Greece

There is little information regarding the procedures followed in events of asset disposals, save for the announcements of the disposals per se. The Ministry complies with transparency rules and publishes all the public tenders on its website and the Clarity 'Diavgeia' website. The Clarity site therefore offers a very detailed approach of the process of selling the equipment which is subject to the oversight of the Finance Directorate of the Hellenic Army General Staff. However, the strength and influence of the Finance Directorate remains relatively ambiguous since no detailed data is published in this regard.

The military itself is the body that scrutinises asset disposals. The Greek Army has a separate department, the Asset Disposal Department, which drafts lists of the military assets that are no longer required, or have greatly depreciated and are available for disposal. The Finance Directorate then oversees the entire process to safeguard transparency since every decision is also published in the Clarity website. Since the Greek Army supervises the entire process, there is potential for issues relating to the independence of scrutiny and accountability. While this cannot be strictly ascertained, there is room to increase transparency by including external auditors in the future.

The Greek Government has debated on changing this process, however this is not likely to happen in the foreseeable future, partially due to the traditional self-monitoring right that has been indirectly recognised for the Greek Army.

The score here should be between 1 and 2 given there is no independent oversight but there is some transparency. Score 1 has been selected to emphasise the importance of independent scrutiny.

According to the official budget of the Ministry of Defence for the year 2014, secret items (under code 0896) account for 0,22% of the Ministry's budget, or €6,950,000 out of the total budget of €3,073,540,000. Estimates based on data sent to the Institutions and Transparency Committee indicated the security budget amount may have totalled around 3% of the Ministry of Defence's budget in 2012. The percentage has reportedly dropped over the past years however, proportionately more than the reduction of the budget of the Ministry.

Although the researcher deems the data officially published by the government to be credible, the overall lack of transparency or strong means of verification means a higher score cannot be awarded. The management of the amount is not published in the Government Journal. Members of the Parliament can request further details pertaining to the expenditure of specific secret items, however they often refrain from doing so for purposes of confidentiality.

The Parliament has committees in order to scrutinise and further examine the spending on items relating to national security and military intelligence. Examples include the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence and the Special Permanent Committee on Institutions and Transparency. However, when it comes to secret items in particular, such a policy process is not in place, and the Members of the Parliament have to request details on a case by case basis, always bearing in mind the sensitive nature of these expenses and the political circumstances vis-à-vis confidential military matters with geopolitical importance. Finally, recent allegations regarding the Ministry of Foreign Affairs support that money given to NGO's was then re-routed to the Ministry to fund secret items.

The State Audit Council audits defence and security expenditure, including contracts and defence procurement. It further examines transactions of significant financial value in order to safeguard its smooth and transparent commission. The aforementioned are then incorporated in an annual report, which is subsequently forwarded to the Parliament for review. This report however does not include secret items, since details of those are not included in the defence budget. Overall, and in accordance with what has been previously mentioned, there is a relative reluctance to exercise oversight over secret spending.

The budget of the Ministry of Defence is predominantly composed of salaries, operating costs and military expenditure. In law, off-budget expenditure is permitted by Article 19 of Law N. 3649/2008. The method of management and justification of the amounts recorded in confidential expenses shall be determined by joint resolution of the Ministers of Interior and Economy & Finance, which is not to be published in the Government Journal. In addition, the Greek Government introduced new legislation (Law N.3978/2011) in order to transpose into national law the EU Defence and Security Procurement Directive 2009/81/EC. The new rules open up the defence procurement process to a regime of transparency and accountability. Article 16 of the Statute translates to Article 2 of the EU Directive; according to it, the new rules relate to contracts relevant to the fields of defence and security. Overall, the off-budget expenditures are adequately regulated and, to the best of our knowledge, no misappropriation of funds is in place.

In practice, there is some off-budget military expenditure since the intelligence services can allocate an allowance towards confidential expenditure. The extent of this practice is unclear since the Ministers of Interior and Economy and Finance determine the management and justification of the amounts recorded. The parliament may further request access to information in relation to the freedom of information principle, however this holds the risk of incomplete disclosure for reasons of military and national security. In practice, the parliament refrains from requesting such information exactly for purposes of national security. The level of off-budget spending in defence is unclear as well and the score has been selected accordingly.

The initiatives of 'Diavgeia' (clarity) and the open government initiative have significantly boosted transparency in the public sector generally and the defence industry in particular since the Government follows the legal obligation to publish online documents issued by the various Ministries and other governmental bodies. This open government approach is now expected in the Greek society and people perceive it as a necessary process for every competition announced and contract signed. It is antithetical to old practices that included sole assignments to specific companies.

The law protects sensitive information on the grounds of protecting national security (Ν. 4070/2012). However, there is no definition of what this 'sensitive information' may be comprised of. No further formal classification exists and consequently there is a lack of scrutiny of the said information. In that regard, Article 252 of the Greek Criminal Code provides for a duty of confidentiality regarding any information that a civil servant might become acquainted with while fulfilling his duties. Criminal sanctions are in place for the violation of the said provision.

The Greek defence industry has ownership of commercial businesses and uses off-set methods in order to gain benefits to support the Greek defence industry. It has tried to increase its international competitiveness through accessing evolving technologies and participation in co-production programmes. The Greek defence industry, in alignment with a traditional corporate structure and information about its operations, is publicly declared. The ownership of these operations is available in the diavgeia (transparency) website, as is every sale of relevant assets. Nonetheless, there are several complaints about buildings which belong to the army and remain unused since this increases the inefficiency of the army's resources and does not contribute towards a financially healthy and stable army structure.

The Greek Army has its own businesses for its own military needs. During an interview with a Ministry of Defence official, he stated that these businesses have a corporate structure and relevant bureaucracy. With regard to scrutiny and auditing, this information is not widely available, however given that all the decisions and contracts are published in the diavgeia portal (transparency), every citizen can search for a specific transaction. It is thus logically presumed that this information is publicly available and therefore transparent albeit no specific evidence exists.

According to Greek Law and the Greek Criminal Code civil servants –which includes both civilian and military- are forbidden to participate in any form of private enterprise. However, exceptions are allowed through express request to the relevant department and the granting of its permission. Civil servants are further excluded from having their own business since their role is strictly restricted to public service. While overall, there have been examples of accusations regarding fraud committed by employees of the defence industry (e.g. fraud regarding insurance companies), none of them refer to private enterprises owned by civil servants. This is therefore the general practice since the vast majority of civil servants respect this exclusivity of civil service and there appears to be no evidence to the contrary.

All the Ministers of Defence over the past years have reiterated their strong commitment and will to effectively introduce and implement anti-corruption and integrity measures. The former Minister of Defence, Mr. Evangelos Venizelos and the current Minister of Defence, Mr. Dimitrios Avramopoulos have, on a number of occasions, expressed their strong commitment towards this goal, which is confirmed by media reports. The recently appointed Minister of Defence, Mr. Panagiotis Kammenos, further committed to further introduce integrity measures and fight against incidents of nepotism and favouritism.

The Law N. 3528/2007 provides for a specific disciplinary process that is related to alleged violations committed by civil servants, including military personnel. Any corrupt or illegal behaviour is categorised under these provisions. Further to that, a new legislation regarding the prosecution of Civil Servants was created with the Law 4057/2012 which facilitates and expedites the entire process. It is a relatively new law and it is therefore too early to evaluate its standing or efficiency. There are a few allegations regarding disciplinary violations that have reportedly not been addressed by the Greek state (e.g. the debts of army personnel) although this does not appear to be a widespread practice. The new legislation has led to individuals being dismissed from public administration because of incidents of corruption. Finally, the pardon provided by the Greek president to some punished Greek Army civil servants is a well-established tradition in Greece, albeit in certain circumstances it might give an impression of unequal treatment before the law.

The Greek Parliament adopted a number of legal provisions concerning whistleblowing in the public sector regarding financial crimes in April 2014. Before that, legal provisions such as Art. 281 of the Civil Code on abuse of rights, Art. 252 of the Penal Code on violation of classified business information, Art. 263B of the Penal Code, Art. 371 of the Penal Code on Violation of professional secrecy, and Art. 40 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on private citizen’s obligations, provided varying degrees of protection for those seeking to report misbehaviour. By and large, however, these provisions are rather generic and cannot easily apply to serious incidents requiring protection for whistle-blowers. It is a widespread phenomenon for whistle-blowers to be sued once they have revealed corruption or ill-practices within an institution, and the lack of protection discourages whistleblowing. The Ministry of Finance has been actively encouraging whistle-blowers to report incidents of corruption, yet the results of this call have been nebulous since no material proof of their efficiency exists.

There exists commitment for the protection of whistle-blowers in GRECO (Group of States against Corruption) which is of eminent importance for the effective prevention of corruption in the public sphere. However, Greece has not made appropriate changes with respect to the GRECO commitment to whistle blowing. Further the EU has recently reinforced its strong commitment to protecting whistle-blowers with its very recent recommendation that Greece will follow, as several sources indicate. It suggests the creation of a normative, institutional and judicial framework that will protect individuals who, in the context of their work-based relationship, report or disclose information or threats or harm to the public interest. This development is therefore of the utmost importance towards the protection of whistle blowers and will change this legal field very soon.

The selection of officials and personnel in defence procurement is ruled by the EU Defence and Security Procurement Directive 2009/81/EC that was transposed into Greek law. The same applies to the management of procurement programmes. The mechanisms require further clarifications as per the selection and oversight that is required. The presumption is that sensitive positions are given thorough consideration, however there is a lack of hard evidence to prove this, including of specific rules of conduct associated with such positions.

The number of civilian and military personnel is publicly available via the registry of public sector employees (provided in the sources section). The data is submitted though the Hellenic Statistical Authority which then transmits it to the registry. It is assessed that, particularly after the prosecution of some incidents of fake pensioners that were discovered a few years ago, these figures are accurate. The Ministry of Administrative Reform and electronic Governance contributes to this transparent process; it organises a census held annually and records in a special registry all the public sector employees.

The law regulates pay rates, deductions and allowances for civilian and military personnel. As one can se from the available web sites, this information is publicly available in detail and updated regularly. Every citizen can access them and be informed with regard to pay rates and allowances of military personnel of every rank.

According to the established practice, and despite the economic crisis which endangered the stability and viability of the domestic economy, personnel receive their salary both on time and according to a well-established system. No sources indicate that salary is not paid in time or that there are any major deficiencies with the system. While pay rates, deductions and allowances are regulated legally and the Army Financial and Accounting Centre computerises and issues the payroll of Military and Civilian personnel. Basic pay is non-discretionary and all relevant information is available in the public domain.

Legislation provides a rather comprehensive and transparent system that defines promotion provisions for military personnel, upon formal qualifications. Evaluation committees exist in a disciplined way that leads to fair and proportional evaluations of the military personnel (Interview source). Allegations of incidents of favouritism, mostly in the lower military ranks, exist however none of them have been explicitly verbalised in the past years nor has there been any media report on the matter. It is assessed that these are likely to be speculations and no hard evidence has been brought to light (Interview source). Allegations regarding political favouritism in the higher ranks is, equally, not proved with hard evidence. Further, all the promotions are publicly available, along with the criteria that the candidates fulfilled, pursuant to the Clarity webpage requirements.

There is an established and well-functioning formal appraisal process that deals with the promotion of military personnel in higher ranks. A promotion board verifies if all the requirements are followed when deciding regarding a promotion. The state does not interfere in this process since there is an inherent trust in the Greek Army that it can adequately take care of its internal business (Interview source). This lack of oversight could potentially lead to a violation of the meritocracy that is implied in the process. However no such incident has been officially recorded and it is, for the time being at least, assumed that the army responds responsibly to the important duty of administering its internal promotions (Interview source). This process is objective since it is not affected by any political institutions, yet there is always a window for corruption since their decisions are not frequently scrutinised.

According to military criminal law, it is illegal to engage in any criminal activity with the purpose of avoiding conscription. Most of the incidents, or allegations, that have been communicated to the public are related to active and passive bribery. There is generally a wide practice in Greece of people trying to avoid conscription in every possible way. This unavoidably leads to incidents that range from a simple favour asked to large bribery. Even though allegations regarding conscription avoidance by politicians and celebrities have been published from time to time, no hard evidence of prosecutions exists. That being said, one can find the last reports of such incidents in the media up until 2007, whereas there is scarcity of information with regard to whether such practice has been followed since then. No data exist with regard to prosecutions, and if any improper behaviour has occurred it has escaped attention.

Even though such allegations are widespread within society, lack of evidence exists since no prosecutions have been documented. Albeit difficult to prove, avoiding conscription, or gaining a preferential posting appears to be widespread.

Bribery is an illegal and criminal offence according to domestic legislation and the relevant international legislation that Greece put in place. This covers incidents relating to corruption within conscription as well as preferred postings in the recruitment process. There have been plentiful allegations regarding such practices, however virtually none of them has been publicly verified or prosecuted by the judicial system. Most of the favours asked offer a “I owe you one” approach, or simply a financial gain; since these favours are not considered huge, the recipient might promise to return the favour in the future or simply offer a small monetary amount. Even though such allegations are widespread within society, lack of evidence exists since no prosecutions have been documented. Albeit difficult to prove, avoiding conscription, or gaining a preferential posting appears to be widespread.

It is assessed unlikely that any ghost soldiers currently exist in the payroll. After the burst of the Greek economic crisis, and upon realisation of the level of public spending in all the sectors, the Government initiated a recording of all the financial data, including payrolls and pensions. In 2011 this revealed almost as many as 100,000 pensioners who were receiving payments such as disability allowances without having the right to do so. This led to the electronic and accurate verification of every pensioner and active employee, including military personnel. As the Defence Ministry had enormous expenses attributed to it before the financial crisis, it was one of the first ministries that had to drastically reduce its spending, making it likely that issues such as this were addressed. Given the well-established payment system and public disclose of personnel numbers as mentioned in Questions 38 and 40, risk is limited further.

The law regulates pay rates, deductions and allowances for both civilian and military personnel. They are publicly available via the electronic registry of personnel website, easily accessible and transparent. The Army Financial and Accounting Centre is responsible for computerising and issuing the payroll of Military and Civilian personnel. Conscripts receive a fairly small amount of money per month that ranges from €8.8 for the majority of them to €100 for exceptional circumstances (e.g. conscript has no parents, or is a parent himself). Given the small nature of the amount the remuneration is not made centrally and electronically but rather through the unit and in cash, after signing a record book. Incidents of corruption in this regard are - if any - rare, since the risk of entering into such a practice is likely to be too high for such a small amount of money. Chains of command are separated from chains of payment, even though this is not a published policy.

There are Military Codes of Conduct which cover conduct and behaviour as well as the relevant disciplinary action to be taken upon the discovery of inappropriate conduct. The Codes of Conduct include guidance to bribery, gifts and hospitality, and conflicts of interest. The Military Codes are updated regularly and meet the criteria of transparency and consistency, technically. The Law 4057/2012 also establishes conduct standards for civil servants in general, creating an expedited process of disciplinary action. A robust oversight mechanism is however lacking. The Codes of Conduct are not entirely comprehensive, since they do not account for any possible scenario, and lack a robust oversight mechanism.

There are Military Codes of Conduct, which address appropriate behaviour and conduct as well as relevant disciplinary action to be taken upon the discovery of breaches of the Codes. The Military Codes are updated regularly and meet the criteria of transparency and consistency. The Law 4057/2012 also establishes conduct standards for civil servants in general, creating an expedited process of disciplinary action. It establishes the standards for the treatment of personnel allegations regarding involvement in corrupt behaviour during their duties.

Over the past few years there have been several cases regarding the breach of Code of Conduct that have been addressed, in accordance with a general zero-tolerance approach for incidents of corruption (Interview). This has led to an increase by 33 per cent in the recorded cases of corruption from civil servants and the dismissal of 204 civil servants who have breached the Greek legislation (see sources). These cases are not publicly available due to provisions regarding data protection.

There is training available for public sector employees in order to become acquainted, to recognise and to avoid corruption. Results of such training are not publicly available. It is likely that selected personnel in more sensitive positions in defence have received relevant training but research found little direct evidence to verify this.

A national plan against corruption was published by the Greek Parliament in 2013 setting the priorities and the way forward whereas there are movements towards the establishment of the national anti-corruption coordinator in every ministry. It is possible this may have led to a coordinated approach to anti-corruption training for the Ministry of Defence, as the national plan does make provisions for training across government (pp. 44-46, 77-78) however no evidence was found of implementation within the MOD, and it is too early to evaluate the success of the wider initiative.

Anti-corruption training is also endorsed by the European Union within its Lifelong Learning Programme. The budget for the training is derived from European funds and recent examples of EU-wide training for incidents of corruption however indicate the commitment of the European Community towards preventing incidents of corruption in every sector, including the military. However, the regularity of training depends on the prioritisation of anti-corruption efforts in the future.

The Inspector General of Public Administration can order inspections and investigations as per the conduct of personnel, which includes ministry personnel. He/she is updated regarding the outcome of investigations and prosecutions against public service personnel and the information is publicly available. There is some public speculation and scepticism as to whether certain prosecutions have been stalled (see sources), since trials regarding allegedly corrupt civil servants have been repeatedly delayed, however there is no adequate evidence that would create any solid claim, as things stand.

Facilitation payments are illegal in Greece and are punishable under the Greek Criminal Code. Given a general legal reform that has been taking place over the past few years, some of these payments are now seen as major offences that can result in sentences of several years of imprisonment. However, no documented evidence as per prosecutions exists. With various initiatives to counter and prevent bribes, the situation is considered better nowadays, since many civil servants fear the consequences. The stringent sanctions appear therefore to have had a deterrent effect in the short-run. It is difficult to evaluate or predict the long-term impact, given the alleged frequency of illegal transactions in Greek society. A website that publishes all the allegations of bribing, called &quoute;I gave a bribe&quoute; is an example of actions that can maximise deterrence.

There is a military doctrine in existence, organised by the Doctrine Directorate of the Greek Army General Staff. The doctrine is available online and is easily accessible. It is updated regularly and is detailed and comprehensive. There are different versions that deal with various issues, including the conduct of military forces when they intervene in a country of conflict. The doctrine addresses corruption expressly as a strategic and serious issue in operations. There is a separate chapter dealing with values applicable to relevant operations. The doctrine has been widely circulated to all the military personnel and is one of the foundations of their training.

The military dogma is rather comprehensive, consistent and detailed. It provides a step-by-step approach with regard to the training in place to safeguard the viability and efficiency of every mission in place. This training includes issues of corruption where officers are trained on how to face and avoid incidents of corruption, both domestically and abroad, however no hard evidence of this wide training exists (Interview source). It is generally understood that this knowledge is applied in the field since there have been no known allegations relating the misuse of power or the corrupt behaviour by individuals, however one cannot disregard the possibility of such occurrences.

The military dogma is comprehensive, consistent and detailed. It provides a step-by-step approach with regard to the training in place to safeguard the viability and efficiency of every mission. The nation-state is responsible for the oversight of missions once abroad. The circumstances of the mission and the organising authority alter the structure and process of each method; nonetheless trained professionals are regularly deployed to monitor corruption risk in conflict environments. Greek troops further hold post-deployment briefings in order to methodically analyse the knowledge and experience in the field (Interview source). These meetings also exist in the form of lessons learned and are used as useful comments for future incorporation in the military dogma.

The Multinational Peace Support Operations Training Centre is a centre that provides training to military personnel at every level that is bound to participate in international missions and who face corruption risks. They care for the welfare of the personnel and ensure that everyone is adequately trained in this regard. An important aspect of this process deals with issues of corruption and its multiple facets (interview source). Officers are therefore trained on how to face and avoid incidents of corruption in every aspect of their professional life, either domestically or abroad. Results of such training are not publicly available and it is unclear what specific training staff receive in relation to corruption risk in contracting whilst on deployed operations or peacekeeping missions. It also could not be verified if there are specific guidelines on corruption risks in contracting whilst on deployed operations or peacekeeping missions, although EΔ 3-0.2 provides some broader guidance on contracting with multinational enterprises. There have been no known allegations regarding misuse of power or corrupt behaviour by individuals however.

Apart from allegations, there is no evidence (transcripts, announcements, prosecutions) that proves the employment of Private Military Contractors (PMCs) in Greece in order to provide operational staff to military environments. Given that the Greek Army is based on conscription that feeds it constantly with operational staff the widespread employment of Private Military Contractors is not required. Further, amidst the financial crisis, it would be highly paradoxical for the Greek Government to further employ PMCs. There have been allegations, mostly media articles, about Greek private military staff training the Afghan army, however even if should be the case, it would be within the NATO Security Force regime and guidance, and not stricto sensu within the Greek Army that operates within the country. No regulation regarding their action is in place, which is however justified exactly due to the lack of their presence.

Greece has transposed the EU Defence and Security Procurement Directive 2009/81/EC on a national level. This was achieved via the introduction of a law in 2011 (Law N. 3978/2011), and it is still early to determine its effectiveness. Article 16 of the Statute –which transposes Article 2 of the EU Directive- sets the application of the new established rules under the provisions of the contracts awarded for cases of defence and security. Many different tools are provided in this regard, including but not limited to sensitive equipment. It should be noted that the responsible Ministry for the monitoring and consequent implementation of the rules is the Ministry of Citizen Protection. The Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Citizen Protection are very closely knit for issues pertaining to security and intelligence services which explains why the latter Ministry is partially responsible for procurement in that regard. This, however, creates inconsistencies as to the independent scrutiny and the results thereof. An article by Reuters about a wide-ranging corruption inquiry which led to the arrest of a former defence official and two arms dealers shows there are clear flaws in the procurement process.

Greece has transposed the EU Defence and Security Procurement Directive 2009/81/EC through the introductions of a law (Law N. 3978/2011) in 2011 . Articles 72-76 of Law 3383/2010 refer to the structure and the requirements of long-term programmes (that last for more than fifteen years) and short-term programmes (on a three year rolling basis). The defence procurement cycle process that includes assessment of needs and contract implementation is overall in summary disclosed to public, in accordance with the Clarity website. The OECD’s government performance indicators report for 2013 mentions that Greece has made significant progress regarding procurement since it has made available several documents required, however there are still a few things that need to be done to achieve maximum efficiency in defence procurement.

Greece has transposed the EU Defence and Security Procurement Directive 2009/81/EC. The transposition happened with a law which was introduced in 2011 (Law N. 3978/2011). The law defines issues of procurement process and oversight mechanisms. These rules have not been widely practically enforced since their introduction. Allegations as to highly inactive oversight mechanisms therefore exist. Additionally, Article 16 of the Statute –which transposes Article 2 of the EU Directive - states that the new rules shall apply to contracts awarded in the fields of defence and security. Various reports indicate the deficient application of laws which decrease the effectiveness of legislation at hand.

Corruption allegations in 2014 prompted plans for increased parliamentary oversight. It is unclear whether this has led to more effective scrutiny.

Under current legislation (Law N. 3978/2011) it is obligatory to publish defence procurement contracts. Articles 72-76 of Law 3383/2010 refer to the structure and the requirements of long-term programmes (that last for more than fifteen years) and short-term programmes (on a three year rolling basis). Actual and planned purchases are disclosed publicly via the “Clarity” Program (diavgeia) transparency website. There is no evidence of audits.

The Ministry of Defence has strict criteria in order for a company to be able to bid for work for the Ministry of the Armed forces. It is required to have anti-corruption standards and processes that are in place and efficient. The companies also need to declare that they abide by compliance programmes that safeguard their transparent activity. Finally, the contractors as well as the sub-contractors, upon request, must provide court evidence that proves they have not been subject to court investigation or conviction with regard to any criminal activity, including of course, corruption.

There is an open and comprehensive process i nplace that deals with the auditing of the national defence and security strategy. Τhe main pillars and priorities of national defence and security strategy are published however audit verification regarding the actual results of the process is dubitable. Greece has transposed the EU Defence and Security Procurement Directive 2009/81/EC. The transposition took place with a law which was introduced in 2011 (Law N. 3978/2011). The country’s defence procurement is of eminent importance to national security and to that extent it is based on the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB). Under current legislation it is obligatory to publish defence procurement contracts. Articles 72-76 of Law 3383/2010 refer to the structure and the requirements of long-term programmes (that last for more than fifteen years) and short-term programmes (on a three year rolling basis). It is difficult to verify, however, how often purchases are derived from the strategy.

Defence purchases are to be based on clear criteria and quantified data relevant to the particulars of a contract. The Ministry of Defence are basing their purchases on requirements that are identifiable and publicly available (Interview source). This is further achieved by the open government initiative and the ‘Diavgeia’ (clarity) website which publishes every transaction executed by –amongst others- the Ministry of Defence. This is a relatively new approach and it has not have a retroactive effect; that is to say that should one wish to trace the decisions taken by the Ministry of Defence before the enforcement of the clarity portal, one should individually contact the Ministry and request this information since it is not available online (Interview source).

According to the existing legislative framework enacted in 2011, defence procurement is conducted as an open competition. There have been major scandals that derived from single-sourced contracts which led ot a focus on reducing them. Rules further suggest that every call for tender in defence procurement is to be published on the European Defence Agency's EBB portal.

However the law has not been enacted as planned since further allegations of bribery are unveiled; the Minister of Defence thus in early 2014 announced that Greece would overhaul defence procurement to make it more transparent.

Before this development, Greece used to base its contracts on a protectionist approach to the national defence industry. Pursuant to the EU Defence and Security Procurement Directive, the country has challenged and altered to a great extent the process it follows in these situations. Nonetheless, the Directive 2004/18/EC generally acts as an umbrella regarding public procurement covering works and services by contracting authorities in the fields of defence and security. No official statistics regarding single-sourced contracts exist, however given the commitment of the country to avoid them as much as possible, it is relatively safe to assume that their value is of significant minority.

Article 346 of the Treaty is the major source regarding the enforcement of Directives, and therefore EU countries, including Greece, can exempt defence and security contracts in cases where Directive 2009/91/EC proves to be inefficient with regard to safeguarding the national and security interests of the country. This exemption creates a risk of compromising open competition.

Greece has transposed the EU Defence and Security Procurement Directive 2009/81/EC. The transposition materialised through a relevant law which was introduced in 2011 (Law N. 3978/2011). The legislation provides for the creation of an institutionalized framework of regulation and oversight, including the function of tender boards. The duty of auditing the legal basis and context of the decisions is reserved for the State Audit Council which does not publish the audits. This occurs for incidents where defence procurement contracts are of significant financial value. Its report is consequently communicated to the Parliament which decides on whether to take any action, if breaches of trust or the law are discovered.

The results of this scrutiny process are automatically published via the Clarity portal and are accessible to the general public.

National laws forbidding collusion vis-à-vis the defence sector exist and have to do with the legislation implementing the EU Defence and Security Procurement Directive of 2009/81/EC. These rules have not been put into extensive use and it is therefore rather difficult to evaluate their efficiency (Interview source). In that regard the legislation regarding punishing colluding companies is rather vague since no specific examples exist. Further, the aforementioned veil of secrecy under which the Greek defence mechanism often operates further contributes to the lack of transparency. According to the recent legal framework, an offence can also result in prosecution and debarment from future competitions.

Procurement staff are expected to safeguard the smooth execution of obligations by defence contractors. The Ministry of Defence has various institutional formations that provide assessments and quality assurances in staffing and procurement. The overarching department responsible for this function is the General Directorate for Defence Investment and Armaments (GDDIA), which was reorganised in 2010. Audit is carried out by legal and technical personnel, aiming to strict compliance with legal rules and appropriate procedures in defence procurement.

However, according to the defence official interviewed, the nature of the staff is problematic since it rotates from other functions. It is thus very difficult to adequately train the staff and expect them to function effectively if they do not know how long they are staying in a post. Nonetheless, there is no evidence of undue influence from higher grades within the organisations.

Formal mechanisms are in place such that they can be used by a company to file a complaint about the procurement process followed, should it feel unfairly treated. The party in question has an array of tools that it can use, including but not limited to temporary judicial protection (Interview with Academic). Technically speaking, this should an adequate mechanism for companies to safeguard and protect their interests. That being said, no one can guarantee that this action will not jeopardise, even indirectly, any future contractual work they might wish to pursue (Interview with MoD official).

Corrupt activities of a supplier can be punished under administrative or criminal provisions. These include fines or debarment if the project is pending. The notion of Joint Enterprise is followed and includes the group of companies and subcontractors. On top of that the companies can follow an internal policy and impose sanctions they deem necessary according to the case. However, evidence of such practice has not yet been published and as such, it is difficult to asses the extent to which it is enforced. The General Inspector of Public Administration in his 2013 report calls for even further sanctions and law enforcement with regard to corruption.

Greece has transposed the EU Defence and Security Procurement Directive 2009/81/EC. The transposition occurred with a law that was introduced in 2011 (Law N. 3978/2011). In that regard article 87 of Law N.3883/2010 describes the process with which the Greek Government was to phase out the use of off-sets in defence procurement by December 31, 2014. According to Trybus (2014), Greece explicitly states it will not ask for offsets. N/A has been selected accordingly.

Any relevant offset agreements will be with refer to old offset programmes that are still incomplete and/or subject to fines.

Greece has transposed the EU Defence and Security Procurement Directive 2009/81/EC. The transposition occurred with a law which was introduced in 2011 (Law N. 3978/2011) and no longer practices offset contracts.

The Greek government has transposed into domestic law the EU Defence and Security Procurement Directive 2009/81/EC, phasing out the use of offsets in defence procurement by December 31, 2014. In this regard contractual parties have the right to request a renegotiation and new offset contract instead of receiving a penalty fine. No new parties are involved in this process, however, except from the setting up of new companies, which are necessary for the completion of the new programme. The N/A score has therefore been selected as new offset contracts are no longer negotiated in Greece. It should be however noted that according to allegations, offset programmes that have expired are not adequately pursued from the Greek state which could have secured at least an additional €290 million.

Response to TI Reviewer: Greece does not practice offset contracts in defence.

Greece has Law N. 3978/2011 in 2011 which prohibits the use of agents or intermediaries within the defence procurement process. There has been a department related to that within the General Directorate for Defence Investment and Armaments (GDDIA) which has wide duties extending even to the prohibition of agents (Interview with MoD official). The Greek Government has demonstrated commitment to make the entire process of agents as clear and transparent as possible, an effort which is constantly increasing (Interview with Academic). These laws, at the moment, appear to be effective since there are no claims as to the contrary.

The Ministry of Defence and the Greek Army are obliged to publish every decision with regard to defence and security procurement in the ‘Diavgeia’ (clarity) web portal. On top of that, they have to set out clearly their identified requirements and the criteria met that lead them to signing a deal with a specific contractor (Interview with Academic). Generally, the vast majority of information regarding financing packages are available online and can be accessed by the public (e.g. interest rates, commercial loans, and export credit agreements). This is not always followed, for example, in cases in which the terms of the procurement cannot be specified in detail; the frequency of these cases is not, however, known in practice (Interview with MoD official). The OECD's report of Government at a Glance for 2013 indicates that generally Greece is compliant with issues of procurement and makes available the details of the financing package.

The main contractor as well as its subsidiaries and subcontractors are required to ensure that they adopt relevant anti-corruption standards and processes. For this purpose, documentary evidence is in order, alongside relevant background checks for all the parties involved in the contract (Interview with Academic). Formally, there is a rather strict and comprehensive process in place for the contractor and all its surrounding parties involved in the process. However, the enforcement of these provisions is not as widespread as intended (Interview with MoD Official).

Under the new defence procurement rules in place, the Greek Government can determine its military needs according to preset criteria and procedures, as per the EU Directive which has been transposed into Greek Law. There are various allegations and reports regarding the decision-making behind weapons’ acquisition and how it is potentially connected to geopolitical alliances. Further, given the financial situation in Greece, the budget allocated to weapons acquisition has declined disproportionately compared to the overall budget cuts. One could therefore assume that political pressure, which might also be linked to the financial allies of Greece (in terms of its financial rescue packages), practically guides, at least to an extent, the decision making process in weapons acquisition. There have been reports regarding Greece's continuing arms acquisitions from Germany and other countries and how pressing the need for more arms is given the dire situation of the country. SIPRI reports arms imports from Germany, France and the United States continuing into 2014.