Poland

The overall procedure of withdrawing assets from use was established by Decision 444/MON.

The Military Property Agency is tasked with the disposal of the military property, including arms, equipment and real estate [3]. It organises public tenders, available on their website and advertised in the main newspapers. 93% of proceeds of the Agency go to the Armed Forced Modernisation Fund and to the Public Security Modernisation Fund [1]. The Military Property Agency is also entrusted with the management of all redundant (that is - not used by the Armed Forces) military equipment, not classified as waste. This equipment can be stored, leased or sold. However, should it be classified by the Military Institute of Technical Armaments as waste, military equipment has to be disarmed and either utilised or recycled. For instance, according to the Government Waste Management Plan, the Military of National Defence was responsible for the disarmament and destruction of ammunition and explosives classified as waste in the years 2003 - 2014. The whole procedure is subject to the regular oversight in the Ministry [4]. The utilisation reports are also periodically reviewed by the Ministry of Environment.

The asset disposal proceeds are included in the Budget Decisions annexes, as explained in Q17.

The Agency operates under the control of the Minister of National Defence and is subjected to the anti-corruption procedures and code of conduct of the Ministry. However, the press has reported possible corruption cases and on-going bribery investigations, indicating some weakness in the procedures and controls. [2]

The Supervisory Board of the Military Property Agency is composed of representatives of the Minister of National Defence, Minister of the State Treasury, Minister of Interior Affairs and Administration, and the Minister of Finance. It is a body responsible for evaluating the annual financial plan of the Agency, evaluating the annual financial statements and reports on activities of the Agency, and choosing the expert auditor to carry out audits of financial statements of the Agency. The annual financial plan and financial statements - including the financial value of the acquisition or disposal of the assets - are presented to the Council of Ministers and are available to the public.They are also audited by the Supreme Chamber of Control [4]. These audits are publicly available.

The Supreme Chamber of Control can also conduct ad hoc audits of the activities of specific government departments and agencies. The last specific audit of the Agency of Military Property was conducted in 2006. [5]

RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER: As the information is publicly available, score 4 was maintained.

Altogether, the expenditure on the security and intelligence services which are under MOD control (Military Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence Services as well as special forces) amounts to 1.79% of the Defence Budgets, according to the MOD's own calculation. [1]

The aggregate budgets of secret services are determined by the budgetary law and are described in a fairly detailed manner. For 2015, the budget for the Internal Security Agency (ABW) is set at 520 million zloty, the Intelligence Agency at 153 million złoty, the Anti-Corruption Bureau (CBA) for 110 million złoty, for the Military Counterilligence (SKW) 200 million złoty and for the Military Intelligence at 230 million złoty [1, 2,3]. The budget project is scrutinised and evaluated by the Parliamentary Intelligence Committee.
Expenses for HR (salaries etc.) are singled out in the specific budgets and analysed separately from expenses on specific activities, assets acquisition, informants etc [4]. This leads the assessor to conclude that the information is likely correct.

Factoring in external secret services as well, the percentage of secret spending as a proportion of the defence and security budget (taken here as the defence budget and the budgets of external secret services together) is 5.8%.

According to the Regulation on Internal Organisation of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland (which is a document regulating the remits of Sejm's committees) members of the Intelligence Oversight Committee have access to the classified data [1]. Budget oversight is one of the main tasks of the Intelligence Oversight Committee. The Committee submits evaluations of the budget proposals and, later, the evaluation of the budget implementatio to the Committee on Public Finances. It is later discussed by the Parliament during the plenary sessions. The Parliament has to consider the recommendations of relevant committees before deciding whether to approve the government's execution of the budget. [3]

The &quoute;Open Budget Questionnaire&quoute; of 2011 (Q94) indicates that audit reports on secret expenditures are not produced [1]. However, the Supreme Chamber of Control does conduct audits of secret budgets and the way the services spend allocated resources as part of its annual control of the execution of the budget. The 2014 report of the SCC indicates that such audit was conducted, but it remains classified due to its content. [2]

No explicit confirmation that these audits are provided to Parliament could be found. However, given that the members of the Intelligence Oversight Committee hold security clearances and are responsible for scrutinising budget planning and execution, it is likely that they receive these audits in some form. To reflect uncertainty, score 1 has been selected.

The Polish MOD has at its disposal one ring-fenced fund devoted to the modernisation of the Polish armed forces. These expenditures are regulated by article 6 of &quoute;Rebuilding and Technical Modernisation and Polish Armed Forces' Financing&quoute; law and are composed of direct budgetary expenditures, income derived from the privatisation of the state-owned defence industry and income from the Technical Modernisation Fund (i.e. the income of the Military Property Agency). This expenditure is part of the official budget framework.

There are no legal provisions allowing for off-budget expenditures and there is no evidence that such expenditures exist. Alternative income sources and expenditures such as American military aid, R&D expenditures or special funds are included in the budgetary framework. [2]

There is no evidence that there are any off-budget military expenditures and the probability of the existence of alternative, unrecognised sources of income is extremely low, given the Polish budgetary legal framework [2].

As the score of 4 was selected in Q27, N/A applies here.

The &quoute;Protection of Classified Information Act&quoute; of 2010 outlines the cases in which public information can be classified. The “top secret” clause can be given to information that may pose a threat to the security of Poland, its citizens or its allies as well as cases when it may lead to the identification and endangering of the Polish security, military, or intelligence service and police officers. The “secret” clause is given to information that might weaken Poland’s international standing and relations with other countries, disrupt its defence policy or the work of the judicial and police systems. The “confidential” clause is given to information that might endanger the foreign or financial policy of Poland or disrupt the proceedings of the administration. The bill establishes the procedures regulating the evaluation of the classification clause and the process accompanying the security clearance evaluation. [1]

However, independent reports highlight the excessive reliance on the classification clauses by the public administration, diminishing the transparency of the government [3]. Moreover, according to the Helsinki Foundation of Human Rights, there are doubts concerning the transparency of the classified information protection, including but not limited to: the limitation of an effective judiciary control over the classified information is severly limited to a quasi-court procedure [4, pp. 10 - 11], retention of classified data [5] and classification of operational material [6].

RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWERS 1 AND 2: Agree, score changed to 2.

The Ministry of National Defence does not have ownership of commercial businesses, but exercises property rights (in consultation with the Ministry of Treasury), on behalf of the State Treasury, over certain commercial businesses, especially munitions, surveillance and repair companies operating mainly for the Armed Forces[1]. The State Treasury exercises ownership of the biggest Polish military procurement companies, grouped in the Polish Armament Group, thus separating the armaments customer (MoD) and the suppliers [2]. The Polish Armament Group operates under the rules of market economy and performs commercial endeavours, engaging i.a. in weapons exports. The entities over which MoD exercises joint control with the Ministry of Treasury operate within the boundaries of the Polish law, including submitting - when required - their books and operations for public scrutiny.

The military maintenance, armament and production companies under the control of the Ministry of National Defence have a diverse legal status, with the majority of them being public joint-stock companies while others remain limited liability entities (thus, their audit details are not available to the public). Nevertheless, they are subject to the same accounting, tax and scrutiny rules of the &quoute;Code of Commercial Companies&quoute; as other enterprises [1].

It is important to distinguish between the limited number of budgetary units formed as military maintenance or construction companies [2] and state-owned defence contractors operating in the free market economy. The latter, such as Polska Grupa Zbrojeniowa S.A. are owned by the State Treasury and are public companies.

Polish accounting standards were already brought to the conformity with the EU law according to the World Bank report of 2005 [3]. Poland also adheres to International Financial Regulation System (IFRS) rules [4,5].

Finally, some aspects of the work of publicly owned companies are also subject to scrutiny by the Supreme Chamber of Control. [6]

The Professional Soldiers' Military Service Act of 2003, article 56, generally forbids meaningful employment for the military personnel in private enterprises, as long as they remain on duty. Military personnel can hold additional posts if these do not collide with performing of duties, and provided that permission has been granted by the commanding officer of the unit. [2, 4] The Civil Service Act of 2008 article 80 paragraph 2 applies similar regulations to the civil service, including the civilian employees of the Ministry of National Defence [2].

A legal analysis indicates that the sanctions available are disciplinary only and that the execution of limitations is left to the soldiers' or civil servants' supervisors, and concludes that the regime is not strong. Combined with the interview material, this merits a score of 2.

Anti-corruption efforts enjoy widespread official and public support both on the Prime Minister level [5] as well as the MoD level. [6]. The Ministry of National Defence is publicly committed to fighting corruption and maintaining transparency in its actions [2]. Senior Ministry political and military officials have underlined the importance of streamlining the rule of law, accountability and good governance practices, especially after the 2013 controversies surrounding Deputy Minister Skrzypczak [1]. The Ministry has issued an official Code of Conduct, signed an agreement of co-operation with the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau and is the only government institution to introduce a sectoral anti-corruption strategy by the end of 2014 [3,4]. Internationally, Poland is one of the lead nations of the NATO Building Integrity programme and contributes to its trust fund. [8]

However, it was not possible to locate public statements on anti-corruption commitments made by the Chiefs of Defence Staff or other high-ranking officers. While the interview material [1] indicates that such commitment is seen internally, the focus of the question is on public commitment. Lack thereof on the military level underpins the choice of score 3.

Administrative and criminal justice measures are taken with respect to personnel found to have taken part in corruption, including immediate suspension from the post or duty, criminal prosecution as well as freezing of illegal assets. Additionally, military personnel involved in the corruption are to be demoted in rank or dishonourably discharged [2]. In articles related to corruption of public officials (228-230, covering bribery and influence peddling), the Polish Criminal Code establishes sanctions comprising fines and imprisonment of up to 2 years. The Code's definition of public officials incorporates military personnel.

In this context, it is worth pointing to the activities of the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau, undertaking comprehensive, cross-sectoral investigations, the Military Counterintelligence Service, providing a so-called &quoute;anti-corruption shield&quoute;, and the Bureau of Anti-Corruption Procedures within the Ministry of National Defence, undertaking administrative measures [4,5].

However, the efficiency of these endeavours is limited by the deficiencies of the Polish administrative and judicial system. Judicial proceedings are notoriously lagging and, in certain cases (especially with regards to corruption in the 1990s), successful prosecution was impossible due to the the statue of limitations. This situation even led to an adoption of the so-called FOZZ-law, prolonging the time in which prosecution was possible. [3]

Due to lack of formal legal instruments, whistleblowers are dealt with in an ad-hoc manner [2,3,5]. In 2011,The Bureau of Anti-Corruption Procedures within the Ministry of National Defence introduced a special email address ([email protected] ) and an anti-corruption hotline within the Defence Ministry. So far, the line has proven useful, with several cases reportedly analysed internally, according to a senior MOD official who was interviewed [1]. When deemed necessary, the cases presented to the Anti-Corruption Bureau are passed on the Military Police, the Military Prosecutor's Office and the Military Counter-intelligence Service.

However, lack of clear procedures is hampering the expansion of the programme [5]. The MOD announced that it would introduce a comprehensive system of whistleblower protection, including follow-up to ensure that no adverse career consequences have followed whistleblowing; however, this is work in progress. [7]
The biggest obstacle lies in the legal uncertainty, lack of formal whistle-blower protection mechanisms (there are only the provisions of the Labour Code on unfair dismissal) and lack of clear answers as to the legal grounds for any further proceedings. The procedural uncertainty may lead to certain administrative steps being challenged before the court of law in the future [3,5].

Furthermore, in general, whistleblowing is rare in Poland. It is discouraged by the fear of the employer's or peer retaliation, lack of specific legislation as well as the ineffective judiciary, which leads to the disproportionate risk for the whistleblower [5,6].

RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER AND PEER REVIEWER 2: Included relevant information.

Military and civilian personnel working in finance units must submit their financial disclosure, to be verified by the Military Police. In addition, personnel directly tasked with procurement must submit declarations of their lack of conflict of interest. [2] Tenders and other financial activities of the Ministry are verified by the Department of Audit, the Anti-Corruption Procedures Bureau and the external institutions (such as the Supreme Chamber of Control and adequate policing institutions) [1]. The staff selection process can be monitored by Military Counter-Intelligence Agency and other relevant services. The delicate nature of the position usually requires a 'secret' or 'top secret' certificate, which can only be obtained after a detailed screening procedure [2]. The 2014 Batory Foundation Report described MoD conflict of interests procedures as &quoute;well designed and developed&quoute; [3, p.12].

The Professional Soldiers' Military Service Act (art. 122) also states that professional soldiers who were at one time obliged to submit a declaration of conflict of interest are prohibited from accepting employment with private companies working in related areas for three years after separation.Employers disregarding the law can be sanctioned through fines or imprisonment. [4] No similar procedures for civilian employees have been found. There are also no regulations regarding rotation and time in post and it is not clear that oversight of these positions is implemented effectively.

The MOD's information on the budget presents the upper limits of the armed forces' numbers: 100,000 active soldiers, 20,000 reserves, and up to 2,650 professional trainees. [2]

Decision 448/MON establishes the numbers of MOD employees and limits for specific employee categories, with the overall number pegged at about 45,000 in 2014-2016. [4] The MOD has also been known to submit responses to questions on its employee numbers, showing itself willing to provide that information.[5]

The exact personnel numbers are available through the SEW-online system, which contains the data on military and reserve personnel as well as candidates. Due to the sensitive content the system is closed for external access [3].

The pay rates and allowances for military personnel are published by the Ministry's Department of Human Resources [1]. Civilian personnel's wages and allowances are regulated by the Civil Service Act, annual budget laws and corresponding executive decisions, which are publicly available [3, 4, 5, 6, 7]: depending on the post, a civilian official receives a salary based on multiplying the 'basic amount' by a coefficient assigned to that post. This can be accompanied by specified allowances and bonuses.

Independent surveys present average wages in the public institutions, including the Ministry of National Defence [2].

The hierarchy [1] and payment system [3] are clear and publicly available in a easily understandable form. Payments are digitised through the SEW-ONLINE programme, which also enables verification of current personnel numbers and corresponding changes in the payment chains. [9]

There are no signals of payment delays or systemic errors in the media. In general the public administration wages in Poland are accounted for and paid on time and regularly; employment in the public sector in Poland is perceived as a stable source of income (this applies to the defence sector as well), which is one of the basic advantages of this type of employment. The portal http://www.wojskowe.info offers data to candidates to the Polish Armed Forces, and here we can find information about main advantages of working in army.

Basic pay is non-discretionary and set by respective laws and government decisions. [3-5, 7-8]

Formal rules of appointment and promotion are regulated by the &quoute;Professional Soldiers' Military Service Act&quoute; of 2003, articles 40 - 43, while the dismissal and discharge rules are regulated by articles 44 and 45 [3].

The selection of military personnel for the middle-ranking and top positions is a two-step procedure. The top-ranking officers are appointed by the President upon the request of the Minister of National Defence, while the middle ranks are appointed by Minister of Defence, or in case of lower ranks, local military commanders. The procedure, including relevant educational requirements and professional qualifications (such as length of service and examinations) was established by the 2010 &quoute;Regulation on the Appointment of the Military Rank&quoute; and the nominations, undertaken in the form of the decision of the President, are announced publicly [1].

While this procedure is aimed at reducing the influence of the government among the military ranks, it has created a very strong position of the President, lacking any oversight. It has been criticised as enabling corruption, fostering informal political ties and cronyism considering top posts [2].

Formal rules of appointment and promotion are regulated by the &quoute;Professional Soldiers' Military Service Act&quoute; of 2003, articles 40 - 43, while the dismissal and discharge rules are regulated by articles 44 and 45 [3].

2013 and 2014 saw the introduction of a reform aimed at streamlining the appointment and promotion system, making it more transparent and based on individual competences and efficiency.[2] This reform was introduced in response to the complaints voiced by some observers, accusing the current system of lowering the army's standards and creating duplicate, fictional positions in order to manage the expectations of experienced soldiers [1].

The new system highlights the transparent physical and psychological exam requirements (art.5), the necessity of obtaining a master's degree (art. 11, for new promotions as well as, retroactively, the old ranks), regular assessment of the soldier's military and professional progress and a motivational system. It also enables promotion for extraordinary bravery in the field.

Article 10 of the Law stipulates that the orders appointing military personnel to particular posts and ranks are issued by the Minister of National Defence for the highest-ranking posts, the MOD's Human Resources Department and commanders of respective services in other cases. While this indicates that in at least some cases, the promotions are effected separately from the chain of command, it is unclear what the extent of independent oversight is and whether promotion boards outside the direct chain of command are used, and how widely.

Compulsory conscription was abandoned in 2009.

There is no compulsory or voluntary conscription within the Polish armed forces - they are an entirely volunteer-based, professional service.

Personnel corruption was widespread before 2009, when potential conscripts sought to avoid military service; since that time it has diminished considerably. The last known criminal sentence related to military conscription was issued in 2011. There is little incentive for potential corruption related to entering the military, since it is the Armed Forces that have trouble finding suitable candidates, not the other way around.

Any forms of bribery are prohibited by Polish Penal Code art. 228. This includes conscription-related payments.

There have been no reports whatsoever of the existence of ghost soldiers. Personnel salaries and allowances are established, published and managed by the MOD's Department for Human Resources (i.e. separate from the chain of command); the payment chain is clear and digitised through the SEW-ONLINE programme [5]; and the SEW-online system also provides ways to monitor actual personnel numbers and reflect it in monthly payments. Thus, the risk of 'ghost soldiers' is minimal.

The Department of Human Resources is under control of the Minister of National Defence, independent and separated from the chain of command [1,2]. The payment system is stipulated in the Law on Professional Military Service art. 74: the wages are paid by the legal entities - military units or civilian institutions - constituting the primary point of service for the soldier rather than their immediate command [3].

There are at least three Codes of Conduct for military and civilian personnel connected to the Polish MOD and armed forces. Prime Minister's Decision no. 70 [6] regulates ethical behaviour for members of the civil service, regulating issues of conflict of interest, limiting additional employment, and obliging civil servants to abide by the law, which in effect refers also to issues of bribery and influence peddling. There are, however, no regulations on post-separation activities. Oversight is provided by the Director of the Civil Service, an independent institutions monitoring the activities of the civil service.

The Code of Honour of the Professional Military Soldier, applying to all military personnel, is quite generic, only referring to general need for integrity. [5]

The most comprehensive is the Code of Conduct introduced by Decision 125/MON in 2011. The Code is publicly available and based on the principles of honour, dignity, transparency and personal responsibility. It goes into detail, outlining suggested behaviour in a wide range of cases such as possible conflict of interest, social contacts (art. 6), real estate lease (art. 7), post-separation activities and the receipt of gifts (art. 5) as well as expenses rules (art. 2). [1,2,3] The Code also contains the mechanism of written clarifications of rules by the Anti-Corruption Bureau in the Ministry of National Defence and a reporting duty on part of the MoD officials and soldiers. Its limitation is that it applies to contacts between military and civilian personnel on one side and external stakeholders on the other, which makes it less than comprehensive.There is no oversight mechanism except for the normal policing/intelligence services activities, however, referring to previous whistleblowing experiences in the MoD, an informal mechanism exists [2].

Furthermore, the post-separation activities and potential conflicts of interest are regulated by art. 122A of the Professional Military Service Act. It prohibits the employment of former soldier by certain companies, among them defence contractors, within a 3-year period. [4]

Score 3 was selected due to the existence of a number of Codes and legal regulations, some of the documents not being comprehensive, and unclear effectiveness of oversight.

The Codes of Conduct foresee disciplinary sanctions for breaches. [1]. Military and civilian personnel are also subject to possible sanctions resulting either from Labour law or the Law on Military Discipline [6] (depending on their civilian or military status) as well as formal criminal investigations. The former are more common in cases falling within the criminal justice 'grey zone', such as social contacts or cronyism [2]. When the breach of the Code is considered to be a criminal offence, the Ministry will notify the Military Police and/or the Military Prosecution [2]. Corruption prosecutions and/or investigations into possible wrongdoing are often very visible in the media and widely reported [e.g. 3, 4,5]

The Civil Service Act and the Professional Soldiers' Military Service Act regulate the employment of the officials tasked with military procurement, preventing them from taking a post in a private company in the defence sector for three years after the termination of his duties. Interestingly, breaches of the law carry the sanctions of fine and imprisonment, but for the employer, not the employee. [1, 2]

However, the interviewee suggests that legal obstacles are circumvented through the creation of virtual companies, unofficial advisory positions (without any legal contract or official job agreement) and other creative efforts aimed at utilising the networks of former civil service and military officials [3]. The laws analysed do not foresee specific sanctions for breaking the limitations on private enterprise and no instances of sanctions being applied have been found.

Though there is no regular and wide-ranging anti-corruption training programme, both the Ministry's Anti-Corruption Procedures Bureau and the Central Anti-corruption Bureau organise such educational exercises for selected personnel [2]. The upcoming sectoral anti-corruption strategy for the Ministry of National Defence and the Armed Forces is to focus on the 'prevention through education' approach [1]. The Central Anti-corruption Bureau has launched an e-learning platform with a special anti-corruption course on its website (https://szkolenia-antykorupcyjne.edu.pl/). The Central Anti-corruption Bureau is preparing an educational and training system based on this e-tool to be launched in 2014. As of 2015, the system is functional [3].

Court verdicts issued by civilian courts are published electronically at the http://orzeczenia.ms.gov.pl, a website run by the MInistry of Justice. Examples of successful prosecution and subsequent sentences have been brought to the attention to the general public by anti-corruption agencies [e.g. 1]. It is unclear whether a similar policy applies to military courts, though the statistics on investigations and prosecutions are included in the annual/bi-annual 'Map of corruption' publication issued by the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau.

However, the coverage given to arrests and accusations made by the Military Police and Prosecutor's Office is much more substantial. The media have stated that judicial procedures took too long and spectacular police operations could yield disappointing results when it comes the material to be presented before the courts. Reported sentences for corruption in the Armed Forces vary from 2 to 4 years, depending on the case. [1-3]

Due to recent controversies surrounding the efficiency and transparency of the Military Prosecutor's Office, the government presented plans of dissolving the institution and introducing military prosecution units within a general civilian framework. However, these plans were postponed [3] and as of 2015 the Military Prosecutor's Office remains active.

Score 2 was selected as it is unclear whether it is a policy to make outcomes of prosecutions public. Some cases have received publicity; the information is collected and used in statistical publications, but this does not necessarily amount to a proactive policy to make the results of investigations and prosecutions public. The score should be between 2 and 3 but 3 could not be awarded due to the aforementioned reasons.

Facilitations payments in Poland are strictly illegal [2]. Polish Criminal Code art. 228 para 1 penalises the acceptance, demanding or offering of &quoute;any material of personal benefit or a promise thereof in connection with the performance of a public function&quoute; [3].

However, a general gap between a clear legal framework and the efficiency of the law enforcement persists, despite improvements in this regard in recent years (see: Corruption Perception Indexes across the years, [4]). This situation is reflected in the Global Integrity Index, which gives Polish anti-corruption law a very strong score, while pointing out the deficiencies of the law enforcement agencies [1]. Consistent with the improving international scoring, the number of people convicted on the corruption charges is slowly falling [5[. The repeat offender ratio remains very low [5].

While there is a declared awareness within the Ministry of National Defence of corruption posing a strategic issue for operations and individual officers have come into contact with its consequences during the ISAF deployment in Afghanistan [1, 6], no specific policy or doctrine has been introduced. The National Security Strategy only refers to corruption as a threat to the domestic and economic security of Poland. [4] The 'Vision for the Polish armed forces - 2030' refers to stabilisation missions and the future likelihood of missions supporting the establishment of democratic governments; it also states that Military Police units will likely be deployed on operations to support governance and disrupt organised crime. However, while these issues are connected to corruption, no direct mention of corruption appears. [5] There is also no direct mention of corruption in the publications of the Doctrine and Training Centre of the Polish Armed Forces.

Anti-corruption activities are conducted according to the general government anti-corruption programme [2] and the Ministry of National Defence Code of Conduct [3], covering the participation of military personnel in operations.

There is no large-scale training programme addressing corruption issues for commanders [1]. However, certain activities of the Department of Education and Defence Promotion address pathological and criminal behaviour in the Army, including bribery and corruption [2]. Furthermore, the Anti-corruption Procedures Bureau organises training sessions in accordance with the “prevention through education” principle. Due to the personnel and financial constrains the programme remains limited, it is yet to form the core of the expected sectoral anti-corruption strategy for the Armed Forces. It is also unclear whether tailored courses for commanders are part of the package.

Cases of corruption in contracting among military officers stationed in Iraq have been uncovered [3]. These cases resulted in some convictions; however, questions remained about the degree of involvement of more senior officers and the effectiveness of the Military Counter-Intelligence Service. [5] On the other hand, there are also examples of Polish officers stationed in Afghanistan addressing corruption risks despite lack of systematic training. [4] Thus, the score of 1 seems to reflect the situation best.

Both the Military Police and Military Counter-Intelligence Service are present in the field, during external operations and peacekeeping missions [e.g. see the list of deployed units contacting Military Police at KFOR mission, source 2; reports of the effectiveness of Counter-Intelligence Service officers being questioned after corruption cases have emerged in Iraq in 4]. However, their role is not clearly established and especially in the case of the Service, anti-bribery activities are not expected to take priority over field surveillance, unless local conditions require so (e.g. Afghanistan, due to the risks associated with the drug trade) [1].

No public data on deployment of anti-corruption specialists is available.

There is no common, comprehensive policy on addressing corruption risks whilst deployed on external missions. Some training takes place in individual cases and on an irregular basis [1]. There is, however, no public information about these courses.

Military and civilian personnel abroad are expected to act according to the 2011 Code of Conduct. However, the latter includes soft law measures, centred on possible conflict of interests between military personnel and defence contractors; it is not specifically tailored to the operational context.

Despite a documented case of corruption in the missions abroad [2], no comprehensive and dedicated programme has been established. However, there has also been some evidence of Polish officers stationed in Afghanistan addressing corruption risks despite lack of systematic training or guidance. [3]

Private military companies (PMC) in Poland mostly comprise civilian security guard agencies providing extensive protection services for the military installations in Poland [2,3]. Media reports highlight the opaque ties between these companies, often owned and controlled by former Communist state security services officers and the military police establishment. [1] It has led to the lack of proper oversight and reported corruption practices.

While the security agencies are regulated in Polish law according to the &quoute;Protection of Persons and Goods Act of 1997&quoute;, there are no specific regulation of the PMC industry. The &quoute;Vision for the Polish armed forces - 2030&quoute; notes that private security companies are likely to play an increasing part in future conflicts, but it doesn't offer recommendations on any actions or regulations. [4] Poland has been, since 1990, a signatory state of the UN &quoute;Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries&quoute;; however, this convention does not impose comprehensive limitations on the use of PMCs. No PMCs performing operational duties of the armed forces have been reported to operate in Poland.

Score 2 has been selected to reflect lack of legal regulation combined with no evidence of use of PMCs in operational environments.

Public procurement is normally regulated by the Public Procurement Law of 2004, which, in order to assure transparency, requires that all tenders and records of the proceedings are published on-line in the Public Procurement Bulletin [1].

The Public Procurement Law was amended on 14 September 2012, in order to bring it into compliance with the EU directive 2009/81/EC, which regulates defence and security contracts for the procurement of military equipment, works and services, and all sensitive purchases involving classified information. As a result, the Polish military procurement market was in principle opened for EU companies [2]. However, article 4 paragraph 5 allows certain exemptions in the case of procurement &quoute;classified as secret or top secret, if there is a paramount security or defence interest of the state&quoute;. The Public Procurement Law also allows for exemptions from the rules governing the EU Single Market in &quoute;case of acquisitions or production of arms and munitions, if justified by the security interest of Poland, as long as the fair competition between the tender participants is maintained&quoute; [1,4]. A 2013 Cabinet directive established the procedure and named those responsible for deciding whether a national interest is concerned in a given procurement process. [9] Furthermore, government-to-government deals can also be excluded from the provisions of the Law.

An exemption form the Law due to an interest of national security does not leave the procurement procedures unsupervised: the process is still controlled by the Supreme Chamber of Control and by internal MOD bodies. The Director or the Public Procurement Office, which is responsible for coordinating and monitoring procurement procedures, can also initiate an investigation as to whether the exemption was justified. [8] Decision 118/MON also stipulates that the MOD's internal Anti-Corruption Procedures Bureau (which is a separate cell within the MOD only answering to the Minister) provides oversight over the procurement process, verifying the terms of particular tenders and monitoring potential corruption risks as well as the legality and utility of the procedures. [3] Furthermore, in 2013 the MOD's Anti-Corruption Procedures Bureau signed an agreement with the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau (CBA), a country-wide institution, stipulating greater CBA oversight over the armed forces' modernisation programme and attendant procurement. [10]

The Public Procurement Law also does not apply to contract awarded to countries outside the EU and to contract below the value of 30,000 euro. Article 5a of the Public Procurement Law stipulates that in the latter case, tenders should still be public and contracts should be awarded with public notice. [1, 7]

Given that the government decisions implementing the Public Procurement Law contain specific anti-corruption provisions, these would seem to bring Poland close to a score of 4. However, it is not clear to what extent the independent controls foreseen - including the prerogatives of the Supreme Chamber of Control - are carried out, as no specific reports could be located. Moreover the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the European Commission have expressed doubts as to whether the national exemption is only used in exceptional cases. [11] Therefore, the score of 3 has been retained.

Defence procurement is regulated by the &quoute;Public Procurement Law Act&quoute; unless it falls within the scope of the art. 345 paragraph 1b of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Member State security exemption), in which case it is regulated by the Minister's &quoute;Decision no. 118/MON&quoute;. [1, 2, 3].

Decisions 103/MON, 25/MON, 72/MON and 444/MON establish in detail the procurement process, from assessment of needs to awarding of contracts to withdrawing equipment from use when it no longer fulfils the requirements of the armed forces. They are available to the public online and in print.

The procurement procedure for exempt items is regulated by the 118/MON decision is public (art. 5 paragraph 1, corresponding with art. 8 of the general procurement law) and can take place in the form of an 'open tendering' or 'restricted negotiations'. Information about the starting open tender and electronic bidding should be publicised on the website of the Public Information Bulletin and the website of the procuring entity. While the negotiations can be classified, in order to protect the commercial secret or the state security interest, the final outcome must still be publicly announced.

RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: Added relevant information.

The Anti-Corruption Procedures Bureau provides oversight at all stages of the procurement procedure for the defence and security sector, as stipulated in article 2, paragraph 1, of the &quoute;Decision 118/MON&quoute; [1]. This is done for the purposes of legality, efficacy and good governance, as well as from the angle of potential corruption risks. The outcomes of the procurement processes are analysed by the Department of Audit and contracts are monitored by the Military Counterintelligence Service as a part of the &quoute;small anti-corruption shield&quoute; [2].

Further oversight is provided by the central Public Procurement Office (PPO), including its Ad Hoc Control Department and the Appeals Department: the former performs audits of selected procedures and the latter deals with complaints and appeals from tenderers and supports the National Chamber of Appeals, an independent body affiliated with the PPO and responsible for settling complaints. [6]

The Supreme Chamber of Control also audits MOD procurement decisions as part of its annual budgetary audit. [7]

The Inspectorate of the Armaments' activities in 2011 - 2014 were audited by the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau between February and November 2014 [3,4]. The control lasted 9 months, the longest possible period. However, as of September 2015, no report or post-control documents were released. Moreover, in 2013 the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau and the MOD signed an agreement on cooperation, aiming to provide greater anti-corruption controls for the armed forces' modernisation programme.[8]

In 2015, opposition MP's have asked the Supreme Chamber of Control to verify the procedural, financial and legal aspects of the ongoing tenders [5]. Accusations of misconduct have been rejected by the Ministry of National Defence. [6]

Score 3 has been selected to reflect general provision of oversight; publication of a greater number of audit reports/results is still an issue to be improved.

The Public Procurement Law (article 11) and Decision 118/MON regulating procurement of items exempt from the Law (articles 2.6,14.2 and 22.2.1) both stipulate that defence acquisitions need to be made public, both in the phase of tendering and when the contract is awarded. Restrictions may apply to features and requirements for items being considered or ordered. [6, 7]

The Ministry of National Defence publishes a long-term planning document &quoute;Armed Forces Technical Modernisation Plan 2013 - 2022&quoute;, indicating present and future purchasing programmes, their current status (the document appears to be updated at least once a year), costs and planned date of completion [5].

Defence purchases are also made public on the Inspectorate of the Armaments website, an Armed Forces unit tasked with the quantification of requirements for procurement of military equipment. There is detailed information on on-going and past procurement [1]. The list is detailed and is presented in the form of calls for tenders, detailing the financial and technical requirements (e.g. [3] or [4]) , as described by the military . However, the list of planned purchases has not been updated since 2012 [2].

The &quoute;Public Procurement Law&quoute; art. 22 outlines the general criteria required of companies to participate in public tenders, while art. 24 lists conditions which preclude an entrepreneur from taking part in a tender bid. Contractors who have failed to fulfil the conditions of previous public tenders or have been lawfully sentenced for corruption offences are automatically banned from the tendering process. [2]

MOD's Decision no.118/MON outlines the conditions under which companies may apply for a military procurement contract. It includes a point on the necessity of compliance with the European Defence Agency's &quoute;Code of the Best Practice in the Supply Chain&quoute;. The Decision also states that those conducted for bribery (and companies which employ them) are precluded from taking part in tenders. [1]

However, no definitive provisions on the business best practices, transparency, ethical behaviour and anti-corruption practices exist beyond what is generally in the company law. Score 1 has been selected to reflect the existence of a ban on companies/individuals convicted of corruption and bribery, and the mention of the Code of Best Practice in the Supply Chain, which incorporates requirements of integrity.

RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 1: Information incorporated.

Procurement decisions are derived from a clear and public hierarchical defence and security strategy system, with the National Security White Paper setting an overall political direction of the modernisation of the Armed Forces and the &quoute;Strategy of the National Security System Development 2022&quoute; presenting a more detailed outlook, to be operationalised with a detailed timeline in the Ministry’s &quoute;Technical Modernisation Plan&quoute; [1, 2, 3]. The MOD Decision 25 also establishes a process of defining armed forces' requirements in a 10-year perspective. The Decision refers to strategic documents, including the National Security Strategy, as guidance in identifying requirements. [6, para 6]

The strategic plan seems to respond to the most pressing security issues for Poland and is usually subjected to a wider political consensus among major parliamentary groups. However, its execution and especially the tender results are sometimes subject to controversies and are under heavy political pressure and industrial lobbying; as a result, the procurement requirements are sometimes criticised and their legality questioned [5].

Technical modernisation is audited within annual budgetary audits conducted by the Supreme Chamber of Control - as a rule, a few procurement processes are audited for legality, efficacy and utility of acquisitions. However, no direct statements regarding links between general strategies and individual acquisitions have been made. [7] In addition, the Chamber has published a critical special report on the state of the modernisation in 2012 which pointed out some delays and deficiencies in financing of equipment modernisation.

Decision 25/MON stipulates that operational requirements should be based on strategic security documents shaping Polish security policy and constituting the basis of the armed forces' operational requirements. Decision 72/MON (&quoute;Rules of Preparation and Implementation of Central Acquisition Plans&quoute;) regulates the assessment of needs and the resulting armaments procedures of the Armed Forces. The plans are prepared through a multi-step process of material requirements evaluation, being at the end approved by the Minister of National Defence [2]. The Decision further stipulates some exceptions to the previously defined military requirements in cases of unexpected needs [3].

The Armaments Council, an advisory body affiliated with the Ministry of National Defence, assesses defence procurement policy. The head of Anti-Corruption Procedures Bureau within the Ministry of National Defence is a member of the Armaments Council.

On the micro level (e.g. each tender), the requirements are clearly defined and illustrated and are accessible to the general public through the Inspectorate of the Armaments website. However, there are reported cases of corrupt tenders, with the requirements tailored for a particular supplier [4]. These, however, are usually conducted on a lower, base level and mainly apply to tenders for non-military services and equipment.

The Europeanisation of Polish defence procurement law introduced by the &quoute;Directive 81/2009/EC&quoute; [3] and subsequent changes in Polish law has reduced - but not eliminated - the ability of the government or other procuring bodies to single-source purchases. The Law stipulates that procurement tenders are conducted in conditions enabling meaningful competition and lists conditions which could lead to procurement being single-sourced (for example, the ability of only one offeror to fulfil stipulated requirements). While Polish defence industry, despite on-going reforms, still lacks the competitive advantage its larger, Western European competitors enjoy - such as advanced technology, capital and access to financial centres - it allegedly resorts to exercising political pressure on the government [1].

According to 2011 report of the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau, while the majority (324) of contracts were awarded through the competitive procedures, the overall value of 160 single sourcing contracts, stipulated in the &quoute;Decision 291/MON&quoute; was higher by 200 million zlotys [4, 6]. The single sourcing procedure grants authorities greater discretion in the procurer selection. While the number might seem excessive, two points have to be made: it does not necessarily prove that anti-competition measures are adopted in each and every case and, more importantly, the available data dates back to the time before the adoption of the &quoute;Directive 81/2009/EC&quoute;, transposed into Polish law in 2011. More recent data could not be located.

A recent tender for utility helicopters has provoked a fair amount of controversy after only one tender participant was invited to submit his product to the final examination. However, the MoD has repeatedly stated that the biding process was open and the limited negotiations were caused by either formal or substantial deficiencies of other offers [5].

Score 2 has been selected to reflect the difficulty of locating relevant data and the 2011 figures suggesting that around 50% of defence procurement procedures were conducted using single-sourcing.

Tender boards are subject to anti-corruption regulations and the 2011 sectoral &quoute;Code of Conduct&quoute; [2]. Additionally, they fall under the scope of the &quoute;Inspectorate of the Armaments Code of Ethics&quoute;, [4] though the document is very general and does not provide detailed guidance. According to the &quoute;Decision no. 291/MON&quoute; article 7 paragraph 2, the tender committee members are obliged to issue a declaration precluding any possible conflict of interests and any other factors such as family or social ties with the bidders [5].

Decision 118/MON (para 13) regulating tender boards deciding tenders exempt from Public Procurement Law also stipulates that members of tender boards need to be excluded from particular proceedings if there is a conflict of interest. [11]

Difficult issues, such as the revolving door phenomenon, are sought to be addressed by the article 122a of the 2003 &quoute;Military Service Act&quoute; [6]; and agreement between the MOD and the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau (CBA) is reported to be focussed on monitoring employment of former soldiers by defence companies. [10]

Public tenders are subject to oversight by the Supreme Chamber of Control (samples) and the Public Procurement Office (Ad Hoc Control Department and the Appeals Department). Results of administrative complaints can be appealed to the National Appellate Court, in accordance with the Public Procurement Act of 2004 (amended i.a. in 2015) [7]. The MOD's Anti-Corruption Procedures Bureau also oversees the procedures exempt from the Public Procurement Act. [11] Overall, however, it is not clear what percentage of procurement procedures are overseen and how control tends to be triggered.

Article 305 of the Penal Code contains provisions on the unlawful obstruction of a public tender, including &quoute;entering into co-operation with another person, to the detriment of the owner of property or a person or institution for which the tender is to be held&quoute;. The perpetrator is subject to the penalty of imprisonment for up to 3 years, and a fine may be imposed. [1] The Law on the Protection of Competition and Consumers, which also prohibits collusion, similarly foresees fines as the main type of sanction. [5] Debarment, however, is not an automatic sanction.

There are also non-criminal law mechanisms implemented in order to deter possible corruptive activities. UOKIK (the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection), the Polish competition authority, instigated two proceedings aimed at verifying if bid-rigging practices have been applied by entrepreneurs bidding in tenders organised by the Military Property Agency in Warsaw [3]. In 2015, UOKIK fined the controlled enterprise with a 298,000 zloty penalty [4].

RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: Information included.

Procurement staff are trained and educated by the Anti-Corruption Procedures Bureau in the Ministry of National Defence. However, with the Bureau's resources and personnel limits, regular and mass training rarely takes place [1]. Procurement staff attend training classes organised by the Ministry on the occasion of an amendment of the public procurement law or the &quoute;Directive 118/MON&quoute; as well as in the case of any other major legal changes, to keep the procedure streamlined and up to date with current regulations [2].

The procurement staff are authorised (article 13 of the &quoute;Decision no. 291/MON&quoute;) to demand any necessary documented proof of the ability of the tender bidder to deliver the product on time in accordance with accounting and reporting rules, including: necessary permits, testimonies of previous contractors highlighting the ability to deliver the product on time, financial and banking statements, and proof of the application of the EDA &quoute;Code of Best Practice in the Supply Chain.&quoute; In cases of contracts with long duration, procurement staff can demand that the contractor provides a deposit which is returned once the contract is fulfilled.[3]

RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER: Agreed. Score changed to 3.

The &quoute;Public Procurement Law Act&quoute;, article 180, enables companies to appeal to the National Appeal Chamber affiliated with the Public Procurement Office, which is responsible for the examination of the appeals lodged in contract award procedures. Parties and participants of the appeal procedure may complain to the court against the Chamber's ruling. [1]

While the &quoute;Directive 81/2009/EC&quoute; gives the bidders the right to appeal, the &quoute;Decision 181/MON&quoute; contains no formal provisions on this subject [2, 3]. However, the Public Procurement Act, Part VI, contains detailed provisions on the appellate procedure, which is applied to the military tenders falling within the scope the said law [4].

RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER: While I agree that Decision no. 118/MON should contain these provisions, there are general appeal instruments available in the &quoute;Public Procurement Law&quoute;. As such, a score of 1 (lack of formal mechanism, discrimination in future procurements) does not appear adequate. Score 3 was awarded as there does not appear to be widespread fear of retaliation among companies.

Article 24 of the &quoute;Public Procurement Law&quoute; forbids contractors who have been lawfully sentenced for corruption offences from entering tenders. [1] The &quoute;Decision no. 118/MON&quoute;, regulating procurement exempt from the Law, contains similar provisions in article 26. [2]

In case of procurement based on Decision 291/MON, as well as 118/MON, conviction in criminal cases, including bribery and unlawful bidding process influence, also exclude individuals and companies who employ them from participating in tenders.

Score 3 has been selected as no information regarding the thoroughness of application of these on the extent to which these provisions are applied could be found, but at the same time, no major reports of corrupt suppliers being allowed to participate in tenders have been located.

There are in effect two laws regulating offset contracts in Poland.

Until mid-2014, all offset contracts were regulated by the &quoute;Act on Certain Compensation Agreements Concluded in Regard to the Delivery Contracts for the Defence and Security of the State&quoute; [1]. Negotiations between the bidder and the Minister of Economy were consulted with the Offset Agreements Committee. According to the article 9A, offset offers submitted by the potential foreign supplier shall comprise, among other things: information on the legal form and the manner of representation of the foreign supplier, information on the financial results from the last three years of operations of the foreign supplier, information on the concluded or on-going offset agreements. The supplier is required to submit offset compliance information on the regular basis and upon the request of the Ministry. However, this oversight seems to be primarily of an economic, not anti-corruption nature.

The new offset law, introduced in July 2014 and applicable to contract signed after it entered into force [4] introduces a number of changes; for example it stipulates that only direct offsets are permitted. Most importantly, it transfers the executive and control authority from the Ministry of Economy to the Ministry of National Defence (art. 7) and introduces automatic financial penalties for the failure of execution of the offset contract (art. 23 - 25) based on the guarantees presented by the contractor (e.g. in blanco check, bank guarantees - as regulated by art. 19). Article 6 details conflict of interests provisions applicable to the awarding of offsets; Articles 12 and 13 [4] regulate the due diligence requirements and control mechanisms, including the possibility of the MoD contracting independent auditors to monitor the financial and operational capacity of the potential offset contractor. However, while some provisions contribute to reducing corruption risks at the moment of signing of the agreement, integrity is not a factor in the follow-up provisions of the law.

The offset performance is also evaluated by the Supreme Chamber of Control [3] and/or the Ministry of the Economy in cases of offset agreement contracted before the 2014 law entered into force.

Score 2 has been selected to reflect two different laws governing offsets

According to art. 4 of the &quoute;Act on Certain Compensation Agreements Concluded in Regard to the Delivery of Contracts for the Defence and Security of the State&quoute;, &quoute;offset agreements are open to the public as regards their value, subject matter, the offset receiver, the offset granter as well as deadlines for the performance of particular offset obligations under the offset agreement&quoute; [1] Article 4 of the 2014 Law on offsets stipulates that elements of offset contracts that should be publicly available include the parties to the offset agreement, the value of the agreement, the agreed date of fulfilment of obligations, and the object of the agreement - unless the publication of this information is detrimental to national security. [5]

The website of the Ministry of Economy contains Polish and European provisions on offsets (the EDA &quoute;Code of Conduct on Offset&quoute;), the list of signed agreements with the tender subject, winning bidder and the sum highlighted as well as the &quoute;Offset Vademecum&quoute;, a document prepared by the Ministry offset specialists in 2009 in order to explain and publicise the offset deal [1,5].

Furthermore, the Minister of Economy is obliged to submit annual reports to the Council of Ministers on the fulfilment of offset obligations, with their short version available to the general public [4]. The 2014 Law imposes the same obligation on the Minister of Defence, although the Law does not stipulate public availability of these reports. [6] No such reports have been published yet by the MOD and the last available annual report prepared by the Ministry of Economy appears to cover year 2012.

The state of offset agreements is audited by the Supreme Chamber of Control. The results are available publicly [3, 7].

Offset details and contracts, however, are not published in the planning phase.

Score 2 has been selected due to apparent shortcomings in reporting and lack of clarity over what the 2014 Law mandates in terms of publication, and how it will be carried out.

The offset procedure in Poland is centralised and the Ministry of National Defence acts as the main representative of the state, signing the offset agreement [4] (until mid 2014, offset agreements had been placed under the authority of the Ministry of Economy and this is still the case for agreements contracted prior to the 2014 Law entering into force [1, 4]). Only after the offset contract is signed can the proper agreement between the investor and the beneficent (i.e. the Polish defence procurement company participating in the process) be concluded. The potential pool of companies is selected by the Ministry itself, thus limiting (though not entirely disabling) free and fair competition. It is partially caused by the state-centred nature of the offset procedure, with its stated goal of &quoute;restructuring and development of the economy of the Republic of Poland&quoute;.

The 2014 Law on Offsets (Article 31) explicitly stipulates that offset contracts are not subject to the provisions of the Law on Protection of Competition. [4]

RESPONSE TO THE GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: While clear criteria are given, it doesn't change the fact of the limited competitor pool. Supreme Chamber of Commerce has indeed praised recent offset contracts, which, compared to the previous ones, were concluded through rather transparent procedures. [5] For instance, EU institutions reportedly expressed concerns about the level of competition of military procurements not falling under the Public Procurement Act [3]. Accordingly, the score was raised to 2.

Arms trade, including brokering services as they are defined in the &quoute;Act on foreign trade in goods technologies and services of strategic importance to the security of the State and to maintaining international peace and security&quoute;, is controlled by the Ministry of Economy and monitored by the Internal Security Agency [1]. Brokerage licence, issues by the Ministry is needed for trade in armaments; unlicensed entities, including agents or intermediaries cannot operate.

The 2011 Code of Conduct of the Ministry of National Defence regulates the contacts of the Ministry employees and military personnel with agents and intermediaries as well as the problem of immediate transfers of employees from the public to the private sector [2].

However, media reports and interviewed sources suggest that due to loopholes in the rules concerning lobbying and brokering, some intermediaries operate as external consultants or PR specialists and seek contact with military personnel or civil servants which is not entirely transparent [3,4] .

RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 1 AND GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: Agree. Score raised to 3. (The score should be between 2 and 3 given the indications that the regime/framework suffers from corruption risk. However, score 3 was selected to acknowledge mechanisms for control and scrutiny.

Information on the financial package is available publicly and is to be found either in the tender announcement or in the tender terms of reference on the Inspectorate of the Armaments website. The information is rather detailed, including not only payment timelines and currencies but also information on necessary deposits, banking guarantees and deadline payments [3]. However, the Supreme Chamber of Control points to the lack of legal grounds for the prepayment system employed by the Ministry of National Defence in its military expenditure system [1, p. 102]. Default penalties or interest rates are not published, unless the contract itself is made public.

There are no direct references to a requirement for the main contractor to ensure that subcontractors adopt anti-corruption programmes. The &quoute;Code of the Best Practice in the Supply Chain&quoute; highlights the shared principles &quoute;of fairness, honesty and openness, efficiency and effectiveness, and professionalism&quoute; and repeatedly refers to transparency and accountability among the sub-contractors and subsidiaries. However, it contains no formal anti-corruption or anti-bribery provisions and neither the Law on Public Procurement nor the current MOD Decisions directly refer to it. (1, 3)

RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 1 AND GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: Information incorporated and taken into account. However, good practices are &quoute;soft law&quoute; - neither binding nor treated as an entry requirement for a tender. Given lack of direct mention of the &quoute;Code,&quoute; score 1 has been retained.

The bulk of small-scale military contracts seem to bear no political influence and are subjected to normal competition under the Public Procurement Act rules. [14]

However, larger contracts are subjected to essentially political negotiations [3,8], including heavy lobbying on part of not only private contractors but also interested governments [1,6,7,10]. This goes both ways, with reports of Polish governments utilising the military helicopter and missile shield tenders to exert influence over French security policy [12].

The national and private lobbying is also described in the 2014 Pulaski Foundation report on the Polish missile shield [13]. Additionally, past military contracts were viewed by media and some commentators as skewed politically [2,5] and relating to strategic and political interests, rather than operational capacity of the equipment. The F-16 offset contract, is, for instance, was analysed in the light of the NATO expansion and Poland's pro-American stance [2,11].

It is worth noting though, that none of the aforementioned purchases were reported to be inspired by the selling nations; they follow the logic of subsequent Security Strategies and medium-and-long term acquisition planning. It is rather the final choice of the defence contractor that contains a political component.

RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: Following a review of material available, score has been revised to 3 - though not necessarily due to examples provided, where it is not easy to verify whether pressure, and how intense, took place.