- A
- B
- C
- D
- E
- F
Hungary’s GI ranking in Band C places it in the moderate risk category for corruption in the defence and security sector. Hungaery scored higher for Personnel Risk, which scores in Band B (low risk of corruption). The highest risk area is Procurement, which fell in Band D (high risk of corruption).
Parliamentary oversight
While the parliamentary Defence and Law Enforcement Committee has ample provisions for effective oversight, its ability to provide effective scrutiny is in doubt. The Committee has the right to review and approve exemptions from procurement law in defence acquisitions, but the exemptions (totaling 55 billion HUF since 2010) have been criticised (including by one of the Committee members) as mostly unjustified. The Committee met rarely in 2014 and its supervisory and control sub-committee has only been called together six times since 2010. The defence budget lacks detail and transparency, and it is unclear whether parliament receives information on intelligence spending. There have been concerns that about the ruling party’s unwillingness to work with opposition parties which has significantly weakened oversight. The parliament as a whole and the Defence and Law Enforcement Committee should build on existing prerogatives to address shortcomings in oversight as a matter of urgency.
Procurement
The Hungarian legislation is in compliance with EU standards. However, the possibility to exempt procurement decisions from the provisions of the legislation appears to be routinely abused and lacking robust oversight; in some cases, such as a recent helicopter procurement, there is no evidence that correct procedures have been followed to obtain exemptions. A government decree suspending the application of the national security exemption has recently been adopted, but its coming into force was preceded by a wave of classifications and its effectiveness remains unknown. We recommend a review of the application of the national security exemption and stringent application of acquisition processes to ensure effective allocation of resources.
Operations
The Hungarian National Military Strategy suggests that the armed forces take pride in their operational experience in international missions. It also recognises that the armed forces might be called upon to perform stabilisation and reconstruction tasks in challenging environments. This is a step in the right direction, supported by some - although not systematic - training. The government could build on that by analysing and acknowledging the impact of corrupt practices on stabilisation and reconstruction, and putting in place a detailed doctrine and in-depth training to prepare operational commanders and troops for risks that corruption could pose in theatre.
Anti-corruption training
The government has recently launched anti-corruption training for public officials, in association with the European Union and the NATO Building Integrity Programme. At the MOD, the number of staff trained rose from 13 in 2013 to 83 in 2014. The challenge is to build on and sustain the momentum. We recommend that training capacity is developed within the MOD and the armed forces, to ensure that it can be continued.
Is there formal provision for effective and independent legislative scrutiny of defence policy?
Transparency International Hungary, Corruption Risks in Hungary 2011, National Integrity Study. http://www.transparency.hu/uploads/docs/Corruption_Risks_in_Hungary_NIS_2011.pdf
'National Integrity Study 2011: Hungarian state captured by private interest groups', Transparency International Hungary, March 8 2012, http://www.transparency.hu/National_integrtity_study
Act CXIII of 2011 on Defence and the Hungarian Defence Forces and the measures that may be implemented in a state of emergency, http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=139266.255344
Hungary's Fundamental Law http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=140968.248458
Website of the Parliament’s National Defence and Law Enforcement Committee’s supervisory and control subcommittee. http://www.parlament.hu/internet/plsql/ogy_biz.biz_adat_uj?p_ckl=39&p_biz=A358&p_tag=&p_tagj=&p_munkatars=&P_stilus=nyito.css&p_honl_rend=&p_ules=I#biz_ules
Website of DLEC: http://www.parlament.hu/internet/plsql/ogy_biz.keret_frissit?p_szerv=&p_fomenu=20&p_almenu=20&p_ckl=39&p_biz=A341&p_rec=&p_egys=&p_nyelv=HU; Jogi Forum (Legal Forum), 23 December 2010, Megkezdte működését a Honvédelmi és rendészeti bizottság Ellenőrző albizottsága (The Supervisory and Control Sub-Committee of DLEC has become operational), http://www.jogiforum.hu/hirek/24403.
Enforcement of Anti-Corruption Laws: Hungary, UNCAC Civil Society Review 2013, http://www.uncaccoalition.org/images/PDF/UNCAC-CSO-Report-Hungary-2013.pdf.
Defence is the winner of next year's budget A jövő év nyertese lesz a honvédelem, Magyar Hirlap June 13 2015 http://magyarhirlap.hu/cikk/27649/A_jovo_ev_nyertese_lesz_a_honvedelem
All Hungary News, 'Government loses parliamentary supermajority as Fidesz candidate beaten in Veszprém by-election', 22 February 2015. http://www.politics.hu/20150222/government-loses-parliamentary-supermajority-as-fidesz-candidate-beaten-in-veszprem-by-election/, accessed November 2015.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: The main tasks of the Parliament related to the field of defence:
Under Article 1(2) of the Fundamental Law the main tasks of the Parliament are listed in 11 points, out of which the following two concern the field of defence:
–tdeciding on the declaration of a state of war and the conclusion of peace;
–tmaking decisions concerning a special legal order, and regarding involvement in military operations.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: While the DLEC' s supervisory and control subcomittee has indeed only held six sessions between 2010 and 2014 (and altogether three of those sessions did not have the necessary quorum), the DLEC itself has held 146 sessions since January 2010, each time with the necessary quorum to be operational. This shows that at least in theory, the DLEC is operational and is able to perform its functions. It gives cause to concern, however, that the DLEC has been called together only a handful of times in 2014, despite repeated calls from the opposition for meetings. In addition, as the National Integrity Study of 2011 notes, “The legal framework for the law enforcement agencies is appropriate with some deficiencies. (…) The governance of the agencies is appropriate as set by law, but their transparency and accountability is criticized.” While the Defence Act provides the DLEC with the authority to scrutinize defence spending and defence policy, it is in fact uncertain how much truly independent scrutiny the Committee can or would be willing to exercise with a 2/3 parliamentary majority in place. As Transparency International noted in the Civil Society Review Report on the Self-Assessment Survey on UNCAC: &quoute;Hungary, as a member of the EU, has a democratic system with an institutional setup designed to guarantee checks and balances by law. In practice, however, the possibility to exercise political influence over these institutions has increased significantly since the last elections in 2010 (...).&quoute;
Website of DLEC: http://www.parlament.hu/internet/plsql/ogy_biz.keret_frissit?p_szerv=&p_fomenu=20&p_almenu=20&p_ckl=39&p_biz=A341&p_rec=&p_egys=&p_nyelv=HU; Jogi Forum (Legal Forum), 23 December 2010, Megkezdte működését a Honvédelmi és rendészeti bizottság Ellenőrző albizottsága (The Supervisory and Control Sub-Committee of DLEC has become operational), http://www.jogiforum.hu/hirek/24403. Enforcement of Anti-Corruption Laws: Hungary, UNCAC Civil Society Review 2013, http://www.uncaccoalition.org/images/PDF/UNCAC-CSO-Report-Hungary-2013.pdf.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Does the country have an identifiable and effective parliamentary defence and security committee (or similar such organisation) to exercise oversight?
The Defence and Law Enforcement Committee is a committee that the Parliament Act makes obligatory to set up. It is an organ of Parliament mandated to take initiatives, make proposals, give opinions, and decide matters as well as to participate in the supervision of governmental work regarding defence and law enforcement. In its operation the committee shall exercise its competence as laid down in the Fundamental Law and other Acts, the Parliament Act, the Standing Orders, as well as in other resolutions of the Parliament. The DLEC – upon the request of the Parliament or at its own choice – may discuss any issues falling within its competence and express an opinion on them, and it can request briefings and appearances from government officials and military officers. It monitors the implementation of defence-related laws, conducts hearings and provides opinions on candidates for ministers and the post of the Chief of Staff and other senior positions. For a comprehensive list of DLEC competencies, see comments from the Government Reviewer below.
The DLEC is adequately resourced and has all of the formal powers necessary for the democratic functioning of such a committee, including the provision to invite and question the main stakeholders responsible for the defence policy (minister, military personnel). It regularly publishes its documents online; however these documents are restricted to the operations of the committee.
However, despite its extensive formal rights, due to the supermajority of the ruling coalition (in place until February 2015), the DLEC is hardly able to exercise any meaningful oversight. Interviewee 2 stated that the DLEC serves as a &quoute;simple rubber stamp&quoute; for approving government policies. Due to the governing party's majority in Parliament, the committee is unable to exert real control on the executive branch. Interviewee 2 stated that the only real tool that worked was the written questions which opposition MPs can use to address ministers and government officials: &quoute;if we have whistle-blowers who tell us what specific questions we should ask, we can have some tangible results&quoute;. The DLEC has a supervisory and control sub-committee which has held only six sessions between 2010 and 2014 (and three of those sessions did not have the necessary quorum). The last two sessions in 2011 and 2013 lasted only five and twelve minutes respectively, without the necessary quorum after the governing party MPs refused to take part in its work.
While the DLEC' s supervisory and control sub-committee has not been active, it should be noted the DLEC itself has held 146 sessions since January 2010, each time with the necessary quorum to be operational. This shows that at least in theory, the DLEC is operational and is able to perform its functions. It gives cause to concern, however, that the DLEC has been called together only a handful of times in 2014, despite repeated calls from the opposition for meetings. One of the most important tools that the DLEC has is its power to invite government officials, ministers, and members of the armed forces to report to the Committee and provide answers to questions, including questions about potential ongoing wrongdoings. This is something that the Committee has been doing since its operationalization, but it can only do so if meetings are held regularly, and if there is enough initiative within the Committee to investigate wrongdoings. As Transparency International noted in the Civil Society Review Report on the Self-Assessment Survey on UNCAC: &quoute;Hungary, as a member of the EU, has a democratic system with an institutional setup designed to guarantee checks and balances by law. In practice, however, the possibility to exercise political influence over these institutions has increased significantly since the last elections in 2010 (...).&quoute;
Second, political parties (particularly the smaller ones in opposition) appear short of real expertise in matters of defence, including defence policies, procurement issues, etc. Hence, even if the DLEC would function properly, its oversight capabilities would probably be weakened by the sheer lack of expertise from the opposition side. Out of three opposition MPs on the Committee, only one has had actual experience in defence. None of the ruling party MPs appear to have had defence-related experience.
RESPONSE TO REVIEWERS: Information incorporated.
Hungary's Fundamental Law http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=140968.248458
Act CXIII of 2011 on Defence and the Hungarian Defence Forces and the measures that may be implemented in a state of emergency, http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=139266.255344
Website of the Parliament’s National Defence and Law Enforcement Committee’s supervisory and control subcommittee. http://www.parlament.hu/internet/plsql/ogy_biz.biz_adat_uj?p_ckl=39&p_biz=A358&p_tag=&p_tagj=&p_munkatars=&P_stilus=nyito.css&p_honl_rend=&p_ules=I#biz_ules
The Parliament’s Defence and Law Enforcement Committee’s website with minutes of the meetings, decisions etc. http://www.parlament.hu/internet/plsql/ogy_biz.keret_frissit?p_szerv=185&p_ckl=39&p_biz=A341&p_nyelv=HU
Official website of the Parliament on the DLEC: http://www.parlament.hu/bizottsagok1?p_auth=zHWs5tej&p_p_id=pairproxy_WAR_pairproxyportlet_INSTANCE_oE5e9ElGPFdl&p_p_lifecycle=1&p_p_state=normal&p_p_mode=view&p_p_col_id=column-1&p_p_col_count=1&_pairproxy_WAR_pairproxyportlet_INSTANCE_oE5e9ElGPFdl_pairAction=%2Finternet%2Fcplsql%2Fogy_biz.biz_adat_uj%3Fp_ckl%3D40%26p_biz%3DA424%26p_ules%3D%26p_munkatars%3D%26p_tag%3D%26p_honl_rend%3D%26p_tagj%3DI%23biz_tag'
Website of the Parliament's National Defence and Law Enforcement Committee, http://www.parlament.hu/internet/plsql/ogy_biz.keret_frissit?p_szerv=&p_fomenu=20&p_almenu=20&p_ckl=39&p_biz=A341&p_rec=&p_egys=&p_nyelv=HU;
HVG (weekly newspaper online version), MTI, 3 April 2014, Kocsis Máté: Nincs értelme összehívni a rendészeti bizottságot (It makes no sense to call together the Law Enforcement Committee), http://hvg.hu/itthon/20140403_Kocsis_Mater_nincs_ertelme_osszehivni_a_h, in which the Head of the DLEC claims that there is no point in calling together a hearing of the Law Enforcement Committee until the socialist party members of the committee do not cooperate.
Galamus Csoport, A Demokratikus Koalíció közleménye - DK: Üljön össze a Honvédelmi és Rendészeti Bizottság! (A Statement from the Democratic Coalition - DC: the Defence and Law Enforcement Committee should hold a meeting!), 2 September 2014, http://www.galamuscsoport.hu/tartalom/cikk/404677_a_demokratikus_koalicio_kozlemenye_dk_uljon_ossze
Hirado.hu, 15 September 2014, A honvédelmi bizottság összehívását sürgeti a DK (The DC urges the DLEC to hold meetings), http://www.hirado.hu/2014/09/15/a-honvedelmi-bizottsag-osszehivasat-surgeti-a-dk/.Inforadio.hu, 17 September 2014,
Hende Csaba tájékoztatta a honvédelmi bizottságot Magyarország kötelezettségeiről (Csaba Hende informs the DLEC on Hungary's commitments),
http://inforadio.hu/hir/belfold/hir-667022,
Interview with Interviewee 2: Opposition Member of Parliament, Budapest, April 23, 2014
Ex-MoD refuses cooperation with subcommitee (Nem jelent meg a HM albizottság ülésén Juhász Ferenc volt honvédelmi miniszter), Nepszava, February 25, 2011.)
Prosecution withdraws: the state secretary did not commit fraud (Visszakozott az ügyészség: mégsem csalt a volt államtitkár), Nepszabadsag, March 27, 2014)
Enforcement of Anti-Corruption Laws: Hungary, UNCAC Civil Society Review 2013, http://www.uncaccoalition.org/images/PDF/UNCAC-CSO-Report-Hungary-2013.pdf.
All Hungary News, 'Government loses parliamentary supermajority as Fidesz candidate beaten in Veszprém by-election', 22 February 2015. http://www.politics.hu/20150222/government-loses-parliamentary-supermajority-as-fidesz-candidate-beaten-in-veszprem-by-election/, accessed November 2015.
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: First and foremost, due to the supermajority of the ruling coalition, the DLEC is hardly able to exercise any meaningful oversight. Second, another problem is that the political parties (particularly the smaller ones in opposition) are short of real expertise in matters of defence, including defence policies, procurement issues, etc. Hence, even if the DLEC would function properly, its oversight capabilities would probably be weakened by the sheer lack of expertise from the opposition side.
For reference, see the CVs of members of the DLEC. Three opposition MPs are working in the committee. One specialises in policing; another is a lawyer and political scientist by education with no documented expertise on matters of defence. Only one, the independent ex-MSZP Agnes Vadai has actual expertise, as she was State Secretary of Defence until 2010. Of the governmental MPs, none have any relevant educational background or meaningful expertise in defence matters based on their official CVs.
Source: Official website of the Parliament on the DLEC: http://www.parlament.hu/bizottsagok1?p_auth=zHWs5tej&p_p_id=pairproxy_WAR_pairproxyportlet_INSTANCE_oE5e9ElGPFdl&p_p_lifecycle=1&p_p_state=normal&p_p_mode=view&p_p_col_id=column-1&p_p_col_count=1&_pairproxy_WAR_pairproxyportlet_INSTANCE_oE5e9ElGPFdl_pairAction=%2Finternet%2Fcplsql%2Fogy_biz.biz_adat_uj%3Fp_ckl%3D40%26p_biz%3DA424%26p_ules%3D%26p_munkatars%3D%26p_tag%3D%26p_honl_rend%3D%26p_tagj%3DI%23biz_tag
Suggested score: 2
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Defence and Law Enforcement Committee
The Defence and Law Enforcement Committee is a committee that is obligatory to be set up under the Parliament Act. In today's parliamentary democracy the Defence and Law Enforcement Committee is an organ of the Parliament to take initiatives, make proposals, give opinions, and decide matters as well as to participate in the supervision of governmental work regarding defence and law enforcement. In its operation the committee shall exercise its competence as laid down in the Fundamental Law and other Acts, the Parliament Act, the Standing Orders, as well as in other resolutions of the Parliament.
The Defence and Law Enforcement Committee – upon the request of the Parliament or at its own choice – may discuss any issues falling within its competence and take a position on them.
•tThe committee – in case the Parliament is unable to attend to its tasks – may suspend the emergency measures introduced by the President of the Republic, or may extend their effect; in state of emergency – in case the Parliament is unable to attend to its tasks – the Defence Committee shall remain in continuous sitting (Article 50 (4) to (5) of the Fundamental Law).
•tIt shall monitor the implementation of the tasks of the Hungarian Defence Force, the level of its competence and facilities, as well as the use of the material resources made available for it (Section 19 (2) of the National Defence Act).
•tThe committee shall hear the nominated minister responsible for defence and law enforcement before his appointment, and give opinion on the person proposed. It decides on the support of their appointment by open ballot (Section 44 (2) of the Parliament Act).
•tIt shall hear the ministers (responsible for defence and law enforcement) at least once a year (Section 41 of the Parliament Act).
•tIt hears the annual report of the Parliamentary Guard Commander on the activities of the Parliamentary Guard (Section 132 (1) (e) of the Parliament Act).
•tIt shall hear the person nominated to the post of Chief of Defence Staff before his appointment, and expresses its opinion on his competence (Section 19 (3) of the National Defence Act).
•tIt shall continuously supervise the implementation of the tasks of the military security services, and within the framework of this it shall
–thear, at least once a year, the briefing of the minister on the general activities of the national security services (Section 17 (1) (a) of the National Security Act);
–thear the briefing of the minister on the government resolutions regarding the Military National Security Service (Section 17 (1) (b) of the National Security Act);
–thear the persons nominated to the post of General Director of the Military National Security Service before their appointment and take a position on their suitability (Section 17 (1) (c) of the National Security Act)
•tThe committee shall – before the decision of the competent minister – give an opinion whether the interest of national security or national defence makes it necessary to launch a restricted tender for a concession contract (Section 4 (2) of the Concession Act).
•tIt hears the person nominated for the post of the National Police Chief, and the Director-General of Counter Terrorism Centre and takes a position on his competency (Section 6 (3) of the Police Act).
•tIt hears the report of the minister responsible for border policing on the reasons for the ordered border closure (Section 12 (3) of Act LXXXIX of 2007 on state borders).
•tJointly with the Human Rights, Minority, Civil and Religious Affairs Committee it proposes members of the Independent Police Complaints Board (Section 6A (2) of the Police Act).
Based on the decision of the committee the member of the standing committee responsible for national defence, is entitled to use the classified information essential to perform the tasks of the committee, as laid down in the Fundamental Law, the Act on National Defence and the Act on National Security Services, without a personal security certificate, a confidentiality statement or a user licence (Section 98 (3) (b) the Parliament Act).
The roles of other bodies and persons in the field of defence and their involvement in the work of the Defence and Law Enforcement Committee:
a.)tThe government shall inform the committee
-ton the development of the radar reconnaissance, information and management system of the air defence, the state of implementation of the programme, and
-ton preserving the defence capacity of the air defence close to the ground and at low height, as well as on the state of implementation of the programme once a year concurrently with the Final Accounts Act for the relevant year (Parliamentary Resolutions No. 94/1995 (IX. 28.) OGY. and No. 95/1995 (IX. 28.) OGY.).
The government shall regularly inform the Committee on the foreign deployment of Hungarian soldiers in NATO, EU and UN missions, including the following:
•tthe Hungarian contribution to military peacekeeping operations implemented in the Balkans under the command of the NATO (Parliamentary Resolution No. 94/2001 (XII. 21.) OGY.);
•ton the Hungarian military involvement in the operations of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan (Parliamentary Resolution No. 99/2003. (X. 10.) OGY.);
•ton the Hungarian contribution to the military peacekeeping operations implemented in the Balkans under the command of the EU (ALTHEA) (Parliamentary Resolution No. 128/2004. (XI. 23.) OGY.);
•ton the Hungarian involvement in the UN peacekeeping mission in Lebanon (UNIFIL) (Parliamentary Resolution No. 44/2006. (X. 10.) OGY).
In the first half of each year the government reports to the committee in writing on the directions of the further development of the Hungarian Defence Force (Parliamentary Resolution No. 51/2007 (VI. 6.) OGY.). By 30 April each year the government reports on the implementation of the Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty regarding the Status of their Armed Forces and the Supplementary Protocol thereof (Section 15 of Act CXVII of 1999).
b.)tThe minister responsible for defence shall send the draft legislation concerning the Hungarian Defence Force to the members of the committee of the Parliament dealing with defence matters for information, by electronic means (Section 19 (4) of the National Defence Act).
c.)tThe minister responsible for supervising the protection of classified information informs the committee on his relevant activities as necessary, but at least once a year (Section 21 (2) of the Classified Information Protection Act).
d.)tThe minister responsible for foreign economy and economic development in the Carpathian Basin Economic Zone reports once a year on the foreign trade licensing activities in the field of military technology to the parliamentary committees dealing with national defence matters, law enforcement matters, foreign policy matters, and national security matters (Section 23 of Government Decree 160/2011 (VIII. 18.) Korm.).
e.)tThe Independent Police Complaints Board informs the committee on the experiences of its operations and procedures once a year (Section 6/A (1) (b) of the Police Act).
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: The verbatim official reports of all open meetings of the DLEC are available on the website of the Committee, which makes it possible to gain an insight into the workings of the DLEC, with the exception of the handful of closed or partially closed meetings. It gives cause for concern that in 2014, the DLEC has held meetings only three times before the elections, and twice after the elections, despite calls from the Democratic Coalition to hold meetings.The Head of the DLEC stated that there is no point in calling together a meeting of the Committee until there is cooperation from the Socialist members of the Committee. One of the most important tools that the DLEC has is its power to invite government officials, ministers, and members of the armed forces to report to the Committee and provide answers to questions, including questions about potential ongoing wrongdoings. This is something that the Committee has been doing since its operationalization, but it can only do so if meetings are held regularly, and if there is enough initiative within the Committee to investigate wrongdoings.
Website of the Parliament's National Defence and Law Enforcement Committee, http://www.parlament.hu/internet/plsql/ogy_biz.keret_frissit?p_szerv=&p_fomenu=20&p_almenu=20&p_ckl=39&p_biz=A341&p_rec=&p_egys=&p_nyelv=HU;
HVG (weekly newspaper online version), MTI, 3 April 2014, Kocsis Máté: Nincs értelme összehívni a rendészeti bizottságot (It makes no sense to call together the Law Enforcement Committee), http://hvg.hu/itthon/20140403_Kocsis_Mater_nincs_ertelme_osszehivni_a_h, in which the Head of the DLEC claims that there is no point in calling together a hearing of the Law Enforcement Committee until the socialist party members of the committee do not cooperate.
Galamus Csoport, A Demokratikus Koalíció közleménye - DK: Üljön össze a Honvédelmi és Rendészeti Bizottság! (A Statement from the Democratic Coalition - DC: the Defence and Law Enforcement Committee should hold a meeting!), 2 September 2014, http://www.galamuscsoport.hu/tartalom/cikk/404677_a_demokratikus_koalicio_kozlemenye_dk_uljon_ossze. Hirado.hu, 15 September 2014, A honvédelmi bizottság összehívását sürgeti a DK (The DC urges the DLEC to hold meetings), http://www.hirado.hu/2014/09/15/a-honvedelmi-bizottsag-osszehivasat-surgeti-a-dk/.Inforadio.hu, 17 September 2014,
Hende Csaba tájékoztatta a honvédelmi bizottságot Magyarország kötelezettségeiről (Csaba Hende informs the DLEC on Hungary's commitments),
http://inforadio.hu/hir/belfold/hir-667022, news article on the Ministry of Defence reporting to DLEC about the NATO Summit in Wales, and noting that the DLEC will hold a joint session with the National Security Committee to examine the alleged abuses of the fast-track naturalization process.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is the country's national defence policy debated and publicly available?
The National Security Strategy (February 2012) and National Military Strategy (2012) were adopted by Parliament and are public documents. Hungarian law stipulates that before such documents are approved, they must be released to the public for a “consultation process”. This requirement was followed in the development of both strategies.
The proposed National Military Strategy was published on the Defence Ministry's website, and was open for comments from all. There was also a conference series held on the National Security Strategy of 2012 at the National University of Public Service in May 2012. An academic analysis from 2013 on the new National Military Strategy made a recommendation that to ensure that objective assessments and evaluations can be prepared in connection with the Strategy, the ongoing planning process - in certain functional areas - should include a larger circle of the professional community, including industry and civilian sphere actors, as well as international partners of Hungary.
Despite the formal consultation process, however, the debate has been restricted to an academic and professional circle. There is no information available of the effectiveness and extension of public debates, no significant debates have been reported on in the media. The strategy is not updated frequently - the previous strategy appears to have been adopted in 2004.
RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: Comments added, score maintained as the debate lacked depth and social reach, and the documents are not regularly updated.
Hungary’s National Security Strategy of 2012 was adopted as a government resolution.
Hungary's National Security Strategy, Annex 1 1035 / 2012th (II. 21), Government Decision, effective from 23 February 2012, accessed 4 April 2014. http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=146225.213089
A press release on the government's website refers to the open discussion of the National Security Strategy.
Hungarian Government website, 'Elkészült Magyarország új Nemzeti Biztonsági Stratégiája, (the new National Security Strategy of Hungary has been finalised)', 22 February 2012, http://www.kormany.hu/hu/kulugyminiszterium/hirek/elkeszult-magyarorszag-uj-nemzeti-biztonsagi-strategiaja
Hungary’s National Military Strategy of 2012 was adopted as a government resolution.
Hungary's National Security Strategy, Annex 1 of the 1656/2012 (XII. 20.) Government Decision, effective from 22 December 2012, access April 4 2014, http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=157721.234310
Biztonsagpolitika.hu, Tugyi Attila, 23 May 2012, 2012 - A Nemzeti Biztonsagi Strategia (2012 - The National Security Strategy), http://www.biztonsagpolitika.hu/?id=16&aid=1186&title=2012-a-nemzeti-biztonsagi-strategia,
reporting on the conference series on the 2012 National Military Strategy held at the National University of Public Service. NKE Stratégia Védelmi Kutatóközpont Nézőpontok, 2013/3, Az új Nemzeti Katonai Stratégia a nemzetközi tapasztalatok tükrében (The New Military Strategy in light of International Experience), http://hhk.uni-nke.hu/uploads/media_items/2013-3.original.pdf.'
A press release on the government's website refers to the open discussion of the National Military Strategy.
Hungarian Government website, 'Az új Nemzeti Katonai Stratégia tervezetének véleményezése (Opinions to the new draft National Military Strategy)', September 25, 2012, http://www.kormany.hu/hu/honvedelmi-miniszterium/hirek/az-uj-nemzeti-katonai-strategia-tervezetenek-velemenyezese
Defence minister announces the preparation of the new draft National Military Strategy after an all-party parliamentary discussion.
Nepszava daily newspaper online, 'Hende: elkészült a nemzeti katonai stratégia (Hende: new National Military Strategy ready)', September 21, 2012, http://nepszava.hu/cikk/586525-hende-elkeszult-a-nemzeti-katonai-strategia
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: The National Security Strategy (February 2012) and National Military Strategy (2012) were adopted by Parliament and are public documents. Hungarian law stipulates that before such documents are approved, they must be released to the public for a “consultation process”. This requirement was followed in the development of both strategies and they are available on the MOD website.
Suggested score: 4
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: The proposed National Military Strategy was published on the Defence Ministry's website, and was open for comments from all. There was also a conference series held on the National Security Strategy of 2012 at the National University of Public Service in May 2012. An academic analysis from 2013 on the new National Military Strategy made a recommendation that to ensure that objective assessments and evaluations can be prepared in connection with the Strategy, the ongoing planning process - in certain functional areas - should include a larger circle of the professional community, including industry and civilian sphere actors, as well as international partners of Hungary.
Biztonsagpolitika.hu, Tugyi Attila, 23 May 2012, 2012 - A Nemzeti Biztonsagi Strategia (2012 - The National Security Strategy), http://www.biztonsagpolitika.hu/?id=16&aid=1186&title=2012-a-nemzeti-biztonsagi-strategia, reporting on the conference series on the 2012 National Military Strategy held at the National University of Public Service. NKE Stratégia Védelmi Kutatóközpont Nézőpontok, 2013/3, Az új Nemzeti Katonai Stratégia a nemzetközi tapasztalatok tükrében (The New Military Strategy in light of International Experience), http://hhk.uni-nke.hu/uploads/media_items/2013-3.original.pdf.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Do defence and security institutions have a policy, or evidence, of openness towards civil society organisations (CSOs) when dealing with issues of corruption? If no, is there precedent for CSO involvement in general government anti-corruption initiatives?
There are broad references in both the National Military Strategy and the National Security Strategy concerning the importance of the cooperation with civil society organisations (CSOs). Thus defence and security institutions can be said to have some openness towards civil society, although this does not reach the level of an actual policy.
The government’s overall commitment towards anti-corruption CSOs has deteriorated considerably since 2013. In April 2013, a number of anti-corruption NGOs (including Transparency International Hungary) left the Anti-Corruption Working Body, which the government had established to help its efforts concerning corruption prevention. The NGOs made this move in protest against the planned and later adopted amendments to the Freedom of Information legislation, which curtailed the public's right to access information. The NGOs have not returned to the Anti-Corruption Working Body and instead, their places have been filled by pro-government civil organisations.
Even while the NGOs that later left the Working Group (Partnership on Open Government) were still present and part of the WG, they voiced concerns that their suggestions do not have any effect on actual governmental decision-making. Transparency International noted in 2013 that meetings seemed to become more about the government informing them of decisions rather than engaging with the CSOs in actual discussions. Even some of the pro-government CSOs have expressed concerns regarding the performance of the Working Group and also voiced criticism of the amendment of the Freedom of Information legislation. However, TI-Hungary noted that it and other critical CSOs were invited to a debate where government and CSO position were discussed in the presence of the UNCAC review team, and the team could ask questions.
RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: The review repeats the government's commitment to anti-corruption fight although it is not substantiated by the NGO reports. The score remains at 1 due to a lack of evidence of engagement on defence issues specifically.
RESPONSE TO PEER AND TI REVIEWERS: Comments and sources added.
Government Decree on government measures against corruption and adopting the Administration Corruption Prevention Programme, 1104/2012, 6 April 2012, accessed 4 April 2014, http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=147403.215553
The ordinance of the Ministry of Defence concerning the implementation of the government’s corruption prevention program 73/2013. (XI. 29), access 4 April 2014, http://www.opten.hu/73-2013-xi-29-hm-utasitas-j241012.html
Government Decree on the Anti-Corruption Coordination Body 1037/2007 (VI. 18), 18 June 2007, accessed 4 April 2014, http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=113091.162223
444.hu, Kormánypárti civilek ugrottak be a korrupcióellenes harcba (Pro-government NGOs join anti-corruption fight), May 09, 2013, http://444.hu/2013/05/09/mar-korabban-befulladt-a-korrupcioellenes-munkacsoport/
Transparency International Hungary, 'Government closing in on freedom of information', 8 May 2013, http://www.transparency.hu/Government_closing_in_on_freedom_of_information?bind_info=tag&bind_id=40
Hungarian Government website, 'A KIM reagálása a civil szervezetek antikorrupciós munkacsoportból történő kilépésére (The reaction of the Ministry of Justice and Public Administration to the NGO’s decision to leave the anti-corruption working body)', 30 April 2013,
http://www.kormany.hu/hu/kozigazgatasi-es-igazsagugyi-miniszterium/tarsadalmi-kapcsolatokert-felelos-allamtitkarsag/hirek/a-kim-reagalasa-a-civil-szervezetek-antikorrupcios-munkacsoportbol-torteno-kilepesere
Conference of the States Parties to the United Nations Convention against Corruption, 'Hungary – Civil Society Report, An input to the UNCAC Implementation Review Mechanism: Third year of review of UNCAC chapters III and IV', 13 November 2013, http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/COSP/session5/V1387719e.pdf
Hvg.hu, 30 April 2013, Navracsicsék hülyére vették őket, lelép az antikorrupciós csoport (Navrasics and company thought they were stupid, the anti-corruption group quits), http://hvg.hu/itthon/20130430_tasz_informacios_torveny_kozerdeku_adatig/.
K blog.hu, 3 February 2014, Kijött az első Európai Antikorrupciós Jelentés (The First European Anti-Corruption Report is Published), http://k.blog.hu/2014/02/03/kijott_az_elso_europai_antikorrupcios_jelentes. Enforcement of Anti-Corruption Laws: Hungary, UNCAC Civil Society Review 2013, http://www.uncaccoalition.org/images/PDF/UNCAC-CSO-Report-Hungary-2013.pdf. '
CPJ July 24 2015 New hurdles for Hungary's press as Orbán restricts FOI requests https://cpj.org/blog/2015/07/new-hurdles-for-hungarys-press-as-orban-restricts-.php
Transparency International Hungary, Contribution to UNCAC Review Process. http://www.transparency.hu/uploads/docs/Civil_society_review_report.pdf
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: After consulting with non-governmental organizations, the Government adopted the Government Resolution No 1104 of 2012 on Governmental Actions against Corruption and the Adoption of the Corruption Prevention Program of the Public Administration.
In addition to public bodies, civil society plays a vital role in ensuring the transparency of the public sector. NGOs, such as the Transparency International and the ‘Átlátszó’ with its website contribute to the social dialogue on corruption and integrity. The Act No 131 of 2010 on Social Participation in the Drafting of Legislation ensures the participation of the civil society in law making. Drafts, along with preliminary impact assessments, are published on the Government’s website where anyone may express an opinion or make suggestions on the draft. Ensuring that those responsible for drafting in the Ministries considered all the opinions and suggestions received, Ministries have to publish a summary and – in the case of rejected opinions –a standardised explanation of the reasons for rejection on its website. Ministers might decide to hold a direct consultation by inviting non-governmental organizations and other stakeholders to participate in person consultations or even to form a working group with the governmental experts working on the draft. The above-mentioned Corruption Prevention Programme and the OGP Action Plan has been subjected to a broad social consultation prior to its approval. The Government reached out to a wide range of organisations and invited civil experts, research institutes, chambers of commerce and other professional organization to participate
More information on the Government’s Corruption Prevention Programme and its implementation on the corruption prevention can be found on the website of the Ministry of Public Administration and Justice at corruptionprevention.gov.hu.
Government Update April 2015: The Ministry for Public Administration ceased to operate in 2014, and all tasks that were earlier carried out by this ministry have been divided under the other ministries. This means that the field of BI and anti-corruption has now its own organizational element, a new Counter Corruption Department, which is dealing with these issues on the public administrational level.
The Public Relations Bureau of the MOD maintains routine contact with all elements of society and has initiated special programmes to promote open and constant information to the public on defence matters. A press office within the minister’s cabinet also engages with journalists and organises regular meetings to encourage cooperation on topics of national defence. The press office replies to queries from the public as rapidly as possible concerning unclassified matters. The MOD has 15 days to answer requests from the public or media and must inform the requestor if it will require a longer period of time.
From April 2012 to May 2013, some 258 requests were received and all were answered. The MOD maintains close relations with NGOs interested in defence topics and also with labour organizations which have a military interest.
Suggested score: 4
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: While the government's commitment to work with anti-corruption NGOs has deteriorated considerably, in theory at least, defence and security institutions do have some openness towards civil society (evidenced through references in the National Military Strategy and the National Security Strategy), although this does not reach the level of an actual policy. With regards to general anti-corruption initiatives, there is indeed a progressive deterioration of the government's commitment to involve CSOS, with the exception of government-friendly NGOs. This justifies the lowering of this indicator score from 2012. Even while the NGOs that later left the Working Group (Partnership on Open Government) were still present and part of the WG, they voiced concerns that their suggestions do not have any effect on actual governmental decision-making. Transparency International noted in 2013 that meetings seemed to become more about the government informing them of decisions, and not engaging with the CSOs in actual discussions. Even some of the pro-government CSOs have expressed concerns regarding the performance of the Working Group and also voiced criticism of the amendment of the Freedom of Information legislation.
Additional sources: Hvg.hu, 30 April 2013, Navracsicsék hülyére vették őket, lelép az antikorrupciós csoport (Navrasics and company thought they were stupid, the anti-corruption group quits), http://hvg.hu/itthon/20130430_tasz_informacios_torveny_kozerdeku_adatig/. K blog.hu, 3 February 2014, Kijött az első Európai Antikorrupciós Jelentés (The First European Anti-Corruption Report is Published), http://k.blog.hu/2014/02/03/kijott_az_elso_europai_antikorrupcios_jelentes. Enforcement of Anti-Corruption Laws: Hungary, UNCAC Civil Society Review 2013, http://www.uncaccoalition.org/images/PDF/UNCAC-CSO-Report-Hungary-2013.pdf.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: TI-Hungary took part in the review process of the UNCAC, and even drafted a parallel assessment. TI-H and other critical CSOs were invited to a debate where government and CSO position were discussed in the presence of the UNCAC review team. The UNCAC reviewers could ask questions to CSOs.
see: http://www.transparency.hu/uploads/docs/Civil_society_review_report.pdf
Suggested score:
Has the country signed up to international anti-corruption instruments such as, but not exclusively or necessarily, UNCAC and the OECD Convention? (In your answer, please specify which.)
The first international anti-corruption treaty Hungary acceded to is the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Officials, which was promulgated by the Act No 37 of 2000. Since then, Hungary has been participating in all major treaties and conventions aimed at fighting bribery and corruption. Hungary ratified two treaties adopted by the Council of Europe: the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (promulgated by the Act No 67 of 2000) and the Civil Law Convention on Corruption 2004 (promulgated by the Act No 50 of 2004). In addition to acceding and implementing the aforementioned convictions, Hungary is also participating in the Council of Europe’s Group of States against Corruption (GRECO).
Another important treaty is the United Nation Convention against Corruption, in which Hungary has been participating since 2005. The UN Convention against Corruption was promulgated by the Act No 134 of 2005. The Executive Summary on the Hungarian implementation of Chapter III and IV was adopted by the COSP in Panama in 2013. The review found that the Hungarian legislation and practice is generally in compliance with the Convention. The Executive Summary on the implementation of Chapter III and IV is available on the UNODC’s website.
Hungary is also part of the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. The most recent development in this field is Hungary’s joining the Open Government Partnership. Hungary made commitments in its Action Plan (promulgated by the Government Resolution No 1080 of 2013) to improve the publicity of fiscal data and the searchability of public procurement data, and to introduce an integrity management system in the public administration.
In terms of compliance, Hungary has improved in its compliance with the OECD Anti-bribery Convention. Transparency International's 2013 progress report upgraded Hungary’s performance from “little or no enforcement” to limited enforcement. Concerning the UN Convention against Corruption, a civil society report prepared in November 2013, in the framework of the third year review of UNCAC Chapters III and IV, remained critical of Hungary’s performance.
RESPONSE TO REVIEWERS: Comments and sources added.
OECD website, Directorate for International and Financial Affairs, Hungary - OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/hungary-oecdanti-briberyconvention.htm
Transparency International, 'Progress Report 2013: Enforcement of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention',
http://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/pub/exporting_corruption_progress_report_2013_assessing_enforcement_of_the_oecd
OECD Working Group on Bribery, 'Phase 3 Report on Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention in Hungary', March 2012, http://www.oecd.org/corruption/anti-bribery/CompilationofRecommendationsP3Reports_December2013.pdf
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, ratified December 22, 2006
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-12&chapter=18&lang=en
Council of Europe, GRECO, 'First Evaluation Round Evaluation Report on Hungary', adopted by GRECO at its 13th Plenary Meeting, 24-28 March 2003, http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/round1/GrecoEval1%282002%295_Hungary_EN.pdf
Council of Europe, GRECO, 'Second Evaluation Round Evaluation Report on Hungary', adopted by GRECO at its 27th Plenary Meeting, 6-10 March 2006, http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/round2
/GrecoEval2%282005%295_Hungary_EN.pdf
Council of Europe, GRECO, 'Third Evaluation Round Evaluation Report on Hungary on Incriminations' (ETS 173 and 191, GPC 2), adopted by GRECO at its 47th Plenary Meeting, 7-11 June 2010, http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/round3/GrecoEval3%282009%298_Hungary_One_EN.pdf
Council of Europe, GRECO, 'Third Evaluation Round Evaluation Report on Hungary Transparency of Party Funding', adopted by GRECO at its 47th Plenary Meeting, 7-11 June 2010, http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/round3
/GrecoEval3%282009%298_Hungary_Two_EN.pdf
Council of Europe, 'Criminal Law Convention on Corruption' CETS No.: 173, entry into force 1 July 2002,
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=173&CM=&DF=&CL=ENG
Council of Europe, 'Civil Law Convention on Corruption', CETS No.: 174, entry into force 1 April 2004
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=174&CM=8&DF=14/10/2013&CL=ENG
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 'UN Convention Against Corruption', signed in 2003, ratified in 2005, http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/signatories.html
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 'Hungary – Civil Society Report By Transparency International Hungary, An input to the UNCAC Implementation Review Mechanism: Third year of review of UNCAC chapters III and IV', 13 November 2013, http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/COSP/session5/V1387719e.pdf
OECD, 'Hungary has improved legal framework for fighting foreign bribery, but must do more to detect and prosecute', March 30, 2012,
http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/anti-briberyconvention/hungaryhasimprovedlegalframeworkforfightingforeignbriberybutmustdomoretodetectandprosecute.htm
Act CXXXIV of 2005 on promulgation of the United Nations Convention against Corruption adopted in Merida on 10 December 2003, accessed April 2014, http://jogszabalykereso.mhk.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=94402.131318
Enforcement of Anti-Corruption Laws: Hungary, UNCAC Civil Society Review 2013, http://www.uncaccoalition.org/images/PDF/UNCAC-CSO-Report-Hungary-2013.pdf.
Conference of the State Parties to the United Nations Convention against Corruption, 'Document submitted by Transparency International, a non-governmental organization in consultative status with the Economic and Social Council,' Fifth Session, Panama City, 25-29 November 2013, CAC/COSP/2013/NGO/7, https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/COSP/session5/V1387719e.pdf.'
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: The first international anti-corruption treaty Hungary acceded to is the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Officials, which was promulgated by the Act No 37 of 2000. Since then, Hungary has been participating in all major treaties and conventions aimed at fighting bribery and corruption. Hungary ratified two treaties adopted by the Council of Europe: the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (promulgated by the Act No 67 of 2000) and the Civil Law Convention on Corruption 2004 (promulgated by the Act No 50 of 2004). In addition to acceding and implementing the aforementioned convictions, Hungary is also actively participating in the Council of Europe’s Group of States against Corruption (GRECO).
Another important treaty is the United Nation Convention against Corruption, in which Hungary has been participating since 2005. The UN Convention against Corruption was promulgated by the Act No 134 of 2005. The Executive Summary on the Hungarian implementation of Chapter III and IV was adopted by the COSP in Panama in 2013. The review found that the Hungarian legislation and practice is generally in compliance with the Convention. The Executive Summary on the implementation of Chapter III and IV is available on the UNODC’s website.
Hungary is also part of the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. The most recent development in this field is Hungary’s joining the Open Government Partnership. Hungary made forward-looking commitments in its Action Plan (promulgated by the Government Resolution No 1080 of 2013) to improve the publicity of fiscal data and the searchability of public procurement data, and to introduce an integrity management system in the public administration. The Action Plan is available on the OGP’s website at http://www.opengovpartnership.org/country/hungary.
Regarding the indices, Hungary scored a 54 on the 0-100 scale on the Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index in 2013, which ranks Hungary as the 53th out of 177 countries. On the World Bank Institute’s Control of Corruption Indicator Hungary achieved 66.5 points. According to the EU’s Eurobarometer Survey on corruption in 2013, 84% of respondents agreed that corruption is a widespread in Hungary and 13% said that they were asked to pay a bribe at least once in the last 12 months. The personal experience with bribery, however, mostly concentrated on the health sector.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Additional sources: Enforcement of Anti-Corruption Laws: Hungary, UNCAC Civil Society Review 2013, http://www.uncaccoalition.org/images/PDF/UNCAC-CSO-Report-Hungary-2013.pdf. Conference of the State Parties to the United Nations Convention against Corruption, 'Document submitted by Transparency International, a non-governmental organization in consultative status with the Economic and Social Council,' Fifth Session, Panama City, 25-29 November 2013, CAC/COSP/2013/NGO/7, https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/COSP/session5/V1387719e.pdf.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is there evidence of regular, active public debate on issues of defence? If yes, does the government participate in this debate?
There are several CSOs and academic institutions that foster public debate through events, summer academies, conferences, workshops and publications. However, the scope of these debates remains very limited and involves a predominantly professional audience.
The Hungarian Institute of International Affairs (HIIA) as a semi-independent academic research institute has been disbanded and merged into a fully government-subordinated new research centre, the Institute of Foreign Affairs and Trade (IFAT) in the end of July 2014. The website of the new institute runs on the central government server. (http://kki.gov.hu/index)
Complex debate on national security, defence and foreign policy issues is lacking in the mainstream media. The majority of the Hungarian public tends to engage primarily in response to a major international event. According to Interviewee 1, &quoute;public debate surrounding the army and defence issues is largely controlled by the PR-department of the MoD.&quoute; There is no evidence of the government actively participating in or organising debates.
RESPONSE TO REVIEWERS: Comments incorporated.
Hungarian Association of Military Science, Events, accessed 5 April 2014, http://mhtt.eu/index.php?page=rendezvenyek
Euroatlantic Summer University, Szolnok, 'Régiónk helyzete stabil és biztonságos, de a kihívások köre bővül -
Euroatlanti Nyári Egyetemnek adott otthont Szolnok (The situation of our region is stable and secure, however, there are more challenges)', http://www.biztonsagpolitika.hu/?id=16&aid=1338&title=R%C3%A9gi%C3%B3nk_helyzete_stabil_%C3%A9s_biztons%C3%A1gos,_de_a_kih%C3%ADv%C3%A1sok_k%C3%B6re_b%C5%91v%C3%BCl_-_Euroatlanti_Ny%C3%A1ri_Egyetemnek_adott_otthont_Szolnok
Faculty of Military Sciences and Officer Training, http://en.uni-nke.hu/.
Hungarian Atlantic Council, http://www.mat.hu/eng/. Summer University in Light of NATO Accession, 28 July -1 August 2014, http://en.uni-nke.hu/no-menu/hirek/2014/08/05/summer-university-in-light-of-nato-accession.
Center for Security and defence Studies Foundation, http://bhkka.hu/index.php?lang=eng.
Biztonsagpolitika.hu, http://www.biztonsagpolitika.hu/index.php?id=1049 - A professional website focusing on national security issues published by the Association of National Security College
Europa Varietas Institute, http://www.europavarietas.org/
Facebook, Andrássy Gyula Foreign Policy Salon, https://www.facebook.com/andrassy.szalon
Hungarian Institute of International Affairs, http://www.kulugyiintezet.hu/
t
Institute of International Studies at the National University of Public Service, http://en.uni-nke.hu/nups/institutes/institute-of-international-studies
Interview with Interviewee 1: Retired Lieutenant-Colonel, Budapest, April 24, 2014.
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: The Hungarian Institute of International Affairs (HIIA) as a semi-independent academic research institute has been disbanded and merged into a fully government-subordinated new research centre, the Institute of Foreign Affairs and Trade (IFAT) in the end of July 2014. The website of the new institute runs on the central government server: http://kki.gov.hu/index. By disbanding the HIIA considerable expertise was lost on matters of foreign and security policy.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Additional sources: Faculty of Military Sciences and Officer Training, http://en.uni-nke.hu/. Hungarian Atlantic Council, http://www.mat.hu/eng/. Summer University in Light of NATO Accession, 28 July -1 August 2014, http://en.uni-nke.hu/no-menu/hirek/2014/08/05/summer-university-in-light-of-nato-accession. Center for Security and defence Studies Foundation,http://bhkka.hu/index.php?lang=eng.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Does the country have an openly stated and actively implemented anti-corruption policy for the defence sector?
High-profile corruption cases associated with previous governments (2002 and 2010, prior to the election of the current government) have been investigated by the Ministry of Defence, which has compiled a White Book outlining the most significant cases of that period. However, no evidence is available to suggest that the same persistence has been applied to investigating possible corruption cases under the new government since 2010. The government launched an extensive corruption prevention program in 2013, which it claims is “the most intensive such program” since 1990. The Ministry of Defence is involved in the program and it has developed a Code of Ethics, an anti-corruption strategy, an action plan for implementation, and a directive on implementation relating to specific rules on whistleblower protection and integrity advisors. However, Transparency International Hungary remarked that the program did not involve considerable changes and could not prevent the institutionalised corruption from becoming systemic. TI-Hungary also criticized the legislation that was introduced in January 2014 to provide legal protection to whistleblowers as insufficient for a real breakthrough in the fight against corruption.
Therefore while it is true that there is a government-wide anti-corruption program that covers the Ministry of Defence as well, and has lead to certain initiatives, there is no specific anti-corruption policy for the defence sector. The State Audit Office in its 2013 report on the defence and law enforcement sector noted that only 39% of defence and law enforcement institutions have some form of public strategy for integrity, and in only approximately one-third of these institutions can one find thematic references to building integrity and preventing corruption. Generally in the defence sector, there has been some integrity management training as part of the government-wide anti-corruption program, and there was also a conference on the role of integrity within the defence sector. These initiatives, however, do not rise to the level of an actual policy.
RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: Comments added. Score maintained, however, as little evidence of implementation could be located and the defence sector has not been specifically isolated in the policy.
Ministry of Defence, 'White Book - Corruption, audit and penal consequences,' 2011, http://www.kormany.hu/download/3/52/40000/Honv%20Min%20-%20Feh%C3%A9r%20k%C3%B6nyv.pdf
Government Decree on Governmental Measures against Corruption and on Adoption of Corruption Prevention Programme of the Public Administration. 1104/2012. (IV. 6.), accessed 5 April 2014
http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=147403.215553
The directive of the Ministry of Defence concerning the government’s corruption prevention program 73/2013. (XI. 29.), accessed 4 April 2014, http://www.opten.hu/73-2013-xi-29-hm-utasitas-j241012.html
The directive of the Ministry of Defence on the publication of the Military Code of Conduct, the establishment and tasks of the Military Ethics Council, accessed 4 April 2014,
https://www.google.hu/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CCwQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.kormany.hu%2Fdownload%2F0%2Fa1%2F00000%2FKatonai%2520Etikai%2520K%25C3%25B3dex.doc&ei=Qug-U62eMciNtAbdrIDICQ&usg=AFQjCNH3xGipVW68MdPVZXIUxWjb9W0gkw&sig2=HS9yjxXOHXph5PEmG9lTfw&bvm=bv.64125504,d.Yms
The modified directive of the Ministry of Defence on the publication of the Military Code of Conduct, the establishment and tasks of the Military Ethics Council, accessed 4 April 2014,
http://www.kozlonyok.hu/kozlonyok/Kozlonyok/13/PDF/2010/8.pdf
Act XCV of 2001 on the legal status of professional and contracted soldiers Hungarian Defence Forces, http://jogszabalykereso.mhk.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=56445.620460
Hungarian Government website, 'Korrupció-megelőzési projektet és honlapot indított a KIM és az NKE (Ministry of Justice and Public Administration together with the National University of Public Administration launches corruption prevention website and project)', 1 March 2013, http://www.kormany.hu/hu/kozigazgatasi-es-igazsagugyi-miniszterium/kozigazgatasi-allamtitkarsag/hirek/korrupcio-megelozesi-projektet-es-honlapot-inditott-a-kim-es-az-nke
Transparency International Hungary, 'Az intézményrendszer és a költségvetés átláthatósága Magyarországon (Transparency of State Institutions and State Budget in Hungary)', 31 January 2014,
http://www.transparency.hu/uploads/docs/tanulmany_osszefoglalo.pdf
Interview with Interviewee 1: Retired Lieutenant-Colonel, Budapest, April 24, 2014.
Honvédelem.hu, Honvédelem es Integritás, http://www.honvedelem.hu/cikk/44567.
Az integritás szerepe a honvédelem területén, 5 June 2014, Budapest, http://hhk.uni-nke.hu/uploads/media_items/_az-integritas-szerepe-a-honvedelem-teruleten_-konferencia-program-es-meghivo.original.pdf. Honvedelem.hu, 23 March 2011,
Interview with Dr. Csaba Hende, Minister of Defence, http://www.honvedelem.hu/cikk/24978.
State Audit Office report on the integrity of the defence and law enforcement sector, 2013, accessed 26 April 2014, http://integritas.asz.hu/uploads/files/rendv%C3%A9delem_elemz%C3%A9s.pdf'
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: The Government adopted the Government Resolution No 1104 of 2012 on Governmental Actions against Corruption and the Adoption of the Corruption Prevention Program of the Public Administration. The Corruption Prevention Programme focuses on prevention by strengthening personal and institutional integrity and resistance to corruption. The project constitutes a milestone in the Hungarian anti-corruption policy by recognizing prevention as of equal importance to criminalization. The Act on Whistleblower Protection and the Act on the System of Integrity Management has been developed, adopted and implemented as part of the Corruption Prevention Program. Hungary’s accession to the Open Government Partnership and the adoption of the OGP Action Plan has also been part of the Project.
Suggested score: 3
Government Update April 2015:
The Government of Hungary is fully committed to counter corruption; furthermore the new National Counter Corruption Program and also an Action Plan for the years 2015 and 2016 has been developed. Those are now under parliamentary discussion and will also be adopted in the coming weeks.
Governmental Resolution Nr. 1104 of 2012 on the Anti-Corruption Program of the Public Administration for the years 2012-2014 that was published during the previous governmental period had the aim of reducing corruption within the Public Administration.
The newest National Counter Corruption Program exceeds this mission, it practices the specific orientation of other non-governmental actors. The strategic document handles the questions of the financing of political parties, transparency of state-owned companies and the regulation of businesses promoting clarity.
The Program lays down the main principles of counter corruption governmental activity, the principles and methodical basis for the definition of main actions, sets the general goals and missions and deals with the questions of inter-connectivity and impoundment.
In the frame of the situation analysis it summarizes the development of counter corruption activity in Hungary, the governmental actions taken to prevent corruption and strengthen integrity. It also presents results of corruption surveys and indexes, deals with the statements of international organizations, reviews the main international anti-corruption and integrity trends.
The general aim of the Program is to strengthen the culture of integrity, to make the use of public money more transparent, to develop magisterial procedures, to develop the regulation of business promoting clarity, to optimize the procedure of whistleblowing and the protection of whistleblowers, widen the range of specific education and training, shaping approach, to create the personal and material system of requirements needed for the effective counter corruption activity. The Program aims for those actions to support the mid-term increase of organizational and individual level ability to engage in counter-corruption . In the interest of the realization of the aims of the Program two year action plans will be developed.
MoD Hungary applies the publicly available regulations of the Defence Ministerial Order Nr. 73 of 2013 about the implementation of defence specific missions and tasks related to the governmental anti-corruption program. This regulation was developed and published considering the Law Nr. 165 of 2013 about complaints and whistle blowing.
According to the Governmental Order Nr. 50 of 2013 about Guidance of Integrity and System of Reception of Lobbyists, the Administrative State Secretary of MoD has appointed an Integrity Adviser whose mission is the support of management of corruption risks and the reception and investigation of whistle blowing.
The above order states that BI is a part of the system of inner control. The control and supervision of the function of this system is the mission of auditors; still, they are not responsible for the development of the system itself, as this would create a conflict of interest. Therefore is the Integrity Advisor (representing the leading authority of the official organization) responsible for the supervision of the function of the BI system based on governmental standards
.
The above mentioned Defence Ministerial Order Nr. 73 of 2013 regulates the system of reception of whistle blowing signals, their pre-evaluation, the collection of necessary information to their investigation, the audition of involved persons, measures to be taken, protection of whistle blowers and the feed-back about the result of investigation.
Suggested score: 4
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: While it is true that there is a government-wide anti-corruption program that covers the Ministry of Defence as well, and has lead to certain initiatives, there is no specific anti-corruption policy for the defence sector. The State Audit Office in its 2013 report on the defence and law enforcement sector noted that only 39% of defence and law enforcement institutions have some form of public strategy for integrity, and in only approximately one-third of these institutions can one find thematic references to building integrity and preventing corruption. Generally in the defence sector, there has been some integrity management training as part of the government-wide anti-corruption program, and there was also a conference on the role of integrity within the defence sector. These initiatives, however, do not rise to the level of an actual policy.
Additional sources: Honvédelem.hu, Honvédelem es Integritás, http://www.honvedelem.hu/cikk/44567. Az integritás szerepe a honvédelem területén, 5 June 2014, Budapest, http://hhk.uni-nke.hu/uploads/media_items/_az-integritas-szerepe-a-honvedelem-teruleten_-konferencia-program-es-meghivo.original.pdf. Honvedelem.hu, 23 March 2011, Interview with Dr. Csaba Hende, Minister of Defence, http://www.honvedelem.hu/cikk/24978.State Audit Office report on the integrity of the defence and law enforcement sector, 2013, accessed 26 April 2014, http://integritas.asz.hu/uploads/files/rendv%C3%A9delem_elemz%C3%A9s.pdf
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are there independent, well-resourced, and effective institutions within defence and security tasked with building integrity and countering corruption?
There are identifiable institutions tasked with building integrity and countering corruption.
MoD Hungary applies the regulations of the Defence Ministerial Order Nr. 73 of 2013 about the implementation of defence specific missions and tasks related to the governmental anti-corruption program. This regulation was developed and published further to the Law Nr. 165 of 2013 about complaints and whistleblowing, and regulates whistleblowing issues. In accordance with the Governmental Order No. 50 of 2013 about Guidance of Integrity and System of Reception of Lobbyists, the Administrative State Secretary of the MoD has appointed an Integrity Adviser whose mission is the support of management of corruption risks and the reception and investigation of whistle blowing. Transparency International, however, criticized the system of integrity advisors although remarked that &quoute;the idea is good&quoute;: the advisor charged with investigation of corruption cases would not be independent from the administration, and the same person would be charged with different other tasks as well including data protection cases, equal treatment affairs or disciplinary cases.
The government's anti-corruption efforts have been assigned to a specific organisational unit within the Ministry of Interior since September 2014: as a part of the National Protective Service, a new Counter Corruption Department deals with these issues on the public administrational level. According to the publicly available Organizational and Functional Regulation of MoD Hungary, the Department for Human Resources Policy deals with counter-corruption strategy and its tasks within the institution and Hungarian Defence Forces; it is under the supervision of the State Secretary for Public Administration.
However, the 2011 National Integrity Report by Transparency International Hungary remarked that, “even though the regulations generally provide sufficient grounds for independence, the independence of control institutions is questionable in practice. (...) Top officials of the State Audit Office, the Prosecution (...) have an explicit political background.” The report also states that “due to the weakening of checks and balances and the inability of the control institutions to limit the power of the government, private interests prevail over public interests”.
The State Audit Office is charged with measuring the defence and law enforcement branch's integrity. While the State Audit Office's mission is not specifically to build integrity, it does have a role to &quoute;contribute to the establishment of a well-managed state, to good governance.&quoute; The report on the integrity of the defence and law enforcement sectors from 2013 highlights the risks inherent in the complexity of the external rule-making, including the often-changing regulatory landscape, and the influence of the political context. The report also noted that only about a third of defence and law enforcement institutions reference integrity building and the prevention of corruption, and less than 40% of the defence and security branch institutes have a public strategy for integrity. In 2012, Transparency International noted that the independence of some of the traditionally most important pillars of anti-corruption efforts, such as the prosecutorial branch or the State Audit Office, has been considerably weakened.
RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: Comments have been incorporated. Score 2 has been maintained, however, as the effectiveness and independence of existing institutions is unclear.
Transparency International Hungary, 'Corruption Risks in Hungary 2011, National Integrity Study',
http://www.transparency.hu/uploads/docs/Corruption_Risks_in_Hungary_NIS_2011.pdf
State Audit Office report on the integrity of the defence and law enforcement sector, 2013, accessed 26 April 2014, http://integritas.asz.hu/uploads/files/rendv%C3%A9delem_elemz%C3%A9s.pdf
Government Directive 50 of 2013. (II. 25.) on the integrity system of the state administration institutions, effective from 2 January 2014, http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=159079.238433
Act CLXV 2013 on complaints and whistleblowing http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=164339.250742 accessed August 25 2015
MoD decree 73/2013. (XI. 29.) http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=165221.252890 accessed August 25 2015
Transparency International Hungary blog, 'The new directive of the government - self-justification instead of the fight agains corruption (Korrupció elleni harc helyett inkább önigazolás a kormány új rendelete)', March 8, 2013, http://korrupcio.blog.hu/2013/03/08/a_korrupcio_elleni_harc_helyett_inkabb_onigazolas_a_kormany_uj_rendelete
Honvédelem.hu, Honvédelem es Integritás, http://www.honvedelem.hu/cikk/44567.
State Audit Office, Methodology, The Safeguards for Independence of the State Audit Office, http://www.asz.hu/modszertan/az-allami-szamvoszek-fuggetlenseget-biztosito-garancialis-elemei/fuggetlenseg-garancialis-elemei-12-15.pdf. Mandiner, Aggódik a Transparency International' NO SCORE CHALLENGE
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: MoD Hungary applies the regulations of the Defence Ministerial Order Nr. 73 of 2013 about the implementation of defence specific missions and tasks related to the governmental anti-corruption program. This regulation was developed and published considering the Law Nr. 165 of 2013 about complaints and whistle blowing.
According to the Governmental Order Nr. 50 of 2013 about Guidance of Integrity and System of Reception of Lobbyists, the Administrative State Secretary of MoD has appointed an Integrity Adviser whose mission is the support of management of corruption risks and the reception and investigation of whistle blowing.
The above order states that BI is a part of the system of inner control. The control and supervision of the function of this system is the mission of auditors; still, they are not responsible for the development of the system itself, as this would create a conflict of interest. Therefore is the Integrity Advisor (representing the leading authority of the official organization) responsible for the supervision of the function of the BI system based on governmental standards.
The above mentioned Defence Ministerial Order Nr. 73 of 2013 regulates the system of reception of whistle blowing, their pre-evaluation, the collection of necessary information to their investigation, the audition of involved persons, measures to be taken, protection of whistle blowers and the feed-back about the result of investigation.
Government Update April 2015:
BI and anti-corruption has since September 2014 its own organizational element within the Ministry of Interior, as a part of the National Protective Service a new Counter Corruption Department is dealing with these issues on the public administrational level. According to the publicly available Organizational and Functional Regulation of MoD Hungary the Department for Human Resources Policy is dealing with BI and counter corruption strategy and its tasks within the institution and Hungarian Defence Forces under the supervision of the State Secretary for Public Administration.
Suggested score: 4
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: The State Audit Office is charged with measuring the defence and law enforcement branch's integrity. While the State Audit Office's mission is not specifically to build integrity, it does have a role to &quoute;contribute to the establishment of a well-managed state, to good governance.&quoute; The report on the integrity of the defence and law enforcement sectors from 2013 highlights the risks inherent in the complexity of the external rule-making, including the often-changing regulatory landscape, and the influence of the political context. The report also noted that only about a third of defence and law enforcement institutions reference integrity building and the prevention of corruption, and less than 40% of the defence and security branch institutes have a public strategy for integrity. In 2012, Transparency International noted that the independence of some of the traditionally most important pillars of anti-corruption efforts, such as the prosecutorial branch or the State Audit Office, as been considerably weakened.
Honvédelem.hu, Honvédelem es Integritás, http://www.honvedelem.hu/cikk/44567. State Audit Office, Methodology, The Safeguards for Independence of the State Audit Office, http://www.asz.hu/modszertan/az-allami-szamvoszek-fuggetlenseget-biztosito-garancialis-elemei/fuggetlenseg-garancialis-elemei-12-15.pdf. Mandiner, Aggódik a Transparency International
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Does the public trust the institutions of defence and security to tackle the issue of bribery and corruption in their establishments?
Transparency International’s Global Corruption Barometer 2013 showed that there is a general mistrust in Hungarian society towards any state institution whose mission is to tackle corruption. Although no specific study or poll has been conducted about the trust in defence institutions, the general opinion climate is negative. According to the majority of Hungarians (61%), corruption is perceived to have increased in the past two years and governmental corruption is a serious issue. According to 82% of respondents, the actions of the state and government are “somewhat or heavily” influenced by a few groups of firms. 48% believe that the government’s fight against corruption is completely ineffective and 7 out of 10 Hungarians would not report a case of corruption, which is the worst ratio in Europe. The survey also showed that the majority of those who would restrain from whistle-blowing (58%) would decide so because they don’t expect any follow-up to their report. The Barometer indicates, however, that the military was perceived to be the second least corrupt institution (17% saw it as corrupt or extremely corrupt), right after religious institutions. This shows that while generally Hungarians' trust towards state institutions is low in terms of integrity, they are less distrustful of the military in this respect than of other branches.
According to Transparency International’s National Integrity Study 2011, Hungarians consider the military as the fourth least corrupt sector of eleven surveyed, with 9.5% of respondents perceiving it to be highly corrupt.
A 2009 study by a respected research institution TARKI (see sources) also confirms that the level of trust towards state institutions is low in terms of tackling corruption issues, mainly because the institutions are perceived to be corrupt: on a scale of 1-5 both the police/prosecution and the courts scored above 3 in terms of corruption perception, the political parties, the Parliament and the media are considered highly corrupt with scores well nearing 4.
RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER AND GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: Score of 3 was selected on the basis of only 9.5% of respondents perceiving the military to be highly corrupt.
Transparency International, 'Global Corruption Barometer 2013, http://www.transparency.hu/uploads/docs/GCB2013_Report_Embargo.265.pdf
Transparency International Hungary, 'Hungarians say our country is corrupt, and the situation is getting worse', 8 July 2013, http://www.transparency.hu/Hungary_is_corrupt__and_the_situation_is_only_getting_worse?bind_info=page&bind_id=323
Transparency International Hungary, 'Corruption Risks in Hungary 2011 National Integrity Study',
http://www.transparency.hu/uploads/docs/Corruption_Risks_in_Hungary_NIS_2011.pdf
Lack of trust, norm problems, sense of injustice and paternalism in the value structure of the Hungarian society (Bizalomhiány, normazavarok,
igazságtalanságérzet és paternalizmus a magyar társadalom értékszerkezetében ), TARKI, 2009 accessed May 21, 2014.
http://www.tarki.hu/hu/research/gazdkult/gazdkult_elemzeszaro_toth.pdf
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: Government Update April 2015:
'N/A' chosen as no public survey focused directly on defence sector was done. However the newly published annual survey of the Civilian College Fund shows data of public trust. The survey contains data in regard of the police, but not for the armed forces of Hungary. http://www.civilkollegium.hu/2015/03/10/arh-2014-orszagos-kozbizalom-felmeres-eredmenyek/
Suggested score: N/A
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: The 2013 Global Corruption Barometer (2013) indicates that the military was perceived to be the second least corrupt institution, right after religious institutions. This indicates that while generally Hungarians' trust towards state institutions is low in terms of integrity, they are less distrustful of the military in this respect than of other branches. This of course does not speak directly to the perceived ability of the military to tackle corruption issues.
Suggested score: 2
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: EU COM's 2013 special Eurobarometer to survey perceptions of corruption in MS also indicate, in line with what Transparency International's Global Corruption Barometer concluded, that mistrust in countries in the Central & Eastern Europe region was high, and this serves as ground for more corruption risks.
Suggested score:
Are there regular assessments by the defence ministry or another government agency of the areas of greatest corruption risk for ministry and armed forces personnel, and do they put in place measures for mitigating such risks?
There are no publicly known regular assessments by the defence ministry or other government agency of the areas of greatest corruption risk for ministry and armed forces personnel. In an interview, the Head of the Military National Security Service (KNBSZ) talked about the organisation’s activities concerning investigations of corruption-related cases and corruption prevention. He alluded to the fact that his organisation may be instrumental in such assessments. However, the mission statement of the KNBSZ does not list corruption prevention among its major tasks and only refers to risks concerning organised crime.
Based on Act CXXV on the National Security Services, the Military National Security Service is entitled to carry out crime prevention and investigation tasks in terms of economic crime, including corruption within the Ministry of Defence and the Hungarian Defence Forces. However, despite its legislative powers, there is no publicly available evidence of the Military National Security Office’s regular assessment and involvement.
The State Audit Office (SAO) has a multi-annual, nationwide integrity project, &quoute;Mapping Corruption Risks - Strengthening Integrity Based Administration&quoute;, in which it surveys thousands of public bodies. The Ministry of Defence has participated in this project, and the integrity report for 2013 has been published. This report states that the institutions measured &quoute;will be able to successfully use and implement the results to strengthen their risk-assessment, integrity control and create an integrity-focused organization culture&quoute;.
According to the government's information, the risks of corruption in MoD Hungary were also assessed in 2014. As a result of the assessment the BI and Anti-corruption Action Plan of MoD Hungary for 2015 was published as part of the Institutional Work Plan of the Ministry.
Since 2011, the MoD has taken part in a yearly Integrity Self-assesment Project run by the State Audit Office. This procedure measures the whole spectrum of public administration and examines fields on integrity and corruption risks. The results of the assesment are publicly available.
RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: Comments added. Amending the score to 3 or 4 would mean to accept that the measures sufficiently address the risks identified or all risks are covered, which is clearly not the case - effectiveness remains difficult to show. It has also not been possible to verify how regular the risk assessments are. The score should be between 2 and 3. However, 2 has been selected to highlight the importance of addressing risks identified and public verification of regular risk assessments.
Military National Security Service website, 'Main Missions', http://www.kfh.hu/en/mission.html
Act CXXV of 1995 on the the National Security Services, accessed 5 April 2014, http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=24361.261528
State Audit Office, 'Report on the integrity of the defence and law enforcement sector, 2013', accessed 26 April 26 2014, http://integritas.asz.hu/uploads/files/rendv%C3%A9delem_elemz%C3%A9s.pdf
State Audit Office Integrity Project on International Levele, Nemzetközi szinten az ÁSZ Integritás-projektje, 2015 March 31. http://www.penzugyiszemle.hu/tanulmanyok-eloadasok/nemzetkozi-szinten-az-asz-integritas-projektje'
t t t
MOD Hungary, mno.hu, 'A főigazgató nem végez műveleti munkát (The chief director does not have operational duties)', 24 February 2013, http://mno.hu/belfold/a-foigazgato-nem-vegez-muveleti-munkat-a-teljes-exkluziv-interju-1140896
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: The selection of areas at risk within the defence sector is based on the continuously developed risk analysis and practical experience. In the latter case, the material damage that occurred and the consequences which negatively influence the lawful operationS of the army will determine the risky area.
The reduction of the corruption risk is possible by increasing the frequency and efficiency of controlling. As a result of this – beyond the cases discovered during the controlling –potential further offenders will also become aware of the discovery of the crime and so – for fear of getting caught – will not commit crimes, which means that the control also has a preventive function.
According to governmental directives, the risks of corruption in MoD Hungary were assessed. As a result of the assessment the BI and Anti-corruption Action Plan of MoD Hungary for 2014 was published as part of the Institutional Work Plan of the Ministry.
Original suggested score: 3
Government Update April 2015:
According to governmental directives, the risks of corruption in MoD Hungary were also assessed last year. As a result of the assessment the BI and Anti-corruption Action Plan of MoD Hungary for 2015 was published as part of the Institutional Work Plan of the Ministry.
Since 2011, the MoD has taken part in a yearly Integrity Self-assesment Project run by the State Audit Office. This procedure measures the whole spectrum of public administration and examines fields on integrity and corruption risks. The results of the assesment are publicly available at the sites below. http://integritas.asz.hu/arop_1_2_4 http://www.penzugyiszemle.hu/tanulmanyok-eloadasok/nemzetkozi-szinten-az-asz-integritas-projektje
Suggested score: 4
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: KNBSZ, just as any other branch of the intelligence or security community, is not authorised to investigate criminal activities or criminal behaviours or conduct. It appears that the Hungarian legislation with regard to functions of secret services gives none of these services the power to investigate, their only task is to carry out certain pre-investigative measures.
Suggested score:
Does the country have a process for acquisition planning that involves clear oversight, and is it publicly available?
The annual public procurement plan of the MoD (along with the main figures of defence spending contained within the Act on the Central Budget) is publicly available but the legislation on public procurement does not require the publication of longer-term planning. MoD Directive No. 18 (Article 26), however, provides a possibility to create longer term frameworks for military procurement that go over one year. When planning these long-term frameworks, all procurement needs must be represented, for up to four years. The annual procurement plans for the Ministry of Defence are itemized and are all accessible to the public on the Ministry's website. However, a 2013 report of the Transparency International Hungary criticised the amount of publicly available information concerning the public procurement process.
The MoD Defence Economic Bureau and the Department for Economic Planning and Regulation are responsible for preparing and finalising the Annual Procurement Plan. The requirements are provided by armed forces commands. Other aspects of the acquisition planning cycle, such as asset disposal, appear to be regulated separately with the Office for Defence Management carrying out asset disposal and use of proceeds regulated by the annual budget acts.
The National Military Strategy also closely ties Hungary's defence planning cycle to the NATO processes of identifying and addressing capability gaps.
While the State Audit Office scrutinises the MOD's implementation of the budget, it is unclear whether it performs oversight over the acquisition process and planning. No evidence of independent oversight has been found.
RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: It is not clear whether a full acquisition planning process incorporating the entire life-cycle of equipment is in place and there is no evidence of independent oversight. The latest audit of the MOD by the SAO, which could have provided some oversight, occurrend in 2012 and since them no relevant information has been available on the website of the State Audit Office. Score 2 maintained.
Act CCXXX of 2013, Central Budget of Hungary of 2013, Chapter XIII. Budget of the Ministry of Defence, Annex 1, http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=165756.254377
Document by the Minister of Defence on the liquidation of Hungary's Armament and Quartermaster Office, 4 June 2013, http://www.kormany.hu/download/c/c0/f0000/HM%20FHH%20megsz%C3%BCnt_154_11_.pdf
Ministry of Defence, Office for Defence Management, http://honvedelmibeszerzes.kormany.hu/
MoD Directive No. 18 of 2014 (III.07) on the procedures of acquisitions of defence organizations, accessed 1 May 2014, http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=167956.260638
Annual Public Procurement Plan 2014 of the MoD’s Office for Defence Management, accessed 15
April 2014, http://honvedelmibeszerzes.kormany.hu/download/2/2b/00000/HM%20VGH%20%28K%C3%B6z%29beszerz%C3%A9si%20terv_2014.pdf
Annual Public Procurement Plan 2013 of the MoD’s Armament and Quartermaster Office, accessed 15
April 2014, http://honvedelmibeszerzes.kormany.hu/download/7/2a/00000/HM%20FHH%202013%20%C3%A9vi%20k%C3%B6zbeszerz%C3%A9si%20terv.pdf
Annual Public Procurement Plan 2012 of the MoD’s Armament and Quartermaster Office (accessed on
April 15, 2014)
http://honvedelmibeszerzes.kormany.hu/download/5/d8/00000/kozbeszerzesi_terv_2012.PDF
The Annual Public Procurement of the MoD, April 2010, website of the Government of Hungary, accessed 15 April 2014, http://www.kormany.hu/download/d/b9/00000/K%C3%B6zbeszerz%C3%A9si%20Terv%202010.pdf
Transparency International, 'Report on the Transparency of the Public Procurement Process, 2013',
http://www.transparency.hu/uploads/docs/Kozbeszerzesi_nyilvanossag_2013_.pdf
Government Decree No. 109 of 2012 on the procedures for acquisition under NATO Security Investment Procurement, accessed 27 September 2014, http://honvedelmibeszerzes.kormany.hu/download/1/6a/00000/109-2012_(VI_1)_Korm_rendelet.pdf.
State Audit Office, 'Állami Számvevőszék, Jelentés a Honvédelmi Minisztérium fejezet működésének ellenőrzéséről, 2009, (State Audit Office report on the control of the budget chapter of the MoD, 2009)''
The Central Budget of Hungary 2013, Act CCXXX, Art. 6 § (8)-(9), accessed 5 April 2014, http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=165756.254377#foot1
The Central Budget of Hungary 2011, Act CXXXIII on the Execution of the Central Budget, accessed 5 April 2014, http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=139456.202569
Hungarian Government, Document by the Minister of Defence on the liquidation of Hungary's Armament and Quartermaster Office, 4 June 2013, http://www.kormany.hu/download/c/c0/f0000/HM%20FHH%20megsz%C3%BCnt_154_11_.pdf
Ministry of Defence, Office for Defence Management, http://honvedelmibeszerzes.kormany.hu/
State Audit Office, 'Jelentés Magyarország 2012. évi központi költségvetése végrehajtásának ellenőrzéséről (Annual report by the State Audit Office on the execution of the central budget, 2012)', August 2013,
http://www.asz.hu/jelentes/13080/jelentes-magyarorszag-2012-evi-kozponti-koltsegvetese-vegrehajtasanak-ellenorzeserol/13080j000.pdf
Hungary’s National Military Strategy of 2012, adopted as a government resolution 1656/2012. (XII.20), http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=157721.234310 (accessed 30 August 2015)
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: The general lack of a meaningful public debate about matters of defence described in the response to Q3 contributes to the lack of publicity in acquisition issues.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: Defence organizations entitled to act as contracting authorities work out their 'Organizational Annual Procurement Plan” (OAPP) in parallel with their elementary budget planning process. Relevant chapters of the OAPP are endorsed by the Joint Forces Command (JFC), the HDF Logistic Centre and General Staff subordinated organisations respectively, and then forwarded to MoD Defence Economic Bureau (MoD DEB) which is responsible for the compilation of the comprehensive Annual Procurement Plan. The plan is then finalised by the MoD Department for Economic Planning and Regulation (MoD DEPR), sent to the MoD Deputy State Secretary for Defence Economy, the Chief of Defence Staff, the Administrative State Secretary, and finally approved by the Minister.
MoD Deputy State Secretary for Defence Economy issues the detailed planning instructions for the preparation of the Annual Procurement Plan with deadlines. With respect to the time of the yearly budget approval – regulated by the Act CXCV of 2011 on Public Finances – the planning procedure takes place between November and March (of the fiscal year). A fundamental deadline is March 31 of the fiscal year: the Ministry is supposed to have an approved Annual Procurement Plan by then, in accordance with Act CVIII of 2011 on Public Procurement.
Defence Organizations have to separate in their APP the procurements they plan to implement from the current Fiscal Year Budget, and the ones they plan to start in the current Fiscal Year but which will be funded from the subsequent Fiscal Year Budget. The latter should not exceed 50 per cent of the budget appropriations approved for the current FY APP in respect of every planning level. Defence Organizations must include in their APPs all their procurement needs required for their operation for the period until the end of March of the following Fiscal Year.
Suggested score: 3
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: MoD Directive No. 18, under Article 26, provides a possibility to create longer term frameworks for military procurement that go over one year. When planning these long-term frameworks, all procurement needs must be represented, for up to four years. The annual procurement plans for the Ministry of Defence are itemized and are all accessible to the public on the Ministry's website.
Additional sources: Government Decree No. 109 of 2012 on the procedures for acquisition under NATO Security Investment Procurement, accessed 27 September 2014, http://honvedelmibeszerzes.kormany.hu/download/1/6a/00000/109-2012_(VI_1)_Korm_rendelet.pdf.State Audit Office, 'Állami Számvevőszék, Jelentés a Honvédelmi Minisztérium fejezet működésének ellenőrzéséről, 2009, (State Audit Office report on the control of the budget chapter of the MoD, 2009)'
Suggested score: 3
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is the defence budget transparent, showing key items of expenditure? This would include comprehensive information on military R&D, training, construction, personnel expenditures, acquisitions, disposal of assets, and maintenance.
The Act on the Central Budget contains the main figures of defence spending, as can be seen for example in the budget for the year 2014. The Annual Central Budget for Hungary does not show comprehensive information on military R&D, training, construction, personnel expenditures, acquisitions, disposal of assets, and maintenance. There are some broad categories, but far from a comprehensive level of detail. Detailed budget information should be disclosed by the Ministry of Defence on its website; however, the latest available data relates to the 2012 budget.
An independent Hungarian research institute KFIB - Fiscal Responsibility Institute Budapest - measured budget transparency using the methodology of the Open Budget Index and concluded that general budget transparency is poor. The country scored 40 which is at the lower end of the category &quoute;moderately transparent&quoute;. This score is worse than all the similar new member countries of the EU.
RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: The comments provided do not address the main issue of the question: systemic transparency and comprehensive information on defence budget. The press department of the MoD can improve its activities but without providing systemic information, the transparency requirements are not fulfilled. Score maintained.
RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 2: Additional source included.
Act CCXXX of 2013, Central Budget of Hungary of 2013, Chapter XIII. the budget of the Ministry of Defence, Annex 1, http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=165756.254377
Document by the Minister of Defence on the liquidation of the Hungary's Armament and Quartermaster Office, 4 June 2013, http://www.kormany.hu/download/c/c0/f0000/HM%20FHH%20megsz%C3%BCnt_154_11_.pdf
Ministry of Defence, Office for Defence Management, http://honvedelmibeszerzes.kormany.hu/
Fiscal transparency in Hungary measured by the methodology of the Open Budget Index - 2013, accessed May 21, 2014, http://www.kfib.hu/uploads/up_20130314_111107_7468_Fiscal_transparency_in_Hungary_measured_by_the_methodology_of_the_Open_Budget_Index_merged.
Act CCXXX of 2013, Central Budget of Hungary of 2014, Chapter XIII. The budget of the Ministry of defence, Annex 1. http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=165756.254377
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: The proper abbreviation if KFI, not KFIB
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: The defence budget – which is rather low and has continuously been reduced over the last few years – severely constrained the options of communication about the budget of the portfolio. In the last two years, the leadership of the Ministry of Defence has been striving to make the development of the budget more transparent than the earlier practice, from the emergence of the first figures of the budgetary framework in the planning phase to the contingent sequestration cuts during the year. In practice, this meant that each time when the Ministry disclosed information on the development of the budget, we sent it through the appropriate channels of communication (primarily via MTI, the Hungarian News Agency) to the interested public, and the ministry strove to give quick, precise and authentic answers to all related questions from the press as well (and also to the written questions submitted by the Members of Parliament). It is worth noting that over the last two years, the political communication (public affairs) of the ministry has never denied that the defence budget is in a difficult situation, and instead of covering up the problems, the emphasis has shifted to saving money and elucidating the economical solutions.
According to the current legal system in force (Act on Public Finances) all government agencies, including the MoD, are liable to submit their annual reports on budget performance relating to the previous year, keeping the prescribed deadline and requirements regarding the content. Within the framework of the annual reports every military and non-military organization under MoD supervision prepares detailed accounts on the execution of budget appropriations (containing both expenditures and revenues) including the appropriations of the peace time establishment as well, applying the common rules of accountancy. During the compilation process of the act on budget execution, all ministries submit not only the report on the appropriations, but also the detailed, task-related explanation and evaluation of the budget including those tasks which are to be carried out during the following fiscal year. Both the reports on the appropriations and the written explanations (with the exclusion of the Military National Security Service) are completely disclosed and available for the public from the moment they are submitted to the Parliament. The report is available on the homepage of the Parliament.
In accordance with the common budgetary and accounting principles the prerequisite of all budget activities on the ministerial level is the balance of expenditures and revenues all the time during the fiscal year. In other words if there were an overspending above the initially approved budget appropriations, then - with the amendment of the budget (with the increase of revenues) - the budget balance would be insured. The budget act recognises, above the initially approved budget appropriations, the surplus appropriations from appropriations of the previous year (carry forward) not spent but authorized by the government and also other revenues that were not foreseen and thus could not be planned as initial funds. These can total an increase of as much as 10% in expenditure or revenues.
The legal system requires every ministry and government agency to report on the settlement of budgetary expenses through quarterly balance sheets (containing the turnovers and balances all of the relevant accounts) and semi-annual reports on the appropriations (changes and performance). Besides these reports, the MoD is regularly informed by the supervised organizations on their budget activities.
Suggested score: 4
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: The lowering of the score from 2012 is justified, since detailed budget information is not disclosed by the Ministry of Defence on its website for the 2013 budget. The Annual Central Budget for Hungary could be more detailed: it does not show comprehensive information on military R&D, training, construction, personnel expenditures, acquisitions, disposal of assets, and maintenance. There are some broad categories, but far from the level of detail that could be called comprehensive.
Act CCXXX of 2013, Central Budget of Hungary of 2014, Chapter XIII. The budget of the Ministry of defence, Annex 1. http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=165756.254377
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is there a legislative committee (or other appropriate body) responsible for defence budget scrutiny and analysis in an effective way, and is this body provided with detailed, extensive, and timely information on the defence budget?
The Parliamentary Defence and Law Enforcement Committee is authorised to oversee the Act on the Central Budget and holds annual hearings with representatives of the MoD and the State Audit Office. It gives its opinion on the detailed draft budget of the national security services, the items of the budget of other organizations entitled to collect confidential information which are related to this activity, and the detailed draft report on the implementation of the annual Budget Act; during the debate of bills it makes proposals in respect of the adoption of the same. However, due to the large majority of the ruling coalition, the DLEC is hardly able to exercise any meaningful oversight. The powers of the Committee are mostly formal and the ruling coalition’s MPs only exercise superficial oversight. In 2013 (while the ruling party held the constitutional majority of over 2/3 of MPs), the first hearing on the 2014 budget plan lasted 80 minutes and the second hearing lasted 22 minutes.
RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: Score unchanged, the comments did not address the problem of only formal oversight. It is also unclear how detailed the information that the Committee received is.
RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 2: Comments incorporated.
Act CCXXX of 2013, Central Budget of Hungary of 2013, Chapter XIII. Budget of the Ministry of Defence, Annex 1, http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=165756.254377
Minutes of the Parliamentary Defence and Law Enforcement Committee of 5 November 2013, HOB/124-1/2013, http://www.parlament.hu/biz39/bizjkv39/HOB/1311051.pdf
Minutes of the Parliamentary Defence and Law Enforcement Committee of 21 October 2013, HOB/124-1/2013, http://www.parlament.hu/biz39/bizjkv39/HOB/1310211.pdf
Hungary's Fundamental Law http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=140968.248458
All Hungary News, 'Government loses parliamentary supermajority as Fidesz candidate beaten in Veszprém by-election', 22 February 2015. http://www.politics.hu/20150222/government-loses-parliamentary-supermajority-as-fidesz-candidate-beaten-in-veszprem-by-election/, accessed November 2015.
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: First and foremost, due to the supermajority of the ruling coalition, the DLIC is hardly able to exercise any meaningful oversight. Second, another problem is that the political parties (particularly the smaller ones in opposition) are short of real expertise in matters of defence, including defence policies, procurement issues, etc. Hence, even if the DLEC would function properly, its oversight capabilities would probably be weakened by the sheer lack of expertise from the opposition side.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: The Parliamentary Defence and Law Enforcement Committee gives its opinion on the detailed draft budget of the national security services, the items of the budget of other organizations entitled to collect confidential information which are related to this activity, and the detailed draft report on the implementation of the annual Budget Act; during the debate of bills it makes proposals in respect of the adoption of the same.
Suggested score: 3
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: The Parliamentary Defence and Law Enforcement Committee hOLD annual hearings with representatives of the MoD, the State Audit Office, and other government agencies, and these provide an opportunity for members of the Committee to ask questions about the budget in general, and about particular items, directly of the stakeholders. Despite the opportunity to ask questions, which is regularly utilized by members of the Committee, it seems that as a result of the 2/3 majority, the Committee in effect rubber-stamps the government's decisions with respect to the budget.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is the approved defence budget made publicly available? In practice, can citizens, civil society, and the media obtain detailed information on the defence budget?
The Act on the Central Budget discloses the main figures of defence spending. Detailed budget information should be disclosed by the Ministry of Defence on its website; however the latest available data relates to the 2012 budget. Act CXII of 2011 on Informational Self-Determination and Freedom of Information prescribes proactive disclosure of financial information of public bodies. The Act also provides for the right of access to information.
However, the Act has been seriously weakened since 2010. Transparency International Hungary, together with several anti-corruption NGOs, criticised the modified version of the Freedom of Information Act which, in their view, seriously limits the fundamental rights of citizens. The updated legislation makes it difficult for CSOs and private citizens to obtain detailed information about state budget expenditures. The amendment introduces, for example, major limits to citizens’ right to access public information by saying only state bodies may hold enough data to carry out large audits. It also obliges citizens to justify a legitimate interest of requests for information on, for example, court cases, decisions of public bodies, or personal information of public officials which until now was in the public domain. The fact that what constitutes a “large audit” or “legitimate interest” is not defined by the amendment gives leeway to public bodies to reject requests to disclose information as “abusive”.
Another modification was approved in 2015 which further restricts the legislation. The bill allows public bodies to refuse to make certain data public for 10 years if deemed to have been used in decision-making processes, and it also allows government actors to charge fees for fulfilling FOI request. Until now, government actors could ask for the copying expenses of documents. From now on, they can ask the person filing the request to cover the “human labor costs” of the inquiry.
RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: The comments did not address the fundamental issue of the weakening of the FOI legislation. Score maintained.
Act CCXXX of 2013, Central Budget of Hungary of 2013, Chapter XIII. the budget of the Ministry of Defence, Annex 1, http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=165756.254377
Website of the Hungarian National Authority for Data Protection and Freedom of Information, Act CXII of 2011 on the Right of Informational Self-Determination and on Freedom of Information, updated on 11 October 2013, http://www.naih.hu/files/Privacy_Act-CXII-of-2011_EN_201310.pdf
Transparency International Hungary, 'Transparency International turns to higher authorities', 3 July 2013, http://www.transparency.hu/Transparency_International_turns_to_higher_authorities?bind_info=tag&bind_id=38
Transparency International Hungary, Hungary: government closing down freedom of information, 13 May, 2013 https://www.transparency.org/news/pressrelease/20130508_hungary_government_closing_down_freedom_of_information
Index on Censorship, 7 July, 2015 Hungary: Government cracks down on freedom of information, https://www.indexoncensorship.org/2015/07/hungary-government-cracks-down-on-freedom-of-information/
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Rights of the citizens to access information on the defence budget are often limited by referring to national security interests, thus by &quoute;securitising&quoute; the debate and refusing to give proper answers.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: The compilation of the bill on the central budget of Hungary and the presentation of the same to the Parliament are regulated by sections 13, 13/B and 22 of the Act CXCV of 2011 on Public Finances, and section 18/A of the Decree 368 of 2011 on the execution of the Act on Pubic Finances. According to these, the following tasks must be performed while observing the relevant deadlines:
TasktDeadline
the Government prepares at least twice a year a macroeconomic and budgetary forecast for the fiscal year and the forthcoming 3 years: April 30 and October 15
the minister responsible for public finances elaborates the detailed schedule and the requirements of the budget planning:tJune 30
chapters prepare their budget proposals and negotiate them with the minister responsible for public financest
the Government discusses the bill on the central budget with the Budget Councilt
the Government presents the bill on the central budget to the Parliament:tOctober 15
the Parliament decides on the amount of the revenues & expenditures of each chapter of the bill on the central budget as well as on the balance of the central budget in an individual decision during the debate on the bill on the central budget:tNovember 30
ratification of the act on the central budget of Hungary:tDecember 31
The budget proposal is based on the macroeconomic indicators determined by the Ministry of National Economy. Each year, the detailed budget proposal is published as the appendix of the Act on the Central Budget, the explanation of which can be found on the website of the Parliament.
In the last two years, the leadership of the Ministry of Defence has been striving to make the development of the budget more transparent than the earlier practice, from the emergence of the first figures of the budgetary framework in the planning phase to the contingent sequestration cuts during the year. In practice, this meant that each time when the ministry disclosed information on the development of the budget, we sent it through the appropriate channels of communication (primarily via MTI, the Hungarian News Agency) to the interested public, and the ministry strove to give quick, precise and authentic answers to all related questions from the press as well (and also to the written questions submitted by the Members of Parliament). It is worth noting that over the last two years, the political communication (public affairs) of the ministry has never denied that the defence budget is in a difficult situation, and instead of covering up the problems, the emphasis has shifted to saving money and elucidating the economical solutions.
Government Update April 2015: The Ministry of Defence prepares a draft financial plan for each budget year based on MOD requirements, and then engages with the Finance Ministry and subsequently the government. After discussions with the budget council, the government presents the bill to Parliament. Parliament determines the final budgetary amount for each ministry during debates on the central budget in November of each year with final approval normally being given by 31 December. The MOD is required to submit annual reports on budget execution and follow-on tasks for the next fiscal year. The reports which include detailed explanations of budget elements are available to the public once submitted to Parliament and are also available on the Parliament’s website.
Suggested score: 3
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Since 2012, as a result of the amendments to the Freedom of Information Act, civil society and private citizens have limited opportunity to access information about central budget expenditures, which justifies lowering the score from 2012 for this indicator, particularly when taken together with the fact that detailed defence budget information for 2013 is not available on the Ministry of Defence's website.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are sources of defence income other than from central government allocation (from equipment sales or property disposal, for example) published and scrutinised?
Act CCXXX on the Central Budget of Hungary (Art. 6 § (8)-(9)) contains provisions on assets disposals and the sale of real estate. Since the liquidation of Hungary's Armament and Quartermaster Office's, the website of the MoD contains no information on equipment sales. The State Audit Office occasionally audits the MoD, including the Hungarian Defence Forces. The report based on the last audit, published in 2009, covered the period from 2005-2008; it scrutinised income from asset disposals and sales of real estates. Businesses owned by the MoD (including cartography and publishing houses) may also generate profit but no comprehensive report could be found on their activities.
Annual State Audit Office reports and budgetary reports on the implementation of the central budget provide some information on revenues. Details relate to the source of the income and the way the revenue is used. However, the data is of poor quality and availability is not satisfactory - interviewee 2 stated that, &quoute;although the MoD has been more detailed than other ministries, it is extremely difficult to obtain details about the budgetary figures.&quoute;
There are sporadic press reports on different asset sales but there is no systematic or regular disclosure of this information.
RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: Score 3 would necessitate a full publication of all sources of income, the money received and the destination which is clearly not the case. There is only a selective publication of income and information on where the money ends up. The Government Reviewer did not provide additional sources and the publication mentioned is not available online. Score 1 maintained.
Act CCXXX of 2013, Central Budget of Hungary of 2013, Chapter XIII. the budget of the Ministry of Defence,
Annex 1, http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=165756.254377
Act CCXXX of 2013, Central Budget of Hungary of 2013, in Art. 6 § (8)-(9) http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=165756.254377
State Audit Office, 'Állami Számvevőszék, Jelentés a Honvédelmi Minisztérium fejezet működésének ellenőrzéséről, 2009, (State Audit Office report on the control of the budget chapter of the MoD, 2009)',
http://www.asz.hu/jelentes/0905/jelentes-a-honvedelmi-miniszterium-fejezet-mukodesenek-ellenorzeserol/0905j000.pdf
State Audit Office, 'Állami Számvevőszék, Jelentés Magyarország 2012. évi központi költségvetése végrehajtásának ellenőrzéséről, T/1202/1, 2013 augusztus (State Audit Office report on the control of the execution of the 2012. annual central budget of Hungary, 2013 August)', http://www.asz.hu/jelentes/13080/jelentes-magyarorszag-2012-evi-kozponti-koltsegvetese-vegrehajtasanak-ellenorzeserol/13080j000.pdf
Act CXCIII. of 2013 on the implementation of the central budget 2012. of the Republic of Hungary, accessed 5 April 2014, http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=165079.252397
hvg.hu, 'Magyar rakétákat, harckocsikat adtak el félmilliárdért (Hungarian rockets and tanks sold for half a billion)', 7 January 2014, http://hvg.hu/gazdasag/20140107_Magyar_raketakat_harckocsikat_adtak_el_fe
Interview with Interviewee 2: Opposition Member of Parliament, Budapest, April 23, 2014
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: The MoD annually reports on the actual income and expenditure, and the detailed calculations are published as part of the Law on the Appropriation Accounts.
Government Update April 2015:
An MoD Department dealing with armaments and asset control is responsible for decisions and implementation of the sales of excess articles. The State Asset Management Holding Company must give its approval to sell any state property, issue a corresponding license and have an independent property appraisal. Laws and updated regulations in the MOD from 2013 have made processes more transparent, giving the MOD more latitude in handling such sales and simplifying procedures. The MOD receives income from the sales of all military facilities and equipment and such proceeds are returned to the MOD Defence Economics Office. The MOD reports annually on the receipt of such income and its use is regulated by law.
In 2014, income from MOD property sales was used for modernisation, and operations and maintenance of the arms and equipment of the HDF. The valuation of assets depends upon a threshold whereby if an item is over HUF five million (Euros 16,174), then valuation is performed by an official separate from the transferring body.
Suggested score: 3
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is there an effective internal audit process for defence ministry expenditure (that is, for example, transparent, conducted by appropriately skilled individuals, and subject to parliamentary oversight)?
Budgetary internal auditing is conducted according to an annual internal audit plan and external controls are performed by the State Audit Office. The Government Control Office utilises an annual audit plan and reviews the timing of MOD appropriations. The MOD’s Independent Internal Control Organisation is authorised to audit the MOD and all of its defence organisations (to include publicly owned companies) and uses a strategic and annual plan to conduct its work. Reports are provided to the head of the audited organisation and all are collected by the MOD and submitted with the MOD’s annual report to the Ministry for Public Finances.
A 2009 SAO audit states that internal control mechanisms exist in the MoD - however, the results of these audits are not publicly available, and there is no evidence as to whether these audits are conducted by appropriately skilled individuals. The reports of the other external control organizations including the Government Control Office are not public.
RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: Comments and sources added. Score changed to 2; score 3 could not be selected as results of internal audit are not available to the public or discussed in parliament.
State Audit Office, 'Állami Számvevőszék, Jelentés a Honvédelmi Minisztérium fejezet működésének ellenőrzéséről, 2009, (State Audit Office report on the control of the budget chapter of the MoD, 2009)',
http://www.asz.hu/jelentes/0905/jelentes-a-honvedelmi-miniszterium-fejezet-mukodesenek-ellenorzeserol/0905j000.pdf
State Audit Office, 'Állami Számvevőszék, Jelentés Magyarország 2012. évi központi költségvetése végrehajtásának ellenőrzéséről, T/1202/1, 2013 augusztus (State Audit Office report on the control of the execution of the 2012. annual central budget of Hungary, 2013 August)', http://www.asz.hu/jelentes/13080/jelentes-magyarorszag-2012-evi-kozponti-koltsegvetese-vegrehajtasanak-ellenorzeserol/13080j000.pdf
2004 report from the State Audit Office on the Operation of the Hungarian defence Sector's Public Procurement, November 2004, http://www.asz.hu/jelentes/0451/jelentes-a-magyar-honvedseg-kozbeszerzesi-rendszere-mukodesenek-ellenorzeserol/0451j000.pdf
Government Decree No. 370/2011 (XII. 31) on the internal control system and internal auditing of the budgetary agencies. http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=143099.295739 accessed 26 August 2015.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: The planning, execution and application of controlling and the reporting on the controlling activities are done in accordance with the Government Decree No. 370/2011 (XII. 31) on the internal control system and internal auditing of the budgetary agencies.
Concerning the budgetary internal auditing – at chapter and institutional level – the controlling organizations’ and elements’ controlling goals are laid down is a Strategic Budgetary Plan for 4 years, but in the case of the given year the concrete inspection is implemented basically in accordance with an Annual Budgetary Internal Audit Plan. The Annual Budgetary Internal Audit Plan is supported by risk-analysis and capacity calculation. The inspection of the procurement processes as certainty giving activities are highly focused upon in these two planning documentations practically, they are always subject to control as procurement is an inseparable part of economic activities.
In accordance with the Government Decree, the objectivity of the certainty giving activities is assured through the impartiality of the auditors and auditing bodies. The functional independence (the members of the auditing body are not allowed to be involved in other activities besides inspection) guarantees that the auditor cannot inspect such area, where he/she is involved in the operative work. The organizational independence (the internal auditor or organizational body works directly as subordinate under the chief executive) guarantees the impartiality and the reports are free from any kind of influence.
Besides the auditing activities set forth in the Annual Audit Plan, ad hoc auditing as well as advice-giving tasks might be executed, usually upon superior request.
Government Update April 2015:
There are three levels of auditing of the MOD budget. External controls are performed by the State Audit Office during the planning and execution phase. The Government Control Office utilises an annual audit plan and reviews the timing of MOD appropriations. The MOD’s Independent Internal Control Organisation is authorised to audit the MOD and all of its defence organisations (to include publicly owned companies) and uses a strategic and annual plan to conduct its work. Reports are provided to the head of the audited organisation and all are collected by the MOD and submitted with the MOD’s annual report to the Ministry for Public Finances.
Suggested score: 3
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Additional sources: 2004 report from the State Audit Office on the Operation of the Hungarian defence Sector's Public Procurement, November 2004, http://www.asz.hu/jelentes/0451/jelentes-a-magyar-honvedseg-kozbeszerzesi-rendszere-mukodesenek-ellenorzeserol/0451j000.pdf.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is there effective and transparent external auditing of military defence expenditure?
External audit is conducted by the State Audit Office, which prepares a detailed report on the implementation of the central budget on an annual basis and conducts a comprehensive audit on the implementation of the budget of the MoD every four years. The latest report is dated 2009 and covers the years 2005-2008; the report for the next four years has not yet been issued as of mid-2015.
A representative of the State Audit Office is occasionally invited to sessions of the Parliament’s Defence and Law Enforcement Committee. The latest such meeting that can be identified took place in 2010. The effectiveness of the external audit process is questionable because there is no public follow-up report on what measures were introduced based on the recommendations of the SAO. This is compounded by a significant delay in the publication of the report on the 2009-2013 period.
Another external control is is performed by the Government Control Office (GCO). Its reports are not open to the public.
RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: Comment added on the GCO. No public information is available on what the MoD reports to the SAO president: parliamentarians can ask questions about the follow-up of the SAO report, but since the latest report was in 2009, the DLEC's website does not contain any such reference. Since concerns remain on the effectiveness of the SAO and the timeliness of reports, score 2 has been maintained.
State Audit Office, 'Állami Számvevőszék, Jelentés a Honvédelmi Minisztérium fejezet működésének ellenőrzéséről, 2009, (State Audit Office report on the control of the budget chapter of the MoD, 2009)',
http://www.asz.hu/jelentes/0905/jelentes-a-honvedelmi-miniszterium-fejezet-mukodesenek-ellenorzeserol/0905j000.pdf
State Audit Office, 'Állami Számvevőszék, Jelentés Magyarország 2012. évi központi költségvetése végrehajtásának ellenőrzéséről, T/1202/1, 2013 augusztus (State Audit Office report on the control of the execution of the 2012. annual central budget of Hungary, 2013 August)', http://www.asz.hu/jelentes/13080/jelentes-magyarorszag-2012-evi-kozponti-koltsegvetese-vegrehajtasanak-ellenorzeserol/13080j000.pdf
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: The tasks connected to the external (legislative) control are performed by the State Audit Office of Hungary (SAO). The SAO controls the expenditure of the Ministry of Defence every year while the budgetary planning and the preparation of the final accounts are in progress. The SAO decides according to the institutional budget of the Ministry of Defence and the chapter-managed allocation whether the performance of the budgetary complied with the rules, and whether the annual financial statements comply with the accounting principles. The SAO reviews the whole chapter in terms of practicality, and it applies the system approach when examining the realisation of economically, efficiency and effectiveness every 5-year. In some areas, a performance-based test is carried out, with regard to the content of the control strategy, scheduled within the framework of a semi-annual control planning. The SAO reports are basically public; they shall be submitted to the Parliament. Any actions necessary within the competence of the Minister of Defence based on the findings, conclusions and recommendations of the SAO must be reported to the president of the SAO.
The government control is performed by the Government Control Office (GCO). The GCO’s controls are based on a control strategy and an annual audit plan. The government’s audit body basically controls the regularity of targeted appropriations of the Ministry of Defence. The GCO’s reports are submitted to the Government, they are not open to the public. The GCO is able to use sanctioning powers in case of irregularities.
Suggested score: 4
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is there evidence that the country's defence institutions have controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country's natural resource exploitation and, if so, are these interests publicly stated and subject to scrutiny?
According to the Hungarian legislation and political tradition, the control and the exploitation of the natural resources are not individually managed by the defence sector institutions. Those assets that previously belonged to the MoD are now managed by other state institutions, (including the Development Bank of Hungary and Hungarian State Asset Management Company).
RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 1: Comments integrated and score raised to 4.
RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 2: The partnership mentioned on the website does not involve control over exploitation.
Hende: stabil és kiszámítható lesz a katonai pálya (Interview with the Minister of Defence), 27 December 2013, http://www.hirado.hu/2013/12/27/hende-stabil-es-kiszamithato-lesz-a-katonai-palya/
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: The MoD has nothing to do with natural resources exploitation at all - actually never had. In the Hungarian political tradition the control over natural resources are not &quoute;securitized&quoute; in such a way that it would mean any involvement of the defence sphere. Even the principal investigator states so in his/her very first sentence here. And if there are no interests at all, that means a 4.0 score.
Suggested score: 4
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: One of the three forestry enterprises (HM Budapesti Erdőgazdaság
Zrt., HM VERGA Erdőgazdaság Zrt., HM Kaszó Erdőgazdaság Zrt) formerly owned by the MoD (until 2010), Verga, states on its website that it still has a partnership with the MoD, since part of its work is conducted on MoD maneuvering grounds. It is unclear how much maneuvering grounds and forestry are still under the control of the MoD or what kind of paRtnership agreements the MoD still has with some its former enterprises.
A HM vagyonkezelésű erdőgazdaságok és nonprofit közhasznú társaságok 2009. évi tevékenységének elemzése, (An Analysis of management of the MoD Forestry and Nonprofit Organizations and for 2009), http://193.224.76.4/download/konyvtar/digitgy/publikacio/hanitz_zsolt03.pdf. Verga.hu,http://www.verga.hu/index.php/cegismerteto#adatlap (noting the transfer of management and ownership for forestry interests from the MoD to the Development Bank of Hungary and the Ministry of Agriculture in 2010).
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is there evidence, for example through media investigations or prosecution reports, of a penetration of organised crime into the defence and security sector? If no, is there evidence that the government is alert and prepared for this risk?
The National Protective Service (Nemzeti Vedelmi Szolgalat) was established in 2010 in order to ensure the corruption-related protection of the police, Parliamentary Guard, and of certain security services. Though the NPS does not publish comprehensive reports about its activities, from time to time there are news in the press about the NPS uncovering police or state bureaucracy corruption cases. The NPS is permitted to use both overt and covert operative methods.
Alertness to the risks involved by organized crime can be detected. Following the current government's takeover in 2010 a White Paper was issued which investigated corruption cases during the previous governments. Among the cases investigated, there is a high-profile corruption case involving several military officials, including generals, which is still ongoing. These cases are considered in the sources stated to involve organised crime, and the prosecution of the case relied upon a paragraph of the criminal code on 'criminal organisation'.
The previous verdict acquitting the accused was overruled by the appeals court, which ordered that the case be restarted from the beginning. The military officials are accused of accepting bribes between 2002-2010 (under the previous governments) in exchange for lucrative defence contracts. In an interview, the head of the military security organization (KNBSZ) talked about the importance of preventing such cases from reoccurring.
Another ongoing case involves the previous Minister of Defence and a State Secretary on charges of misappropriation. The ex-minister considers the procedure as a showcase trial and accuses the prosecution of political bias.
Although the current government started its activities with a strong anti-corruption drive focusing on, among other sectors, the defence industry in its White Book on the corruption practices under the previous governments, no similar cases have been investigated since 2010.
RESPONSE TO REVIEWERS: Comments added.
hvg.hu, 'Hatályon kívül helyezték a felmentő ítéletet, új eljárás jön a tábornokok vesztegetési perében (Acquittal verdict overruled, new procedure starts in the bribery case of generals)', 12 February 2014,
http://hvg.hu/itthon/20140212_Hatalyon_kivul_helyeztek_a_felmento_itele
mno.hu, 'A főigazgató nem végez műveleti munkát (The chief director does not have operational duties)', 24 February 2013, http://mno.hu/belfold/a-foigazgato-nem-vegez-muveleti-munkat-a-teljes-exkluziv-interju-1140896
magyarhirlap.hu, 'Juhász ártatlannak tartja magát. (Juhász pleads innocent)', 25 February 2014, http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/juhasz-artatlannak-tartja-magat
MInistry of Defence, 'Fehér Könyv: Korrupció, átvilágítás és büntetőjogi konzekvenciák. Honvédelmi Minisztérium, 2011. (White Book: Corruption, audit and criminal law consequenses. Ministry of Defence)', http://www.kormany.hu/download/3/52/40000/Honv%20Min%20-%20Feh%C3%A9r%20k
%C3%B6nyv.pdf;
Official website of the National Protective Service: www.nvsz.hu
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: The National Protective Service (Nemzeti Vedelmi Szolgalat) was established in 2010 in order to ensure the corruption protection of the police, Parliamentary Guard, and of certain security services. Though the NPS does not publish comprehensive reports about its activities, from time to time there are news in the press about the NPS uncovering police or state bureaucracy corruption cases. The NPS is permitted to use both overt and covert operative methods.
Official website of the National Protective Service: www.nvsz.hu
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: After 2010, a number of criminal proceedings were started because of the crimes of misappropriation of funds, agreement in restraint of competition in public procurement, forgery of private documents, embezzlement and bribery. The criminal proceedings are still pending, and verdicts have not been passed yet.
Several military officers were arrested because of reasonable suspicion of bribery and were interrogated as suspects. After this, other officers were also arrested by the court. During investigation carried out by the prosecutor’s office, the arrested were released and the prosecutor brought a charge against them. The criminal proceeding is pending, and as far as we know judgments have not been passed yet.
In parallel with the criminal proceedings, indignity proceedings have been started against those concerned, which resulted in the termination of service relations of field-officers by the Chief of Staff of the HDF.
Indignity proceedings have also been launched against persons in the generals staff, however – bearing in mind that the appointment of generals, and the terminating of their service falls in the competency of the President of the Republic – this procedure is longer: the decision is preceded by a procedure in labour court.
This procedure has resulted in Decision No. 205/2012. (VIII. 2) KE and Decision No. 83/2012. (III. 20) KE of the President of the Republic.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: The 2011 White Paper from the MoD on corruption signals at least some form of alertness to these risks, even if the direction of actual investigations seems to have taken an entirely political turn.
Alfahir.hu, 24 February 2010, Tábornokok a vádlottak padján - korrupció a Honvédelmi Minisztériumban, (Generals on the accused bench -corruption in the MInistry of Defence), http://alfahir.hu/node/47814?t=1267088772. K-Monitor, Korrupció a HM-ben (Corruption in the Ministry of Defence), http://k-monitor.hu/adatbazis/aktak/korrupcio-a-hm-ben.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is there policing to investigate corruption and organised crime within the defence services and is there evidence of the effectiveness of this policing?
State-wide independent policing functions are managed by the Prosecution Service whose independence has been under question since 2010. The 2011 National Integrity Study of Transparency International Hungary suggests that, although there is no proven evidence of political influence on enforcement, “considerable concerns have been raised”. In a recent interview, the head of legal affairs of Transparency International Hungary stated that, since 2010, &quoute;the government has systematically disrupted and dismantled those independent democratic checks and balances which were designed to control the government’s power. This has spread to Hungary’s Constitutional Court, the lower courts, and the same is true for the Office of the Prosecutor General which is a very powerful branch of the Hungarian justice system”.
There is policing to investigate corruption and independent crime within the defence services. Act CXXV of 1995 on the National Security Services established the Military National Security Service as the organisation responsible for the detection and prevention of organised crime. Its duties include collecting information on illegal weapons trade; organised crime affecting its functioning; and criminal acts falling within its competences or jeopardising the MoD and the HDF in carrying out their legal tasks. However, investigations seem to focus only on pre-2010 events. The ongoing weakening of the democratic system of checks and balances makes it unlikely that effective investigations will take place with respect to potentially ongoing corruption occurences within the defence sector. An article from 2011 mentions fictitious billing and other corrupt activities with respect to several defence contractors/suppliers, and that these activities were not included in the 2011 White Book on Corruption. Another article by investigative news site Atlatszo.hu revealed corruption cases not being properly investigated. The past years have seen some significant changes in how Hungary’s authorities handle corruption cases, both with regard to the number of filings received and the number of investigations launched. Atlatszo.hu reviewed the data to find that since the current government has been in power, the rate of early termination of corruption investigations has doubled.
RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: Information incorporated. The score, however, was maintained due to continuing doubts as to the independence and effectiveness of policing.
RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 2: Comments added.
Transparency International Hungary, 'Corruption Risks in Hungary 2011 National Integrity Study',
http://www.transparency.hu/uploads/docs/Corruption_Risks_in_Hungary_NIS_2011.pdf
Budapest Beacon, 'Meet Miklos Ligeti of Transparency International Hungary', 2 April 2014
http://budapestbeacon.com/featured-articles/meet-miklos-ligeti-of-transparency-international-hungary/
Law CLXIII of 2011 on the Prosecution (accessed May 21, 2014) http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=139710.262819
Organizational structure of the Hungarian Prosecution Service, webpage of the government (accessed May 21, 2014) http://www.kormany.hu/hu/mo/az-igazsagszolgaltatas-rendszere/ugyeszi-szervezeti-rendszer
Élet és Irodalom, 2 December 2011, Rajnai Attila, Ami a Honvédelmi Fehér Könyvből Kimaradt (What was left out of the defence Sector White Book),http://www.es.hu/rajnai_attila%3bami_a_honvedelmi_feher_konyvbol_kimaradt%3b2011-11-30.html
Atlatszo.hu, 12 February 2015. Top prosecutor heralds drastic drop in corruption investigations in Hungary http://english.atlatszo.hu/2015/02/12/top-prosecutor-heralds-drastic-drop-in-corruption-investigations-in-hungary/
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: Pursuant to Act CXXV of 1995 on the National Security Services the Military National Security Service has responsibilities regarding the detection and prevention of organised crime. The Military National Security Service have duties regarding illegal arms trading, and arms- and drug trafficking, respectively.
The Military National Security Service collects information on illegal weapons trade, on organised crime affecting its functioning, on criminal acts assigned into its competence by the National Security Law or jeopardising the MoD and the HDF in carrying out their legal tasks, as well as on any cyber-activity violating Hungary’s defence interests and on any efforts and attempts aimed against Hungarian units and troops deployed in operations. The Military National Security Service of Hungary is a governmental organization. According to the present budgetary jurisdiction, the MNSS is an independently functioning budgetary establishment. The Government controls the MNSS through the Minister of Defence.
Original suggested score: 3
Government Update April 2015:
Under current law regarding the National Security Services, the Information Office, Constitution Protection Office, and the Military National Security Service all have responsibilities regarding the detection and prevention of organised crime.
The Constitution Protection Office and Military National Security Service have specific duties regarding illegal arms trading, and weapons and drug trafficking respectively. These organisations operate under the direction of the government and the National Assembly exercises Parliamentary oversight through its National Security Committee.
The Military National Security Service collects information on illegal weapons trade, organised crime affecting the functioning of the MOD and on criminal acts that affect the MOD and armed forces in performing their missions as well as any cyber activity impacting Hungary’s defence and security. The security service has its own budget and is controlled by the government through the MOD.
The National Protective Service of Hungarian Law Enforcement Agencies was established and it now conducts integrity assessments among professional staff and public servants. National police have the responsibility to detect, investigate and document corrupt activities within the MOD and HDF, as there is no military police organisation.
Suggested score: 4
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: There is policing to investigate corruption and independent crime within the defence services, but these investigations seem to focus only on pre-2010 events. The ongoing weakening of the democratic system of checks and balances makes it unlikely that effective investigations will take place with respect to potentially ongoing corruption occurences within the defence sector. An article from 2011 mentions fictive billing and other corrupt activities with respect to several defence contractors/suppliers, and that these activities were not included in the 2011 White Book on Corruption.
Élet és Irodalom, 2 December 2011, Rajnai Attila, Ami a Honvédelmi Fehér Könyvből Kimaradt (What was left out of the defence Sector White Book),http://www.es.hu/rajnai_attila%3bami_a_honvedelmi_feher_konyvbol_kimaradt%3b2011-11-30.html .
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are the policies, administration, and budgets of the intelligence services subject to effective, properly resourced, and independent oversight?
According to Act CXXV on National Security Services, there are four intelligence services including the Military National Security Service (KNBSZ), which is controlled by the government through the Minister of Defence.
Parliamentary oversight of all national security services is conducted by the National Security Committee of Parliament, which is in charge of providing oversight for the intelligence services and can only be chaired by an opposition Member of Parliament. The Committee's meetings are mostly closed (partially or wholly) to the public, therefore it is very hard to evaluate the effectiveness of the budgetary oversight. The Committee seems adequately resourced, but its independence may be under question considering the large majority the government currently enjoys in the legislature (a constitutional majority of 2/3 until February 2015). The effectiveness of the Committee's oversight is questionable, considering for instance that the new head of the Special Service for National Security was appointed without being first heard by the Committee, which would have been mandatory. Its activities are not properly documented on the website of the DLEC; meetings are announced, but minutes and documents are mostly unavailable due to the closed nature of the Committee.
Special control powers over the KNBSZ are held by the National Defence and Law Enforcement Committee of parliament. However, oversight has been proven ineffective as it failed to prevent the major corruption scandals of the government in 2010, as outlined in the 2011 White Book. (see Origo.hu)
RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 2: Comments and source added.
Act CXXV of 1995 on National Security Services, accessed 5 April 2014, http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=24361.261528
Ministry of Defence, 'Fehér Könyv: Korrupció, átvilágítás és büntetőjogi konzekvenciák. Honvédelmi Minisztérium, 2011. (White Book: Corruption, audit and criminal law consequenses. Ministry of Defence)', http://www.kormany.hu/download/3/52/40000/Honv%20Min%20-%20Feh%C3%A9r%20k
%C3%B6nyv.pdf
Origo.hu, 21 July 2014, Bakival magyarázzák az idő előtti kinevezést (They are trying to explain the too early appointment with a mistake), http://www.origo.hu/itthon/20140721-meg-nem-szabo-hedvig-a-nemzetbiztonsagi-szakszolgalat-uj-foigazgatoja.html
All Hungary News, 'Government loses parliamentary supermajority as Fidesz candidate beaten in Veszprém by-election', 22 February 2015. http://www.politics.hu/20150222/government-loses-parliamentary-supermajority-as-fidesz-candidate-beaten-in-veszprem-by-election/, accessed November 2015.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: The National Security Committee of the Parliament, which is in charge of providing oversight for the intelligence services, can only be chaired by an opposition Member of Parliament. The Committee's meetings are mostly closed (partially or wholly) to the public, therefore it is very hard to evaluate the effectiveness of the budgetary oversight. The Committee seems adequately resourced, but its independence may be under question considering the 2/3 majority. The effectiveness of the Committee's oversight is questionable, considering for instance that the new head of the Special Service for National Security was appointed without being first heard by the Committee, which would have been mandatory.
Origo.hu, 21 July 2014, Bakival magyarázzák az idő előtti kinevezést (They are trying to explain the too early appointment with a mistake), http://www.origo.hu/itthon/20140721-meg-nem-szabo-hedvig-a-nemzetbiztonsagi-szakszolgalat-uj-foigazgatoja.html.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Moreover, it seems that a former agent of the military intelligence service was a co-perpetrator in the commission of the country's biggest ethnic crime, the serial killings against members of the Romani community. KNBSZ has publicly denied to his involvement, though there were rounded suggestions that there were contacts between the former agent and KNBSZ while the killings were committed.
Suggested score:
Are senior positions within the intelligence services filled on the basis of objective selection criteria, and are appointees subject to investigation of their suitability and prior conduct?
The Act CXXV of 1995 on National Security Services defines a system of requirements for the admission of staff to the Military National Security Service (KNBSZ). Besides these general requirements, the website of the KNBSZ does not make any reference to selection criteria for either entry level or senior positions.
There does not seem to be adequate oversight for senior appointments within the intelligence services, evidenced by the recent appointment of the head of the Special Service for National Security without being heard and questioned by the National Security Committee of the Parliament. Members of the National Security Committee only gained knowledge of the appointment from the official review, even though a hearing from the Committee is necessary prior to this appointment. The opposition members of the Committee decided to boycott the subsequent hearing of the Committee.
RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: It is unclear how comments are relevant to the issue at hand.
Act CXXV of 1995 on National Security Services, accessed 5 April 2014, http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=24361.261528
Website of the Military National Security Service, http://www.kfh.hu/hu/index.html
Origo.hu, 21 July 2014, Bakival magyarázzák az idő előtti kinevezést (They are trying to explain the too early appointment with a mistake), http://www.origo.hu/itthon/20140721-meg-nem-szabo-hedvig-a-nemzetbiztonsagi-szakszolgalat-uj-foigazgatoja.html. MNO, 21 July 2014, Vizsgálják a Magyar Közlöny idő előtti közlését (The early statement from the Magyar Közlöny is being investigated), http://mno.hu/ahirtvhirei/vizsgaljak-a-magyar-kozlony-ido-elotti-kozleset-1238387'
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: The act regulating the legal status of soldiers provides for the possibility of promotion for every soldier, through the system of performance evaluation. If the requirements prescribed by the law are met, soldiers can be appointed to a higher post and, at the same time, promoted to a higher rank, or promoted to a higher rank within their own post.
The expression &quoute;sensitive post&quoute; does not exist in the Act on the Status of Military Personnel; still, certain organisations or branches might be considered sensitive.
N/A Criteria chosen because none of the statements fit the above mentioned criteria of selection for posts within the defence sector.
Government Update April 2015:
Important provisions of the National Security Services Act specify key positions and the level of security clearance required for such posts across all Public Administration, including the Hungarian Defence Forces. The HDF does not designate any particular posts which are sensitive. However all MOD and Hungarian Defence Forces personnel in the chain of the procurement process must sign a statement that there is no conflict of interest in executing their responsibilities.Personnel assigned to procurement-related posts are required to make an annual declaration of property. The regulation on defence procurement prohibits personnel who worked in procurement and financial offices to work for military suppliers for five years after retirement.
There is a centralised system in place for selection and promotion of military personnel and a new performance evaluation system has been initiated for the civil service. New regulations guide promotion policies which are now more transparent. There is no set rotation policy for officers for routine assignments or for those serving in sensitive positions.
Suggested score: N/A
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: There does not seem to be adequate oversight for senior appointments within the intelligence services, evidenced by the recent appointment of the head of the Special Service for National Security without being heard and questioned by the National Security Committee of the Parliament. Members of the National Security Committee only gained knowledge of the appointment from the official review, even though a hearing from the Committee is necessary prior to this appointment. The opposition members of the Committee decided to boycott the subsequent hearing of the Committee.
Origo.hu, 21 July 2014, Bakival magyarázzák az idő előtti kinevezést (They are trying to explain the too early appointment with a mistake), http://www.origo.hu/itthon/20140721-meg-nem-szabo-hedvig-a-nemzetbiztonsagi-szakszolgalat-uj-foigazgatoja.html. MNO, 21 July 2014, Vizsgálják a Magyar Közlöny idő előtti közlését (The early statement from the Magyar Közlöny is being investigated), http://mno.hu/ahirtvhirei/vizsgaljak-a-magyar-kozlony-ido-elotti-kozleset-1238387
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Does the government have a well-scrutinised process for arms export decisions that aligns with international protocols, particularly the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)?
Hungary voted for the adoption of the Arms Trade Treaty. The Treaty was signed on 3 June 2013 and ratified on 2 April 2014. Hungary also complies with a number of other international treaties and protocols, as discussed on the website of the Hungarian Trade Licensing Office (HTLO). The Department of Authority of Defence Industry and Export Control of the Hungarian Trade Licensing Office serves as a control organisation for arms control processes. The Office publishes annual reports on its activities and the most recent report is from 2012.
While the legal framework appears adequate, there seems to be a complete lack of scrutiny for the implementation of the protocols that would ensure compliance with treaties. Parliamentary oversight is weak: the relevant committee, the DLEC, is entitled to scrutinize these decisions, but no publicly available document proves that it has done so. While the HTLO does not have an annual report published for 2013, its website does have quarterly reports for its various units (both plans and reports on activities). The latest such report is the second quarterly report from 2014. These reports contain audits and inspections conducted by the various units of the HTLO, including by the Export Control Department and the defence Industry and Military Foreign Trade Department. The reports contain information about the inspection/audit and its results. There are some recent news media items about Hungary potentially violating the ATT by exporting arms to Russia, but these have not been supported by other media. According to SIPRI, Hungary exported arms to Ethiopia in 2013. Given the poor human rights record in Ethiopia, this would impact compliance with the ATT.
RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 2: Comments added.
Arms Trade Treaty Negotiation Database, Hungary, http://armstreaty.org/state/hungary/
Government decree No. 320/2010. (XII.27) on the Hungarian Trade Licensing Office and the regional competent metrological and technical safety offices, accessed 5 April 2014, http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=133802.259733
Website of the Hungarian Trade Licensing Office, http://mkeh.gov.hu/haditechnika/haditechnika_kulkereskedelem/6a_Jelentesek
Act CIX of 2005 on the Licensing of Producing Military Equipment and Providing Technical Assistance. accessed 5 April 2014, http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=95216.254509
Government Decree No. 160/2011. (VIII. 18) on the licensing of export, import and transit of military equipment, accessed 5 April 2014, http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=139688.255536
Government Decree No. 301/2005. (XII. 23.) on the detailed rules of licesing and producing military equipment, accessed 5 April 2014, http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=96353.252227
Website of the Hungarian Trade Licensing Office, with the Quarterly Reports of its Units, http://mkeh.gov.hu/hivatal/kozerdeku_adatok_2013/hivatali_jelentesek_es_ellenorzesek#top (accessed 27 September 2014).
ITAR-TASS News Agency, 16 August 2014, Hungary’s arms supplies to Kiev violate Budapest’s legal obligations - RF Foreign Ministry, http://en.itar-tass.com/russia/745284
SIPRI, Hungary Arms Exports 2010 - 2014, http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/html/export_values.php
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: While the legal framework appears adequate, there seems to be a complete lack of scrutiny for the implementation of the protocols that would ensure compliance with treaties. While the HTLO does not have an annual report published for 2013, its website does have quarterly reports for its various units (both plans and reports on activities). The latest such report is the second quarterly report from 2014. These reports contain audits and inspections conducted by the various units of the HTLO, including by the Export Control Department and the defence Industry and Military Foreign Trade Department. The reports contain information about the inspection/audit and its results. There are some recent news media items about Hungary potentially violating the ATT by exporting arms to Russia, but the sources of these statements are mostly Russian.
Additional sources: Website of the Hungarian Trade Licensing Office, with the Quarterly Reports of its Units, http://mkeh.gov.hu/hivatal/kozerdeku_adatok_2013/hivatali_jelentesek_es_ellenorzesek#top (accessed 27 September 2014). See also http://www.armstrade.info/countryprofile/hungary/, providing a good overview of the framework for arms exports in Hungary). ITAR-TASS News Agency, 16 August 2014, Hungary’s arms supplies to Kiev violate Budapest’s legal obligations - RF Foreign Ministry, http://en.itar-tass.com/russia/745284
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
How effective are controls over the disposal of assets, and is information on these disposals, and the proceeds of their sale, transparent?
The general rule is that Act CXXXIII, on the Execution of the Central Budget, is supposed to include detailed revenues from the asset disposal and sale of real estate. The Act on the Central Budget of Hungary 2013 contains provisions on asset disposals and the sale of real estate, stipulating that income from the sale of these assets is to be spent on the modernisation of the Hungarian Defence Forces.
The 2009 report of the State Audit Office also contains information on the income from asset disposals as well as information on accounting irregularities. According to the SAO report, budgetary procedures and controls over asset disposals are in place; however, there is limited information on the proceeds of the disposals and regular detailed information is missing. The website of the organisation that has replaced the Armament and Quartermaster Office and which appears to be responsible for asset disposal (i.e. the Ministry of Defence, Office for Defence Management) does not publish any information relating to these issues.
RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: Comments incorporated.
The Central Budget of Hungary 2013, Act CCXXX, Art. 6 § (8)-(9), accessed 5 April 2014, http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=165756.254377#foot1
The Central Budget of Hungary 2011, Act CXXXIII on the Execution of the Central Budget, accessed 5 April 2014, http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=139456.202569
Hungarian Government, Document by the Minister of Defence on the liquidation of Hungary's Armament and Quartermaster Office, 4 June 2013, http://www.kormany.hu/download/c/c0/f0000/HM%20FHH%20megsz%C3%BCnt_154_11_.pdf
Ministry of Defence, Office for Defence Management
http://honvedelmibeszerzes.kormany.hu/
State Audit Office, 'Állami Számvevőszék, Jelentés a Honvédelmi Minisztérium fejezet működésének ellenőrzéséről, 2009, (State Audit Office report on the control of the budget chapter of the MoD, 2009)',
http://www.asz.hu/jelentes/0905/jelentes-a-honvedelmi-miniszterium-fejezet-mukodesenek-ellenorzeserol/0905j000.pdf (accessed May 21, 2014)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: A transparent, controllable and verifiable system was established in the last years with the lowering of the decision making competencies. Besides the more transparent implementation of the utilisation of movable assets, cost and time efficiency is also a positive factor. In 2013, by updating the Act CIX of 2005 on the Authorization of Military Services and the MoD Directive regarding the field unburdened the estrangement rules and widened the margins of the MoD Department for Armaments and Asset Control. This update grants a legal option to the head of the Department to sign a sales contract on behalf of the MoD.
Within the accounting system of the MoD, the income is well separated. The MoD annually reports on the actual income and expenditures, and the detailed calculations are published as part of the law on the Appropriation Accounts. The use of the income from property sales is regulated by the law on the annual budget. In 2014, this is Act CCXXX of 2013 on the central budget of Hungary for the year 2014. According to this, the income from property sales in 2014 – approved by the Government in a decision – can be used for the modernization, operation and maintenance of the arms and equipment of the Hungarian Defence Forces.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is independent and transparent scrutiny of asset disposals conducted by defence establishments, and are the reports of such scrutiny publicly available?
The State Audit Office conducts a comprehensive audit of the implementation of the Ministry of Defence's budget every four years; the report is publicly available on the organisation’s website. The report generally scrutinises the incomes and the use of income from asset disposals. The latest audit was due in 2013 but no relevant information is available on the website of the State Audit Office.
RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 2: Despite the delay in the publication of the 2013 audit report, score 3 has been maintained.
State Audit Office, 'Állami Számvevőszék, Jelentés a Honvédelmi Minisztérium fejezet működésének ellenőrzéséről (State Audit Office report on the control of the budget chapter of the MoD), 2009, http://www.asz.hu/jelentes/0905/jelentes-a-honvedelmi-miniszterium-fejezet-mukodesenek-ellenorzeserol/0905j000.pdf
State Audit Office, 'Jelentés Magyarország 2012. évi központi költségvetése végrehajtásának ellenőrzéséről (Annual report by the State Audit Office on the execution of the central budget, 2012)', August 2013,
http://www.asz.hu/jelentes/13080/jelentes-magyarorszag-2012-evi-kozponti-koltsegvetese-vegrehajtasanak-ellenorzeserol/13080j000.pdf
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: It is a significant omission that the State Audit's Office 2013 audit for the MoD's budget is not publicly available on its website, particularly as this would be the only comprehensive independent oversight over the asset disposals of the MoD.
Suggested score: 2
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
What percentage of defence and security expenditure in the budget year is dedicated to spending on secret items relating to national security and the intelligence services?
This information is not available to the public. No detailed information on secret expenditures and intelligence budgets is available in the budget. The State Audit Office (ÁSZ) and the Government Control Office (KEHI) are dedicated to inspecting the financial practices and procurement of the national security services. However, the annual report by the State Audit Office on the execution of the central budget does not contain any reference to this information and reports of the Government Control Office are not generally made public.
A recent article by the daily newspaper, Nepszabadsag, stated that the MoD leads the list of ministries with secret procurement decisions amounting to 830 since 2010. The estimated percentage of these procurements is around 10 percent of the overall defence budget.
The recent helicopter purchase from Russia exemplifies the issues with secret purchases. The acquisition took place without a public procurement procedure, and members of the defence and Law Enforcement Committee and the National Security Committee of the Parliament do not recall that a permission for a secret procurement had been asked by the MoD. According to investigative journalism center, Atlatszo.hu, based on data from the defence and Law Enforcement Committee, the Committee has approved acquisitions without a public procurement procedure in at least 30 instances since 2010, totaling 55 billion HUF spent in secret. A member of the Committee said that in about 80% of the cases, there was no reason to abandon the public procurement process.
RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 1: Comments added.
State Audit Office, 'Jelentés Magyarország 2012. évi központi költségvetése végrehajtásának ellenőrzéséről (Annual report by the State Audit Office on the execution of the central budget, 2012)', August 2013, http://www.asz.hu/jelentes/13080/jelentes-magyarorszag-2012-evi-kozponti-koltsegvetese-vegrehajtasanak-ellenorzeserol/13080j000.pdf
Secret defence billions (Titkos honvédségi milliárdok) - Népszabadsag, April 7, 2014. http://nol.hu/belfold/titkos-honvedsegi-milliardok-1454961
Atlatszo.blog.hu, 55 milliárd forint közbeszerzés nélkül, nemzetbiztonsági indokkal (55 billion HUF without public procurement, stating national security reasons), Horn Gabriella, 15 October 2013, http://atlatszo.blog.hu/2013/10/15/55_milliard_forint_kozbeszerzes_nelkul_nemzetbiztonsagi_indokkal.
Hvg.hu, 23 April 2014, Titokzatos helikopterbeszerzés a választások előtt, http://hvg.hu/itthon/20140423_Titokzatos_helikopterbeszerzes_a_valaszta.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: The recent helicopter purchase from Russia exemplifies the issues with secret purchases. The acquisition took place without a public procurement procedure, and members of the defence and Law Enforcement Committee and the National Security Committee of the Parliament do not recall that a permission for a secret procurement had been asked by the MoD. According to Atlatszo.hu, based on data from the defence and Law Enforcement Committee, the Committee has approved acquisitions without a public procurement procedure in at least 30 instances since 2010, totalling 55 billion HUF spent in secret. A member of the Committee said that in about 80% of the cases, there was no reason to abandon the public procurement process.
Additional sources: Atlatszo.blog.hu, 55 milliárd forint közbeszerzés nélkül, nemzetbiztonsági indokkal (55 billion HUF without public procurement, stating national security reasons), Horn Gabriella, 15 October 2013, http://atlatszo.blog.hu/2013/10/15/55_milliard_forint_kozbeszerzes_nelkul_nemzetbiztonsagi_indokkal. Hvg.hu, 23 April 2014, Titokzatos helikopterbeszerzés a választások előtt, http://hvg.hu/itthon/20140423_Titokzatos_helikopterbeszerzes_a_valaszta.
Government Decree 218/2011 (X.19.) on the special rules regarding acquisition relating to qualified data, the nation's fundamental security, national security interests, or acquisitions regarding special security measures,http://net.jogtar.hu/jr/gen/hjegy_doc.cgi?docid=A1100218.KOR (accessed 26 September 2014).
Jegyzet a minősített beszerzést alkalmazók részére
a minősített adatot, az ország alapvető biztonsági, nemzetbiztonsági érdekeit érintő vagy
a különleges biztonsági intézkedést igénylő beszerzések sajátos szabályairól (Guidance on the rules for acquisitions relating to qualified data, the nation's fundamental security, national security interests, or acquisitions regarding special security measures for those using qualified procurement), 2013, Dr. Liszkai Rita, Ministry of Interior, http://bmprojektek.kormany.hu/download/a/90/80000/Jegyzet%20Min%C5%91s%C3%ADtett%20beszerz%C3%A9st%20alkalmaz%C3%B3k%20r%C3%A9sz%C3%A9re.pdf.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is the legislature (or the appropriate legislative committee or members of the legislature) given full information for the budget year on the spending of all secret items relating to national security and military intelligence?
Act CXXV of the 1995 CXXXI law, National Security Services, stipulates that any external organisation can only oversee the spending of secret items on the basis of the criteria of lawfulness and not success. The financial practices of the national security services are inspected from the criteria of appropriateness and success by the minister in charge. Parliament’s Defence and Law Enforcement Committee and National Security Committees approve 'secret' procurement; MPs are provided with information on spending on secret items. No information available on what kind of information MPs are provided: the sessions discussing secret purchases are closed, and the information is not disclosed to the public. Score 2 reflects this uncertainty.
The recent helicopter purchase from Russia showcased the issues with secret purchases. The acquisition took place without a public procurement procedure, and members of the defence and Law Enforcement Committee and the National Security Committee of the Parliament do not recall that a permission for a secret procurement had been asked by the MoD. According to Atlatszo.hu, based on data from the defence and Law Enforcement Committee, the Committee has approved acquisitions without a public procurement procedure in at least 30 instances since 2010, totalling 55 billion HUF spent in secret. A member of the Committee said that in about 80% of the cases, there was no reason to abandon the public procurement process.
1995 CXXXI law, National Security Services, Act CXXV, sections 11 and 66, accessed 5 April 2014,
http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=24361.261528
Government Decree 228/2004 on procurement in connection with basic defence and military interest, accessed 5 April 2014, http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=139990.256046
Atlatszo.blog.hu, 55 milliárd forint közbeszerzés nélkül, nemzetbiztonsági indokkal (55 billion HUF without public procurement, stating national security reasons), Horn Gabriella, 15 October 2013, http://atlatszo.blog.hu/2013/10/15/55_milliard_forint_kozbeszerzes_nelkul_nemzetbiztonsagi_indokkal. Hvg.hu, 23 April 2014, Titokzatos helikopterbeszerzés a választások előtt, http://hvg.hu/itthon/20140423_Titokzatos_helikopterbeszerzes_a_valaszta.
Government Decree 218/2011 (X.19.) on the special rules regarding acquisition relating to qualified data, the nation's fundamental security, national security interests, or acquisitions regarding special security measures,http://net.jogtar.hu/jr/gen/hjegy_doc.cgi?docid=A1100218.KOR (accessed 26 September 2014).
Jegyzet a minősített beszerzést alkalmazók részére
a minősített adatot, az ország alapvető biztonsági, nemzetbiztonsági érdekeit érintő vagy
a különleges biztonsági intézkedést igénylő beszerzések sajátos szabályairól (Guidance on the rules for acquisitions relating to qualified data, the nation's fundamental security, national security interests, or acquisitions regarding special security measures for those using qualified procurement), 2013, Dr. Liszkai Rita, Ministry of Interior, http://bmprojektek.kormany.hu/download/a/90/80000/Jegyzet%20Min%C5%91s%C3%ADtett%20beszerz%C3%A9st%20alkalmaz%C3%B3k%20r%C3%A9sz%C3%A9re.pdf.'
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are audit reports of the annual accounts of the security sector (the military, police, and intelligence services) and other secret programs provided to the legislature (or relevant committee) and are they subsequently subject to parliamentary debate?
No audit of secret items exists. Controlling organisations, like the State Audit Office and the Government Control Office, are not entitled to conduct separate audits on secret procurement. The Act on National Security Services states that inspection by an external organ of the use of special operating expenses by national security services may only be conducted from the criteria of lawfulness. During an inspection by an external body, the inspecting body must not be allowed access to information generated during secret intelligence activities, the sources of such information, or information on the method of gathering secret intelligence. Parliament’s National Defence and Law Enforcement Committee receives no separate audit report.
1995 CXXXI law, National Security Services, Act CXXV, sections 11 and 66, accessed 5 April 2014,
http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=24361.261528
Government Decree 226/2004 (VII 27) on the general rules of public finance with regard to the operation of defence bodies, access 5 April 2014, http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=86373.121797
Government Decree 130/2011 (VII 18) on various special rules of budget and management of civil
intelligence services, accessed 5 April 2014, http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=139427.255692
Government Decree 370/2011 (XII 31) on the internal control mechanisms of budgetary organisations, accessed 5 April 2014, http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=143099.253971
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: It is important that the use of secret budget items are not audited. The permission to fund secret operations is granted either by the government or the Parliament National Security Committee, but the SAO has no say in this process.
Suggested score:
Off-budget military expenditures are those that are not formally authorised within a country's official defence budget, often considered to operate through the 'back-door'. In law, are off-budget military expenditures permitted, and if so, are they exceptional occurrences that are well-controlled?
The legislation does not deal with off-budget military expenses.; there is neither an explicit prohibition or an explicit provision for off-budget expenses. None of the interviewees were aware of the existence of off-budget military expenditures, but neither is there irrefutable evidence that they are not in existence.
Interviewee 2 added that given the budgetary restraints of the Hungarian state concerning military spending, &quoute;it is highly unlikely that a considerable level of off-budget expenses exist&quoute;.
Interview with Interviewee 1: Retired Lieutenant-Colonel, Budapest, April 24, 2014
Interview with Interviewee 2: Opposition Member of Parliament, Budapest, April 23, 2014
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
In practice, are there any off-budget military expenditures? If so, does evidence suggest this involves illicit economic activity?
There is no positive evidence that off-budget military expenditures they are not in existence, however, no allegations of them happening were located.
RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 1: Agree, score amended to 4.
Interview with Interviewee 1: Retired Lieutenant-Colonel, Budapest, April 24, 2014.
Interview with Interviewee 2: Opposition Member of Parliament, Budapest, April 23, 2014
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: So far there has been no evidence for the existence of any off-budget military expenditure at all. Hence, along with the guidelines, this suggest that instead 3.0, actually a 4.0 score should be given. (Score 3.0 would mean that 'there is evidence of occasional off-budget military expenditures' - but there is not.)
Suggested score: 4
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
In law, are there provisions regulating mechanisms for classifying information on the grounds of protecting national security, and, if so, are they subject to effective scrutiny?
The Act on the Protection of Classified Information regulates the criteria of classifying information and the procedure for doing that. Hungarian civil liberties and anti-corruption NGOs have criticised the Act, arguing that it does not assure that information will be classified only when it is necessary. The Act can easily be abused by individuals seeking to prevent the detection of corrupt acts or the reputation of their organisation, as it allows for the relatively easy classification of documents on national security grounds. Criticism also relates to the implementation of the law, emphasising the lack of scrutiny by the courts. The Act does not provide an effective legal mechanism in court for accessing classified information. Additionally, it does not specify whether judges can examine the reasonableness of the classification, or if judges are limited to examining whether or not documents have been marked “Secret.”
Effective scrutiny has also deteriorated. In the past, Hungary had an independent Freedom of Information Ombudsman. The Fidesz government, which came into power in 2010, replaced the Ombudsman with the President of the Hungarian Data Protection and Freedom of Information Authority. Formally, this individual is independent. However, unlike his predecessor, he is part of the executive. This was questioned by the European Commission, which then litigated Hungary before the Luxembourg Court for breach of EU law.
2009 CLV Act on the Protection of Classified Information, accessed 7 April 2014, http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=126195.253159
Government Decree No. 90/2010. (III.26.), On the rules of the National Security Authority’s operation and the handling of classified information, accessed 7 April 2014, http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=132266.246118
Transparency International Hungary, 'No effective control over national security', 20 May 2010,
http://www.transparency.hu/No_Effective_Control_Over_National_Security?bind_info=tag&bind_id=38
Transparency International Hungary, 'Statement on the OGP Action Plan draft', 31 January 2013,
http://www.transparency.hu/Az_OGP_akcioterv_tervezeterol?bind_info=index&bind_id=0
http://www.transparency.hu/uploads/docs/ogp_eszrevetelek_0130.pdf
Transparency International Hungary, 'NGO’s statement on the legislation concerning classified information', 20 May 2010,
http://www.transparency.hu/No_Effective_Control_Over_National_Security?bind_info=tag&bind_id=38
Transparency International Hungary, 'Hungarian transparency under threat', 22 May 2013,
http://www.transparency.org/news/feature/hungarian_transparency_under_threat
444.hu 15 September 2014, The 8 silliest public procurement classified for national security reasons (A 8 legidiótább beszerzés, amiről nemzetbiztonsági okból nem tudhatunk) http://444.hu/2014/09/15/a-8-legidiotabb-beszerzes-amirol-nemzetbiztonsagi-okbol-nem-tudhatunk/
Portfolio.hu, 11 November 2014 The government first used then closed a &quoute;small gate&quoute; (Előbb kihasznált egy &quoute;kiskaput&quoute; a kormány, majd bezárta azt) http://www.portfolio.hu/unios_forrasok/gazdasagfejlesztes/elobb_kihasznalt_egy_kiskaput_a_kormany_majd_bezarta_azt.206270.html
Government Decree 276/2014, 6 November 2014 on the special rules of classified public procurements http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=172383.275667 (accessed 27 August, 2015)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: The Act on Informational Self-Determination and Freedom of Information (Act No 107 of 2011) promotes transparency and accountability by giving citizens the right to claim access to data of public interest either orally, in writing or electronically. The claim shall be granted at the latest within 15 days.
Government Update April 2015:
The rising democratic claim of the society about a controllable state and the establishment of an open society focus the attention on the requirement of the freedom of information and the widespread availability of the information relevant to the public interest. The aim of the National Security Authority of Hungary is to promote the protection of classified information and those electronic systems which handle sensitive data. The National Security Authority of Hungary is responsible for mitigating dangers threatening classified information according to the Act CLV of 2009 on the Protection of Classified Information. Since the 1st of July 2013 the Authority is also responsible for the information security of electronic systems at the central and local government agencies, as well as the critical infrastructures upon the Act L. of 2013.
The mission of the Authority on one hand is to launch and to acclimatise the damage-based classification culture. According to this philosophy, not the hypothetic importance of the information has to be considered when determining the classification level but the amount of the damage which might be caused in case of unauthorized access. Thus the Authority facilitates the reform of the previous automatism-based approach and subserves that only those information can be marked as classified, and is closed from the eye of the public which actually deserves this protection. However on the other hand since the 1st of July 2013 the Authority enhances that regardless of the spreading electronization the data of the citizens, the elements of the national data asset and information concerning the operation of the state is protected even during non paper-based data handling.
Suggested score: 3
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: In 2011, the Hungarian Civil Liberties Union found that the system for classifying information in Hungary is completely non-transparent and unscrutinizable. The government is able to classify information merely by citing to the public interest at large (such interests include defence, national security, territorial integrity, sovereignty, among others); there is no exclusive list of information types for which classification is available. The most critical concern is the complete lack of independent scrutiny, since it is the classifier who has to review the classification every five years, but even this system is non-transparent. The HCLU, the Eötvös Károly Intézet and TI Hungary jointly challenged the validity of the 2009 Act as well as parts of the National Security Act.
Index.hu, 8 July 2011, Joób Sándor, Ami már nem titkos, arról sem tudni semmit (Even if it is no longer secret, no one can know about it), http://index.hu/belfold/2011/07/08/allamtitkok/.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Do national defence and security institutions have beneficial ownership of commercial businesses? If so, how transparent are details of the operations and finances of such businesses?
Companies controlled by the Ministry of Defence (MoD) are either directly owned by the MoD or by the Hungarian State Asset Management Company, of which the MoD has beneficial ownership. These business interests range from cartography to arms. These companies are:
1. HM Elektronikai, Logisztikai és Vagyonkezelő Zártkörűen Működő Részvénytársaság,
2. HM CURRUS Gödöllői Harcjárműtechnikai Zártkörűen Működő Részvénytársaság,
3. HM Arzenál Elektromechanikai Zártkörűen Működő Részvénytársaság,
4. HM ArmCom Kommunikációtechnikai Zártkörűen Működő Részvénytársaság,
5. HM Térképészeti Közhasznú Nonprofit Kft.,
6. HM Zrínyi Kommunikációs Szolgáltató Nonprofit Közhasznú Kft.
7. HM Bessenyei György Kulturális és Üdültetési Közhasznú Nonprofit Kft.
Details of their operations and finances are not sufficiently transparent: basic details of their operations (including financial balance sheets, yearly declarations) are declared just as is the case with other commercial entities. Their governance standards are also just the same as other publicly owned commercial enterprises. Besides the basic information no further data is available on what constitutes their revenues, expenses, their operations are not detailed on their websites or the MoD website.
RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: Comments updated to reflect the 2015 situation.
Ministry of Defence, 'Fehér Könyv: korrupció, átvilágítás és büntetőjogi konzekvenciák, (White Book: corruption, audit and penal law consequences), 2011, accessed 7 April 2014, http://www.kormany.hu/download/3/52/40000/Honv%20Min%20-%20Feh%C3%A9r%20k%C3%B6nyv.pdf#!DocumentBrowse
State Audit Office, 'Report of the State Audit Office on the Audit of Functioning of the Chapter of the Ministry of Defence', 2009, http://www.asz.hu/jelentes/0905/jelentes-a-honvedelmi-miniszterium-fejezet-mukodesenek-ellenorzeserol/0905j000.pdf
Website of the Hungarian State Asset Management Company, http://mnvzrt.hu/
Act Nr. 113 on National Defence and Hungarian Defence Forces of 2011 http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=139266.290145 accessed 27 August
hvg.hu, 'Magyar rakétákat, harckocsikat adtak el félmilliárdért (Hungarian rockets and tanks sold for half a billion)', 7 January 2014, http://hvg.hu/gazdasag/20140107_Magyar_raketakat_harckocsikat_adtak_el_fe
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: Government update, April 2015:
According to 22/A§ and Annex1 of the Act Nr. 113 on National Defence and Hungarian Defence Forces of 2011 MoD Hungary owns: 1. HM Elektronikai, Logisztikai és Vagyonkezelő Zártkörűen Működő Részvénytársaság,
2. HM CURRUS Gödöllői Harcjárműtechnikai Zártkörűen Működő Részvénytársaság,
3. HM Arzenál Elektromechanikai Zártkörűen Működő Részvénytársaság,
4. HM ArmCom Kommunikációtechnikai Zártkörűen Működő Részvénytársaság,
5. HM Térképészeti Közhasznú Nonprofit Kft.,
6. HM Zrínyi Kommunikációs Szolgáltató Nonprofit Közhasznú Kft.
7. HM Bessenyei György Kulturális és Üdültetési Közhasznú Nonprofit Kft.
Suggested score: 3
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: While the 2011 White Book does discuss some of these companies and their involvement in corruption-related activities, no such assessment was done after 2011.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are military-owned businesses subject to transparent independent scrutiny at a recognised international standard?
While there are formal requirements regulated by a government decree on auditing of these companies, the details of the scrutiny is not made available to the public.
Every four years the State Audit Office is meant to conduct an audit of the MoD and its companies. Both the 2004 and 2009 reports of the SAO provide indications that the SAO audited the military-owned businesses. However, there is only a summary of the findings in these reports, and there is no such report for 2013, which is when the next audit was due. After a 2011 scandal, when one of the businesses owned by the military - HM EI Zrt, tasked with providing and developing military infrastructure - lost millions of HUF in an ill-conceived, non-military purpose enterprise in Kosovo (building a sports centre) that was not recommended by either the auditor of the company or MoD leadership, the MoD vowed to ensure the transparent and clean operations of its businesses. However, this has not materialized as of yet.
In 2010 the MoD requested that an independent consulting firm, Ancro Ltd., conduct scrutiny of MoD-owned companies from 2005 until 2010. The results were published in a White Book in 2011. However, this auditing company is not a well-known outlet in Hungary: founded in 2007, it lacks significant international references and its independence is not established. This is because its income for 2010 was 700 000 euros and for 2011, it was 400 000 euros; the audit commissioned by the MoD could easily have been one of the biggest businesses of the company in 2010-2011 and thus could have created dependence.
RESPONSE TO REVIEWERS: Comments incorporated.
Ministry of Defence, 'Fehér Könyv: korrupció, átvilágítás és büntetőjogi konzekvenciák, (White Book: corruption, audit and penal law consequences)', 2011, access 7 April 2014, http://www.kormany.hu/download/3/52/40000/Honv%20Min%20-%20Feh%C3%A9r%20k%C3%B6nyv.pdf#!DocumentBrowse
Hvg.hu, 19 March 2011, Százmillióba került a HM cégének a koszovói álmodozás, http://hvg.hu/itthon/20110319_szazmillioba_kerult_koszovoi_hm_ei_uzlet
State Audit Office, 'Report of the State Audit Office on the Audit of Functioning of the Chapter of the Ministry of Defence', 2009, http://www.asz.hu/jelentes/0905/jelentes-a-honvedelmi-miniszterium-fejezet-mukodesenek-ellenorzeserol/0905j000.pdf
Website of the Hungarian State Asset Management Company, http://mnvzrt.hu/
Governmental Resolution Nr. 370 of 2011 on the internal control systems and internal audits of budgetary organizations regulates the auditing of those companies http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=143099.295739 accessed 27 August, 2015
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: Government Update April 2015:
Governmental Resolution Nr. 370 of 2011 on the internal control systems and internal audits of budgetary organizations regulates the auditing of those companies. All audit processes fit international standards.
Suggested score: 3
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Both the 2004 and 2009 reports of the SAO provide indication that the SAO audited the military-owned businesses. There is only a summary of the findings in these reports, and there is no such report for 2013. After a 2011 scandal, when one of the businesses owned by the military - HM EI Zrt, tasked with providing and developing military infrastructure - lost millions of HUF in an ill-conceived, non-military purpose enterprise in Kosovo (building a sports centre), an enterprise that was not recommended by either the auditor of the company or MoD leadership, the MoD vowed to ensure the transparent and clean operations of its businesses, but this has not materialized as of yet.
Hvg.hu, 19 March 2011, Százmillióba került a HM cégének a koszovói álmodozás, http://hvg.hu/itthon/20110319_szazmillioba_kerult_koszovoi_hm_ei_uzlet
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is there evidence of unauthorised private enterprise by military or other defence ministry employees? If so, what is the government's reaction to such enterprise?
General rules on the legal status of public employees outlaw illicit private enterprises by military and defence ministry employees, and the legislation foresees sanctions against these practices. An external audit into the period under the previous government in charge between 2002-2010 scrutinized this question without tangible results. There is no publicly available data on the existence of such illicit enterprises.
In a 2012 case, a journalist was acquitted of defamation with respect to the executive director of a military-owned business. The journalist claimed - and the court found the statement was truthful - that the executive director of HM Zrinyi Media Kft. confused his private business with the official business of the military enterprise. The court found that the director in essence turned the military enterprise into a family business. Beyond this information, there is no publicly available data on this issue.
RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 1: Additional comments suggest that some cases have been located. Score maintained.
RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: The rules are there but sanctions are weak. Sanctions include publication of information about conflicts of interests and initiation of infringement procedures (disciplinary or other) which might result in suspension or dismissal. Prosecution only in case criminal activity was involved.
Act XXXIII of 1992 on the legal status of public employees, accessed May 21, 2014.
Fehér Könyv: Korrupció, átvilágítás és büntetőjogi konzekvenciák. Honvédelmi Minisztérium, 2011. (White Book: Corruption, audit and criminal law consequenses. Ministry of Defence) http://www.kormany.hu/download/3/52/40000/Honv%20Min%20-%20Feh%C3%A9r%20k
%C3%B6nyv.pdf
Act on Civil Servants CXCIX/2011 accessed 27 August, 2015 http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=142936.296044
Act on the Legal Status of MPs accessed 27 August, 2015, XXXVI/2012 http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=148174.296050
Index.hu, 26 January 2012, Gubcsi Lajos elvesztette az Index elleni büntetőpert, http://index.hu/belfold/2012/01/26/elvesztette_gubcsi_lajos_az_index_elleni_buntetopert/.
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: I agree that there is no publicly available evidence on the existence of such illicit activities. However, along the guideline 'no evidence' should mean a score of 4.0.
Suggested score: 4
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: The Act on the Legal Status of Civil Servants (2010) and the Act on the Legal Status of the Members of the Parliament lay down strict rules designed to prevent conflicts of interest. The aforementioned Acts impose strict restrictions on ancillary employment; require MPs, ministers and other political leaders to submit asset declarations of both private and family income and assets; and calls civil servants to declare any private interest relevant to their current cases.
N/A Criteria selected as the other score criteria do not cover the situation.
Suggested score: N/A
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: In a 2012 case, a journalist was acquitted of defamation with respect to the executive director of a military-owned business. The journalist claimed - and the court found the statement was truthful - that the executive director of HM Zrinyi Media Kft. confused his private business with the official business of the military enterprise. The court found that the director in essence turned the military enterprise into a family business. Beyond this information, there was no publicly available data on this issue.
Index.hu, 26 January 2012, Gubcsi Lajos elvesztette az Index elleni büntetőpert, http://index.hu/belfold/2012/01/26/elvesztette_gubcsi_lajos_az_index_elleni_buntetopert/.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Do the Defence Ministry, Defence Minister, Chiefs of Defence, and Single Service Chiefs publicly commit - through, for example, speeches, media interviews, or political mandates - to anti-corruption and integrity measures?
In 2010, the ruling centre-right coalition won the election with the promise of ridding the administration of corruption. Since then, a strong anti-corruption drive has started, with a significant focus on the MoD. A White Book summarised suspicious deals concluded under previous governments, 2002-2010, and several high-profile police investigations were initiated against former MoD officials, including the minister himself, and state secretaries. The concerned politicians and officials accused the government and the judicial investigations of political bias.
Aside from these cases, however, there is no evidence of corruption-related investigations involving the activities of the current government. In terms of official rhetoric, there is a strong commitment to anti-corruption and integrity (the minister of defence often speaks about those commitments), but there have been few tangible results. An extensive integrity training program connected with the NATO Building Integrity initiative has also been established, illustrating commitment on a policy level. Opposition parties accuse the government, including the MoD and arms forces, of engaging in corrupt deals. For example, a MoD helicopter tender came under attack after it emerged that the government was open to negotiations with an Italian company, AugustaWestland, which was involved in corrupt deals in India.
RESPONSE TO REVIEWERS: Agree, score amended to 3. The question has been scored on the basis of evidence of public commitment only.
Ministry of Defence, 'Fehér Könyv: korrupció, átvilágítás és büntetőjogi konzekvenciák, (White Book: corruption, audit and penal law consequences)', 2011, accessed 7 April 2014, http://www.kormany.hu/download/3/52/40000/Honv%20Min%20-%20Feh%C3%A9r%20k%C3%B6nyv.pdf#!DocumentBrowse
Metropol.hu, 'Elszámoltatná Hende Csabát az MSZP (Socialists would make MoD, Hende accountable)', 11 March 2014, http://www.metropol.hu/itthon/cikk/1157527-elszamoltatna-hende-csabat-az-mszp
honvedelem.hu, 'Uniós forrásból fejlesztik a katonai beszerzési rendszert (EU funds used to develop military procurement system)', 15 November 2013, http://www.honvedelem.hu/cikk/41046_unios_forrasbol_fejlesztik_a_katonai_beszerzesi_rendszert
vg.hu, 'Vonzóbb lett a helikoptertender (Helicopter-tender more appealing)', 20 November 2013, http://www.vg.hu/vallalatok/vonzobb-lett-a-helikoptertender-416278
pestisracok.hu, 'Újabb bizonyítékok kerülhetnek elő Fapál ügyében (New evidence may arise in Fapal’s case)', 25 October 2013, http://pestisracok.hu/ujabb-bizonyitekok-kerulhetnek-elo-fapal-laszlo-ugyeben/
Honvedelem es integritas' (National defence and Integrity) 8 June 2014. http://www.honvedelem.hu/cikk/44567 accessed: 17 October 2014.
origo.hu, 'HM-es szerződések miatt nyomoznak (Police investigation into contracts at the MoD)', 13 September 2013, http://www.origo.hu/itthon/20130913-hm-es-szerzodesek-miatt-nyomoznak.html
nol.hu, 'A hadseregnél nincs korrupció – vagy csak nem jelentik? (Is there really no corruption at the Armed Forces or just not reported?)', 1 August 2013, http://nol.hu/belfold/a_hadseregnel_nincs_korrupcio___vagy_csak_nem_jelentik_-1403785
vg.hu, 'Hende: Újrafegyverkezésre van szükség (Hende: need for rearmament)', 6 May 2013,t
http://www.vg.hu/velemeny/interju/hende-ujrafegyverkezesre-van-szukseg-402895
mno.hu, 'A főigazgató nem végez műveleti munkát (The chief director does not have operational duties)', 24 February 2013, http://mno.hu/belfold/a-foigazgato-nem-vegez-muveleti-munkat-a-teljes-exkluziv-interju-1140896
Transparency International Hungary, 'Pénz, pénz, pénz és korupció (Money, money, money and corruption)', 29 January 2013, http://www.transparency.hu/Penz__penz_es_penz__meg_korrupcio__altalaban_ez_kell_a_hadseregek_felszerelesehez?bind_info=index&bind_id=0
nol.hu, 'HM helikoptervásárlás előtt: Kínos, de mit tehetünk? (MoD before helicopter purchase)', 15 February 2013, http://nol.hu/belfold/20130215-_kinos__de_mit_tehetunk__-1367001
Alon.hu, 27 May 2010, Hende Csaba: első a Honvédelmi Minisztérium átvilágítása, a korrupció megszüntetése
(Hende Csaba: First task is scrutinizing the Ministry of Defence, and eliminating corruption) http://www.alon.hu/hende-csaba-elso-honvedelmi-miniszterium-atvilagitasa-korrupcio-megszuntetese
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Score 2. would mean that the anti-corruption commitment of the MoD leadership is not publicly stated, however, it is: Minister Csaba Hende often speaks publicly about the importance of fighting corruption. Besides, since September 2013 a series of training programs have been conducted in order to improve anti-corruption measures and strenghthen the integrity of the armed forces personnel. A score of 3.0 would describe the situation best.
Honvedelem es integritas' (National defence and Integrity) 8 June 2014. http://www.honvedelem.hu/cikk/44567 accessed: 17 October 2014.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: The Government of Hungary considers anti-corruption activities as being of primary importance; therefore a comprehensive governmental anti-corruption program was developed in which the MoD takes an active part.
The level of awareness of integrity and corruption risk matters increased noticeably in recent years. The leadership of the MoD lays great emphasis on fighting corruption and strengthening integrity perspective. The development of the base of an extended information and training system to the whole staff was initiated.
Government update, April 2015:
The leading authority on Building Integrity and counter-corruption activity of MoD Hungary is the Administrative State Secretary - all missions and tasks are supervised by him. In the planning and implementation processes, all Heads, Directors and Commandants of MoD, of Defence Staff, of central defence agencies, of Hungarian Defence Forces and Military National Security Service are involved.
NATO-level BI, ethical and anti-corruption education and training has been planned since 2014 as part of the yearly BI and Anti-corruption Action Plan of MoD Hungary authorized by the Minister of Defence.
The specialized national-level education and training is carried out at the National University of Public Administrative Services. According to the anti-corruption initiative the education program of Integrity Advisers was developed 2013. Its goal is the education of those advisors who are able to support the function of the integrated system of leadership and also promote the establishment of corruption-free and ethical organizational culture.
Further training and senior level training of governmental officials are carried out in the frame of the programs “Ethics of Public Administrative Service” and Ethics of Public Administrative Services and Integrity”. The aim of this training is the recognition and spread of integrity based view of public administrative services.
Suggested score: 3
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Additional source:
Alon.hu, 27 May 2010, Hende Csaba: első a Honvédelmi Minisztérium átvilágítása, a korrupció megszüntetése
(Hende Csaba: First task is scrutinizing the Ministry of Defence, and eliminating corruption) http://www.alon.hu/hende-csaba-elso-honvedelmi-miniszterium-atvilagitasa-korrupcio-megszuntetese
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are there effective measures in place for personnel found to have taken part in forms of bribery and corruption, and is there public evidence that these measures are being carried out?
Different instances of corruption (abuse of power, bribery etc) are listed in the Criminal Code. Act C of 2012 on the Criminal Code prescribes a punishment of imprisonment of up to three or five years; between two and eight years; or between five and ten years for the various kinds of bribery. Damage caused by bribery may also be reimbursed under the provisions of civil law or labour law. If the offender is a soldier, then – if the conditions provided for by law exist – dishonourable discharge proceedings may be held, as a result of which the service (labour relation) may be terminated.
Apart from the legal consequences, there is a strong commitment to transparency and corruption prevention in statements, publications, and interviews with the MoD. There are different legal norms and codes of conduct in place and the National Defence Act contains provisions against corruption and bribery. In 2011, the Minister promised an elaboration of a new Military Code of Conduct. This promise was reiterated in 2013 but no new document has been created. There is no public evidence that these measures were carried out. With the current Military Code of Conduct being essentially without teeth and with no information available about actual disciplinary hearings for bribery and corruption based on the Code, the only measures in place that could be used effectively would be the Criminal Code. Interviewee 3. confirmed that the Military Code of Conduct lacks procedural rules to make it effectively implementable.
There is an ongoing criminal case against several high-ranking military officials for bribery. The case started in 2011 based on investigation by the Budapest military prosecutor's office. While in the first instance all the accused were acquitted, this decision has been annulled and a new criminal case was started in early 2014.
RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: No new information on the military Code of Conduct was found and evidence of robust enforcement is limited. Score maintained.
RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 2: Comments incorporated.
Act C/2012 Criminal Code http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=152383.294596 (accessed 28 August 2015)
MoD Directive 67, 2003 (HK 18) on the Military Code of Conduct, accessed 12 April 2014, http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:lJJtIaTkuRkJ:www.kormany.hu/download/0/a1/00000/Katonai%2520Etikai%2520K%25C3%25B3dex.doc+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=hu
MoD Decree No 24/2005 (VI. 30) on the issue of the Hungarian Defence Forces Service Regulations, accessed 8 April 2014, http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=93581.234011
MoD Directive 73 of 2013 (XI. 29) on the action plan related to the Government’s corruption prevention program, accessed 8 April 2014, http://www.kormany.hu/download/d/73/21000/Honv%C3%A9delmi%20K%C3%B6zl%C3%B6ny%2012.pdf
Hungarian Government, #Több országgal fejleszti együttműködését az idén a Magyar Honvédség (Hungarian armed forces to cooperate with several countries)', 2 April 2013, http://www.kormany.hu/hu/honvedelmi-miniszterium/hirek/tobb-orszaggal-fejleszti-egyuttmukodeset-az-iden-a-magyar-honvedseg
mno.hu, 'Hende: 2010-ben egy „szétlopott” hadsereget örököltünk (Hende: in 2010 we took over a corrupt armed forces)', 16 March 2014, http://mno.hu/belfold/hende-2010-ben-egy-szetlopott-hadsereget-orokoltunk-1216197
Origo.hu, 12 February 2014, Új eljárás indul a tábornokok ellen (New procedure starts agains the generals), http://www.origo.hu/itthon/20140212-uj-eljaras-indul-a-tabornokok-ellen.html.
Hungarian Government, 'A tárca és a honvédség elmúlt évét értékelte Hende Csaba (Csaba Hende evaluated the last year of the MoD and the armed forces)', http://www.kormany.hu/hu/honvedelmi-miniszterium/hirek/a-tarca-es-a-honvedseg-elmult-evet-ertekelte-hende-csaba
honvedelem.hu, 'További országokkal tervez katonai együttműködést kötni a honvédelmi tárca (MoD plans to cooperate with more countries)', 23 December 2013, http://www.honvedelem.hu/cikk/41651_tovabbi_orszagokkal_tervez_katonai_egyuttmukodest_kotni_a_honvedelmi_tarca
vg.hu, 'Hende: Újrafegyverkezésre van szükség (Hende: need for rearmament)', 6 May 2013,
http://www.vg.hu/velemeny/interju/hende-ujrafegyverkezesre-van-szukseg-402895
Interview with Interviewee 3. Government official, Ministry of Defence, April 22, 2014
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: In order to address deficiencies discovered during the supervision of the structure and function of the operational internal control system of the Ministry of Defence, in 2012 an Action Plan was developed. In this Action Plan the Minister of Defence directed the renewal of the Military Code of Conduct; this happens through the development of a new Defence Ministerial Order that is to be published by the end of 2014. (Currently MoD Directive No. 67/2003 (HK 18) was issued on the publication of the “Military Code of Conduct” and the institution and tasks of the “Military Ethics Council” is still effective.)
Government update, April 2015:
The National Defence Act and military service regulations guide military personnel in their actions and these also address ethical behaviour to some extent. One section of the defence act prohibits acceptance of honoraria for public appearances connected with service duties. The military code of conduct generally discusses actions which might be linked to corruption risks, but no directive specifically delineates issues such as accepting corporate hospitality, transport, accommodation and meal costs during performance of official duties and other undesirable actions. There are two regulations for military personnel concerning acceptance of gifts. There is no law or regulation on post-retirement employment by military officials in defence industries, although personnel who worked in procurement and financial offices are not allowed to work for military suppliers for five years after retirement.
The new Defence Ministerial Order on the Code of Military Ethics handling the above mentioned areas and also containing an ethical procedure is to be published this year, as the CHOD directed to harmonize military de-merital and ethical processes.
As to the civilian personnel of MoD and defence forces, the Hungarian Government Officials’ Corps adopted a Code of Ethics for governmental officials. The Code of Ethics sets out values and principles to follow, provides specific rules on accepting gifts and introduces the so-called ‘ethical procedure’. An ethical offence is defined as ‘’an act committed by government officials in violation of the principles or detailed rules of professional ethics, which is not compliant with the ethical rules set forth in the Public Officials Act, the provisions of the Code of Ethics or the Charter of Government Officials and does not qualify as a criminal act, an infringement or infraction of discipline’. In case of an ethical offence, the Hungarian Government Officials’ Corps can conduct an ‘ethical procedure’ against its member.
Defence Ministerial Order Nr. 73 of 2013 regulates the system of reception of whistle blowing, their pre-evaluation, the collection of necessary information to their investigation, the audition of involved persons, measures to be taken, protection of whistle blowers and the feed-back about the result of investigation. This regulation was developed and published considering the Law Nr. 165 of 2013 about complaints and whistleblowing, so that the rights and protection of whistleblowers are ensured.
Suggested score: 3
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Aside from possible disciplinary sanctions (based on the military code of conduct), criminal prosecutions for bribery and corruption also represent an avenue. There is an ongoing criminal case against several high-ranking military officials for bribery. The case started in 2011 based on investigation by the Budapest military prosecutor's office. While in the first instance all the accused were acquitted, this decision has been annulled and a new criminal case was started in early 2014. With the Military Code of Conduct being essentially without teeth and with no information available about actual disciplinary hearings for bribery and corruption based on the Code, the only measures in place that could be used effectively would be the Criminal Code.
Origo.hu, 12 February 2014, Új eljárás indul a tábornokok ellen (New procedure starts agains the generals), http://www.origo.hu/itthon/20140212-uj-eljaras-indul-a-tabornokok-ellen.html.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is whistleblowing encouraged by the government, and are whistle-blowers in military and defence ministries afforded adequate protection from reprisal for reporting evidence of corruption, in both law and practice?
A new whistleblower protection law came into effect on 1 January 2014 within the framework of the government’s corruption prevention program. Previously, provisions on employees submitting information about violations of public interest were covered by the Act on the Protection of Fair Procedures, 2009. At the time the Act was accompanied by another piece of legislation which intended to set up the Public Interest Protection Office; however, the latter did not enter into force.
The new law on whistleblowing aims to guarantee confidentiality of reporting and protect whistleblowers from any negative consequences. It also provides for the appointment of an official from each public institution tasked with minimising the institution's exposure to corruption and forwarding information received from witnesses to the Ombudsman. The new law establishes the legal framework for the protection of whistleblowers in the private sector and includes provisions on the confidentiality of client-lawyer relationships.
However, the law has been criticised by civil liberties and anti-corruption NGOs, which argue that it is insufficient. Transparency International Hungary asserts that the new law is not better than the previous one. “With no whistleblower agency in place, employees who have suffered from retaliation must seek reinstatement and compensation through the courts, where a positive outcome is far from guaranteed. Moreover, rather than encouraging people to report abuses, the law reinforces existing oversight systems that have failed to control and uncover graft – thus contributing to a flourishing culture of corruption.”
The new whistleblowing law does not provide enough protection to the whistleblowers: they are not protected from procedures against them in case they reveal professional or commercial secrets. The safest route for the whistleblower is to turn to the ombudsman. If the whistleblower turns to the media, and not the ombudsman or the public institution in question, he or she can lose his position or be a subject of disciplinary proceedings or can be charged with defamation or a violation of confidentiality. There is no information available specifically on whistle-blowers in the military or defence ministries; most likely, they would be subject to the same level/lack of protection as other whistle-blowers. An Integrity Adviser, whose mission is the support of management of corruption risks and the reception and investigation of signals, has been appointed at the MOD and a Ministerial Order has been adopted to regulate the system of receiving and processing whistleblowing signals.
The whisltblowing regulations do not apply to military personnel, and no known cases are available which would test the law.
RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: Given the lack of trust in the whistleblowing regulations and their shortcomings, score 4 cannot be awarded. Score changed to 2 to reflect the existence of legislation and some implementation.
RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 2: Comments added.
Act CLXV of 2013 on Complaints and Public Interest Disclosure, accessed 8 April 2014,
http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=164339.250742
Act CXII of 2011 on the Right of Self-Determination in Respect of Information and the Freedom of Information, accessed 8 April 2014, http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=139257.243466
MoD Directive 73 of 2013 (XI. 29) on the action plan related to the Government’s corruption prevention program, accessed 8 April 2014, http://www.kormany.hu/download/d/73/21000/Honv%C3%A9delmi%20K%C3%B6zl%C3%B6ny%2012.pdf
European Commission, 'Hungary EU Anti-Corruption Report', Annex, February 3, 2014
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/organized-crime-and-human-trafficking/corruption/anti-corruption-report/docs/2014_acr_hungary_chapter_en.pdf
Lexology, 'Hungary: new whistleblowing law', 18 November 2013, http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=482b2d89-a20f-411b-80e1-aa2fb910c569
Transparency International, 'Hungary”s whistleblower law offers no real protection', 12 November 2013, http://blog.transparency.org/2013/11/12/hungarys-whistleblower-law-offers-no-real-protection/
Ataszjelenti.hu, Te is tehetsz a korrupció ellen - de csak óvatosan! (You too can act against corruption - but with caution!), http://ataszjelenti.blog.hu/2014/01/17/te_is_tehetsz_a_korrupcio_ellen
Transparency International, Exporting Corruption, http://www.transparency.org/exporting_corruption/Hungary
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: In 2013, the Parliament adopted an act on whistleblower-protection: the ‘Act on Complaints and Public Interest Disclosures’ (Act No 165 of 2013). Citizens can make a report through an electronic system that assigns a unique identification number to each report, so authorities can later contact the whistleblower using this identification number and the whistleblower’s identity can be protected. The electronic whistleblowing system is operated by the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights. Whistleblowers may request that their personal data be only available to the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights. In this case, other authorities will be still able to contact the whistleblower for more information by using the identification number, but without disclosing the identity of the whistleblower. The electronic whistleblower system doesn’t replace the possibility to submit a report in person, but offers a safe and user-friendly alternative.
According to the Governmental Order Nr. 50 of 2013 about Guidance of Integrity and System of Reception of Lobbyists, the Administrative State Secretary of MoD has appointed an Integrity Adviser whose mission is the support of management of corruption risks and the reception and investigation of whistle blowing.
Defence Ministerial Order Nr. 73 of 2013 regulates the system of reception of whistle blowing, their pre-evaluation, the collection of necessary information to their investigation, the questioning of involved persons, measures to be taken, protection of whistle blowers and the feed-back about the result of investigation.
Suggested score: 4
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: The new whistleblowing law does not provide enough protection to the whistleblowers: they are not protected from procedures against them in case they reveal professional or commercial secrets. The safest route for the whistleblower is to turn to the ombudsman. If the whistleblower turns to the media, and not the ombudsman or the public institution in question, he or she can lose his position or be a subject of disciplinary proceedings or can be charged with defamation or a violation of confidentiality. There is no information available specifically on whistle-blowers in the military or defence ministries; most likely, they would be subject to the same level/lack of protection as other whistle-blowers. It is not clear who would review whistleblowing complaints within the military and defence ministries, whether there is already a person appointed within the MoD who is in charge of receiving and reviewing complaints from whistleblowers.
Ataszjelenti.hu, Te is tehetsz a korrupció ellen - de csak óvatosan! (You too can act against corruption - but with caution!), http://ataszjelenti.blog.hu/2014/01/17/te_is_tehetsz_a_korrupcio_ellen
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is special attention paid to the selection, time in post, and oversight of personnel in sensitive positions, including officials and personnel in defence procurement, contracting, financial management, and commercial management?
Important provisions of the National Security Services Act specify key positions and levels of security clearance required for such posts across all Public Administration, including the Hungarian Defence Forces. Rules for personnel involved in defence procurement are found in MoD Decree 41 of 2007, which requires a certain level of regular national security checks. The HDF does not designate any particular posts which are sensitive. However, personnel assigned to procurement-related posts are required to make an annual declaration of property ownership.
There is a centralised system in place for selection and promotion of military personnel and a new performance evaluation system has been initiated for the civil service. New regulations guide promotion policies which are now more transparent. There is no set rotation policy for officers for routine assignments or for those serving in sensitive positions. However, all MOD and Hungarian Defence Forces personnel in the chain of the procurement process must sign a statement confirming that there is no conflict of interest in executing their responsibilities. The regulation on defence procurement prohibits personnel who worked in procurement and financial offices to work for military suppliers for five years after retirement.
The Act on Public Procurement outlines the requirements for state employees, including personnel involved in the procurement process on behalf of the contracting party (excluding personnel with conflicts of interests), as well as impartiality and incompatibility. Each person participating in the preparation of a public procurement decision is required to make a declaration that there is no conflict of interest for each procedure. While the Act on Public Procurement does contain rules and requirements for personnel involved in the procurement process on behalf of the state party, the law has no provisions for independent oversight in this respect.
Interviewee 1, however, stated that &quoute;national security checks and declarations of wealth [are of insufficient depth] for effectively screening corruption risks.&quoute; This is supported by a recent, 2014 assessment made by anti-corruption NGOs (Transparency International Hungary, K-Monitor, Atlatszo.hu), which concluded that the current system of asset declarations is unable to fulfil the functions it was originally designed for. Asset declarations are impossible to compare from year to year, no effective oversight and control mechanisms are in place and there are no sanctions for providing false information.
RESPONSE TO REVIEWERS: Comments incorporated. Score 3 selected to reflect shortcomings in implementation.
Act CXXV/1995 on the National Security Services http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=24361.285802 (accessed 28 August 2015)
Act CVIII of 2011 on Public Procurement, section 24, accessed on 9 April 2013, http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=139217.259648
Decree 41 of 2007(XII 14) of the MoD on the on important and confidential work positions and on the levels of security checks, accessed on 9 April 2013, http://kozlonyok.hu/kozlonyok/index.php?m=0&p=kozltart&ev=2008&szam=1&k=13
Act CLII of 2007 on asset declarations, accessed on 9 April 2013, http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=111766.259638
Interview with Interviewee 1: Retired Lieutenant-Colonel, Budapest, April 24, 2014.
Report &quoute;Ez a minimum&quoute;, 2014.
http://www.ezaminimum.hu/minimumpontok/3-vagyonnyilatkozatok-%C3%A9s-%C3%B6sszef%C3%A9rhetetlens%C3%A9g.html
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Government update, April 2015:
Important provisions of the National Security Services Act specify key positions and levels of security clearance required for such posts across all Public Administration, including the Hungarian Defence Forces. The HDF does not designate any particular posts which are sensitive. However, personnel assigned to procurement-related posts are required to make an annual declaration of property ownership.
There is a centralised system in place for selection and promotion of military personnel and a new performance evaluation system has been initiated for the civil service. New regulations guide promotion policies which are now more transparent. There is no set rotation policy for officers for routine assignments or for those serving in sensitive positions.
However, all MOD and Hungarian Defence Forces personnel in the chain of the procurement process must sign a statement confirming that there is no conflict of interest in executing their responsibilities. The regulation on defence procurement prohibits personnel who worked in procurement and financial offices to work for military suppliers for five years after retirement.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: While the Act of Public Procurement does contain rules and requirements for personnel involved in the procurement process on behalf of the state party, the law has no provisions for independent oversight in this respect.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is the number of civilian and military personnel accurately known and publicly available?
The number of civilian and military personnel is publicly stated by parliament in a resolution determining the maximum headcount of the Hungarian Defence Forces (currently max 29700). In the resolution, different categories are mentioned with maximum quotas for the categories. The actual numbers are not known. The development of the headcount is monitored by the Parliamentary Defence and Law Enforcement Committee; decisions concerning actual numbers are made by the MoD.
35/2013. (V 16) Resolution of the Parliament on detailed number of the Armed Forces of Hungary, accessed 10 April 2014, http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=160509.241612
Act CCV of 2012 on the Legal status of military personnel, accessed 10 April 2014, http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=157593.255367
Act CXCIX of 2011 on Public Service Officials, accessed 10 April 2013, http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=142936.255696
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are pay rates and allowances for civilian and military personnel openly published?
Information and criteria on pay rates and allowances for civilian and military personnel are defined by the law and published in official journals. Information concerning pay rates are also available in brochures provided by the Ministry of Defence and Hungarian Defence Forces. The government is publicly committed to increasing the defence budget, and in a recent interview the MoD mentioned a 0,1 percent of the GDP increase for 2015 and a 50 increase for allowances and benefits of the personnel.
RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 2: Information added.
Act CCV of 2012 on the Legal status of miliatary personnel, accessed 10 April 2014, http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=157593.255367
Act CXCIX of 2011 on Public Service Officials, accessed 10 April 2014, http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=142936.255696
MoD Directive 21/2013 (IX.17.) on the salary, allowances, and bonuses of military personnel and of civilians employed as public servants in the defence sector, http://net.jogtar.hu/jr/gen/hjegy_doc.cgi?docid=A1300021.HM
Monetary bonus instead of a salary raise: defending a country for nothing), http://www.pecsistop.hu/belfold/penzjutalom-beremeles-helyett-orszagvedelem-lyukas-garasert/1195793/.
Hungarian Defence Forces, 'Hogyan le Hetek szerződéses katona? (How can I be a contractual soldier? Brochure on the career opportunities of contract soldiers)', accessed 10 April 2014, http://www.hadkiegeszites.hu/pub/docs/hogyan_lehetek_szerzodeses_katona.pdf
Magyar Hirlap, 3 June 2015. A jövő év nyertese lesz a honvédelem (Winner of the next year's budget is defence) http://magyarhirlap.hu/cikk/27649/A_jovo_ev_nyertese_lesz_a_honvedelem
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: MoD Directive 21/2013 (IX.17.) on the salary, allowances, and bonuses of military personnel and of civilians employed as public servants in the defence sector, http://net.jogtar.hu/jr/gen/hjegy_doc.cgi?docid=A1300021.HM. Pécsi Stop, 23 November 2013, Pénzjutalom béremelés helyett: országvédelem lyukas garasért
(Monetary bonus instead of a salary raise: defending a country for nothing), http://www.pecsistop.hu/belfold/penzjutalom-beremeles-helyett-orszagvedelem-lyukas-garasert/1195793/.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Do personnel receive the correct pay on time, and is the system of payment well-established, routine, and published?
The pay and salary system for public employees and military personnel is regulated by legislation and is not subject to discretionary adjustments. Annual agreements are reached between the MoD and the relevant trade unions on different allowances.
There is no publicly available information that suggests late payment of salaries or problems relating to payments. Interviewee 2, an opposition MP, mentioned that there were rumours about late payments for certain off-salary allowances (such as compensation for clothing), and in the compensation scheme, which was introduced for state sector employees after a flat personal income tax system was installed. However, interviewee 3, a government official, said that all payments were made in due time and added that certain allowances could only be calculated after annual salary agreements were concluded with trade unions. In some cases these negotiations were not finished until the beginning of the year.
Interview with Interviewee 2: Opposition Member of Parliament, Budapest, April 23, 2014
Interview with Interviewee 3. Government official, Ministry of Defence, April 22, 2014
Act XXXIII of 1992 on the legal status of public employees (accessed May 21, 2014)
http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=17120.243703
Szakszervezetek.hu, 11 March 2014, Agreement signed on allowances for military personnel (Aláírták a megállapodást a honvédségi dolgozók béren kívüli juttatásairól), szakszervezetek.hu http://www.szakszervezetek.hu/index.php/hirek/9158-alairtak-a-megallapodast-a-honvedsegi-dolgozok-beren-kivuli-juttatasairol
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is there an established, independent, transparent, and objective appointment system for the selection of military personnel at middle and top management level?
There are detailed rules on appointment and promotion procedures regulated by the law on the legal status of the military personnel, which, in principle, ensure transparency and objectivity throughout the system. The law provides clear prerequisites and requirements for all military personnel, and clarification of possibilities and career options. The promised new military career-model (not published yet) may make the appointment system more transparent and objective. However, the interviewees note that there is a high-level of politicisation in the selection of middle or top level personnel. There is no evidence of independent oversight.
RESPONSE TO REVIEWERS: Information incorporated.
Act on Defence, CXIII/2011, accessed 29 August 2015, http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=139266.290145
Act CCV of 2012 on the Legal status of military personnel, accessed 10 April 2014, http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=157593.255367
79/2011 (July 29) HM Order of the Hungarian Armed Forces, 'Instruction of the Minister of Defence on Human Resources Strategy for the period of 2012-2021', accessed 11 April 2014, http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=138888.235976
Inforadio.hu, 7 July 2014, Hende: A katonai életpályamodell világos előmeneteli rendszert kínál (Hende: The military career model provides a clear promotional system) ,http://inforadio.hu/hir/belfold/hir-572495
Interview with Interviewee 1: Retired Lieutenant-Colonel, Budapest, April 24, 2014.
Interview with Interviewee 2: Opposition Member of Parliament, Budapest, April 23, 2014
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: On 18 December 2012, Parliament passed the new law on the legal status of military personnel, effective form 1 July 2013. The main aim of the new law is the proper regulation of increased responsibilities and authorizations based on the specialities of military public service according to the challenges of society, the international and legal environment. For the sake of effective functioning, it was a basic principle to have a simpler and more transparent regulation, the level of bureaucracy is to be decreased, public budget is to be used more cost effectively and personnel processes must be rationalized.
The basic principle of the new law is the priority of organizational interest. The law provides clear prerequisites and requirements for all military personnel, and clarification of possibilities and career options.
This transparent career model is an element of key importance for ensuring the proper strength and consistency of military personnel needed by the Defence Force.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: The promised new military career-model (not published yet) may make the appointment system more transparent and objective. Politicization has been a repeated concern at the top levels, as the assessor notes.
Inforadio.hu, 7 July 2014, Hende: A katonai életpályamodell világos előmeneteli rendszert kínál (Hende: The military career model provides a clear promotional system) ,http://inforadio.hu/hir/belfold/hir-572495.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are personnel promoted through an objective, meritocratic process? Such a process would include promotion boards outside of the command chain, strong formal appraisal processes, and independent oversight.
The act regulating the legal status of military personnel provides for the possibility of promotion for each uniformed member of the Armed Forces, through the system of performance evaluation. If the requirements prescribed by the law are met,a military person can be appointed to a higher post and, at the same time, promoted to a higher rank, or promoted to a higher rank within their own post.
Starting in 2010, the MoD started a process to make the military career more stable, more predictable and straighforward. This process, according the Minister of Defence, is set to continue, with a promise that the new military career model should enter into force. The model is still in preparation.
Although the process of promotion for military personnel is based on rules and regulations - including annual performance evaluations, and promotional boards (outside the chain of command), no independent oversight is in place. Anecdotal evidence in interviews shows that in practice, personal relationships, political affiliations and other aspects can often play an important role, although no publicly known case substantiate these anecdotal accounts. It remains to be seen whether the new military career model, once it is in force, will achieve its objectives, including the exclusion of subjective criteria from the promotion process.
RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 2: Comments added.
RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: Some comments added. Score maintained as the system is still being put in place and there is no evidence of independent oversight.
Act CCV of 2012 on the Legal status of military personnel, accessed 10 April 2014, http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=157593.255367
79/2011 (July 29) HM Order of the Hungarian Armed Forces, 'Instruction of the Minister of Defence on Human Resources Strategy for the period of 2012-2021', accessed 11 April 2014, http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=138888.235976
Inforadio.hu, 7 July 2014, Hende: A katonai életpályamodell világos előmeneteli rendszert kínál (Hende: The military career model provides a clear promotional system) ,http://inforadio.hu/hir/belfold/hir-572495.
Interview with Interviewee 1: Retired Lieutenant-Colonel, Budapest, April 24, 2014.
Interview with Interviewee 2: Opposition Member of Parliament, Budapest, April 23, 2014
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: The act regulating the legal status of military personnel provides for the possibility of promotion for each uniformed member of the Armed Forces, through the system of performance evaluation. If the requirements prescribed by the law are met,a military person can be appointed to a higher post and, at the same time, promoted to a higher rank, or promoted to a higher rank within their own post.
Original suggested score: 3
Government Update April 2015:
The military career model is based on the promotional system, which ensures the motivation for the whole service period and makes the horizontal, sideward movement and its appreciation possible besides the promotion in a higher position . The career model offers a clear and plannable career: foundations of promotion are performance, knowledge and experience. In the relatively closed promotional system the military career becomes bi-directional: not only the possibility of the promotion in a higher position (vertical promotion) turns up on the career span, but also, as a new element, the possibility of moving sideward (horizontal move) comes up. Both career ways can be applied in parallel.
The sideward career path ensures the possibility of progress in the same or in same-level positions with gaining higher grades and appreciates the cumulative organizational knowledge and experience. The sideward career path will be developed for all three categories (officers, NCOs, privates) and will be applied in the case of pre-defined ranks. The exams connected to the grades are obligatory for the personnel after the expiration of the waiting time of a definite rank; a successful exam results in an increase of salary, but this does not reach the standard of raise in case of vertical advancement, so that the member of the armed forces will be motivated to vertical promotion. Based on the specialities of military hierarchy, the role of military rank - that states the place of a position in the organizational structure - remains a determining element of the military career model. Senior ranks (generals) can only be appointed and promoted by the minister president of Hungary by law.
Suggested score: 4
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Starting in 2010, the MoD started a process to make the military career more stable, more predictable and straighforward. This process, according the Minister of Defence, is set to continue in 2014, with a promise that the new military career model should enter into force in 2014. It remains to be seen whether the new military career model, once it is in force, will achieve its objectives, including the exclusion of subjective criteria from the promotion process.
Inforadio.hu, 7 July 2014, Hende: A katonai életpályamodell világos előmeneteli rendszert kínál (Hende: The military career model provides a clear promotional system) ,http://inforadio.hu/hir/belfold/hir-572495.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Where compulsory conscription occurs, is there a policy of not accepting bribes for avoiding conscription? Are there appropriate procedures in place to deal with such bribery, and are they applied?
In peacetime there is only voluntary military service in Hungary, as stipulated in the Fundamental Law. However, according to the Fundamental Law, a general conscription is applicable to every male citizen above the age of 18 in the case of war. There is no special policy on accepting bribes for avoiding conscription.
Article XXXI of the Fundamental Law of Hungary, accessed 11 April 2014,
http://www.kormany.hu/download/4/c3/30000/THE%20FUNDAMENTAL%20LAW%20OF%20HUNGARY.pdf
Hungarian government; website on Hungary's defence system, http://www.kormany.hu/hu/mo/honvedelem, accessed January 2015
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
With regard to compulsory or voluntary conscription, is there a policy of refusing bribes to gain preferred postings in the recruitment process? Are there appropriate procedures in place to deal with such bribery, and are they applied?
The Hungarian Defence Forces are based on voluntary military service, thus score N/A was selected.
Accepting bribes is a criminal offence and thus strictly forbidden by the military code of conduct which lists incorruptibility as a basic requirement for military personnel, however no actual evidence was found for enforcement of the code. here is also a Military Ethical Council, established by MoD Directive 67 of 2003 (HK 18) on the Military Code of Conduct, but there is almost no information about the operation of the Council available to the public. Moreover, the Code of Conduct only contains general rules against corruptibility but has no clear guidelines and procedural rules in place for infractions. It is unclear what the sanctions are, and there is generally no information as to the effectiveness or actual implementation of the code.
Ministry of Defence Directive 67 of 2003 (HK 18) on the Military Code of Conduct, accessed 12 April 2014, http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:lJJtIaTkuRkJ:www.kormany.hu/download/0/a1/00000/Katonai%2520Etikai%2520K%25C3%25B3dex.doc+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=hu
Fizettem.hu, Anti-bribery portal
http://www.fizettem.hu/osszesbejelentes/mindenmegye/mindenvaros/rend%C5%91rs%C3%A9g%2C_t%C5%B1zolt%C3%B3s%C3%A1g%2C_honv%C3%A9ds%C3%A9g/mindenugyintezes?page=3
Hungarian Government, website on the structure of the prosecution in Hungary: http://www.kormany.hu/hu/mo/az-igazsagszolgaltatas-rendszere/ugyeszi-szervezeti-rendszer, accessed January 2015
Article XXXI of the Fundamental Law of Hungary, accessed 11 April 2014,
http://www.kormany.hu/download/4/c3/30000/THE%20FUNDAMENTAL%20LAW%20OF%20HUNGARY.pdf
Hungarian government; website on Hungary's defence system, http://www.kormany.hu/hu/mo/honvedelem, accessed January 2015
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: It is important to note that conscription was suspended in Hungary in 2004. Hence, since then no specific policy has been elaborated.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: While Fizettem.hu is a commendable initiative, it is not an official platform for dealing with the issue of potential bribery in the military and does not replace an official policy in this respect. That being said, the military code of conduct does have some provisions with regards to incorruptibility. The question is whether there is actual enforcement for the code, for which no evidence was found. There is also a Military Ethical Council, established by MoD Directive 67 of 2003 (HK 18) on the Military Code of Conduct, but there is almost no information about the operation of the Council available to the public. Moreover, the Code of Conduct only contains general rules against corruptibility but has no clear guidelines and procedural rules in place for infractions. It is unclear what the sanctions are, and there is generally no information as to the effectiveness or actual implementation of the code.
MoD Directive 67 of 2003 (HK18) on the Military Code of Conduct, http://2010-2014.kormany.hu/download/d/14/41000/katonai_etikai_kodex_20140430.pdf.
Suggested score: 3
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is there evidence of 'ghost soldiers', or non-existent soldiers on the payroll?
The number of civilian and military personnel is publicly stated by parliament in a resolution determining the maximum headcount of the Hungarian Defence Forces (currently max 29700). In the resolution different categories are mentioned with maximum quotas for the categories.
The pay and salary system for public employees and military personnel is regulated by legislation and is not subject to discretionary adjustments; chains of command are separated from chains of payment. Annual agreements are reached between the MoD and the relevant trade unions on different allowances. Chains of command cannot influence chains of payments, (salaries and allowances). Officers in the chain of command have to respect legislative regulations.
There is no evidence either from interviews or publicly available information of non-existent soldiers on the payroll.
35/2013. (V 16) Resolution of the Parliament on detailed number of the Armed Forces of Hungary, accessed 10 April 2014, http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=160509.241612
Source: Act XXXIII of 1992 on the legal status of public employees (accessed May 21, 2014)
http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=17120.243703
Interview with Interviewee 1: Retired Lieutenant-Colonel, Budapest, April 24, 2014.
Interview with Interviewee 2: Opposition Member of Parliament, Budapest, April 23, 2014
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are chains of command separate from chains of payment?
Chains of command cannot influence chains of payments, (salaries and allowances). Officers in the chain of command have to respect legislative regulations. There is an economic and financial organisation within the MoD (MoD Defence Economy Bureau is) which is responsible for payments. Interviewee 3, a government official, also confirmed that there is a legal and real separation of the two chains of command.
Hungarian Defence Forces and Ministry of Defence, 'HM Közgazdasági és Pénzügyi Ügynökség (Economic and Financial Organization of the MoD)', https://www.ket.hm.gov.hu/Lapok/hm_kph.aspx?isDlg=1
Act XXXIII of 1992 on the legal status of public employees (accessed 28 August, 2014)
http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=17120.243703
Act CCV of 2012 on the Legal status of military personnel, (accessed 28 August, 2014) http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=157593.255367
Interview with Interviewee 3. Government official, Ministry of Defence, April 22, 2014
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: HM KPH does not exist any more. The MoD's Defence Economy Bureau is responsible for payments.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is there a Code of Conduct for all military and civilian personnel that includes, but is not limited to, guidance with respect to bribery, gifts and hospitality, conflicts of interest, and post-separation activities?
The National Defence Act and military service regulations guide military personnel in their actions and these address ethical behaviour to some extent. One section of the Defence Act prohibits acceptance of honoraria for public appearances connected with service duties.
The Military Code of Conduct, which applies to soldiers of the armed forces, states that soldiers must be incorruptible. Among the behavioural norms, the code forbids accepting advantages, rights, discounts, privileges, benefits of treatment and it provides general guidance on ethical behaviour. The same rules apply to the Code of Conduct for Government Officials.
There is a Military Ethical Council, established by MoD Directive 67 of 2003 (HK 18) on the Military Code of Conduct, but there is almost no information available about the operation of the Council. There are civilians working for the military and it is not clear what rules - beyond the criminal code - would apply to them, but the Military Code of Conduct would not be applicable. In the absence of a unified code of conduct for both military and civilian personnel, there is a significant gap that needs to be filled. In the framework of the government’s corruption prevention action plan, there are plans to create a unified code of conduct for both military and civilian personnel. The launch date was announced for 2013; however, there has been no recent news on its introduction. The Military Code of Conduct does have a general prohibition against bribery, gifts, hospitality, but it cannot be said to have clear guidelines and procedural rules, making it potentially ineffective.
There is no evidence that these codes are effectively implemented or that there is a robust oversight mechanism in place.
RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: Comments incorporated. Score maintained, however, as the Code lacks specificity and is not comprehensive.
RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 2: Comments incorporated.
MoD Directive 67 of 2003 (HK 18) on the Military Code of Conduct, accessed 12 April 2014, http://www.kormany.hu/download/d/14/41000/katonai_etikai_kodex_20140430.pdf#!DocumentBrowse
Code of Conduct for Government Officials, accessed 12 April 2014, http://mkk.org.hu/node/102
Government decree 1104 of 2012 on the government’s corruption prevention action plan, accessed 12 April 2014, http://korrupciomegelozes.kormany.hu/download/d/fc/50000/antikorrupcios_int%C3%A9zkedesek_eloterjesztes.pdf
Green Book of the government on the general principles relating to corruption prevention at state institutions, accessed 12 April 2014, http://korrupciomegelozes.kormany.hu/download/e/0b/60000/Z%C3%B6ld.pdf
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: The MoD Directive No. 67/2003 (HK 18) was issued on the publication of the “Military Code of Conduct” and the institution and tasks of the “Military Ethics Council” is effective.
In oder to counteract the deficiencies discovered during the supervision of the structure and function of the operational internal control system of the Ministry of Defence in 2012, an Action Plan was developed. In this Action Plan the Minister of Defence directed the renewal of the Military Code of Conduct; this happens through the development of a new Defence Ministerial Order that is to be published by the end of 2014.
The Hungarian Government Officials’ Corps adopted a Code of Ethics for governmental officials. The Code of Ethics sets out values and principles to follow, provides specific rules on accepting gifts and introduces the so-called ‘ethical procedure’. An ethical offence is defined as ‘’an act committed by government officials in violation of the principles or detailed rules of professional ethics, which is not compliant with the ethical rules set forth in the Public Officials Act, the provisions of the Code of Ethics or the Charter of Government Officials and does not qualify as a criminal act, an infringement or infraction of discipline’. In case of an ethical offence, the Hungarian Government Officials’ Corps can conduct an ‘ethical procedure’ against its member.
Government Update April 2015:
The National Defence Act and military service regulations guide military personnel in their actions and these also address ethical behaviour to some extent. One section of the Defence Act prohibits acceptance of honoraria for public appearances connected with service duties. The military code of conduct generally discusses actions which might be linked to corruption risks, but no directive specifically delineates issues such as accepting corporate hospitality, transport, accommodation and meal costs during performance of official duties and other undesirable actions. There are two regulations for military personnel concerning acceptance of gifts. There is no law or regulation on post-retirement employment by military officials in defence industries, although personnel who worked in procurement and financial offices are not allowed to work for military suppliers for five years after retirement.
The new Defence Ministerial Order on the Code of Military Ethics handling the above mentioned areas and also containig an ethical procedure is to be published this year, as the CHOD directed to harmonize military demerital and ethical processes.
As to the civilian personnel of MoD and defence forces, the Hungarian Government Officials’ Corps adopted a Code of Ethics for governmental officials. The Code of Ethics sets out values and principles to follow, provides specific rules on accepting gifts and introduces the so-called ‘ethical procedure’. An ethical offence is defined as ‘’an act committed by government officials in violation of the principles or detailed rules of professional ethics, which is not compliant with the ethical rules set forth in the Public Officials Act, the provisions of the Code of Ethics or the Charter of Government Officials and does not qualify as a criminal act, an infringement or infraction of discipline’. In case of an ethical offence, the Hungarian Government Officials’ Corps can conduct an ‘ethical procedure’ against its member.
Suggested score: 3
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: There is a Military Ethical Council, established by MoD Directive 67 of 2003 (HK 18) on the Military Code of Conduct, but there is almost no information available about the operation of the Council. There are civilians working for the military and it is not clear what rules - beyond the criminal code - would apply to them, but the Military Code of Conduct would not be applicable. In the absence of a unified code of conduct for both military and civilian personnel, there is a significant gap that needs to be filled. The Military Code of Conduct does have a general prohibition against bribery, gifts, hospitality, but it cannot be said to have clear guidelines and procedural rules, making it potentially ineffective.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is there evidence that breaches of the Code of Conduct are effectively addressed ,and are the results of prosecutions made publicly available?
There is a Military Ethical Council set up to deal with violations of the Code of Conduct, but there is no information available about its operation and with a lack of procedural rules, it is not clear how effective the implementation of the the Code of Conduct would be.
However, neither Act XCV of 2001 on the legal status of career and contractual soldiers of the Hungarian Armed Forces, nor Act CCV on the legal status of military personnel of 1. July 2012 include the rules of ethical procedures; therefore the violating of the Military Code of Conduct cannot be sanctioned at the moment unless the breach is punishable under other regulations. If the violation of a rule laid down in the Military Code of Conduct is also a violation of a rule arising from the service relationship, disciplinary proceedings can be instigated. If the conduct is a misdemeanour or a crime, a misdemeanour procedure or a criminal procedure is admissible. The Hungarian Government Officials’ Corps can conduct an ‘ethical procedure’ against government officials for a breach of the Ethical Code, irrespective of whether the government official has committed the ethical offence in Hungary or abroad. Cases are investigated and tried by the Regional Ethics Committee and the National Ethics Committee in the second instance.
Apart from a number of criminal cases arising from the audit commissioned by the government in 2010, which investigated corruption cases relating to the left-wing government between 2002 and 2010, there is no evidence of any successful corruption cases under the current government or any ethical investigations into corruption or bribery based on the Code of Conduct. Interviewee 1, a retired Lieutenant-Colonel, said that &quoute;the Code of Conduct remains in the generalities and contains nothing tangible which could be effectively used in corruption cases&quoute;. Interviewee 3, a government official added that &quoute;there are no procedural regulations linked to the Code of Conduct at all, making it difficult to implement&quoute;.
RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 2: Comments added.
RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: Comments added. Score maintained as it describes the current situation.
Act CCV/2012 on the legal status of military personnel, accessed 28 August, 2015, http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=157593.292461
Ministry of Defence, 'White Book - Corruption, audit and penal consequences,' 2011, http://www.kormany.hu/download/3/52/40000/Honv%20Min%20-%20Feh%C3%A9r%20k%C3%B6nyv.pdf
MoD Directive 67 of 2003 (HK 18) on the Military Code of Conduct, accessed 28 August 2015, http://www.kormany.hu/download/d/14/41000/katonai_etikai_kodex_20140430.pdf#!DocumentBrowse
Interview with Interviewee 1: Retired Lieutenant-Colonel, Budapest, April 24, 2014.
Interview with Interviewee 3. Government official, Ministry of Defence, April 22, 2014
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: Neither Act XCV of 2001 on the legal status of career and contractual soldiers of the Hungarian Armed Forces (which was effective from 1. July 2003), nor Act CCV on the legal status of military personnel of 1. July 2012 include the rules of ethical procedures; therefore the violating of the Military Code of Conduct – operative from 3 October, 2003 – cannot be sanctioned at the moment.
If the violation of a rule laid down in the Military Code of Conduct is also a violation of a rule arising from the service relationship, disciplinary proceedings shall be conducted. If the conduct is a misdemeanour or a crime, a misdemeanour procedure or a criminal procedure is admissible.
The Hungarian Government Officials’ Corps can conduct an ‘ethical procedure’ against government officials for a breach of the Ethical Code, irrespective of whether the government official has committed the ethical offence in Hungary or abroad. Cases are investigated and tried by the Regional Ethics Committee and the National Ethics Committee in the second instance.
Government Update April 2015:
The new Defence Ministerial Order on the Code of Military Ethics containiNg the rules of an &quoute;ethical procedure&quoute; is to be published this year, as the CHOD directed to harmonize military demerital and ethical processes.
N/A Criteria is chosen as all others do not cover the existing practice. Neither Act XCV of 2001 on the legal status of career and contractual soldiers of the Hungarian Armed Forces (which was effective from 1. July 2003), nor Act CCV on the legal status of military personnel of 1. July 2012 include the rules of ethical procedures therefore the violating of the Military Code of Conduct – operative from 3 October, 2003 – cannot be sanctioned at the moment.
If the violation of a rule laid down in the Military Code of Conduct is also a violation of a rule arising from the service relationship, disciplinary proceedings shall be conducted. If the conduct is military demerit or a crime, a military demotion or a criminal procedure is admissible.
Suggested score: N/A
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: There is a Military Ethical Council set up to deal with violations of the Code of Conduct, but there is no information available about its operation and with a lack of procedural rules, it is not clear how effective the implementation of the the Code of Conduct would be.
MoD Directive 67 of 2003 (HK 18) on the Military Code of Conduct, accessed 12 April 2014, http://www.kormany.hu/download/d/14/41000/katonai_etikai_kodex_20140430.pdf#!DocumentBrowse
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Does regular anti-corruption training take place for military and civilian personnel?
Within the framework of the anti-corruption initiative, the government has launched an extensive integrity project for state institutions funded by the European Union and this project offers anti-corruption training. Interviewee 3, a government official, said that in 2013-2014, there was a wave of anti-corruption training courses for civilian employees of the MoD: in 2013 a total of 14 had participated and in 2014, 83 people participated.
Further training and senior level training of governmental officials are carried out in the frame of the programs “Ethics of Public Administrative Service” and Ethics of Public Administrative Services and Integrity”. The aim of those training is the recognition and spread of integrity based view of public administrative services.The National University of Public Administrative Services offers specialised anti-corruption training.
Commanding officers are not fully trained in the management of corruption risks yet. An individual programme of instruction for commanding level training does not exist; still, the anti-corruption training is part of the general training prior to deployment. All military personnel serving in MoD, at central defence agencies and military organization with public authority are to pass the public administrative exam. This exam contains the topics of integrity and ethics. Participation in the NATO Building Integrity programme has also yielded training schemes.
RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: Additional information incorporated and score amended to 3 based on recent developments.
Government decree 1104 of 2012 (April 6) Government’s Decision on governmental measures to combat corruption and administration for the adoption of the Corruption Prevention Programme, accessed 12 April 2014, http://korrupciomegelozes.kormany.hu/download/d/fc/50000/antikorrupcios_int%C3%A9zkedesek_eloterjesztes.pdf
CorruptionPrevention, 'Training, Integrity Project of the Government', http://corruptionprevention.gov.hu/training, accessed July 2015
Interview with Interviewee 3. Government official, Ministry of Defence, April 22, 2014
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: Specialized national level education and training is carried out at the National University of Public Administrative Services. According to the anti-corruption initiative the education program of Integrity Advisers was developed 2013. Its goal is the education of those advisors who are able to support the function of the integrated system of leadership and also promote the establishment of corruption-free and ethical organizational culture.
The further training and senior level training of governmental officials are carried out in the frame of the programs “Ethics of Public Administrative Service” and Ethics of Public Administrative Services and Integrity”. Aim of those training is the recognition and spread of integrity based view of public administrative services.
Commanding officers are not fully trained in the management of corruption risks yet. An individual programme of instruction for commanding level training does not exist; still, the anti-corruption training is part of the general training prior to deployment.
Government Update April 2015:
According to the regulations of Paragraph 91.1, all military personnel serving in MoD, at central defence agencies and military organization with public authority are to pass the public administrative exam. This exam contains the topics of integrity and ethics, so that the wide-range education of military personnel is ensure.
Suggested score: 3
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is there a policy to make public outcomes of the prosecution of defence services personnel for corrupt activities, and is there evidence of effective prosecutions in recent years?
The last systematic audit of corruption related cases at the MoD and the armed forces happened in 2010-2011 and the opposition regularly accuses of the government of conducting politically biased investigations resulting in biased prosecutions of high-profile military personnel and MoD officials. This accusation is supported by the fact that since 2011 no new corruption cases have been revealed (as Interviewee 3 confirmed) and no prosecution has been made. There is no policy on making prosecution outcomes public, though it is likely that the media would carry relevant information. Score 2 has been selected given that systematic audits (while not regular) would provide information on the outcomes of prosecutions.
Ministry of Defence, ' White Book - Corruption, audit and penal consequences,' 2011, see at: http://www.kormany.hu/download/3/52/40000/Honv%20Min%20-%20Feh%C3%A9r%20k%C3%B6nyv.pdf
Ex MoD and his state secretary complain about showcase trial. Nepszabadsag.hu, November 26, 2013.
http://nol.hu/belfold/juhasz_ferenc_es_fapal_laszlo_is_koncepciosnak_nevezte_az_ellenuk_indult_eljarast-1428881
Source: Interview with Interviewee 3. Government official, Ministry of Defence, April 22, 2014
2014-05-21
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: In accordance with the information from the MoD Internal Audit Department and the Military National Security Service the areas of greatest risk in bribery and corruption for Defence Ministry and armed forces personnel are the following:
1)tpublic procurement procedures,
2)tthe selling of property,
3)tproperty protection,
4)tthe awarding of subsidies,
5)tthe awarding of missions,
6)tthe settlement of expenses.
The selection of areas at risk is based on the continuously developed risk analysis and practical experience. In the latter case, the material damage that occurred and the consequences which negatively influence the lawful operation of the army will determine the risky area.
The reduction of the corruption risk is possible by increasing the frequency and efficiency of controlling. As a result of this – beyond the cases discovered during the controlling –potential further offenders will also become aware of the discovery of the crime and so – for fear of getting caught – will not commit crimes, which means that the control also has a preventive function.
In order to reduce the possibility of corruption, an audit was conducted concerning companies and other institutions overseen by the ministry, with the aim to explore the functional and structural defects in the subsystems of the ministry.
The formation and operation of an organisational unit dealing exclusively with controlling within the ministry serves the purpose of reducing the risk of corruption. The role of the Controlling Department of MoD is, according to the Organisational and Operational Rules of the MoD, the coordination of the ministry’s anti-corruption activity.
Corruption prevention processes include national security checks, the regular use of declarations of property, the implementation of training programmes, and making known the contents of codes of ethics.
Since bribery is an offence, its primary sanction is punishment. Act C of 2012 on the Criminal Code prescribes a punishment of imprisonment up to three years, five years, between two years to eight years or between five years to ten years for the various cases of bribery.
Damage caused by bribery may also be reimbursed under the provisions of civil law or labour law.
If the offender is a soldier, then – if the conditions provided for by law exist – indignity proceedings may be held, as a result of which the service (labour relation) may be terminated.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: The government started a comprehensive audit of the entire government, including the MoD, in 2010, resulting in a number of prosecutions of military leaders under the previous government for corruption. The audit results are included in the White Book the MoD published in 2011. While these results were made public, there is no ongoing corruption prosecutions for post-2010 activities.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are there effective measures in place to discourage facilitation payments (which are illegal in almost all countries)?
The Military Code of Conduct and Code of Conduct for Government Officials, as well as the Criminal Code, forbid the acceptance of any kind of bribe, including facilitation payments; there is also no facilitation payments exemption in connection with international conventions. However, there are doubts about the effectiveness of codes and laws relating to bribery as very few cases are publicly mentioned.
Interviewee 3 also confirmed that no cases relating to facilitation payments had been made public in recent years, and that no information was available as to whether any such procedures were initiated. Interviewee 3. also confirmed that the Military Code of Conduct does not contain procedural guidance, making its implementation questionable.
RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER: Agree, score amended to 2.
MoD Directive 67 of 2003 (HK 18) on the Military Code of Conduct, accessed 12 April 2014, http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:lJJtIaTkuRkJ:www.kormany.hu/download/0/a1/00000/Katonai%2520Etikai%2520K%25C3%25B3dex.doc+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=hu
Code of Conduct for Government Officials, accessed 12 April 2014, http://mkk.org.hu/node/102
Act C. of 2012 on the criminal code (accessed May 21, 2014)
http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=152383.262832
Interview with Interviewee 3. Government official, Ministry of Defence, April 22, 2014
Andy Spalding, 'Notes from IACA, Part Three (concl.): A facilitation payments question we could not answer', 5 August 2015. http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2015/8/5/notes-from-iaca-part-three-concl-a-facilitation-payments-que.html, accessed October 2015.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: While it is commendable that there are rules in place against facilitating payments, there is no evidence of the effectiveness of these measures. Without actual implementation and enforcement, these may be laws without teeth.
Suggested score: 2
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Do the armed forces have military doctrine addressing corruption as a strategic issue on operations?
Interviewee 3, a government official, mentioned that the MoD, like all the other ministries, has an obligation to prepare a yearly integrity report and an annual anti-corruption action plan. However, these documents are not publicly available.
The different training courses in the military show awareness of the problem, however, no dedicated training modules for commanding military officers have been developed yet. During pre-deployment training, this issue is integrated into the general agenda of the preparation of the commanders. The military CIMIC Centre conducts pre-deployment training on local cultures and on corruption risks for deploying units. The armed forces rely on returning contingent commanders to coordinate with their successors on lessons learned that might be applicable as regards corruption incidents which occurred during deployment. A Lessons Learned Department in the Joint Staff provides separate reports to the Deputy CHOD. Moreover, commanders of deploying units receive two weeks training on expenditure of funds, logistics and financial management and a lawyer deploys with each contingent to support the commander.
RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: Information included. Score changed to 2.
RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 1: The focus of the question is on corruption in military operations; the Strategy appears to refer to domestic issues.
Hungary’s National Security Strategy of 2012 was adopted as a government resolution. 1035/2012. (II 21) Government Decree on the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Hungary, accessed 4 April 2014, http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=146225.213089
A press release on the government's website refers to open discussion of the National Security Strategy. Elkészült Magyarország új Nemzeti Biztonsági Stratégiája, (The new National Security Strategy of Hungary has been finalized), 22 February 2012, http://www.kormany.hu/hu/kulugyminiszterium/hirek/elkeszult-magyarorszag-uj-nemzeti-biztonsagi-strategiaja
Hungary’s National Security Strategy of 2012, http://www.kormany.hu/download/4/32/b0000/National%20Security%20Strategy.pdf
Hungary’s National Military Strategy of 2012 was adopted as a government resolution. 1656/2012. (XII 20) , accessed 4 April 2014, http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=157721.234310
Hungary’s National Military Strategy of 2012,
http://www.kormany.hu/download/b/ae/e0000/national_military_strategy.pdf#!DocumentBrowse
A press release on the government's website refers to open discussion of the National Military Strategy. Az új Nemzeti Katonai Stratégia tervezetének véleményezése (Opinions to the new draft National Military Strategy), 25 September 2012, http://www.kormany.hu/hu/honvedelmi-miniszterium/hirek/az-uj-nemzeti-katonai-strategia-tervezetenek-velemenyezese
Interview with Interviewee 3. Government official, Ministry of Defence, April 22, 2014
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: The National Security Strategy adopted in 2012 specifically mentions organized crime and corruption among the security threats and challenges Hungary has to face (Point No. 35 of the strategy). The text is unusually open when stating that &quoute;Organised crime is attempting to infiltrate law enforcement and the judiciary. This may lead to a distortion of their activities or even make them inoperable. Criminal organisations have targeted the employees working in public service and law enforcement and
are also trying to infiltrate political decision making&quoute; However, there is no explicit doctrine on this subject.
The National Security Strategy of Hungary. Available: http://2010-2014.kormany.hu/download/4/32/b0000/National%20Security%20Strategy.pdf Accessed: 17 October 2014.
Suggested score: 1
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: There is no guidance on the subject at the strategic level at the moment. At the field level, there is no guidance determining the behaviour expected of the troops of the Hungarian Defence Forces. The Operative Internal Controls Handbook is dedicated to establishing a control mechanism for the prevention of corruption.
Government Update April 2015:
The military CIMIC Centre conducts pre-deployment training on local cultures and on corruption risks for deploying units. The armed forces rely on returning contingent commanders to coordinate with their successors on lessons learned that might be applicable as regards corruption incidents which occurred during deployment. A Lessons Learned Department in the Joint Staff provides separate reports to the Deputy CHOD. Moreover, commanders of deploying units receive two weeks training on expenditure of funds, logistics and financial management and a lawyer deploys with each contingent to support the commander.
Suggested score: 2
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is there training in corruption issues for commanders at all levels in order to ensure that these commanders are clear on the corruption issues they may face during deployment? If so, is there evidence that they apply this knowledge in the field?
General training is provided for military personnel preparing for deployments. This training relates to possible challenges and includes an overview of corruption-related problems. The handbooks (mentioned among the sources) reviewed, however, are very poor in terms of corruption related risks and do not go beyond the usual information provided even by travel guides on bribes and corruption. During the training sessions there might be more discussion, but no publicly available documents exist on the exact content of these sessions.
General information is provided in handbooks on specific countries and regions where Hungarian military personnel is deployed. Interviewee 3, a government official in the Ministry of Defence, mentioned that Hungary actively participates in NATO's Building Integrity (BI) program (see also NATO source); however, it is unclear to what extent this influences pre-deployment training.
No evidence on commanders either applying anti-corruption expertise in the field or mishandling corruption issues has been found.
honvedelem.hu, 'CIMIC-tanfolyam sok kihívással (CIMIC-training with a lot of challenges)', 13 October 2013, http://www.honvedelem.hu/cikk/40462_cimic-tanfolyam-sok_kihivassal
Hungarian Government, 'Baghlan Province CIMIC Handbook, 2010', http://www.kormany.hu/download/7/b5/10000/baghlan.pdf
honvedelem.hu, 'CIMIC Handbook of Afghanistan, CIMIC-PSYOPS Unit, Hungarian Defence Forces Joint Forces, 2004', http://www.honvedelem.hu/files/9/5960/afganisztan_cimic_kezikonyve__3._kiadas_.pdf
honvedelem.hu, 'CIMIC Handbook of Iraq, CIMIC-PSYOPS Unit, Hungarian Defence Forces Joint Forces, 2004', http://www.honvedelem.hu/files/9/5963/jooo.pdf
Interview with Interviewee 3. Government official, Ministry of Defence, April 22, 2014
NATO, 'Building Integrity (BI) Programme', 2014. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_68368.htm
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: No dedicated training modules for commanding military officers were developed yet. During pre-deployment training, this issue is integrated into the general agenda of the preparation of the commanders.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are trained professionals regularly deployed to monitor corruption risk in the field (whether deployed on operations or peacekeeping missions)?
According to the Act on National Security Services, the Military National Security Service (KNBSZ) is charged with monitoring corruption-related risks in the field and conducting investigations into economic crimes. In a recent interview, the head of KNBSZ mentioned that they conduct more than 1000 personal controls and hundreds of audits related to corruption. However, there is no evidence that these controls are conducted in a systemic or regular way in the field.
Act CXXV of 1995 on National Security Services (Section 6), accessed 5 April 2014, http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=24361.261528
Military National Security Service’s Missions, http://www.kfh.hu/en/mission.html
mno.hu, 'A főigazgató nem végez műveleti munkát (The chief director does not have operational duties)', 24 February 2013, http://mno.hu/belfold/a-foigazgato-nem-vegez-muveleti-munkat-a-teljes-exkluziv-interju-1140896
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Due to the overall secret nature of the KNBSZ (it is a secret service) it is not surprising that no concrete information is disclosed about their activities.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: The organizations are partly trained to mitigate the risks arising from corruption.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are there guidelines, and staff training, on addressing corruption risks in contracting whilst on deployed operations or peacekeeping missions?
Based on the response of the Hungarian government to the previous Government Defence Anti-Corruption Index assessment, experts from the Military National Security Service hold training sessions for staff who are preparing to go on foreign missions. In addition, the activities of preventive officers installed in foreign missions extend to preventing and identifying cases of corruption. There is no publicly available data on these training programmes, though their existence was confirmed by Interviewee 3.
Hungarian Review of the Country Vertical Scorecard Summary, Government Defence Anti-Corruption Index, December 2012, http://government.defenceindex.org/sites/default/files/documents/Hungary-government-response.pdf
Interview with Interviewee 3. Government official, Ministry of Defence, April 22, 2014
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Private Military Contractors (PMCs) usually refer to companies that provide operational staff to military environments. They may also be known as security contractors or private security contractors, and refer to themselves as private military corporations, private military firms, private security providers, or military service providers.
The White Book, compiled by the government in 2011, criticises the previous government for employing private contractors to guard and secure military instalments. These tasks are now managed by the armed forces. As the 2012 Government Defence Anti-Corruption Index notes, private contractors for logistics and transport may however be employed. This position was also confirmed by Interviewee 2. There is a lack of public evidence on the use of private contractors in other areas.
As there is no legal prohibition on the use of PMCs and no evidence of them being currently used, score 2 has been selected.
Ministry of Defence, ' White Book - Corruption, audit and penal consequences,' 2011, http://www.kormany.hu/download/3/52/40000/Honv%20Min%20-%20Feh%C3%A9r%20k%C3%B6nyv.pdf
Interview with Interviewee 2: Opposition Member of Parliament, Budapest, April 23, 2014
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Private contractors are no longer employed by the military, but as the 2012 Government Defence Anti-Corruption Index notes, private contractors for logistics and transport may be employed. There is, however, not much information available on these contractors and their use.
Government Defence Anti-Corruption Index 2012, http://government.defenceindex.org/results/countries/hungary.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Does the country have legislation covering defence and security procurement and are there any items exempt from these laws?
All of the necessary laws and regulations on public procurement are in full compliance with the relevant directives of the European Commission (2009/81/EC, 2004/17/EC and 2004/18/EC).
The Act on Public Procurement (covering defence contracts as well) and government decrees listed as sources determine exceptions (most prominently national security interests or procurement of high national interest) as defined in the directives. The Government decree on the special rules of defence procurement determines the public procurement tender process for unique cases, including procurement based on international agreement with special procurement rules and government-to-government agreements. In these cases, Ministers of Defence and Economy determine special rules, which are approved by the government.
There are no special anti-corruption clauses in the public procurement legislation, which has been criticised by anti-corruption organisations as “often itself a fertile ground for corruption”. According to the European Anti-Corruption Report, practices relating to public procurement in Hungary raise a wide array of problems: certain companies are winning high numbers of tenders co-financed by the European Union and there is a practice of using inappropriate selection and evaluation methods to favour some bidders above others. According to press reports, there is an increasing number of tenders in which public procurement rules are not applied on the grounds of national security interest. The wide array of exemptions raise suspicions that national security interests are being used as pretext for corrupt procurement transactions.
The defence and Law Enforcement Committee of parliament is empowered to review and approve the process of classifying some procurement procedures as exempt from the general rules. According to Atlatszo.hu and based on data from the defence and Law Enforcement Committee, the Committee has approved acquisitions without public procurement in at least 30 instances since 2010, totalling 55 billion HUF. A member of the Committee said that in about 80% of the cases, there was no reason to abandon the public procurement process. For the recent helicopter purchase by the MoD, there was no public procurement process and there was no trace of a petition for exemption from the public procurement process either. It is fairly easy to ask for an exemption from public procurement citing national security reasons and NGOs have warned of the excessive use of these exemptions in recent years.
Due to the ongoing criticism from EU institutions, the government approved a decree which outright suspends the application of public procurements classified for national security reasons. The decree is still in effect. However, before the decree coming into effect, the government hurried to apply the rules preceding it in a number of cases. A recent article provided examples of classified public procurements which all suggest that the rules were so easy that they were often abused, and that without a serious justification. Among the cases are: the classification of the public procurement contract of the cleaning services of a government body dealing with public procurements and the renovation of the facade of Office of the Parliament.
RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: Sources integrated. Due to significant concerns that legislation is bypassed, score 2 maintained.
RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 2: Comments integrated.
Act CVIII of 2011 on Public Procurement, accessed 18 April 2014, http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=139217.259648
Government Decree No. 218/2011 (X.19.) on the particular rules for procurements which concern classified information or the fundamental interests of the country's security and national security, or which require special security measures, accessed 15 April 2014, http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=139990.256046
Government decision no. 228/2004 (VII. 30.) on procurements involving the acquisition of goods specifically designed for military and public order purposes and service contracts in the field of defence which concern the fundamental interests of the country’s security, accessed 15 April 2014,
http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=86378.261530
Government Decree No. 109/2012 (VI. 1) on the detailed rules of the procurement realised within the framework of the NATO Security Investment Programme; http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=149040.218299 (accessed 29 August 2015)
Government Decree No. 44/2011 (III. 23) on certain supply obligations of the penitentiary organisation towards central administrative bodies and law enforcement bodies and on the order of delivery of products and services and their compensation. http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=138283.295735 (accessed 29 August 2015)
Government decree 228 of 2004. (VII. 30) on special rules of defence procurements, accessed 18 April 2014, http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=86378.261530
European Commission, 'Annex - Hungary to the EU Anti-Corruption Report', February 2014,
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/organized-crime-and-human-trafficking/corruption/anti-corruption-report/docs/2014_acr_hungary_chapter_en.pdf
Budapest Institute, 'Transparency and Accountability in Public Procurements - The Case of the Visegrad Countries', Final Report published by K-Monitor, April 2012, http://budapestinstitute.eu/uploads/v4_ppstudy_kmonitor.pdf
atlatszo.blog.hu, '55 billion forint without public procurement for national security reasons (55 milliárd forint közbeszerzés nélkül, nemzetbiztonsági indokkal)', 15 October 2013, http://atlatszo.blog.hu/2013/10/15/55_milliard_forint_kozbeszerzes_nelkul_nemzetbiztonsagi_indokkal
Transparency International Hungary, 'Is there a solution to make public procurements free of corruption?' 18 February 2014, http://www.transparency.hu/Is_there_a_solution_to_make_public_procurements_free_of_corruption_?bind_info=tag&bind_id=44
Atlatszo.blog.hu, 55 milliárd forint közbeszerzés nélkül, nemzetbiztonsági indokkal (55 billion HUF without public procurement, stating national security reasons), Horn Gabriella, 15 October 2013, http://atlatszo.blog.hu/2013/10/15/55_milliard_forint_kozbeszerzes_nelkul_nemzetbiztonsagi_indokkal. Government Decree 218/2011 (X.19.) on the special rules regarding acquisition relating to qualified data, the nation's fundamental security, national security interests, or acquisitions regarding special security measures,http://net.jogtar.hu/jr/gen/hjegy_doc.cgi?docid=A1100218.KOR (accessed 26 September 2014). Nepszabadsag, 26 November 2013, Titokban elköltött milliárdok: még a takarítás is nemzetbiztonsági ügy (Billions spent in secret: even cleaning has become a national security case), http://nol.hu/gazdasag/20131026-fedi_a_jotekony_homaly-1422199
444.hu 15 September 2014, The 8 silliest public procurement classified for national security reasons (A 8 legidiótább beszerzés, amiről nemzetbiztonsági okból nem tudhatunk) http://444.hu/2014/09/15/a-8-legidiotabb-beszerzes-amirol-nemzetbiztonsagi-okbol-nem-tudhatunk/
Portfolio.hu, 11 November 2014 The government first used then closed a &quoute;small gate&quoute; (Előbb kihasznált egy &quoute;kiskaput&quoute; a kormány, majd bezárta azt) http://www.portfolio.hu/unios_forrasok/gazdasagfejlesztes/elobb_kihasznalt_egy_kiskaput_a_kormany_majd_bezarta_azt.206270.html
Government Decree 276/2014, 6 November 2014 on the special rules of classified public procurements http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=172383.275667 (accessed 27 August, 2015)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: Laws specifically relating to defence and security procurement:
–Government Decree No. 228/2004 (VII. 30) on the special rules of the procurement of commodities concerning basic security interests on the field of defence, specially designed for military and law enforcement purposes, as well as on the ordering of services;
–Government Decree No. 218/2011 (X. 19)on the special rules of procurements concerning classified data, the basic security or national security interests of the country, and procurements requiring special security measures;
–Government Decree No. 109/2012 (VI. 1) on the detailed rules of the procurement realised within the framework of the NATO Security Investment Programme;
–Government Decree No. 44/2011 (III. 23) on certain supply obligations of the penitentiary organisation towards central administrative bodies and law enforcement bodies and on the order of delivery of products and services and their compensation.
Pursuant to section 2 (2) h) of Government Decree No. 228/2004 (VII. 30), in the case of procurements below the threshold of EUR 412,000, the procurements falling within the scope of Government Decree No. 44/2011 (III. 23) are regarded as exceptions.
Suggested score: 3
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: According to Atlatszo.hu and based on data from the defence and Law Enforcement Committee, the Committee has approved acquisitions without public procurement in at least 30 instances since 2010, totalling 55 billion HUF. A member of the Committee said that in about 80% of the cases, there was no reason to abandon the public procurement process. For the recent helicopter purchase by the MoD, there was no public procurement process and there was no trace of a petition for exemption from the public procurement process either. It is fairly easy to ask for an exemption from public procurement citing national security reasons and NGOs have warned of the excessive use of these exemptions in recent years.
tlatszo.blog.hu, 55 milliárd forint közbeszerzés nélkül, nemzetbiztonsági indokkal (55 billion HUF without public procurement, stating national security reasons), Horn Gabriella, 15 October 2013, http://atlatszo.blog.hu/2013/10/15/55_milliard_forint_kozbeszerzes_nelkul_nemzetbiztonsagi_indokkal. Government Decree 218/2011 (X.19.) on the special rules regarding acquisition relating to qualified data, the nation's fundamental security, national security interests, or acquisitions regarding special security measures,http://net.jogtar.hu/jr/gen/hjegy_doc.cgi?docid=A1100218.KOR (accessed 26 September 2014). Nepszabadsag, 26 November 2013, Titokban elköltött milliárdok: még a takarítás is nemzetbiztonsági ügy (Billions spent in secret: even cleaning has become a national security case), http://nol.hu/gazdasag/20131026-fedi_a_jotekony_homaly-1422199
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is the defence procurement cycle process, from assessment of needs, through contract implementation and sign-off, all the way to asset disposal, disclosed to the public?
The MoD Defence Economic Bureau and the Department for Economic Planning and Regulation are responsible for preparing and finalising the Annual Procurement Plan and the requirements are provided by armed forces commands. Other aspects of the planning cycle, such as asset disposal, appear to be regulated separately, with the Office for Defence Management carrying out asset disposal and use of proceeds regulated by the annual budget acts. There are, however, concerns related to the transparency and oversight of the asset disposal process.
Although the procurement cycle is well regulated (from the definition of demands to the contract signing) the openness of the process is very limited. Usually the announcement of the tender is the first publicly available document, with the announcement of the results at the end of the process. There are serious concerns about the openness of the public procurement process, as described in Transparency International Hungary's 2013 report on openness in public procurement. Documents relating to the procurement process are not comprehensive. There is no comprehensive and easily searchable database of all military procurement tenders.
The defence public procurement process is no exception. In terms of military procurement, the annual military procurement plans are published and in certain cases very detailed documents are published about specific procurement tenders (mainly for items like office supplies or spare parts for military equipments). MoD Defence Economic Bureau (MoD DEB) is the central purchasing body, but other organisations also have right of purchase.
RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: Comments incorporated.
RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 2: Agree and score amended to 1.
Transparency International Hungary, 'Közbeszerzési nyilvánosság Magyarországon (Openness in the public procurement process in Hungary)', 2013, http://www.transparency.hu/uploads/docs/Kozbeszerzesi_nyilvanossag_2013_.pdf
Ministry of Defence, 'Annual Public Procurement Plan 2013 of the MoD’s Armament and Quartermaster Office', accessed on 15 April 2014, http://honvedelmibeszerzes.kormany.hu/download/7/2a/00000/HM%20FHH%202013%20%C3%A9vi%20k%C3%B6zbeszerz%C3%A9si%20terv.pdf
Ministry of Defence, 'Annual Public Procurement Plan 2012 of the MoD’s Armament and Quartermaster Office', accessed on 15 April 2014, http://honvedelmibeszerzes.kormany.hu/download/5/d8/00000/kozbeszerzesi_terv_2012.PDF
Hungarian Government, 'The Annual Public Procurement of the MoD, April 2010', accessed on 15 April 2014, http://www.kormany.hu/down
The Central Budget of Hungary 2011, Act CXXXIII on the Execution of the Central Budget, accessed 5 April 2014, http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=139456.202569
Hungarian Government, Document by the Minister of Defence on the liquidation of Hungary's Armament and Quartermaster Office, 4 June 2013, http://www.kormany.hu/download/c/c0/f0000/HM%20FHH%20megsz%C3%BCnt_154_11_.pdf
Ministry of Defence, Office for Defence Management, http://honvedelmibeszerzes.kormany.hu/
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: MoD Defence Economic Bureau (MoD DEB) is the central purchasing body. Besides MoD DEB other defence organisations also have a right to purchase, at different levels.
Procurement cycle:
1. Definition of demands (responsible: military organization);
2. Elaboration of mandates and technical requirements/responsible: military organization;
3. Overview of technical requirements/responsible: organizations of the General Staff, term: 5 days/;
4. Confirming of financial coverage /responsible: MoD DEB, term: 5 days/;
5. Reception of mandate, convening the meeting of the expert committee if necessary /responsible: MoD DEB, term: 8 days/;
6. Control of the mandate and the technical requirements, sending back the same if there are deficiencies /responsible: MoD DEB, term: 8 days/;
7. Authorisation /responsible: MoD Deputy State Secretary of Defence Economy or MoD State Secretary, term: 5 days/;
8. Preliminary authorization according to Government Decree No. 46/2011 /responsible: Ministry of National Development, term: 20 days/;
9. Initiation of procurement procedure /responsible: MoD DEB/;
10. Procurement procedure /responsible: MoD DEB/;
11. Subsequent authorisation for contracting according to Government Decree No. 46/2011 /responsible: Ministry of National Development, term: 5 days/;
12. Information about authorisation for contracting /responsible: MoD Department for Economic Planning and Regulation/;
13. Announcements of results/responsible: MoD DEB/;
14. Conclusion of the contract /responsible: MoD DEB, term: 10 days/.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: The concerns noted by Transparency International are serious enough to warrant a more negative evaluation for this indicator. Based on these sources, the defence procurement process seems even more opaque. The recent helicopter purchase from Russia was far from transparent; it was unclear what the basis for the decision was and there was no trace of the procurement contract.
Nepszabadsag Online, 5 April 2014, Használt helikopterek Oroszországból (Used helicopters from Russia), http://nol.hu/gazdasag/helikopterek-oroszorszagbol-1454543.
Suggested score: 2
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are defence procurement oversight mechanisms in place and are these oversight mechanisms active and transparent?
No specific oversight mechanism is in place for defence procurement, as the mechanisms are the same as for any other government procurement processes. The Public Procurement Arbitration Board is the first instance of arbitration before cases are brought to court. The Competition Authority and State Audit Office oversee public procurement, the latter from the perspective of the use of public funds and the former hearing competition-related cases. The Government Control Office (GCO) also executes inspections concerning the conformity of the procurements. There is no publicly available information as to how the process of oversight by these institutions is formalised.
The State Audit Office prepares a detailed report on the implementation of the central budget on an annual basis and conducts a comprehensive audit on the implementation of the budget of the MoD every four years. The latest report is dated 2009 and covers the years 2005-2008; the report for the next four years has not yet been issued as of mid-2015.
The amended Public Procurement Bill was criticised by Transparency International Hungary on the basis that the performance of the Public Procurement Arbitration Board should be improved. Following Transparency International's assessment that the Hungarian state had been captured by powerful business and political interest groups, the anti-corruption watchdog Atlatszo.hu also listed the Public Procurement Authority and arbitration board as state institutions that had been captured by private and political interests.
RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: Comments added. However, concerns exist about the SAO's audits of the MOD and the results of either current SAO oversight or GCO oversight overall are not available to the public. Given the lack of transparency and timeliness of SAO audits and that other forms of oversight appear to lack independence, score has been selected although the score should be between 1 and 2.
Act CVIII of 2011 on Public Procurements, Article 9, Paragraph 1 (accessed May 21, 2014)
http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=139217.263819
Government Decree No. 355/2011 (XII. 30) on the Government Control Office http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=142950.295738 (accessed 29 August 2014)
Transparency International Hungary, 'The amendment to the public procurement act will not reduce corruption', 7 June 2013, http://www.transparency.hu/The_amendment_to_the_Public_Procurement_Act_will_not_reduce_corruption
Transparency International Hungary, 'EU funds and public procurement, control dilemmas, presentation by Dr. Róbert Gajdos, president of the Public Procurement Authority at the Transparency International Hungary conference', 18 February 2014, http://www.transparency.hu/uploads/docs/Gajdos_Robert.322.pdf
Transparency International Hungary, 'Hungarian state captured by private interest groups, National Integrity Study 2011', 8 March 2012, http://www.transparency.hu/National_integrtity_study
Atlatszo.hu, 'Who captured the Hungarian state?(Kik ejtették foglyul a magyar államot?)' 24 September 2012, http://atlatszo.hu/2012/09/24/a-nemzeti-egyuttmukodes-rendszere-kik-ejtettek-foglyul-a-magyar-allamot/
State Audit Office, 'Állami Számvevőszék, Jelentés a Honvédelmi Minisztérium fejezet működésének ellenőrzéséről, 2009, (State Audit Office report on the control of the budget chapter of the MoD, 2009)',
http://www.asz.hu/jelentes/0905/jelentes-a-honvedelmi-miniszterium-fejezet-mukodesenek-ellenorzeserol/0905j000.pdf
State Audit Office, 'Állami Számvevőszék, Jelentés Magyarország 2012. évi központi költségvetése végrehajtásának ellenőrzéséről, T/1202/1, 2013 augusztus (State Audit Office report on the control of the execution of the 2012. annual central budget of Hungary, 2013 August)', http://www.asz.hu/jelentes/13080/jelentes-magyarorszag-2012-evi-kozponti-koltsegvetese-vegrehajtasanak-ellenorzeserol/13080j000.pdf
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: Outside Control
As a subordinated controlling body of the National Assembly of Hungary, the outside control at the ministries is executed by the State Audit Office of Hungary (SAO) in accordance with Act LXVI of 2011 on the SAO, which concerns or may concern the procurements of the government, thus the procurements of the Ministry of Defence as well.
Control by the Government
In compliance with the Government Decree No. 355/2011 (XII. 30) on the Government Control Office, the Government Control Office (GCO) also executes inspections concerning the conformity of the procurements.
Suggested score: 3
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are actual and potential defence purchases made public?
Public procurement calls for tenders, information materials, and contracts, as well as annual (and only annual) public procurement plans for the MoD Defence Economy Bureau (DEB) are published on the website of the MoD. Annual statistical summary about its completed procurements must also be published on its homepage and sent to procurement authority. No information is available on the systematic audit of the public procurement process.
NATO tenders have their own regulations and home page. Both websites also contain password-protected documents.
RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: Comments added.
Transparency International Hungary, 'Openness in the public procurement process in Hungary (Közbeszerzési nyilvánosság Magyarországon)', http://www.transparency.hu/uploads/docs/Kozbeszerzesi_nyilvanossag_2013_.pdf
Ministry of Defence, 'Annual Public Procurement Plan 2014 of the MoD’s Office for Defence Management', accessed on 15 April 2014, http://honvedelmibeszerzes.kormany.hu/download/2/2b/00000/HM%20VGH%20%28K%C3%B6z%29beszerz%C3%A9si%20terv_2014.pdf
Ministry of Defence, 'Annual Public Procurement Plan 2013 of the MoD’s Armament and Quartermaster Office', accessed on 15 April 2014, http://honvedelmibeszerzes.kormany.hu/download/7/2a/00000/HM%20FHH%202013%20%C3%A9vi%20k%C3%B6zbeszerz%C3%A9si%20terv.pdf
Ministry of Defence, 'Annual Public Procurement Plan 2012 of the MoD’s Armament and Quartermaster Office', accessed on 15 April 2014, http://honvedelmibeszerzes.kormany.hu/download/5/d8/00000/kozbeszerzesi_terv_2012.PDF
Hungarian Government, 'Annual Public Procurement of the MoD, April 2010', accessed on 15 April 2014,
http://www.kormany.hu/download/d/b9/00000/K%C3%B6zbeszerz%C3%A9si%20Terv%202010.pdf
Website of the Office for Defence Management of the Ministry of Defence, documents on processes and relevant rules and legislation:
http://honvedelmibeszerzes.kormany.hu/eljarasok
http://honvedelmibeszerzes.kormany.hu/fontos-jogszabalyok
NATO Supplier Information website, http://www.natotender.gov.hu
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: The contracting authority prepares an annual public procurement plan regarding its public procurements in advance and an annual statistical summary about its completed procurements, which must be published on its homepage, and must be sent to procurement authority.
Technical specifications are generally defined by the customer. The Defence Staff's responsible group examines the timeliness and the military utility of the procurement. If it agrees with it, the Defence Staff sends the mandate to MoD Defence Economy Bureau (MoD DEB), which prepares the invitation to tender.
The purchases concluded based on the Government Decree No. 228/2004 do not feature in a public procurement plan, however the open procedures conducted based on the Decree must be published on the homepage of MoD DEB, and depending on the limit of the value on the homepage of the EU, and EDA.
The order of the documentation of procurement procedures are regulated in the MoD DEB’s related document. According to this, all related documents are filled.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
What procedures and standards are companies required to have - such as compliance programmes and business conduct programmes - in order to be able to bid for work for the Ministry of Defence or armed forces?
The relevant government decrees contain information on the eligibility criteria for bidders. The website of the Office for Defence Management of the MoD also summarises information on the relevant rules and regulations. The Act on Public Procurement and sections 23 and 26-29 of Government decision no. 228/2004 (VII. 30) mention eligibility criteria as well as economic crimes as grounds for exclusion from the public procurement process. There are no specific rules relating to corruption prevention. However, the government can only conclude a contract with companies which fulfil the conditions of transparency stipulated in the legislation on public assets of 2011, and which defines what &quoute;transparent entity&quoute; means. Among the criteria is, for example, the stipulation that the company's actual owners are known, or that it headquarters in an EU member state and it is under the jurisdiction of an EU tax authority.
The application of ethical procedures is not prescribed for tenderers in Hungary. Sections 56 and 57 of the PPA define grounds for exclusion, obligatory and optional conditions which cause companies to be excluded from the procedure, for example if a person supplied false data in an earlier contract award procedure (concluded within the previous three years) and was therefore excluded from the procedure.
There are positive and negative lists of tenderers according to section 56 of the PPA. For example the list of „public debt free taxpayers” managed by the National Tax and Customs Authority, or the list, managed by the Public Procurement Authority, of tenderers who provided false data or statements in a public procurement procedure, thereby jeopardising fair competition.
During the evaluation of the tenders the contracting authority checks if the tenderer is subject to legal grounds of exclusions and conforms to the technical-professional and financial-economic eligibility requirements defined in the tender notice or in the tender documents.
In NATO tenders, only contractors with the &quoute;Suitable Supplier for NATO Tenders” certificate can apply. To be able to acquire the certificate, companies have to fulfil strict conditions. These conditions are regulated in a government decision which prescribes a process evaluating the general reputation, incorruptibility and suitability of the company.
When NSIP procurements are conducted via NATO agencies, their procurement regulations will be applied.
The grounds for exclusion in the case of special military procurements are also included in a statutory instrument (Sections 23 and 24 of Government Decree No. 228/2004), transposing the provisions of the relevant directives into Hungarian law.
In the case of NSIP procurements, only companies which have a valid „Suitable Supplier for NATO Tenders” certificate (it is only possible to depart from this rule in exceptional cases when the conditions specified in the relevant law exist) are allowed to submit their tenders. If a company’s certificate has been suspended, during that time it is not allowed to take part in NSIP procurement procedures. The Security Investment Committee has the right to suspend or restore a „Suitable Supplier for NATO Tenders” certificate considering all aspects.
RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: Valuable comments added. Score maintained as it does appear to describe the usual practice.
RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 2: Source added.
Website of the Office for Defence Management of the Ministry of Defence, documents on individual processes and relevant rules and legislation:
http://honvedelmibeszerzes.kormany.hu/eljarasok
http://honvedelmibeszerzes.kormany.hu/fontos-jogszabalyok
Government Decree No. 218/2011 (X.19) on the particular rules for procurements which concern classified information or the fundamental interests of the country's security and national security, or which require special security measures, accessed 15 April 2014, http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=139990.256046
Government decision no. 228/2004 (VII. 30) on procurements involving the acquisition of goods specifically designed for military and public order purposes and service contracts in the field of defence which concern the fundamental interests of the country’s security, accessed 15 April 2014,
http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=86378.261530
NATO Supplier Information website, http://www.natotender.gov.hu
Government decision No. 164 of 2002 (VIII.2.) (accessed May 21, 2014)
http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=66755.262784
Government Decree No. 109 of 2012 on the procedures for acquisition under NATO Security Investment Procurement, accessed 27 September 2014, http://honvedelmibeszerzes.kormany.hu/download/1/6a/00000/109-2012_(VI_1)_Korm_rendelet.pdf
Act CXCVI of 2011. on public assets, Paragraph 3. (accessed May 21, 2014.)
http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=142898.255814
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: During the evaluation of the tenders the contracting authority examines if the tenderer is subject to legal grounds of exclusions and conforms to the technical-professional and financial-economic eligibility requirements defined in the tender notice or in the tender documents. The winner is primarily selected based on the criterion of the lowest price from among the eligible tenderers. If the subject of the tender is various goods or services, the winner is selected based on the most economically advantageous tender.
The application of ethical procedures is not prescribed for tenderers in Hungary. Sections 56 and 57 of the PPA define grounds for exclusion, obligatory and optional conditions which cause companies to be excluded from the procedure, for example if a person supplied false data in an earlier contract award procedure (concluded within the previous three years) and was therefore excluded from the procedure.
When NSIP procurements are conducted via NATO agencies, their procurement regulations will be applied.
The grounds for exclusion in the case of special military procurements are also included in a statutory instrument (Sections 23 and 24 of Government Decree No. 228/2004), transposing the provisions of the relevant directives into Hungarian law.
According to our experience, there is no difference between Hungarian and foreign companies in respect of ethical questions and their propensity to default.
There are positive and negative lists of tenderers according to section 56 of the PPA. For example the list of „public debt free taxpayers” managed by the National Tax and Customs Authority, or the list, managed by the Public Procurement Authority, of tenderers who provided false data or statements in a public procurement procedure, thereby jeopardising fair competition.
The Public Procurement Authority published a guide about free data bases the application of which is compulsory during public procurement procedures. There are no lists about procedures according to Government Decree No. 228/2004 (VII. 30).
In the case of NSIP procurements, only companies which have a valid „Suitable Supplier for NATO Tenders” certificate (it is only possible to depart from this rule in exceptional cases when the conditions specified in the relevant law exist) are allowed to submit their tenders. If a company’s certificate has been suspended, during that time it is not allowed to take part in NSIP procurement procedures. The Security Investment Committee has the right to suspend or restore a „Suitable Supplier for NATO Tenders” certificate considering all aspects.
N/A Criteria is chosen as all others do not cover the existing practice.
Suggested score: N/A
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Government Decree No. 109 of 2012 on the procedures for acquisition under NATO Security Investment Procurement, accessed 27 September 2014, http://honvedelmibeszerzes.kormany.hu/download/1/6a/00000/109-2012_(VI_1)_Korm_rendelet.pdf.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are procurement requirements derived from an open, well-audited national defence and security strategy?
Hungary has adopted the National Security Strategy and the National Military Strategy in 2012. The NMS states that Hungarian forces must possess the equipment enabling them to carry out the full spectrum of operations, to deploy and sustain a force, and maintain interoperability with NATO allies. Beyond that, however, the NMS is not specific about procurement needs. In principle, procurement requirements and plans are based on this strategic document. However a recent evaluation published by Hadtudomány, (2013/3–4., p.8) stated that the strategy is full of unrealistic expectations that are far from the financial capacities of the country, thus making it unrealistic that the annual procurement plans are in line with the military strategy.
Hungary has prepared several ten-year strategic plans for development, the latest one for the period between 2009 and 2018. However, budgetary constraints have led to the MoD having to modify the 2009-2018 plan. It is unclear whether this plan is still in effect and how much it guides procurement requirements in practice. It is also not clear how much Hungary's long-term military strategy from 2012 and annual procurement plans are in line, particularly as in the past, budgetary contraints have often lead to the modification of long-term acquisition plans.
There appears to be no audit verification of the flow from strategic goals to individual procurement decisions.
RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 2: Agree. Comments added and score revised to 2.
58/2007. (HK 12.) MoD Directive on the preparation of the strategic 10-year plan between 2009 and 2018 and on the undertaking of national obligations for the NATO defence planning and review procedure (HM utasítás az MH 2009-2018. közötti időszak 10 éves stratégiai
tervének kidolgozásáról, valamint a NATO védelmi tervezési és áttekintési eljárás nemzeti
feladatainak végrehajtásáról), http://kozlonyok.hu/kozlonyok/index.php?m=0&p=kozltart&ev=2007&szam=12&k=13. 85/2007. (HK 16.) (accessed 30 August 2015)
MoD Directive on the ministerial guidelines on defence planning (HM utasítás
miniszteri irányelvek a védelmi tervezéshez (2009-2018)), http://www.kozlonyok.hu/kozlonyok/index.php?m=0&p=kozltart&ev=2007&szam=16&k=13. (accessed 30 August 2015)
Hungary’s National Military Strategy of 2012, adopted as a government resolution 1656/2012. (XII.20), http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=157721.234310 (accessed 30 August 2015)
Hungarian Government, 'Az új Nemzeti Katonai Stratégia tervezetének véleményezése (Opinions to the new draft National Military Strategy)', 25 September 2012, http://www.kormany.hu/hu/honvedelmi-miniszterium/hirek/az-uj-nemzeti-katonai-strategia-tervezetenek-velemenyezese (accessed 30 August 2015)
Hadtudomány, 'Bali József: Nemzeti katonai stratégia 2012 –új jövõkép kérdõjelekkel (National Military Strategy 2012 - new future with many question marks)', 2013/3–4, http://mhtt.eu/hadtudomany/2013/3_4/Hadtudomany_2013_3-4_2.pdf (accessed 30 August 2015)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: Hungary has prepared several ten-year strategic plans for development, the latest one for the period between 2009 and 2018. Budgetary constraints have led to the MoD having to modify the 2009-2018 plan. It is unclear whether this plan is still in effect and how much it guides procurement requirements in practice. It is also not clear how much Hungary's long-term military strategy from 2012 and annual procurement plans are in line, particularly as in the past, budgetary contraints have often lead to the modification of long-term acquisition plans.
58/2007. (HK 12.) MoD Directive on the preparation of the strategic 10-year plan between 2009 and 2018 and on the undertaking of national obligations for the NATO defence planning and review procedure (HM utasítás az MH 2009-2018. közötti időszak 10 éves stratégiai
tervének kidolgozásáról, valamint a NATO védelmi tervezési és áttekintési eljárás nemzeti
feladatainak végrehajtásáról),http://kozlonyok.hu/kozlonyok/index.php?m=0&p=kozltart&ev=2007&szam=12&k=13. 85/2007. (HK 16.) MoD Directive on the ministerial guidelines on defence planning (HM utasítás
miniszteri irányelvek a védelmi tervezéshez (2009-2018)), http://www.kozlonyok.hu/kozlonyok/index.php?m=0&p=kozltart&ev=2007&szam=16&k=13.
Suggested score: 2
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are defence purchases based on clearly identified and quantified requirements?
The MoD's Defence Economy Bureau (established by the Ministry of Defence) must prepare a public procurement plan which outlines all public procurements envisaged for the given year; the plan must be published on its website. The contracting authority prepares an annual public procurement plan about its public procurements in advance and an annual statistical summary about its completed procurements, which must be published on its homepage and sent to procurement authority. Technical specifications are generally defined by the customer, i.e. the designated user of the item being procured. The Nation Military Strategy also states that procurement must be guided by the requirements of interoperability with NATO allies, which suggests that it could have influence over the process of quantifying requirements.
The Office for Defence Management (later MoD's Defence Economy Bureau) of the MoD deals with planning and quantitative assessments of public procurements, and the Hungarian Institute of Military Technology, an independent budgetary unit within the MoD, provides quality assurance for defence procurements. No information regarding these assessments is publicly available on the websites, however. The interviewees stated that planning and assessment of requirements of the defence procurements was poor.
RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: Comments added. The short and long term plans mentioned were not available at the time of the research (30 August 2015). Score 2 selected.
The MoD's Defence Economy Bureau's website http://hm.vedelemgazdasagihivatal.kormany.hu/ (accessed 30 August 2015)
Annual procurement plan of the MoD 2014 http://hm.vedelemgazdasagihivatal.kormany.hu/download/2/2b/00000/HM%20VGH%20%28K%C3%B6z%29beszerz%C3%A9si%20terv_2014.pdf (accessed 30 August 2015)
The Hungarian Institute of Military Engineering website, accessed 16 April 2014, http://www.haditechnikaiintezet.hu/
Office for Defence Management of the Ministry of Defence website, documents on individual processes and the relevant rules and legislation, accessed 16 April 16 2014,
http://honvedelmibeszerzes.kormany.hu/eljarasok
http://honvedelmibeszerzes.kormany.hu/fontos-jogszabalyok
Hungary’s National Military Strategy of 2012, adopted as a government resolution 1656/2012. (XII.20), http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=157721.234310 (accessed 30 August 2015)
Interview with Interviewee 1: Retired Lieutenant-Colonel, Budapest, April 24, 2014.
Interview with Interviewee 2: Opposition Member of Parliament, Budapest, April 23, 2014
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: The MoD's Defence Economy Bureau must prepare a public procurement plan which outlines all public procurements envisaged for the given year; the plan must be published on its website.
The contracting authority prepares an annual public procurement plan about its public procurements in advance and an annual statistical summary about its completed procurements, which must be published on its homepage, and must be sent to procurement authority. Technical specifications are generally defined by the customer.
Government Update April 2015:
The key criteria are the operational requirements driven by the national or NATO defence needs. From the NSIP point of view the key criteria are the NATO Minimum Military Requirements. All requirements are stated in the long- and short-term plans of MoD and HDf.
Suggested score: 3
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is defence procurement generally conducted as open competition or is there a significant element of single-sourcing (that is, without competition)?
The general rule in the Public Procurement Act is open competition and in the case of nationally mandated and funded procurements, single sourcing needs to be cleared by the national boards.
According to the PPA, single source procurements are possible in case of for example national security interests. Parliament’s Defence and Law Enforcement Committee has the right to grant exemptions from the requirement of the Act on Public Procurement for national security reasons. According to anti-corruption and investigative journalism watchdog Atlatszo.hu, there has been a record number of such exemptions since 2010, with tenders totalling 55 billion HUF. In his comments to Atlatszo.hu, an opposition member of the parliamentary committee suggested that 80 percent of exemptions were unjustified. Interviewee 2, an Opposition MP said that oversight of the parliamentary committee is purely formal. The large majority of the governing party (2/3 majority until February 2015) guarantees that all exemptions proposed by the government will be approved by Parliament. The DLEC committee's oversight is not transparent, sessions on these decisions are closed and detailed arguments are not made public.
These exemptions do not necessarily mean that there will be only one bidder. In the negotiated procedure without publication of a notice, the contracting authority has the right to invite at least three bidders to compete. However, in most cases these procedures limit open competition and increase the risk of corruption.
In the case of nationally managed and nationally funded NATO procurements, it is obligatory that single sourcing is approved by a national board. In the case of NATO funded projects, the NATO Investment Committee (NATO) IC has the right to authorise single source procurement.
RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: Comments added. Score 2 maintained due to a significant number of exempt procurement procedures and general lack of transparency.
Atlatszo.hu, '55 billion forint without public procurement for national security reasons (55 milliárd forint közbeszerzés nélkül, nemzetbiztonsági indokkal)', 15 October 2013, http://atlatszo.blog.hu/2013/10/15/55_milliard_forint_kozbeszerzes_nelkul_nemzetbiztonsagi_indokkal
Decisions by the Parliament’s Defence and Law Enforcement Committee on approved exemptions from the Act on Public Procurement, accessed 16 April 2014, http://www.parlament.hu/internet/plsql/ogy_biz.keret_frissit?p_szerv=&p_fomenu=20&p_almenu=25&p_ckl=39&p_biz=A341&p_rec=&p_egys=&p_nyelv=HU
Interview with Interviewee 2: Opposition Member of Parliament, Budapest, April 23, 2014
All Hungary News, 'Government loses parliamentary supermajority as Fidesz candidate beaten in Veszprém by-election', 22 February 2015. http://www.politics.hu/20150222/government-loses-parliamentary-supermajority-as-fidesz-candidate-beaten-in-veszprem-by-election/, accessed November 2015.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: In case of nationally managed and nationally funded procurement, single source procurement needs to be cleared by a national board. Most commonly single source procurements are conducted when exclusive intellectual property rights would otherwise preclude the project completion (e.g.: constructing design). In the case of NATO funded projects, IC authorization is needed for single source procurement.
Single source procurement is used in the range of 5% of total procurements, based on the number of procurements and approximately 8% based on procurement value.
According to the MoD State Secretary and the Chief of General Staff Joint Regulation No. 53/2011 procurements related to military operations are authorised and supervised by HDF Joint Force Command, according to the provisions of the Regulation.
Suggested score: 4
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are tender boards subject to regulations and codes of conduct and are their decisions subject to independent audit to ensure due process and fairness?
Tender boards are used: the relevant legislation (Act CVIII of 2011 on Public Procurement) states that a committee shall be formed to evaluate the tenders, involving selected members of the contracting authority, the initiating organisation, the General Staff's responsible group and the MoD DEB. The procurement regulations of the MoD regulate the responsibilities of the tender boards or - in specific cases - the expert committees, as well as exercising external control over the whole process. Chapter 5, paragraph 12 details the rules on the tender boards (how to set up the boards, how to establish the procedures of the boards, how to take minutes of meetings, rules on declaration of assets for the members of the board, declarations of conflict of interests). Auditing only takes place when results are contested, and the auditing process is regulated by the Act on Public Procurement, the Public Procurement Arbitration Board being the first instance preceding the remedies by the courts.
There is no procurement code of conduct for the committee members except for the general regulations on conflict of interest. Those who have provided a declaration of assets and a declaration in writing concerning conflict of interest in respect of the given procedure may be members of the evaluation committee. The Military Code of Conduct serves as a general background on the fairness of procurement. The Military Code of Ethics stipulates the setting up of a Military Council of Ethics - however, there is no publicly available information about its activities. An employer may initiate an investigation by the National Tax and Customs Office on the basis of the yearly prepared mandatory declaration of assets.
The Military Code of Conduct has no procedural rules attached to it, and it is a fairly general document, embodying principles rather than concrete rules. Any role that the Code may have to ensure the fairness of military procurement is unsure at best. There is also no information available about the operations of the Military Council of Ethics and there is no evidence that the Council provides any sort of oversight over tender boards or the procurement process in general.
RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 2: Comments added.
RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: Comments added. Score maintained as it appears to best describe the usual practice. Internal auditing may well be taking place, but as its results are not public, it is not possible to assess how routine and effective tender board audits are.
The Directive of the Ministry of defence on the publication of the Military Code of Conduct, the establishment and tasks of the Military Ethics Council, accessed 4 April 2014, https://www.google.hu/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CCwQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.kormany.hu%2Fdownload%2F0%2Fa1%2F00000%2FKatonai%2520Etikai%2520K%25C3%25B3dex.doc&ei=Qug-U62eMciNtAbdrIDICQ&usg=AFQjCNH3xGipVW68MdPVZXIUxWjb9W0gkw&sig2=HS9yjxXOHXph5PEmG9lTfw&bvm=bv.64125504,d.Yms
Procurement Regulations of the Ministry of Defence (2013), accessed 17 April 2014, http://honvedelmibeszerzes.kormany.hu/download/b/e9/00000/HM%20FHH%20(K%C3%B6z)beszerz%C3%A9si%20szab%C3%A1lyzat%20(nytsz_21_544)%202013_01_22.pdf
Source: Act CVIII of 2011 on Public Procurement, http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=139217.259648
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: There is a multi-level procurement system (central and unit) at the Ministry of Defence. The strength of the central purchasing organisation is that the personnel has valuable professional experience (the necessary legal, economic, financial and technical knowledge). General weakness of the procurement system is the constant changing of laws.
There is no procurement code of conduct for the committee members. Those, who have provided a declaration of property, a declaration in writing concerning conflict of interest in respect of the given procedure may be members of the evaluation committee.
The Internal Auditors of the MoD DEB execute budgetary internal auditing at institutional level, which concerns the procurements as well.
The planning, execution and application of controlling and the reporting on the controlling activities are done in accordance with the Government Decree No. 370/2011 (XII. 31) on the internal control system and internal auditing of the budgetary agencies.
The inspection of the procurement processes as certainty giving activities are highly focused, they are always subject to control as procurement is an inseparable part of economic activities.
Suggested score: 3
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: The Military Code of Conduct has no procedural rules attached to it, and it is a fairly general document, embodying principles rather than concrete rules. Any role that the Code may have to ensure the fairness of military procurement is unsure at best. There is also no information available about the operations of the Military Council of Ethics and there is no evidence that the Council provides any sort of oversight over tender boards or the procurement process in general.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Does the country have legislation in place to discourage and punish collusion between bidders for defence and security contracts?
Act LVII of 1996 on the Prohibition of Unfair and Restrictive Market Practices discourages and punishes collusion between bidders. This includes bidders for defence and security contracts. Available sanctions include fines, debarment from further public procurement and criminal investigation. Offending companies can face punishment based on the legislation, however, as of yet there is no evidence of such cases in the press. Debarment is not an automatic sanction and is imposed on the basis of the decision of the competition authority, in cases when a fine is also imposed on the undertaking.
The Competition Authority is responsible for implementing the legislation in line with EU legislation. However, the integrity of the Competition Authority’s leadership, installed in 2010, has been questioned by several NGOs including Transparency International Hungary, which protested publicly against leadership nominations.
RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 1: There is evidence of collusion in other sectors with evidence of investigation and sanctions. For example, a case in the pharmaceutical sector in October 2015. This may be in an indication for collusion in the defence sector as well. Score 3 selected.
Act LVII of 1996 on the Prohibition of Unfair and Restrictive Market Practices, accessed 17 April 2014, http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=26902.256005
Transparency International Hungary, 'Jogszerűen állította a TI, hogy a GVH elnöke bennfentes információval élt vissza kinevezése előtt (TI legally alleged that the President of the Competition Authority had an insider information case before his nomination), http://www.transparency.hu/Jogszeruen_allitotta_a_TI__hogy_a_GVH_elnoke_bennfentes_informacioval_elt_vissza_kinevezese_elott?bind_info=tag&bind_id=51
origo.hu, 'Anti-corruption NGO protests against Orban’s candidate for the Competition Authority (Tiltakozik Orbán jelöltje ellen a korrupcióellenes szervezet)', 10 August 2014, http://www.origo.hu/itthon/20100809-vitatja-a-gvh-elere-jelolt-ugyved-hitelesseget-a-transparency-international.html
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: There is legislation in place to prevent collusion between bidders, including bidders in the defence sector. Moreover, there are no known cases of bidder collusion in defence and security contracts.
Suggested score: 4
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are procurement staff, in particular project and contract managers, specifically trained and empowered to ensure that defence contractors meet their obligations on reporting and delivery?
According to section 22 (1) of the Public Procurement Act the contracting authority shall determine the order of responsibilities for preparing, conducting and internally auditing procurement procedures, the spheres of responsibility of persons and organisations involved in the procedure and the order of documenting procurement procedures. The relevant legislation (Act CVIII of 2011 on Public Procurement) states that the persons and organisations acting in the name of a contracting authority at all stages of the procurement procedure shall be required to possess adequate professional competence related to the subject-matter of the public procurement, in the field of public procurement, in the field of law and in the field of finance. The qualifications or practical experience conditions are not determined by the applicable law.
There is a specific department for the procurement staff within the MOD, but no further information about the background or training of staff is publicly available, making it difficult to assess their general level of professionalism. The SAO's integrity report stated that training is generally rare for employees in the defence sector.
RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: Comments added. However, it is still not clear that the level of training and empowerment of procurement staff would merit a higher score.
(Act CVIII of 2011 on Public Procurement http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=139217.292452 (accessed 30 August 2015)
Ministry of Defence, Defence Management Deputy State Secretariat website, accessed 17 April 2014, http://www.kormany.hu/hu/honvedelmi-miniszterium/vedelemgazdasagert-felelos-helyettes-allamtitkarsag/a-helyettes-allamtitkar
State Audit Office Integrity Report 2013 on the Law Enforcement and Defence Sectors, accessed July 6th, 2014.
http://integritas.asz.hu/uploads/files/rendv%C3%A9delem_elemz%C3%A9s.pdf
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: According to section 22 (3) of Act CVIII of 2011 on Public Procurement (PPA), persons and organisations acting in the name of a contracting authority at all stages of the procurement procedure shall be required to possess adequate professional competence related to the subject-matter of the public procurement, in the field of public procurement, in the field of law and in the field of finance. The qualifications or practical experience conditions are not determined by the applicable law.
According to section 21 of the Defence Ministry Instruction No. 48/2012. (VII.19), a committee shall be formed to evaluate the tenders, involving selected members of the contracting authority, the initiating organisation, the General Staff's responsible group and the MoD DEB. The evaluation committee prepares a detailed record that includes reasoned sheets of the members.
Prior to the procurement procedure, all persons involved in the committee’s work (on the side of the customer) shall declare whether any conflict of interest exists in their case. A person or organisation that is unable to perform their tasks impartially for any reason may not represent the contracting authority in the procedure because of a conflict of interest.
If appropriate, the employer may initiate an investigation by the National Tax and Customs Office on the basis of the yearly prepared mandatory declaration of assets.
According to section 22 (1) of the Public Procurement Act the contracting authority shall determine the order of responsibilities for preparing, conducting and internally auditing procurement procedures, the spheres of responsibility of persons and organisations involved in the procedure and the order of documenting procurement procedures.
Suggested score: 4
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are there mechanisms in place to allow companies to complain about perceived malpractice in procurement, and are companies protected from discrimination when they use these mechanisms?
The Act on Public Procurement defines the mechanisms in place for companies wishing to report alleged discrimination. These include the Arbitration Board, which serves in the first instance as a quasi-judicial body, and the courts as second instance.
The tenderer may initiate a preliminary dispute settlement within 3 business days after becoming aware of the relevant event if it considers that the written summary or any document made during the contract award procedure, in whole or in part, violates the law. Preliminary dispute settlement may be initiated by any economic operator, professional chamber or interest representation body not later than 10 days before the expiry of the time limit for submitting tenders if they consider that the contract notice, the invitation to tender, the invitation to participate, the documentation or the modification thereof is partly or entirely illegal. The contracting authority shall inform the party initiating the dispute resolution about its opinion and it also informs all tenderers the application for dispute resolution and its relevant opinion within three business days. The contract cannot be concluded within 10 days after the sending of the answer.
Preliminary dispute resolution procedures are usually about the contents of technical requirements, which are not determined by contracting authorities.
The Public Procurement Arbitration Board's annual reports are available on the Parliament's website. The latest report is for 2012. The Arbitration Board's website shows ongoing, active cases. The Arbitration Board has a national scope and is - in theory - only subject to the law. Transparency International has noted that the safeguards of the Board's independence must be strengthened. Atlatszo.hu, another anti-corruption NGO also warned about the weakened independence of the Authority and Board. The specific rules of procedure before the Arbitration Board are in Act CXL of 2004 on the General Rules of Administrative Authority Procedure.
No reports of companies being discriminated against following a complaint have been found.
RESPONSE TO REVIEWERS: Comments included.
Act CVIII of 2011 on Public Procurement, accessed on 9 April 2013, http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=139217.259648
Transparency International Hungary, Notes to the modifications of the Act on Public Procurement by the Transparency International Hungary, 2012, http://www.transparency.hu/uploads/docs/kbt_eszrevetelek.pdf
Legal remedies in public procurement processes in Hungary, study by the Public Procurement Authority, accessed May 17, 2014.
http://kozbeszerzes.hu/data/documents/2013/11/05/K%C3%B6vesdi_HU.pdf
The website of the Public Procurement Authority and Arbitration Board: http://www.kozbeszerzes.hu/. (accessed 30 August 2015)
The 2012 annual report of the Public Procurement Authority: http://www.parlament.hu/irom39/10294/10294.pdf (accessed 30 August 2015)
Merjtenni.hu (Anti-corruption legal aid service, in partnership with Transparency International), Public Procurement, http://merjtenni.hu/hol-tapasztalt-korrupciot-2/kozbeszerzesek/. (accessed 30 August 2015)
Act CXL of 2004 on the General Rules of Administrative Authority Procedure, http://www.complex.hu/jr/gen/hjegy_doc.cgi?docid=A0400140.TV (setting the rules for procedures before the Public Procurement Arbitration Board) (accessed 30 August 2015)
Atlatszo.hu, 'Who captured the Hungarian state?(Kik ejtették foglyul a magyar államot?)' 24 September 2012, http://atlatszo.hu/2012/09/24/a-nemzeti-egyuttmukodes-rendszere-kik-ejtettek-foglyul-a-magyar-allamot/
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: The tenderer may initiate a preliminary dispute settlement within 3 business days after becoming aware of the relevant event if it considers that the written summary or any document made during the contract award procedure, in whole or in part, violates the law.
Preliminary dispute settlement may be initiated by any economic operator, professional chamber or interest representation body not later than 10 days before the expiry of the time limit for submitting tenders if they consider that the contract notice, the invitation to tender, the invitation to participate, the documentation or the modification thereof is partly or completely illegal. The contracting authority shall inform the party initiating the dispute resolution about its opinion and it also informs all tenderers the application for dispute resolution and its relevant opinion within three business days. The contract cannot be concluded within 10 days after the sending of the answer.
Preliminary dispute resolution procedures are usually about the contents of technical requirements, which are not determined by contracting authorities.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: The Public Procurement Arbitration Board's annual reports are available on the Parliament's website. The latest report is for 2012. The Arbitration Board's website shows ongoing, active cases. The Arbitration Board has a national scope and is - in theory - only subject to the law. Transparency International has noted that the safeguards of the Board's independence must be strengthened. Atlatszo.hu, another anti-corruption NGO also warned about the weakened independence of the Authority and Board. The specific rules of procedure before the Arbitration Board are in Act CXL of 2004 on the General Rules of Administrative Authority Procedure.
The website of the Public Procurement Authority and Arbitration Board: http://www.kozbeszerzes.hu/. The 2012 annual report of the Public Procurement Authority: http://www.parlament.hu/irom39/10294/10294.pdf. Merjtenni.hu (Anti-corruption legal aid service, in partnership with Transparency International), Public Procurement, http://merjtenni.hu/hol-tapasztalt-korrupciot-2/kozbeszerzesek/. Act CXL of 2004 on the General Rules of Administrative Authority Procedure, http://www.complex.hu/jr/gen/hjegy_doc.cgi?docid=A0400140.TV (setting the rules for procedures before the Public Procurement Arbitration Board). Atlatszo.hu, 'Who captured the Hungarian state?(Kik ejtették foglyul a magyar államot?)' 24 September 2012, http://atlatszo.hu/2012/09/24/a-nemzeti-egyuttmukodes-rendszere-kik-ejtettek-foglyul-a-magyar-allamot/
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
What sanctions are used to punish the corrupt activities of a supplier?
Criminal sanctions against corrupt activities are regulated by the Criminal Code (under Chapter 27) which lists corrupt activities from abuse of power to bribery. The Act on the Prohibition of Unfair Trading Practices and Unfair Competition authorizes the Competition Authority to initiate a criminal investigation.
Supplier companies with legally binding court verdicts against them related to economic crimes, including corruption, are automatically barred from public procurement processes. Similar sanctions are included in the legislation against companies with legally binding competition authority decisions or legally binding court verdicts relating to competition irregularities. At the end of 2012, according to the latest published report of the Public Procurement Council, there were only three companies on the list of suppliers barred from public procurement because of violations. The council levied fines in only 89 cases in 2012.
Act CVIII of 2011 on Public Procurement section 24, accessed 9 April 2014, http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=139217.259648
Act C of 2012 Criminal Code http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=152383.294596 (accessed 30 August 2015)
Act LVII of 1996 in the Prohibition of Unfair Trading Practices and Unfair Competition http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=26902.294659 (accessed 30 August 2015)
Procurement Regulations of the Ministry of Defence (2013), accessed 17 April 2014,
http://honvedelmibeszerzes.kormany.hu/download/b/e9/00000/HM%20FHH%20(K%C3%B6z)beszerz%C3%A9si%20szab%C3%A1lyzat%20(nytsz_21_544)%202013_01_22.pdf
Annual Report of the Public Procurement Council to the Parliament, 2012, accessed 17 April 2014, http://www.parlament.hu/irom39/10294/10294.pdf
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
When negotiating offset contracts, does the government specifically address corruption risk by imposing due diligence requirements on contractors? Does the government follow up on offset contract performance and perform audits to check performance and integrity?
The Government decree on the special rules of defence procurement determines the public procurement tender process for unique cases, including procurement based on international agreement with special procurement rules and government-to-government agreements. In these cases, Ministers of Defence and Economy determine special rules, which are approved by the government. In the case of offset contracts, due diligence and auditing requirements can be determined on a case-by-case basis, according to the quoted legislation. The government reportedly follows up on contract performance with annual reports, however, no public information on the issue could be found.
However, the scandal surrounding the Gripen fighter jet offset in 2001 (detailed in the 2013 GI report) shows that no effective special arrangements were installed to prevent corruption. (The sale of Gripen fighter jets to several countries in the region ended in corruption-related cases, although in Hungary no such charges were made against any Hungarian officials. There has been no effective follow-up on the offset contract performance and integrity form the Hungarian government.) There was also a parliamentary commission of inquiry in the aftermath of the Gripen jet purchase with respect to corruption accusations that surfaced first in Sweden regarding the deal, but the results of the inquiry were not published and the matter was not pursued despite indications from foreign investigations that Hungarian actors were involved.
The government is currently preparing a helicopter purchase agreement and press reports have already highlighted risks of corruption, especially since one of the possible contractors, AgustaWestland, has been accused of bribery in an Indian deal. This might show how the current government manages offsets and what lessons have been learned from previous controversial offset agreements.
RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: The rationale for score 1 appears to reflect the situation: the government can, but is not obliged to, impose due diligence requirements. Effectiveness of the requirements cannot be assessed and there is little information on offset monitoring. Score maintained.
RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 2 : Comments incorporated.
Government decree 228 of 2004. (VII. 30) on special rules of defence procurements, accessed 18 April 2014, http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=86378.261530
K-Monitor, Gripen-ügy (The Gripen Case) http://k-monitor.hu/adatbazis/aktak/gripen-ugy. Magyar Narancs, 3 November 2005, Gripmadártörténet - visszapillantás a vadászgéptenderre (Gripbird story - looking back at the tender), http://magyarnarancs.hu/belpol/gripmadartortenet_-_visszapillantas_a_vadaszgeptenderre-64734
Helicopter-tender more appealing (Vonzóbb lett a helikoptertender), 20 November 2013, http://www.vg.hu/vallalatok/vonzobb-lett-a-helikoptertender-416278
Decision on the helicopter-tender at the beginning of the next government mandate - says MoD (Hende: A következő ciklus elején dönthetnek a helikopterekről) 12 April 2013, http://mandiner.hu/cikk/20130412_hende_a_kovetkezo_ciklus_elejen_donthetnek_a_helikopterekrol
MoD before helicopter purchase (HM helikoptervásárlás előtt), 15 February 2014, http://nol.hu/belfold/20130215-_kinos__de_mit_tehetunk__-1367001
Faultily classified report on the Gripen-offset (Rosszul titkosított jelentés rejti a Gripen-beszerzés minden adatát) 12 February 2014, http://nol.hu/belfold/20140212-sosem_derul_ki__mi_tortent-1444113
Hungarian Spectrum, 'The Gripen affair redux', 26 September 2012,
https://hungarianspectrum.wordpress.com/2012/09/26/the-gripen-affair-redux/comment-page-1/
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: Offsets were introduced in Hungary in the mid-90s, being part of the defence procurement as a normative and transparent requirement with a fixed threshold of HUF 1 billion. Offset agreements managed by the Ministry for National Economy and its legal predecessors were framework-type agreements permitting direct, indirect defence-related and indirect commercial offsets.
With the implementation of the Directive 2009/81/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, normative offset were abolished. Nevertheless, the modified Government Decree 228/2004 on defence procurement allows the application of unique procurement rules on a case-by-case basis when exemptions are applicable. Those exemptions are: procurements based on international agreement with special procurement rules; procurements in the framework of joint research and development programmes; government-to-government agreements concerning procurements on the basis of Article 346 of the TFEU subject to the decision of the government.
For those cases unique procurement rules should be determined by the Ministers of Defence and Economy subject to Governmental approval.
Offset requirements and evaluation principles are stipulated in the invitation to tender. The tenders are evaluated accordingly, offset weight in the overall tender is around 25%.
Offset fulfilment is subject to approval by the Committee for Unique Procurements (formerly Offset Committee). Obligors have to submit yearly reports on the status of performance.
Offset fulfilment is to be approved by a committee formed by representatives of 5 ministries, thereby providing transparency to the process. Offset agreements and fulfilment results are public.
Suggested score: 3
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: There was a parliamentary commission of inquiry in the aftermath of the Gripen jet purchase with respect to corruption accusations that surfaced first in Sweden regarding the deal, but the results of the inquiry were not published and the matter was not pursued despite indications from foreign investigations that Hungarian actors were involved. With respect to the helicopter tender, the government did not disqualify AgustaWestland despite the allegations of bribery that surfaced with regards to the supplier. These cases suggest that due diligence measures are not often utilized and follow-up with respect to problematic off-set contracts is often lagging.
K-Monitor, Gripen-ügy (The Gripen Case) http://k-monitor.hu/adatbazis/aktak/gripen-ugy. Magyar Narancs, 3 November 2005, Gripmadártörténet - visszapillantás a vadászgéptenderre (Gripbird story - looking back at the tender), http://magyarnarancs.hu/belpol/gripmadartortenet_-_visszapillantas_a_vadaszgeptenderre-64734
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Does the government make public the details of offset programmes, contracts, and performance?
Hungary has been a signatory of the Code of Conduct on Offsets since 2010; the Code aims to introduce greater transparency in offset agreements. There is no national website dedicated to offset contracts. Press reports regularly criticize the government for lack of transparency in the preparation of a new offset contract for military helicopter purchases.
The recent helicopter purchase from Russia and the Gripen fighter jet purchase are both examples that show the opaqueness of offset programmes and contracts in Hungary. In the Gripen jet purchase, a HCLU-supported journalist sued successfully to gain information about the contract and ancillary agreements and in 2007, a parliamentary commission of inquiry was established to investigate allegations of corruption with respect to the deal, but the results of the inquiry were not made public. With respect to the recent helicopter purchase from Russia, there was no trace of the procurement process in the Ministry. Both of these cases show that the lack of transparency in offset programmes and contracts is an ongoing issue.
RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 2: Comments added.
RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: There is no public information on the issue and there are indications of ongoing shortcomings in transparency. Score maintained.
European Defence Agency, 'Code of Conduct on Offsets, accessed 18 April 2014, http://www.eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/documents/The_Code_of_Conduct_on_Offsets.pdf
MoD before helicopter purchase (HM helikoptervásárlás előtt), 15 February 2014, http://nol.hu/belfold/20130215-_kinos__de_mit_tehetunk__-1367001
K-Monitor, Gripen-ügy (The Gripen Case) http://k-monitor.hu/adatbazis/aktak/gripen-ugy.
Magyar Narancs, 3 November 2005, Gripmadártörténet - visszapillantás a vadászgéptenderre (Gripbird story - looking back at the tender), http://magyarnarancs.hu/belpol/gripmadartortenet_-_visszapillantas_a_vadaszgeptenderre-64734.
Nepszabadsag Online, 5 April 2014, Használt helikopterek Oroszországból (Used helicopters from Russia), http://nol.hu/gazdasag/helikopterek-oroszorszagbol-1454543
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: Offset fulfilments are subject to approval by the Committee for Unique Procurements (formerly Offset Committee). Obligors have to submit yearly reports on the status of performance.
Offset fulfilments are to be approved by a committee formed by representatives of 5 ministries, thereby providing transparency to the process. Offset agreements and fulfilment results are public.
Suggested score: 2
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: The recent helicopter purchase from Russia and the Gripen fighter jet purchase are both examples that show the opaqueness of offset programmes and contracts in Hungary. In the Gripen jet purchase, a HCLU-supported journalist sued successfully to gain information about the contract and ancillary agreements and in 2007, a parliamentary commission of inquiry was established to investigate allegations of corruption with respect to the deal, but the results of the inquiry were not made public. With respect to the recent helicopter purchase from Russia, there was no trace of the procurement process in the Ministry. Both of these cases show that the lack of transparency in offset programmes and contracts is an ongoing issue.
K-Monitor, Gripen-ügy (The Gripen Case) http://k-monitor.hu/adatbazis/aktak/gripen-ugy. Magyar Narancs, 3 November 2005, Gripmadártörténet - visszapillantás a vadászgéptenderre (Gripbird story - looking back at the tender), http://magyarnarancs.hu/belpol/gripmadartortenet_-_visszapillantas_a_vadaszgeptenderre-64734.Nepszabadsag Online, 5 April 2014, Használt helikopterek Oroszországból (Used helicopters from Russia), http://nol.hu/gazdasag/helikopterek-oroszorszagbol-1454543.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are offset contracts subject to the same level of competition regulation as the main contract?
Offset contracts are not part of the procurement procedure. The Government decree on the special rules of defence procurement determines the public procurement tender process for unique cases, including procurements based on international agreement with special procurement rules and government-to-government agreements. In these cases, Ministers of Defence and Economy determine the special rules of the tender process and those rules are approved by the Government.
Hungary is a member state of the European Defence Agency, which has a Code of Conduct for Offsets (2011), which encourages fair and open competition. That being said, even the EDA's Code of Conduct recognizes that procurement in the defence market is different than procurement in the regular commercial market. The score has been selected on the assumption that the level of competition is less than that of the main contract.
RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 2: Comments added.
Government decree 228 of 2004. (VII. 30) on special rules of defence procurement, accessed 18 April 2014, http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=86378.261530
European Defence Agency, Code of Conduct on Offsets Agreed by the EU Member States Participating in the European Defence Agency, Version Approved on May 3, 2011, http://www.eda.europa.eu/docs/documents/brochure_offsets.pdf (accessed 30 August 2015)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Hungary is a member state of the European Defence Agency, which has a Code of Conduct for Offsets (2011), which encourages fair and open competition. That being said, even the EDA's Code of Conduct recognizes that procurement in the defence market is different than procurement in the regular commercial market.
European Defence Agency, Code of Conduct on Offsets Agreed by the EU Member States Participating in the European Defence Agency, Version Approved on May 3, 2011, http://www.eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/documents/The_Code_of_Conduct_on_Offsets.pdf.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
How strongly does the government control the company's use of agents and intermediaries in the procurement cycle?
Official sources do not refer to the use of agents and intermediaries in the procurement cycle as such, since these companies do not have a special status, using simply the possibility of subcontracting which is permitted in the legislation.
Based on interviews and comments made by officials of the MoD, the current government strongly discourages the use of agents and intermediaries in defence procurement processes and promotes the establishment of new relations with them which are more favourable to the state. It appears that these arguments have a political element, as the current government has accused previous left-wing governments of overusing agents and intermediaries as a form of corruption (see second source listed). There is no publicly available evidence that indicates an improvement in control over the use of agents and intermediaries.
However, a news article from 2014 mentions that the government may attempt to sell its MiG-29 jets this year through the use of &quoute;secret intermediaries.&quoute; The article mentions one specific company with respect to this potential deal (Armitech Industries Kft). The article also mentions a number of other intermediary firms that are trading with the MoD in used arms and military equipment. While there are no official sources to support these statements, it is probable that the government still engages agents and intermediaries in the procurement cycle to some extent, but there does not seem to be strong control over their use.
RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 2: Comments included for context, but the question -as you rightly point out in point 4. - is about intermediaries used by companies, not the government.
RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: The comments do not appear to directly address the question. Score maintained.
Market share of intermediaries in the defence sector set to decrease (Kevesebb lesz a részesedése a honvédségi közvetítő cégeknek), 3 September 2011, http://www.origo.hu/itthon/20110903-nepszabadsag-kevesebb-lesz-a-reszesedese-a-honvedsegi-kozvetito-cegeknek.html
Hende strikes back to MSZP (Hende Csaba visszavágott az MSZP-nek), 13 December 2010, http://hvg.hu/itthon/20101213_honvedelem_hende_csaba_
Hungary’s defence industry as a new growth sector? (A magyar hadiipar mint húzóágazat?) 3 September 2011, http://www.old.szentkoronaradio.com/belfold/2011_09_03_a-magyar-hadiipar-mint-huzoagazat
Nol.hu, 6 September 2014, Hende akár már októberben távozni kényszerülhet (Hende may have to leave in October),http://nol.hu/belfold/hende-akar-mar-oktoberben-tavozni-kenyszerulhet-1484691
Interview with Interviewee 3. Government official, Ministry of Defence, April 22, 2014
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Disagree
Comment: In case of NSIP procurements, the only intermediaries used can be NATO Agencies, in which case the procurement rules of the specific agency are applied. The conclusion of a contract with any NATO agency requires the previous approval of a national board (Security Investment Planning Committee) before signing the contract. Integrity is assured through NATO's financial authorization process and auditing processes (International Board of Auditors) as well as the nations’ own control mechanisms (through Boards of Directors, various conventions, thus the MOU, MOA, LOA etc.). The strength of the procedure lies in the high level of integrity, the high standards of services, and the professional approach of NATO agencies. Its weaknesses are the slow progress from the idea to delivery (lengthy process until the procurement contract is signed with the NATO agency) and the high service costs payable to the NATO agency.
Suggested score: 3
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: A news article from 2014 mentions that the government may attempt to sell its MiG-29 jets this year through the use of &quoute;secret intermediaries.&quoute; The article mentions one specific company with respect to this potential deal (Armitech Industries Kft). The article also mentions a number of other intermediary firms that are trading with the MoD in used arms and military equipment. While there are no official sources to support these statements, it is probable that the government still engages agents and intermediaries in the procurement cycle to some extent, but there does not seem to be strong control over their use.
Nol.hu, 6 September 2014, Hende akár már októberben távozni kényszerülhet (Hende may have to leave in October),http://nol.hu/belfold/hende-akar-mar-oktoberben-tavozni-kenyszerulhet-1484691
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Are the principal aspects of the financing package surrounding major arms deals, (such as payment timelines, interest rates, commercial loans or export credit agreements) made publicly available prior to the signing of contracts?
The website of the Office for Defence Management of the MoD is responsible for publishing information on defence procurement processes. It publishes public procurement notices and contracts, which contain details about financial packages and payment conditions. The notice about the winner of the tender is published before the actual contract is concluded and published. The notice is a general form detailing only top-line elements of the future contract (the exact contractual amount, the deadline, the winning company, the subject of the tender, the share of subcontractors).
Ministry of Defence, Office for Defence Management website, documents on individual processes and the relevant rules and legislation:
http://honvedelmibeszerzes.kormany.hu/eljarasok
http://honvedelmibeszerzes.kormany.hu/fontos-jogszabalyok
Ministry of Defence, Procurement Regulations (2013), accessed 17 April 2014, http://honvedelmibeszerzes.kormany.hu/download/b/e9/00000/HM%20FHH%20(K%C3%B6z)beszerz%C3%A9si%20szab%C3%A1lyzat%20(nytsz_21_544)%202013_01_22.pdf
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Does the government formally require that the main contractor ensures subsidiaries and sub-contractors adopt anti-corruption programmes, and is there evidence that this is enforced?
The Government Decree on procurement in connection with basic defence and military interest only contains general requirements for bidders not to have legally binding criminal or anti-competition court verdicts. There is no special mention of mandatory anti-corruption programs for bidders and their subsidiaries or subcontractors and there is also no reference to enforcement mechanisms.
The Act on National Assets defines very broadly what a transparent organization is (basically any business entity under the jurisdiction of an EU tax authority is qualified as such) without mentioning the necessity or encouraging the practice of introducing specific anti-corruption programs as a condition. The declaration of transparency affects the transparency of the ownership structure (that the actual owners are known); there is no mention of subcontractors.
RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: Comments on the Act on National Assets added. The quoted Nr. 29/2014 regulation is not accessible in publicly available databases.
RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 2: Agree. Score amended to 0.
Government Decree 228/2004 on procurement in connection with basic defence and military interest, accessed 5 April 2014, http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=139990.256046
Act on National Assets 196/2011 http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=142898.290151 (accessed 3 September 2015)
Ministry of Defence, Procurement Regulations (2013), accessed 17 April 12014, http://honvedelmibeszerzes.kormany.hu/download/b/e9/00000/HM%20FHH%20(K%C3%B6z)beszerz%C3%A9si%20szab%C3%A1lyzat%20(nytsz_21_544)%202013_01_22.pdf
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Disagree
Comment: According to 3§ (1) 1.a) of the Act on National Asset Nr 196 all contractors must sign a Declaration of Transparency; without it, a contract cannot be concluded.
This year also a new regulation Nr. 29/2014. of the MoD Administrative State Secretary and the Chief of Defence Staff was published about the tasks related to transparent organisations.
N/A Criteria chosen as none of the statements fit fully the national legislative situation.
Suggested score: N/A
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: Since there are only general legal requirements, and only for the bidders and not subsidiaries and subcontractors, there is a significant gap here that can potentially lead to circumventing the law. While Government Decree 228/2004 does have general rules for subcontractors, under Article 27, there is no mention of a mandatory anti-corruption program for these actors.
Suggested score: 0
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
How common is it for defence acquisition decisions to be based on political influence by selling nations?
Previous major defence deals, including the Gripen fighter jet offset agreement, show that deals often take into account the wider geopolitical context. Comments surrounding the new helicopter purchase, which is in the phase of preparation, also suggest that political considerations will influence the bidding process.
The decision will have to be made between US, European, Russian or possibly Chinese suppliers and the final deliberations could easily be influenced by the wider geopolitical context, as Hungary belongs to the group of EU countries opposing widespread sanctions against Russia. Purchases driven by political influence can be formally justified by the government since these military purchases are conducted with the help of offset contracts for which a special regime is established in the Hungarian legislation.
In another deal of the purchase of used helicopters the Hungarian government chose the Russian suppliers (this was criticised by commentators due to the ongoing conflict in Ukraine). The three used helicopters, the maintenance of which is considered more costly than that of newer versions, were acquired for 3 billion HUF and without public procurement procedures, which means that the government had a secret tender for this purchase. Political considerations - in light of the Hungarian government's pro-Russia stance and strengthening economic ties with the country - seem to have weighed in favor of the Russian supplier.
RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 1: Comments added.
mno.hu, 'Helicopter-purchase next year (Helikopterbeszerzés jövőre)', 2 April 2013, http://mno.hu/phalanx/helikopterbeszerzes-jovore-1148456
Hungarian Spectrum, 'The Gripen affair redux', 26 September 2012,
https://hungarianspectrum.wordpress.com/2012/09/26/the-gripen-affair-redux/comment-page-1/
index.hu, 'Fighter helicopters for Hungary (Harci helikoptert Magyarországnak!)'
http://index.hu/belfold/2013/01/08/helikopter/
Hungary opposed to economic sanctions against Russia, Reuters.com, March 28, 2014
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/28/us-ukraine-crisis-russia-hungary-idUSBREA2R0CD20140328
Borderlands: Hungary Maneuvers, Geopolitical Weekly, May 20, 2014.
http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/borderlands-hungary-maneuvers
www.kormany.hu, 10 July 2014, Katonai és civil feladatok ellátására is alkalmasak a beszerzett Mi-8-as orosz helikopterek (The acquired MI-8 Russian helicopters are capable to fulfill both military and civil functions),http://www.kormany.hu/hu/honvedelmi-miniszterium/hirek/katonai-es-civil-feladatok-ellatasara-is-alkalmasak-a-beszerzett-mi-8-as-orosz-helikopterek
Nepszava Online, 11 June 2014, Nagy Magyar Helikopterhelyzet (The Big Hungarian Helicopter Situation), http://nepszava.hu/cikk/1023462-nagy-magyar-helikopterhelyzet
Hvg.hu, 27 April 2014,Titokzatos helikopterbeszerzés a HM-ben (Secret helicopter acquisiton at the Ministry of Defence), http://hvg.hu/itthon/201417_titokzatos_helikopterbeszerzes_a_hmben_lesz
Hvg.hu, 28 March 2013, Négyen pályáztak a HM helikoptertenderén (Four companies have submitted applications for the Ministry of Defence's helicopter tender), http://hvg.hu/itthon/20130328_Negyen_palyaztak_a_HM_helikoptertenderen
National Interest, 14 February 2014, Hungary Turns East as Europe Fades, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/hungary-turns-east-europe-fades-9878.
Foreign Affairs, Jan-Werner Müller, Moscow's Trojan Horse: In Europe's Ideological War, Hungary Picks Putinism, 6 August 2014, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141825/jan-werner-mueller/moscows-trojan-horse
Nepszabadsag Online, 5 April 2014, Használt helikopterek Oroszországból (Used helicopters from Russia), http://nol.hu/gazdasag/helikopterek-oroszorszagbol-1454543.' NO SCORE CHALLENGE
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: In a recent helicopter purchase, the Hungarian government chose the Russian suppliers. As experts noted, it does not look good for the country that amidst the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, Hungary chose to purchase military equipment from Russia. The three used helicopters, the maintenance of which is considered more costly than that of newer versions, were acquired for 3 billion HUF and without public procurement, which means that the government had a secret tender for this purchase. Political considerations - in light of the Hungarian government's pro-Russia stance and strengthening economic ties with the country - seem to have weighed in favor of the Russian supplier.
www.kormany.hu, 10 July 2014, Katonai és civil feladatok ellátására is alkalmasak a beszerzett Mi-8-as orosz helikopterek (The acquired MI-8 Russian helicopters are capable to fulfill both military and civil functions),http://www.kormany.hu/hu/honvedelmi-miniszterium/hirek/katonai-es-civil-feladatok-ellatasara-is-alkalmasak-a-beszerzett-mi-8-as-orosz-helikopterek. Nepszava Online, 11 June 2014, Nagy Magyar Helikopterhelyzet (The Big Hungarian Helicopter Situation), http://nepszava.hu/cikk/1023462-nagy-magyar-helikopterhelyzet. Hvg.hu, 27 April 2014,Titokzatos helikopterbeszerzés a HM-ben
(Secret helicopter acquisiton at the Ministry of Defence), http://hvg.hu/itthon/201417_titokzatos_helikopterbeszerzes_a_hmben_lesz. Hvg.hu, 28 March 2013, Négyen pályáztak a HM helikoptertenderén (Four companies have submitted applications for the Ministry of Defence's helicopter tender), http://hvg.hu/itthon/20130328_Negyen_palyaztak_a_HM_helikoptertenderen. National Interest, 14 February 2014, Hungary Turns East as Europe Fades, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/hungary-turns-east-europe-fades-9878. Foreign Affairs, Jan-Werner Müller, Moscow's Trojan Horse: In Europe's Ideological War, Hungary Picks Putinism, 6 August 2014, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141825/jan-werner-mueller/moscows-trojan-horse.Nepszabadsag Online, 5 April 2014, Használt helikopterek Oroszországból (Used helicopters from Russia), http://nol.hu/gazdasag/helikopterek-oroszorszagbol-1454543.
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Opinion: Agree
Comment:
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According to Hungary's Fundamental Law, the Parliament has extensive rights over defence policy. Under Article 1(2), Parliament is empowered to adopt laws, adopt the central budget and approve its implementation (thus it can amend or reject the defence budget, participates in the formulation and the eventual veto of the defence policy), decides on the declaration of a state of war and the conclusion of peace and makes decisions concerning a special legal order, and regarding involvement in military operations.
The Parliament’s National Defence and Law Enforcement Committee (DLEC) is tasked with performing the tasks guaranteed by Article 19 of the Defence Act. According to the legislation, the Committee has extensive rights to scrutinise defence policy and exercise budgetary power. However, in 2011, Transparency International Hungary's National Integrity Study noted that “Hungary’s system of checks and balances has been undermined, thereby also weakening the integrity of the bodies examined. Even where legislation enacted provides adequate grounds of independence, it is doubtful that control institutions (...) can operate free of interference in practice. Corruption risks arising from the symbiotic relationship between the political and the business elite, commonly voiced doubts regarding the independence of control institutions, and the lack of transparency in the legislative process together signal that the Hungarian state has been captured by powerful interest groups.” These trends can be seen in the general operations of Parliament as well as in the activities of a number of parliamentary committees, including the DLEC. Due to the two-thirds supermajority of the ruling party (in place until February 2015), in most cases legislative scrutiny remains purely formal. The DLEC has a supervisory and control sub-committee which has held only six sessions between 2010 and 2014 (and three of those sessions did not have the necessary quorum). The last two sessions in 2011 and 2013 lasted only five and twelve minutes respectively, without the necessary quorum after the governing party MPs refused to take part in its work.