-264f59a5fb42&page=1&pagesize=10&uCon=ad51044d-2219-db41-cc9b-f42207b988f2&uTem=aaaaaaaa-aaaa-aaaa-bbbb-000000000011.htm
Suggested score: 4
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Do defence and security institutions have a policy, or evidence, of openness towards civil society organisations (CSOs) when dealing with issues of corruption? If no, is there precedent for CSO involvement in general government anti-corruption initiatives?
There is not a lot of evidence that defence and security institutions practice much openness towards civil society organisations (CSOs) when dealing with issues of corruption in Germany. It seems that the main reason for this is not so much a general reticence towards CSOs, but rather that that defence institutions do not see a need for specific anti-corruption initiatives. While the overall defence sector in Germany has seen some corruption scandals this past year (for example, several German defence contractors were involved in bribery allegations concerning arms sales to Greece), neither the German Bundeswehr nor the Ministry of Defence appear to have been directly involved in these scandals. The German Ministry of Defence has (slightly) increased its anti-corruption activities and has for example participated in an initiative of the federal administration and German industry to exchange information about anti-corruption standards. They have also actively participated in a survey by Transparency International, and a member of the high-profile Bundeswehr-Strukturkommission ('Structural Commission') in 2010 was the chair of Transparency Germany at the time.
RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: A score of 3 would require that the MoD encourages the engagement of CSOs. While participation in the Corruption Prevention Initiative Committee for Federal Administration and Industry shows the MoD’s efforts in the direction of corruption prevention, this can hardly be regarded as evidence of openness towards CSOs. Score maintained.
- Bundesministerium des Innern, „Initiativkreis Korruptionsprävention Wirtschaft/Bundesverwaltung“, accessed November 02, 2014, http://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Themen/OED_Verwaltung/Korruption_Sponsoring/initiativkreis_korruptionspraevention.pdf?__blob=publicationFile
- Bundesrechungshof, “Bundesrechnungshof“ Last modified 2014, http://www.bundesrechnungshof.de/en/bundesrechnungshof
- Deutscher Bundestag, “Defence Committee” Last modified 2014, http://www.bundestag.de/htdocs_e/bundestag/committees/a12/index.jsp
- “Grundgesetz für de Bundesrepublik Deutschland” (Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany), including the amendment(s) to the Act by the Act of 21.7.2010 (Federal Law Gazette I p. 944), May 23, 1949.
- Kröter, Thomas, “Regeln für Auslandseinsätze werden geprüft“, Frankfurter Rundschau, April 10, 2014.
- Schulte, Ulrich, “Minderheitenrechte im Bundestag. 12 Minuten für die Oppositionszwerge”, taz, April 02, 2014, accessed May 03, 2014, http://www.taz.de/!136064/
- SWP-Berlin. “Recalibrating German Security Policy three years after Libya.” Last modified March 17, 2014. http://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publications/point-of-view/recalibrating-german-security-policy-three-years-after-libya.html
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Disagree
Comment: Statement by the German MoD with the aim to raise the score to level to 3:
In its continuous efforts to prevent and combat corruption wherever possible, the Bundeswehr welcomes the mutual exchange of opinions and experiences with any like-minded organisation.
The MoD participates in bi-annual seminars (Corruption Prevention Initiative Committee for Federal Administration-Industry [Initiativkreis Korruptionsprävention Bundesverwaltung-Wirtschaft]) on the subjects of best practice and combating corruption together with representatives of other ministries and the heads of the compliance divisions of various leading German enterprises. At the same time the German armed forces regularly participate in studies carried out by Transparency International.
Suggested score: 3
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Has the country signed up to international anti-corruption instruments such as, but not exclusively or necessarily, UNCAC and the OECD Convention? (In your answer, please specify which.)
Germany has signed and ratified the OECD Bribery Convention and the Convention drawn up in Article K.3 (2c) of the Treaty of the European Union. It also signed the UNCAC in 2003, the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption of the Council of Europe and its Additional Protocol in 2003, and the Civil Law Convention on Corruption of the Council of Europe in 1999. The German Bundestag and the German Bundesrat unanimously agreed on the 25th of September, respectively 10th of October 2014 to ratify UNCAC. The Council of Europe Conventions have not yet been ratified.
RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 1: Agree with comments.
RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: The German Bundestag and the German Bundesrat unanimously agreed on the 25th of September, respectively 10th of October 2014 to ratify UNCAC. However, while the ratification of UNCAC is clearly a positive step towards a stricter alignment with international regulations, the Conventions of the Council of Europe are still awaiting ratification and the Council of Europe has stated in the last review in 2014 that no progress could be noted. Specific evidence that this will change within the timeframe considered for this review is missing. Score changed from 2 to 3.
- Bäumel, Jochen, “Zehn Jahre nix passiert, also auch in Zukunft weiter nix?”, Scheinwerfer, November, 2013, accessed April 29, 2014, http://www.transparency.de/Zehn-Jahre-nix-passiert-also.2415.0.html#c5466
- OECD. “OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions: Ratification Status as of 8 April 2014.” Last modifies April 08, 2014, http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/WGBRatificationStatus_April2014.pdf
- Council of Europe. “Criminal Law Convention on Corruption CETS No.:173.” Last modified May 12, 2014, http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=173&CM=&DF=&CL=ENG
- Becker, Sven, “Criticism by Council of Europe: Germany Falling Behind in Fight against Corruption.” Der Spiegel, November 28, 2012, accessed May 03, 2014 http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/germany-too-lax-on-fighting-political-corruption-says-watchdog-a-869763.html
- N.N., “Parteifinanzen: Europarat lobt, verlangt aber mehr Kontrollmöglichkeiten.”, Der Standard, October 08, 2014, accessed November 03, 2014, http://derstandard.at/2000006578567/Parteifinanzen-Europarat-lobt-verlangt-aber-mehr-Kontrollmoeglichkeiten
- Wolf, Sebastian, “Political Corruption as a Regulatory Problem in Germany.” German Law Journal 14(2013), available at http://www.germanlawjournal.com/index.php?pageID=11&artID=1573
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: From my point of view, the researcher could have given a score of 3. The question asks whether Germany has signed up to international anti-corruption instruments which it has. While there are shortcomings in the implementation I believe that it might not be correct to claim that there is no evidence of compliance.
Suggested score: 3
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: Statement by German MoD with the aim to raise the score to level 4:
Having signed the United Nations Convention against corruption of 31 October 2003 on 9 December 2003, Germany is due to ratify the Convention in autumn 2014.
On 21 February 2014 the German Bundestag took the final legal hurdle to tightening the criminal law on the bribing of delegates. This will remove the final national obstacle to ratification of the UNCAC Convention. The amended § 108 e of the German Criminal Code will enter into force from 1 September 2014, criminalising any corrupt behaviour by and towards German regional, national and EU delegates.
Ratification of further international conventions, which all have been already signed by Germany, such as the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption of the Council of Europe of 27 January 1999, the Additional Protocol to the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption of 15 May 2003 and the Civil Law Convention on Corruption of the Council of Europe of 4 November 1999 are to follow.
Additional source to be added:
http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/18/004/1800476.pdf (accessed August 12, 2014)
http://www.transparency.de/UN-Konvention.108.0.html (accessed August 12, 2014)
Governemt Update March 2015:
Statement by the German MoD aiming to raise the score to level 4
Having tightened the criminal code on the bribing of delegates in spring 2014 Germany fulfilled the final provisions in order to ratify the UNCAC Convention on November 12th 2014 which then entered into force on December 12th 2014. Ratification of further international conventions on corruption, which all have been already signed by Germany will follow suit in due course.
Additional link: http://www.transparency.de/UN-Konvention.108.0.html
Suggested score: 4
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is there evidence of regular, active public debate on issues of defence? If yes, does the government participate in this debate?
There is much evidence of regularly active public debate about issues of defence in Germany. Media attention is generally focused on current affairs, therefore topics such as the Defence Policy Guidelines or the Weissbuch are most often only marginal issues (due to their irregular publication). However, there is a relatively active academic community who keeps discussions about policy issues, especially regarding EU and NATO, alive.
Members of the Bundestag, especially leading members of the Defence Committee, are frequently interviewed by the media. However as far as the executive branch is concerned it is almost exclusively the Minister of Defence who is participating in public discussions, and the State Secretaries or the Chief of Federal Armed Forces Staff are often not included.
RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 2: Relative to other large NATO members, Germany has a smaller number of conferences, think tanks, researchers and/or journalists who are focusing on issues of defence policy. Overall there is an active debate but it is far less institutionalised than in the countries mentioned. In particular, there is no evidence of a large number of co-organised discussions with independent think tanks or CSOs as mentioned in the criteria for score 4. Score maintained.
- Mölling, Christian, “Deutsche Verteidigungspolitik. Eckpunkte für eine überfällige Debatte zur militärisch-konzeptionellen Ausrichtung der Bundeswehr.” SWP-Aktuell 18 (March 2012): 1- 4, http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/aktuell/2012A18_mlg.pdf
- BMVg. “Verteidigungsminister seit 1955.” Last modified December 16, 2013, http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/!ut/p/c4/NcpBDkAwEEbhs7hAJxYW7NwCm6ZqMv1DS3TU9YlE3vJ7NNFbcgXiFHtyGw00enTzbeZYxEQkZOUTVzTC2Qf4oGw_K3wqY4FcSfI_2sxQW7dNQ8faVw_-f7Q4/
- BMVg. “Reden und Interviews.” Last modified March 27, 2014, http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/!ut/p/c4/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP3I5EyrpHK9pNyydL3i1KKyzORUvaLUlNS80ryUzLwSkEhqebF-QbajIgAKLThB/
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: For the many reasons listed correctly by the author, the score should perhaps be a 4 (especially relative to comparable countries). The fact that the Minister of defence serves as the primary link from the Executive is not sufficient evidence to warrant a 3.
Suggested score: 4
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Government Update March 2015:
Link update: http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/!ut/p/c4/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP3I5EyrpHK9pNyydL3czLzM4pLUoszSXL2U1KJ4GF-vKDUlNU-_INtREQBOq4f0/
http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/!ut/p/c4/NcpBDkAwEEbhs7hAJxYW7NwCm6ZqMv1DS3TU9YlE3vJ7NNFbcgXiFHtyGw00enTzbeZYxEQkZOUTVzTC2Qf4oGw_K3wqY4FcSfI_2sxQW7dNQ8faVw_-f7Q4/
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Does the country have an openly stated and actively implemented anti-corruption policy for the defence sector?
The German Ministry of Defence has an implementing provision, the “Richtlinie der Bundesregierung zur Korruptionsprävention in der Bundesverwaltung”, created in 2004. This provision provides details of expected standards of employee actions and behavior to avoid any misconduct in this area. It also defines processes and responsibilities, such as the role of points of contact in larger agencies.
Additionally, further legislation such as the “Gesetz über die Rechtsstellung der Soldaten”, or the more general “Strafgesetzbuch”, include articles concerning bribery and malpractice. Overall, there is evidence that the Bundeswehr implements the anti-corruption policies of the federal government.
The Government Reviewer (below) provides additional information on implementation.
RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: Agree with comments. Score changed from 2 to 3.
- Deutscher Bundestag, “Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Katja Keul, Nicole Maisch, Luise Amtsberg, weiterer Abgeordneter und der Fraktion BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN – Wirksame Sanktionierung von Rechtsverstössen in Unternehmen.“, July 22, 2014, accessed November 03, 2014, http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/18/021/1802187.pdf
- Richtlinie der Bundesregierung zur Korruptionsprävention in der Bundesverwaltung. “Richtlinie der Bundesregierung zur Korruptionsprävention in der Bundesverwaltung, July 30, 2004” http://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Themen/OED_Verwaltung/Korruption_Sponsoring/Richtlinie_zur_Korruptionspraevention_in_der_Bundesverwaltung.html
- &quoute;Soldatengesetz in der Fassung der Bekanntmachung vom 30. Mai 2005 (BGBl. I S. 1482), das zuletzt durch Artikel 8 des Gesetzes vom 28. August 2013 (BGBl. I S. 3386) geändert worden ist&quoute; http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/sg/index.html
- BAAINBw. “Ansprechperson für Korruptionsprävention.” Last modified November 26, 2013, http://www.baain.de/portal/a/baain/!ut/p/c4/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP3I5EyrpHK9pMTEzDy94tSisszkVL3s_KKi0gKQGv2CbEdFAHqfuYU!/
- &quoute;Strafgesetzbuch in der Fassung der Bekanntmachung vom 13. November 1998 (BGBl. I S. 3322), das zuletzt durch Artikel 1 des Gesetzes vom 23. April 2014 (BGBl. I S. 410) geändert worden ist&quoute; http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/stgb/index.html
- Gebauer, Matthias, “Interner Bericht: Bundeswehr gibt unsinnige Millionen für Waffen aus.”, Der Spiegel, September 09, 2012, accessed April 25, 2014, http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/bundesrechnungshof-kritisiert-waffenkaeufe-der-bundeswehr-a-854776.html
- Schuler, R., “Korruptionsverdacht bei der Bundeswehr - Wurde bei Beratungsverträgen gemauschelt?”, Bild, July 05, 2012, accessed April 25, 2014, http://www.bild.de/politik/inland/bundeswehr/wurde-bei-beratungs-vertraegen-gemauschelt-25003654.bild.html
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: Statement by German MoD with the aim to raise the score to level 3:
The German government has repeatedly emphasised that it perceives corruption as having a detrimental effect on competition and the free market and thus also on companies, businesses and employees. As a means to counter this threat, parliament is considering extending application of the Criminal Code to business enterprises by introduction of a corporate criminal code [Unternehmensstrafrecht]. The nature of the German legal system means that there are no specific criminal offences on corruption which apply exclusively to the armed forces. Instead the relevant provisions of the Criminal Code apply equally to everybody.
The fight against corruption can now be considered engrained in the moral code of the German armed forces and the MoD in general, particularly but not exclusively as far as procurement is concerned.
A wide range of governmental and internal regulations, such as those on sponsoring and the policies on acceptance of gifts and rewards, form the backbone of the continuous battle against corruption.
The implementing provision “Government Guideline on the Prevention of Corruption in the Federal Administration” [Richtlinie der Bundeswehr zur Korruptionsprävention in der Bundesverwaltung] has recently been amended and adapted to the needs and specific circumstances of the MoD and the Bundeswehr by way of a revision of the internal regulation “General Service Regulation on Implementation of the Federal Government Guideline on the Prevention of Corruption” (Zentrale Dienstvorschrift zur Umsetzung zur Richtlinie der Bundesregierung zur Korruptionsprävention). In addition, according to the regulations on procurement [Vergabevorschriften] any contractor in business with the MoD or Bundeswehr found guilty of corruption or contravening monopoly regulations will be excluded from entering into further contracts with the MoD until permanent restructuring of its organisation rules out further illegal behaviour.
Source to be added:
http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/18/021/1802187.pdf
Government Update March 2015:
Link update: http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/!ut/p/c4/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP3I5EyrpHK9pNyydL3i1KKyzORUvez8oqLSApCS4oKixNSy1DwQW78g21ERAIDy0-Q!/
Suggested score: 3
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are there independent, well-resourced, and effective institutions within defence and security tasked with building integrity and countering corruption?
The Ministry of Defence does not have a dedicated anti-corruption department but has defined anti-corruption experts / points of contact within the specific agencies, in military units from the battalion level upwards and, additionally, a special investigations branch (R II 1) Branch of the Legal Affairs Directorate) of 30 investigators and former military prosecutors. R II 1 works with various law enforcement agencies, drafts guidelines, and supervises their implementation and training. It is tasked with both building integrity and countering corruption, meaning that corruption prevention is as much a focus area as investigations into corrupt practices and activities.
Whilst the reorientation of the Bundeswehr downgraded the position of the special investigations branch in the organisational structure and integrated it into the Legal Affairs Directorate, instead of its previous status as an exclusive agency which raised questions as to how effective investigations might be, this has not affected the overall attention granted to anti-corruption policy adherence. The main reason for the &quoute;downgrade&quoute; of the special investigation branch may have been to allow for more effective investigations by putting it directly under one of the state secretaries within the ministry. There do not appear to be any other anti-corruption departments within the German MoD, and it is not part of other functions. While most have own anti-corruption representatives, they all report to this special investigations branch within the legal department of the MoD.
There is some evidence of R II 1’s effectiveness, e.g. not allowing a former General to work as a lobbyist and the initial investigations into the G36 in 2011. It is not entirely clear how intelligence agencies (such as the Bundesnachrichtendienst, the Federal Intelligence Service) are part of this process, though the Military Intelligence Service seems to be included.
(Please also review the Government Reviewer comments below)
RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: It is accepted that a change in organisational structure may not have resulted in less efficiency or independence. However, more evidence of effectiveness is required. There do not appear by annual reports published by the R II 1, which would have aided in assessing this. Score maintained.
- Richtlinie der Bundesregierung zur Korruptionsprävention in der Bundesverwaltung. “Richtlinie der Bundesregierung zur Korruptionsprävention in der Bundesverwaltung, July 30, 2004” http://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Themen/OED_Verwaltung/Korruption_Sponsoring/Richtlinie_zur_Korruptionspraevention_in_der_Bundesverwaltung.html
- BAAINBw. “Ansprechperson für Korruptionsprävention.” Last modified November 26, 2013, http://www.baain.de/portal/a/baain/!ut/p/c4/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP3I5EyrpHK9pMTEzDy94tSisszkVL3s_KKi0gKQGv2CbEdFAHqfuYU!/
- Bundesministerium der Verteidigung. “Organisationsübersicht des Bundesministeriums der Verteidigung.” Last modified January 24, 2014, http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/!ut/p/c4/HYtBDoAgDMDe4ge2uzd_oV7MMEIWYBBg-H2R9NgWTxwIdXbUOAkF3PG4eTUvmNgdRBau7SmsEUitIb2siv9bSMXRsHOsOZBg9tvyAQuzF9c!/
- Y Punkt. “Gewissenhaft – ES kommt ungelegen.” Last modified December 04, 2013, http://www.y-punkt.de/portal/a/ypunkt/!ut/p/c4/LYvBCsIwEAX_aDexoQdvihQE0ZsaL5ImoS62SQjbFsGPNwHfwFyGhw8sBLPQYJhiMCPeUVva9iv0q_PPT5rDm8Fk-6IFNkK0eKsX58HG4LmafWAqHrLhmCHFzGMtc86lADnUQh72spHiP_ltr_qkOtWo47m7YJqm3Q-S2g_G/
- &quoute; Rüstungsindustrie: Verteidigungsministerium stoppt Lobbyarbeit von Ex-General.&quoute;, Der Spiegel, November 6, 2010, http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/ruestungsindustrie-verteidigungsministerium-stoppt-lobbyarbeit-von-ex-general-a-727674.html
- Thomas Wiegold, &quoute;G36: Verteidigungsministerium erhöht juristischen Druck auf Heckler&Koch.&quoute; Last modified June 28, 2015. http://augengeradeaus.net/2015/06/g36-verteidigungsministerium-erhoeht-juristischen-druck-auf-hecklerkoch/
- Matthias Mantey, &quoute;Konzentration und Verantwortung. Die prozessorientierte Neuausrichtung der Bundeswehr.&quoute; February 7, 2011. http://www.bundeswehr-monitoring.de/fileadmin/user_upload/media/Bericht-ASU-20110207.pdf
- Andreas Maisch, &quoute;Korruption bei Bundesbehörden: Verschwundene Laptops&quoute;, taz, August 15, 2013. http://www.taz.de/Korruption-bei-Bundesbehoerden/!5061200/
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: Statement by German MoD with the aim to raise the score to level 4:
There are well-trained independent anti-corruption representatives [Ansprechpersonen zur Korruptionsprävention] appointed in the MoD, its federal offices and in all military units from battalion level upwards, who advise leaders and unit commanders and report to the Special Investigation Branch of the MoD.
R II 1, the Special Investigation Branch [Ermittlung in Sonderfällen] of the MoD, staffed by around 30 investigators and former military prosecutors, is tasked with preventing and combating corruption in the armed forces and the MoD. In close cooperation with local and federal police forces, the various civil and military prosecutors’ offices as well as customs authorities and other law enforcement agencies, this branch follows up any suspicion of corruption in the armed forces.
At the same time it is responsible for drafting and enacting internal corruption regulations and guidelines for the MoD and supervising their implementation, as well as training the anti-corruption representatives.
The integration of the Special Investigation Branch into the legal department of the MOD in the course of a restructuring of the MoD in 2012 was a purely organisational measure and should not be seen as a downgrade of its importance. Neither the authority and powers nor the independence of the branch were impaired by this move.
Government Update March 2015:
Link update: http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/!ut/p/c4/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP3I5EyrpHK9pNyydL3i1KKyzORUvez8oqLSApCS4oKixNSy1DwQW78g21ERAIDy0-Q!/
http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/!ut/p/c4/HYtBDoAgDMDe4ge2uzd_oV7MMEIWYBBg-H2R9NgWTxwIdXbUOAkF3PG4eTUvmNgdRBau7SmsEUitIb2siv9bSMXRsHOsOZBg9tvyAQuzF9c!/
Suggested score: 4
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Does the public trust the institutions of defence and security to tackle the issue of bribery and corruption in their establishments?
According to the 2013 TI Global Corruption Barometer, the military was found to be the fifth least corrupt institution (from a total of twelve institutions) in terms of public perception of corruption, with 25% of respondents perceiving it to be corrupt or very corrupt - compared to for example the 48% of respondents who perceived medical and health services as corrupt.
According to the EU Anti-Corruption Report 2014, 59% of the German population believe corruption is widespread, which is much lower than the EU average of 75%. The perception of the anti-corruption work of the German government's efforts to combat corruption and the number of successful prosecutions correspond to the EU average. This suggests that the German population believes there is less corruption, but that there is little confidence in the government to handle corruption when it does occur. This is not a blanket sentiment however, as some institutions are held in better regard than others.
RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 2: The critique that relying primarily on survey figures is not an ideal method for answering this question is correct, but it seems feasible regarding other similar approaches. For example, the Corruption Perceptions Index by TI is relying on 13 different surveys and expert assessments, with between 14 to 148 countries covered in these assessments. For this assessment the EU Anti-Corruption Report 2014, which is based on several studies and surveys such as the Eurobarometer survey (see Annex on methodology in the report), and the 2013 TI Global Corruption Barometer, the largest available survey on the public opinion of corruption, were consulted. The former is measuring the perception of corruption, while the latter focuses on experienced corruption and gives the possibility for a cross-sectional analysis in a country (which allows for the focus on the defence arena). The importance of this methodology is, for example, discussed in Fisman and Svensson (2007).
Additionally, while articles in the German media on cases where corrupt practices in the MoD were uncovered and prosecutors began investigations could be found, discussions that were specifically mentioning a lack of trust concerning the prosecution or any evidence that would imply a higher than average prevalence of corruption in the field were missing. Score maintained.
- European Commission. “EU Anti-Corruption Report 2014 – Country Sheet Germany.” Last modified 2014, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/organized-crime-and-human-trafficking/corruption/anti-corruption-report/docs/2014_acr_germany_factsheet_en.pdf
- European Commission. “ANNEX GERMANY to the EU Anti-Corruption Report. COM(2014) 38 final, February 3, 2014”, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/organized-crime-and-human-trafficking/corruption/anti-corruption-report/docs/2014_acr_germany_chapter_en.pdf
- GfK Verein. “Die Deutschen schenken der Regierung wieder mehr Vertrauen.” Last modified Feburary 07, 2013, http://www.gfk.com/de/Documents/Pressemitteilungen/2013/20130207_PM-GfK-Verein-Global-Trust-2013-fin_dt.pdf
- Transparency International. “Global Corruption Barometer. National results: Germany.” Last modified 2014, http://www.transparency.org/gcb2013/country/?country=germany
- Transparency International, “Corruption Perceptions Index 2013: Full Source Description”, accessed November 04, 2014, http://www.transparency.org/files/content/pressrelease/2013_CPISourceDescription_EN.pdf
- Fisman, R. & Svensson, J. ,2007, “Are corruption and taxation really harmful to
growth? Firm level evidence”. Journal of Development Economics, 83, 63–75.
- N.N., “Beschaffung von Sturmgewehren: Bundeswehr unter Korruptionsverdacht.” Der Spiegel, May 26, 2013, accessed November 04, 2014, http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/bundeswehr-geraet-bei-beschaffung-unter-verdacht-der-korruption-a-901929.html
- statista, &quoute;Wie sehr vertrauen Sie der Bundeswehr?&quoute;, spring 2015, http://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/377235/umfrage/umfrage-in-deutschland-zum-vertrauen-in-die-bundeswehr/
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: This is obviously a relative question and the score should fall somewhere between 2 and 3. I would encourage the author to engage more fully with the complex issues of corruption measure and perception instead of relying primarily on survey figures.
Suggested score: 2
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are there regular assessments by the defence ministry or another government agency of the areas of greatest corruption risk for ministry and armed forces personnel, and do they put in place measures for mitigating such risks?
In the implementation section of the “Richtlinie der Bundesregierung zur Korruptionsprävention in der Bundesverwaltung”, a provision created in 2004, it is clearly stated that occupational fields with particular risks of corruption must be identified, and there has to be a rotation of staff in intervals that must not exceed five years. This rotation is obligatory and if there are exceptional circumstances for which it cannot be adhered to, this decision needs to be justified in writing. The same guidelines identify criteria which indicate particular risks of corruption, such as processes in which only one person is solely responsible for the award of concessions or benefits.
Further, as discussed in Question 15, the Federal Audit Office undertakes audits of defence expenditure. While not containing specific reference to corruption risks, areas of high risk are identified. For instance, in February 2014, the the then Social Democratic defence spokesperson identified “structural problems of non-transparency” in defence procurement. Recommendations made to the Ministry of Defence which are followed, although there have been instances where the implementation was sometimes delayed, which has been severely criticised by the Federal Audit Office.
- Richtlinie der Bundesregierung zur Korruptionsprävention in der Bundesverwaltung. “Richtlinie der Bundesregierung zur Korruptionsprävention in der Bundesverwaltung, July 30, 2004” http://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Themen/OED_Verwaltung/Korruption_Sponsoring/Richtlinie_zur_Korruptionspraevention_in_der_Bundesverwaltung.html
- BAAINBw. “Ansprechperson für Korruptionsprävention.” Last modified November 26, 2013, http://www.baain.de/portal/a/baain/!ut/p/c4/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP3I5EyrpHK9pMTEzDy94tSisszkVL3s_KKi0gKQGv2CbEdFAHqfuYU!/
- Bundesrechnungshof. “Bemerkungen 2014 zur Haushalts- und Wirtschaftsführung des Bundes.” Last modified November 26, 2014, https://www.bundesrechnungshof.de/de/veroeffentlichungen/bemerkungen-jahresberichte/jahresberichte/2014/inhalt/2014-bemerkungen-gesamtbericht-pdf
- Bundesrechnungshof. “Status.” Last modified 2014. https://www.bundesrechnungshof.de/en/bundesrechnungshof/stellung
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Statement by the German MoD:
In order to further specify the Federal Government Directive, the MoD issued implementing instructions for its own area of responsibility and determined that, as a rule all occupational fields with a particular risk of corruption must be identified at regular intervals not exceeding five years. In case of organisational changes with far-reaching implications, the necessary analyses have to be performed at an earlier date as required by the circumstances. In case of a particular corruption risk not only the duration of the assignment of the employee involved must generally be limited, but, among other things, it must also be examined through a risk analysis whether workflows have to be modified or, for example, tasks can be shifted or responsibilities changed.
Government Update March 2015:
Link update: http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/!ut/p/c4/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP3I5EyrpHK9pNyydL3i1KKyzORUvez8oqLSApCS4oKixNSy1DwQW78g21ERAIDy0-Q!/
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Does the country have a process for acquisition planning that involves clear oversight, and is it publicly available?
The Federal Office of Bundeswehr Equipment, Information Technology and In-Service Support (BAAINBw) is in charge of all procurement within the Ministry of Defence. A collection of all procedural regulations can be found in the Customer Product Management (CPM), which stipulates clear goals to foster transparency and guarantee a fair and public procurement cycle. All information about the CPM is publicly available online on the agency’s website.
Details of defence acquisition can be found in the budget of the Ministry of Defence (Einzelplan 14, part of the annual Federal Budget). The entire process is overseen by the Federal Audit Office, as defined by German Basic Law in Article 114, with evaluations included in the Annual Reports on Federal Financial Management (Bemerkungen), Category C (Sonstige Prüfungs und Beratungsergebnisse).
- BAAINBw. “Customer Product Management (CPM) - Verfahrensvorschrift zur Bedarfsermittlung und Bedarfsdeckung in der Bundeswehr.” Last modified April 04, 2014, http://www.baain.de/portal/a/baain/!ut/p/c4/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP3I5EyrpHK9pMTEzDy9gqL8rNTsEr3kglz9gmxHRQDlu1V7/
- BMVg. “Verteidigungshaushalt 2013.” Last modified December 3, 2013, http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/!ut/p/c4/Nck9DoAgDEDhs3gBSkxc3LyFupCiDTb8aKDg9WUxL9_0YIdewsYOhe-EAVbYDp7tq2xsTkVOXIQy16gaZSE-2dXkyoW1C2JGrSd1UjbopVIIZP4Fj1-GD5nD8bI!/
- Bundesrechnungshof. “Bemerkungen 2013 zur Haushalts- und Wirtschaftsführung des Bundes.” Last modified April 29, 2014, http://www.bundesrechnungshof.de/de/veroeffentlichungen/bemerkungen-jahresberichte/2013-weitere-pruefungsergebnisse/inhalt/2013-bemerkungen-gesamtbericht-weitere-pruefungsergebnisse-pdf
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Government Update March 2015:
Link update: http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/!ut/p/c4/NYxNC8IwEET_UTbxIOqtpSAi9OBF21vahLiQj7LdxIs_3uTgDPMuDwZmqI26oNOMKWoPL5hWvCwfsYTiRMCIO1vCHESxxBYNuhzd_ta5zjM824OxYk3RciPbyFjpSHMisSVi30wmqkaggUmqoZdK_qO-5_HeXefj4TTc-gdsIXQ_EI9lHw!!/
https://www.bundesrechnungshof.de/de/veroeffentlichungen/bemerkungen-jahresberichte/jahresberichte/2014
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is the defence budget transparent, showing key items of expenditure? This would include comprehensive information on military R&D, training, construction, personnel expenditures, acquisitions, disposal of assets, and maintenance.
Detailed budget information about the Ministry of Defence is located in the Einzelplan 14, part of the annual Federal Budget. This includes military R&D, training, construction, personnel expenditures, acquisitions, disposal of assets, and maintenance. This information is made publicly available on both the Ministry of Defence and Federal Government websites.
- BMVg. “Verteidigungshaushalt 2013.” Last modified December 3, 2013, http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/!ut/p/c4/Nck9DoAgDEDhs3gBSkxc3LyFupCiDTb8aKDg9WUxL9_0YIdewsYOhe-EAVbYDp7tq2xsTkVOXIQy16gaZSE-2dXkyoW1C2JGrSd1UjbopVIIZP4Fj1-GD5nD8bI!/
- Bundesrechnungshof. “Bemerkungen 2013 zur Haushalts- und Wirtschaftsführung des Bundes.” Last modified April 29, 2014, http://www.bundesrechnungshof.de/de/veroeffentlichungen/bemerkungen-jahresberichte/2013-weitere-pruefungsergebnisse/inhalt/2013-bemerkungen-gesamtbericht-weitere-pruefungsergebnisse-pdf
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Government Update March 2015:
Link update: http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/!ut/p/c4/NYxNC8IwEET_UTbxIOqtpSAi9OBF21vahLiQj7LdxIs_3uTgDPMuDwZmqI26oNOMKWoPL5hWvCwfsYTiRMCIO1vCHESxxBYNuhzd_ta5zjM824OxYk3RciPbyFjpSHMisSVi30wmqkaggUmqoZdK_qO-5_HeXefj4TTc-gdsIXQ_EI9lHw!!/
https://www.bundesrechnungshof.de/de/veroeffentlichungen/bemerkungen-jahresberichte/jahresberichte/2014
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is there a legislative committee (or other appropriate body) responsible for defence budget scrutiny and analysis in an effective way, and is this body provided with detailed, extensive, and timely information on the defence budget?
There are two separate legislative committees responsible for defence budget scrutiny: the Defence Committee, which can also act as an investigative committee of inquiry, and, within the Budget Committee, the Budget Committee for Departmental Budget 14. Both of these legislative committees are separately informed at a regular basis. Additionally, budget formulation and implementation are subject to parliamentary control as a whole and the implementation is overseen by the Federal Audit Office.
The Defence Committee discusses the annual budget of the Ministry of Defence and provides recommendations. In addition, all defence purchases that are of 'special importance' or that exceed 25 million euro have to be discussed and can only be made if approved by the committee, irrespective of whether or not they have been included in the budget.
The requirement for a Defence Committee to be established is anchored in the constitution (Article 45a (1), Grundgesetz). It cannot be dissolved.
- Bundesrechnungshof. “Bemerkungen 2013 zur Haushalts- und Wirtschaftsführung des Bundes.” Last modified April 29, 2014, http://www.bundesrechnungshof.de/de/veroeffentlichungen/bemerkungen-jahresberichte/2013-weitere-pruefungsergebnisse/inhalt/2013-bemerkungen-gesamtbericht-weitere-pruefungsergebnisse-pdf
- BMVg. “Verteidigungshaushalt 2013.” Last modified December 3, 2013, http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/!ut/p/c4/Nck9DoAgDEDhs3gBSkxc3LyFupCiDTb8aKDg9WUxL9_0YIdewsYOhe-EAVbYDp7tq2xsTkVOXIQy16gaZSE-2dXkyoW1C2JGrSd1UjbopVIIZP4Fj1-GD5nD8bI!/
- Deutscher Bundestag. “Defence Committee.” Last modified 2014, http://www.bundestag.de/htdocs_e/bundestag/committees/a12/index.jsp
- Deutscher Bundestag. “Budget Committee.” Last modified 2014, http://www.bundestag.de/htdocs_e/bundestag/committees/a08/index.jsp
- Website of SPD parliamentarian Johannes Kahrs, http://www.kahrs.de/bundestag/verteidigungsausschuss/
- German Constitution 1949 (Grundgesetz), https://www.bundestag.de/grundgesetz
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Government Update March 2015:
Link update: http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/!ut/p/c4/NYxNC8IwEET_UTbxIOqtpSAi9OBF21vahLiQj7LdxIs_3uTgDPMuDwZmqI26oNOMKWoPL5hWvCwfsYTiRMCIO1vCHESxxBYNuhzd_ta5zjM824OxYk3RciPbyFjpSHMisSVi30wmqkaggUmqoZdK_qO-5_HeXefj4TTc-gdsIXQ_EI9lHw!!/
https://www.bundesrechnungshof.de/de/veroeffentlichungen/bemerkungen-jahresberichte/jahresberichte/2014
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is the approved defence budget made publicly available? In practice, can citizens, civil society, and the media obtain detailed information on the defence budget?
The Ministry of Defence publicly provides an overview of the defence budget, including comparative information against previous years, information about systematic issues and the structure of the budget, as well as line-item budget details. Overall the German defence budget is highly transparent.
According to the German Freedom of Information Law, everyone 'is entitled to official information from the authorities of the Federal Government in accordance with the provisions of this Act'. It specifies that the entitlement to access to information shall not apply 'where disclosure of the information may have detrimental effects on . . . military and other security-critical interests of the Federal Armed Forces'. In general '[a]ccess to the information should be provided within one month'. There is furthermore an appeal process for those who consider their right to information to have been violated.
There is no evidence to suggest that those regulations are not strictly upheld. In a document with all parliamentary questions and answers from 2013, one question concerned the number of access to information requests to the German Ministry of Defence (BMVg) and a breakdown of which answers were and were not replied to and on what grounds. The BMVg answered this question in full and provided the breakdown.
- Bundesrechnungshof. “Bemerkungen 2013 zur Haushalts- und Wirtschaftsführung des Bundes.” Last modified April 29, 2014, http://www.bundesrechnungshof.de/de/veroeffentlichungen/bemerkungen-jahresberichte/2013-weitere-pruefungsergebnisse/inhalt/2013-bemerkungen-gesamtbericht-weitere-pruefungsergebnisse-pdf
- BMVg. “Verteidigungshaushalt 2013.” Last modified December 3, 2013, http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/!ut/p/c4/Nck9DoAgDEDhs3gBSkxc3LyFupCiDTb8aKDg9WUxL9_0YIdewsYOhe-EAVbYDp7tq2xsTkVOXIQy16gaZSE-2dXkyoW1C2JGrSd1UjbopVIIZP4Fj1-GD5nD8bI!/
- Federal Act Governing Access to Information held by the Federal Government
(Freedom of Information Act), http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_ifg/index.html
- Schriftliche Fragen mit den in der Woche vom 9. September 2013 eingegangenen Antworten der Bundesregierung, http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/17/147/1714744.pdf
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Government Update March 2015:
Link update: http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/!ut/p/c4/NYxNC8IwEET_UTbxIOqtpSAi9OBF21vahLiQj7LdxIs_3uTgDPMuDwZmqI26oNOMKWoPL5hWvCwfsYTiRMCIO1vCHESxxBYNuhzd_ta5zjM824OxYk3RciPbyFjpSHMisSVi30wmqkaggUmqoZdK_qO-5_HeXefj4TTc-gdsIXQ_EI9lHw!!/
https://www.bundesrechnungshof.de/de/veroeffentlichungen/bemerkungen-jahresberichte/jahresberichte/2014
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are sources of defence income other than from central government allocation (from equipment sales or property disposal, for example) published and scrutinised?
Defence income from sources other than the central government allocation are included in the budget of the Ministry of Defence, as well as all other parts of the budget, and are scrutinised by the Federal Audit Office. The evaluation reports can be found in the Annual Reports on Federal Financial Management “Bemerkungen”, Category C: “Sonstige Prüfungs und Beratungsergebnisse”.
Defence income other than from central government allocation is broken down in a detailed manner and explanations and descriptions are provided for each line. The defence budget specifies that this income flows directly into expenditure and lists this expenditure below the income.
- Bundesrechnungshof. “Bemerkungen 2013 zur Haushalts- und Wirtschaftsführung des Bundes.” Last modified April 29, 2014, http://www.bundesrechnungshof.de/de/veroeffentlichungen/bemerkungen-jahresberichte/2013-weitere-pruefungsergebnisse/inhalt/2013-bemerkungen-gesamtbericht-weitere-pruefungsergebnisse-pdf
- BMVg. “Verteidigungshaushalt 2013.” Last modified December 3, 2013, http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/!ut/p/c4/Nck9DoAgDEDhs3gBSkxc3LyFupCiDTb8aKDg9WUxL9_0YIdewsYOhe-EAVbYDp7tq2xsTkVOXIQy16gaZSE-2dXkyoW1C2JGrSd1UjbopVIIZP4Fj1-GD5nD8bI!/
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Government Update March 2015:
Link update: http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/!ut/p/c4/NYxNC8IwEET_UTbxIOqtpSAi9OBF21vahLiQj7LdxIs_3uTgDPMuDwZmqI26oNOMKWoPL5hWvCwfsYTiRMCIO1vCHESxxBYNuhzd_ta5zjM824OxYk3RciPbyFjpSHMisSVi30wmqkaggUmqoZdK_qO-5_HeXefj4TTc-gdsIXQ_EI9lHw!!/
https://www.bundesrechnungshof.de/de/veroeffentlichungen/bemerkungen-jahresberichte/jahresberichte/2014
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is there an effective internal audit process for defence ministry expenditure (that is, for example, transparent, conducted by appropriately skilled individuals, and subject to parliamentary oversight)?
Within the Ministry of Defence, the “Budget and Controlling” division supervises military expenditure and represents the Ministry of Defence to the Treasury. Military expenditure is indirectly subject to Parliamentary oversight, as it is included in the annual federal budget voting process. Additionally, the Bundestag's “Budget Committee” is responsible for controlling all government budgetary activity.
It is parliamentary custom that the Budget Committee is chaired by a member of the largest opposition parliamentary group.
While it is highly likely that the government takes its findings into account, no clear evidence of this was found and the score has been awarded accordingly.
- Bundesministerium der Verteidigung. “The Directorate-General for Budget and Controlling.” Last modified December 03, 2013, http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/!ut/p/c4/Fc1BDsJACEDRG8HenafQupkwLaVEYEwL9fra_O1LPr7wX9CpQqkjyPCJ06y3_oXup4Br6JG8azlQrZ2qrRXvy8Ki3Kgnq1UIB2xUx0aWrWJp84jch5mG4OOamODEgR_3-w-YCzCu/
- Deutscher Bundestag. “Budget Committee.” Last modified 2014, http://www.bundestag.de/htdocs_e/bundestag/committees/a08/index.jsp
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is there effective and transparent external auditing of military defence expenditure?
The Federal Audit Office, the “Bundesrechnungshof”, acts independently as an external auditor of the German defence budget, as mandated in Paragraph (2) of Article 114 of the German Basic Law. The Federal Audit Office publishes a publicly available bi-annual audit impact report in addition to providing recommendations to the Parliament at a regular basis. The publicly available Annual Reports on Federal Financial Management “Bemerkungen”, Category C “Sonstige Prüfungs und Beratungsergebnisse” contain evaluation and analysis of defence budget expenditure.
The Federal Audit Office’s Annual Report covers defence from pp. 251. The defence section, however, does not include any references to corruption. In terms of defence purchases, the then Social Democratic defence spokesperson identified “structural problems of non-transparency” for defence procurement in February 2014. The Social Democrats are and have been the junior government coalition partner in the 'Grand Coalition'.
The report furthermore refers to cases in which the Federal Audit Office made recommendations to the Ministry of Defence which were adapted, albeit the implementation was sometimes delayed which the Federal Audit Office criticised sharply.
- Bundesrechnungshof. “Bemerkungen 2014 zur Haushalts- und Wirtschaftsführung des Bundes.” Last modified November 26, 2014, https://www.bundesrechnungshof.de/de/veroeffentlichungen/bemerkungen-jahresberichte/jahresberichte/2014/inhalt/2014-bemerkungen-gesamtbericht-pdf
- Bundesrechnungshof. “Status.” Last modified 2014. https://www.bundesrechnungshof.de/en/bundesrechnungshof/stellung
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Government Update March 2015:
Link update: https://www.bundesrechnungshof.de/de/veroeffentlichungen/bemerkungen-jahresberichte/jahresberichte/2014
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is there evidence that the country's defence institutions have controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country's natural resource exploitation and, if so, are these interests publicly stated and subject to scrutiny?
No evidence could be found that the country’s defence institutions have any controlling or financial interest in businesses associated with the country’s natural resource exploitation. There is also no evidence that suggests this in the external audit findings published in the annual &quoute;Beteiligungsbericht&quoute;, which publishes the results of independent scrutiny of military-owned businesses by private audit companies according to international standards as well as those of the Federal Audit Office. Legislative scrutiny is regulated by Article 69 of the “Bundeshaushaltsordnung”.
The current Defence Policy Guidelines, written in 2011, stress the importance of natural resources and one can see that the Ministry of Defence as well as other ministries in Germany have put more emphasis on potential security problems concerning resource scarcity. Yet these efforts, especially within the armed forces, were mainly conducted to get a better understanding of worldwide geostrategic issues, such as the 2010 Peak Oil Report.
- Dobelmann, Jan Kai, “ Bundeswehrstudie zu den Auswirkungen einer Ölknappheit.”, Sonnenenergie, November-Dezember 2010, accessed May 02, 2014, http://www.sonnenenergie.de/sonnenenergie-redaktion/SE-2010-06/Layout-fertig/PDF/Einzelartikel/SE-2010-06-s016-Ressourcenknappheit-Bundeswehrstudie_Teil_1.pdf
- ISN (2011). German Defence Policy Guidelines 2011. http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?id=157024&lng=en
- Von Krause, U. “Die Bundeswehr als Instrument deutscher Aussenpolitik.” (Berlin: Springer, 2013).
- Rost, Norbert, “Peak Oil-Studie der Bundeswehr und ihre Bedeutung für Kommunen.” Peak-oil.com, March 04, 2011, accessed May 02, 2014, http://www.peak-oil.com/effizienzrevolution-nach-peak-oil/peak-oil-studie-bundeswehr/
- Die Beteiligungen des Bundes. Beteiligungsbericht 2012.” Last modified February, 2013, http://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/Content/DE/Standardartikel/Themen/Bundesvermoegen/Privatisierungs_und_Beteiligungspolitik/Beteiligungen_des_Bundes/beteiligungsbericht-2012-Anlage.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=2
- “Bundeshaushaltsordnung vom 19. August 1969 (BGBl. I S. 1284), die zuletzt durch Artikel 2 des Gesetzes vom 15. Juli 2013 (BGBl. I S. 2395) geändert worden ist“, http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bundesrecht/bho/gesamt.pdf
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is there evidence, for example through media investigations or prosecution reports, of a penetration of organised crime into the defence and security sector? If no, is there evidence that the government is alert and prepared for this risk?
Specific evidence of organised crime penetration of the defence and security sector could not be found.
According to the latest report on organised crime by the Federal Criminal Police Office (“Bundeskriminalamt”, BKA) however, unlawful exertion of influence in the areas of public administration, politics, media and economic crime happened in 26% of all cases of organised crime in 2012. 1.2% of total criminal activity involved corruption. 104 cases involved the public administration, but only half of those included a governmental body from Germany. The BKA reports provides evidence of the alertness and preparedness of the government against risks related to organised crime, and Germany seems to be putting forth a major effort fighting organised crime at the international level. One interesting example is the Federal Government mentioning the support of the fight against organised crime as one of the most important arguments for the extension of Germany's involvement in the Kosovo Force (KFOR).
- Bundeskriminalamt. “ Lagebilder Organisierte Kriminalität.” Last modified 2014, http://www.bka.de/DE/Publikationen/JahresberichteUndLagebilder/OrganisierteKriminalitaet/organisierteKriminalitaet__node.html?__nnn=true
- Auswärtiges Amt. “Die VN-Konvention gegen die grenzüberschreitende organisierte Kriminalität, einschließlich ihrer Zusatzprotokolle.” Last modified August 08, 2008, http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/Aussenpolitik/Friedenspolitik/VereinteNationen/Schwerpunkte/OKriminalitaet_node.html
- Bundesregierung. &quoute;Fortsetzung der deutschen Beteiligung an der internationalen Sicherheitspräsenz
in Kosovo auf der Grundlage der Resolution 1244 (1999) des Sicherheitsrates der
Vereinten Nationen vom 10. Juni 1999 und des Militärisch-Technischen
Abkommens zwischen der internationalen Sicherheitspräsenz (KFOR) und den
Regierungen der Bundesrepublik Jugoslawien (jetzt: Republik Serbien) und der
Republik Serbien vom 9. Juni 1999&quoute;. Last modified May 2014, http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/18/014/1801415.pdf
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is there policing to investigate corruption and organised crime within the defence services and is there evidence of the effectiveness of this policing?
As mentioned in the comments for Question 8, a special investigations branch (R II 1) Branch of the Legal Affairs Directorate exists, consisting of 30 investigators and former military prosecutors. R II 1 investigates corrupt practices and activities, working with various law enforcement agencies, drafting guidelines, and supervising their implementation and training.
The 2012 Annual Report of the Federal Ministry of the Interior mentioned three allegations of corruption within the Ministry of Defence (MoD) that led to further investigations and one legal trial. The investigation of such cases is initiated by the R II 1 Branch of the Legal Affairs Directorate of the MoD and is then turned over to external prosecutors. The process of investigating corruption is defined in the Federal Anti-corruption Guidelines and its implementing provision within the MoD. The guidelines also define specific reporting obligations for suspicious cases within Bundeswehr agencies.
Further, the Federal Criminal Police Office (Bundeskriminalamt) has authority to investigate criminal cases in defence institutions.
- Bundesministerium der Verteidigung. “Organisationsübersicht des Bundesministeriums der Verteidigung.” Last modified January 24, 2014, http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/!ut/p/c4/HYtBDoAgDMDe4ge2uzd_oV7MMEIWYBBg-H2R9NgWTxwIdXbUOAkF3PG4eTUvmNgdRBau7SmsEUitIb2siv9bSMXRsHOsOZBg9tvyAQuzF9c!/
- Y Punkt. “Gewissenhaft – ES kommt ungelegen.” Last modified December 04, 2013, http://www.y-punkt.de/portal/a/ypunkt/!ut/p/c4/LYvBCsIwEAX_aDexoQdvihQE0ZsaL5ImoS62SQjbFsGPNwHfwFyGhw8sBLPQYJhiMCPeUVva9iv0q_PPT5rDm8Fk-
- Schuler, R., “Korruptionsverdacht bei der Bundeswehr - Wurde bei Beratungsverträgen gemauschelt?”, Bild, July 05, 2012, accessed April 25, 2014, http://www.bild.de/politik/inland/bundeswehr/wurde-bei-beratungs-vertraegen-gemauschelt-25003654.bild.html
- Bundesministerium des Inneren. “Korruptionsprävention in der Bundesverwaltung. Jahresbericht 2012.” Last modified June 21, 2013, http://www.transparency.de/fileadmin/pdfs/Themen/Verwaltung/RPA-Bericht_2012_KW.pdf
- Bundeskriminalamt, https://www.bka.de/EN/Home/homepage__node.html?__nnn=true
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Source to be added:
http://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Themen/OED_Verwaltung/Korruption_Sponsoring/Richtlinie_zur_Korruptionspraevention_in_der_Bundesverwaltung.pdf?__blob=publicationFile (accessed 14.08.2014)
Government Update March 2015:
Link update: http://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Themen/OED_Verwaltung/Korruption_Sponsoring/jahresbericht-2013-korruptionspraevention.pdf?__blob=publicationFile
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are the policies, administration, and budgets of the intelligence services subject to effective, properly resourced, and independent oversight?
Germany has three different intelligence services, two of which are civilian agencies - the Federal Intelligence Service (BND) and the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV). One, the Military Counter-Intelligence Service (MAD), is part of the Ministry of Defence. All of them are subject to parliamentary scrutiny (overseen by the Parliamentary Control Committee) and the latter is also controlled by a state secretary in the MoD.
The work of the three intelligence services is defined in specific laws (“Gesetz über den Bundesnachrichtendienst”, “Bundesverfassungsschutzgesetz” and “Gesetz über den Militärischen Abschirmdienst”). While budget, administration, etc. are constantly monitored, they are only open to a relatively small group of parliamentarians in the committees, for example a selected group within the Budget Committee.
According to Transparency Germany there has been a lively debate on the transparency, competence and oversight of intelligence services in recent months.
- Streitkräftebasis. “Über uns.” Last modified February 26, 2014, http://www.kommando.streitkraeftebasis.de/portal/a/kdoskb/!ut/p/c4/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP3I5EyrpHK94uyk-OyUfL3y1MySlOKS4hK93MQUvdLUpNSi0rxi_YJsR0UAUKJtgw!!/
- Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz. “Aufsicht und Kontrolle.” Last modified n/a, http://www.verfassungsschutz.de/de/das-bfv/aufsicht-und-kontrolle
- Bundesnachrichtendienst. “Gesetzliche Grundlagen und Kontrollorgane.” Last modified n/a http://www.bnd.bund.de/DE/Arbeitsfelder/Gesetzliche_Kontrolle/gesetzliche_kontrolle_node.html
- Deutscher Bundestag. “Budget Committee.” Last modified 2014. http://www.bundestag.de/htdocs_e/bundestag/committees/a08/index.jsp
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Although we agree with the score, it is worth mentioning that there has been a lively debate on the transparency, competence and oversight of intelligence services in recent months.
Suggested score:
Are senior positions within the intelligence services filled on the basis of objective selection criteria, and are appointees subject to investigation of their suitability and prior conduct?
In Article 33, the German Constitution (Grundgesetz) stipulates that every German national has equal
opportunities to run for public offices if they bring the skills and knowledge needed to fill the position. This technically rules out the undue preference of senior officials for certain positions in the intelligence services, as officials in the intelligence services are also public servants.
The selection criteria for senior positions within the intelligence services have the same legal foundation as the selection criteria for other public servants, which are covered in the German Basic Law and more specifically the “Bundesbeamtengesetz” (Law for Holders of Public Offices). The &quoute;Bundesbeamtengesetz&quoute; does not specify specific selection criteria for senior officials within the state intelligence service, the &quoute;Bundesnachrichtendienst&quoute;.
The FAQ to the military intelligence service, &quoute;Militärischer Abschirmdienst&quoute;, specify that only existing officers in the Bundeswehr can apply for positions within the service. The list of questions does not give any information about the appointment of senior officials.
All intelligence services have some information on the application procedure and selection of candidates available on their websites. However, the vacancies advertised (October 2015) are not for senior positions but include positions for translators, interpreters, engineers etc.
It remains to be seen whether the likely introduction of a new legal expert with 20-30 staff (a so-called &quoute;Ständiger Sachverständiger&quoute;) might have a positive impact on the transparency of senior appointments.
A German magazine refers to vetting of individuals who join the &quoute;Bundesnachrichtendienst&quoute; relying on anecdotal evidence from one person who transferred from the Bundeswehr to the intelligence service. According to the article, the vetting procedure is very strict. It includes information about the candidates' personal life and other references, and its purpose is to avoid hiring individuals who can be subject to blackmail. However, this article does not specifically refer to senior positions within the intelligence services.
(Evidence re-reviewed and score changed to 2 during the finalisation stage of the assessment)
- “Bundesbeamtengesetz vom 5. Februar 2009 (BGBl. I S. 160), das durch Artikel 2 des Gesetzes vom 28. August 2013 (BGBl. I S. 3386) geändert worden ist”, http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bundesrecht/bbg_2009/gesamt.pdf
- German Constitution, &quoute;Grundgesetz&quoute;, 23 May 1949, https://www.bundestag.de/grundgesetz
- Streitkräftebasis. “Downloads.” Last modified February 26, 2014, http://www.kommando.streitkraeftebasis.de/portal/a/kdoskb/!ut/p/c4/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP3I5EyrpHK94uyk-OyUfL3y1MySlOKS4hK93MQUvZT88ryc_MQU_YJsR0UA2lBoRg!!/
- DPA, &quoute;„Ständiger Sachverständiger“ soll BND & Co. kontrollieren&quoute;, Focus Online, 26 August 2015, available at http://www.focus.de/politik/deutschland/parlament-staendiger-sachverstaendiger-soll-bnd-co-kontrollieren_id_4905167.html (last accessed on 30 October 2015)
- Spiegel, &quoute;James Bond käme nicht durchs Bewerbungsgespräch&quoute;, http://www.spiegel.de/karriere/berufsleben/auslandsagent-james-bond-kaeme-nicht-durchs-bewerbungsgespraech-a-899877.html
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Does the government have a well-scrutinised process for arms export decisions that aligns with international protocols, particularly the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)?
Germany’s arms export controls are defined by Paragraph (2) of Article 26 of the German Basic Law and the more specific “Kriegswaffenkontrollgesetz” and “Aussenwirtschaftsgesetz”. Germany also signed and ratified a number of international agreements including the ATT, the EU Common Position, the Waasenaar Arrangement and the UN Resolution 1540. The Federal Government provides an annual report on arms exports and also provides data for reports conducted by NGOs such as SIPRI.
The Government Reviewer has provided information on the Government's efforts for compliance with the ATT in his/her response below.
It seems that while there are effective rules and regulations for the control of arms exports, there has, nonetheless, been a growing critique regarding the transparency deficit of German arms export controls. The main reason for this is that the final decision, especially on controversial exports, happened in closed sessions by the “Bundessicherheitsrat” (Federal Security Council) headed by Chancellor Merkel. Information about the meetings and voting results are restricted, and up until 2014, the public was informed about the outcome of council decisions by a delay of up to two years.
Both the Government Reviewer and TI Chapter Reviewer have provided information on the improvements made to the arms export regime in regard to transparency and parliamentary oversight. There is evidence of public scrutiny as German weapons deals (especially to countries with questionable human rights) have been heavily discussed in the media. Overall, it seems that the situation regarding arms export controls has improved, but it is too early to consider this a drastic change of the current practice.
RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 2: The statement was focusing on the “situation regarding transparency in arms export controls” and while the overall improvements on arms control were significant, the effects on transparency were smaller. Comment edited as the scope of the question encompasses structural changes and oversight as well.
RESPONSE TO ALL REVIEWERS: As mentioned above, it is still too early to assess the impact of recent improvements and efforts of compliance with the ATT. Score raised to 3.
- Arms Trade Treaty, Country Profile, Germany, http://www.armstrade.info/countryprofile/germany/
- SIPRI. “Germany National Reports.” Last modified 2014, http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/transfers/transparency/national_reports/germany
- Bromley, Mark, “The review of the EU common position on arms exports: prospects for strengthened controls.”, Non-Proliferation Papers 7(2012): 1-18, http://www.sipri.org/research/disarmament/eu-consortium/publications/publications/non-proliferation-paper-7
- European Union. “Arms Export Control.” Last modified n/a, http://eeas.europa.eu/non-proliferation-and-disarmament/arms-export-control/index_en.htm
- Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie. “Bericht der Bundesregierung über ihre Exportpolitik für konventionelle Rüstungsgüter im Jahre 2012.” Last modified October, 2013, http://www.bmwi.de/DE/Mediathek/publikationen,did=603452.html
- Bundesverband der Deutschen Sicherheits- und Rüstungsindustrie. “Bundessicherheitsrat.” Last modified n/a, http://www.ruestungsindustrie.info/export/bundessicherheitsrat
- Glawe, R. “Der Bundessicherheitsrat als sicherheits- und rüstungspolitisches Koordinationselement.” Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt, 127-6(2012): 329-336.
- N.N. “Rüstungsexporte sollen transparenter werden.” Hannoverische Allgemeine, April 18, 2014, accessed May 05, 2014, http://www.haz.de/Nachrichten/Wirtschaft/Deutschland-Welt/Ruestungsindustrie-mit-mehr-Transparenz-bei-Exporten-einverstanden
- Wassenaar Arrangement. “Contacts and Information on National Export Control Policies.” Last modified May 12, 2014, http://www.wassenaar.org/participants/contacts.html
- Hoppe, Till, “Gabriel will Rüstungs-Deal mit Saudi-Arabien stoppen.” Handelsblatt, May 06, 2014, accessed May 06, 2014, http://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/airbus-und-kmw-betroffen-gabriel-will-ruestungs-deal-mit-saudi-arabien-stoppen/9854510.html
- “Gesetz über die Kontrolle von Kriegswaffen in der Fassung der Bekanntmachung vom 22. November 1990 (BGBl.
- I S. 2506), das zuletzt durch Artikel 2 Absatz 2 des Gesetzes vom 6. Juni 2013 (BGBl. I S. 1482) geändert worden ist”, http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/krwaffkontrg/index.html
- “Außenwirtschaftsgesetz vom 6. Juni 2013 (BGBl. I S. 1482)”, http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/awg_2013/
- &quoute;Germany: Heckler & Koch sues Ministry over export licence denial&quoute; Octover 30, 2015, http://www.defenceindustrydaily.com/mq-9-reaper-the-first-operational-ucav-05021/
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: The score is accurate but the statement that &quoute;arms controls has improved slightly&quoute; is problematic. The improvements in recent years have been significant, though, as the author points out, there are still key structural weaknesses to be addressed. The integration of this process into European legal codes also deserves mention.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: Government Update March 2015:
Statement by the German MoD with the aim of raising the score to level 4
Germany is committed to full implementation of Art. 7.1 iv, 11.5 and 15.6. of the ATT and is in full compliance with these provisions. Germany ratified the ATT on 2 April 2014 and is bound by the ATT’s provisions since the Treaty’s entry into force on 24 December 2014. Since 2 April 2014, Germany has provisionally applied paras 6 and 7 of the ATT, representing the Treaty’s core provisions. Article 7.1.iv has thus been an integral part of the legal framework governing arms export decisions since 2 April 2014. Since 24 December 2014 the ATT in its entirety is legally binding for German export control authorities.
The official memorandum - submitted as part of the legislative process - emphasizes with respect to para 15: States Parties are also encouraged to take national measures and to cooperate with each other to prevent corruption in connection with the trade in conventional arms. In the view of the German Government, international cooperation has a particularly important role to play in the implementation of the Treaty because of the cross-border nature of arms transfers and of the associated problems. The practice of States Parties over and above the fulfilment of their treaty obligations will largely determine the effectiveness of the ATT. Furthermore the chapters on para 7 and 11 describe the efforts of the German government during the ATT negotiations for achieving a strong and robust text, including the references to corruption.
Hence Germany suggests altering the assessment as follows:
Germany´s arms export control is strictly regulated. Its basis is paragraph 2 art. 26 of the German Constitution (Basic Law), the War Weapons Control Act and the Foreign Trade and Payments Act. Germany as a member of all relevant international export control regimes has signed and ratified all major international agreements on export control including the Arms Trade Treaty and strictly applies the EU common position.
Applying a restrictive export control policy improved transparency is a key issue of the current government’s coalition treaty. In 2014 the German Government altered and improved the procedural rules of the Federal Security Council. Consequently parliament is regularly informed about Federal Security Council's decisions on export licenses and vividly debates on all relevant export control issues. From 2014 onwards the annual export control report will be presented to the German Parliament already before the summer break and thus much earlier than in previous years. Additionally, in 2014 Parliament received the intermediate report on licenses granted in the first half year as early as October. In its answers to numerous minor and major interpellations, the Federal Government provided Parliament with detailed information on its export control policy and practice, including information on Federal Security Council decisions under previous governments. Transparency, public scrutiny and debate about German arms export control policy have significantly improved.
Additional link:
http://www.new-york-un.diplo.de/contentblob/4273854/Daten/4472412/2014724attmemorandum.pdf
Suggested score: 4
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: The Minister for Economics and Energy has introduced more transparent mechanisms and a stricter arms exports policy is visible. This is accompanied by a lively debate in parliament. Also the highest German court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) just recently issued a verdict on the constitutionality of the Bundessicherheitsrats executive decision power. This is not to say that other aspects of information about arms exports are not to be improved.
Suggested score: 4
How effective are controls over the disposal of assets, and is information on these disposals, and the proceeds of their sale, transparent?
Information on the disposal of assets and the proceeds of their sales can be found in the annual “Beteiligungsbericht” (Equity Holdings Report), and more specifically in the budget of the Ministry of Defence (Einzelplan 14). The report of the Federal Audit Office also includes information on the disposal of assets. The control of the disposal, as well as other financial aspects within the MoD, is provided either by the respective parliamentary committees or by the Federal Audit Office.
In terms of upcoming conversions (of the German or other militaries) as well as in terms of the announcement of individual opportunities, there is a special coordination entity in the MOD (Referat IUD I 3) that works jointly with the Federal Real Estate Office (Bundesanstalt für Immobilienaufgaben) and the relevant local and state authorities to plan conversion projects but also to conduct market analyses etc. The annual report of the Federal Real Estate Office lists those conversations including detailed information on who the asset went to and a what price. The so-called &quoute;Stationierungskonzept&quoute; specifies that , after giving up the military use, a planning process by the local authorities is required to determine civilian terminal use by third parties.
The &quoute;Gesellschaft für Entwicklung, Beschaffung und Betrieb mbh (g.e.b.b.)&quoute; is a military-owned business whose purpose is to reorganise some of the civilian functions of the Bundeswehr and MoD and to make them more cost-effective. This also includes asset disposals.
- Bundesrechnungshof. “Bemerkungen 2013 zur Haushalts- und Wirtschaftsführung des Bundes.” Last modified April 29, 2014, http://www.bundesrechnungshof.de/de/veroeffentlichungen/bemerkungen-jahresberichte/2013-weitere-pruefungsergebnisse/inhalt/2013-bemerkungen-gesamtbericht-weitere-pruefungsergebnisse-pdf
- BMVg. “Verteidigungshaushalt 2013.” Last modified December 3, 2013, http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/!ut/p/c4/Nck9DoAgDEDhs3gBSkxc3LyFupCiDTb8aKDg9WUxL9_0YIdewsYOhe-EAVbYDp7tq2xsTkVOXIQy16gaZSE-2dXkyoW1C2JGrSd1UjbopVIIZP4Fj1-GD5nD8bI!/
- Bundesministerium der Finanzen. “Die Beteiligungen des Bundes. Beteiligungsbericht 2012.” Last modified February, 2013, http://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/Content/DE/Standardartikel/Themen/Bundesvermoegen/Privatisierungs_und_Beteiligungspolitik/Beteiligungen_des_Bundes/beteiligungsbericht-2012-Anlage.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=2
- Bundesimmobilien. “Bundesanstalt für Immobilienaufgaben.” Last modified 2014. https://www.bundesimmobilien.de/
- &quoute;Stationierungskonzept&quoute;, Bundesanstalt für Immobilienaufgaben, https://www.bundesimmobilien.de/6275457/stationierungskonzept
- &quoute;Gemeinsame Koordinierungsstelle des Bundesministeriums der Verteidigung und des Bundesministeriums der Finanzen&quoute;, https://www.google.co.uk/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CCQQFjAAahUKEwiK8tzJs-rIAhUFtxQKHXGXA4I&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.bundeswehr.de%2Fresource%2Fresource%2FMzEzNTM4MmUzMzMyMmUzMTM1MzMyZTM2MzEzMDMwMzAzMDMwMzAzMDY4NjEzMjZjNjc2ZjM5NzIyMDIwMjAyMDIw%2FGemeinsame%2520Koordinierungsstelle%2520Konversion%252011-2012.pdf&usg=AFQjCNEQJVh41-LfTlfA6DVFcSo4bp-8DA&cad=rja
- Gesetz über die Bundesanstalt für Immobilienaufgaben (BImAG), http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bimag/BJNR323510004.html
- g.e.b.b. Geschäftsbericht 2004, http://gebb.de/dms/Dokumente/Broschueren/05_Geschaeftsbericht_050712/Geschaeftsbericht_050712.pdf
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Government Update March 2015:
Link update: http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/!ut/p/c4/NYxNC8IwEET_UTbxIOqtpSAi9OBF21vahLiQj7LdxIs_3uTgDPMuDwZmqI26oNOMKWoPL5hWvCwfsYTiRMCIO1vCHESxxBYNuhzd_ta5zjM824OxYk3RciPbyFjpSHMisSVi30wmqkaggUmqoZdK_qO-5_HeXefj4TTc-gdsIXQ_EI9lHw!!/
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is independent and transparent scrutiny of asset disposals conducted by defence establishments, and are the reports of such scrutiny publicly available?
The independent and transparent scrutiny of asset disposals is provided by the Federal Audit Office, as this is the external body responsible for the scrutiny of all public expenditures. Data is publicly available.
The Federal Disposal Sales and Marketing Agency (VEBEG), responsible for the asset disposal, is annually controlled by external audit companies as well as sporadically by the Federal Audit Office. The disposal of assets within the Ministry of Defence is additionally controlled by the Defence Committee and (as far as it is already discussed within the budget) the Budget Committee of the German Bundestag. This data is publicly available as well. The revenues of asset disposal for example can be found in the budget of the Ministry of Defence: &quoute;Erlöse aus der Veräusserung von beweglichen Sachen&quoute; (132 01 -032).
- Bundesrechnungshof. “Bemerkungen 2013 zur Haushalts- und Wirtschaftsführung des Bundes.” Last modified April 29, 2014, http://www.bundesrechnungshof.de/de/veroeffentlichungen/bemerkungen-jahresberichte/2013-weitere-pruefungsergebnisse/inhalt/2013-bemerkungen-gesamtbericht-weitere-pruefungsergebnisse-pdf
- Deutscher Bundestag. “Budget Committee.” Last modified 2014, http://www.bundestag.de/htdocs_e/bundestag/committees/a08/index.jsp
- BMVg (2013). Verteidigungshaushalt 2013. http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/!ut/p/c4/Nck9DoAgDEDhs3gBSkxc3LyFupCiDTb8aKDg9WUxL9_0YIdewsYOhe-EAVbYDp7tq2xsTkVOXIQy16gaZSE-2dXkyoW1C2JGrSd1UjbopVIIZP4Fj1-GD5nD8bI!/
- VEBEG (2014). &quoute;Unsere Dienstleistungen&quoute;. Last modified 2014, https://www.vebeg.de/web/de/unternehmen/service.htm
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Government Update March 2015:
Link update: http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/!ut/p/c4/NYxNC8IwEET_UTbxIOqtpSAi9OBF21vahLiQj7LdxIs_3uTgDPMuDwZmqI26oNOMKWoPL5hWvCwfsYTiRMCIO1vCHESxxBYNuhzd_ta5zjM824OxYk3RciPbyFjpSHMisSVi30wmqkaggUmqoZdK_qO-5_HeXefj4TTc-gdsIXQ_EI9lHw!!/
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
What percentage of defence and security expenditure in the budget year is dedicated to spending on secret items relating to national security and the intelligence services?
Only one of the three intelligence services is directly financed by the Ministry of Defence. In 2013, the MAD (Military Counter-Intelligence Service) received approximately 72 million Euros from a defence budget of 33.2 billion Euros, around 0.2% of the budget.
The BND (Federal Intelligence Service) is financed by the budget of the Federal Chancellery and the BfV (Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution) by the Ministry of Interior. Their budgets in 2013 were approximately 530 and 206 million Euros respectively (the exact numbers are stated in the Federal budgets, Einzelplan 4; 6 and 14).
Contrary to the budget of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defence does not have a dedicated sub-division dealing with secret expenditures. The secret expenditure of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is relatively small with an envisaged amount of 1 million Euro in 2013. This is in accordance with Article 19 of the Law of the Federal Audit Office.
In order to calculate the overall percentage of &quoute;secret spending&quoute;, spending of the BND, the BfV and the &quoute;secret&quoute; expenditure of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have have been considered as the total level of secret expenditure (72 million + 530 million + 206 million + 1 million Euros), thereby conflating the &quoute;defence and security&quoute; budget as well (33.2 billion + 530 million + 206 million + 1 million Euros). The figure arrived at is 2.38%. The score has been selected accordingly.
- BMVg. “Verteidigungshaushalt 2013.” Last modified December 3, 2013, http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/!ut/p/c4/Nck9DoAgDEDhs3gBSkxc3LyFupCiDTb8aKDg9WUxL9_0YIdewsYOhe-EAVbYDp7tq2xsTkVOXIQy16gaZSE-2dXkyoW1C2JGrSd1UjbopVIIZP4Fj1-GD5nD8bI!/
- “Bundesrechnungshofgesetz vom 11. Juli 1985 (BGBl. I S. 1445), das durch Artikel 15 Absatz 82 des Gesetzes vom 5. Februar 2009 (BGBl. I S. 160) geändert worden ist“, http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bundesrecht/brhg_1985/gesamt.pdf
- Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz. “Verfassungsschutzberichte.” Last modified June 2014, http://www.verfassungsschutz.de/de/oeffentlichkeitsarbeit/publikationen/verfassungsschutzberichte
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Government Update March 2015:
Link update: http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/!ut/p/c4/NYxNC8IwEET_UTbxIOqtpSAi9OBF21vahLiQj7LdxIs_3uTgDPMuDwZmqI26oNOMKWoPL5hWvCwfsYTiRMCIO1vCHESxxBYNuhzd_ta5zjM824OxYk3RciPbyFjpSHMisSVi30wmqkaggUmqoZdK_qO-5_HeXefj4TTc-gdsIXQ_EI9lHw!!/
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is the legislature (or the appropriate legislative committee or members of the legislature) given full information for the budget year on the spending of all secret items relating to national security and military intelligence?
While the Federal Audit Office oversees secret expenditure, based on subsection (a) of Article 10 of the Federal Budget Regulation, only a limited group of parliamentarians (a subcommittee of the Budget Committee which is referred to as the “Council of Trust”) has access to the full information on secret expenditure spending items relating to national security and military intelligence. This subcommittee is comprised of members from all parties of the Bundestag, and publishes a short bi-annual report on their activities, which is publicly available online.
- Deutscher Bundestag. “Bericht über die Tätigkeit des Vertrauensgremiums im Zeitraum Januar 2012 bis Juni 2013.” Last modified July 05, 2013, http://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btd/17/143/1714344.pdf
- “Bundeshaushaltsordnung vom 19. August 1969 (BGBl. I S. 1284), die zuletzt durch Artikel 2 des Gesetzes vom 15. Juli 2013 (BGBl. I S. 2395) geändert worden ist“, http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bundesrecht/bho/gesamt.pdf
- “Bundesrechnungshofgesetz vom 11. Juli 1985 (BGBl. I S. 1445), das durch Artikel 15 Absatz 82 des Gesetzes vom 5. Februar 2009 (BGBl. I S. 160) geändert worden ist“, http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bundesrecht/brhg_1985/gesamt.pdf
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are audit reports of the annual accounts of the security sector (the military, police, and intelligence services) and other secret programs provided to the legislature (or relevant committee) and are they subsequently subject to parliamentary debate?
The Federal Audit Office acts as an external supervisory body and evaluates all accounts of the security sector on a regular basis. Audit reports are distributed to the relevant parliamentary committees, such as the Defence Committee or the Council of Trust. Additionally (with exception to the accounts of the intelligence services) all members of the Bundestag and the parliamentary groups have the right to ask questions in accordance with Article 20 and Article 38 of the German Basic Law.
- Bundesrechnungshof. “Bemerkungen 2013 zur Haushalts- und Wirtschaftsführung des Bundes.” Last modified April 29, 2014, http://www.bundesrechnungshof.de/de/veroeffentlichungen/bemerkungen-jahresberichte/2013-weitere-pruefungsergebnisse/inhalt/2013-bemerkungen-gesamtbericht-weitere-pruefungsergebnisse-pdf
- Deutscher Bundestag. “Bericht über die Tätigkeit des Vertrauensgremiums im Zeitraum Januar 2012 bis Juni 2013.” Last modified July 05, 2013, http://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btd/17/143/1714344.pdf
- Wiegold, Thomas, “Für eine attraktivere Bundeswehr: Debatte mit erster Ministerinnen-Rede im Bundestag.”, Augen geradeaus!, January 16, 2014, accessed May 01, 2014, http://augengeradeaus.net/2014/01/fur-eine-attraktivere-bundeswehr-debatte-mit-erster-ministerinnen-rede-im-bundestag/
- Bundesministerium der Verteidigung. “Bundestag berät über Verteidigungshaushalt für 2013.” Last modified September 13, 2013, http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/!ut/p/c4/NYuxDsIwDET_yE7ogtiouiDUhQXClrZRZFQnlXHKwseTDNxJb7inwyfWJr9T9Eo5-RUf6GY6TR-YeI_wykXqCkyJ3hqECuO9fZYAc05BGzUkpcooXrPAlkXXZopINUALOmOH3ljzj_0e3eE6jqbrhkt_w435_AOda_lc/
- Deutscher Bundestag, 18. Wahlperiode, Drucksache 18/2872, 14. Oktober 2014, Antrag der Fraktion DIE LINKE, &quoute;Für eine transparente Haushaltskontrolle nachrichtendienstlicher Tätigkeiten&quoute;, available at http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/18/028/1802872.pdf (last accessed 30 October 2015).
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Off-budget military expenditures are those that are not formally authorised within a country's official defence budget, often considered to operate through the 'back-door'. In law, are off-budget military expenditures permitted, and if so, are they exceptional occurrences that are well-controlled?
There is no expenditure outside of the defence budget. Support by the armed forces with personnel or material in case of unforeseen events such as natural disasters can be initially funded by the Ministry of Defence (MoD), in which case the beneficiary must reimburse the MoD after the measure is completed. Although, in some exceptions, the reimbursement may be withdrawn by the Ministry of Finance.
- “Haushaltstechnische Richtlinien des Bundes (HRB).”, http://www.verwaltungsvorschriften-im-internet.de/bsvwvbund_15122008_IIA1.htm
- Heller, R. “Haushaltsgrundsätze für Bund, Länder und Gemeinden: Handbuch zum Management der öffentlichen Finanzen.”, Heidelberg: R.v.Decker, 2010.
- BMVg. “Verteidigungshaushalt 2013.” Last modified December 3, 2013, http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/!ut/p/c4/Nck9DoAgDEDhs3gBSkxc3LyFupCiDTb8aKDg9WUxL9_0YIdewsYOhe-EAVbYDp7tq2xsTkVOXIQy16gaZSE-2dXkyoW1C2JGrSd1UjbopVIIZP4Fj1-GD5nD8bI!/
- “Bundeshaushaltsordnung vom 19. August 1969 (BGBl. I S. 1284), die zuletzt durch Artikel 2 des Gesetzes vom 15. Juli 2013 (BGBl. I S. 2395) geändert worden ist“, http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bundesrecht/bho/gesamt.pdf
- Piraten Partei Thüringen. “Hochwasserhilfe der Bundeswehr - Steuerzahler wird doppelt zur Kasse gebeten.” Last modified June 12, 2013, http://www.wahlkreis-192.de/2013/06/12/hochwasserhilfe-der-bundeswehr-steuerzahler-wird-doppelt-zur-kasse-gebeten/
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Government Update March 2015:
Link update: http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/!ut/p/c4/NYxNC8IwEET_UTbxIOqtpSAi9OBF21vahLiQj7LdxIs_3uTgDPMuDwZmqI26oNOMKWoPL5hWvCwfsYTiRMCIO1vCHESxxBYNuhzd_ta5zjM824OxYk3RciPbyFjpSHMisSVi30wmqkaggUmqoZdK_qO-5_HeXefj4TTc-gdsIXQ_EI9lHw!!/
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
In practice, are there any off-budget military expenditures? If so, does evidence suggest this involves illicit economic activity?
All military expenditure is incorporated in the federal budget, specifically the budget of the Ministry of Defence (Einzelplan 14). In case the budget is not suitable for specific actions, a so called &quoute;Wirtschaftsplan&quoute; (business plan) has to be compiled and added to the original budget according to Article 26 of the Bundeshaushaltsordnung. Off-budget military expenditure is thus not existent in Germany.
- BMVg. “Verteidigungshaushalt 2013.” Last modified December 3, 2013, http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/!ut/p/c4/Nck9DoAgDEDhs3gBSkxc3LyFupCiDTb8aKDg9WUxL9_0YIdewsYOhe-EAVbYDp7tq2xsTkVOXIQy16gaZSE-2dXkyoW1C2JGrSd1UjbopVIIZP4Fj1-GD5nD8bI!/
- BMJV (1980). Bundeshaushaltsordnung (BHO). http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bundesrecht/bho/gesamt.pdf
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Government Update March 2015:
Link update: http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/!ut/p/c4/NYxNC8IwEET_UTbxIOqtpSAi9OBF21vahLiQj7LdxIs_3uTgDPMuDwZmqI26oNOMKWoPL5hWvCwfsYTiRMCIO1vCHESxxBYNuhzd_ta5zjM824OxYk3RciPbyFjpSHMisSVi30wmqkaggUmqoZdK_qO-5_HeXefj4TTc-gdsIXQ_EI9lHw!!/
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
In law, are there provisions regulating mechanisms for classifying information on the grounds of protecting national security, and, if so, are they subject to effective scrutiny?
Mechanisms for classifying information are based on the law “Gesetz über die Voraussetzungen und das Verfahren von Sicherheitsüberprüfungen des Bundes”, and on directives such as the “Verschlusssachenanweisung”. It does not seem to be the case that these mechanisms as such are subject to effective scrutiny.
Classified information is automatically declassified after 30 years, or earlier in case the agency responsible for classifying a specific document reevaluates the document. Yet it does not seem to be practicable to do so, due to the amount of resources needed for these procedures.
According to the German Freedom of Information Law, everyone 'is entitled to official information from the authorities of the Federal Government in accordance with the provisions of this Act'. It specifies that the entitlement to access to information shall not apply 'where disclosure of the information may have detrimental effects on . . . military and other security-critical interests of the Federal Armed Forces'. In general '[a]ccess to the information should be provided within one month'. There is furthermore an appeal process for those who consider their right to information to have been violated.
There is no evidence to suggest that those regulations are not strictly upheld. In a document with all parliamentary questions and answers from 2013, one question concerned the number of access to information requests to the German Ministry of Defence (BMVg) and a breakdown of which answers were and were not replied to and on what grounds. The BMVg answered this question in full and provided the breakdown.
RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 2 AND GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: Assessor agrees with comments. Score changed from 2 to 3. It remains unclear whether the mechanisms themselves are subject to scrutiny.
- Gaserow, Vera, “Innenministerium kippt Novelle zur Freigabe geheimer Akten.” Frankfurter Rundschau, February 26, 2009, accessed May 03, 2014, http://www.fr-online.de/politik/verschlossen-innenministerium-kippt-novelle-zur-freigabe-geheimer-akten,1472596,3195116.html
- “Sicherheitsüberprüfungsgesetz vom 20. April 1994 (BGBl. I S. 867), das zuletzt durch Artikel 4 des Gesetzes vom 7. Dezember 2011 (BGBl. I S. 2576) geändert worden ist”, http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/s_g/index.html
- “Allgemeine Verwaltungsvorschrift des Bundesministeriums des Innern zum materiellen und organisatorischen Schutz von Verschlusssachen (VS-Anweisung – VSA) vom 31. März 2006 in der Fassung vom 26. April 2010 (GMBl 2010, S. 846)”, http://www.verwaltungsvorschriften-im-internet.de/bsvwvbund_31032006_IS46065201.htm
- Federal Act Governing Access to Information held by the Federal Government
(Freedom of Information Act), http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_ifg/index.html
- Schriftliche Fragen mit den in der Woche vom 9. September 2013 eingegangenen Antworten der Bundesregierung, http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/17/147/1714744.pdf
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: Though the author's rationale is technically correct, the spirit of the question is whether or not the government in question can arbitrarily classify documents as secret. This is, as the author correctly explains, not the case in Germany. In fact the opposite is often true.
Suggested score: 4
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: Statement by German MoD with the aim to raise the score to level 3:
Responsibility for regulations on classifying information to protect national security, such as the Regulations on the Classification and Protection of Sensitive Information [Verschlusssachenanweisung - VSA] which deals extensively with the classification and release of sensitive information, lies with the Ministry of the Interior as the national authority for internal security.
Depending on its sensitivity, information and material can as a rule be classified for up to 30 years; only in exceptional cases is a longer period possible. Regular revisions of the classification are to be carried out to downgrade or declassify information as soon as this is feasible based on its sensitivity.
The VSA itself sets out the conditions and mechanisms for monitoring and complying with security standards, as well as the obligations to report abuse and violations of the regulations and the associated consequences.
In the field of information technology, security standards are developed and effectively controlled by the Federal Office for Information Security [Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik - BSI].
The Act on the Preconditions and Procedures for Federal Security Screenings [Gesetz über die Voraussetzungen und das Verfahren von Sicherheitsüberprüfungen des Bundes] sets out the conditions for accessing and handling classified information and material in line with the law on data protection. Control over the procedures and security requirements for security screened personnel lies in the hand of specially-trained employees known as “Security Representatives” [Sicherheitsbeauftragten] whose task it is to ensure that staff in sensitive functions satisfy the security requirements. as “Security Representatives”are in turn overseen by the Commissioner for the Security of Information [Geheimschutzbeauftragter] as the final and highest supervisory authority.
The combination of mandatory preconditions to evaluate information, the selection and monitoring of the personnel handling such information and the security and protection measures under various laws is considered very effective, especially against any abuse of official powers and competences.
Source to be added:
http://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Themen/Sicherheit/SicherheitAllgemein/VSA.html
Suggested score: 3
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Do national defence and security institutions have beneficial ownership of commercial businesses? If so, how transparent are details of the operations and finances of such businesses?
The annual &quoute;Beteiligungsbericht&quoute; discloses the German government’s financial participation in commercial business, including the commercial activity and beneficial ownership of the Ministry of Defence (Article 65 of the &quoute;Bundeshaushaltsordnung&quoute; (BHO) provides guidance for beneficial ownership of commercial businesses).
The report is generated by the Treasury and is comprised of the findings from external audit companies. These reports are subject to the scrutiny of the Federal Audit Office and are available to the public. The companies, however, do not appear to publish annual reports on their respective websites.
- Bundesministerium der Finanzen. “Die Beteiligungen des Bundes. Beteiligungsbericht 2012.” Last modified February, 2013, http://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/Content/DE/Standardartikel/Themen/Bundesvermoegen/Privatisierungs_und_Beteiligungspolitik/Beteiligungen_des_Bundes/beteiligungsbericht-2012-Anlage.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=2
- “Bundeshaushaltsordnung vom 19. August 1969 (BGBl. I S. 1284), die zuletzt durch Artikel 2 des Gesetzes vom 15. Juli 2013 (BGBl. I S. 2395) geändert worden ist“, http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bundesrecht/bho/gesamt.pdf
- Bundeswehr. “Fuhrparkservice.” Last modified n/a, http://www.bwfuhrpark.de/de/
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Government Update March 2015:
Link update: http://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/Content/DE/Standardartikel/Themen/Bundesvermoegen/Privatisierungs_und_Beteiligungspolitik/Beteiligungen_des_Bundes/Beteiligungsbericht-2014.html
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are military-owned businesses subject to transparent independent scrutiny at a recognised international standard?
Military-owned businesses are subject to independent scrutiny by private audit companies according to international standards as well as by the Federal Audit Office, which acts independently as an external auditor of the German defence budget (see Q15).
The combined findings are published in the annual “Beteiligungsbericht”. Legislative scrutiny is regulated by Article 69 of the “Bundeshaushaltsordnung”. The &quoute;Beteiligungsbericht&quoute; includes the shareholder structure, the corporate purpose, the annual business as well as an excerpt of the financial report (rough income statement, balance sheet and equity ratio). It also includes financial contributions, management salaries, earnings of the board of directors and the name of the auditor of each company. However, the audit details seem to be only available in this abbreviated form in the &quoute;Beteiligungsbericht&quoute; as the companies do not seem to publish annual reports on their webpages. These critical reports of the Federal Audit Office are often debated in the public.
- Friedrichs, Hauke & Staud, Toralf, “Teuer und schlecht.”, Die Zeit, December 13, 2013, accessed April 23, 2014, http://www.zeit.de/2013/50/herkules-computertechnik-bundeswehr/seite-2
- Bundesministerium der Finanzen. “Die Beteiligungen des Bundes. Beteiligungsbericht 2012.” Last modified February, 2013, http://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/Content/DE/Standardartikel/Themen/Bundesvermoegen/Privatisierungs_und_Beteiligungspolitik/Beteiligungen_des_Bundes/beteiligungsbericht-2012-Anlage.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=2
- “Bundeshaushaltsordnung vom 19. August 1969 (BGBl. I S. 1284), die zuletzt durch Artikel 2 des Gesetzes vom 15. Juli 2013 (BGBl. I S. 2395) geändert worden ist“, http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bundesrecht/bho/gesamt.pdf
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Government Update March 2015:
Link update: http://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/Content/DE/Standardartikel/Themen/Bundesvermoegen/Privatisierungs_und_Beteiligungspolitik/Beteiligungen_des_Bundes/Beteiligungsbericht-2014.html
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is there evidence of unauthorised private enterprise by military or other defence ministry employees? If so, what is the government's reaction to such enterprise?
In accordance with Article 20 of the “Soldatengesetz” and Article 97 to 101 of the “Bundesbeamtengesetz” (BBG), the Ministry of Defence distinguishes between ancillary activities that are subject to approval (Article 99 of the BBG) and activities that need no approval (Article 100 of the BBG).
A 2013 report by the Federal Government mentioned a maximum of 16 cases annually between 2010 and 2012 that required authorisation, and 12 cases that required no authorisation. Between 2010 and 2012 9 individuals were prosecuted for unauthorised activities. It seems the Ministry of Defence has a very stringent and effective policy regarding unauthorised private enterprise by military or other defence ministry employees.
Further ways to sanction misconduct are to be found in Article 23 Soldatengesetz (Legal Status of Military Personnel Act) and Article 77 Bundesbeamtengesetz (Federal Civil Service Act ).
Beyond that, contractors of the Bundeswehr undertake in the &quoute;Zusätzlichen Vertragsbedingungen des BMVg zur VOL Teil B&quoute; (Additional Contractual Provisions of the MoD concerning Part B of the Conditions Concerning Contracts for Supplies and Services) that they will not employ civil servants or soldiers, neither whilst on active duty nor after retirement, in secondary employment without approval of the MoD. Infringement will result in contractual penalties.
- “Bundesbeamtengesetz vom 5. Februar 2009 (BGBl. I S. 160), das durch Artikel 2 des Gesetzes vom 28. August 2013 (BGBl. I S. 3386) geändert worden ist”, http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bundesrecht/bbg_2009/gesamt.pdf
- “Soldatengesetz in der Fassung der Bekanntmachung vom 30. Mai 2005 (BGBl. I S. 1482), das zuletzt durch Artikel 8 des Gesetzes vom 28. August 2013 (BGBl. I S. 3386) geändert worden ist”, http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/sg/index.html
- BAAINBw. “Vertragsbedingungen.” Last modified November 26, 2013, http://www.baain.de/portal/a/baain/!ut/p/c4/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP3I5EyrpHK9pMTEzDy9stSi9MSkVL20_KLc0pxEEL-kKDFdvyDbUREAjcSb9A!!/
- Die Linke. “Ausmass von Nebentätigkeiten von Mitarbeiterinnen und Mitarbeitern in Bundesministerien und -behörden.” Last modified April 11, 2013, http://www.linksfraktion.de/kleine-anfragen/ausmass-nebentaetigkeiten-mitarbeiterinnen-mitarbeitern-bundesministerien-behoerden/
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Further ways to sanction miscoduct are to be found in Article 23 Soldatengesetz (Legal Status of Military Personnel Act) and Article 77 Bundesbeamtengesetz (Federal Civil Service Act ).
Beyond that contractors of the Bundeswehr undertake in the Zusätzlichen Vertragsbedingungen des BMVg zur VOL Teil B (Additional Contractual Provisions of the MoD concerning Part B of the Conditions Concerning Contracts for Supplies and Services) that they will not employ civil servants or soldiers, neither whilst on active duty nor after retirement, in secondary employment without approval of the MoD: Infringement will result in contractual penalties.
Government Update March 2015:
Link update: http://www.baainbw.de/portal/a/baain/!ut/p/c4/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP3I5EyrpHK9pMTEzDy9stSi9MSkVL20_KLc0pxEEL-kKDFdvyDbUREAjcSb9A!!/
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Do the Defence Ministry, Defence Minister, Chiefs of Defence, and Single Service Chiefs publicly commit - through, for example, speeches, media interviews, or political mandates - to anti-corruption and integrity measures?
While there is much legal evidence that the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and its officials support anti-corruption measures, such as ratification of most international agreements on this topic, there is scant evidence that any representatives of the MoD have publicly committed to domestic anti-corruption and integrity measures.
German government representatives do not generally appear to perceive an identified need for domestic anti-corruption measures, although they can be vocal about the need for anti-corruption measures vis-à-vis allied countries. Evidence could for example be found that the former Minister of Defence actively asked for better anti-corruption measures in countries where the Bundeswehr was stationed.
- N.N., “Bundeswehr wusste von Korruption bei Siemens.”, Merkur-online, August 30, 2008, accessed April 26, 2014, http://www.merkur-online.de/aktuelles/wirtschaft/bundeswehr-wusste-korruption-siemens-91378.html
- Hollstein, Miriam & Meier, Simone, “Korruptionsverdacht - Neuer Ärger für de Maizière.” Die Welt, May 26, 2013, accessed May 04, 2014, http://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article116534761/Korruptionsverdacht-Neuer-Aerger-fuer-de-Maiziere.html
- Kohler, Berthold, “Guttenberg fordert Karzai zum Kampf gegen Korruption auf.”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, November 13, 2009, accessed May 03, 2014, http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/ausland/afghanistan-guttenberg-fordert-karzai-zum-kampf-gegen-korruption-auf-1881470.html
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: While there can certainly be improvement in this area, the commitment is visible &quoute;though perhaps not strongly&quoute; (as the criteria for 3 points mentions). For instance on the website of the defence ministry you can find information on &quoute;corruption prevention&quoute; (http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/!ut/p/c4/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP3I5EyrpHK9pNyydL3i1KKyzORU_YJsR0UAWMo18Q!!/) and the concept of &quoute;Innere Führung&quoute; also stresses behavior that builds on integrity.
Suggested score: 3
Are there effective measures in place for personnel found to have taken part in forms of bribery and corruption, and is there public evidence that these measures are being carried out?
Cases of bribery or corruption may lead to multi-year prison sentences or fines, according to Articles 331 to 358 of the German Strafgesetzbuch. In cases involving public employees, condemnation can additionally lead to disciplinary measures and, in more severe cases, to the loss of jobs, pension and medical allowance claims.
There is evidence that the Ministry of Defence acts quite rigidly in such cases and that the respective branch within the Legal Affairs Directorate works very closely with external prosecutors. The Annual Corruption Report of the Federal Criminal Police Office reported that approximately 40 individuals in the military were prosecuted in 2012 for acts of bribery or corruption.
Personnel involved in corruption or bribery is liable to restitute pecuniary advantages obtained in a breach of duty, unless forfeiture for the benefit of the exchequer has already been decreed in the criminal proceedings ( §§ 73 ff StGB [German Criminal Code]) or the advantage obtained has already passed to the government in another way. In addition, Bundeswehr members are liable to pay damages caused by premeditated or grossly negligent breaches of duty.
- N.N. “Beschaffung von Sturmgewehren: Bundeswehr unter Korruptionsverdacht.” Der Spiegel, May 26, 2013, accessed May 01, 2014, http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/bundeswehr-geraet-bei-beschaffung-unter-verdacht-der-korruption-a-901929.html
- &quoute;Strafgesetzbuch in der Fassung der Bekanntmachung vom 13. November 1998 (BGBl. I S. 3322), das zuletzt durch Artikel 1 des Gesetzes vom 23. April 2014 (BGBl. I S. 410) geändert worden ist&quoute; http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/stgb/index.html
- Bundeskriminalamt. “Lagebilder Korruption.” Last modified 2014, http://www.bka.de/nn_193376/DE/Publikationen/JahresberichteUndLagebilder/Korruption/korruption__node.html?__nnn=true
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Personnel involved in corruption or bribery is liable to restitute pecuniary advantages obtained in a breach of duty, unless forfeiture for the benefit of the exchequer has already been decreed in the criminal proceedings ( §§ 73 ff StGB [German Criminal Code]) or the advantage obtained has already passed to the government in another way. In addition, Bundeswehr members are liable to pay damages caused by premeditated or grossly negligent breaches of duty.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is whistleblowing encouraged by the government, and are whistle-blowers in military and defence ministries afforded adequate protection from reprisal for reporting evidence of corruption, in both law and practice?
The Federal Government Directive concerning the Prevention of Corruption in the Federal Administration, as well as the implementing provision of the Ministry of Defence, require the establishment of a “contact person for corruption prevention”. The website has statements that encourage whistle-blowing.
Subsection (a) of Paragraph (1) of Article 5 of the Directive clearly states that public servants can directly talk to the contact person regardless of the official chain of command in the respective agency. Citizens can also contact this person directly. The directive encourages individuals to report corruption where they witness it and reiterates the importance of providing evidence.
The “Code of Practice against Corruption” referenced has several Articles that directly discuss whistleblowing (3, 6 and 9), and the commentary for Article 6 states that the contact person has to observe secrecy when requested by an individual.
In terms of legal protection for whistle-blowers, a 2014 report which evaluated the same across G20 countries found that there were only limited legal provisions for protection which applied only to public officials reporting bribery or acceptance of gratuities. Specifically, the report found the the &quoute;provisions and protections for anonymous reporting&quoute; and &quoute;broad retaliation protections&quoute; to be &quoute;somewhat or partially comprehensive&quoute;, while &quoute;confidentiality protection&quoute; and the requirement of &quoute;internal disclosure procedures&quoute; to be &quoute;absent/not at all comprehensive&quoute;. Further, as there is no dedicated national agency to receive such complaints, it is mostly up to labour courts to determine whether a whistle-blower could be compensated or protected.
There are isolated cases of individuals reporting irregularities or other issues (to the media) but these cases were not directly related to corruption. Evidence could not be found if those cases were first brought to the contact person for corruption prevention and if they were dealt with adequately.
- Bundesministerium der Verteidigung. “Ansprechperson für Korruptionsprävention im BMVg.”, Last modified December 03, 2013, http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/!ut/p/c4/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP3I5EyrpHK9pNyydL3i1KKyzORUvez8oqLSApCS4oKixNSy1DwQW78g21ERAIDy0-Q!/
- Richtlinie der Bundesregierung zur Korruptionsprävention in der Bundesverwaltung. “Richtlinie der Bundesregierung zur Korruptionsprävention in der Bundesverwaltung, July 30, 2004” http://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Themen/OED_Verwaltung/Korruption_Sponsoring/Richtlinie_zur_Korruptionspraevention_in_der_Bundesverwaltung.html
- BAAINBw. “Ansprechperson für Korruptionsprävention.” Last modified November 26, 2013, http://www.baain.de/portal/a/baain/!ut/p/c4/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP3I5EyrpHK9pMTEzDy94tSisszkVL3s_KKi0gKQGv2CbEdFAHqfuYU!/
- S Wolfe, M Worth, S Dreyfus, AJ Brown &quoute;Whistleblower Protection Laws in G20 Countries&quoute;, Transparency International Australia/Blue Print for Free Speech, 2014, https://www.transparency.de/fileadmin/pdfs/Themen/Hinweisgebersysteme/Whistleblower-Protection-Laws-in-G20-Countries-Priorities-for-Action.pdf
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Government Update March 2015:
Link update: http://www.baainbw.de/portal/a/baain/!ut/p/c4/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP3I5EyrpHK9pMTEzDy94tSisszkVL3s_KKi0gKQGv2CbEdFAHqfuYU!/
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is special attention paid to the selection, time in post, and oversight of personnel in sensitive positions, including officials and personnel in defence procurement, contracting, financial management, and commercial management?
Article 4 of the Federal Government Directive concerning the Prevention of Corruption in the Federal Administration requires special attention for the selection of personnel in areas with a higher corruption risk and furthermore limits the time in post for this personnel to a maximum length of five years. Exceptions to this rule are possible but have to be justified by the respective agency.
Additionally, there is an array of special requirements for sensitive areas. For example, subsection (1) of paragraph (5) of Article 11 of the additional contractual provisions for service agreements with the Ministry of Defence (MoD) defines post-retirement restrictions for public servants and requires a “certificate of non-objection” from the MoD, as well as defining that retired public servants may not take up posts with tendering companies within three years. However, corruption cases in the media imply that due diligence procedures, especially concerning procurement and tender processes, are lacking.
RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: The criterion for a score of 4 demands that these positions are openly declared and the specific rules of conduct associated with such position are made available. This does not seem to be the case. Score maintained.
- Bundesministerium des Inneren “Initiativkreis Korruptionsprävention - Wirtschaft/Bundesverwaltung.”, n/a, accessed April 28, 2014, http://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Themen/OED_Verwaltung/Korruption_Sponsoring/initiativkreis_korruptionspraevention.pdf?__blob=publicationFile
- Schuler, R., “Korruptionsverdacht bei der Bundeswehr - Wurde bei Beratungsverträgen gemauschelt?”, Bild, July 05, 2012, accessed April 25, 2014, http://www.bild.de/politik/inland/bundeswehr/wurde-bei-beratungs-vertraegen-gemauschelt-25003654.bild.html
- Richtlinie der Bundesregierung zur Korruptionsprävention in der Bundesverwaltung. “Richtlinie der Bundesregierung zur Korruptionsprävention in der Bundesverwaltung, July 30, 2004” http://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Themen/OED_Verwaltung/Korruption_Sponsoring/Richtlinie_zur_Korruptionspraevention_in_der_Bundesverwaltung.html
- BAAINBw. “Vertragsbedingungen.” Last modified November 26, 2013, http://www.baain.de/portal/a/baain/!ut/p/c4/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP3I5EyrpHK9pMTEzDy9stSi9MSkVL20_KLc0pxEEL-kKDFdvyDbUREAjcSb9A!!/
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: Statement by German MoD with the aim to raise the score to level 4:
Based on the implementing provision “Government Guideline on the Prevention of Corruption in the Federal Administration” [Richtlinie der Bundeswehr zur Korruptionsprävention in der Bundesverwaltung] and the internal regulation “General Service Regulation on Implementation of the Federal Government Guideline on the Prevention of Corruption” (Zentrale Dienstvorschrift zur Umsetzung zur Richtlinie der Bundesregierung zur Korruptionsprävention) every 5 years at the latest a corruption survey takes place, identifying areas and positions of high corruption risk. Identified personnel shall remain no longer than 5 years in a position of identified high corruption risk.
By law, specifically § 20 of the German Legal Status of Military Personnel Act [Soldatengesetz] and § 99 of the Federal Public Servants Act [Bundesbeamtengesetz], any secondary employment of soldiers and civil servants on active duty requires official authorisation and may not be permitted if there is a conflict of interest. The same applies to retired personnel for up to 5 years after ceasing work.
Contractual penalties in accordance with No. 11.5 of the Additional Contractual Terms for the Ministry of Defence [Zusätzliche Vertragsbedingungen BMVg] apply if contactors for the armed forces employ such personnel without approval from the MoD. Personnel taking up such employment without official authorisation will be subject to disciplinary action.
Private contractors may have to sign anti-corruption clauses according to Article 12 of the Government Guideline on the Prevention of Corruption in the Federal Administration, and have to adhere to standards defined in the Guideline in accordance with Article 1 of the “Verpflichtungsgesetz”.
In the view of the MoD these regulations are comprehensive and sufficient.
Suggested score: 4
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: There seem to be decent mechanisms in place and a score of only three not based on sufficient argument.
Suggested score: 4
Is the number of civilian and military personnel accurately known and publicly available?
The number of civilian and military personnel is available in Article 2 of the Preliminary Note to the budget of the Ministry of Defence in accordance with subsection (a) of Article 87 of the German Basic Law. Moreover, the organisational structure and information about commanding personnel is available on the Ministry of Defence website, and respectively on the websites of the specific agencies.
- BMVg. “Verteidigungshaushalt 2013.” Last modified December 3, 2013, http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/!ut/p/c4/Nck9DoAgDEDhs3gBSkxc3LyFupCiDTb8aKDg9WUxL9_0YIdewsYOhe-EAVbYDp7tq2xsTkVOXIQy16gaZSE-2dXkyoW1C2JGrSd1UjbopVIIZP4Fj1-GD5nD8bI!/
- Bundesministerium der Verteidigung. “Organisationsübersicht des Bundesministeriums der Verteidigung.” Last modified January 24, 2014, http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/!ut/p/c4/HYtBDoAgDMDe4ge2uzd_oV7MMEIWYBBg-H2R9NgWTxwIdXbUOAkF3PG4eTUvmNgdRBau7SmsEUitIb2siv9bSMXRsHOsOZBg9tvyAQuzF9c!/
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are pay rates and allowances for civilian and military personnel openly published?
Pay rates and allowances for both civilian and military personnel are defined by the “Bundesbesoldungsgesetz” (Federal Compensation Law) and its derived directives. All information regarding pay rates is publicly available and there are additional non-governmental websites with supplemental information and overviews of current salary charts / payment structures.
- “Bundesbesoldungsgesetz in der Fassung der Bekanntmachung vom 19. Juni 2009 (BGBl. I S. 1434), das zuletzt durch Artikel 13c des Gesetzes vom 19. Oktober 2013 (BGBl. I S. 3836) geändert worden ist”, http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bbesg/
- “Anlage I Bundesbesoldungsordnungen A und B. Fundstelle: BGBl. I 2009, 1460 - 1479”, http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bbesg/anlage_i_113.html
- Beamtenbesoldung.org. “Besoldungstabellen für Beamte, Besoldung /2012/2013/2014, Bund.” Last modified March 02, 2014, http://www.beamtenbesoldung.org/besoldungstabellen.html
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Civil employees who are not Federal Civil Servants (Bundesbeamte) are paid according to the Tarifvertrag Öffentlicher Dienst (Civil Service Collective Agreement).
Government Update March 2015:
Link update: http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/!ut/p/c4/NYxNC8IwEET_UTbxIOqtpSAi9OBF21vahLiQj7LdxIs_3uTgDPMuDwZmqI26oNOMKWoPL5hWvCwfsYTiRMCIO1vCHESxxBYNuhzd_ta5zjM824OxYk3RciPbyFjpSHMisSVi30wmqkaggUmqoZdK_qO-5_HeXefj4TTc-gdsIXQ_EI9lHw!!/
http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/!ut/p/c4/HYtBDoAgDMDe4ge2uzd_oV7MMEIWYBBg-H2R9NgWTxwIdXbUOAkF3PG4eTUvmNgdRBau7SmsEUitIb2siv9bSMXRsHOsOZBg9tvyAQuzF9c!/
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Do personnel receive the correct pay on time, and is the system of payment well-established, routine, and published?
The system of payment is well established in accordance with Article 30 of the “Soldatengesetz” and the “Bundesbesoldungsgesetz”. Personnel receive their pay on the first day of each month. There is no evidence that basic pay is non-discretionary, especially since the payment structures are very well explained on the Website of the BMVg.
- &quoute;Soldatengesetz in der Fassung der Bekanntmachung vom 30. Mai 2005 (BGBl. I S. 1482), das zuletzt durch Artikel 8 des Gesetzes vom 28. August 2013 (BGBl. I S. 3386) geändert worden ist&quoute; http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/sg/index.html
- “Bundesbesoldungsgesetz in der Fassung der Bekanntmachung vom 19. Juni 2009 (BGBl. I S. 1434), das zuletzt durch Artikel 13c des Gesetzes vom 19. Oktober 2013 (BGBl. I S. 3836) geändert worden ist”, http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bbesg/
- Treff Bundeswehr. “Das Gehalt - Der Wehrsold - Die Besoldung.” Last modified n/a, https://treff.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/treff/!ut/p/c4/FcfBDYAwCEDRWVyg3L25hXqjQgkpoaairm_Nv7wPO4wcHxUMbY4GK2yHzvlN0bmURKzO49AsUIj71Yww2FPmn7cLnHWZPhjlkfE!/
- N.N., “Grundgehälter von Soldaten und Beamten.“, October 13, 2014, accessed November 04, 2014, http://www.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/bwde/!ut/p/c4/DckxDoAgDADAt_gBurv5C3UhRSppIMWUgomvl9x4cMIkODihcRUssMNx8RpeF95IrpkSW1ak28gFarXELsl3iT4ySbNv_iBtVdMMePK2_JPXem4!/
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Government Update March 2015:
Link update: http://www.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/bwde/!ut/p/c4/DckxDoAgDADAt_gBurv5C3UhRSppIMWUgomvl9x4cMIkODihcRUssMNx8RpeF95IrpkSW1ak28gFarXELsl3iT4ySbNv_iBtVdMMePK2_JPXem4!/
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is there an established, independent, transparent, and objective appointment system for the selection of military personnel at middle and top management level?
The requirements and procedures for the appointment and promotion of military personnel are clearly defined in Articles 27 and 42 of the “Soldatengesetz” (Legal Status of Military Personnel Act) in accordance with Paragraph (2) of Article 33 of the German Basic Law. More specific requirements for military personnel at mid and top management levels can be found, for instance, in Article 25 to 28 of the “Soldatenlaufbahnverordnung” (Act on the Career of Military Personnel).
In the &quoute;Stellungnahme des Bundesministeriums der Verteidigung zum Jahresbericht 2012 des Wehrbeauftragten des Deutschen Bundestages&quoute; (statement of the MoD about the 2012 annual report of the parliamentary commissioner for the armed forces), the MoD responds to reproaches of unjust and untimely promotions, laying out the reasoning behind mechanisms in place and decisions taken. It also acknowledges shortcomings in the system, such as the fact those entering the Bundeswehr at a senior level (in very specific cases) could have more chances for promotion than their peers who have reached that level through promotion from a lower level. The report of the
parliamentary commissioner for the armed forces can be seen as a form of oversight mechanism.
- “Soldatengesetz in der Fassung der Bekanntmachung vom 30. Mai 2005 (BGBl. I S. 1482), das zuletzt durch Artikel 8 des Gesetzes vom 28. August 2013 (BGBl. I S. 3386) geändert worden ist”, http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/sg/index.html
- “Soldatenlaufbahnverordnung in der Fassung der Bekanntmachung vom 19. August 2011 (BGBl. I S. 1813), die zuletzt durch Artikel 2 Absatz 5 des Gesetzes vom 8. April 2013 (BGBl. I S. 730) geändert worden ist”, http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bundesrecht/slv_2002/gesamt.pdf
- Stellungnahme des Bundesministeriums der Verteidigung zum Jahresbericht 2012 des Wehrbeauftragten des Deutschen Bundestages, http://goo.gl/YVHUxj
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: In addition article 3 Soldatengesetz postulates: A soldier shall be appointed and assigned according to his or her aptitude, qualification and performance without distinction as to gender, descent, race, belief, religious or political opinions, native country or origin.
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Are personnel promoted through an objective, meritocratic process? Such a process would include promotion boards outside of the command chain, strong formal appraisal processes, and independent oversight.
In accordance with Article 33 of the German Basic Law, which defines the constitutional principle of equal treatment and selection of the most suitable candidates, the “Soldatengesetz” (Legal Status of Military Personnel Act) stipulates the rights and duties of military personnel concerning promotion, more specifically defined in Article 27 and 42. The legal framework for civilian personnel is similarly strict and defined in the “Bundesbeamtengesetz” (Federal Civil Service Act). Both laws have additional regulations concerning career paths.
Selection decisions based on civil service law are subject to a review by the administrative courts with regard to compliance with the selection of the most suitable candidates. Additional independent oversight is provided by the Federal Personnel Commission based on Chapter 8 in the Federal Civil Service Act.
- “Soldatengesetz in der Fassung der Bekanntmachung vom 30. Mai 2005 (BGBl. I S. 1482), das zuletzt durch Artikel 8 des Gesetzes vom 28. August 2013 (BGBl. I S. 3386) geändert worden ist”, http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/sg/index.html
- “Bundesbeamtengesetz vom 5. Februar 2009 (BGBl. I S. 160), das durch Artikel 2 des Gesetzes vom 28. August 2013 (BGBl. I S. 3386) geändert worden ist”, http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bundesrecht/bbg_2009/gesamt.pdf
- “Soldatenlaufbahnverordnung in der Fassung der Bekanntmachung vom 19. August 2011 (BGBl. I S. 1813), die zuletzt durch Artikel 2 Absatz 5 des Gesetzes vom 8. April 2013 (BGBl. I S. 730) geändert worden ist”, http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bundesrecht/slv_2002/gesamt.pdf
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Where compulsory conscription occurs, is there a policy of not accepting bribes for avoiding conscription? Are there appropriate procedures in place to deal with such bribery, and are they applied?
Compulsory conscription was abolished by the Federal Government on December 15th 2010. This became effective in July 2011. The question is therefore not applicable.
- Bundeswehr. “Wehrpflicht und Wehrdienst.” Last modified December 03, 2013, http://www.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/bwde/!ut/p/c4/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP3I5EyrpHK9pPKUVL3ikqLUzJLsosTUtJJUvfLUjKKCtJzM5IwS_YJsR0UApA3igw!!/
- “Wehrpflichtgesetz in der Fassung der Bekanntmachung vom 15. August 2011 (BGBl. I S. 1730), das zuletzt durch Artikel 2 Absatz 8 des Gesetzes vom 3. Mai 2013 (BGBl. I S. 1084) geändert worden ist”, http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/wehrpflg/index.html
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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With regard to compulsory or voluntary conscription, is there a policy of refusing bribes to gain preferred postings in the recruitment process? Are there appropriate procedures in place to deal with such bribery, and are they applied?
There is no specific policy about refusing bribes to gain preferred postings in the recruitment process, as this falls under the scope of the Federal Government Directive concerning the Prevention of Corruption in the Federal Administration. The score has been awarded on the basis that there are provisions to deter against this, but no specific policy.
The Directive states in the code of conduct (Article 6) that employees should contact the corruption prevention contact person if indication of possible bribery exists. As candidates can express their wishes regarding preferred postings in the application form, and later again during the interview stage, with senior staff, it seems unlikely that undisclosed bribery in the context of voluntary conscription is happening. There is no evidence in the media that would imply that such cases happen.
- Karriere Bundeswehr. “Ihre Bewerbung.” Last modified April 30, 2014, https://mil.bundeswehr-karriere.de/portal/a/milkarriere/!ut/p/c4/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP3I5EyrpHK93Myc7MSioszUolS9zIyi1KTU8tSipNK8dP2CbEdFAFYZxF8!/
- Richtlinie der Bundesregierung zur Korruptionsprävention in der Bundesverwaltung. “Richtlinie der Bundesregierung zur Korruptionsprävention in der Bundesverwaltung, July 30, 2004” http://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Themen/OED_Verwaltung/Korruption_Sponsoring/Richtlinie_zur_Korruptionspraevention_in_der_Bundesverwaltung.html
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Is there evidence of 'ghost soldiers', or non-existent soldiers on the payroll?
‘Ghost-soldiers’ or non-existent soldiers in payroll do not seem to be allowed and there is no evidence that any cases exist. The number of military personnel is stipulated by Article 87 of the German Basic Law and is shown in Article 2 of the preliminary note of the annual budget of the Ministry of Defence.
The tables of organisation and equipment (Stärke- und Ausstattungsnachweisung, STAN) provide further information on the exact number, positions and equipment of military units (STANs are not publicly accessible but there are similar STANs for civil protection units available on the webpage of the Federal Office of Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance that provide an insight into how exact these aspects are defined within Germany). The budget is also scrutinised by the Federal Audit Office and the respective parliamentary committees.
- “Grundgesetz für de Bundesrepublik Deutschland” (Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany), including the amendment(s) to the Act by the Act of 21.7.2010 (Federal Law Gazette I p. 944), May 23, 1949.
- BMVg. “Verteidigungshaushalt 2013.” Last modified December 3, 2013, http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/!ut/p/c4/Nck9DoAgDEDhs3gBSkxc3LyFupCiDTb8aKDg9WUxL9_0YIdewsYOhe-EAVbYDp7tq2xsTkVOXIQy16gaZSE-2dXkyoW1C2JGrSd1UjbopVIIZP4Fj1-GD5nD8bI!/
- Bundesamt für Bevölkerungsschutz und Katastrophenhilfe. “Stärke- und Austattungsnachweisungen (STAN) für die Einheiten undEinrichtungen des Katastrophenschutzes.” Last modified n/a, http://www.bbk.bund.de/DE/Service/Fachinformationsstelle/RechtundVorschriften/VorschriftenundRichtlinien/VolltextKatS-STAN/KatS_STAN_einstieg.html
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Government Update March 2015:
Link update:
http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/!ut/p/c4/NYxNC8IwEET_UTbxIOqtpSAi9OBF21vahLiQj7LdxIs_3uTgDPMuDwZmqI26oNOMKWoPL5hWvCwfsYTiRMCIO1vCHESxxBYNuhzd_ta5zjM824OxYk3RciPbyFjpSHMisSVi30wmqkaggUmqoZdK_qO-5_HeXefj4TTc-gdsIXQ_EI9lHw!!/
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Are chains of command separate from chains of payment?
The reorientation of the Bundeswehr during the past 10 years has led to an even stricter separation of the chains of command and chains of payment in the Bundeswehr. While previously, civil regional agencies within the Ministry of Defence (MoD) were responsible for payments, since 2013 the payroll accounting is no longer done by the MoD but by an agency within the Ministry of the Interior. Financial management and controlling within the Bundeswehr is organised by the “Bundesamt für Infrastruktur, Umweltschutz und Dienstleistungen der Bundeswehr” which is a civil agency within the MoD.
- Bundeswehr. “Personal.” Last modified February 02, 2014, http://www.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/bwde/!ut/p/c4/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP3I5EyrpHK9pPKUVL2y1KLyxJyS0rx0vYLUouL4otTkjJL44tTUnOL8ovRU_YJsR0UANsA_oQ!!/
- Bundesamt für Infrastruktur, Umweltschutz und Dienstleistungen der Bundeswehr. “Bundesamt für Infrastruktur, Umweltschutz und Dienstleistungen der Bundeswehr.” Last modified December 09, 2013, http://www.iud.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/iudbw/!ut/p/c4/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP3I5EyrpHK9zNIUIJlflJ6Yl1kMltVLSgQL6hdkOyoCAJZfIbk!/
- Bundesministerium der Verteidigung. “Personalabrechnung und Travel-Management - Bundeswehr gibt Aufgaben ab.” Last modified November 02, 2012, http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/!ut/p/c4/NYvBCsIwEET_aDcRBPFm6UWhIL1oe0vbEFaabFk39eLHmxycgXeYx-CIpcntFJwSJ7fiE4eZztMHprgHeHGWskKkRG_1Qjnio34WDzMnr5Xqk1JhEKcssLHoWk0WKQZowcHYtjHW_GO_p7G7dfeDObbXpsctxssPr3H4bA!!/
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Government Update March 2015:
Link update: http://www.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/bwde/!ut/p/c4/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP3I5EyrpHK9pPKUVL2y1KLyxJyS0rx0vYLUouL4otTkjJL44tTUnOL8ovRU_YJsR0UANsA_oQ!!/
http://www.iud.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/iudbw/!ut/p/c4/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP3I5EyrpHK9zNIUIJlflJ6Yl1kMltVLSgQL6hdkOyoCAJZfIbk!/
http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/!ut/p/c4/NYvBCsIwEET_aDcRBPFm6UWhIL1oe0vbEFaabFk39eLHmxycgXeYx-CIpcntFJwSJ7fiE4eZztMHprgHeHGWskKkRG_1Qjnio34WDzMnr5Xqk1JhEKcssLHoWk0WKQZowcHYtjHW_GO_p7G7dfeDObbXpsctxssPr3H4bA!!/
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Is there a Code of Conduct for all military and civilian personnel that includes, but is not limited to, guidance with respect to bribery, gifts and hospitality, conflicts of interest, and post-separation activities?
The Annex to the Federal Government Directive concerning the Prevention of Corruption in the Federal Administration serves as a Code of Conduct for all public servants and includes very clear guidance with respect to bribery, conflicts of interest and other corruption-related activities. Additionally, the individual issues addressed in the question are regulated in different statutory guidelines. The “Soldatengesetz” (Legal Status of Military Personnel Act) prohibits the acceptance of rewards and gifts (Article 19) and regulates furthermore cases of conflict of interest.
The Government Reviewer has provided more detailed information below on conduct standards specified in legislation. The provisions for an oversight mechanism are not clear.
- Richtlinie der Bundesregierung zur Korruptionsprävention in der Bundesverwaltung. “Richtlinie der Bundesregierung zur Korruptionsprävention in der Bundesverwaltung, July 30, 2004” http://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Themen/OED_Verwaltung/Korruption_Sponsoring/Richtlinie_zur_Korruptionspraevention_in_der_Bundesverwaltung.html
- “Soldatengesetz in der Fassung der Bekanntmachung vom 30. Mai 2005 (BGBl. I S. 1482), das zuletzt durch Artikel 8 des Gesetzes vom 28. August 2013 (BGBl. I S. 3386) geändert worden ist”, http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/sg/index.html
- “Bundesbeamtengesetz vom 5. Februar 2009 (BGBl. I S. 160), das durch Artikel 2 des Gesetzes vom 28. August 2013 (BGBl. I S. 3386) geändert worden ist”, http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bundesrecht/bbg_2009/gesamt.pdf
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: The principle of decisions to be taken unbiased in compliance with existing laws and regulations geared towards public welfare is enshrined in the public service law, valid for all members of the Bundeswehr. As a rule it prohibits the acceptance of rewards or gifts. Even the mere impression of a possible manipulation or a lack of objectivity must be avoided by the officials; relevant offers must be reported. In addition to the code of conduct on correct behaviour with regards to corruption-related offences (Annex 1 to the Federal Administrative Guideline concerning the Prevention of Corruption in the Federal Administration) the issues addressed in the question are regulated by the following statutory provisions, some of which are further specified by way of decrees and administrative regulations:
- Prohibition on the acceptance of rewards and gifts: article 71 of the Federal Civil Service Act, article 19 of the Legal Status of Military Personnel Act, subsection 2 of article 3 of the Civil Service Collective Agreement; supplementary general administrative regulations concerning the sponsoring of agencies as well as decrees issued by the MoD defining the principle for the acceptance of benefits by Bundeswehr members.
- Obligation to report before taking up a job after retirement from service or employment (article 105 of the Federal Civil Service Act, article 20 a of the Legal Status of Military Personnel Act).
- Conflict of interest: Code of Conduct (Annex 1 to the Federal Guidelines) as well as obligations to report any conflict of interest (article 20 and 21 of the Law on Administrative Proceedings, article 16 of the Regulation on the Award of Public Contracts, each in connection with the general status-related basic duties whilst holding public office.
Government Update March 2015:
Link update: http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/sg/BJNR001140956.html#BJNR001140956BJNG000103310
http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bundesrecht/bbg_2009/gesamt.pdf
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Is there evidence that breaches of the Code of Conduct are effectively addressed ,and are the results of prosecutions made publicly available?
There is evidence of effective prosecution of defence services personnel for corrupt activities in recent years, and the results of the prosecution are publicly available and can be found in the media or specific public watchdog websites. Trials, the pronouncement of judgements and the decisions by the court are publicly available in accordance with Paragraph 169 of the Court Act (Gerichtsverfahrensgesetz).
- Arbeitsstelle Frieden und Abrüstung e.V. “Bundeswehr Monitoring.” Last modified May 08, 2014, http://www.bundeswehr-monitoring.de/
- N.N. “Beschaffung von Sturmgewehren: Bundeswehr unter Korruptionsverdacht.” Der Spiegel, May 26, 2013, accessed May 01, 2014, http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/bundeswehr-geraet-bei-beschaffung-unter-verdacht-der-korruption-a-901929.html
- Schuler, R., “Korruptionsverdacht bei der Bundeswehr - Wurde bei Beratungsverträgen gemauschelt?”, Bild, July 05, 2012, accessed April 25, 2014, http://www.bild.de/politik/inland/bundeswehr/wurde-bei-beratungs-vertraegen-gemauschelt-25003654.bild.html
- &quoute;Gerichtsverfahrensgesetz&quoute; (Courts Act), including the amendment(s) to the Act by the Act of 23/4/2014 (Federal Law Gazette I p.410), September 12, 1950
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Does regular anti-corruption training take place for military and civilian personnel?
The Federal Government Directive concerning the Prevention of Corruption in the Federal Administration, as well as the implementing provision of the Ministry of Defence, requires anti-corruption training for civilian and military personnel. According to the annual report on corruption prevention, this training occurs annually. Additionally, commanding officers and the corruption prevention contact persons are encouraged to raise awareness about corruption within their agencies in conversations at least once a year.
The Ministry of Defence uses an IT-based learning programme on their internal webpage with 5 modules for everyone (according to an interview source; the 2012 corruption prevention report states that the MoD does not have an IT-based learning tool), and an additional one for employees in high risk areas, there are also e-learning platforms and seminars available within other institutions such as the Federal Academy of Public Administration.
- Bundesakademie für öffentliche Verwaltung. “Unser Seminarangebot.” Last modified 2010, http://www.bakoev.bund.de/DE/03_Unser_Fortbildungsangebot/01_Unser_Seminarangebot/Unser_Seminarangebot_node.html
- Richtlinie der Bundesregierung zur Korruptionsprävention in der Bundesverwaltung. “Richtlinie der Bundesregierung zur Korruptionsprävention in der Bundesverwaltung, July 30, 2004” http://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Themen/OED_Verwaltung/Korruption_Sponsoring/Richtlinie_zur_Korruptionspraevention_in_der_Bundesverwaltung.html
- Bundesministerium des Ineren. “Empfehlungen zur Korruptionsprävention in der Bundesverwaltung.” Last modified February 09, 2012, http://www.umweltbundesamt.de/sites/default/files/medien/377/dokumente/empfehlungen_zur_rl_korruptionspraevention_09.02.2012.pdf
- Bundesministerium des Inneren. “Korruptionsprävention in der Bundesverwaltung. Jahresbericht 2012.” Last modified June 21, 2013, http://www.transparency.de/fileadmin/pdfs/Themen/Verwaltung/RPA-Bericht_2012_KW.pdf
- Interview with Senior Official in MoD
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Government Update March 2015:
Additional link: https://www.lernplattform-bakoev.bund.de/login.php?client_id=BAKOEV
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Is there a policy to make public outcomes of the prosecution of defence services personnel for corrupt activities, and is there evidence of effective prosecutions in recent years?
The annual corruption report of the Federal Criminal Police Office showed that approximately 40 individuals in the military were prosecuted for acts of bribery or corruption in 2012. However, with the exception of high-level cases that are debated in the media, a public outcome of the prosecution of public servants (not just in the area of defence) has not occurred, and the individuals remain anonymous. This has not so much to do with a lack of a specific policy but rather with the protection of the constitutionally guaranteed personal rights of individuals.
Response to Government Reviewer: Agree with comments.
Score changed from 3 to 4.
- Richtlinie der Bundesregierung zur Korruptionsprävention in der Bundesverwaltung. “Richtlinie der Bundesregierung zur Korruptionsprävention in der Bundesverwaltung, July 30, 2004” http://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Themen/OED_Verwaltung/Korruption_Sponsoring/Richtlinie_zur_Korruptionspraevention_in_der_Bundesverwaltung.html
- Arbeitsstelle Frieden und Abrüstung e.V. “Bundeswehr Monitoring.” Last modified May 08, 2014, http://www.bundeswehr-monitoring.de/
- Bundesministerium des Inneren. “Korruptionsprävention in der Bundesverwaltung. Jahresbericht 2012.” Last modified June 21, 2013, http://www.transparency.de/fileadmin/pdfs/Themen/Verwaltung/RPA-Bericht_2012_KW.pdf
- Bundeskriminalamt. “Lagebilder Korruption.” Last modified 2014. http://www.bka.de/nn_193376/DE/Publikationen/JahresberichteUndLagebilder/Korruption/korruption__node.html?__nnn=true
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Disagree
Comment: Statement by German MoD with the aim to raise the score to level 4:
Military leaders and supervisors are obliged to follow up any initial suspicion of corruption and bring it to the attention of the military prosecutors and the MoD’s Special Investigation Branch, which will then support them in their investigations. If sufficient evidence is found cases are transferred to the respective public prosecutor’s office, which is similarly obliged to carry out further investigation and, if appropriate, prosecute the case.
In all cases where, following the rule of law, sufficient evidence was found, disciplinary action and / or criminal conviction followed suit.
Court hearings on corruption - like all court hearings - are open to the public and, whenever there is sufficient public interest, will be reported and discussed in the media.
The aim of the published annual corruption report on the other hand is to give a statistical overview in the area of corruption; hence only facts such as the number of incidents, the infringed law and the area in which corruption occurred are collated anonymously. A governmental policy of “name and shame” would contravene the constitutionally guaranteed rights of the individual.
Government Update March 2015:
Link update: http://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Themen/OED_Verwaltung/Korruption_Sponsoring/jahresbericht-2013-korruptionspraevention.pdf?__blob=publicationFile
Suggested score: 4
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are there effective measures in place to discourage facilitation payments (which are illegal in almost all countries)?
Article 332 and 334 of the German Strafgesetzbuch (Penal Code) explicitly deal with the illegality of facilitation payments and instance of misconduct may lead to multi-year imprisonment in severe cases. Public servants would additionally be subject to disciplinary sanctions, such as losing their jobs. There is no evidence that these mechanisms are not effectively applied.
From Q18: The 2012 Annual Report of the Federal Ministry of the Interior mentioned three allegations of corruption within the Ministry of Defence (MoD) that led to further investigations and a legal trial. The investigation of such a case is initiated by the R II 1 Branch of the Legal Affairs Directorate of the MoD and is then turned over to external prosecutors. The process of investigating corruption is defined in the Federal Anti-corruption Guidelines and its implementing provision within the MoD. The guidelines also define specific reporting obligations for suspicious cases within Bundeswehr agencies.
- &quoute;Strafgesetzbuch in der Fassung der Bekanntmachung vom 13. November 1998 (BGBl. I S. 3322), das zuletzt durch Artikel 1 des Gesetzes vom 23. April 2014 (BGBl. I S. 410) geändert worden ist&quoute; http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/stgb/index.html
- Bundesministerium des Inneren. “Korruptionsprävention.” Last modified 2014, http://www.bmi.bund.de/DE/Themen/Moderne-Verwaltung/Korruptionspraevention-Sponsoring-IR/Korruptionspraevention/korruptionspraevention_node.html
- Schuler, R., “Korruptionsverdacht bei der Bundeswehr - Wurde bei Beratungsverträgen gemauschelt?”, Bild, July 05, 2012, accessed April 25, 2014, http://www.bild.de/politik/inland/bundeswehr/wurde-bei-beratungs-vertraegen-gemauschelt-25003654.bild.html
- Bundesministerium des Inneren. “Korruptionsprävention in der Bundesverwaltung. Jahresbericht 2012.” Last modified June 21, 2013, http://www.transparency.de/fileadmin/pdfs/Themen/Verwaltung/RPA-Bericht_2012_KW.pdf
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Government Update March 2015:
Link update:
http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/stgb/BJNR001270871.html#BJNR001270871BJNG000102307
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Do the armed forces have military doctrine addressing corruption as a strategic issue on operations?
The Bundeswehr has no specific operational doctrine that focuses on issues of corruption, but the latest Weissbuch and Defence Policy Guidelines both mention corruption risks, at least indirectly.
Regarding deployments it seems that while the Bundeswehr is aware of corruption risks in theatre, for example in Afghanistan, it considers taking an active stance against corruption as too risky. This impression seems to be confirmed by a report of the Afghanistan Analyst Network which specifically mentions that the Bundeswehr tried to ignore corruption problems with Afghan commanders in their area in order to avoid dangerous situations for the German troops deployed.
RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: Accepted. Score raised to 2.
- Bundesministerium der Verteidigung. “Weißbuch zur Sicherheitspolitik Deutschlands und zur Zukunft der Bundeswehr 2006.” Last modified February 25, 2014, http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/!ut/p/c4/Dca7DYAwDAXAWVgg7unYAuicYCVP-Qrnsz7omqObfoUnPHfUwolOuhx2u4zN0xuFC_IGQddWEzqi4eLF1i7mqXFkKf-WQNUOF6jFY_sAY_7e5g!!/
- Bundesministerium der Verteidigung. “Die Verteidigungspolitischen Richtlinien 2011.” Last modified May 27, 2011, http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/!ut/p/c4/LYsxEoAgDATf4gdIb-cv1MYBzcQbMDgQ8ftSONtssUsrddQ3iDdk9YlmWnaM4XXhauIq9pPLybB65wRDdF6FQzZ2R47PxdqtcTHGAXlU_q72byv9tgQFK91xGj6tRgx1/
- Hansen, Sven, “Kundus nach Abzug der Bundeswehr: Deutschland stärkte die Warlords.” taz, November 12, 2013, accessed May 01, 2014, http://www.taz.de/!127272/
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Disagree
Comment: Statement by German MoD with the aim to raise the score to level 2:
Whilst there is no explicit military doctrine on corruption in the Bundeswehr, corruption as a strategic issue in operations is addressed, for example, in the pre-deployment training for advisors in Afghanistan. Furthermore, all key military personnel receive a refresher briefing on corruption during pre-deployment training for all missions.
In addition the ISAF “Security Force Assistance Guide” addresses the issue repeatedly. It is intended to provide NATO partners and nations contributing troops which are participating as part of ISAF with a summary of ISAF´s Security Force Assistance (SFA) concept, as well as guidance and information on SFA activities, countering insider threat, mission critical tasks, and training requirements in support of Afghan National Security Forces.
Government Update March 2015:
Link update: http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/!ut/p/c4/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP3I5EyrpHK9pNyydL3y1Mzi4qTS5Az9gmxHRQBg2ftX/
Suggested score: 2
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is there training in corruption issues for commanders at all levels in order to ensure that these commanders are clear on the corruption issues they may face during deployment? If so, is there evidence that they apply this knowledge in the field?
Commanders at all levels are trained on corruption issues insofar as it is outlined in the Federal Government Directive concerning the Prevention of Corruption in the Federal Administration, and the implementing provision of the Ministry of Defence, which also applies to deployments.
This means that it may not be considered important during mission training to focus on an area that should already be well known by any commanding officer in the Bundeswehr. However, the contact person for anti-corruption is provided with training. According to a 2013 report by the Afghanistan Analyst Network (AAN), the German Bundeswehr did not actively try to influence power structures in their area of responsibility and instead legalistically focused on cooperation with Afghan commanders. This would imply that knowledge on a corruption issue is/was not well applied during deployment.
RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: Score changed from 1 to 2.
- Wiegold, Thomas. “Fortschrittsbericht Afghanistan’: Bundesregierung sieht ‘mangelnden politischen Willen’ in Kabul.” Augen geradeaus!, February 03, 2014, accessed May 01, 2014, http://augengeradeaus.net/2014/02/fortschrittsbericht-afghanistan-bundesregierung-sieht-mangelnden-politischen-willen-in-kabul/
- Hansen, Sven, “Kundus nach Abzug der Bundeswehr: Deutschland stärkte die Warlords.” taz, November 12, 2013, accessed May 01, 2014, http://www.taz.de/!127272/
- Bundesregierung. “Auslandseinsatz: Bundeswehr weiter in Afghanistan.” Last modified February 20, 2014, http://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Artikel/2014/02/2014-02-04-isaf-mandatsverlaengerung.html
Opinion: Not Qualified
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: Statement by German MoD with the aim to raise the score to level 2:
Comparing the findings of the country assessor with the given criteria the score level should be raised to 2
Suggested score: 2
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are trained professionals regularly deployed to monitor corruption risk in the field (whether deployed on operations or peacekeeping missions)?
While there is no particular guideline addressing corruption while on deployed operations or peacekeeping missions, the Federal Government Directive concerning the Prevention of Corruption in the Federal Administration and the implementing provision of the Ministry of Defence, also apply to deployments in foreign countries. According to these guidelines, a contact person for the prevention of corruption needs to be appointed. According to the German MoD, key personnel receive refresher briefings on corruption during pre-deployment training and commanders are assisted by trained anti-corruption representatives during missions.
- Richtlinie der Bundesregierung zur Korruptionsprävention in der Bundesverwaltung. “Richtlinie der Bundesregierung zur Korruptionsprävention in der Bundesverwaltung, July 30, 2004” http://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Themen/OED_Verwaltung/Korruption_Sponsoring/Richtlinie_zur_Korruptionspraevention_in_der_Bundesverwaltung.html
- Drews, Vivien-Marie, “Feldjäger aus Hannover: Mit den Militärermittlern unterwegs in Afghanistan.” Hannoverische Allgemeine Zeitung, January 04, 2012, accessed May 01, 2014, http://www.haz.de/Hannover/Aus-der-Stadt/Uebersicht/Mit-den-Militaerermittlern-unterwegs-in-Afghanistan
- MEC. “Fifth Six-Month Report.” Last modified January 30, 2014, http://www.mec.af/files/5thSixMonthReport.pdf
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: As the latest report by the Monitoring and Evaluation Committee points out, Germany, as a member of the donors’ working group in ISAF, is striving to ensure effective international coordination at policy and programmatic level on anti-corruption in Afghanistan by prioritising areas for anti-corruption efforts, identifying areas for joint and individual action and harmonising projects and programs on anti-corruption to avoid duplication and maximise effects. Key personnel receive refresher briefings on corruption during pre-deployment training. In every mission commanders are always assisted by trained anti-corruption representatives.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are there guidelines, and staff training, on addressing corruption risks in contracting whilst on deployed operations or peacekeeping missions?
While there is no particular guideline addressing corruption while on deployed operations or peacekeeping missions, the Federal Government Directive concerning the Prevention of Corruption in the Federal Administration and the implementing provision of the Ministry of Defence also apply to deployments in foreign countries.
Additionally, all military staff receive training before the deployment that include, for example, specific intercultural lectures and practical exercises. There is also a transition period in deployments that should allow for the transfer of specific knowledge that is needed in cases such as contracting.
- Richtlinie der Bundesregierung zur Korruptionsprävention in der Bundesverwaltung. “Richtlinie der Bundesregierung zur Korruptionsprävention in der Bundesverwaltung, July 30, 2004” http://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Themen/OED_Verwaltung/Korruption_Sponsoring/Richtlinie_zur_Korruptionspraevention_in_der_Bundesverwaltung.html
- Löwenstein, Stephan, “Bundeswehr-Skandal: Aus dem Ruder gelaufen.” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, October 26, 2006, accessed May 01, 2014, http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/ausland/bundeswehr-skandal-aus-dem-ruder-gelaufen-1381914.html
Opinion: Not Qualified
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Private Military Contractors (PMCs) usually refer to companies that provide operational staff to military environments. They may also be known as security contractors or private security contractors, and refer to themselves as private military corporations, private military firms, private security providers, or military service providers.
The overall impression regarding private military contractors (PMCs) in Germany is that they are not allowed, as it is solely the responsibility of the Federal state to deploy military forces according to Article 87a of the German Basic Law. Thus, it may appear that the involvement of PMCs is not allowed in almost all responsibilities of the Bundeswehr.
Yet the European Parliament highlighted the problem that the German government does not have an official definition of PMCs or of private security companies (PSCs). One could argue that it can therefore not claim that neither PMCs nor PSCs are being used, despite the fact that the Bundeswehr as well as other German ministries supplied military support companies or security services in Afghanistan.
RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: While it is true that the definition of PMCs used in this review is rather broad, a similar definition is, for example, used in the ‘2008 Montreux Document’ by the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs and the International Committee of the Red Cross stating that PMCs are “private business entities that provide military and/or security services, irrespective of how they describe themselves”. This would also include logistic services. According to a 2011 report by the German PRIF (HSFK), Germany has used security personnel in Afghanistan to protect the German embassy as well as other locations. The Bundeswehr has used PMCs for “transport, logistic, catering, maintenance, repairs, laundry services, wastewater- and garbage disposal, fuel supply and protection services” for the Bundeswehr and German bases in Afghanistan. Also, it is important to mention that PMCs are responsible for their own protection, according to the German Minister of defence in 2010, which would imply that armed contractors were included in the services.
TI RESPONSE: Score changed to 2, in light of a lack of evidence for sanctions being not only available but also applied.
- Petersohn Ulrich, “ Die Nutzung privater Militärfirmen durch US-Streitkräfte und Bundeswehr.” Last modified December, 2006, http://www.swp-berlin.org/de/publikationen/swp-studien-de/swp-studien-detail/article/private_militaerfirmen.html
- European Parliament. “The role of private security companies (PSCs) in CSDP missions and operations.” Last modified 2011, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/droi/dv/803_sedestudy_/803_sedestudy_en.pdf
- Krahmann, Elke & Friesendorf, Cornelius, „Debatte vertagt? Militär- und Sicherheitsfirmen in deutschen Auslandseinsätzen.“, HSFK-Report Nr. 8/2011, accessed November 04, 2014 http://www.academia.edu/6037706/Debatte_vertagt_Milit%C3%A4r-_und_Sicherheitsfirmen_in_deutschen_Auslandseins%C3%A4tzen
- Federal Department of Foreign Affairs & ICRC, “The Montreux document - on pertinent international legal obligations and good practices for States related to operations of private military and security companies during armed conflict.&quoute;, August, 2009, accessed November 04, 2014, https://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/fdfa/foreign-policy/international-law/international-humanitarian-law/private-military-security-companies/montreux-document.html
- Christian Kjelstrup, &quoute;NATO and Private Military Contractors: Different approaches, and challenges to internal cohesion and solidarity&quoute;, University of Oslo, 23 May 2011. https://www.duo.uio.no/bitstream/handle/10852/13142/Kjelstrupx2011x_Master.pdf?sequence=1
- David Isenberg, &quoute;The Many PMC Faces of NATO&quoute;, Huffington Post, 28 November 2012. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-isenberg/the-many-pmc-faces-of-nato_b_2200697.html
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: Statement by German MoD with the aim to raise the score to level 4:
The principles of democratic control of the armed forces, the requirement of parliamentary approval, the legal state, the state monopoly on use of force and the guarantee of effective judicial protection substantiate and define the exclusive right of the state to employ military force in line with Article 87a of the Basic Law [Grundgesetz] and form an insurmountable barrier to any privatisation of military tasks.
The cited study by Ulrich Petersohn “Outsourcing the Big Stick: The Consequences of Using Private Military Companies” includes under the definition “private military companies” support services which are always performed pre or post actual combat and cites as example for activities of private military companies even the performance of mere logistical services. This opinion ignores the clearly established constitutional principles on the state’s exclusive right to employ military force and is not shared by the MoD.
Notwithstanding this, unlike members of the armed forces themselves, civil contractors of the armed forces are not subject to disciplinary measures in line with the military code, but instead – German jurisdiction provided – they are subject to German criminal law for the commission of criminal offences, even whilst working on a foreign assignment.
Suggested score: 4
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Does the country have legislation covering defence and security procurement and are there any items exempt from these laws?
The procurement needs of the armed forces are organised by the “Bundesamt für Ausrüstung, Informationstechnik und Nutzung” (Federal Office of Bundeswehr Equipment, Information Technology and In-Service Support (BAAINBw)) in accordance with subsection (b) of Article 87 of the German Basic Law.
The Federal Government Directive concerning the Prevention of Corruption in the Federal Administration and the implementing provision of the Ministry of Defence also apply to this federal office, and therefore, for all procurement issues.
For example, the Guidelines request identification of areas of corruption risk. While the law, based on international regulations such as WTO GPA as well as the EU’s Directive 2009/81/EC, allows certain exceptions in the area of security and defence, for example that the “Act against restraints of competition” does not apply for certain defence procurements, according to subsection (c) of Paragraph 100, this does not exclude the procurement from the Guidelines. Additionally, there is an array of specific regulations for defence procurement that include anti-corruption measures within the Customer Product Management.
- Deutscher Bundestag. “VIII. Die Ausführung der Bundesgesetze und die Bundesverwaltung.” Last modified n/a, http://www.bundestag.de/bundestag/aufgaben/rechtsgrundlagen/grundgesetz/gg_08.html
- BAAINBw. ”Grundlagen der Beschaffung.” Last modified November 26, 2013, http://www.baain.de/portal/a/baain/!ut/p/c4/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP3I5EyrpHK9pMTEzDy9stSi9MSkVL30lCT9gmxHRQDDhWk3/
- “Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen in der Fassung der Bekanntmachung vom 26. Juni 2013 (BGBl. I S. 1750, 3245), das zuletzt durch Artikel 2 Absatz 78 des Gesetzes vom 7. August 2013 (BGBl. I S. 3154) geändert worden ist”, http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bundesrecht/gwb/gesamt.pdf
- European Commission, “Defence Procurement.” Last modified February 07, 2014, http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/publicprocurement/rules/defence_procurement/
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Government Update March 2015:
Link update: http://www.baainbw.de//portal/a/baain/!ut/p/c4/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP3I5EyrpHK9pMTEzDy9stSi9MSkVL30lCT9gmxHRQDDhWk3/
http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bundesrecht/gwb/gesamt.pdf
http://ec.europa.eu/growth/single-market/public-procurement/rules/defence-procurement/index_en.htm
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is the defence procurement cycle process, from assessment of needs, through contract implementation and sign-off, all the way to asset disposal, disclosed to the public?
The defence procurement cycle process for all varieties of procurement within the Ministry of Defence is defined in the Customer Product Management (CPM). The process is divided into three phases: an analysis phase, a production phase and an in-service phase. It defines the objectives, the specific work stages and the activities and responsibilities of each phase.
The process also includes (asset) disposal but only as part of the in-service phase. The CPM is disclosed to the public in several languages on the website of the Federal Office of Bundeswehr Equipment, Information Technology and In-Service Support (BAAINBw). Both the new version, implemented in 2012, and the older version are available on the webpage.
The whole CPM document gives the impression that Germany is striving to increase transparency within procurement processes, for example, the CPM also includes several appendices with additional information such as terms and definitions or specific information on fast-track procurements.
- BAAINBw. “Customer Product Management (CPM) - Verfahrensvorschrift zur Bedarfsermittlung und Bedarfsdeckung in der Bundeswehr.” Last modified April 04, 2014, http://www.baain.de/portal/a/baain/!ut/p/c4/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP3I5EyrpHK9pMTEzDy9gqL8rNTsEr3kglz9gmxHRQDlu1V7/
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Government Update March 2015:
Link update: http://www.baainbw.de//portal/a/baain/!ut/p/c4/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP3I5EyrpHK9pMTEzDy9gqL8rNTsEr3kglz9gmxHRQDlu1V7/
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are defence procurement oversight mechanisms in place and are these oversight mechanisms active and transparent?
Germany has two oversight mechanisms for defence procurement in place. On the one hand, parliamentary scrutiny, especially through the Defence Committee and the Budget Committee, and, on the other hand, independent oversight through the Federal Audit Office (FAO).
The Ministry of Defence must specifically submit procurements of more than 25 million Euros, procurements with a cost increase, discontinued projects with financial implications exceeding 25 million Euros, and reports requested by parliamentarians. This is defined in the Customer Product Management (CPM).
The Federal Audit Office can request reports and additionally controls the overall budget and financial management of the Ministry of Defence. Reports for the Federal Audit Office have been heavily discussed in the media, especially because the FAO has more than once criticised the transparency of large procurement projects. However, due to a change of the legal basis during the past year, the FAO can now deny requests for reports from the public more easily, which could lead to a severe decrease in transparency.
- BAAINBw. “Customer Product Management (CPM) - Verfahrensvorschrift zur Bedarfsermittlung und Bedarfsdeckung in der Bundeswehr.” Last modified April 04, 2014, http://www.baain.de/portal/a/baain/!ut/p/c4/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP3I5EyrpHK9pMTEzDy9gqL8rNTsEr3kglz9gmxHRQDlu1V7/
- Deutscher Bundestag. “Budget Committee.” Last modified 2014, http://www.bundestag.de/htdocs_e/bundestag/committees/a08/index.jsp
- N.N. “Rechnungshof rügt Eurofighter und Luftpumpen-Beschaffung bei der Bundeswehr.” WDR, April 29, 2014, accessed May 01, 2014, http://www1.wdr.de/studio/bonn/nrwinfos/nachrichten/rechnungshof-ruegt-eurofighter100.html
- N.N. “Verschwendung: Rechnungshof prangert teure Nasensprays der Bundeswehr an.” Berliner Morgenpost, November 13, 2012, accessed May 01, 2014, http://www.morgenpost.de/politik/inland/article111015186/Rechnungshof-prangert-teure-Nasensprays-der-Bundeswehr-an.html
- N.N. “Bundeswehr: Prüfer kritisieren Waffen-Beschaffungspraxis.” Die Welt, September 09, 2012, accessed May 07, 2014, http://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article109114031/Pruefer-kritisieren-Waffen-Beschaffungspraxis.html
- Staud, Toralf. “Informationsfreiheit : Bundestag versteckt Rechnungshof-Akten.” Die Zeit, March 12, 2014, accessed May 01, 2014, http://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2014-03/ifg-transparenz-bundesrechnungshof
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Government Update March 2015:
Link update: http://www.baainbw.de//portal/a/baain/!ut/p/c4/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP3I5EyrpHK9pMTEzDy9gqL8rNTsEr3kglz9gmxHRQDlu1V7/
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are actual and potential defence purchases made public?
In line with EU Directive 2009/81/EC Germany now publishes tenders for the procurement of 'hard' defence materials in the European public procurement journal: “Tenders Electronic Daily”. The TED also includes the contracts awarded for the tender processes, and additional information regarding procurement can be found in the budget of the Ministry of Defence.
Invitations to tender for potential procurements (with the exception of cases without competition according to the “Act against restraints of competition”) are made publicly available on the webpage of the Federal Government. Additionally, for the field of ‘hard’ defence materials and according to the Military Weapons List under Article 296 of the EC contract, invitations are made publicly available in the Electronic Bulletin Board (EBB) of the European Defence Agency.
The Federal Office of Bundeswehr Equipment, Information Technology and In-Service Support (BAAINBw) also has online information available about selected procurement projects, and in some specific cases special webpages are created with additional information, such as the Herkules IT project.
A private magazine called ‘Griephan’ offers a large amount of information about current procurement projects. Yet a proper overview of defence purchases is missing, and the information about selected projects from the BAAINBw seems to focus on advertising instead of transparency.
RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: Main text changed according to the suggestions. Score maintained.
- BAAINBw. “Customer Product Management (CPM) - Verfahrensvorschrift zur Bedarfsermittlung und Bedarfsdeckung in der Bundeswehr.” Last modified April 04, 2014, http://www.baain.de/portal/a/baain/!ut/p/c4/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP3I5EyrpHK9pMTEzDy9gqL8rNTsEr3kglz9gmxHRQDlu1V7/
- BAAINBw. “Aktuelle Projekte des Bundesamtes für Ausrüstung, Informationstechnik und Nutzung der Bundeswehr.” Last modified November 26, 2013, http://www.baain.de/portal/a/baain/!ut/p/c4/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP3I5EyrpHK9pMTEzDy9gqL8rNTsEr3UzLyq1JwC_YJsR0UAOR_d6w!!/
- BMVg. “Verteidigungshaushalt 2013.” Last modified December 3, 2013, http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/!ut/p/c4/Nck9DoAgDEDhs3gBSkxc3LyFupCiDTb8aKDg9WUxL9_0YIdewsYOhe-EAVbYDp7tq2xsTkVOXIQy16gaZSE-2dXkyoW1C2JGrSd1UjbopVIIZP4Fj1-GD5nD8bI!/
- BWI. “Das IT-Projekt Herkules.” Last modified n/a, http://www.herkules-fakten.de/
- BAAINBw. “Ausschreibungen.” Last modified November 26, 2013, http://www.baain.de/portal/a/baain/!ut/p/c4/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP3I5EyrpHK9pMTEzDy9stSi9MSkVL3E0uLi5Iwi_YJsR0UAUdk7Bg!!/
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Statement of the German MoD for clarification:
Invitations to tender for potential procurement, as far as “hard” defence materials are concerned, are no longer published on the “Electronic Bulletin Board” as this platform was closed in 2013. Since EU Directive 2009/81/EC came into force, Germany now publishes tenders for the procurement of “hard” defence materials in the European public procurement journal “Tenders Electronic Daily”.
Government Update March 2015:
Link update: http://www.baainbw.de//portal/a/baain/!ut/p/c4/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP3I5EyrpHK9pMTEzDy9gqL8rNTsEr3kglz9gmxHRQDlu1V7/
http://www.baainbw.de//portal/a/baain/!ut/p/c4/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP3I5EyrpHK9pMTEzDy9gqL8rNTsEr3UzLyq1JwC_YJsR0UAOR_d6w!!/
http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/!ut/p/c4/NYxNC8IwEET_UTbxIOqtpSAi9OBF21vahLiQj7LdxIs_3uTgDPMuDwZmqI26oNOMKWoPL5hWvCwfsYTiRMCIO1vCHESxxBYNuhzd_ta5zjM824OxYk3RciPbyFjpSHMisSVi30wmqkaggUmqoZdK_qO-5_HeXefj4TTc-gdsIXQ_EI9lHw!!/
http://www.baainbw.de//portal/a/baain/!ut/p/c4/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP3I5EyrpHK9pMTEzDy9stSi9MSkVL3E0uLi5Iwi_YJsR0UAUdk7Bg!!/
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
What procedures and standards are companies required to have - such as compliance programmes and business conduct programmes - in order to be able to bid for work for the Ministry of Defence or armed forces?
The required procedures and standards for companies are listed on the webpage of the Federal Office of Bundeswehr Equipment, Information Technology and In-Service Support (BAAINBw).
Procedures are based on the Customer Product Management and the specific information that companies must provide is listed in the bidding documents and can vary depending on the type of procurement project. They usually include information about security, reliability, general conditions and definitions for cost prices.
Anti-corruption clauses can be required according to subsection (1) of Article 12 of the Federal Government Directive, concerning the Prevention of Corruption in the Federal Administration, and subsection (2) of the same Article, which states that private companies have to work under the standards defined in the Directive in accordance with subsection (1) of Article 1 of the “Verpflichtungsgesetz”.
- Richtlinie der Bundesregierung zur Korruptionsprävention in der Bundesverwaltung. “Richtlinie der Bundesregierung zur Korruptionsprävention in der Bundesverwaltung, July 30, 2004” http://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Themen/OED_Verwaltung/Korruption_Sponsoring/Richtlinie_zur_Korruptionspraevention_in_der_Bundesverwaltung.html
- BAAINBw. “Customer Product Management (CPM) - Verfahrensvorschrift zur Bedarfsermittlung und Bedarfsdeckung in der Bundeswehr.” Last modified April 04, 2014, http://www.baain.de/portal/a/baain/!ut/p/c4/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP3I5EyrpHK9pMTEzDy9gqL8rNTsEr3kglz9gmxHRQDlu1V7/
- BAAINBw. “Unterlagen zur Angebotsabgabe.” Last modified November 26, 2013, http://www.baain.de/portal/a/baain/!ut/p/c4/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP3I5EyrpHK9pMTEzDy9stSi9MSkVL3EvPTUpPwS_YJsR0UAul0npQ!!/
- OrgStudie G36, Pressehintergrund, 14 October 2015. Available at https://www.google.de/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CCMQFjAAahUKEwjmx_flr-rIAhVL2BoKHck4AA4&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.bmvg.de%2Fresource%2Fresource%2FMzEzNTM4MmUzMzMyMmUzMTM1MzMyZTM2MzEzMDMwMzAzMDMwMzAzMDY5NjY3MTc0Mzg3MzM1NjYyMDIwMjAyMDIw%2F151014%2520Handout%2520OrgStudie.pdf&usg=AFQjCNGp1tMJgwpq3lU-qiW5H5YFGIesSg&cad=rja (last accessed 30 October 2015)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Government Update March 2015:
Link update: http://www.baainbw.de//portal/a/baain/!ut/p/c4/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP3I5EyrpHK9pMTEzDy9gqL8rNTsEr3kglz9gmxHRQDlu1V7/
http://www.baainbw.de//portal/a/baain/!ut/p/c4/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP3I5EyrpHK9pMTEzDy9stSi9MSkVL3EvPTUpPwS_YJsR0UAul0npQ!!/
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are procurement requirements derived from an open, well-audited national defence and security strategy?
The fundamentals of the Bundeswehr's capability planning are the Defence Policy Guidelines, the derived set of capabilities, and the 2013 concept of the Bundeswehr (Weißbuch). These documents are well-audited and open to the public.
In addition, more specific strategic objectives from the Ministry of Defence, such as the “Eckpunktepapier” (benchmark paper), the “Dresdner Erlass” (Dresden Decree) or the new “Konzeption der Bundeswehr” (Doctrine of the Armed Forces) and requirements from international organisations, such as NATO or EU, provide further information.
The Chief of Defence of the German Armed Forces is responsible for capability management. The so-called “Integrierter Plannungsprozess” (Integrated Planning Process) defines the phases of integrated planning, from strategy development to future development planning to capability planning to the definition of specific resources and its implementation. It also includes the areas of budgeting and controlling within the MoD.
Yet there was criticism from the Federal Audit Office in 2012 that procurements of hand held weapons had been made “without conceptual planning” and that feedback from the Armed Forces, especially from deployments, had only minor influence when conducting procurement.
RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: It is arguably true that there is a logical flow down from strategy to individual procurements, which would be the main criterion for a score of 4. However, government audits as well as the latest report on ‘Comprehensive Evaluation and Risk Analysis of Central Defence Procurement Projects’ by KPMG found problems in the capability as well as the project management, the procurement concept and reporting. These do not provide confidence that the logical flow is always followed. Main text changed according to suggestions from Government Reviewer. Score maintained.
- N.N. “Bundeswehr: Prüfer kritisieren Waffen-Beschaffungspraxis.” Die Welt, September 09, 2012, accessed May 07, 2014, http://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article109114031/Pruefer-kritisieren-Waffen-Beschaffungspraxis.html
- Planungsamt der Bundeswehr. “Integrierter Planungsprozess.” Last Modified January 27, 2014, http://www.planungsamt.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/plgabw/!ut/p/c4/DcUxCoAwDADAt_iBZnfzF-oiUUMIDWlIWwVfb7nhYIfB8BHGJsVQYYXtkvl8kyvjiKPbrchkSawRh1A0isMVrRtXj_JRreB5mX4vsdOX/
- Bundesministerium der Verteidigung. “Bericht zum Stand der Neuausrichtung der Bundeswehr.” Last modified May 08, 2013, https://www.google.ch/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CDIQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.bmvg.de%2Fresource%2Fresource%2FMzEzNTM4MmUzMzMyMmUzMTM1MzMyZTM2MzEzMDMwMzAzMDMwMzAzMDY4Njc2NzM3NzMzMDZjNmMyMDIwMjAyMDIw%2FRessortberichtl.pdf&ei=AjhwU-n4E8T_PMv0gNgL&usg=AFQjCNF6vOVK-d6Xi4MQzSSu6BarGE2IYg&sig2=da44dgEx4MWj-VLOhBC0Cg&bvm=bv.66330100,d.ZWU
- Bundeswehr. “Konzeption der Bundeswehr erlassen.” Last modified July 10, 2013, http://www.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/bwde/!ut/p/c4/FcvBDYAgDAXQWVyA3r25hXoxRb9IIIVAkcTp1bzzo5U-wrd3rD4JR5pp2f1ou7H9gKla4DUUxqkwguZQlaM2cSYkeZD_ttkmB2rHVSiHaXgBSFNgLw!!/
- Planungsamt der Bundeswehr. “Integrierter Planungsprozess.” Last Modified January 27, 2014, http://www.planungsamt.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/plgabw/!ut/p/c4/DcUxCoAwDADAt_iBZnfzF-oiUUMIDWlIWwVfb7nhYIfB8BHGJsVQYYXtkvl8kyvjiKPbrchkSawRh1A0isMVrRtXj_JRreB5mX4vsdOX/
- KPMG, P3 Group & TaylorWessing, “Umfassende Bestandsaufnahme und Risikoanalyse zentraler Rüstungsprojekte. Exzerpt.“, September 30, 2014, accessed November 04, 2014, http://augengeradeaus.net/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Exzerpt-final.pdf
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: Statement by the German MoD with the aim of raising the score to level 4:
Military requirements and the resulting procurement is derived logically and consistently from the national security and defence strategy and from multinational regulations (starting with the Defence Policy Guidelines and the Bundeswehr Concept, the NATO planning objectives for medium term budgeting, the financial needs analysis and the resources plan and ending with allocation of the MoD budget as part of the Federal Budget). Full parliamentary control of procurement decisions is guaranteed through unrestricted information and discussion in the parliamentary Defence and Budget Committees.
Government Update March 2015:
Link update: http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/!ut/p/c5/hYtZDoIwFEXX4gpeKQTKZyGo1YJIMQF-CFGCgAwODHX1sgHiuZ_nHkhgWZuNZZF9yq7NHhBBoqcW4SHHJsbhFquIWSzYacxSCMOLj_UUrUDRn1rccoghMdY_BoQQIS0VFemP3BneyB4Zl6-DEGog0DTI69dfvCvcmctL7UnHxHda1aeye9LC5nI---DtuyaHvokmhdDND0Q18VE!/dl3/d3/L0lJSklKSUpKZ2tLQ2xFS0NsRUtDbEVLQ2xFQSEvWUtZTUFBQUFNRUFBQUVFS0lBQUNDQ0dHQ0NPQkpCSk9CRk5GTk9GRExETE9ESFBIUE9IQS80Qm40UklBbHF3RnRla1FZaVRJaEtRa21UQ1VJcE1sRW94U1pPSlFTLzZfQjhMVEwyOTIyRFVKNDBJNlI3SThVRjIwUTQvN19COExUTDI5MjJUNUI3MElCQjhJUDNVMTA4NS8zQ2lBODk0NTcwMDYxL3NpbXBsZS9zcGZfQWN0aW9uTmFtZS9zcGZfQWN0aW9uTGlzdGVuZXIvc3BmX3N0cnV0c0FjdGlvbi8lMHRyaWdnZXJTZWFyY2guZG8vbGF5b3V0bm9kZS9idy5ibXZnLnguc3VjaGUuaC52MS5jMQ!!/
http://www.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/bwde/!ut/p/c4/FcvBDYAgDAXQWVyA3r25hXoxRb9IIIVAkcTp1bzzo5U-wrd3rD4JR5pp2f1ou7H9gKla4DUUxqkwguZQlaM2cSYkeZD_ttkmB2rHVSiHaXgBSFNgLw!!/
http://www.planungsamt.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/plgabw/!ut/p/c4/DcUxCoAwDADAt_iBZnfzF-oiUUMIDWlIWwVfb7nhYIfB8BHGJsVQYYXtkvl8kyvjiKPbrchkSawRh1A0isMVrRtXj_JRreB5mX4vsdOX/
Suggested score: 4
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are defence purchases based on clearly identified and quantified requirements?
Specific requirements are identified and quantified within the “Integrierter Planungsprozess” (Integrated Planning Process), organised by the Directorate-General for Planning. Planning parameters are derived from the planning guidelines and the capability requirements. They then lead – after the analysis of financial requirements – to a resource plan. The units within the MoD that are responsible for controlling and budget are included in this process.
Yet the Federal Audit Office in 2012 criticised the procurement of hand held weapons as having been made “without conceptual planning” and that feedback from the Armed Forces, especially from deployments, had only minor influence when doing procurement. Additionally, newer reports from 2014 highlight examples of unnecessary procurement and fault the transparency of the planning processes.
RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: Main text changed according to the suggestions. Score maintained.
- N.N. “Rechnungshof rügt Eurofighter und Luftpumpen-Beschaffung bei der Bundeswehr.” WDR, April 29, 2014, accessed May 01, 2014, http://www1.wdr.de/studio/bonn/nrwinfos/nachrichten/rechnungshof-ruegt-eurofighter100.html
- N.N. “Verschwendung: Rechnungshof prangert teure Nasensprays der Bundeswehr an.” Berliner Morgenpost, November 13, 2012, accessed May 01, 2014, http://www.morgenpost.de/politik/inland/article111015186/Rechnungshof-prangert-teure-Nasensprays-der-Bundeswehr-an.html
- N.N. “Bundeswehr: Prüfer kritisieren Waffen-Beschaffungspraxis.” Die Welt, September 09, 2012, accessed May 07, 2014, http://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article109114031/Pruefer-kritisieren-Waffen-Beschaffungspraxis.html
- Bundeswehr. “Konzeption der Bundeswehr erlassen.” Last modified July 10, 2013, http://www.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/bwde/!ut/p/c4/FcvBDYAgDAXQWVyA3r25hXoxRb9IIIVAkcTp1bzzo5U-wrd3rD4JR5pp2f1ou7H9gKla4DUUxqkwguZQlaM2cSYkeZD_ttkmB2rHVSiHaXgBSFNgLw!!/
- Bundesministerium der Verteidigung. “The Directorate-General for Planning.” Last modified March 12, 2013, http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/!ut/p/c4/FYy7DoAwCAD_CHY3v8LH0lDFhghotOjva3PLDZfDGX-cHilU5XBSHHFapMsvZHsKmLjclS8JA4otU6QtfG8trMKJcmXR8MIOp5L_hkN7asGJHU-z_gMRQHLk/
- Planungsamt der Bundeswehr. “Integrierter Planungsprozess.” Last Modified January 27, 2014, http://www.planungsamt.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/plgabw/!ut/p/c4/DcUxCoAwDADAt_iBZnfzF-oiUUMIDWlIWwVfb7nhYIfB8BHGJsVQYYXtkvl8kyvjiKPbrchkSawRh1A0isMVrRtXj_JRreB5mX4vsdOX/
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Additional Statement of the German MoD:
In the eyes of the MoD the Customer Product Management (CPM) and Integrated Planning Process (IPP) used guarantee overall transparency and constant involvement of the end user. Additional feedback from the armed forces, including their deployment experiences, is ensured during the IPP since representatives of the armed forces are part of the Integrated Project Teams which accompany the whole planning and procurement process.
Government Update March 2015:
Link update: http://www.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/bwde/!ut/p/c4/FcvBDYAgDAXQWVyA3r25hXoxRb9IIIVAkcTp1bzzo5U-wrd3rD4JR5pp2f1ou7H9gKla4DUUxqkwguZQlaM2cSYkeZD_ttkmB2rHVSiHaXgBSFNgLw!!/
http://www.planungsamt.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/plgabw/!ut/p/c4/DcUxCoAwDADAt_iBZnfzF-oiUUMIDWlIWwVfb7nhYIfB8BHGJsVQYYXtkvl8kyvjiKPbrchkSawRh1A0isMVrRtXj_JRreB5mX4vsdOX/
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is defence procurement generally conducted as open competition or is there a significant element of single-sourcing (that is, without competition)?
Public procurement in Germany is generally conducted as an open competition in accordance with international regulations such as WTO GPA and specific German law, particularly the “Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen” (Act Against Restraints of Competition).
Certain defence procurements are excluded from the competition requirement according to subsection (c) of Paragraph 100. However, especially with the adoption of 2009/81/EC and the resulting new “Vergabeverordnung für die Bereiche Verteidigung und Sicherheit” (Awarding Regulation for the Area of Defence and Security), the number of possible exceptions has decreased drastically. An increase of tender procedures can already be observed in the Tenders Electronic Daily webportal.
Specific statistics that would provide information about the aggregated volume should soon be available due to 2009/81/EC, yet they are missing at the moment. The score has been selected on the basis that it not possible to assess the proportion of defence contracts that are single sourced.
- “Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen in der Fassung der Bekanntmachung vom 26. Juni 2013 (BGBl. I S. 1750, 3245), das zuletzt durch Artikel 2 Absatz 78 des Gesetzes vom 7. August 2013 (BGBl. I S. 3154) geändert worden ist”, http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bundesrecht/gwb/gesamt.pdf
- Oppenhoff & Partner Rechtsanwälte. “Newsletter Defence: Beschaffung im Verteidigungssektor - Was wird sich 2013 ändern?” Last modified n/a, http://www.oppenhoff.eu/aktuelles/newsletter/article/newsletter-defence-beschaffung-im-verteidigungssektor-was-wird-sich-2013-aendern.html
- European Commission. “COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT, Annual Public Procurement Implementation Review 2012, SWD(2012) 342”, October 09, 2012, http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/publicprocurement/docs/implementation/20121011-staff-working-document_en.pdf
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Government Update March 2015:
Link update: http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bundesrecht/gwb/gesamt.pdf
http://ec.europa.eu/growth/single-market/public-procurement/implementation/index_en.htm
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are tender boards subject to regulations and codes of conduct and are their decisions subject to independent audit to ensure due process and fairness?
The main intention of the new “Integrierter Planungsprozess” (Integrated Planning Process) is to have combined teams of specialists from different areas within the Ministry of Defence, which should be part of the whole life cycle of a product, including the tender phase.
There is an array of regulations, such as the “Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen” (Act Against Restraints of Competition), for this phase and, as with all processes within the Federal Government, the Federal Audit Office can independently control the work of the government.
According to Articles 102 and 104 of the Act Against Restraints of Competition, there is also the potential for an independent review of the decision of the tender boards to ensure a fair process.
There appears to be a lack of evidence for tender board decisions being audited, and the most recent Audit Office Annual Report does not mention the &quoute;integrierter Planungsprozess&quoute;.
- “Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen in der Fassung der Bekanntmachung vom 26. Juni 2013 (BGBl. I S. 1750, 3245), das zuletzt durch Artikel 2 Absatz 78 des Gesetzes vom 7. August 2013 (BGBl. I S. 3154) geändert worden ist”, http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bundesrecht/gwb/gesamt.pdf
- BAAINBw. ”Grundlagen der Beschaffung.” Last modified November 26, 2013, http://www.baain.de/portal/a/baain/!ut/p/c4/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP3I5EyrpHK9pMTEzDy9stSi9MSkVL30lCT9gmxHRQDDhWk3/
- Planungsamt der Bundeswehr. “Integrierter Planungsprozess.” Last Modified January 27, 2014, http://www.planungsamt.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/plgabw/!ut/p/c4/DcUxCoAwDADAt_iBZnfzF-oiUUMIDWlIWwVfb7nhYIfB8BHGJsVQYYXtkvl8kyvjiKPbrchkSawRh1A0isMVrRtXj_JRreB5mX4vsdOX/
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Government Update March 2015:
Link update: http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bundesrecht/gwb/gesamt.pdf
http://www.baainbw.de//portal/a/baain/!ut/p/c4/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP3I5EyrpHK9pMTEzDy9stSi9MSkVL30lCT9gmxHRQDDhWk3/
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Does the country have legislation in place to discourage and punish collusion between bidders for defence and security contracts?
Collusion is prohibited in German legislation according to Article 298 of the Strafgesetzbuch (Criminal Code), and Germany has an independent competition authority (Bundeskartellamt) within the Federal Ministry of Economics and Energy based on Article 32ff of the Act Against Restraints of Competition. The act also provides further information about the procedures and punishments.
A recent investigation led to three suppliers being awarded a penalty of 1.3 million Euros for collusion in July 2015. They were bidding for supplies to military vehicles. A forth company was not punished as they disclosed the collusion to the authorities.
- “Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen in der Fassung der Bekanntmachung vom 26. Juni 2013 (BGBl. I S. 1750, 3245), das zuletzt durch Artikel 2 Absatz 78 des Gesetzes vom 7. August 2013 (BGBl. I S. 3154) geändert worden ist”, http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bundesrecht/gwb/gesamt.pdf
- &quoute;Strafgesetzbuch in der Fassung der Bekanntmachung vom 13. November 1998 (BGBl. I S. 3322), das zuletzt durch Artikel 1 des Gesetzes vom 23. April 2014 (BGBl. I S. 410) geändert worden ist&quoute; http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/stgb/index.html
- n-tv, &quoute;Kartellamt greift durch. Rüstungszulieferer müssen Strafe zahlen&quoute;. Last modified July 16, 2015. http://www.n-tv.de/wirtschaft/Ruestungszulieferer-muessen-Strafe-zahlen-article15531976.html
- AP, &quoute;Zulieferer von Rüstungsfirmen müssen wegen Preisabsprachen zahlen&quoute;, Die Zeit, July 16, 2015. http://www.zeit.de/news/2015-07/16/deutschland-zulieferer-von-ruestungsfirmen-muessen-wegen-preisabsprachen-zahlen-16111012
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Government Update March 2015:
Link update: http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bundesrecht/gwb/gesamt.pdf
http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/stgb/BJNR001270871.html#BJNR001270871BJNG000202307
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are procurement staff, in particular project and contract managers, specifically trained and empowered to ensure that defence contractors meet their obligations on reporting and delivery?
The Federal Office of Bundeswehr Equipment, Information Technology and In-Service Support (BAAINBw) is responsible for all defence procurement.
The tasks of the BAAINBw staff regarding reporting and delivery of the defence contractors are specifically defined in the Customer Product Management (CPM), for example in Article 2.2.4 “Integrierte Nachweisführung” (Integrated Compliance Demonstration).
According to these guidelines, the project manager is responsible for the collection of the reports. Also, the CPM stresses the importance of project management and project management accounting (the in-house management tools to control/assess the process).
Additionally, the Government Quality Assurance is used to inspect the performance for compliance with the contractor. The CPM and the management tools are subject to internal training.
- BAAINBw. “Customer Product Management (CPM) - Verfahrensvorschrift zur Bedarfsermittlung und Bedarfsdeckung in der Bundeswehr.” Last modified April 04, 2014, http://www.baain.de/portal/a/baain/!ut/p/c4/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP3I5EyrpHK9pMTEzDy9gqL8rNTsEr3kglz9gmxHRQDlu1V7/
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Government Update March 2015:
Link update: http://www.baainbw.de//portal/a/baain/!ut/p/c4/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP3I5EyrpHK9pMTEzDy9gqL8rNTsEr3kglz9gmxHRQDlu1V7/
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are there mechanisms in place to allow companies to complain about perceived malpractice in procurement, and are companies protected from discrimination when they use these mechanisms?
There are several mechanisms in place to allow companies to complain about perceived malpractice. The most important is that companies can, according to Articles 116 to 124 of the Act Against Restraints of Competition, complain about decisions taken by the responsible agency.
In the case of defence procurement, the Federal Office of Bundeswehr Equipment, Information Technology and In-Service Support (BAAINBw) is the responsible agency.
Additionally, based on the Federal Anti-corruption Guidelines and the derived documents within the Ministry of Defence, the BAAINBw has, because of its size, a dedicated contact person for corruption prevention. It is also possible to send anonymous information to this contact person.
- “Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen in der Fassung der Bekanntmachung vom 26. Juni 2013 (BGBl. I S. 1750, 3245), das zuletzt durch Artikel 2 Absatz 78 des Gesetzes vom 7. August 2013 (BGBl. I S. 3154) geändert worden ist”, http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bundesrecht/gwb/gesamt.pdf
- &quoute;Strafgesetzbuch in der Fassung der Bekanntmachung vom 13. November 1998 (BGBl. I S. 3322), das zuletzt durch Artikel 1 des Gesetzes vom 23. April 2014 (BGBl. I S. 410) geändert worden ist&quoute; http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/stgb/index.html
- BAAINBw. “Ansprechperson für Korruptionsprävention.” Last modified November 26, 2013, http://www.baain.de/portal/a/baain/!ut/p/c4/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP3I5EyrpHK9pMTEzDy94tSisszkVL3s_KKi0gKQGv2CbEdFAHqfuYU!/
- BAAINBw. “Auftraggeber Bundeswehr.”, Last modified February 18, 2014, http://www.baain.de/portal/a/baain/!ut/p/c4/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP3I5EyrpHK9pMTEzDy9stSi9MSkVL3E0rSSosR0_YJsR0UAehlP1Q!!/
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Government Update March 2015:
Link update: http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bundesrecht/gwb/gesamt.pdf
http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/stgb/BJNR001270871.html#BJNR001270871BJNG000202307
http://www.baainbw.de//portal/a/baain/!ut/p/c4/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP3I5EyrpHK9pMTEzDy94tSisszkVL3s_KKi0gKQGv2CbEdFAHqfuYU!/
http://www.baainbw.de//portal/a/baain/!ut/p/c4/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP3I5EyrpHK9pMTEzDy9stSi9MSkVL3E0rSSosR0_YJsR0UAehlP1Q!!/
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
What sanctions are used to punish the corrupt activities of a supplier?
The subsection (2) of Article 12 of the Federal Government Directive concerning the Prevention of Corruption in the Federal Administration states that private companies have to work under the standards defined in the Directive in accordance with subsection (1) of Article 1 of the “Verpflichtungsgesetz”.
This means that a supplier would be entitled to the same sanctions as public servants based on the German Criminal Law. The Criminal Law defines such sanctions further, for example, bribery is punishable by imprisonment from three months up to five years, or in less severe cases by imprisonment up to two years or financial penalties according to Article 334.
Additionally, companies can be fined up to 10 million Euros, and this fine can be exceptionally higher when the corrupt practice was more profitable for the company. Germany does not practice blacklisting.
A recent investigation led to three suppliers being awarded a penalty of 1.3 million Euros for collusion in July 2015. They were bidding for supplies to military vehicles. A fourth company was not punished as they disclosed the collusion to the authorities.
The score has been awarded on the basis that sanctions are consistently applied in practice, but they do not include blacklisting.
- &quoute;Strafgesetzbuch in der Fassung der Bekanntmachung vom 13. November 1998 (BGBl. I S. 3322), das zuletzt durch Artikel 1 des Gesetzes vom 23. April 2014 (BGBl. I S. 410) geändert worden ist&quoute; http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/stgb/index.html
- Richtlinie der Bundesregierung zur Korruptionsprävention in der Bundesverwaltung. “Richtlinie der Bundesregierung zur Korruptionsprävention in der Bundesverwaltung, July 30, 2004” http://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Themen/OED_Verwaltung/Korruption_Sponsoring/Richtlinie_zur_Korruptionspraevention_in_der_Bundesverwaltung.html
- Jahn, Joachim, “ Schärfere Strafen für Unternehmen“, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, August 13, 2012, accessed May 09, 2014, http://www.faz.net/aktuell/wirtschaft/unternehmen/bundesjustizministerium-schaerfere-strafen-fuer-unternehmen-11854907.html
- n-tv, &quoute;Kartellamt greift durch. Rüstungszulieferer müssen Strafe zahlen&quoute;. Last modified July 16, 2015. http://www.n-tv.de/wirtschaft/Ruestungszulieferer-muessen-Strafe-zahlen-article15531976.html
- AP, &quoute;Zulieferer von Rüstungsfirmen müssen wegen Preisabsprachen zahlen&quoute;, Die Zeit, July 16, 2015. http://www.zeit.de/news/2015-07/16/deutschland-zulieferer-von-ruestungsfirmen-muessen-wegen-preisabsprachen-zahlen-16111012
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Even though Germany doesn't practise blacklisting as such, contractors who have been found guilty of corruption or forming cartels are excluded from contracting with the MoD until sustainable reorganisation has been undertaken to ensure lawful conduct in the future.
Government Update March 2015:
Link update: http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/stgb/BJNR001270871.html#BJNR001270871BJNG000202307
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
When negotiating offset contracts, does the government specifically address corruption risk by imposing due diligence requirements on contractors? Does the government follow up on offset contract performance and perform audits to check performance and integrity?
Officially, the Ministry of Defence is against offsets because they “create an obstacle for fair competition&quoute;, and explicitly states that that no offsets will be asked for, as is reiterated by the Government Reviewer comments (below).
However, Germany may quasi direct-offsets in cooperative projects and defines cost- and work-share agreements, that too in exceptional cases.
RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: Agreed. Score changed to N/A.
- Martin Trybus, “Buying Defence and Security in Europe: The EU Defence and Security Procurement Directive in Context”. 2014. p.427
- “The European Defence Agency: Arming Europe (Routledge Studies in European Security and Strategy)” Edited by Nikolaos Karampekios, Iraklis Oikonomou, April 20th 2015. Routledge.
- EDA. “Offset Portal: Germany.” Last modified May 12, 2014, http://www.eda.europa.eu/offsets/viewpolicy.aspx?CountryID=DE
- “Gesetz über die förmliche Verpflichtung nichtbeamteter Personen (Verpflichtungsgesetz), vom 2. März 1974 (BGBl. I S. 469, 547), das durch § 1 Nummer 4 des Gesetzes vom 15. August 1974 (BGBl. I S. 1942) geändert worden ist”
- Richtlinie der Bundesregierung zur Korruptionsprävention in der Bundesverwaltung. “Richtlinie der Bundesregierung zur Korruptionsprävention in der Bundesverwaltung, July 30, 2004” http://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Themen/OED_Verwaltung/Korruption_Sponsoring/Richtlinie_zur_Korruptionspraevention_in_der_Bundesverwaltung.html
Opinion: Not Qualified
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: Statement of the German MoD:
The German MoD considers offset contracts a breach of market economy principles; they are too dirigiste and protectionist in their nature, infringe international cooperation and lead to the mis-allocation of resources. As a rule they increase the costs of manufactured armaments as non-competitive services or create additional costs by the compensatory sale of third-party goods elsewhere.
Contracts with other nations, where the question of offset contracts might arise, are as a rule concluded directly with the German defence industry – without participation of the MoD. Therefore, as the MoD itself never engages in offset contracts, there is no requirement for internal regulation on this matter.
Government Update March 2015:
Link update: http://www.eda.europa.eu/offsets
Suggested score: N/A
Opinion: Not Qualified
Comment:
Suggested score:
Does the government make public the details of offset programmes, contracts, and performance?
Officially, the Ministry of Defence is against offsets because they “create an obstacle for fair competition,” and explicitly states that that no offsets will be asked for, as is reiterated by the Government Reviewer comments (below).
However, Germany may quasi direct-offsets in cooperative projects and defines cost- and work-share agreements, that too in exceptional cases.
RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: Agreed. Score changed to N/A.
- Martin Trybus, “Buying Defence and Security in Europe: The EU Defence and Security Procurement Directive in Context”. 2014. p.427
- “The European Defence Agency: Arming Europe (Routledge Studies in European Security and Strategy)” Edited by Nikolaos Karampekios, Iraklis Oikonomou, April 20th 2015. Routledge.
- EDA. “Offset Portal: Germany.” Last modified May 12, 2014, http://www.eda.europa.eu/offsets/viewpolicy.aspx?CountryID=DE
- “Gesetz über die förmliche Verpflichtung nichtbeamteter Personen (Verpflichtungsgesetz), vom 2. März 1974 (BGBl. I S. 469, 547), das durch § 1 Nummer 4 des Gesetzes vom 15. August 1974 (BGBl. I S. 1942) geändert worden ist”
- Richtlinie der Bundesregierung zur Korruptionsprävention in der Bundesverwaltung. “Richtlinie der Bundesregierung zur Korruptionsprävention in der Bundesverwaltung, July 30, 2004” http://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Themen/OED_Verwaltung/Korruption_Sponsoring/Richtlinie_zur_Korruptionspraevention_in_der_Bundesverwaltung.html
- EDA. “Offset Portal: Germany.” Last modified May 12, 2014, http://www.eda.europa.eu/offsets/viewpolicy.aspx?CountryID=DE
- BAAINBw. “Eurofighter Typhoon.”, Last modified November 26, 2013, http://www.baain.de/portal/a/baain/!ut/p/c4/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP3I5EyrpHK9pMTEzDy9gqL8rNTsEr3UzLyq1JwCvdTSovy0zHT9gmxHRQBXAtdr/
- Wiegold, Thomas, “Was kostet der Eurofighter? Das BMVg hat keine Ahnung, sagt dr Rechnungshof.”, Augen geradeaus!, April 29, 2014, accessed May 12, 2014, http://augengeradeaus.net/2014/04/was-kostet-der-eurofighter-das-bmvg-hat-keine-ahnung-sagt-der-rechnungshof/
Opinion: Not Qualified
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: Statement of the German MoD:
Non applicable, see MoD statement to 5.5,70
The German MoD considers offset contracts a breach of market economy principles; they are too dirigiste and protectionist in their nature, infringe international cooperation and lead to the misallocation of recourses. As a rule they increase the costs of manufactured armaments as non-competitive services or create additional costs by the compensatory sale of third-party goods elsewhere.
Contracts with other nations, where the question of offset contracts might arise, are as a rule concluded directly with the German defence industry – without participation of the MoD. Therefore, as the MoD itself never engages in offset contracts, there is no requirement for internal regulation on this matter.
Government Update March 2015:
Link update: http://www.eda.europa.eu/offsets
http://www.baainbw.de//portal/a/baain/!ut/p/c4/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP3I5EyrpHK9pMTEzDy9gqL8rNTsEr3UzLyq1JwCvdTSovy0zHT9gmxHRQBXAtdr/
Suggested score: N/A
Opinion: Not Qualified
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are offset contracts subject to the same level of competition regulation as the main contract?
Officially, the Ministry of Defence is against offsets because they “create an obstacle for fair competition,” and explicitly states that that no offsets will be asked for, as is reiterated by the Government Reviewer comments (below).
However, Germany may quasi direct-offsets in cooperative projects and defines cost- and work-share agreements, that too in exceptional cases.
RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: Agreed. Score changed to N/A.
-European Commission, Defence Procurement 2009/81/EC , http://ec.europa.eu/growth/single-market/public-procurement/rules-implementation/defence/index_en.htm
- Bundesverband der Deutschen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungsindustrie e.V., Offset/Kompensationsleistungen, http://www.bdsv.eu/de/Taetigkeitsfelder/Themen/Offset.htm
- EDA offsets code of conduct, http://www.bdsv.eu/data/8aae7378c3a8bbc67db7ba86bed47bceb9a494cdb9dca0cdc7b790bac7a77cd8c3a7d9b88aae777cc3a9bf847dcdbe93.pdf
Opinion: Not Qualified
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: Government Update March 2015:
Link update: http://www.eda.europa.eu/offsets
Suggested score: N/A
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
How strongly does the government control the company's use of agents and intermediaries in the procurement cycle?
Article 8.2.1 of the “Zusätzliche Vertragsbedingungen des Bundesministeriums der Verteidigung zur Verdingungsordnung für Leistungen Teil B” (Additional Terms of Contract of the Federal Ministry of defence to Part B of the General Terms and Conditions Concerning Contracts for Supplies and Services of 28 February 1998 as amended on 10 May 2001) states that the contractor is not allowed to involve third parties as intermediaries.
An exception to this rule only occurs when the procurement agency (BAAINBw) expresses consent, or if the consultation only happens for “legal, tax-related, business economy or technical matters”. The process of the audit is defined in the Customer Product Management, particularly in Article 2.2.4 “Integrierte Nachweisführung” (Integrated Compliance Demonstration).
- BAAINBw. “Vertragsbedingungen.” Last modified November 26, 2013, http://www.baain.de/portal/a/baain/!ut/p/c4/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP3I5EyrpHK9pMTEzDy9stSi9MSkVL20_KLc0pxEEL-kKDFdvyDbUREAjcSb9A!!/
- BAAINBw. “Customer Product Management (CPM) - Verfahrensvorschrift zur Bedarfsermittlung und Bedarfsdeckung in der Bundeswehr.” Last modified April 04, 2014, http://www.baain.de/portal/a/baain/!ut/p/c4/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP3I5EyrpHK9pMTEzDy9gqL8rNTsEr3kglz9gmxHRQDlu1V7/
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Government Update March 2015:
Link update: http://www.baainbw.de//portal/a/baain/!ut/p/c4/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP3I5EyrpHK9pMTEzDy9stSi9MSkVL20_KLc0pxEEL-kKDFdvyDbUREAjcSb9A!!/
http://www.baainbw.de//portal/a/baain/!ut/p/c4/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP3I5EyrpHK9pMTEzDy9gqL8rNTsEr3kglz9gmxHRQDlu1V7/
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are the principal aspects of the financing package surrounding major arms deals, (such as payment timelines, interest rates, commercial loans or export credit agreements) made publicly available prior to the signing of contracts?
Specific financial information, with the exception of the budget information (target costs for the current and following year, as well as the actual costs of the year before for individual procurement projects) is included in the Einzelplan 14 (the budget of the MoD. It is not publicly available, especially not prior to the signing of the contract.
The Federal Audit Office stated in 2014 that one of the problems in this situation is that the MoD does not have all of the required information, referencing the example of the Eurofighter procurement and the missing data for life-cycle costing.
(Score reassessed in finalisation stage of research and changed from 2 to 1)
- BAAINBw. “Aktuelle Projekte des Bundesamtes für Ausrüstung, Informationstechnik und Nutzung der Bundeswehr.” Last modified November 26, 2013, http://www.baain.de/portal/a/baain/!ut/p/c4/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP3I5EyrpHK9pMTEzDy9gqL8rNTsEr3UzLyq1JwC_YJsR0UAOR_d6w!!/
- Bundesrechnungshof. “Bundesministerium der Verteidigung (BMVg) (Einzelplan 14), 9 Kostentransparenz beim EUROFIGHTER herstellen” Last modified 2014, http://www.bundesrechnungshof.de/de/veroeffentlichungen/bemerkungen-jahresberichte/2013-weitere-pruefungsergebnisse/einzelplanbezogene-pruefungsergebnisse/bundesministerium-der-verteidigung/langfassungen/2013-bemerkungen-weitere-pruefungsergebnisse-nr-09-kostentransparenz-beim-eurofighter-herstellen
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Government Update March 2015:
Link update: http://www.baainbw.de//portal/a/baain/!ut/p/c4/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP3I5EyrpHK9pMTEzDy9gqL8rNTsEr3UzLyq1JwC_YJsR0UAOR_d6w!!/
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Does the government formally require that the main contractor ensures subsidiaries and sub-contractors adopt anti-corruption programmes, and is there evidence that this is enforced?
Germany’s anti-corruption measures are based on the Federal Government Directive concerning the Prevention of Corruption in the Federal Administration. Contractors have to work under the standards defined in the Directive in accordance with subsection (1) of Article 1 of the “Verpflichtungsgesetz”.
Article 1 also includes subsidiaries and subcontractors, thus anti-corruption measures are enforced in the same manner as for main contractors. There is no evidence that anti-corruption programmes are less enforced at these sublevels.
The score has been awarded on the basis that this requirement does not equate to an obligation for the subcontractor to have an anti-corruption programme in place.
- BAAINBw. “Vertragsbedingungen.” Last modified November 26, 2013, http://www.baain.de/portal/a/baain/!ut/p/c4/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP3I5EyrpHK9pMTEzDy9stSi9MSkVL20_KLc0pxEEL-kKDFdvyDbUREAjcSb9A!!/
- Richtlinie der Bundesregierung zur Korruptionsprävention in der Bundesverwaltung. “Richtlinie der Bundesregierung zur Korruptionsprävention in der Bundesverwaltung, July 30, 2004” http://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Themen/OED_Verwaltung/Korruption_Sponsoring/Richtlinie_zur_Korruptionspraevention_in_der_Bundesverwaltung.html
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Government Update March 2015:
Link update:
http://www.baainbw.de//portal/a/baain/!ut/p/c4/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP3I5EyrpHK9pMTEzDy9stSi9MSkVL20_KLc0pxEEL-kKDFdvyDbUREAjcSb9A!!/
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
How common is it for defence acquisition decisions to be based on political influence by selling nations?
Exclusive external political influence is rather uncommon for Germany.
According to SIPRI, Germany was the third largest arms exporter in the world between 2008 and 2012. With approximately 100,000 defence company employees in 2011 and an additional 220,000 dependent employees in supplying or subcontracting companies, the defence industry is considered very relevant from a defence political, as well as from an economic, point of view.
The German focus on its own arms industry has led to fewer and fewer arms imports, which have decreased to an average of approximately 100 million Euros between 2007 and 2011.
Taking this into account, and while it may be very common for defence acquisitions to be based on political influence by the selling nation, in the case of Germany this selling nation is almost exclusively the buying nation as well.
An exception may be the planning of arms cooperation projects, but Germany has generally been in the lead within such projects, rather than the other way around. A 2014 study commissioned by the Ministry of Defence interestingly defined German key defence capabilities that should definitely be maintained in a very narrow way, excluding e.g. battle tanks, fighter jets and small arms and light weapons.
There have been expert comments suggesting that imporant procurement decisions have been made based on political considerations rather then needs, price, and availability.
- Bundesverband der Deutschen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungsindustrie, “ Beschäftigung in der deutschen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungsindustrie.” Last modified 2012, http://www.ruestungsindustrie.info/industrie/beschaeftigung-in-der-deutschen-sicherheits-und-verteidigungsindustrie
- Marsh, Sarah & Jones, Gareth &quoute;Germany, France to deepen defence cooperation.”, June 12, 2012, accessed May 10, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/14/us-germany-france-defence-idUSBRE85D10G20120614
- von Vosss, Alicia; Major, Claudia & Mölling, Christian, “The State of Defence Cooperation in Europe.” SWP Working Paper, December, 2013, accessed May 12, 2014, http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/arbeitspapiere/WP_DefenceCooperationEurope_Voss_Major__Moelling_Dez_2013.pdf
- SIPRI. “The Top 20 Arms Exporters, 2008 - 2012.” Last modified March 18, 2013, http://www.sipri.org/googlemaps/2013_of_at_top_20_exp_map.html
- index mundi. “Germany - Arms imports.” Last modified n/a, http://www.indexmundi.com/facts/germany/arms-imports
Martin Greive, Thorsten Jungholt, &quoute;Gabriel punktet im Duell der Reservekanzler&quoute;, Die Welt, October 8, 2014, http://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article133067740/Gabriel-punktet-im-Duell-der-Reservekanzler.html (last accessed 3 November 2015)
Hans Ruehle, &quoute;Ministerin von der Leyens 'management by terror'&quoute;, Die Welt, March 28, 2014, http://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article126309150/Ministerin-von-der-Leyens-management-by-terror.html (last accessed 3 November 2015)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Parliamentary control of government and the Ministry of Defence's work is provided by Paragraph (1) of subsection (a) of Article (45) of the German Basic Law, which stipulates the establishment of the Defence Committee in the German Bundestag. The Committee has two main tasks: the preparation of decisions taken by Parliament, and to provide major support to Parliament in scrutinising the governmental bodies responsible for defence.
For the latter task, the Committee can convene itself as a 'committee of inquiry' (the only committee to do so in the German Bundestag). Up until 2014, 25% of members' votes were needed to convene as an inquiry commission; a number that could not be achieved due to the large majority of the two 'Grand Coalition' parties, which consists of the two parties with the largest number of MPs. This threshold has since been changed to a flexible threshold, depending on the size of the 'Grand Coalition' in order to guarantee the rights of the minority parties.
Additionally, parliamentary groups and members of the Parliament have the right to ask questions based on Paragraph (2) Article (20) and Article Paragraph (1) of (38) of the German Basic Law. In addition, the defence budget is checked by the Federal Audit Office.
There was criticism by the opposition on the implementation of the so called 'Rühe Commission', which reviewed the Parliamentary Participation Act regarding foreign engagement of the Bundeswehr. The opposition was concerned that this might lead to less effective scrutiny of defence policy. The commission, however, concluded that parliamentary control over Bundeswehr deployment should not be weakened, even if other benefits (such as e.g. more timely decisions) could materialise.
Despite Germany having a 'parliamentary army', which means that theoretically any deployment needs to be voted on by Parliament (with the Foreign Affairs Committee leading on this process), this has not always happened in practice or been deemed feasible by the government - e.g. because of short deployment timelines - in recent years. So notwithstanding the findings of the Rühe Commission, parliamentary control seems to have become somewhat less effective.