- A
- B
- C
- D
- E
- F
France’s GI ranking in Band C places it in the medium risk category for corruption in the defence and security sector. It has the lowest score of all G7 nations. France’s lowest scores are for Operations in Band E (very high risk). With over 10,000 troops deployed on international peacekeeping and stabilisation missions, we recommend that France mitigate its corruption vulnerabilities through the following reforms.
Compliance with International Instruments
One of the world’s major arms exporters, France has signed and ratified the UN Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) and has worked in partnership with defence companies and NGOs to achieve its ratification at the global level. France has also been a strong supporter of anti-corruption elements in the treaty. We recommend that France displays the same leadership when it comes to implementing the relevant anti-corruption provisions of the ATT. This could include putting in place mechanisms to avoid the risk of arms diversion and releasing greater information to the legislature at an earlier stage of arms procurement discussions so as to help ensure upcoming arms exports are subject to robust parliamentary approval and debate. This could also demonstrate that France is devoted to learning from and addressing the legacy of ‘Karachigate’ and other incidences that continue to receive widespread public attention. Intermediaries and agents are widely used for major armament sales. Our assessment found a lack of sufficient controls for defence companies’ use of agents and intermediaries in the procurement cycle. There should be a clear policy on their usage, with controls to ensure the law is not circumvented. These controls should be public and well known to companies.
Corruption Reporting Mechanisms and Enforcement
We were unable to identify a defence specific anti-corruption policy or plan, and there is no evidence of independent, well-resourced, and effective institutions within defence and security tasked with building integrity and countering corruption. The most powerful institutions are external to the government such as investigative journalists and individual judges prosecuting cases. French internal audit procedures in the Ministry of Defence are systematic, yet there is no evidence that internal audit reports are subject to any parliamentary scrutiny and it is not clear how effective or comprehensive this procedure is. External auditing is performed by the Cour des Comptes, which has proven to be independent and active with their findings available to the public. However, there is a lack of evidence of the government implementing these recommendations.
To ensure proper oversight of defence spending, we recommend a more transparent process of internal audit which is appropriately resourced and subject to parliamentary scrutiny. For both internal and external audit findings, we recommend that the government become much more active in presenting evidence of implementing these recommendations.
To ensure that bribery is reported, we recommend that France take action to encourage whistle-blowing and to ensure that whistle-blowers be afforded adequate protection from reprisals.particularly in the defence and security sector. We recommend a review to ensure that effective legislation and mechanisms applicable to military and official personnel be enacted to report corruption. These laws and mechanisms should be vigorously implemented with appropriate legal measures in place to rigorously defend whistle-blowers in both the public and private sector.
Adopting a Strategic Approach to Corruption Risks on Operations
Statements by the Ministry of Defence allude to corruption challenges on operations (e.g. Afghanistan and Kosovo), but there does not seem to be specific doctrine focused on anti-corruption. We recommend that France introduces regular anti-corruption modules as part of its pre-deployment training. The Cour de Comptes has criticised the insufficient and irregular evaluation of peacekeeping costs. While some operational flexibility is of course necessary, France should ensure that regular evaluations take place.
While there is a dedicated parliamentary commission composed of four Members of Parliament from both the Senate and the National Assembly, which has special access to strategies and budget reports and can organise hearings, the commission does not have access to information on current operations. We recommend that the commission is provided with this information.
Is there formal provision for effective and independent legislative scrutiny of defence policy?
French Constitution (1958): Art-5, Art-13, Art-15, Art-20, Art-21, Art-34, Art-35, Art-49
Règlement de l'Assemblée Nationale: Art-36, Art-45, Art-140, Art-152-156
http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/connaissance/reglement.asp
Assemblée nationale, Commission de la défense nationale et des forces armées, Commission permanente législative, http://www2.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/commissions-permanentes/commission-de-la-defence
Transparency International France, &quoute;Extension du secret defence : une menace sur les pouvoirs d’investigation des juges anti-corruption&quoute;, 8.6.2009.
Ministry of Defence, Organisation des pouvoirs en matière de défense et de sécurité, 21.05.2012, http://www.defence.gouv.fr/portail-defence/ministere/organisation/organisation-des-pouvoirs-en-matiere-de-defence-et-de-securite (accessed Nov.16,2014)
France 24, Intervention en Syrie : le Parlement français n'a pas son mot à dire, 01.09.2013
http://www.france24.com/fr/20130831-intervention-syrie-francois-hollande-cameron-parlementaires-vote-assemblee-deputes-parlement/ (accessed Nov.16, 2014)
Marc Houben. International Crisis Management. The Approach of European States. London/New York, Routledge, 2005.
List of Parliament Enquiry Commissions:
http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/connaissance/enquetes_Ve.asp (accessed Nov.16, 2014)
Bernard Cazeneuve, Karachi: L'Enquête Impossible, Calmann-Lévy, 2011
Jean-Jacques Videlin, Droit de la défense nationale, Bruylant, 2014, p.67-68
Assemblée nationale, Fiche de synthèse n°47 : La déclaration de guerre et les interventions armées à l’étranger, 16 avril 2014 (last accessed on 11 February 2015).
http://www2.assemblee-nationale.fr/decouvrir-l-assemblee/role-et-pouvoirs-de-l-assemblee-nationale/les-fonctions-de-l-assemblee-nationale/les-fonctions-de-controle-et-l-information-des-deputes/la-declaration-de-guerre-et-les-interventions-armees-a-l-etranger
Two expert interviews, 2014.
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Assemblée nationale, Fiche de synthèse n°47 : La déclaration de guerre et les interventions armées à l’étranger, 16 avril 2014 (last accessed on 11 February 2015).
http://www2.assemblee-nationale.fr/decouvrir-l-assemblee/role-et-pouvoirs-de-l-assemblee-nationale/les-fonctions-de-l-assemblee-nationale/les-fonctions-de-controle-et-l-information-des-deputes/la-declaration-de-guerre-et-les-interventions-armees-a-l-etranger
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: The number of permanent commissions is limited in each chamber (max. 8), thus 40-60 MPs participate in the work of each legislative commission (this might have an effect on the quality of legislative oversight). It is not obligatory to nominate opposition MPs as president of defence/foreign affairs commissions.
Suggested score:
Does the country have an identifiable and effective parliamentary defence and security committee (or similar such organisation) to exercise oversight?
The National Assembly has two separate committees (Foreign Affairs/Defence). In the Senate, there is a more encompassing committee (Commission des affaires étrangères, de la défense et des forces armées). Both the National Assembly's defence committee and the one in the Senate have the power to amend military laws (for example the military programmation law for the 2014-2019 period). They are in charge of examining treaties and can organize hearings with high-level staff (Defence, Foreign Affairs, French Development Agency, Gendarmerie, etc). They are staffed by MPs and supported by a very qualified permanent civil servant staff.
Another Commission (Commission Consultative du Secret de la Défense Nationale) has been set-up to determine what should remain classified under &quoute;defence secrets&quoute;, which is an &quoute;administrative Commission&quoute;. This Commission has been set-up as a result of a corruption affair (“frégates de Taiwan” where judges were prevented to conduct their enquiry by the executive) but this mechanism has, according to Transparency International France, some shortcomings as this Commission is staffed mostly by civil servants who might have a bias towards the executive.
In 2010, there was further evidence of obstruction by the executive when the Karachi information mission tried to investigate defence matters (the Karachi affair example which has been dubbed “Karachigate” - explained later in the assessment). In the Karachi affair, the special enquiry commission had been denied a hearing with Trade civil servants and other Ministries were not cooperative (i.e. very slow in communicating necessary documents).
In contrast with TI's concern, an interviewee from the Parliament considered that control can be exercised because many of the MPs working on defence issues have anyway a clearance to work on these issues (&quoute;habilitation secret défense&quoute;). Interviewees confirmed that the permanent staff is extremely competent.
Senate's Commission website (http://www.senat.fr/commission/etr/)
Assemblée Nationale website - Current scrutiny of the 2014-2019 law, Rapport N° 1551.
http://www.nosdeputes.fr/14/document/1551
Legal basis: Article 36-7 Commission des Affaires Etrangères, Article 36-11 Commission de la défense nationale et des forces armées (http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/connaissance/reglement.asp)
Transparency International ,&quoute;Affaire de Karachi : une nouvelle illustration de l’utilisation abusive du secret défense&quoute;, Paris, 19.5.2010.
Legal basis for the &quoute;Commission Consultative du Secret de la Défense Nationale&quoute;, Code de la Défense, Article L2312-1
Interview with Parliamentarian, date TBC.
Assemblée Nationale website. Commission de la Défense nationale et des forces armées. (last accessed on 11 February 2015).
http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/commissions/59046_tab.asp
Ministère de la Défense. Secret Défense. 17 septembre 2012. (last accessed on 11 February 2015).
http://www.defence.gouv.fr/sga/le-sga-en-action/droit-et-defence/secret-defence/secret-defence
Assemblée nationale. Délégation parlementaire au renseignement. (last accessed on 11th February 2015).
http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/connaissance/delegation_renseignement.asp#presentation
Assemblée nationale. Mission d'information. Evaluation du cadre juridique applicable aux services de renseignement. (last accessed on 11 February 2015).
http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/pdf/rap-info/i1022.pdf
Assemblée nationale. Mission d’évaluation du cadre juridique applicable aux services de renseignement : publication du rapport « Pour un « Etat secret » au service de notre démocratie » - mardi 14 mai 2013. (last accessed on 11 February 2015).
http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/presse/communiques/20130514-05.asp
Sénat, Note de synthèse &quoute;Instance parlementaire et contrôle des services de renseignement&quoute;. (last accessed on 11 February 2015)
http://www.senat.fr/lc/lc103/lc1030.html
http://legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000252177
http://legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexteArticle.do;jsessionid=E790958141CB8CB9245F8830D4BAE673.tpdila11v_2?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000705067&idArticle=LEGIARTI000006530065&dateTexte=20150227&categorieLien=id#LEGIARTI000006530065
http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/connaissance/delegation_renseignement.asp#presentation
http://www.senat.fr/commission/renseignement/
Interview with parliamentary and other experts, 2014.
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: The Commission Consultative du Secret de la Défense Nationale has limited powers, especially since its role is to provide advisory opinions (avis consultatif) to the defence minister when the latter is seized by a French jurisdiction which want to access classified information.
The Parliamentary Delegation for Intelligence Services (&quoute;delegation parlementaire au renseignement&quoute;), which is composed of 4 deputies and 4 senators, is in charge of the oversight of intelligence activities. In 2013, a report following an information mission was published in order to propose a new framework to better control the activities of intelligence services, notably under the scrutiny of the Parliament.
Several measures were suggested to increase the oversight of intelligence agencies' activities, including by the Parliament, but also through the creation of an independent authority called the &quoute;Committee for the control of intelligence activities&quoute; (Commission de contrôle des activités de renseignement). However, there is no source proving that this committee has been created since then.
Assemblée Nationale website. Commission de la Défense nationale et des forces armées. (last accessed on 11 February 2015).
http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/commissions/59046_tab.asp
Ministère de la Défense. Secret Défense. 17 septembre 2012. (last accessed on 11 February 2015).
http://www.defence.gouv.fr/sga/le-sga-en-action/droit-et-defence/secret-defence/secret-defence
Assemblée nationale. Délégation parlementaire au renseignement. (last accessed on 11th February 2015).
http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/connaissance/delegation_renseignement.asp#presentation
Assemblée nationale. Mission d'information. Evaluation du cadre juridique applicable aux services de renseignement. (last accessed on 11 February 2015).
http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/pdf/rap-info/i1022.pdf
Assemblée nationale. Mission d’évaluation du cadre juridique applicable aux services de renseignement : publication du rapport « Pour un « Etat secret » au service de notre démocratie » - mardi 14 mai 2013. (last accessed on 11 February 2015).
http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/presse/communiques/20130514-05.asp
Sénat, Note de synthèse &quoute;Instance parlementaire et contrôle des services de renseignement&quoute;. (last accessed on 11 February 2015)
http://www.senat.fr/lc/lc103/lc1030.html
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: A parliamentary delegation for intelligence issues exists also, consisting of 4 representatives and 4 senators. The body follows the activities of intelligence services. While they publish reports and their activities appear on the site of the National Assembly and the Senate, their work is considered as a state secret. Moreover, the law limits, by default, the scope of information they can check.
http://legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000252177
http://legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexteArticle.do;jsessionid=E790958141CB8CB9245F8830D4BAE673.tpdila11v_2?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000705067&idArticle=LEGIARTI000006530065&dateTexte=20150227&categorieLien=id#LEGIARTI000006530065
http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/connaissance/delegation_renseignement.asp#presentation
http://www.senat.fr/commission/renseignement/
Suggested score:
Is the country's national defence policy debated and publicly available?
The 2013 security and defence strategy was debated over several months - a process that involved numerous internal and external experts (including British and German experts for the first time). The 2013 “White Book” served as a basis for the Décision du bureau de la commission de la Défense nationale et des forces armées relative à la publicité des travaux (2014-2019). The 2008 White Book had already followed a similar process - here, there was a marked change from previous years, with the then President announcing that representatives from trade unions, think tanks and civil society would participate in public debate.
Yet a substantial majority of these chosen experts are high-ranking civil servants who are routinely involved in strategic assessments. One observer noted that the 2008 experts were required to satisfy the &quoute;military secrecy&quoute; codes.
The &quoute;military secrecy code&quoute; may render key aspects of the defence and security policy not subject to open policy debates for many years. Defence agreements binding France and its former colonies for example were secret earlier. Even though they are currently scrutinized by the Parliament (see for example the Djibouti-France agreement debate in the French Senate on 9 December 2013). According to the 2015 &quoute; Décision du bureau de la commission de la Défense nationale et des forces armées relative à la publicité des travaux&quoute;, all debates are open for the public apart from those classified as &quoute;secret&quoute;. Even though the content of these debates is now publicly available, there is a lack of involvement of the general public.
RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 1: Additional information added and score increased to 3. Debates on intelligence policy are not included within the scope of this question.
2013 White Book (The White Paper on defence and national security), Livre Blanc, Dossier de presse,29.4.2013
http://www.defence.gouv.fr/actualites/articles/livre-blanc-2013
Décision du bureau de la commission de la Défense nationale et des forces armées relative à la publicité des travaux, January 2015, http://www2.assemblee-nationale.fr/static/14/comdef/Decision-bureau-comdef.pdf
Défense et Sécurité nationale : le Livre blanc - Les débats, http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/rapports-publics/084000342/
Example of reports by the Senate's Commission:
http://www.senat.fr/compte-rendu-commissions/affaires-etrangeres.html
Example of the National Assembly's report on the 2014-2019 programmation law:
http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/rapports/r1551-t1.asp
Olivier Berger. &quoute;Renseignement : enfin, le premier débat public à l'Assemblée nationale !&quoute;, La Voix du Nord-Les Blogs, 10 February 2015. (last accessed on 14 February 2015).
http://defence.blogs.lavoixdunord.fr/archive/2015/02/10/debat-public-sur-le-renseignement-13766.html
Bastien Nivet. &quoute;La défense dans les débats publics en Europe&quoute;. IRIS. 2003. Pp. 48-66. (last accessed on 14 February 2015).
http://www.iris-france.org/docs/consulting/2004_public.pdf
Laurent Lagneau. &quoute;Le retour du Service national plébiscité par 80% des Français&quoute;. Opex 360. 25 January 2015. (last accessed on 14 February 2015).
http://www.opex360.com/2015/01/25/le-retour-du-service-national-plebiscite-par-80-des-francais/
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: France's defence policy is increasingly publicly available and debated in more and more dimensions by the legislature. A major progress can be seen with the first public debate about intelligence activities held on February 10, 2015, at the National Assembly, regarding the 2014 report on the work of the parliamentary delegation for intelligence. Thus, it shows the willingness of the French authorities to control intelligence activities and to create a specific and public policy about it.
However, there are very few differences of opinions between political parties regarding defence policy. This consensus explains the fact that debates on this topic are rarely contradictory.
Besides, defence policy is quite absent from the media, the latter focusing on broad security issues in the aftermath of current events. For instance, after the terrorist attacks in Paris in January 2015, the public debate on the reintroduction of the military service was reopened, a reintroduction supported by 80% of the French people. Otherwise, the general public does not show any interest in the matter, hence the absence of debate among the population.
Olivier Berger. &quoute;Renseignement : enfin, le premier débat public à l'Assemblée nationale !&quoute;, La Voix du Nord-Les Blogs, 10 February 2015. (last accessed on 14 February 2015).
http://defence.blogs.lavoixdunord.fr/archive/2015/02/10/debat-public-sur-le-renseignement-13766.html
Bastien Nivet. &quoute;La défense dans les débats publics en Europe&quoute;. IRIS. 2003. Pp. 48-66. (last accessed on 14 February 2015).
http://www.iris-france.org/docs/consulting/2004_public.pdf
Laurent Lagneau. &quoute;Le retour du Service national plébiscité par 80% des Français&quoute;. Opex 360. 25 January 2015. (last accessed on 14 February 2015).
http://www.opex360.com/2015/01/25/le-retour-du-service-national-plebiscite-par-80-des-francais/
Suggested score: 3
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Parts of the doctrine, most importantly nuclear deterrence, are never questioned, even when new policy is debated: http://www.liberation.fr/politiques/2013/11/26/la-dissuasion-nucleaire-merite-un-debat_962217.
Suggested score:
Do defence and security institutions have a policy, or evidence, of openness towards civil society organisations (CSOs) when dealing with issues of corruption? If no, is there precedent for CSO involvement in general government anti-corruption initiatives?
Transparency International France has been active in providing general recommendations to the defence sector. Its working group included academics but also two members of the Defence Ministry (Vice-Admiral Christian Huet and &quoute;Contrôleur Général des Armées&quoute; Jean-Claude Roqueplo). An interview confirmed that the CGA (Contrôle Général des Armées) used to have a strong identity as a &quoute;controlling body&quoute; and could favour such a partnership.
However, the CGA lost resources and influence over the last years and would not currently be in position to advocate for a stronger engagement of CSOs. The fact that TI recommendations do not seem to have been followed by a significant change of policies indicates that CSO partnerships are not long-lasting and substantial. A Green MP did advocate for the creation of a dialogue between advocacy or humanitarian NGOs (like the Secours Catholique and ASER) and Parliament committees/Ministry of Defence in the field of armament exports. These two NGOs mention that they have been able to exchanges views with the Cabinet of the Ministry of Defence but regret that promises of transparency have not been met with concrete results and that there is no real &quoute;debate&quoute; engaging them.
Other NGOs would oppose engagement. Survie association which advocates (among others) for the abolishment of military secrecy is considered biased and &quoute;politically motivated&quoute; by some high-ranking civil servants in light of its activism on Rwanda.
Transparency International France - Working group on Secret defence, Pg.17 - Composition of the working group:
http://www.transparency-france.org/ewb_pages/div/Secret_defence.php
Survie Committee website:
http://survie.org/francafrique/?lang=fr
Expert interview, 2014.
MP blog report following the 2012 presentation about armament exports to the Parliament:
Ventes d’armes de la France : la nécessité d’une plus grande transparence, 23.07.2013
http://noelmamere.eelv.fr/ventes-darmes-de-la-france-la-necessite-dune-plus-grande-transparence/
ASER Association website:
http://www.aser-asso.org/
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Has the country signed up to international anti-corruption instruments such as, but not exclusively or necessarily, UNCAC and the OECD Convention? (In your answer, please specify which.)
France has ratified the UNCAC convention in 2005. The OECD convention, to which France is a party, entered into force in 2000. The OECD expressed its regrets to the lack of corruption prosecution cases since ratification, but acknowledged efforts to guarantee the prosecutor's independence.
The SCLC is the focal point for the OECD and for the implementation of the UNCAC convention. The SCLC is also the focal point for other organizations - it also works for OLAF, the G20, etc.
OECD, The OECD criticizes the lack of convictions in France for bribery but acknowledges the recent efforts to ensure full independence of the prosecution, 23.10.2012
http://www.oecd.org/fr/corruption/locdedeplorelepeudecondamnationsenfrancepourcorruptiontransnationalemaisreconnaitleseffortsrecentspourassurerlapleineindependanceduparquet.htm
Service Central de La Lutte contre la Corruption (Ministry of Justice)
http://www.justice.gouv.fr/le-ministere-de-la-justice-10017/service-central-de-prevention-de-la-corruption-12312/ (accessed April 26th, 2014).
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: OECD. &quoute;Annual Report 2013 of the OECD Working Group on Bribery&quoute;. Pp. 49-50. (last accessed on 14 February 2015).
http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/AntiBriberyAnnRep2012.pdf
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is there evidence of regular, active public debate on issues of defence? If yes, does the government participate in this debate?
The Ministry of Defence has its own think tank (IRSEM) and fosters exchanges with academia and think tanks.
Discussions on the White Book defence and security strategy provided ground for inclusive dialogue. However, there is a concern over the full ability of civil society to form a critical opinion on French defence policy. Experts participating to such debates are often recruited in think tanks which are close to the executive and belong to the same &quoute;circles&quoute;.
Moreover, another concern is the full independence from the armament industry. The IRIS provides a good example: one of the board members is a former secretary of state of defence who was mentioned in a Le Monde article as having allegedly hired the first &quoute;middleman&quoute; for armament contracts with Libya (Jacques Boyon).
However, it does not mean that some intellectuals, academics or think tanks do not occasionally challenge the executive. Despite the armament industry being board members of the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, researchers formulate their own research questions. In the list provided by the Ministry of defence, both the CERI and the Brussels-based GRIP are likely to engage in critical debates. For example, the CERI researcher Roland Marchal is the &quoute;usual suspect&quoute; who is challenging French Africa policies in op-eds, in particular when France pushed for a EUFOR Chad/RCA intervention which would use the French bases located in the non-democratic state of Chad.
But still, a researcher interviewed mentioned that some research questions are problematic for the defence institutions (some surveys would be unwelcome). Recently, there was a surprising absence of voices criticizing an arms deal with Egypt, a country having a questionable human rights record (regarding Rafale planes which France had had trouble exporting in the past). This consensus can be explained by a broad national agreement on two priorities (support to employment in national industries and fight against extremists in Libya), but it could also be explained by the absence of critical opinion-formers on French defence issues.
As mentioned by the Peer Reviewers, there is evidence of debate with the French think tank IFRI and in 2015, the National assembly publicly a parliamentary report on intelligence issues.
Ministry of defence list of think tanks established by the Délégation aux Affaires Stratégiques:
http://www.defence.gouv.fr/das/reflexion-strategique/partenaires/instituts (accessed Nov.16, 2014)
IRIS website - Board members:
http://www.iris-france.org/iris/conseil-administration.php
Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique - Un think tank indépendant-
Board members (Thales, EADS, Dassault Aviation, etc)
http://www.frstrategie.org/barreFRS/frs/frsDirection.php
France24, Vente du Rafale à l'Égypte : Paris signe son premier contrat à l'exportation, http://www.france24.com/fr/20150216-paris-le-caire-signent-vente-rafale-aviation-armement-france-egypte-jean-yves-le-drian/ (accessed March 20, 2015)
Profile of an academic who engages critically with French security institutions:
http://www.sciencespo.fr/ceri/fr/users/rolandmarchal
Another example: Martial FOUCAULT, Les budgets de défense en France, entre déni et déclin, Focus stratégique n°36, avril 2012, http://www.ifri.org/?page=detail-contribution&id=7111&id_provenance=97
Nathalie Guibert, &quoute;Armes de corruption massive : secrets et combines des marchands de canons, de Jean Guisnel: mirages libyens&quoute;, Le Monde, 24.02.2011
Expert interview, 2014.
IFRI. &quoute;L'Afrique en questions n°13: &quoute; Hollande l'Africain &quoute; ? La politique africaine de la France à la croisée des chemins - Interview de Yves Gounin&quoute;. Actuelle de l'IFRI. September 2012.
http://www.ifri.org/fr/publications/editoriaux/lafrique-questions/lafrique-questions-ndeg13-hollande-lafricain-politique-0
Renseignement : enfin, le premier débat public à l'Assemblée nationale !, 10 February 2015, http://defence.blogs.lavoixdunord.fr/archive/2015/02/10/debat-public-sur-le-renseignement-13766.html
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: The French think tank IFRI also occasionally engages in debate with civil servants on issues of defence, such as the policy of France in Africa.
IFRI. &quoute;L'Afrique en questions n°13: &quoute; Hollande l'Africain &quoute; ? La politique africaine de la France à la croisée des chemins - Interview de Yves Gounin&quoute;. Actuelle de l'IFRI. September 2012.
http://www.ifri.org/fr/publications/editoriaux/lafrique-questions/lafrique-questions-ndeg13-hollande-lafricain-politique-0
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: The scope of &quoute;the occasional debate&quoute; is clearly expanding. In early 2015, for the first time, the National assembly held a debate about intelligence issues (debated the activity report of the parliamentary delegation):
http://defence.blogs.lavoixdunord.fr/archive/2015/02/10/debat-public-sur-le-renseignement-13766.html
Suggested score:
Does the country have an openly stated and actively implemented anti-corruption policy for the defence sector?
There is no anti-corruption policy specific to the defence sector in France. There is no mention of any anti-corruption policy on the Ministry of Defence's website and the word &quoute;corruption&quoute; does not appear on the 2013 White Paper on National Defence and Security, which outlines France's defence and security strategy.
However, at the national level, France has a few legal instruments and institutions that can be considered part of a broad national anti-corruption framework and which applies to the defence sector:
- Article 324-1 of the French Penal Code outlaws money laundering ;
- Ordonnance 2009 -104 relating to money laundering in the context of the fight against terrorism;
- 2013 laws on the Transparency of Public Life, which precludes the creation of a &quoute;High Authority&quoute; (Haute Autorité pour la Transparence de la Vie Publique) to monitor its implementation. These laws force holders of public mandates and high-level civil servants to make public statements on their properties/revenues. This law also includes the protection of whistleblowers and defines for the first time the concept of &quoute;conflict of interest&quoute; in French legislation.
While the laws on the Transparency of Public Life have been actively enforced since their creation, there are no recent examples of defence officials having been convicted.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs international strategy, France and the fight against money laundering and corruption, Updated March 2013,
http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/enjeux-internationaux/defence-et-securite/blanchiment-et-corruption/
Ministry of Justice international strategy, Fight against corruption - position of France, March 17,2009
http://www.justice.gouv.fr/justice-penale-11330/lutte-contre-la-corruption-position-de-la-france-23846.html
Central Service for the Prevention of Corruption: Report 2012, July,2013
http://www.lgdj.fr/colloques-etudes-rapports/233810739/service-central-prevention-corruption-rapport-2012
Law on the transparency of &quoute;public life&quoute;, 2013 (Loi organique et loi ordinaire du 11 octobre 2013 relatives à la transparence de la vie publique)
http://www.vie-publique.fr/actualite/panorama/texte-discussion/projet-loi-organique-projet-loi-relatifs-transparence-vie-publique.html
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCodeArticle.docidTexte=LEGITEXT000006070719&idArticle=LEGIARTI000006418330&dateTexte=&categorieLien=cid
http://www.tresor.economie.gouv.fr/4019_Cadre-juridique-national
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Reference suggestion:
High Authority for Transparency in Public Life: hatvp.fr; http://www.hatvp.fr/en/
Suggested score:
Are there independent, well-resourced, and effective institutions within defence and security tasked with building integrity and countering corruption?
The general institution in charge of &quoute;regularity of operations&quoute; (Contrôle Général des Armées) in the Defence Ministry does not specifically mention the risk of corruption, or at least does not frame its activities under the label of &quoute;anti-corruption&quoute;. It does control in particular the international companies which are awarded defence markets. According to one interviewee, control is however weaker than it used to be. While it used to be in charge of a real and comprehensive control based on its suspicions, it has been replaced by &quoute;audits&quoute; which are not fulfilling the same function.
There is an ethics department located within the Justice Ministry, as mentioned earlier. Its webpage mentions that it has a role in sensitizing other institutions about the risk of corruption (and it mentions defence institutions): &quoute;is also present in various institutions, notably through outreach missions to monitoring or inspections bodies in order to map risks and to establish mechanisms to detect and prevent fraud and corrupt practices (Ministry of Defence, Equipment ...).&quoute; Interviewees all assessed its role as a very weak one.
Investigative journalists and individual judges are the most effective &quoute;institutions&quoute; currently fighting against corruption. Journalists regularly denounce the proximity of the defence industry with the political establishment. An investigation newspaper claims that the Dassault defence firm whose initial order for the French army had been downsized, was compensated &quoute;by other means&quoute;.
General control of the army - missions (Contrôle Général des Armées), Updated: 2.24.2014
http://www.defence.gouv.fr/cga/nos-missions/la-mission-generale/la-mission-generale
Service central de la prévention de la corruption:
http://www.justice.gouv.fr/le-ministere-de-la-justice-10017/service-central-de-prevention-de-la-corruption-12312/ (accessed Nov.16, 2014)
Nouvel Observateur, The &quoute;Dassault System&quoute;: A witness tells vote buying in Corbeil, 18.10.2010
http://tempsreel.nouvelobs.com/politique/20101018.OBS1425/le-systeme-dassault-un-temoin-raconte-l-achat-de-voix-a-corbeil.html
Le Canard enchainé,Un parachute sénatorial pour Dassault (refus de sa levée d'immunité), 15.01.2014
Huffington Post, Dassault: L'Etat donne 1 milliard d'euros à Dassault pour améliorer son Rafale, 10.01.2014
Expert interview, 2014.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Does the public trust the institutions of defence and security to tackle the issue of bribery and corruption in their establishments?
In France in 2011, 72% of the population estimated that politicians were corrupt. However, a survey conducted by the Ministry of Defence shows that the army enjoys a high level of trust (80% of people had a &quoute;good image&quoute; of the army in 2013). According to an interview with a researcher who specialized on public opinion, this good opinion could originate from a lack of interest/knowledge about the army.
According to Transparency International's Global Corruption Barometer 2013, 19% of respondents found the military to be corrupt or extremely corrupt. Overall, it was found to be the second least corrupt institution (in terms of public perceptions) from the twelve institutions surveyed.
Hence corruption suspicions apply generally to politicians and high civil servants who are treated as one amalgamated entity. The Elf corruption scandals of the 1990s have discredited not only some politicians but also French institutions. Citizens groups like &quoute;Survie&quoute; have appeared as a result of mistrust. The founder of Survie wrote a political manifesto denouncing the &quoute;Françafrique&quoute; corruption scandals. This NGO has very strong opinions against the military.
More recently, reports of armament transactions with Muammar Gaddafi and his alleged financing of Sarkozy's political campaign have reinforced this general mistrust (attached article on the issue of offset contract with Gaddafi).
The Karachi affair (killing of 11 French civilian naval armament staff in Karachi taking the appearance of a Islamist bombing, but allegedly connected to revenge following the suspension of retro-commissions to Pakistan) induced a very high degree of mistrust from the public. Family members of the Karachi incident have set up a CSO &quoute;to find truth&quoute;. In 2012, the families of the victims of the Karachi incident also looked to European Court of Human Rights for a resolution of the issue.
But again as a conclusion, in this specific example as in the general survey, it seems that &quoute;politicians&quoute; rather than defence institutions or the army are considered responsible. This is further corroborated by the sources put forth by the Peer Reviewers, which indicate that public trust in the army is quite high, more so recently.
Journal du Dimanche, On associe souvent la corruption à la pratique du pouvoir, 28.09.2011
http://www.lejdd.fr/Politique/Actualite/72-des-Francais-jugent-les-politiques-corrompus.-Decryptage-avec-l-historien-Frederic-Monier-interview-397389?sitemapnews
Laurent Lagneau,80% des Français ont une bonne image de leur armée, 12.07.13
http://www.opex360.com/2013/07/12/80-des-francais-ont-une-bonne-image-de-leur-armee/
Website of CSO created by affected families after &quoute;Karachigate&quoute;:http://www.verite-attentat-karachi.org/
General opinion on France and Africa:
http://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2013/12/04/cinquante-ans-de-fiasco-de-la-francafrique_3525416_3232.html
Survie association:
http://survie.org/francafrique/?lang=fr
France 24, Le Who's Who de l'affaire Karachi, 22.09.2011
http://www.france24.com/fr/20101123-affaire-karachi-qui-role-personnalite-politique-sarkozy-balladur-chirac-dcn-reseauk-millon-leotard-de-villepin/
Le Figaro/AFP,Pour le fils Kadhafi, le contrat d'armement ''n'est pas une contrepartie&quoute;,14.10.2007
http://www.lefigaro.fr/international/2007/08/04/01003-20070804ARTWWW90135-pour_le_fils_kadhafi_le_contrat_darmement_n_est_pas_une_contrepartie.php
Expert interview with public opinion researcher, 2014.
http://www.huffingtonpost.fr/2014/03/15/sondage-francais-politiques-corrompus_n_4969110.html.
And a more recent poll about the army (numbers are even better/higher after the Charle Hebdo affair): http://www.20minutes.fr/societe/1381693-20140521-sondage-20-minutes-francais-attaches-mythe-service-militaire
http://www.transparency.org/gcb2013/country/?country=france
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: According to more recent surveys, in 2013, the public largely trusts the army (91%) and the police (78%). However, justice institutions (54%) and politicians are considered as being corrupt (70% in 2014).
IFOP. &quoute;La perception de l'armée et de la Défense par les français&quoute;. 14 July 2013. (last accessed on 13 February 2015).
http://www.ifop.com/?option=com_publication&type=poll&id=2292
http://www.ifop.com/media/poll/2292-1-study_file.pdf
Le Parisien. &quoute;Pour 7 Français sur 10, les politiques sont &quoute;le plus souvent corrompus&quoute;&quoute;. 15 March 2014. (last accessed on 14 February 2015).
http://www.leparisien.fr/flash-actualite-politique/pour-7-francais-sur-10-les-politiques-sont-le-plus-souvent-corrompus-15-03-2014-3675717.php
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Reference suggestion:
A more recent opininon poll about politicians and corruption: http://www.huffingtonpost.fr/2014/03/15/sondage-francais-politiques-corrompus_n_4969110.html.
And a more recent poll about the army (numbers are even better/higher after the Charle Hebdo affair): http://www.20minutes.fr/societe/1381693-20140521-sondage-20-minutes-francais-attaches-mythe-service-militaire
Suggested score:
Are there regular assessments by the defence ministry or another government agency of the areas of greatest corruption risk for ministry and armed forces personnel, and do they put in place measures for mitigating such risks?
Internal assessment by the Ministry of Defence does not seem to take place, or at least not under the umbrella of &quoute;anti-corruption&quoute;. The Contrôle Général des Armées mentions a &quoute;risk mapping&quoute; exercise. But risks listed never include corruption, but rather &quoute;social consequences or negative image consequences&quoute; (impact social ou image).
The &quoute;activism&quoute; of some journalists and judges (which carries a negative connotation in French) is instead the most efficient anti-corruption prevention strategy currently in place. Again, Le Canard Enchaîné published an allegation of corruption/favouritism of the Bouygues business for the contruction of the Ministry of Defence headquarters. Bouygues could have had access to the proposals of its competitors, which would have been given by an army official. This allegation was followed upon by judges. Two army generals were allegedly involved. The newspaper was sued by Bouygues and there was an internal investigation by an military body (the DPSD). When the new Minister of Defence took over, judges got access to documents that were formerly classified &quoute;secret défense&quoute; and were able to relaunch the investigation.
Interviews confirmed that the CGA was not able to play any role in the Balard affair and that risk assessment was not conducted regularly.
Ministry of defence, Contrôle Général des Armées, Risk Mapping Exercise:
http://www.defence.gouv.fr/cga/nos-travaux/le-plan-de-mission/le-plan-de-mission (accessed Nov.16, 2014)
Jean-François Merchet, Marianne, January 7, 2013
http://www.marianne.net/blogsecretdefence/Exclusif-l-affaire-de-corruption-a-Balard-relancee-actualise_a905.html
Le Canard Enchaîné, &quoute;Bouygues coule dans le béton du &quoute;Balardgone&quoute;, 18.12.13
Expert interviews, 2014.
Central Service for Corruption Prevention (Ministry of Justice). List of reports on corruption prevention in France.
http://www.justice.gouv.fr/le-ministere-de-la-justice-10017/service-central-de-prevention-de-la-corruption-12312/#doc
Central Service for Corruption Prevention (Ministry of Justice). &quoute;Rapport sur la prévention
de la corruption en France. 2013&quoute;. (last accessed on 14 February 2015).
http://www.justice.gouv.fr/publication/scpc_rapport2013.pdf
Lovells, Hogan, and Thomas Rouhette and Christelle Coslin. &quoute;French anti-corruption agency advocates in favour of a new French Bribery Act&quoute;. Lexicology.com. 26 August 2013. (last accessed on 14 February 2015).
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=6aa55715-8a01-4859-819f-d1bbd891ddc6
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: The Central Service for Corruption Prevention (SCPC) publishes a report every year which assesses the level of corruption in France (Defence Ministry included) and the greatest corruption risks, with detailed cases, and suggests some measures to prevent corruption (for instance, the SCPC organizes training sessions among public and private actors to raise awareness regarding corruption risk).
According to the SCPC, it is in contact with civil society actors engaged in the fight against corruption, but without going to the extent of tasking them with independent assessments of the government defence sector.
Central Service for Corruption Prevention (Ministry of Justice). List of reports on corruption prevention in France.
http://www.justice.gouv.fr/le-ministere-de-la-justice-10017/service-central-de-prevention-de-la-corruption-12312/#doc
Central Service for Corruption Prevention (Ministry of Justice). &quoute;Rapport sur la prévention
de la corruption en France. 2013&quoute;. (last accessed on 14 February 2015).
http://www.justice.gouv.fr/publication/scpc_rapport2013.pdf
Lovells, Hogan, and Thomas Rouhette and Christelle Coslin. &quoute;French anti-corruption agency advocates in favour of a new French Bribery Act&quoute;. Lexicology.com. 26 August 2013. (last accessed on 14 February 2015).
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=6aa55715-8a01-4859-819f-d1bbd891ddc6
Suggested score: 2
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Reference suggestion: http://www.performance-publique.budget.gouv.fr/sites/performance_publique/files/files/documents/gestion_publique/CIB/CIB_deploiement_CIB_MD_012012.pdf.
Suggested score:
Does the country have a process for acquisition planning that involves clear oversight, and is it publicly available?
According to the Military Programmation Law 2009-2014, the government has to present a report every year which describes acquisition strategies/planning for the year to come:&quoute;The Government presents to Parliament each year, prior to the fiscal policy debate a report on the implementation of the military programming law. This report is subject to debate.This report describes the strategy defined by the government in the procurement of defence equipment. This strategy sets guidelines concerning weapons systems and specifies the desired technologies.&quoute;
For example in the current programmation cycle (2014-2019), the government justified the acquisition of drones in accordance with the White Book and its chapter devoted to &quoute;information-gathering&quoute;. To Videlin, the Comité des Prix de revient des fabrications d'armement, which is composed of MPs, and whose role is to compare real costs with planned acquisition costs could meet more often.
Oversight activity also takes place, as the Minister of Defence has to present the implementation of the law every semester to the Parliament (art-8). However, all the activities of the general Parliamentary commissions are limited by the art-7 which sets boundaries to the field of investigation. Their mission is not &quoute;applicable to the fields which have a secret character relative to national defence or related to the internal or external security of the state&quoute;.
Military Programmation Law 2009-2014, Chapter II related to Parliament oversight, in particular Art-10 (quoted below) & Art-7, Art-8, Art-11:
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000028338825&dateTexte&categorieLien=id (accessed Nov.16, 2014)
Example of debates related to the acquisition process taking place in the National Assembly:
http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/rapports/r1551-t1.asp (accessed Nov.16, 2014)
Comité des Prix de revient des fabrications d'armement, mentioned by Jean-Jacques Videlin, Droit de la défense nationale, Bruylant, 2014, p.119
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: The defence Ministry's website, which is publicly available, presents the information relevant to acquisition procedures and tenders.
Defence Ministry. Achats de défense. (last accessed on 14 February 2015).
https://www.achats.defence.gouv.fr/
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is the defence budget transparent, showing key items of expenditure? This would include comprehensive information on military R&D, training, construction, personnel expenditures, acquisitions, disposal of assets, and maintenance.
The defence budget is transparent and shows key items of expenditures, such as described by the Senate and the Finance Committee of the National Assembly.
RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWERS: Accepted. Score raised to 4.
Example of the National Assembly's report on the 2014-2019 programmation law (military budget):
http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/rapports/r1551-t1.asp (accessed Nov.16,3014)
Data Publica,Voyage dans le patrimoine immobilier de l’Etat,
http://www.data-publica.com/content/2012/03/voyage-dans-le-patrimoine-immobilier-de-letat/ (accessed Nov.13,2014)
D.Boulaud et F.Trucy. La politique immobilière du ministère de la Défense, Assemblée Nationale, Rapport d'Information 503, 2010, 98 pages.
http://www.senat.fr/rap/r09-503/r09-503_mono.html (accessed March 22, 2015).
Senate. &quoute;La politique immobilière du ministère de la défense. Rapport d'information n° 503 (2009-2010) de MM. François TRUCY et Didier BOULAUD, fait au nom de la commission des affaires étrangères et de la commission des finances, déposé le 26 mai 2010&quoute;. (last accessed on 14 February 2015).
http://www.senat.fr/rap/r09-503/r09-503_mono.html
Communication à la Commission des Finances, de l'Economie Générale et du Plan de l'Assemblée Nationale. &quoute;L'immobilier du ministère de la défense&quoute;. Octobre 2007. (last accessed on 14 February 2015).
Defence Ministry. &quoute;Projet de Loi de Finances 2015&quoute;. (last accessed on 14 February 2015).
http://www.defence.gouv.fr/content/download/311433/4195225/file/Projet%20de%20loi%20de%20finances%202015%20-%20Minist%C3%A8re%20de%20la%20D%C3%A9fense.pdf
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: The defence budget is transparent, including regarding assets and properties, such as described by the Senate and the Finance Committee of the National Assembly.
Senate. &quoute;La politique immobilière du ministère de la défense. Rapport d'information n° 503 (2009-2010) de MM. François TRUCY et Didier BOULAUD, fait au nom de la commission des affaires étrangères et de la commission des finances, déposé le 26 mai 2010&quoute;. (last accessed on 14 February 2015).
http://www.senat.fr/rap/r09-503/r09-503_mono.html
Communication à la Commission des Finances, de l'Economie Générale et du Plan de l'Assemblée Nationale. &quoute;L'immobilier du ministère de la défense&quoute;. Octobre 2007. (last accessed on 14 February 2015).
Defence Ministry. &quoute;Projet de Loi de Finances 2015&quoute;. (last accessed on 14 February 2015).
http://www.defence.gouv.fr/content/download/311433/4195225/file/Projet%20de%20loi%20de%20finances%202015%20-%20Minist%C3%A8re%20de%20la%20D%C3%A9fense.pdf
Defence Ministry. &quoute;Les chiffres clé de la Défense. Edition 2013&quoute;. (last accessed on 14 February 2015).
http://www.defence.gouv.fr/content/download/219706/2444262/file/Chiffres%20cl%C3%A9s%20de%20la%20d%C3%A9fense%20-%202013.pdf
Suggested score: 4
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: The Data Publica post is dated 2012, however, a May 2010 Senate report is relatively detailed when it comes to the value of the buildings and sites managed/owned by the ministry (16 mrd euros). Gendarmerie real estate (included in this report) is no longer managed by the ministry, and eventual sales took and will take place (see MPL and http://www.economie.gouv.fr/cessions). Yet, data is - at least partly- available. There is a detailed 2008 list of the biggest military sites in the report.
http://www.senat.fr/rap/r09-503/r09-5030.html
Suggested score: 4
Is there a legislative committee (or other appropriate body) responsible for defence budget scrutiny and analysis in an effective way, and is this body provided with detailed, extensive, and timely information on the defence budget?
The legislative committee is involved in the preparation of the military programmation law. However, as Videlin explains, the Ministry of defence has the freedom to decide whether it follows the &quoute;programmation plan&quoute;. It can decide to allow some new expenses and to reduce other budgetary lines. The legislative committee is provided with detailed information on the yearly defence budged (source 3), but decision-making cannot be influenced at this stage. There are also occasional slips in standards, as one example illustrates (last source). In this example there was no written mention of equipment sales to balance the budget. Later on, different equipement sales scenarios were discussed by a Defence ministry representative audited by the defence commission. The finance commission of the Parliament has been reinforced since 2013 and the Government has to present every semester a detailed account of expenditures.
Videlin concludes that scrutiny exists, but that, while MPs debate on every detail of the programmatic law, they have accepted the fact that the program is never respected and are routinely overruled.
National Assembly's 2014-2019 programmation law (military budget):
http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/rapports/r1551-t1.asp
Jean-Jacques Videlin, Droit de la défense nationale, Bruylant, 2014, p.110-111 and p.119-120
Rapport d'information sur le contrôle de l’exécution des crédits de la Défense pour les exercices 2011 et 2012, présenté par F.André et P.Vitel, n°1388
http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/rap-info/i1388.asp (accessed March 22, 2015)
Laurent Lagneau,Pour boucler son budget, le ministère de la Défense va revendre des équipements, 14.10.13.
http://www.opex360.com/2013/10/14/pour-boucler-son-budget-le-ministere-de-la-defence-va-revendre-des-equipements/ (accessed March 22, 2015)
Guillaume, Marc. &quoute;Parlement et secret(s)&quoute;. Pouvoirs. CAIRN. 2001-2002. N°97. (last accessed on 14 February 2015).
http://www.cairn.info/zen.php?ID_ARTICLE=POUV_097_0067#s2n5
Senate. &quoute;Les législations spécifiques et le secret de la défense nationale&quoute;. (last accessed on 14 February 2015).
http://www.senat.fr/rap/l97-337/l97-3372.html
Lagneau, Laurent. &quoute;Le Sénat a rejeté le budget 2015 de la Défense pour son manque de sincérité&quoute;. 5 December 2014. (last accessed on 14 February 2015).
http://www.opex360.com/2014/12/05/le-senat-rejete-le-budget-2015-de-la-defence-pour-son-manque-de-sincerite/
Commission de la défense nationale et des forces armées. &quoute;Compte-rendu n°18. Jeudi 23 Octobre 2014&quoute;. (last accessed on 14 February 2015).
http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/pdf/cr-cdef/14-15/c1415018.pdf
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2011/sep/ep-study-dem-control-intel-agencies.pdf
http://www.defence.gouv.fr/sga/le-sga-en-action/droit-et-defence/secret-defence/secret-defence
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: The Defence and Armed Forces Committee of the National Assembly and the Senate's Committee on Foreign Affairs and Armed Forces both analyse defence budget. Such committees can have a decisive impact on decision-making: in 2014, the Senate, guided by the work of its Defence Committee, rejected the 2015 budget defence, based on a &quoute;lack of clarifications and sincerity&quoute; from the government about it.
However, as previously mentioned, these committees alone only have the power to submit opinions, and it is difficult to find evidence proving that these opinions are followed by the government. It is equally difficult to assess the level of the information they have access to. Indeed, parliamentarians cannot in theory access classified information. For instance, defence agreements, which are secret information, might only be made available to parliamentarians if they have inquiries from a budgetary perspective. Nevertheless, in reality, there have been several occasions during which the members of the two commissions have had access to classified information.
Guillaume, Marc. &quoute;Parlement et secret(s)&quoute;. Pouvoirs. CAIRN. 2001-2002. N°97. (last accessed on 14 February 2015).
http://www.cairn.info/zen.php?ID_ARTICLE=POUV_097_0067#s2n5
Senate. &quoute;Les législations spécifiques et le secret de la défense nationale&quoute;. (last accessed on 14 February 2015).
http://www.senat.fr/rap/l97-337/l97-3372.html
Lagneau, Laurent. &quoute;Le Sénat a rejeté le budget 2015 de la Défense pour son manque de sincérité&quoute;. 5 December 2014. (last accessed on 14 February 2015).
http://www.opex360.com/2014/12/05/le-senat-rejete-le-budget-2015-de-la-defence-pour-son-manque-de-sincerite/
Commission de la défense nationale et des forces armées. &quoute;Compte-rendu n°18. Jeudi 23 Octobre 2014&quoute;. (last accessed on 14 February 2015).
http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/pdf/cr-cdef/14-15/c1415018.pdf
Suggested score: 2
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: According to a 2011 EP report about intelligence services: &quoute;In a number of states (e.g., France) access to classified information is further restricted because it is only made available to the chairs of designated parliamentary committees. This approach is problematic from the point of view of oversight because a committee chair alone cannot easily conduct oversight on the basis of such information.&quoute;
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2011/sep/ep-study-dem-control-intel-agencies.pdf
Politically speaking, defence is a reserved domain of the president and parliamentary control is generally weak. The political reasons behind this phenomenon are explained on p. 233.
Suggested score:
Is the approved defence budget made publicly available? In practice, can citizens, civil society, and the media obtain detailed information on the defence budget?
Since the programming cycle of 2009-2014, citizens can access detailed information on the defence budget (before then, the published budget only encompassed the budget for equipment). According to my interviews, many requests for information are sent to the Parliament (by citizens, the media etc.). MPs reply and communicate details regularly (one example that came up in the interviews: the nuclear dissuasion budget). There are however no clear provisions on the matter.
Projet de Loi de Finances, 2013: http://www.performance-publique.budget.gouv.fr/fileadmin/medias/documents/gestionpublique/CIB/Le_deploiement_du_controle_interne_budgetaire_au_Ministere_de_la_defence.pdf
Ministry of Defence - Budget information, Budget for fiscal year 2013/14 (Updated 03.03.2014),
http://www.defence.gouv.fr/sga/le-sga-en-action/budget-finances-de-la-defence/budget/2013
Expert interviews, 2014.
Sénat. &quoute;Refonder le droit à l'information publique à l'heure du numérique : un enjeu citoyen, une opportunité stratégique (Rapport)&quoute;. (last accessed on 14 February 2015).
http://www.senat.fr/rap/r13-589-1/r13-589-13.html
1978 law: http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006068643&dateTexte=20080929.
Cada.fr (Commission for Acess to Administrative Documents)
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: According the law of the 17th July 1978, French citizens have the right to request access to administrative documents in general, under the principle of the right to information. However this right is limited, notably when the information requested is classified, such as secret information on national defence (article 6-I, 2°). Besides, it is not proven that their requests are satisfied and that they obtain responses.
Sénat. &quoute;Refonder le droit à l'information publique à l'heure du numérique : un enjeu citoyen, une opportunité stratégique (Rapport)&quoute;. (last accessed on 14 February 2015).
http://www.senat.fr/rap/r13-589-1/r13-589-13.html
Suggested score: 3
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: The defence budget is public information.
The scope of restricted administrative documents (not to be comminicated by the Cada) can be found in an 1978 law: http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006068643&dateTexte=20080929.
Reference suggestion:
Cada.fr (Commission for Acess to Administrative Documents)
Suggested score:
Are sources of defence income other than from central government allocation (from equipment sales or property disposal, for example) published and scrutinised?
There is full publication of all sources of income, the money received and the destination by the &quoute;Cour des Comptes', which exercises full scrutiny together with Parliament. In 2014, the &quoute;Cour des Comptes&quoute; criticised the fact that the budget related to salaries and external operations had been underestimated, which prompted the government to reallocate some &quoute;credits&quoute; within the defence budget. This had an impact on equipment acquisitions, which are considered the adjustment variable.
Apart from the central government allocation, the sale of radio frequencies and of real estate assets deemed &quoute;unnecessary&quoute; by the Ministry of Defence are the only two additional sources of income. These are published in the Finance Planning Act (&quoute;Loi de Programmation Militaire&quoute;) and their destination is specified.
La Tribune, Carton jaune de la Cour des comptes sur la gestion du budget de la défense en 2013, 29.11.2013.
http://www.latribune.fr/entreprises-finance/industrie/aeronautique-defence/20131129trib000798584/carton-jaune-de-la-cour-des-comptes-sur-la-gestion-du-budget-de-la-defence-en-2013.html
La Tribune, Défense : la fuite en avant des recettes exceptionnelles, 29.11.2013. http://www.latribune.fr/entreprises-finance/industrie/aeronautique-defence/20131113trib000795559/defence-la-fuite-en-avant-des-recettes-exceptionnelles.html
Lagneau, Laurent, &quoute;Pour boucler son budget, le ministère de la Défense va revendre des équipements&quoute;, 14.10.2013
http://www.opex360.com/2013/10/14/pour-boucler-son-budget-le-ministere-de-la-defence-va-revendre-des-equipements/
https://www.ccomptes.fr/Publications/Publications/Le-budget-de-l-Etat-en-2014-resultats-et-gestion
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/jopdf//jopdf/2014/1230/joe_20141230_0002.pdf
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is there an effective internal audit process for defence ministry expenditure (that is, for example, transparent, conducted by appropriately skilled individuals, and subject to parliamentary oversight)?
There is a process for internal audit in place in the Ministry of Defence. According to the second source, internal audits have been taking place more systematically since 2009. Reports are however not subject to parliamentary scrutiny and the internal audit department is not bound to communicate its results to the public.
Interviews mentioned that auditing could not replace &quoute;contrôle&quoute; and was not sufficient to prevent corruption, especially in the field of procurement (for example in the Balard project, no prior auditing took place). The score has been selected on the basis of the lack of evidence of effectiveness of this function.
Defence Ministry, Internal Audit Charter &quoute;Mission d'audit interne - MAI&quoute;, Updated: 6.25.2014
http://www.defence.gouv.fr/sga/le-sga/son-organisation/entites-rattachees-au-sga/mission-d-audit-interne-mai
Ministry of Finance assessment: http://www.performance-publique.budget.gouv.fr/fileadmin/medias/documents/gestionpublique/CIB/Le_deploiement_du_controle_interne_budgetaire_au_Ministere_de_la_defence.pdf (accessed Nov.13, 2014)
Also published in: Le déploiement du contrôle interne budgétaire au ministère de la Défense by Hugues BIED-CHARRETON, Gestion Finances Publiques, January 2012
Inspection générale des finances. &quoute;Rapport relatif à la structuration de la politique de contrôle et d’audit internes de l’Etat&quoute;. October 2009. Pp. 9-11. (last accessed on 14 February 2015).
http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/var/storage/rapports-publics/104000073/0000.pdf
Expert interviews, 2014.
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Inspection générale des finances. &quoute;Rapport relatif à la structuration de la politique de contrôle et d’audit internes de l’Etat&quoute;. October 2009. Pp. 9-11. (last accessed on 14 February 2015).
http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/var/storage/rapports-publics/104000073/0000.pdf
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is there effective and transparent external auditing of military defence expenditure?
The Cour des Comptes, composed of life-long appointed judges, is a fierce defender of its independance, as the first press article demonstrates: it successfully opposed the executive in the area of internal security. Its principles are &quoute;independance, contradiction, and collective decision making process (&quoute;collégialité&quoute;)&quoute;.
In the area of defence and security, many reports by the highly respected Cour des Comptes are available and provide detailed recommendations.
According to the Court itself however, its findings are not necessarily acted upon. The Ministry of defence does not hide the Court recommendations - its website states the reservation of the Court. But it also does not necessarily show how they have been acted upon in any measure.
Competences of the Cour des Comptes:
http://www.vie-publique.fr/decouverte-institutions/justice/fonctionnement/juridictions-particulieres/quels-sont-tribunaux-qui-controlent-finances-publiques.html (accessed Nov.16, 2014)
Libération, Les magistrats de la Cour des comptes défendent leur indépendance, 8 July 2011 (accessed Nov.16, 2014)
Higher Court of Audit (Cour des Comptes) competences in the defence sector: http://www.ccomptes.fr/Thematiques/Pouvoirs-publics/defence (accessed Nov.16, 2014)
The reserves of the Cour des Comptes as stated by the Ministry of defence:
http://www.defence.gouv.fr/sga/le-sga-en-action/budget-finances-de-la-defence/etats-financiers-et-comptables (accessed Nov.16, 2014)
La Tribune, Carton jaune de la Cour des comptes sur la gestion du budget de la défense en 2013, 29.11.2013
http://www.latribune.fr/entreprises-finance/industrie/aeronautique-defence/20131129trib000798584/carton-jaune-de-la-cour-des-comptes-sur-la-gestion-du-budget-de-la-defence-en-2013.html (accessed Nov.16, 2014)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is there evidence that the country's defence institutions have controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country's natural resource exploitation and, if so, are these interests publicly stated and subject to scrutiny?
There is no evidence that the Ministry of Defence has controlling or financial interests in businesss associated with the exploitation of natural resources. The &quoute;Code on the environment&quoute; establishes rules that defence institutions must respect to preserve the quality of the environment when running their activities. There are ongoing sustainable development projects in some military sites and the ones that have been sold are now mainly used for agricultural purposes.
Defence Code referring to the environment code: Article L2313-3 http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCode.do;jsessionid=772C8ACF53FFC3A26A1D7186EB27AF81.tpdjo06v_1?idSectionTA=LEGISCTA000006193162&cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006071307&dateTexte=20120725
(accessed Nov. 16, 2014)
http://www.defence.gouv.fr/sga/le-sga-en-action/developpement-durable/environnement (accessed Nov.16, 2014)
Midi Libre, Libération du major Melara mis en examen pour &quoute;complicité d�orpaillage illicite&quoute;, ??? November 2010 (accessed Nov.16, 2014)
http://www.midilibre.fr/2012/11/13/dma-le-major-melara-libere,593692.php
Jean-Jacques Videlin, Droit de la défense nationale, Bruylant, 2014, p.253
S.Brondel, &quoute;La mise à disposition des terrains militaires précisée&quoute;, AJDA, 2008, p.1919
http://www.iledefrance.fr/fil-actus-region/armee-cede-sa-place-agriculture-essonne
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: The &quoute;Environment Code&quoute; establishes rules that defence institutions must respect to preserve the quality of the environment when running their activities. It does not imply that they have financial or controlling interests in businesses associated with the country's natural resource exploitation, and no information is available, to my knowledge, to state otherwise. Besides, regarding the trial of a policeman for allegedly helping a gold dealer, the behavior of one defence employee does not mean that defence institutions as a whole do exploit natural resources. Therefore, given the lack of information on this issue, a score of 4 seems appropriate.
Suggested score: 4
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Areva is an important example: ~86,5% of its shares are controlled directly or indirectly by the state. http://www.areva.com/FR/finance-1166/structure-du-capital-du-leader-mondial-de-l-industrie-nucleaire-et-acteur-majeur-des-bioenergies.html
The rest of the shares are publicly traded: http://www.areva.com/FR/finance-1178/devenir-actionnaire-du-groupe-leader-mondial-de-l-industrie-nucleaire.html.
There is a very clear (and publicly stated) transit structure for ex-military personnel to join Areva: http://www.areva.com/FR/actualites-992/areva-et-le-ministere-de-la-defence-signent-une-convention-en-faveur-de-l-acces-a-l-emploi-civil-des-militaires.html.
Individual, case by case transit occurs as well: http://www.marianne.net/blogsecretdefence/Ministere-de-la-defence-depart-surprise-du-dir-cab-chez-Areva_a389.html
Finally, the closeness of the ministry of defence and Areva is proven by the fact that France does not hesitate to deploy troops to protect Areva sites abroad: http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2013/01/24/des-forces-speciales-francaises-protegeraient-les-mines-d-uranium-d-areva-au-niger_1822028_3212.html.
When it comes to other companies, note that the French state is a shareholder in GDF-Suez and EDF. State participation in companies is public and searchable through a specialized agency's site: http://www.economie.gouv.fr/agence-participations-etat/Les-participations-publiques.
GDF-Suez and EDF also concluded Areva type contracts with the defence MInistry to ensure the employment of former military personnel: http://www.defence-mobilite.fr/var/defencemob/storage/fckeditor/File/partenariats/convention_gdf-suez.pdf.
http://www.defence.gouv.fr/salle-de-presse/communiques/ministere/gdf-suez-mindef-signature-d-une-convention-de-partenariat?nav=web
http://www.defence-mobilite.fr/var/defencemob/storage/fckeditor/File/presse/communique%20de%20presse%20-%20convention%20defence%20Mobilite%20avec%20EDF%20et%20AAA.pdf
Suggested score:
Is there evidence, for example through media investigations or prosecution reports, of a penetration of organised crime into the defence and security sector? If no, is there evidence that the government is alert and prepared for this risk?
There is some evidence that organised crime occasionally penetrates some sections of the defence sector.
For example, one military official of the secret services was arrested because he was involved in arms trafficking (selling arms to organised crime groups).
Yet other examples could not be found in the press. The conclusion to be drawn, based on a comparison with the internal security field, is that these events rarely take place. Contrasting with the lack of evidence for the defence sectors, there are important number of articles related to police corruption, involvement in drug trafficking, etc (for example, articles 2 and 3). Many similar articles and references were found during the research for this assessment.
The available legal framework tackling organised crime (Loi Perben II, 2004) does not specifically address the corruption nexus. The security sector (more broadly) seems to be more &quoute;aware&quoute; of the dangers of penetration by organised crime (drug trafficking, for example). Corruption and organised crime have two different legal frameworks.
The score has been selected on the basis of the lack of evidence of government capability to tackle organised crime in the defence sector.
Merchet, Jean-Dominique, Un militaire du Service Action (DGSE) mis en examen pour trafic d'armes, 14.10.2010
http://secretdefence.blogs.liberation.fr/defence/2010/10/un-militaire-du-service-action-dgse-mis-en-examen-pour-trafic-darmes.html (accessed Nov.16, 2014)
Le Canard Enchainé, L'ex flic qui dénonce vingt ans de coups tordus, 24.07.13
Le Canard Enchainé, A Marseille, l’entreprise la mieux gérée, c’est la drogue, 12.03.14
Loi Perben II on crime and organized crime:
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000249995&categorieLien=id (accessed Nov.16, 2014)
Le Figaro. &quoute;6 militaires de Calvi mis en examen&quoute;. 22 November 2012. (last accessed on 14 February 2015).
http://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-actu/2012/11/22/97001-20121122FILWWW00538-6-militaires-de-calvi-mis-en-examen.php
http://www.corsematin.com/article/calvi/trafic-de-drogue-au-2e-rep-de-calvi-6-militaires-en-cause.823605.html
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Le Figaro. &quoute;6 militaires de Calvi mis en examen&quoute;. 22 November 2012. (last accessed on 14 February 2015).
http://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-actu/2012/11/22/97001-20121122FILWWW00538-6-militaires-de-calvi-mis-en-examen.php
http://www.corsematin.com/article/calvi/trafic-de-drogue-au-2e-rep-de-calvi-6-militaires-en-cause.823605.html
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is there policing to investigate corruption and organised crime within the defence services and is there evidence of the effectiveness of this policing?
The &quoute;Brigade Centrale de Lutte conte la Corruption&quoute; which is part of the judiciary police has special investigative powers with regard to corruption offenses and organised crime involving public officials, including those from the Ministry of Defence. It can act on its own or in collaboration with the Police or the Gendarmerie. Media articles testifiy to its effectiveness although a defence related case could not be found.
Further, the CGA reports to the Prime Minister. It is mandated to investigate any kind of crime within the Ministry of Defence but there is no specific mention of corruption or organised crime. Recent cases of soldiers involved in organised crime (drug trafficking) have been dealt with by the Gendarmerie.
In a case of illegal gold mining, judges sued the Gendarme (which used to belong to the Ministry of defence - now the Gendarmerie is part of the Ministry of Interior) over both &quoute;passive corruption&quoute; and &quoute;complicity of illegal gold mining&quoute;. The accused personnel was eventually released in the same year (2012, lack of proof).
In the case involving a secret service (military) staff (2010), judges were the ones investigating whether this affair was involving other defence officials beyond the suspected individual. Judges told the French News Agency: &quoute;Given his job, we will dig to see if there is not something bigger in the background&quoute;. No details could be found on whether this was the case or not.
In relation to corruption prosecution, it seems that judges are effective. For example in the case of Balard (defence headquarters alleged corruption scandal), while internal investigation did not conclude in any fraudulent behavior, judges did organize a hearing with both a defence official and a middleman (last source).
Merchet, Jean-Dominique, Un militaire du Service Action (DGSE) mis en examen pour trafic d'armes, 14.10.2010
http://secretdefence.blogs.liberation.fr/defence/2010/10/un-militaire-du-service-action-dgse-mis-en-examen-pour-trafic-darmes.html (accessed Nov.16, 2014)
Ministry of Defence, La mission générale, Contrôle Général des Armées (missions). Updated: 2.24.2014. http://www.defence.gouv.fr/cga/nos-missions/la-mission-generale/la-mission-generale
Le Figaro, Pentagone à la française: 2 mis en examen, 14.05.2014
http://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-actu/2014/05/14/97001-20140514FILWWW00035-pentagone-a-la-francaise-2-mis-en-examen.php (accessed Nov.16, 2014)
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: In one case, military authorities seized the police, with the authorization of a judge, to investigate their suspicions regarding the involvement of a group of soldiers in drug trafficking.
Le Figaro. &quoute;6 militaires de Calvi mis en examen&quoute;. 22 November 2012. (last accessed on 14 February 2015).
http://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-actu/2012/11/22/97001-20121122FILWWW00538-6-militaires-de-calvi-mis-en-examen.php
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are the policies, administration, and budgets of the intelligence services subject to effective, properly resourced, and independent oversight?
General policies regarding intelligence services (DGSE, DGSI, DGM) are defined in the White Book and in an &quoute;intelligence orientation plan&quoute; (PNOR) which is presented to Parliament. Some degree of oversight over budget and administration has been reinforced recently (Source: Urvoas).
In the attached hearing example (2011), one MP's question (Yves Fromion) shows that he is informed about the general increase of the DGSE budget. However, some items are not disclosed. For example, the DGSE can also decide freely on its staff salaries in order to attract highly qualified staff.
There was a proposal for a law to better control intelligence services by setting up an independent administrative authority, but it was not successful (Faligot, Guisnel, Kauffer, 2012). A &quoute;Mission d’information sur l’évaluation du cadre juridique applicable aux services de renseignement&quoute; (information mission on the evaluation of the legal framework regulating intelligence services) also focused on the necessity of giving better oversight capacities to Parliamentary commissions for intelligence services.
The DGSE has displayed support for such an evolution. There are now clear provisions in the programmation law (article 12, &quoute;Extension of the power of the parliamentary delegation for intelligence services&quoute;) which regulate the parliamentary oversight capacities of the intelligence services. The parliamentary delegation composed of 4 MPs (both Senate and National Assembly) can access strategies, past budget reports, it can organise hearings but for example cannot have any information on ongoing operations.
Interviews concluded that this was a sufficient control mechanism.There is a new law proposal by the government which would increase legal accountability of the intelligence services (contrôle juridictionnel).
RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWERS: Score changed to 3, as it is unclear whether sufficient progress for a score of 4 has been made since the GI 2013. Peer Reviewer 1 highlights a lack of implementation, and the source (and thus quality) of the interview cited is not (yet) clear.
Roger Faligot, Jean Guisnel, Rémi Kauffer, Histoire politique des services secrets français, édition La Découverte, Paris 2012.
&quoute;La DGSE, outil de réduction de l'incertitude?&quoute; ,Revue Défense Nationale , janvier 2014, http://www.defence.gouv.fr/dgse/tout-le-site/la-dgse-outil-de-reduction-de-l-incertitude-revue-defence-nationale-janvier-2014
National Assembly of France, Parliament hearing of the National Intelligence Coordinator, 26.01.2011 http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/13/cr-cdef/10-11/c1011022.asp (accessed Nov. 16, 2014)
LOI n° 2013-1168 du 18 décembre 2013 relative à la programmation militaire pour les années 2014 à 2019 et portant diverses dispositions concernant la défense et la sécurité nationale
&quoute;Extension des prérogatives de la délégation parlementaire au renseignement&quoute; (Article 12)
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000028338825
and
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexteArticle.do;jsessionid=E99FD9EB91DAF920BC24E186C30191E6.tpdjo15v_1?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000705067&idArticle=LEGIARTI000028344881&dateTexte=20141116&categorieLien=id#LEGIARTI000028344881
(accessed Nov.16, 2014)
La Tribune, Comment la DGSE parvient à recruter des espions de très haut niveau, Michel Cabirol, 7.11.12
http://www.latribune.fr/entreprises-finance/industrie/aeronautique-defence/20121107trib000729514/comment-la-dgse-parvient-a-recruter-des-espions-de-tres-haut-niveau.htm
Jean-Jacques URVOAS, Les enjeux du contrôle et de l'efficacité du renseignement français, Géoéconomie, 2013/4 - n° 67, pp 31-40
Source: Le Monde. &quoute;Renseignement: la DCRI se transforme en DGSI&quoute;. 12 May 2014. (last accessed on 14 February 2015).
http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2014/05/12/la-dcri-se-transforme-en-dgsi_4415032_3224.html
Assemblée nationale. &quoute;Délégation parlementaire au renseignement&quoute;. (last accessed on 14 February 2015).
http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/connaissance/delegation_renseignement.asp#presentation
Assemblée nationale. &quoute;Mission d'information. Evaluation du cadre juridique applicable aux services de renseignement&quoute;. (last accessed on 14 February 2015).
http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/pdf/rap-info/i1022.pdf
Assemblée nationale. &quoute;Mission d’évaluation du cadre juridique applicable aux services de renseignement : publication du rapport « Pour un « Etat secret » au service de notre démocratie » - mardi 14 mai 2013&quoute;. (last accessed on 14 February 2015).
http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/presse/communiques/20130514-05.asp
Sénat, Note de synthèse &quoute;Instance parlementaire et contrôle des services de renseignement&quoute;. (last accessed on 14 February 2015).
http://www.senat.fr/lc/lc103/lc1030.html
Expert interviews, 2014.
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: The Parliamentary Delegation for Intelligence Services (&quoute;délégation parlementaire au renseignement&quoute;), which is composed of 4 deputies and 4 senators, is also in charge of the oversight of intelligence activities. In 2013, a report following an information mission was published in order to propose a new framework to better control the activities of intelligence services, notably under the scrutiny of the Parliament. Several measures were suggested, including but the creation of an independent authority called the &quoute;Committee for the control of intelligence activities&quoute; (&quoute;Commission de contrôle des activités de renseignement&quoute;). However, they have not been implemented so far.
Assemblée nationale. &quoute;Délégation parlementaire au renseignement&quoute;. (last accessed on 14 February 2015).
http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/connaissance/delegation_renseignement.asp#presentation
Assemblée nationale. &quoute;Mission d'information. Evaluation du cadre juridique applicable aux services de renseignement&quoute;. (last accessed on 14 February 2015).
http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/pdf/rap-info/i1022.pdf
Assemblée nationale. &quoute;Mission d’évaluation du cadre juridique applicable aux services de renseignement : publication du rapport « Pour un « Etat secret » au service de notre démocratie » - mardi 14 mai 2013&quoute;. (last accessed on 14 February 2015).
http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/presse/communiques/20130514-05.asp
Sénat, Note de synthèse &quoute;Instance parlementaire et contrôle des services de renseignement&quoute;. (last accessed on 14 February 2015).
http://www.senat.fr/lc/lc103/lc1030.html
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: PARLIAMENTARY OVERSIGHT OF SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2011/sep/ep-study-dem-control-intel-agencies.pdf
(http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201109/20110927ATT27674/20110927ATT27674EN.pdf)
Suggested score:
Are senior positions within the intelligence services filled on the basis of objective selection criteria, and are appointees subject to investigation of their suitability and prior conduct?
The selection process for all public service positions lays the framework for intelligence processes as well. There is first a competitive examination. It is either by the decree of the minister or one taken with the Council of Ministers that appointments are made for senior management positions. This depends on the intelligence service in question and the level of the position. Special permission is to be granted to to the individual to be given protected information - this granting of permission is based on the results of investigations and other security considerations about the individual.
An academy has been created in 2010 to train senior appointees. The recruitment (e.g. the profile of the last director) seems to be in accordance with the background/suitability/prior conduct of the appointees.
One appointee's name had however been cited in the Clearstream's corruption scandal (2004) involving several politicians. But this does not prove wrongful appointment, as he had been allegedly dismissed (2002) because of his possible role as a whistle blower in another corruption affair.
RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 1: Score of 2 maintained. As Peer Reviewer 1 points out, &quoute;a few senior positions happen to be filled based on personal relations rather than on qualifications and experiences.&quoute; This suggests that &quoute;investigation of candidates’ suitability is questionable, and impartiality may be an issue&quoute;.
Articles D3126-1 à D 3126-4 du Code de la défense, file:///C:/Users/TI/Downloads/articles_d3126_1_a_d_3126_4_du_code_de_la_defence.pdf
Website of the Directorate General of External Security, Les conditions de recrutement, http://www.defence.gouv.fr/dgse/tout-le-site/les-conditions-de-recrutement
Académie du Renseignement Français (Academy of French intelligence)
http://www.defence.gouv.fr/actualites/articles/academie-du-renseignement-former-une-communaute-d-esprit
Le Point, Clearstream: un ancien de la DGSE met en cause Villepin, 25.05.2011
http://www.lepoint.fr/societe/clearstream-un-ancien-de-la-dgse-met-en-cause-villepin-23-05-2011-1333924_23.php
La Tribune, Comment la DGSE parvient à recruter des espions de très haut niveau, Michel Cabirol, 7.11.12
http://www.latribune.fr/entreprises-finance/industrie/aeronautique-defence/20121107trib000729514/comment-la-dgse-parvient-a-recruter-des-espions-de-tres-haut-niveau.htm
DGSE. &quoute;Conditions de recrutement&quoute;. 24 March 2014. (last accessed 14 February 2015).
http://www.defence.gouv.fr/dgse/tout-le-site/les-conditions-de-recrutement
Ministère de l'intérieur. &quoute;La police nationale recrute&quoute;. (last accessed on 14 Februay 2015).
http://www.lapolicenationalerecrute.fr/
Communication with personnel from the Defence and Interior Ministry, October 2014.
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: Recruitment criteria to join intelligence services are available on their websites, and, according to defence and security personnel, candidates are indeed subject to a full investigation of their suitability. However, a few senior positions happen to be filled based on personal relations rather than on qualifications and experiences.
DGSE. &quoute;Conditions de recrutement&quoute;. 24 March 2014. (last accessed 14 February 2015).
http://www.defence.gouv.fr/dgse/tout-le-site/les-conditions-de-recrutement
Ministère de l'intérieur. &quoute;La police nationale recrute&quoute;. (last accessed on 14 Februay 2015).
http://www.lapolicenationalerecrute.fr/
Communication with personnel from the Defence and Interior Ministry, October 2014.
Suggested score: 3
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Does the government have a well-scrutinised process for arms export decisions that aligns with international protocols, particularly the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)?
France ratified the Arms Trade Treaty in April 2014 and had worked, according to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in partnership with defence companies and NGOs to achieve ratification.
There are however still major shortcomings with regards to control of exports by the legislature. According to a Green Party MP (François de Rugy), the role given to the Parliament in the 2014-2019 military programming law is very much in continuity with previous practices and does not consider the fact that the French state is a major contributor in most of the defence businesses: &quoute;[...] we are proposing the creation of a parliamentary delegation of export control for the businesses where the State holds shares, and we're building up on a previous 1990 law proposal&quoute;.
There is a concern that, despite the ratification of the ATT, the legislature is still not involved in assessing risks of diversion of armaments as MPs lack information and are coaxed into supporting national &quoute;vital exports&quoute; (Rafale example in the parliament debate quoted here).
Since a 2012 reform, the Contröle Général des Armées is also in charge of controlling arms sales ex post (&quoute;contrôle a posteriori du matériel de guerre&quoute;). The inter-ministerial commission deciding on diversion risks is according to Videlin, very active. One concern could however be that it is not suitably staffed with corruption experts or representatives of the development sector (neither NGOs nor the French Development Agency are present).
Régulation du commerce des armes (4.04.13)
http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/politique-etrangere-de-la-france/desarmement-et-non-proliferation/la-france-et-le-controle-des/article/regulation-du-commerce-des-armes
Ratification of the Arms Trade Treaty:
http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/a/att/france/rat/un
Parliamentary debate on the 2009-2014 law, Green MP's opinion
http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/cr-cdef/13-14/c1314021.asp (accessed Nov. 16, 2014)
Commission interministérielle pour l'étude des exportations de matériel de guerre:
http://www.sgdsn.gouv.fr/site_rubrique81.html
Rafale example:
http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/rapports/r1551-t1.asp
Le Canard Enchaîné, Un contrat naval mal embarqué, 23.10.2013
L'Etat et les industries de défense : le bilan de la Cour des Comptes
http://www.vie-publique.fr/politiques-publiques/evaluation/etat-industries-defence-bilan-cour-comptes.html (accessed Nov. 16, 2014)
Armament exportation law:
Arrêté du 27 juin 2012 relatif à la liste des matériels de guerre et matériels assimilés soumis à une autorisation préalable d'exportation et des produits liés à la défense soumis à une autorisation préalable de transfert
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000026088164&categorieLien=id (accessed Nov. 19, 2014)
Contrôle Général des Armées -Attributions particulières (update 29/08/2014)
http://www.defence.gouv.fr/cga/nos-missions/les-attributions-particulieres/les-attributions-particulieres (accessed Nov.19, 2014)
Jean-Jacques Videlin, Droit de la défense nationale, Bruylant, 2014
Defence Ministry. &quoute;Rapport au Parlement 2014 sur les exportations d'armement de la France&quoute;. 30 September 2014. Pp. 18- 31. (last accessed on 14 February 2015).
http://www.defence.gouv.fr/content/download/305478/4080769/file/Rapport%20au%20Parlement%202014%20sur%20les%20exportations%20d/'armement%20de%20la%20France.pdf
Ricotta, Julien. &quoute;Rafale : les coulisses d'une vente historique&quoute;. 13 Februay 2015. (last accessed on 14 Februay 2015).
http://www.europe1.fr/international/rafale-dans-les-coulisses-de-la-negociation-2372053
Amnesty International. &quoute;Une tradition française : l’opacité sur ses ventes d’armes&quoute;. 11 September 2014. (last accessed on 14 February 2015).
http://www.amnesty.fr/Nos-campagnes/Crises-et-conflits-armes/Actualites/Une-tradition-francaise-opacite-sur-ses-ventes-armes-12536?prehome=0
Defence Ministry. &quoute;Le contrôle des exportations&quoute;. 21 January 2013. (last accessed on 14 February 2015).
http://www.defence.gouv.fr/das/maitrise-des-armements/node_73891/le-controle-des-exportations
Defence Ministry. &quoute;Les exportations d'armement. La réglementation en matière d'exportation et de transfert d'armement&quoute;. 22 July 2014. (last accessed 14 February 2015).
http://www.ixarm.com/-Les-exportations-d-armement-
Ministry for Foreign Affairs. &quoute;Contrôle des exportations de matériels de guerre&quoute;. (last accessed on 14 February 2015).
http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/politique-etrangere-de-la-france/desarmement-et-non-proliferation/la-france-et-le-controle-des/article/controle-des-exportations-de
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: The Defence Ministry presents reports to the Parliament regarding arms exports. In its last report, the ministry declares that &quoute;in the field of arms export, France applies the greatest transparency towards the international community and civil society&quoute; (p.26, source 1). However, there are some shortcomings: given the rapidity with which the sale of Rafale was concluded by the Defence minister with the Egyptian authority, the scrutiny of the decision-making process, including by the Parliament, can be put into question. Besides, NGOs, such as Amnesty International, consider that the report is not detailed enough, which prevents the appropriate control of arms export by the Parliament.
Defence Ministry. &quoute;Rapport au Parlement 2014 sur les exportations d'armement de la France&quoute;. 30 September 2014. Pp. 18- 31. (last accessed on 14 February 2015).
http://www.defence.gouv.fr/content/download/305478/4080769/file/Rapport%20au%20Parlement%202014%20sur%20les%20exportations%20d/'armement%20de%20la%20France.pdf
Ricotta, Julien. &quoute;Rafale : les coulisses d'une vente historique&quoute;. 13 Februay 2015. (last accessed on 14 Februay 2015).
http://www.europe1.fr/international/rafale-dans-les-coulisses-de-la-negociation-2372053
Amnesty International. &quoute;Une tradition française : l’opacité sur ses ventes d’armes&quoute;. 11 September 2014. (last accessed on 14 February 2015).
http://www.amnesty.fr/Nos-campagnes/Crises-et-conflits-armes/Actualites/Une-tradition-francaise-opacite-sur-ses-ventes-armes-12536?prehome=0
Defence Ministry. &quoute;Le contrôle des exportations&quoute;. 21 January 2013. (last accessed on 14 February 2015).
http://www.defence.gouv.fr/das/maitrise-des-armements/node_73891/le-controle-des-exportations
Defence Ministry. &quoute;Les exportations d'armement. La réglementation en matière d'exportation et de transfert d'armement&quoute;. 22 July 2014. (last accessed 14 February 2015).
http://www.ixarm.com/-Les-exportations-d-armement-
Ministry for Foreign Affairs. &quoute;Contrôle des exportations de matériels de guerre&quoute;. (last accessed on 14 February 2015).
http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/politique-etrangere-de-la-france/desarmement-et-non-proliferation/la-france-et-le-controle-des/article/controle-des-exportations-de
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
How effective are controls over the disposal of assets, and is information on these disposals, and the proceeds of their sale, transparent?
Control over asset disposal is exercised by the Cour des Comptes. However, the court clearly criticises the continuing lack of transparency of the Ministry of Defence's report on assets, and of its procedures to assess their value.
The second source reports a discrepancy between the mention of asset sales in the programmation law and the statement originating from a defence ministry hearing in which many more sales were mentioned. The exact profit resulting from them is still not known exactly (&quoute;no precise number has been given&quoute;).
Cour des Comptes, Certification des Comptes de l'Etat. Exercice 2012, May 2013, in particular pp.65-67
Lagneau, Laurent &quoute;Pour boucler son budget, le ministère de la Défense va revendre des équipements&quoute; (2014)
http://www.opex360.com/2013/10/14/pour-boucler-son-budget-le-ministere-de-la-defence-va-revendre-des-equipements/ (accessed Nov.16, 2014).
Gallois, Dominique. &quoute;Le ministère de la défense innove pour boucler son budget&quoute;. Le Monde. 30 December 2015. (last accessed on 14 February 2015).
http://www.lemonde.fr/economie-francaise/article/2014/12/30/le-ministere-de-la-defence-innove-pour-boucler-son-budget_4547272_1656968.html
Amnesty International. &quoute;Une tradition française : l’opacité sur ses ventes d’armes&quoute;. 11 September 2014. (last accessed on 14 February 2015).
http://www.amnesty.fr/Nos-campagnes/Crises-et-conflits-armes/Actualites/Une-tradition-francaise-opacite-sur-ses-ventes-armes-12536?prehome=
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Gallois, Dominique. &quoute;Le ministère de la défense innove pour boucler son budget&quoute;. Le Monde. 30 December 2015. (last accessed on 14 February 2015).
http://www.lemonde.fr/economie-francaise/article/2014/12/30/le-ministere-de-la-defence-innove-pour-boucler-son-budget_4547272_1656968.html
Amnesty International. &quoute;Une tradition française : l’opacité sur ses ventes d’armes&quoute;. 11 September 2014. (last accessed on 14 February 2015).
http://www.amnesty.fr/Nos-campagnes/Crises-et-conflits-armes/Actualites/Une-tradition-francaise-opacite-sur-ses-ventes-armes-12536?prehome=0
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: In spite of efforts, the Higher Court of Audit criticized the ministry in 2013 as well: https://www.ccomptes.fr/Publications/Publications/Certification-des-comptes-de-l-Etat-exercice-2013
Suggested score:
Is independent and transparent scrutiny of asset disposals conducted by defence establishments, and are the reports of such scrutiny publicly available?
Asset disposal is controlled by the Parliament and by the Cour des Comptes, but this does not take place on a regular basis.
RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWERS: Score maintained at 2. The law quoted does have a chapter on asset disposal (VIII), which does not mention oversight. The source suggested by Peer Reviewer 2 (added) states that a controlling body exists, but does not seem to establish where information would be available. Information is available on the 'data publica' website, though it is not entirely clear where that data comes from. The website is not run by the government. The existence of the website and the information does not appear to be sufficient proof of the scrutinising body working effectively.
LOI n° 2013-1168 du 18 décembre 2013 relative à la programmation militaire pour les années 2014 à 2019 et portant diverses dispositions concernant la défense et la sécurité nationale
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000028338825&dateTexte&categorieLien=id
Benjamin Gans – INRIA & Thomas Dudouet – Data Publica, Voyage dans le patrimoine immobilier de l’Etat (date unknown) http://www.data-publica.com/content/2012/03/voyage-dans-le-patrimoine-immobilier-de-letat/ (accessed Dec.2, 2014)
http://www.senat.fr/rap/r09-503/r09-5033.html
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: Scrutiny is taking place, notably through the work of the General Control of Armed Forces and its Ministerial Committee for Oversight (&quoute;comité ministériel d’audit comptable et financier&quoute;). However, there are no public reports about the results of such scrutiny.
Defence Ministry. &quoute;Les attributions particulières&quoute;. 4 February 2015. (last accessed on 14 February 2015).
http://www.defence.gouv.fr/cga/nos-missions/les-attributions-particulieres/les-attributions-particulieres
Suggested score: 2
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
What percentage of defence and security expenditure in the budget year is dedicated to spending on secret items relating to national security and the intelligence services?
The 2013 budgets for the DGSE, DRM and DCRI were €600m, €155m and €36 respectively, while the overall defence budget (separate from the intelligence budget was € 41,27. billion In order to calculate the overall percentage of &quoute;secret spending&quoute;, spending of the DGSE, DRM and DCRI have have been considered as the total level of secret expenditure (€600m + €155m + €36), thereby conflating the &quoute;defence and security&quoute; budget as well (€ 41,27. billion + €600m + €155m + €36). The figure arrived at is 1.88%. The score has been selected accordingly.
Special funds and their allocation per ministry (2013)
http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/budget/plf2013/b0251-tIII-a12.asp#P262_37302
General defence budget (2013)
http://www.defence.gouv.fr/sga/le-sga-en-action/budget-finances-de-la-defence/budget/2013
Les services secrets français disposeront de 50 millions en 2015, 21 October 2014, http://bfmbusiness.bfmtv.com/france/les-services-secrets-francais-disposeront-de-50-millions-en-2015-841510.html
Délégation parlementaire au renseignement, http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/connaissance/delegation_renseignement.asp
Canges are described here: http://www.senat.fr/rap/a14-110-9/a14-110-95.html
Réforme du renseignement : Manuel Valls choisit la continuité, 17 June 2013, http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2013/06/17/reforme-du-renseignement-manuel-valls-choisit-la-continuite_3431299_3224.html
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is the legislature (or the appropriate legislative committee or members of the legislature) given full information for the budget year on the spending of all secret items relating to national security and military intelligence?
In order to access information on classified information that relates to secret services, an ordinary MP would need to obtain a 'declassification authorisation' from the &quoute;commission consultative du secret de la défense nationale (CCSDN)&quoute;. Only a dedicated commission of MPs is given full access to the &quoute;secret fund&quoute; spending (since 2002), 90% of which go to the DGSE.
Yet even this committee cannot access information related to spending on ongoing interventions/missions of the intelligence services: &quoute;Being responsible for ensuring that the services' special funds are used for their intended purpose, the Committee has access to the account of all funds and to all supporting documents. However it may not know the expenses associated with ongoing operations&quoute;.
In terms of other spending on intelligence services, as discussed in Question 19, there is oversight by a parliamentary delegation, which, again, cannot access information on ongoing operations (as mentioned above).
RESPONSE TO REVIEWERS: Score changed to 2, in light of the Commission (on Special Funds) having access to the relevant information apart from operations.
RTL News, Primes en liquide : que sont les fonds spéciaux ?, 01.05.2013
http://www.rtl.fr/actualites/info/politique/article/primes-en-liquide-que-sont-les-fonds-speciaux-7760979678 (accessed Nov.16, 2014)
Projet de loi portant création d'une délégation parlementaire pour le renseignement (May 7th, 2014): information on the Commission on Special Funds
http://www.senat.fr/rap/l06-337/l06-3373.html (accessed Nov.16, 2014).
Senate. &quoute;Projet de loi portant création d'une délégation parlementaire pour le renseignement&quoute; (accessed on 14 February 2015). http://www.senat.fr/rap/l06-337/l06-3373.html
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: The Commission on Special Funds has access to most documents related to secret funds, the only exception being information on the spending of ongoing operations.
Same source: Senate. &quoute;Projet de loi portant création d'une délégation parlementaire pour le renseignement&quoute;. (last accessed on 14 February 2015).
http://www.senat.fr/rap/l06-337/l06-3373.html
Suggested score: 2
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are audit reports of the annual accounts of the security sector (the military, police, and intelligence services) and other secret programs provided to the legislature (or relevant committee) and are they subsequently subject to parliamentary debate?
The Special Commission which assesses funds devoted to secret programs is composed of MPs, but it also includes two Cour des Comptes representatives who act as &quoute;administrative staff&quoute;.
It establishes &quoute;un rapport sur l'emploi des crédits&quoute; (an auditing report), but it works within the boundaries that were outlined before (i.e. no information on ongoing operations is made available to the members).
As the auditing report is then classified, there is no public debate on this auditing report. This report however is shared with the President and the Prime Minister, as well as the President of the Legislative Finance Commission.
RTL News, Primes en liquide : que sont les fonds spéciaux ?, 01.05.2013
http://www.rtl.fr/actualites/info/politique/article/primes-en-liquide-que-sont-les-fonds-speciaux-7760979678 (accessed Nov.19, 2014)
Projet de loi portant création d'une délégation parlementaire pour le renseignement, 7th May2014
http://www.senat.fr/rap/l06-337/l06-3373.html (accessed Nov. 19, 2014)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Off-budget military expenditures are those that are not formally authorised within a country's official defence budget, often considered to operate through the 'back-door'. In law, are off-budget military expenditures permitted, and if so, are they exceptional occurrences that are well-controlled?
Off-budget military expenses is permitted within defined boundaries of Article 12 of the Finance Law (LOLF, first source).
There is a sense that the costs of peacekeeping operations are not evaluated sufficiently at a regular basis. They are financed through extra budgetary transfers (for example from one ministry to the other). General legislative guidance on this is given by Art. 12 of the LOLF (first source). These operations are recorded ex post in the defence budget.
The Cour des Comptes has complained about the chronic undervaluation of these costs (source 3). Interviewees argue that some flexibility is necessary in order to allow the forces to fulfil their mission and not be put at risk. It is not clear whether this flexibility includes off-budget military expenditure, however,
Budgets which finance programs that fall under &quoute;secret defence&quoute; are authorised and recorded as well as controlled by a special Commission (source 2).
Loi organique n° 2001-692 du 1 août 2001 relative aux lois de finances, last update Oct.13, 2013,
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000394028 (art-12)
RTL News, Primes en liquide : que sont les fonds spéciaux ?, 01.05.2013
http://www.rtl.fr/actualites/info/politique/article/primes-en-liquide-que-sont-les-fonds-speciaux-7760979678 (Accessed Nov.20, 2014)
Le Figaro, Défense: La Cour des Comptes pointe le non-respect des budgets, last update: 28.05.2014 http://www.lefigaro.fr/conjoncture/2014/05/28/20002-20140528ARTFIG00070-defence-la-cour-des-comptes-pointe-le-non-respect-des-budgets.php (accessed Nov.20, 2014)
Expert interviews, 2014.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
In practice, are there any off-budget military expenditures? If so, does evidence suggest this involves illicit economic activity?
The use of &quoute;special funds&quoute; to finance political campaigns predates the 2002 reforms, which set up a control mechanism. There is still a lack of transparency however.
In 2013, the Ministry of defence reported that it might consider using the sale of armaments to finance additional costs, such as those of peacekeeping operations. These sales had not been mentioned previously, when only the sale of broadband frequencies had been flagged.
As the Cour des Comptes regrets, there are some gaps in ex ante reporting. However, there is thus far no evidence nor any allegations that this involves illicit economic activity.
The score has been selected on the basis that the extent of such expenditure is not clear.
RTL News, Primes en liquide : que sont les fonds spéciaux ?, 01.05.2013
http://www.rtl.fr/actualites/info/politique/article/primes-en-liquide-que-sont-les-fonds-speciaux-7760979678 (Accessed Nov.20, 2014)
Le Figaro, Défense: La Cour des Comptes pointe le non-respect des budgets, last update: 28.05.2014 http://www.lefigaro.fr/conjoncture/2014/05/28/20002-20140528ARTFIG00070-defence-la-cour-des-comptes-pointe-le-non-respect-des-budgets.php (accessed Nov.20, 2014)
Lagneau, Laurent, &quoute;Pour boucler son budget, le ministère de la Défense va revendre des équipements&quoute;, 14.10.2013
http://www.opex360.com/2013/10/14/pour-boucler-son-budget-le-ministere-de-la-defence-va-revendre-des-equipements/ (accessed Nov.20, 2014)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
In law, are there provisions regulating mechanisms for classifying information on the grounds of protecting national security, and, if so, are they subject to effective scrutiny?
A special commission (the &quoute;Commission consultative du secret de la défense nationale&quoute;) exists to decide about the declassification of information. The classification however is carried out by an &quoute;administrative agency&quoute;. According to the Penal Code (Article 413-9), the classification of information on the grounds of national security is determined by a decree from the Council of State (&quoute;Conseil d'Etat&quoute;).
Transparency International France has reported that there have been some doubts on the full impartiality of the Commission for declassification, as its members are nominated by the executive.They proposed in 2008 to reinforce the independence of the Commission and to reinforce impartiality (expiry dates for classification etc.).
In 2010, Transparency International France released a statement regarding the 'Karachi affair' and denouncing the lack of access for the investigation by MPs as well as the delays before judges could access classified documents. They recommended that the Commission should be able to have a real-decision making power, not merely a &quoute;consultative opinion&quoute; given to the administrative agency in charge of classification. Its decisions could also be reformed so that they could be appealed by civil jurisdictions.
Transparency International France, &quoute;Secret Défense - Rapport Final&quoute;, p.6, Date missing (probably April 2008?), www.transparency-france.org/e_upload/pdf/rapport_secret_defence.pdf
Transparency International France, &quoute;Extension du secret défense: une menace sur les pouvoirs d'investigation des juges anti-corruption&quoute; Press release June 8 2009.
Transparency International France, &quoute;Affaire de Karachi : une nouvelle illustration de l'utilisation abusive du secret-défense&quoute;, Press releave, May 19, 2010.
Defence Code (last update Oct. 30, 2014): Chapter II &quoute;Commission consultative du secret de la défense nationale&quoute;, in particular Article L2312-2
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCode.do;jsessionid=BD6F7306FFE001F3322F7E3411534C66.tpdjo03v_1?idSectionTA=LEGISCTA000006166932&cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006071307&dateTexte=20141119
(accessed Nov.19, 2014)
Code pénal. &quoute;Article 413-9&quoute;. August 2009. (last accessed on 15 February 2015).
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCodeArticle.do;jsessionid=B364B548DF7AC7733B36704851B783A2.tpdila15v_2?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006070719&idArticle=LEGIARTI000006418400&dateTexte=&categorieLien=cid
Warufsel, Bertrand. &quoute;Le contrôle du secret de la défense nationale: une exigence de l'Etat de droit&quoute;. Droit et Défense. 96/4. (last accessed on 15 February 2015).
http://www2.droit.parisdescartes.fr/warusfel/articles/secretdef_warusfel96.pdf
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: According to the Penal Code (Article 413-9), the classification of information on the grounds of national security is determined by decree from the Council of State (&quoute;Conseil d'Etat&quoute;).
Code pénal. &quoute;Article 413-9&quoute;. August 2009. (last accessed on 15 February 2015).
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCodeArticle.do;jsessionid=B364B548DF7AC7733B36704851B783A2.tpdila15v_2?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006070719&idArticle=LEGIARTI000006418400&dateTexte=&categorieLien=cid
Warufsel, Bertrand. &quoute;Le contrôle du secret de la défense nationale: une exigence de l'Etat de droit&quoute;. Droit et Défense. 96/4. (last accessed on 15 February 2015).
http://www2.droit.parisdescartes.fr/warusfel/articles/secretdef_warusfel96.pdf
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Do national defence and security institutions have beneficial ownership of commercial businesses? If so, how transparent are details of the operations and finances of such businesses?
The Ministry of defence does own some commercial businesses - these work as providers and have a special commercial status. They are financially autonomous but are supervised by the Ministry of defence. The &quoute;Economat des armées&quoute; is one example, providing goods to military personnel stationed abroad. Some agencies are allowed to have other customers than just French state agencies, such as the &quoute;Oil Service for the Army&quoute;). There are strict procedures in place when choosing these customers.
The French state had/has market shares in many other defence-related companies (Safran, Thales, Areva). In 2010, the French state was the most important stakeholder for 1,217 businesses in the defence sector, representing EUR 0.4 billion). France for example owns 49.9% of the market shares of a security agency cooperating with the Ministry of Defence, the Défense Conseil International.
Centrale d'Achat et Prestataire du Ministère de la Défense,
http://www.economat-armees.com/ (accessed Nov.20, 2014)
Service des essences des armées (SEA), Activity Reports
http://www.defence.gouv.fr/essences/dossiers/rapports-d-activite (accessed Nov.20, 2014)
Décret 91-686 du 14 juillet 1991 fixant les attributions du SEA (BOC, p.2547 ; BOEM 110* et BOEM
610*)
Marianne, Défense : peut-on se financer en vendant les bijoux de famille ?, April 8, 2013 http://www.marianne.net/blogsecretdefence/defence-peut-on-se-financer-en-vendant-les-bijoux-de-famille_a1005.html (accessed Nov., 20, 2014)
OECD, RAPPORT DE PHASE 3 SUR LA MISE EN OEUVRE PAR LA FRANCE DE LA CONVENTION DE L’OCDE SUR LA LUTTE CONTRE LA CORRUPTION October 2012, p.8
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are military-owned businesses subject to transparent independent scrutiny at a recognised international standard?
The Cour des comptes evaluates the performance of state-owned entities, and in particular military-owned businesses as well as those businesses in which the French state is a significant stakeholder. It summarises its findings in general reports. The 2012 report criticises the absence of internal auditing data for an important number of state-owned entities (paragraph 280).
With regards to the state as a shareholder, it concluded that there is a need to &quoute;step-up monitoring, within the Armament Procurement Agency (DGA), of shareholdings in defence industries.&quoute;
Cour des Comptes, Les faiblesses de l'Etat actionnaire d'entreprises industrielles de défense, 2013
https://www.ccomptes.fr/Publications/Publications/Les-faiblesses-de-l-Etat-actionnaire-d-entreprises-industrielles-de-defence (available in FR and EN)
Marianne, Défense : peut-on se financer en vendant les bijoux de famille ?, April 8, 2013 http://www.marianne.net/blogsecretdefence/defence-peut-on-se-financer-en-vendant-les-bijoux-de-famille_a1005.html (accessed Nov., 20, 2014)
Cour des Comptes, Acte de certification de la Cour des comptes 2012, p.56 paragraph 273 and paragraph 280
http://www.defence.gouv.fr/sga/le-sga-en-action/budget-finances-de-la-defence/etats-financiers-et-comptables (accessed Nov.23, 2014)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is there evidence of unauthorised private enterprise by military or other defence ministry employees? If so, what is the government's reaction to such enterprise?
The Defence Code strictly regulates private activities by military staff. Military staff are for example allowed to sell their own goods, or work in a business owned by their partner. They have to apply to receive authorisation.
There are no examples of corruption in this regard, which suggests that the deontology commission which decides as to which activity is compatible with military functions has been a good safeguard.
Code de la Défense, Part 4: Military Personnel, Livre 1, the status of military personnel, Title II Rights and obligations, http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCode.do?idSectionTA=LEGISCTA000019528666&cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006071307&dateTexte=20120725 (accessed Nov.23, 2014)
Article R*4122-18 on &quoute;Deontology commission&quoute;
http://legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCodeArticle.do;jsessionid=16C5C8F434C274C6708CA071EDE1FD11.tpdila10v_2?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006071307&idArticle=LEGIARTI000018727734&dateTexte=&categorieLien=cid
Auzou, Stanislas. &quoute;Vers des sociétés militaires privées à la française?&quoute;. 2008. (last accessed on 15 February 2015).
http://www.sciencespo-toulouse.fr/servlet/com.univ.collaboratif.utils.LectureFichiergw?ID_FICHIER=3833
Alonso, Pierre. &quoute;Sécurité privée: les sociétés militaires prêtes à embarquer&quoute;. Slate. 2 February 2014. (last accessed 15 February 2015).
http://www.slate.fr/story/82641/pirates-soldats-prives
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: There are private enterprises owned by former military or other defence ministry (Private Military Companies or &quoute;Entreprise de Services de Sécurité et de Défense&quoute; in French). However, it is difficult to assess whether they are authorized as there is a legal void (&quoute;vide juridique&quoute;) regarding this issue. Otherwise, there is no evidence of unauthorised private enterprise by current military or other defence ministry employees.
Auzou, Stanislas. &quoute;Vers des sociétés militaires privées à la française?&quoute;. 2008. (last accessed on 15 February 2015).
http://www.sciencespo-toulouse.fr/servlet/com.univ.collaboratif.utils.LectureFichiergw?ID_FICHIER=3833
Alonso, Pierre. &quoute;Sécurité privée: les sociétés militaires prêtes à embarquer&quoute;. Slate. 2 February 2014. (last accessed 15 February 2015).
http://www.slate.fr/story/82641/pirates-soldats-prives
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Do the Defence Ministry, Defence Minister, Chiefs of Defence, and Single Service Chiefs publicly commit - through, for example, speeches, media interviews, or political mandates - to anti-corruption and integrity measures?
It is very difficult to find examples of speeches and interviews from senior military officials committing to the fight against corruption. In the recent corruption scandals surrounding the contruction of the new Defence Ministry building in Balard (Paris), the Ministry of Defence has repeatedly refused to make any comments.
In 2013, a committee of 15 ministers (including the Defence Minister) decided on some measures to improve the efficiency, accountability and transparency of France's international development policy.
Only one talk that referenced corruption by the Defence Ministry or by other senior members of the armed forces could be found. It said: &quoute;French defence companies respect French law on the prohibition of corruption. This seems obvious, but I think it’s better to recall this because all countries do not have the same obligations.&quoute;
The first source points out that the Service Central de Prévention de la Corruption created in 1993 (by the Justice Ministry), although not leading investigations, has been particularly active in its education mission.
Shailendrasingh Leeleea & Christophe Roquilly, Lutte anti-corruption: Gestion des risques et compliance Feb. 2013, (no page numbers as only access to extracts of the googlebook version are available via the internet)
Lecture on Indo-French Defence Partnership: the Choice of Strategic Autonomy Friday, 26th July 2013. http://www.defence.gouv.fr/ministre/prises-de-parole-du-ministre/prises-de-parole-de-m.-jean-yves-le-drian/lecture-on-indo-french-defence-partnership-the-choice-of-strategic-autonomy-friday-26th-july-2013/(language)/fre-FR#SearchText=corruption#xtcr=9
http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/IMG/pdf/07-31_Releve_de_decisions_du_Comite_interministeriel_de_la_cooperation_internationale_et_du_developpement_CICID__cle0e5e79.pdf
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Recently, a state secretary working in the Defence Ministry had to leave the government for corruption allegations: http://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2014/11/28/le-contrat-du-ministere-de-la-defence-qui-a-fait-tomber-kader-arif_4531017_823448.html .
Suggested score:
Are there effective measures in place for personnel found to have taken part in forms of bribery and corruption, and is there public evidence that these measures are being carried out?
Measures seem to be applied as the three examples demonstrate: not only disciplinary measures, but also prosecution.
For example, a theft of cables was sanctioned and the person responsible had to leave its function.
A new code of conduct for gendarmes has been established to ensure greater consistency with their role, which is closer to the one of the police than to the one of the army. There are generally more corruption cases as well as sanction cases involving police staff as opposed to army personnel.
One interviewee mentioned that Kosovo soldiers who had been caught selling arms upon return had been severely punished, although no reference was found in the press. There are recent examples of on-going investigations, but no confirmation that individuals were found guilty.
Score 3 has been selected as there is generally a lack of evidence across various possible sources that effective measures are being carried out beyond investigations.
La Rep.fr, Des militaires de Bricy poursuivis pour avoir dérobé du cuivre, 16.10.13
http://www.larep.fr/loiret/actualite/2013/10/16/des-militaires-de-bricy-poursuivis-pour-avoir-derobe-du-cuivre_1731808.html (accessed Nov.23, 2014)
Le Monde, Guyane : un gendarme mis en cause dans l'orpaillage illicite, 31.10.2012
http://opexnews.over-blog.com/article-guyane-un-gendarme-mis-en-cause-dans-l-orpaillage-illicite-111961109.html
Merchet, Jean-Dominique, Un militaire du Service Action (DGSE) mis en examen pour trafic d'armes, 14.10.2010
http://secretdefence.blogs.liberation.fr/defence/2010/10/un-militaire-du-service-action-dgse-mis-en-examen-pour-trafic-darmes.html
Le Figaro, Plus de 2400 policiers sanctionnés en 2013, 06.05.14
http://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/2014/05/06/01016-20140506ARTFIG00331-plus-de-2-400-policiers-sanctionnes-en-2013.php
Sanctions disciplinaires dans la fonction publique, update 14.08.2014, http://vosdroits.service-public.fr/particuliers/F510.xhtml (accessed Nov. 23, 2014)
Reuters, Bouygues manager investigated over 'French Pentagon' deal, 12.07.15, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/07/12/france-corruption-bouygues-idUSL5N0ZS09P20150712 (accessed Oct. 7, 2015)
Engineering and Technology Magazine, Brazil-France submarine programme investigated for fraud, 30.07.14, http://eandt.theiet.org/news/2015/jul/submarine-brazil.cfm (accessed Oct. 7, 2015).
Expert interview, 2014.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is whistleblowing encouraged by the government, and are whistle-blowers in military and defence ministries afforded adequate protection from reprisal for reporting evidence of corruption, in both law and practice?
The French Penal Code explicitly states that any civil servant has the duty to communicate to a judge (procureur) any breaches of law that they were able to witness while working. However, interviewees indicated that this article has rarely been used. One reason cited was that if accusations against military staff are being made, the judge must ask the Defence Ministry for its opinion.
A new law was passed in 2014 to protect whistleblowers in the public sector - before then, only employees of the private sector were protected. There is however no specific mention of the defence sector, where whistleblowing is likely to be difficult and likely to be impeded by the notion of &quoute;contempt to flag or the army&quoute;which can be punished by 5 years of imprisonment.
To support the implementation of this law a collective of journalists proposed a &quoute;protection platform&quoute;, giving legal advice to whistleblowers (generally, not just in relation to the defence sector). It is too early to assess whether the law will effectively protect whistleblower in the defence sector, because of the specifics of Article 698-1 of Penal Procedural Code.
According to interviewees, there have been no whistleblowing example in the recent years. One interviewee mentioned that the Ministry of Defence had improved the protection of staff denouncing sexual harassment and that such a mechanism could be reproduced for whistleblowers.
Article 40 of Penal Procedure Code: http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCodeArticle.do;jsessionid=AACB6F9AB04ED4E4E0C099FA8192E98A.tpdila21v_2?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006071154&idArticle=LEGIARTI000006574931&dateTexte=&categorieLien=cid
Article 698-1 of Penal Procedure Code:
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCodeArticle.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006071154&idArticle=LEGIARTI000006577450&dateTexte=&categorieLien=cid
Le Monde, Une plate-forme de protection des lanceurs d'alerte, Le Monde, 23.04.2014 - William Bourdon (Avocat et président de Sherpa), Edwy Plenel (Journaliste et président de Mediapart) et Gerard Ryle (Directeur de l’International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ))
Le Monde, Lanceurs d'alerte : la France adopte enfin une législation protectrice, 06.02.2014
http://abonnes.lemonde.fr/economie/article/2014/02/06/lanceurs-d-alerte-la-france-adopte-enfin-une-legislation-protectrice_4361322_3234.html
Code de Justice militaire - Section 7 : De l'outrage au drapeau ou à l'armée. Article L322-17, last update 1.10.2014, http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCode.do;jsessionid=CF64AD2BF05080D37EFFD573E353503F.tpdjo06v_1?idSectionTA=LEGISCTA000006167358&cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006071360&dateTexte=20080505 (accessed Nov.23, 2014)
Expert interviews, 2014.
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: The 2013 law dedicated to the prevention of tax fraud and economic crime also establishes the protection of whistle-blowers working in the private and the public sectors: &quoute; No employee of the public or private sector can be sanctioned for reporting in good faith crimes that (s)he would have witnessed while performing his(her) duties, including if the employee sent his testimony to the media&quoute;.
However, there is no information available about the existence of a law protecting whistle-blowers specifically in military and defence institutions.
Legifrance. &quoute; Loi n° 2013-1117 du 6 décembre 2013 relative à la lutte contre la fraude fiscale et la grande délinquance économique et financière&quoute;. Articles 35-36. (last accessed on 15 February 2015).
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000028278976&dateTexte=&categorieLien=id#JORFSCTA000028278979
Service public. &quoute;Les salariés lanceurs d’alerte protégés&quoute;. 12 December 2013. (last accessed on 15 February 2015).
http://www.service-public.fr/actualites/002917.html
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: The law in question was adopted in 2013.
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000028278976
Suggested score:
Is special attention paid to the selection, time in post, and oversight of personnel in sensitive positions, including officials and personnel in defence procurement, contracting, financial management, and commercial management?
The service central de prévention de la corruption (SCPC) is aware of the specific risks in the procurement sector. Lionel Sabater-Bono from the SCPC has claimed that the gradual softening of procurement laws and the global economic crises are factors which led to the multiplication of risks. He cites in particular the 'Balard project affair' (building of new headquarters of the Defence Ministry) and argues that the complexity of &quoute;public-private&quoute; partnerships contributes to the creation of risks. The judge admits that controls are imperfect, and that the number of condemnations does not reflect the reality of this phenomenon (in general, not only regarding the Defence Ministry).
The judge also argues that better protection for whistleblowers (which has since then been established) but also special attention to personnel in sensitive positions (career management) should be improved.
The same article includes an additional interview with François Hiaux from the Defence Ministry, which explains how they have established an &quoute;Ethics code&quoute; for procurement agents which is however not public.
Other sensitive positions (financial management, etc) are not covered by this ethics code. Interviewees argued that the CGA had been gradually dismantled in its function of control of public procurement and claimed that formerly corrupt personnel of the DGA had been given a new function there.
Marchés publics: en finir avec la corruption, Décision Achats N°160 - 07.12.2012 - Charles Cohen
http://www.decision-achats.fr/Decision-Achats/Article/Marches-publics-en-finir-avec-la-corruption-45172-1.htm (accessed Dec.1, 2014)
Le Moniteur.fr, Médiateur de la sous-traitance dédié aux marchés publics: Deux médiateurs désignés pour la sous-traitance et les marchés publics (Sophie d’Auzon), 24.10.2012
Chapitre III : Dispositions spécifiques à certains marchés de la défense (Article 4), Code des marchés publics (consolidated version 1.1.2014)
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCode.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000005627819
Merchet, Jean-Dominique, Exclusif : l'affaire de corruption à Balard relancée, Secret défense, 7.1.2013 http://www.marianne.net/blogsecretdefence/Exclusif-l-affaire-de-corruption-a-Balard-relancee-actualise_a905.html (accessed Dec.1, 2014)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is the number of civilian and military personnel accurately known and publicly available?
The number of civilian and military personnel are known with accuracy and commented upon by observers. A budget expert interviewee confirmed that France is very accurate in this regard and that it is &quoute;The Ministry of Defence is the Ministry that knows its employees best&quoute;.
Ministère de la Défense, Les effectifs de la défense, Chapter 4
http://www.defence.gouv.fr/sga/le-sga-en-action/economie-et-statistiques/annuaire-statistique-de-la-defence
Martial FOUCAULT, Les budgets de défense en France, entre déni et déclin, Focus stratégique n°36, April 2012
http://www.ifri.org/?page=detail-contribution&id=7111&id_provenance=97
Expert interviews, 2014.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are pay rates and allowances for civilian and military personnel openly published?
Pay rates for civilian and military personnel are publicly available. However there are two exceptions: Allowances and bonuses for military personnel are usually tax-free, and the Higher Audit Court has asked for clarification regarding the tax policy on these allowances.
There appears to be a lack of transparency regarding the criteria: &quoute;La Cour des comptes a constaté que le contrôle de certaines primes pourrait être renforcé. Les critères d'attribution diffèrent selon l'autorité qui les octroie et leur montant pas toujours bien connu.&quoute;.
Cour des Comptes, COMMUNICATION A LA COMMISSION DES FINANCES DU
SENAT, ARTICLE 58-2° DE LA LOI ORGANIQUE DU 1ER AOUT 2001 RELATIVE AUX LOIS DE FINANCES, La rémunération des militaires, September 2013
Johan Garcia, L'Expansion, Combien gagne (et coûte) un militaire français, 11.10.2013
http://lexpansion.lexpress.fr/actualite-economique/combien-gagne-et-coute-un-militaire-francais_1345551.html
Salaire des civils travaillant pour le Ministère de la defence, 22.08.2012 (taken from paiecheck.com)
http://paiecheck.com/2012/08/22/salaire-des-civils-travaillant-pour-le-ministere-de-la-defence/
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Defence Ministry. &quoute;Bilan social 2013&quoute;. (last accessed on 15 February 2015).
http://www.defence.gouv.fr/content/download/291929/3802866/file/Bilan%20social%202013.pdf
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Do personnel receive the correct pay on time, and is the system of payment well-established, routine, and published?
The Cour des Comptes report argues that the payment system (&quoute;Louvois&quoute;) has to be reformed in light of major mistakes and delays). Most mistakes were reported in the way that the 170 different allowances for the Armée de Terre were paid. This automatic payment system (&quoute;Louvois&quoute;) was implemented after a tailor-made payment system became difficult to afford, in light of important staff cuts in the Defence Ministry. These shortcomings are recognised however, and the current system is being replaced by another system.
Romain Rosso, Programme Louvois: ces soldats à la merci d'un logiciel, L'express, 04.10.2013, http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/societe/programme-louvois-ces-soldats-a-la-merci-d-un-logiciel_1288106.html?xtmc=miliraire_louvois&xtcr=1
Cour des Comptes, COMMUNICATION A LA COMMISSION DES FINANCES DU
SENAT, ARTICLE 58-2° DE LA LOI ORGANIQUE DU 1ER AOUT 2001 RELATIVE AUX LOIS DE
FINANCES, La rémunération des militaires, September 2013
Adrien Geneste, Le Ministère de la Défense abandonne Louvois,Le monde Informatique, 21.11.13,
http://www.lemondeinformatique.fr/actualites/lire-le-ministere-de-la-defence-abandonne-louvois-[maj]-55753.html
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is there an established, independent, transparent, and objective appointment system for the selection of military personnel at middle and top management level?
Most senior and middle management positions are filled by graduates of the elite military school Saint-Cyr, according to their own rankings. There is evidence that promotions are based on merit, including performance on operations. However there does not seem to be independent oversight. No allegations on appointments not based on merit were found. An interview confirmed this last point.
Colonel Testimony (2011) on his promotion, 14.05.2011.
http://alphacom.unblog.fr/files/2011/07/lapromotioninternejdduliere.pdf
Saint-Cyr military school:
http://www.st-cyr.terre.defence.gouv.fr/
Code de la Défense, Nominations (Last updated: September 14, 2014)
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCode.do;jsessionid=B090577AC0E9EEC60BB0E570CF78A1EC.tpdjo13v_2?idSectionTA=LEGISCTA000006166978&cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006071307&dateTexte=20140429
Christophe Cornevin, Le général Denis Favier, homme d'élite nommé à la tête de la gendarmerie,Le Figaro, 10.04.2013.
http://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/2013/04/10/01016-20130410ARTFIG00768-le-general-denis-favier-homme-d-elite-nomme-a-la-tete-de-la-gendarmerie.php
Expert interviews, 2014.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are personnel promoted through an objective, meritocratic process? Such a process would include promotion boards outside of the command chain, strong formal appraisal processes, and independent oversight.
A commission composed of people who are hierarchically higher than the applicant being considered for promotion presents the list of candidates for promotion to the Minister of Defence. Age and merit are taken into consideration. There is, however, no mention of an independent oversight that governs this process.
Ministère de la Défense, nominations
http://www.defence.gouv.fr/salle-de-presse/nominations
Code de la Défense, nominations
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCode.do;jsessionid=B090577AC0E9EEC60BB0E570CF78A1EC.tpdjo13v_2?idSectionTA=LEGISCTA000006166978&cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006071307&dateTexte=20140429
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Where compulsory conscription occurs, is there a policy of not accepting bribes for avoiding conscription? Are there appropriate procedures in place to deal with such bribery, and are they applied?
France does not have a policy of compulsory conscription. It was abolished via a policy directive in 1996.
La documentation francaise, La fin du service militaire obligatoire 16.10.2006
http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/dossiers/service-civil/fin-service-militaire-obligatoire.shtml
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
With regard to compulsory or voluntary conscription, is there a policy of refusing bribes to gain preferred postings in the recruitment process? Are there appropriate procedures in place to deal with such bribery, and are they applied?
Conscription (both voluntary or compulsory) was abolished via a policy directive in 1996.
Directorate of Legal and Administrative Information , Journée Défense et Citoyenneté, Updated 26.03.2014
http://vosdroits.service-public.fr/particuliers/F871.xhtml
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: TI: people can voluntarily join the army as volunteers, but this does not constitute voluntary conscription such as defined in the&quoute;hint&quoute;.
Armée de Terre. &quoute;Engagez-vous comme volontaire de l'armée de terre&quoute;. (last accessed on 20 February 2015).
http://www.recrutement.terre.defence.gouv.fr/sans-bac/avec-votre-niveau-d-etude/engagez-vous-comme-engage-volontaire-de-l-armee-de-terre
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is there evidence of 'ghost soldiers', or non-existent soldiers on the payroll?
There is no publicly available evidence of the existence of 'ghost soldiers', or non-existent soldiers on the payroll. No truth was found of any such allegations, despite in-depth investigations by the Higher Court of Audit in respect of the payment systems.
Cour des Comptes, Communication a la commission des finances du senat, Article 58-2° de la loi organique du 1er aout 2001 relative aux lois de finances, La rémunération des militaires, September 2013
Martial Foucault, Les budgets de défense en France, entre déni et déclin, Focus stratégique No.36,April 2012, http://www.ifri.org/?page=detail-contribution&id=7111&id_provenance=97
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Source suggestion:
2013, Cour des comptes
http://www.ccomptes.fr/Actualites/Archives/La-remuneration-des-militaires
Suggested score:
Are chains of command separate from chains of payment?
The Ministry of Defence's organogram shows that there is a clear separation between the chain of command (Chef d'Etat Major overseing the three branches of the army: land, sea and air forces) and the chain of payment (Secretaire General pour l'Administration). Décret n° 2011-469 of April 2011 details the Ministry of Defence's remuneration policy.
Organisation de l'armée de terre en 2011,
http://www.defence.gouv.fr/terre/presentation/organisation-des-forces/organisation-des-forces (accessed Nov. 27, 2014)
Rémunération, Code de défense, last update Oct. 30, 2014
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCode.do;jsessionid=B090577AC0E9EEC60BB0E570CF78A1EC.tpdjo13v_2?idSectionTA=LEGISCTA000006182623&cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006071307&dateTexte=20140429 (accessed Nov.27, 2014)
Nomination, Code de défense, last update Oct. 30, 2014
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCode.do;jsessionid=B090577AC0E9EEC60BB0E570CF78A1EC.tpdjo13v_2?idSectionTA=LEGISCTA000006166976&cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006071307&dateTexte=20140429
https://www.ccomptes.fr/content/.../la_remuneration_des_militaires.pdf
http://www.defence.gouv.fr/sga/le-sga-en-action/ressources-humaines
http://www.defence.gouv.fr/portail-defence/ministere/organisation/organisation-du-ministere-de-la-defence/organigramme-simplifie-du-ministere-de-la-defence/organigramme
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is there a Code of Conduct for all military and civilian personnel that includes, but is not limited to, guidance with respect to bribery, gifts and hospitality, conflicts of interest, and post-separation activities?
This Code of Conduct for the Soldier (only applicable for the Armée de Terre) is a simple set of 11 rules. It does not mention corruption (nor any of its components). However the Defence Code does regulate conflicts of interest and post-separation activities. The Gendarmerie (formerly part of defence) and policemen now also have a new Ethics Code encompassing many dimensions of corruption under the &quoute;probité&quoute; (honesty) article. And finally there is a General Statute covering civil servants, which is more detailed and does include provisions on private gain, and conflicts of interests.
Code du Soldat, Updated: 10.12.2012
http://www.defence.gouv.fr/terre/bloc-les-essentiels/code-du-soldat
Code de déontologie de la police nationale et de la gendarmerie nationale (Since January 1st, 2014) -
Article R. 434-9
Defence Code, Section 2 : Exercice d'activités privées ou d'activités accessoires.(Last updated: September 14, 2014)
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCode.do;jsessionid=772C8ACF53FFC3A26A1D7186EB27AF81.tpdjo06v_1?idSectionTA=LEGISCTA000019528705&cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006071307&dateTexte=20120725
Statut Général des Fonctionnaires, http://legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006068812&dateTexte=20151102
La Tribune, Boris Boillon, ex-sarkoboy, interpellé avec une valise contenant 350.000 euros en liquide, 30.08.2013
http://www.latribune.fr/actualites/economie/france/20130830trib000782436/boris-boillon-ex-sarkoboy-interpelle-avec-une-valise-contenant-350.000-euros-en-liquide.html
Le Canard Enchaîné, La rançon des otages versée grâce aux assurances, 6.11.13
Gendarmes et policiers auront un code de déontologie commun, Laurent Lagneau, (via opex360.com) 06.12.2013
http://www.opex360.com/2013/12/06/gendarmes-et-policiers-auront-un-code-de-deontologie-commun/
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is there evidence that breaches of the Code of Conduct are effectively addressed ,and are the results of prosecutions made publicly available?
For soldiers, the Code of Conduct (&quoute;Code du soldat&quoute;) is not a relevant basis for prosecution as it is not legally binding. However, other legal bases for prosecutions do exist in the Code de Justice Militaire, which covers prosecution during wartime and while at peace.
There are a number of relevant provisions in the Code du Soldat. One provision which corresponds to the code of conduct is Article L322-13, mentioning the use of arms for a purpose different than national service and punishable by 5 years of imprisonment. Breaches do not seem to be made public.
Code de Justice Militaire, update Oct. 1st, 2014
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCode.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006071360&dateTexte=20080505 (accessed Nov.27, 2014)
Code du Soldat, Updated: 10.12.2012, and in particular article 7 (&quoute;honor, transparency and loyalty&quoute;)
http://www.defence.gouv.fr/terre/bloc-les-essentiels/code-du-soldat
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Does regular anti-corruption training take place for military and civilian personnel?
Training is mentioned by the SCPC on its website, but there is no evidence that it takes place regularly or how it relates to particularly important personnel.
It is unclear if the training is specifically on anti-corruption or generic in nature, and whether it is given to defence and security personnel. The SCPC was contacted in this regard, but there has been no response. An additional other source (book) mentions the important role of their &quoute;education&quoute; mission.
The general conclusion of expert interviewees was that the SCPC had a very weak role. One interviewee, however, mentioned the positive benefits of army personnel being taught modesty. He also mentioned that one unit of the MinDef (DPSD) trains personnel (for example defence attachés deployed abroad; personnel in charge of nuclear equipment) not to be &quoute;phished&quoute; by foreign secret services.
Ministry of Justice, Details of establishment of the 'Service central de prévention de la corruption', Section &quoute;
FORMATION Administration, Grandes Ecoles et Universités&quoute;, http://www.justice.gouv.fr/le-ministere-de-la-justice-10017/service-central-de-prevention-de-la-corruption-12312/ (accessed Nov.27, 2014)
Lutte anti-corruption: Gestion des risques et compliance by Shailendrasingh Leeleea, Christophe Roquilly, 2013, Wolters Kluwer (no page numbers as I could only access excerpts of the googlebook version)
Expert interviews, 2014.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is there a policy to make public outcomes of the prosecution of defence services personnel for corrupt activities, and is there evidence of effective prosecutions in recent years?
There have been examples of effective prosecutions in recent years, for example in the case of arms trafficking by an intelligence officer. Yet publicly available information remains very limited and details about cases are very difficult to find, contrary to the widespread publication of police sanctions mentioned in the press (second source). There even is a platform for citizens to contact the &quoute;general inspection of policemen&quoute; (third source). There is however no equivalent example mechanism available in reference to the defence sector.
Merchet, Jean-Dominique, « Un militaire du Service Action (DGSE) mis en examen pour trafic d'armes », 24.10.2010
http://secretdefence.blogs.liberation.fr/defence/2010/10/un-militaire-du-service-action-dgse-mis-en-examen-pour-trafic-darmes.html (accessed Dec 1, 2014)
Le Figaro, Plus de 2400 policiers sanctionnés en 2013, 07.05.14
http://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/2014/05/06/01016-20140506ARTFIG00331-plus-de-2-400-policiers-sanctionnes-en-2013.php (accessed Dec 1, 2014)
Le Figaro, La «police des polices» à la portée des internautes
http://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/2013/09/02/01016-20130902ARTFIG00371-la-police-des-polices-a-la-portee-des-internautes.php (accessed Dec 1, 2014)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are there effective measures in place to discourage facilitation payments (which are illegal in almost all countries)?
The penal code strictly forbids facilitation payments, i.e. payments (money or goods) made to government official to perform or speed up the performance of an existing duty. This includes accepting money, promises, gifts, and advantages (&quoute;des offres, des promesses, des dons, des présents ou des avantages quelconques&quoute;). Punishment for civil servants can reach up to 10 years imprisonment or a fine of more than 150,000 Euros.
However, according to Transparency International France, there are some practical limits to the effectiveness of this mechanism - it is for example difficult to prove the &quoute;constitutive elements of corruption&quoute; etc., as was demonstrated in the Balard affair.
RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWERS :Score changed to 2. While facilitation payments are illegal, there is a lack of information regarding the existence of effective mechanisms to discourage such behaviour, as well as a lack of published information about officials being paid facilitation payments.
Transparency International France, definition of &quoute;corruption&quoute; and repression:
http://www.transparency-france.org/ewb_pages/r/repression_penale_de_la_corruption.php (accessed Nov. 27, 2014)
Code pénal, De la corruption passive et du trafic d'influence commis par des personnes exerçant une fonction publique, Last Updated: October 1, 2014
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCode.do;jsessionid=FF1B7F19EAE0446E18D0C39213BE6C71.tpdjo02v_3?idSectionTA=LEGISCTA000006181763&cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006070719&dateTexte=20080522
Le Monde, &quoute;Armes de corruption massive : secrets et combines des marchands de canons&quoute;, de Jean Guisnel : mirages libyens, 24.02.2011 (Nathalie Guibert)
Les Echos, &quoute;Safran. Pas de peine requise pour corruption présumée au Nigéria&quoute;,18.09.14, http://bourse.lesechos.fr/infos-conseils-boursiers/infos-conseils-valeurs/infos/safran-pas-de-peine-requise-pour-corruption-presumee-au-nigeria-1000248.php (accessed Dec.2, 2014)
Euractiv.fr, &quoute;L'OCDE reproche à la France de lutter modérément contre la corruption transnationale&quoute;, 24.10.14, http://www.euractiv.fr/sections/euro-finances/locde-reproche-la-france-de-lutter-moderement-contre-la-corruption (accessed Dec.2, 2014)
Penal Code. &quoute;Article 432-11: De la corruption passive et du trafic d'influence commis par des personnes exerçant une fonction publique&quoute;. Last modification on 14 February 2015. (last accessed on 16 February 2015).
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCode.do;jsessionid=CC43293EC66697CC1B810ED6B2EDE359.tpdila10v_3?idSectionTA=LEGISCTA000006181763&cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006070719&dateTexte=20150216
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCode.do;jsessionid=CC43293EC66697CC1B810ED6B2EDE359.tpdila10v_3?idSectionTA=LEGISCTA000006181763&cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006070719&dateTexte=20150216
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: Facilitation payments are strictly illegal, as indicated in the Penal Code (article 432-11), and entail, when civil servants are caught, 10 years imprisonment and 1 000 000 fines, and the amount may be increased to twice the proceeds of the offense (&quoute;une amende de 1 000 000 €, dont le montant peut être porté au double du produit tiré de l'infraction).
However there is a lack of information regarding the existence of effective mechanisms to discourage such behaviour, as well as a lack of published information about officials being paid facilitation payments.
Therefore, a score of 2 seems more appropriate.
ps: I understand that this question only concerns officials working for security or defence institutions.
Penal Code. &quoute;Article 432-11: De la corruption passive et du trafic d'influence commis par des personnes exerçant une fonction publique&quoute;. Last modification on 14 February 2015. (last accessed on 16 February 2015).
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCode.do;jsessionid=CC43293EC66697CC1B810ED6B2EDE359.tpdila10v_3?idSectionTA=LEGISCTA000006181763&cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006070719&dateTexte=20150216
ASSESSOR: I found different amounts regarding fines, from 150 000 to 1 000 000 euros. I do not know which one of them is the correct amount of the fine.
For 1 000 000 euros:
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCode.do;jsessionid=CC43293EC66697CC1B810ED6B2EDE359.tpdila10v_3?idSectionTA=LEGISCTA000006181763&cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006070719&dateTexte=20150216
For 150 000 euros:
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCode.do;jsessionid=FF1B7F19EAE0446E18D0C39213BE6C71.tpdjo02v_3?idSectionTA=LEGISCTA000006181763&cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006070719&dateTexte=20080522
Suggested score: 2
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Do the armed forces have military doctrine addressing corruption as a strategic issue on operations?
There is an impression that the armed forces are aware of the issue of corruption. Numerous talks by the Ministry of Defence allude to corruption challenges during operations, in countries such as Afghanistan or Kosovo. In some exceptional cases the army has even been at the front-line combatting corruption-related issues (for example drug trafficking in the Antilles). However, as per publicly available information, there is no specific doctrine focused on anti-corruption.
Ministry of Defence, Combat contre le narcotrafic: en première ligne, 01.02.2011
http://www.defence.gouv.fr/marine/operations/zoom-sur-la-marine-en-outre-mer/la-lutte-contre-le-narcotrafic-aux-antilles/combat-contre-le-narcotrafic-en-premiere-ligne/(language)/fre-FR#SearchText=corruption#xtcr=1 (accessed Nov.29, 2014)
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: CESIFO. &quoute;Government Defence Anti-Corruption Index 2013&quoute;. (last accessed on 16 February 2015).
http://www.cesifo-group.de/ifoHome/facts/DICE/Public-Sector/Public-Governance-and-Law/Corruption/Government-Defence-Anti-Corruption-Index/fileBinary/Government-Defence-Anti-Corruption-Index-2013.pdf
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is there training in corruption issues for commanders at all levels in order to ensure that these commanders are clear on the corruption issues they may face during deployment? If so, is there evidence that they apply this knowledge in the field?
There is no mention of the term &quoute;corruption&quoute; in the context of training in the section of the Ministry of Defence website devoted to deployment. There are only a few related mentions of commanders describing local governance situations in countries of deployment.
Training is said to take several months and to have people exercise in &quoute;real life situations.&quoute; But country and regional descriptions do not mention sensitive political issues (e.g. the West Africa region description makes no mention of corruption). There do not seem to be any press articles however claiming that corruption issues are mishandled during deployments.
Interviewees could not confirm that a specific anticorruption training was taking place.
Ministry of Defence, operational preparation, 14/01/2013
http://www.defence.gouv.fr/terre/formation-entrainement/preparation-operationnelle/preparation-operationnelle (accessed Nov. 29, 2014)
Comprendre les Enjeux Stratégiques (CLES), Interview of Michel Goya on preparation, 26/02/2013
http://notes-geopolitiques.com/geopolitique-operations-exterieures-opex/ (accessed Nov.20, 2014)
Expert interviews, 2014.
Specialized school for cultural preparation for deployment (Marine troops):
http://www.emsome.org/emsome-accueil.htm
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are trained professionals regularly deployed to monitor corruption risk in the field (whether deployed on operations or peacekeeping missions)?
As mentioned, there is no reference to &quoute;corruption&quoute; specifically in the context of deployment for the armed forces - hence it is unlikely that corruption monitors exist. It might be possible that the &quoute;Army Inspectors&quoute; who visit field bases have a more formal role assigned in this regard.
Ministry of Defence, operational preparation,14.01.2013
http://www.defence.gouv.fr/terre/formation-entrainement/preparation-operationnelle/preparation-operationnelle
Ministry of Defence, L'inspection générale des armées, 05.04.2011
http://www.defence.gouv.fr/portail-defence/ministere/organisation/organisation-du-ministere-de-la-defence/organismes-dependant-du-ministre/l-inspection-generale-des-armees
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are there guidelines, and staff training, on addressing corruption risks in contracting whilst on deployed operations or peacekeeping missions?
Based on publicly available information, no guidelines addressing corruption risks in contracting whilst on deployed operations or peacekeeping missions was found. Interviews could not clarify this point either.
Ministry of Defence, operational preparation,14.01.2013
http://www.defence.gouv.fr/terre/formation-entrainement/preparation-operationnelle/preparation-operationnelle
Interview of Michel Goya on preparation,Geopolitics of &quoute;OPEX&quoute;, Grenoble Ecole de Management, 26.02.2013
http://notes-geopolitiques.com/geopolitique-operations-exterieures-opex/
Expert interviews, 2014.
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Private Military Contractors (PMCs) usually refer to companies that provide operational staff to military environments. They may also be known as security contractors or private security contractors, and refer to themselves as private military corporations, private military firms, private security providers, or military service providers.
PMCs are widely used by French forces (source 4, p.69) but their activity is not regulated by law - the code of internal security does not mention their role in the military sector explicitly, and mercenaries are forbidden by law cf.first source.
They were partially scrutinized by the &quoute;Mission d’évaluation et de contrôle (MEC)&quoute; on externalisations in the defence field (second source) This evaluation mission was led by a sub-group of the Parliamentary Finance Commission and took place in 2010-2011. There is no evidence of regular scrutiny of PMCs activities. The mission report (last source, p.24) stressed that it was not satisfied by the level of transparency provided by the Defence ministry on the externalization to the private sector (no precise data).
The 2009-2014 programmation law generalised the use of private sector services. Currently, 92% of strategic transportation for example is carried out by the private sector. There seem to be no allegations of PMC corruption in France.
Loi n° 2003-340 du 14 avril 2003 relative à la répression de l'activité de mercenaire (consolidated version: 22 march 2015)
http://legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000602805
HAMZA CHERIEF, Enjeux juridiques et stratégiques du recours aux sociétés militaires privées, le cas de la France, 23.2.2014
http://www.espritcorsaire.com/?ID=269/Hamza_Cherief/Enjeux_juridiques_et_strat%C3%A9giques_du_recours_aux_soci%C3%A9t%C3%A9s_militaires_priv%C3%A9es,_le_cas_de_la_France (accessed Nov.29, 2014)
Code of Internal Security, Article L 611-1, 3 July 2014
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCodeArticle.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000025503132&idArticle=LEGIARTI000025506185&dateTexte=&categorieLien=cid (accessed Nov.29, 2014)
GISCARD-D’ESTAING, B. CASENEUVE, O. CARRE, D. HABIB, Rapport d’information en conclusion des travaux de la Mission d’évaluation et de contrôle (MEC) sur les externalisations dans le domaine de la défense, Assemblée Nationale, July, 5, 2011, n° 3624, pp. 69 et 70.
Régis Soubrouillard, Les sociétés militaires privées à l'affût du business libyen, Marianne, 19.05.2011, http://www.marianne.net/Les-societes-militaires-privees-a-l-affut-du-business-libyen_a206320.html (accessed Oct 7, 2015).
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Does the country have legislation covering defence and security procurement and are there any items exempt from these laws?
In 2011, a third section on defence and security procurement was added to the &quoute;Code des Marchés Publics&quoute;, in order to comply with the EU directive 2009/81/CE. However, the most sensitive items are exempted from this law in relation to competition and advertisement. Their scrutiny is internal to the Ministry of Defence.
The last source contains an indicative reference to problems that can surface: two lawyers discussed whether the use of this &quoute;limited competition&quoute; procedure for &quoute;sensitive items&quoute; can be a tool to bypass competition in order to favour national businesses or not.
Marchés publics de la défense et de la sécurité: Fiche technique &quoute;Marchés publics de défense ou de sécurité&quoute;,17.09.2012
http://www.economie.gouv.fr/daj/marches-publics-defence-ou-securite (accessed Nov.29, 2014)
Code des marchés publics, 3rd part: Defence and security markets, 16 Sept.2011
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCodeArticle.do;jsessionid=8406F95DB4B0509A3829634D23E50BBD.tpdjo11v_3?idArticle=LEGIARTI000024564171&cidTexte=LEGITEXT000005627819&dateTexte=20120306 (accessed Nov.29, 2014)
Code des marchés publics, 3rd part: Defence and security markets, 16 Sept.2011, Title V: Dispositions relatives au contrôle,http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCode.do?idArticle=LEGIARTI000024564027&idSectionTA=LEGISCTA000024564025&cidTexte=LEGITEXT000005627819&dateTexte=20120306 (accessed Nov.29, 2014)
Commande record de blindés lancée par le ministère français de la défense (EBRC-VBMR) : Protectionnisme industriel ou protection des intérêts essentiels de la sécurité de l’Etat?,Laurent-Xavier Simonel , Benjamin Touzanne, 23.01.2014
http://www.kpratique.fr/Commande-record-de-blindes-lancee-par-le-ministere-francais-de-la-defence-EBRC-VBMR-Protectionnisme-industriel-ou_a241.html (accessed Dec 1, 2014)
Sarraf, Sabine. &quoute;Les (nouveaux) aspects juridiques des marchés de défense et de sécurité&quoute;. Perspectives Internationales. 27 November 2011. (last accessed on 17 February 2015).
http://perspectivesinternationales.com/?p=889
Infos marchés publics. &quoute;La spécificité des marchés de la défense nationale&quoute;. 27 May 2010. (last accessed on 17 February 2015).
http://www.info-marches-publics.net/La-specificite-des-marches-de-la-defence-nationale.html
http://www.economie.gouv.fr/daj/marches-publics-defence-ou-securite
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Sarraf, Sabine. &quoute;Les (nouveaux) aspects juridiques des marchés de défense et de sécurité&quoute;. Perspectives Internationales. 27 November 2011. (last accessed on 17 February 2015).
http://perspectivesinternationales.com/?p=889
Infos marchés publics. &quoute;La spécificité des marchés de la défense nationale&quoute;. 27 May 2010. (last accessed on 17 February 2015).
http://www.info-marches-publics.net/La-specificite-des-marches-de-la-defence-nationale.html
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Is the defence procurement cycle process, from assessment of needs, through contract implementation and sign-off, all the way to asset disposal, disclosed to the public?
The different steps of the procurement cycle have to be made public in an official source, the &quoute;Bulletin officiel des annonces des marchés publics&quoute; for non-sensitive items of procurement, and for markets which are of a certain value (Article 212). Regarding general procurement the 2010-2011 report by the National Assembly asked for a a greater availability of data on public-private partnerships (the construction of Balard headquarters was based on such a PPP).
A more recent article by two lawyers mentions that the exceptions to the general public procurement rules (publicity in particular being a key principle) and applicable to the defence market can be stretched too much by using TEU Article 346. An express order of tanks the government was able to for example could, according to the experts, amount to &quoute;industrial protectionism&quoute; and does not necessarily seem to be an expression of the need for secure purchases.
Secrétariat Général pour l'Administration, Mission de l'ingénierie financière, des contrats de partenariat et des contrats complexes (MPPP), http://www.defence.gouv.fr/sga/le-sga-en-action/budget-finances-de-la-defence/mission-de-l-ingenierie-financiere-des-contrats-de-partenariat-et-des-contrats-complexes-mppp (accessed Nov., 23, 2014)
Code des marchés publics (édition 2006) - article 212
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCodeArticle.do;jsessionid=3879D1B8CCED6CB80A75DA6B59CC417D.tpdjo11v_3idArticle=LEGIARTI000024958560&cidTexte=LEGITEXT000005627819&dateTexte=20120831&categorieLien=id
Commande record de blindés lancée par le ministère français de la défense (EBRC-VBMR) : Protectionnisme industriel ou protection des intérêts essentiels de la sécurité de l’Etat ,Laurent-Xavier Simonel , Benjamin Touzanne, 23.01.2014
http://www.kpratique.fr/Commande-record-de-blindes-lancee-par-le-ministere-francais-de-la-defence-EBRC-VBMR-Protectionnisme-industriel-ou_a241.html (accessed Dec 1, 2014)
ASSEMBLÉE NATIONALE, Parliamentary mission, Mission d’évaluation et de contrôle (MEC) sur les externalisations dans le domaine de la défense by Louis GISCARD D’ESTAING and Bernard CAZENEUVE, n°3624, 2010-2011, p.79
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Defence Ministry. &quoute;Méthodologie des marchés publics et des accords-cadres &quoute;. 15 October 2010. (last accessed on 17 February 2015).
https://www.achats.defence.gouv.fr/-Methodologie-des-marches-publics-
Suggested score:
Opinion: Not Qualified
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are defence procurement oversight mechanisms in place and are these oversight mechanisms active and transparent?
Public procurement oversight mechanisms are outlined in the Public Procurement Code. Up until 2011, the main institution tasked to investigate public procurement (including defence procurement) was the inter-ministerial investigative Mission (MIEM). However the MIEM was suppressed in order the simplify procedures. According to Charles Cohen, this has weakened oversight. The investigative missions formely carried about by the MIEM are now carried out by the Anti-Corruption Central Unit (brigade centrale de lutte contre la corruption), part of a division of the judiciary police. An administrative judge has then the power to cancel irregular public procurement and to enforce financial sanctions. However, there seems to be very little transparency surrounding oversight mechanisms of defence procurement and results of investigative missions seem to be rarely published. The recent corruption scandals surrounding the new Ministry of Defence building in Balard shows that there is a clear absence of efficient oversight in defence public procurement.
GISCARD-D’ESTAING, B. CASENEUVE, O. CARRE, D. HABIB, Rapport d’information en conclusion des travaux de la Mission d’évaluation et de contrôle (MEC) sur les externalisations dans le domaine de la défense, Assemblée Nationale, July, 5, 2011, n° 3624, p.77
Charles Cohen, Marchés publics: en finir avec la corruption, Décision Achats N°160 - 07/12/2012
http://www.decision-achats.fr/Decision-Achats/Article/Marches-publics-en-finir-avec-la-corruption-45172-1.htm (accessed Dec.1, 2014)
Code de la Défense, Contrôle des coûts de revient, 1 october 2014, http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCode.do;jsessionid=8752900A234DCFE7939218190F33CE22.tpdjo07v_3?idSectionTA=LEGISCTA000024564025&cidTexte=LEGITEXT000005627819&dateTexte=20140530 (accessed Dec.1, 2014)
Cour des Comptes, Rapport Public Annuel 2013, Chapter 1: 'Les achats de maintenance du ministère
de la défense : un fort potential d’économies' (2013), http://www.ccomptes.fr/content/download/53100/1415224/version/1/file/1_1_achats_maintenance_ministere_defence.pdf (accessed Oct. 7, 2015)
Expert interviews, 2014.
http://www.achats.defence.gouv.fr/-Procedures-de-passation-des-
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCode.do;jsessionid=8766A692C8273B2B6E9536688DF579C3.tpdila10v_1?idSectionTA=LEGISCTA000006145874&cidTexte=LEGITEXT000005627819&dateTexte=20151106
http://www.marches-publics.legibase.fr/newsletter/55
http://www.liberation.fr/france/2014/01/20/la-trouble-erection-du-pentagone-hexagonal_974308
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: &quoute;L’organisation en place ne permet donc, à aucun moment, de
s’assurer que l’acheteur obtient les prestations demandées par les étatsmajors
au meilleur coût. (...) Cette situation n’est ni saine en terme de gestion et de risque, ni
conforme à des objectifs d’amélioration de la qualité des dépenses
publiques.&quoute;
http://www.ccomptes.fr/content/download/53100/1415224/version/1/file/1_1_achats_maintenance_ministere_defence.pdf
Suggested score:
Are actual and potential defence purchases made public?
According to the Public Procurement Code (2005), each public entity is to the publish the list of contracts concluded over the last year, along with the role of beneficiaries in the first quarter of each year.
This is done on the e-procurement platform of the government. The number of exemptions and the reasoning behind them is not clear.
The public is informed about programmed purchases for coming years, as the first source demonstrates. In the case of drones, the general public was able to compare the advantages and disadvantages of potential purchases, as the second source outlines.
France Public Procurement Code 2005
E-procurement platform of the French government, https://www.marches-publics.gouv.fr/index.php?page=entreprise.EntrepriseHome&goto=&lang=en
Projet de loi de finance 2013, Vers une nouvelle programmation militaire, LES MARCHÉS PLURIANNUELS or LE PROGRAMME MRTT, p.37
Drones 101. Pourquoi la France n’est pas prête de renouveler ses MALE. Joseph Henrotin, CAPRI, DSI, n°85, Comparaison des différents types de drones MALE dont l’achat a été évoqué par la France, octobre 2012, http://www.dsi-presse.com/?p=5882
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
What procedures and standards are companies required to have - such as compliance programmes and business conduct programmes - in order to be able to bid for work for the Ministry of Defence or armed forces?
In order to be able to bid for defence, companies should not have been condemned in the last 5 years.
The term &quoute;corruption&quoute; however is not mentioned in the guidelines.
The main actors in the anti-corruption process are the buyers in the Ministry of Defence, who are required, since 2011, to abide by an ethics code, which is not public.
SGA, mission achats - comment accéder aux marchés publics de la défense
https://www.achats.defence.gouv.fr/Didacticiel-Comment-acceder-aux (accessed Dec. 1, 2014)
Marchés publics: en finir avec la corruption, Décision Achats N°160, Charles Cohen, Testimony by Ministry of Defence official François Hiaux, «Un code de déontologie pour lutter contre la corruption», 07.12.2012
http://www.decision-achats.fr/Decision-Achats/Article/Marches-publics-en-finir-avec-la-corruption-45172-1.htm (accessed Dec. 1, 2014)
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are procurement requirements derived from an open, well-audited national defence and security strategy?
Procurement requirements are derived from a national defence and security strategy which is openly published, and there is a logical flow down from strategy to individual procurements. The Committee on Contracts (&quoute;Comité des achats&quoute;) of the Defence Ministry validates procurement strategies regarding contracts other than military equipment and weapons.
A Committee on the cost price of the manufacture of armaments (&quoute;Le comité des prix de revient des fabrications d'armement&quoute;) only controls the cost of the contracts, but it is not clear whether controls are also placed on the type of equipment purchased in relation to the security and defence strategy.
When two drones were purchased, debate focused on their role in relation to the White Book and if this purchase fulfilled this function or not. According to interviews, audits are useful in order to see &quoute;gaps&quoute; but smaller procurement mismatches in the non-armament sector could still be overlooked.
La Direction générale de l’armement a réceptionné deux drones MQ-9 Reaper, Laurent Lagneau, 19.12.2013
http://www.opex360.com/2013/12/19/la-direction-generale-de-larmement-a-receptionne-deux-drones-mq-9-reaper/ (accessed Dec 1, 2014)
Zone Militaire, Aucune décision n’a encore été prise pour les 10 autres drones MALE prévus à l’horizon 2019, 18-10-2013
http://www.opex360.com/2013/10/18/aucune-decision-na-encore-ete-prise-pour-les-10-autres-drones-male-prevus-a-lhorizon-2019/ (accessed Dec 1, 2014)
National Assembly. &quoute;Question N° : 13253. de M. Marc Le Fur ( Union pour un Mouvement Populaire - Côtes-d'Armor )&quoute;. 14è législature. 05 March 2013. (last accessed on 19 February 2015).
http://questions.assemblee-nationale.fr/q14/14-13253QE.htm
Legifrance. &quoute;Arrêté du 7 avril 2010 portant création du comité des achats du ministère de la défense&quoute;. JORF n°0088 du 15 avril 2010, texte n° 21. (last accessed on 19 February 2015).
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000022096596&categorieLien=id
Services des achats de l'Etat. &quoute;Bernard Cazeneuve rencontre le comité des achats&quoute;. (last accessed on 19 February 2015).
http://www.economie.gouv.fr/sae/bernard-cazeneuve-rencontre-comite-des-achats-letat
Defence Ministry. &quoute;Jean-Yves Le Drian annonce le lancement du programme Scorpion&quoute;. 11 December 2014.
http://www.defence.gouv.fr/dga/actualite/jean-yves-le-drian-annonce-le-lancement-du-programme-scorpion
Cabirol, Michel. &quoute;Armement : le contrat Scorpion enfin dompté&quoute;. La Tribune. 5 November 2014. (last accessed on 19 February 2015).
http://www.latribune.fr/entreprises-finance/industrie/aeronautique-defence/20141105trib46a2f8563/armement-le-contrat-scorpion-enfin-dompte.html
Defens'Aero. &quoute;La Défense réceptionne son sixième A400M&quoute;. 14 December 2014. (last accessed on 19 February 2015).
http://www.defens-aero.com/2014/12/la-direction-generale-de-l-armement-receptionne-son-sixieme-a400m.html
Expert interviews, 2014.
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: Procurement requirements are derived from a national defence and security strategy which is openly published, and there is a logical flow down from strategy to individual procurements.
The Committee on Contracts (&quoute;Comité des achats&quoute;) of the Defence Ministry validates procurement strategies regarding contracts other than military equipment and weapons (article 2 Arrêté du 7 avril 2010 - source 2).
A Committee on the cost price of the manufacture of armaments (&quoute;Le comité des prix de revient des fabrications d'armement&quoute;) only controls the cost of the contracts, but it is not clear weather the control is also made on the type of equipment purchased in regards to the security and defence strategy (source 1). Hence, the score of 3.
National Assembly. &quoute;Question N° : 13253. de M. Marc Le Fur ( Union pour un Mouvement Populaire - Côtes-d'Armor )&quoute;. 14è législature. 05 March 2013. (last accessed on 19 February 2015).
http://questions.assemblee-nationale.fr/q14/14-13253QE.htm
Legifrance. &quoute;Arrêté du 7 avril 2010 portant création du comité des achats du ministère de la défense&quoute;. JORF n°0088 du 15 avril 2010, texte n° 21. (last accessed on 19 February 2015).
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000022096596&categorieLien=id
Services des achats de l'Etat. &quoute;Bernard Cazeneuve rencontre le comité des achats&quoute;. (last accessed on 19 February 2015).
http://www.economie.gouv.fr/sae/bernard-cazeneuve-rencontre-comite-des-achats-letat
Defence Ministry. &quoute;Jean-Yves Le Drian annonce le lancement du programme Scorpion&quoute;. 11 December 2014.
http://www.defence.gouv.fr/dga/actualite/jean-yves-le-drian-annonce-le-lancement-du-programme-scorpion
Cabirol, Michel. &quoute;Armement : le contrat Scorpion enfin dompté&quoute;. La Tribune. 5 November 2014. (last accessed on 19 February 2015).
http://www.latribune.fr/entreprises-finance/industrie/aeronautique-defence/20141105trib46a2f8563/armement-le-contrat-scorpion-enfin-dompte.html
Defens'Aero. &quoute;La Défense réceptionne son sixième A400M&quoute;. 14 December 2014. (last accessed on 19 February 2015).
http://www.defens-aero.com/2014/12/la-direction-generale-de-l-armement-receptionne-son-sixieme-a400m.html
Suggested score: 3
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: The government has to submit an annual report to parliament about the execution of the MPL (as required by Art. 10.). It is not a governmental audit process, but it forces the government to review its procurements through the lens of the MPL.
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexteArticle.do;jsessionid=326908997A0F8B0CFBE99EB51FA588E4.tpdila24v_3?idArticle=JORFARTI000028338850&cidTexte=JORFTEXT000028338825&dateTexte=29990101&categorieLien=id
Suggested score:
Are defence purchases based on clearly identified and quantified requirements?
The General Direction for Armaments (DGA) is in charge of purchases (source 1). Purchases are defined quite precisely ex ante in the White Book (see source 3). Purchases correspond to requirements, but sometimes it seems that there is a lack of transparency as to how the Ministry of Defence plans to pursue its acquisition plan. For example, the second source mentions that the U.S. Congress took note of the planned purchase of 16 drones by France, while the purchase of 12 drones was planned in the White Book and mentioned publicly by the French Ministry of Defence.
Interviewees argued that condemnations for malpractice in procurement did not have a significant impact. Moreover, interviewees identified greater risk of corruption for civilian contracts: &quoute;L'informatique est un gisement de corruption&quoute; (computer/softwares equipment have a high potential for corruption).
Direction Générale de l'Armement (DGA), functions:
http://admi.net/jo/20050201/DEFD0500022D.html (accessed Dec.1, 2014)
Lesechos.fr , Défense : Paris maintient la cible de 12 drones du livre blanc, 28.06.2013
http://www.lesechos.fr/28/06/2013/lesechos.fr/0202861088843_defence---paris-maintient-la-cible-de-12-drones-du-livre-blanc.htm (accessed Dec.1, 2014)
Le Figaro, Défense : les cinq éléments marquants du livre blanc, Véronique Guillermard, 29.04.2013
http://www.lefigaro.fr/conjoncture/2013/04/29/20002-20130429ARTFIG00357-defence-les-cinq-elements-marquants-du-livre-blanc.php
Expert interviews, 2014.
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: I agree, but only based on source 3, since I have not found any other information proving that there have been/are other opportunistic and unplanned purchases.
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Purchases are also defined in the military programmation law, which in turn relies on the White Book: http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000028338825
Suggested score:
Is defence procurement generally conducted as open competition or is there a significant element of single-sourcing (that is, without competition)?
The Public Procurement Code provides for competition regulation. Tenders that are restricted to specific bidders are possible (first source), yet no example of single sourcing could be found. It seems that the most problematic area in this context is rather the selection of a few domestic companies. One expert quotes an example of what he deems to be &quoute;industrial protectionism&quoute;, justified based on national security and timelines.
While it is difficult to estimate exactly the percentage of the value of contract that are singled-sourced, a 2011 report from the Cour des Comptes (Audit Court) shows that when it comes the maintenance of naval equipment (nuclear submarines for example) 82% of the value of contracts have been awarded to a company called DCNS in 2011 (which used to be state owned until 2007). The report specifies that the company knew what the financial needs were several months in advance.
Defence procurement is conducted in principle as open competition (as defined in the Public Procurement Code), but the many exceptions to this code and the above example demonstrate that in many sensitive cases, a significant percentage of value of contracts are single-sourced or awared to a small selection of companies.
Public Procurement Code (2005)
Appel d'offres restreint - Article 238, 2006, last update, 1 oct. 2014
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCode.do;jsessionid=8752900A234DCFE7939218190F33CE22.tpdjo07v_3?idSectionTA=LEGISCTA000024563636&cidTexte=LEGITEXT000005627819&dateTexte=20140530 (accessed Dec. 1, 2014)
Laurent-Xavier Simonel , Benjamin Touzanne, &quoute;Commande record de blindés lancée par le ministère français de la défense (EBRC-VBMR) : Protectionnisme industriel ou protection des intérêts essentiels de la sécurité de l’Etat&quoute;, Kpratique, 23.01.2014
http://www.kpratique.fr/Commande-record-de-blindes-lancee-par-le-ministere-francais-de-la-defence-EBRC-VBMR-Protectionnisme-industriel-ou_a241.html (accessed Dec. 1, 2014)
Marie-Amélie Fenoll, La Cour des comptes épingle la mauvaise gestion des achats publics, 13.02.13, http://www.decision-achats.fr/thematique/marches-1036/commandes-publiques-10139/Breves/La-Cour-des-Comptes-epingle-la-mauvaise-gestion-des-achats-publics-51413.htm (accessed Oct 7, 2015)
Michel Cabirol, Jérôme Cahuzac veut surveiller plus étroitement les contrats signés avec les industriels de la défense, 12.02.2013, http://www.latribune.fr/entreprises-finance/industrie/aeronautique-defence/20130211trib000748094/jerome-cahuzac-veut-surveiller-plus-etroitement-les-contrats-signes-avec-les-industriels-de-la-defence.html (accessed Oct 7, 2015)
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: Defence procurement is conducted as open competition, and as the assessor explained, &quoute;no example of single sourcing could be found. It rather seems that the problem area in this context is the selection of a few national firms&quoute;. Therefore, since there is no information on single-sourcing and on the percentage it represents, I would suggest a score of 4.
Suggested score: 4
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Reference suggestion about negotiated procedures with suppliers in monpolistic position:
&quoute;La Cour estime que des économies importantes peuvent être obtenues en exerçant une pression plus importante sur des fournisseurs qui sont relativement peu nombreux, mais qui interviennent fréquemment en situation de monopole. Ces marchés ont également pour caractéristique d’être passés fréquemment selon des procédures négociées sans mise en concurrence et pour des durées longues.&quoute;
http://www.decision-achats.fr/thematique/marches-1036/commandes-publiques-10139/Breves/La-Cour-des-Comptes-epingle-la-mauvaise-gestion-des-achats-publics-51413.htm
http://www.latribune.fr/entreprises-finance/industrie/aeronautique-defence/20130211trib000748094/jerome-cahuzac-veut-surveiller-plus-etroitement-les-contrats-signes-avec-les-industriels-de-la-defence.html
Suggested score:
Are tender boards subject to regulations and codes of conduct and are their decisions subject to independent audit to ensure due process and fairness?
Tender boards are subject to regulations such as the Public Procurement Code which is publicly available. Nevertheless, there is no public and transparent information proving that auditing takes place.
The Balard case (building of defence headquarters) has suggested that judges are mostly responsible for investigating the behaviour of tender board decisions.This is not routinely undertaken.
RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER: The Public Procurement Code is regulation, not a code of conduct. Given there is no evidence of audit, score is maintained.
Jean-François Merchet,&quoute;Exclusif : l'affaire de corruption à Balard relancée (actualisé)&quoute;, Marianne, 01.07.2013
http://www.marianne.net/blogsecretdefence/Exclusif-l-affaire-de-corruption-a-Balard-relancee-actualise_a905.html (accessed Dec.1, 2014)
Le Canard Enchaîné, &quoute;Bouygues coule dans le béton du &quoute;Balardgone&quoute;, 18.12.13
Public Procurement Code. &quoute;Dispositions spécifiques à certains marchés de la défense (CMP 2006 2014)
Annexe au décret n° 2006-975 du 1er août 2006 portant code des marchés publics&quoute;. (last accessed on 19 February 2015).
http://www.marche-public.fr/CMP-2006/Marches-defence.htm
Public Procurement Code. &quoute;Pouvoirs adjudicateurs&quoute;. (last accessed on 19 February 2015).
http://www.marche-public.fr/Marches-publics/Definitions/Entrees/Pouvoir-adjudicateur.htm
Legifrance. &quoute;Circulaire du 14 février 2012 relative au Guide de bonnes pratiques en matière de marchés publics&quoute;. (last accessed on 19 February 2015).
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000025364925
Defence Ministry. &quoute;Procédures de passation des marchés publics et des accords cadres&quoute;. 01 December 2012. (last accessed on 19 February 2015). https://app.box.com/s/osrtdadwyg1us68ojnna
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: Tender boards are subject to codes of conduct, such as the Public Procurement Code which is publicly available. Nevertheless, there is no public and transparent information proving that auditing takes place.
Public Procurement Code. &quoute;Dispositions spécifiques à certains marchés de la défense (CMP 2006 2014)
Annexe au décret n° 2006-975 du 1er août 2006 portant code des marchés publics&quoute;. (last accessed on 19 February 2015).
http://www.marche-public.fr/CMP-2006/Marches-defence.htm
Public Procurement Code. &quoute;Pouvoirs adjudicateurs&quoute;. (last accessed on 19 February 2015).
http://www.marche-public.fr/Marches-publics/Definitions/Entrees/Pouvoir-adjudicateur.htm
Legifrance. &quoute;Circulaire du 14 février 2012 relative au Guide de bonnes pratiques en matière de marchés publics&quoute;. (last accessed on 19 February 2015).
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000025364925
Defence Ministry. &quoute;Procédures de passation des marchés publics et des accords cadres&quoute;. 01 December 2012. (last accessed on 19 February 2015).
https://www.achats.defence.gouv.fr/-Procedures-de-passation-des-
Suggested score: 2
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Does the country have legislation in place to discourage and punish collusion between bidders for defence and security contracts?
The EU Commission reports that collusion is perceived as a problem by the public - 55% of the French population criticise it in a survey. The &quoute;Trade Code&quoute; condemns collusion very severely and mandates up to four years imprisonment, but there is no specific mention of the defence sector.
The Competition Authority controls the concentration and possible collusion of defence industries which are bidding for the Ministry of Defence's procurement. There are examples, and legislation does discourage collusion. According to the OECD, however, enforcement is still weak in general (i.e. not only in defence).
RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWERS: Score changed to 3, as there appear to be no sources proving that sanctions are not applied when collusion is evident. Based on the limited information available, it seems that collusion cases are rare.
European Commission, 3.2.2014, COM(2014) ANNEX 10 FRANCE au Rapport anticorruption de l'UE
Code du Commerce, Article L. 420-6, update 15.11.2008
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCodeArticle.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000005634379&idArticle=LEGIARTI000006232003&dateTexte=&categorieLien=cid (accessed Dec.1, 2014)
Competition Authority &quoute;Autorité de la concurrence&quoute;, ex: &quoute;Décision n° 12-DCC-148 du 18 octobre 2012 relative à la prise de contrôle exclusif par la société Renault Trucks defence de la société Auverland Général Défense&quoute;
http://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/user/index.php (accessed Dec.1, 2014)
OECD- Forum on competition, LUTTE CONTRE LA CORRUPTION ET PROMOTION DE LA CONCURRENCE-France, 14 February 2014
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: No other sources could be found to prove that sanctions are often not applied when collusion is evident. Based on what little information was available, it seems that collusion cases are only occasional.
Suggested score: 3
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are procurement staff, in particular project and contract managers, specifically trained and empowered to ensure that defence contractors meet their obligations on reporting and delivery?
The Defence Ministry provides training to its staff, including on auditing, public procurement and outsourcing. The staff responsible for acquisitions is composed of 2,000 people, trained according to the Ethics Code to monitor contractors. The SCPC also helps to train staff.
There is no information on staff rotation or shortages to suggest this is an issue.
Charles Cohen, Marchés publics: en finir avec la corruption, Décision Achats N°160, 07.12.2012
http://www.decision-achats.fr/Decision-Achats/Article/Marches-publics-en-finir-avec-la-corruption-45172-1.htm (accessed Dec.1, 2014)
Defence Ministry. &quoute;Le centre de formation au management du ministère de la Défense&quoute;. 16 September 2014. (last accessed on 19 February 2015).
http://www.defence.gouv.fr/sga/le-sga-a-votre-service/formation/cfmd/le-centre-de-formation-au-management-du-ministere-de-la-defence
http://www.justice.gouv.fr/le-ministere-de-la-justice-10017/service-central-de-prevention-de-la-corruption-12312/
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: The Defence Ministry provides trainings to its staff, including on auditing, public procurement and outsourcing.
Defence Ministry. &quoute;Le centre de formation au management du ministère de la Défense&quoute;. 16 September 2014. (last accessed on 19 February 2015).
http://www.defence.gouv.fr/sga/le-sga-a-votre-service/formation/cfmd/le-centre-de-formation-au-management-du-ministere-de-la-defence
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: The SCPC also helps to train staff: http://www.justice.gouv.fr/le-ministere-de-la-justice-10017/service-central-de-prevention-de-la-corruption-12312/
Suggested score:
Are there mechanisms in place to allow companies to complain about perceived malpractice in procurement, and are companies protected from discrimination when they use these mechanisms?
Perceived malpractice in procurement can be addressed by the mediator and followed upon by the administrative tribunals. No information could be found regarding complaints about malpractice in procurement and the possible stigmatisation it might cause to suing companies. It is worth noting that the Paris City Hall filed a complaint against the construction project of the &quoute;Balardgone&quoute;.
Charles Cohen, Marchés publics: en finir avec la corruption, Décision Achats N°160, 07.12.2012
http://www.decision-achats.fr/Decision-Achats/Article/Marches-publics-en-finir-avec-la-corruption-45172-1.htm (accessed Dec.1, 2014)
Agnès Béranger, La Médiation inter-entreprises et de la sous-traitance, April 2, 2013
http://larevue.squirepattonboggs.com/La-Mediation-inter-entreprises-et-de-la-sous-traitance_a2022.html (accessed Dec.1, 2014)
Ministère des Finances, Médiation des Marchés Publics,
http://www.economie.gouv.fr/mediation-des-marches-publics/mediation-mode-alternatif-resolution-des-conflits-efficace (accessed Dec. 1, 2014)
Defence Ministry. &quoute;Voies de recours&quoute;. 25 January 2012. (last accessed on 19 February 2015).
https://www.achats.defence.gouv.fr/-Voies-de-recours-
Lagneau, Laurent. &quoute;La Mairie de Paris dépose un recours en justice contre le chantier du Pentagone français&quoute;. 03 March 2012. (last accessed on 19 February 2015).
http://www.opex360.com/2012/04/03/la-mairie-de-paris-depose-un-recours-en-justice-contre-le-chantier-du-pentagone-francais/
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: No information could be found regarding complaints about malpractice in procurement and the possible stigmatization it might cause to suing companies. However, for your information, the Paris City Hall filed a complaint against the construction project of the &quoute;Balardgone&quoute;.
Defence Ministry. &quoute;Voies de recours&quoute;. 25 January 2012. (last accessed on 19 February 2015).
https://www.achats.defence.gouv.fr/-Voies-de-recours-
Lagneau, Laurent. &quoute;La Mairie de Paris dépose un recours en justice contre le chantier du Pentagone français&quoute;. 03 March 2012. (last accessed on 19 February 2015).
http://www.opex360.com/2012/04/03/la-mairie-de-paris-depose-un-recours-en-justice-contre-le-chantier-du-pentagone-francais/
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
What sanctions are used to punish the corrupt activities of a supplier?
Debarment does not take place in practice. The 'Safran affair' suggests that the sanction regime is weak, and there is limited evidence that sanctions are effectively applied otherwise.
Les Echos, &quoute;Safran. Pas de peine requise pour corruption présumée au Nigéria&quoute;,18.09.14, http://bourse.lesechos.fr/infos-conseils-boursiers/infos-conseils-valeurs/infos/safran-pas-de-peine-requise-pour-corruption-presumee-au-nigeria-1000248.php (accessed Dec.2, 2014)
Euractiv.fr, &quoute;L'OCDE reproche à la France de lutter modérément contre la corruption transnationale&quoute;, 24.10.14, http://www.euractiv.fr/sections/euro-finances/locde-reproche-la-france-de-lutter-moderement-contre-la-corruption (accessed Dec.2, 2014)
Quentin. &quoute;Pots-de-vin et corruption de l’acheteur : un secret de Polichinelle&quoute;. 28 December 2013. (last accessed on 19 February 2015).
https://quentindutoit.wordpress.com/2013/12/28/pots-de-vin-et-corruption-de-lacheteur-un-secret-de-polichinelle/
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: I agree with the score, but only because no information is available to prove that sanctions are effectively applied.
Quentin. &quoute;Pots-de-vin et corruption de l’acheteur : un secret de Polichinelle&quoute;. 28 December 2013. (last accessed on 19 February 2015).
https://quentindutoit.wordpress.com/2013/12/28/pots-de-vin-et-corruption-de-lacheteur-un-secret-de-polichinelle/
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
When negotiating offset contracts, does the government specifically address corruption risk by imposing due diligence requirements on contractors? Does the government follow up on offset contract performance and perform audits to check performance and integrity?
France does not appear to have an official offset policy which makes it difficult to evaluate how often or in which manner it engages in offset contracts. While it is bound by EU Competition Law under the EU Directive on Defence Procurement 2009/81/EC, exemption under Article 346 allows for offsets under restrictive interpretation.
The score has been selected on the basis of the lack of information available on the subject.
RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWERS: Score changed to 0, as there offset arrangements are possible but there is no available information on due diligence requirements.
European Commission, EU Directive on Defence Procurement 2009/81/EC, http://ec.europa.eu/growth/single-market/public-procurement/rules-implementation/defence/index_en.htm
Article 346 - European Commission, 2010, ec.europa.eu/internal_market/publicprocurement/docs/defence/more_on_defence_procurement_en.pdf
UK Government, “Defence and security export market briefing: France”, March 25 2015, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/defence-and-security-export-market-briefing-france/defence-and-security-export-market-briefing-france
Martin Trybus, “Buying Defence and Security in Europe” (2014), p. 427
European Union. &quoute;Coucil Common Position 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008 defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment&quoute;. (last accessed on 19 February 2015).
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32008E0944&from=EN
European Union. &quoute;User's Guide to Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP defining common
rules governing the control of exports of military technology and equipment. 29 April 2009&quoute;. (last accessed on 19 February 2015).
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%209241%202009%20INIT
Expert interviews, 2014.
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: The European Union forbids offsets among EU Member States and aims to reduce the number of offsets within the Union. Until recently, EU Member States were free to negotiate offsets with third countries. However, in the Common Position 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008, the EU Council establishes common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment towards third countries, but it has not been transformed into a decision yet. Besides, there is no information available that the French government does respect these rules. Furthermore, offsets seem to be a common practice by EU Member States when dealing with third countries.
AEGE. &quoute;Comment la France peut-elle rester compétitive sur le marché mondial dans le domaine des offsets? L'Europe et la position de Bruxelles&quoute;. June 2011. (last accessed on 19 February 2015.
http://bdc.aege.fr/public/Comment_la_France_peut_elle_rester_competitive_sur_le_marche_mondial_dans_le_domaine_des_offsets.pdf
European Union. &quoute;Coucil Common Position 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008 defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment&quoute;. (last accessed on 19 February 2015).
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32008E0944&from=EN
European Union. &quoute;User's Guide to Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP defining common
rules governing the control of exports of military technology and equipment. 29 April 2009&quoute;. (last accessed on 19 February 2015).
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%209241%202009%20INIT
Suggested score: 1
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: According to this study, offsets are not forbidden between EU states and third parties (there is no extra-territorial effect of EU legislation). The study (dated 06/2011) also discusses the offset practices of France - defence companies seem to be quite implicated.
http://bdc.aege.fr/public/Comment_la_France_peut_elle_rester_competitive_sur_le_marche_mondial_dans_le_domaine_des_offsets.pdf.
Another source suggestion (detailing seller and buyer issues and the role of an offset coordination commission created in 2003): http://questions.assemblee-nationale.fr/q13/13-91542QE.htm.
Suggested score:
Does the government make public the details of offset programmes, contracts, and performance?
France does not appear to have an official offset policy which makes it difficult to evaluate how often or in which manner it engages in offset contracts. While it is bound by EU Competition Law under the EU Directive on Defence Procurement 2009/81/EC, exemption under Article 346 allows for offsets under restrictive interpretation.
There have been statements by government officials in the past that the Government was planning to abolish offsets; however these are dated and given there is no clear policy on the subject (as verified by sources 3 and 4); it is unclear to what extent this was achieved.
The score has been selected on the basis of the lack of information available on the subject.
RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWERS: Score changed to 0, as offset arrangements with third parties are possible but there is no available information on due diligence requirements. Further, the question is to be assessed and scored on the basis of offset import policy only, not the export policies of French companies.
European Commission, EU Directive on Defence Procurement 2009/81/EC, http://ec.europa.eu/growth/single-market/public-procurement/rules-implementation/defence/index_en.htm
Article 346 - European Commission, 2010, ec.europa.eu/internal_market/publicprocurement/docs/defence/more_on_defence_procurement_en.pdf
UK Government, “Defence and security export market briefing: France”, March 25 2015, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/defence-and-security-export-market-briefing-france/defence-and-security-export-market-briefing-france
Martin Trybus, “Buying Defence and Security in Europe” (2014), p. 427
Délégation à l’information et à la communication de la Défense, Rapport au Parlement sur les Exportations d'Armement en 2010, 2011, p.10-11
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: AEGE. &quoute;Comment la France peut-elle rester compétitive sur le marché mondial dans le domaine des offsets? L'Europe et la position de Bruxelles&quoute;. June 2011. (last accessed on 19 February 2015).
http://bdc.aege.fr/public/Comment_la_France_peut_elle_rester_competitive_sur_le_marche_mondial_dans_le_domaine_des_offsets.pdf
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: According to this study, offsets are not forbidden between EU states and third parties (there is no extra-territorial effect of EU legislation). The study (dated 06/2011) also discusses the offset practices of France - defence companies seem to be quite implicated.
http://bdc.aege.fr/public/Comment_la_France_peut_elle_rester_competitive_sur_le_marche_mondial_dans_le_domaine_des_offsets.pdf.
Another source suggestion (detailing seller and buyer issues and the role of an offset coordination commission created in 2003): http://questions.assemblee-nationale.fr/q13/13-91542QE.htm.
Suggested score:
Are offset contracts subject to the same level of competition regulation as the main contract?
Concretely, offsets contracts are included in the main contract, so they are supposedly all subject to the same level of competition regulation as the main contract. The score has been selected on the basis that the lack of information makes it difficult to verify this.
There have been statements by government officials in the past that the Government was planning to abolish offsets; however these are dated and given there is no clear policy on the subject (as verified by sources 3 and 4); it is unclear to what extent this was achieved.
European Commission, EU Directive on Defence Procurement 2009/81/EC, http://ec.europa.eu/growth/single-market/public-procurement/rules-implementation/defence/index_en.htm
Article 346 - European Commission, 2010, ec.europa.eu/internal_market/publicprocurement/docs/defence/more_on_defence_procurement_en.pdf
UK Government, “Defence and security export market briefing: France”, March 25 2015, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/defence-and-security-export-market-briefing-france/defence-and-security-export-market-briefing-france
Martin Trybus, “Buying Defence and Security in Europe” (2014), p. 427
Délégation à l’information et à la communication de la Défense, Rapport au Parlement sur les Exportations d'Armement en 2010, 2011, p.10-11
Le Figaro/AFP,Pour le fils Kadhafi, le contrat d'armement ''n'est pas une contrepartie', 14.10.2007
http://www.lefigaro.fr/international/2007/08/04/01003-20070804ARTWWW90135-pour_le_fils_kadhafi_le_contrat_darmement_n_est_pas_une_contrepartie.php (accessed Dec.2, 2014)
Defence Ministry. Centre d'Etudes Stratégiques de la Marine (CESM). &quoute;Enjeux et avenirs des &quoute;offsets&quoute; en Europe. Les procédures de compensation adossées aux contrats d’armement vues à travers des exemples fournis par une entreprise du secteur, ELAC Nautik&quoute;. (last accessed on 20 February 2015).
http://www.cesm.air.defence.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/03_article_bray.pdf
European Defence Agency. &quoute;Code of Conduct on Offsets&quoute;. (last accessed on 20 February 2015).
http://www.eda.europa.eu/docs/documents/brochure_offsets.pdf
Fromion, Yves. &quoute;Les moyens de développer et de structurer une industrie européenne de défense&quoute;. La Documentation Française. 30 June 2008. P. 25. (last accessed on 20 February 2015).
http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/var/storage/rapports-publics/084000456/0000.pdf
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: Concretely, offsets contracts are included in the main contract, so they are supposedly all subject to the same level of competition regulation as the main contract (source 1).
France is not asking for offset contracts when dealing with EU partners. According to the French Member of Parliament Yves Fromion, &quoute;France is very active to abolish offsets and work with other EU Member States to harmonise regulations on offsets and decrease the number of offset contracts&quoute; (source 3), through initiatives such as the establishment of a Code of Conduct on Offsets (source 2).
Nevertheless, offset contracts are standard when negotiated with third countries. (source 1, p. 6).
Defence Ministry. Centre d'Etudes Stratégiques de la Marine (CESM). &quoute;Enjeux et avenirs des &quoute;offsets&quoute; en Europe. Les procédures de compensation adossées aux contrats d’armement vues à travers des exemples fournis par une entreprise du secteur, ELAC Nautik&quoute;. (last accessed on 20 February 2015).
http://www.cesm.air.defence.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/03_article_bray.pdf
European Defence Agency. &quoute;Code of Conduct on Offsets&quoute;. (last accessed on 20 February 2015).
http://www.eda.europa.eu/docs/documents/brochure_offsets.pdf
Fromion, Yves. &quoute;Les moyens de développer et de structurer une industrie européenne de défense&quoute;. La Documentation Française. 30 June 2008. P. 25. (last accessed on 20 February 2015).
http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/var/storage/rapports-publics/084000456/0000.pdf
Suggested score: 4
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: According to this study, offsets are not forbidden between EU states and third parties (there is no extra-territorial effect of EU legislation). The study (dated 06/2011) also discusses the offset practices of France - defence companies seem to be quite implicated.
http://bdc.aege.fr/public/Comment_la_France_peut_elle_rester_competitive_sur_le_marche_mondial_dans_le_domaine_des_offsets.pdf.
Another source suggestion (detailing seller and buyer issues and the role of an offset coordination commission created in 2003): http://questions.assemblee-nationale.fr/q13/13-91542QE.htm.
Suggested score:
How strongly does the government control the company's use of agents and intermediaries in the procurement cycle?
Intermediaries are widely used for major armament sales and in many cases. Agents are legally allowed to serve as intermediaries during the procurement cycle. For example a semi public-private company, Odas, headed by a former defence official, is a specialised intermediary for Saudi Arabia that will be in charge of arms transfers to Lebanon.
The Ministry of Defence issues an authorisation (&quoute;every activity of intermediation has to be authorised&quoute;).
Yet both further internal control and external controls on the activities and remuneration of these agents are weak. It does not seem that there is a follow-up or due diligence of their activity once authorisation is given, and the detailed contracts are not known by parliament.
Hedy Belhassine, Paris et Riyad, Kiev et Moscou: aux armes et caetera...,22/4/2014
http://www.espritcorsaire.com/?ID=317/Hedy_Belhassine/Paris_et_Riyad,_Kiev_et_Moscou:_aux_armes_et_caetera... (accessed Dec.2, 2014)
Alain Ruello, Lesechos, Armement : Beyrouth a bouclé sa liste d’achats de matériels avec Paris,10.03.14
http://www.lesechos.fr/entreprises-secteurs/air-defence/actu/0203361246638-armement-beyrouth-a-boucle-sa-liste-d-achats-de-materiels-avec-paris-655651.php (accessed Dec.2, 2014)
Ministère de la Défense, Direction des Affaires Stratégiques,21.01.2013 http://www.defence.gouv.fr/das/maitrise-des-armements/node_73891/le-controle-des-exportations (accessed Dec.2, 2014)
Grégoire Fleurot, Marchand d'armes, un job (souvent) légal, Slate, 26.09.2011, http://www.slate.fr/story/44109/vente-armes-karachi-commissions (accessed Dec.2, 2014)
Muracciole, Benoît. &quoute;France : Est venu le temps d’un contrôle des intermédiaires et de la transparence dans les ventes d’armes !&quoute;. Armer Désarmer. 25 June 2014. (last accessed on 20 February 2015).
https://armerdesarmer.wordpress.com/2014/06/25/france-il-est-temps-du-controle-des-intermediaires-et-de-la-transparence-dans-les-ventes-darmes/
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Muracciole, Benoît. &quoute;France : Est venu le temps d’un contrôle des intermédiaires et de la transparence dans les ventes d’armes !&quoute;. Armer Désarmer. 25 June 2014. (last accessed on 20 February 2015).
https://armerdesarmer.wordpress.com/2014/06/25/france-il-est-temps-du-controle-des-intermediaires-et-de-la-transparence-dans-les-ventes-darmes/
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Are the principal aspects of the financing package surrounding major arms deals, (such as payment timelines, interest rates, commercial loans or export credit agreements) made publicly available prior to the signing of contracts?
It is very difficult to find any information on the financial package prior to the signing of contracts for major arms deals. Some details are made public only after a contract has been signed.
As example show, some estimates of the break-down of a contract are given to the press in press conferences by the DGA (Direction Generale de l'Armement), but financial details are not present.
Search tools for the public on the Ministry of Defence's website include only non-sensitive items, and they include no financial details such as interest rates.
Ministry of Defence, CP MINDEF - Annonce de la commande de 12 MRTT, 20.11.14 http://www.defence.gouv.fr/salle-de-presse/communiques/ministre/cp-mindef-annonce-de-la-commande-de-12-mrtt (accessed Dec.1, 2014)
Search Tools for defence markets' financial packages (dates unknown):
https://www.marches-publics.gouv.fr/?page=entreprise.EntrepriseRechercherListeMarches (accessed Dec.1, 2014)
Annuaire des entités d'achats du MINDEF - Ixarm, http://www.ixarm.com/-Annuaire-des-entites-d-achats-du- (accessed Dec.1, 2014)
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: I agree with the score on the basis that these details are really made publicly available prior to and not after the signing of contracts (this is not clear to me, especially given the lack of information relevant to this issue).
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
Does the government formally require that the main contractor ensures subsidiaries and sub-contractors adopt anti-corruption programmes, and is there evidence that this is enforced?
Contractors are required to be transparent, and to provide full information about the subcontractors that they hire. Some conditions that are stipulated with regards to sub-contractors are somewhat related to an anti-corruption agenda, for example with regards to their payment, but corruption is not mentioned in this context. Nor it is in the &quoute;manual&quoute; on how to gain access to public markets. An ethic code only exists for buyers at the Ministry of Defence and is not public.
RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 1: Score maintained at 1. The article by Charles Cohen points out a reference to corruption.
Code des marchés publics: Part III Defence sector,
Article 231 &quoute;Le groupement d'opérateurs économiques&quoute;
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCode.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000005627819 (accessed Dec.1, 2014)
Sous-section 1 : Dispositions applicables aux sous-contrats présentant le caractère de sous-traités (article 276 to article 280)
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCode.do;jsessionid=08545102FD23CFADD9F8E338676515B6.tpdjo07v_1?idSectionTA=LEGISCTA000024563924&cidTexte=LEGITEXT000005627819&dateTexte=20140530 (accessed Dec.1, 2014)
SGA, mission achats - comment accéder aux marchés publics de la défense
https://www.achats.defence.gouv.fr/Didacticiel-Comment-acceder-aux (accessed Dec. 1, 2014)
Marchés publics: en finir avec la corruption, Décision Achats N°160, Charles Cohen, Testimony by Ministry of Defence official François Hiaux, «Un code de déontologie pour lutter contre la corruption», 07.12.2012
http://www.decision-achats.fr/Decision-Achats/Article/Marches-publics-en-finir-avec-la-corruption-45172-1.htm (accessed Dec. 1, 2014)
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: There is a lack of information to prove that the government formally requires the main contractor to ensure that its subsidiaries and sub-contractors adopt programmes dedicated to fight corruption strictly (and not transparency programmes) and that these programmes are in force. Hence the score of 0.
Suggested score: 0
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Reference suggestion: http://www.achats.defence.gouv.fr/Charte-deontologique.
Suggested score:
How common is it for defence acquisition decisions to be based on political influence by selling nations?
France is an influential seller, but it seems that as a buyer the government takes its decisions after having closely evaluated its military needs. For example drones are currently being bought and seller's influence does not seem to have played an important role in the purchase decision. U.S. drones were immediately available and less expensive than their potential Dassault European alternative, as Le Monde explains.
Interviews mentioned that given the context of budget cuts, it was unlikely that political influence by selling nations could play an important role.
Score 3 was chosen because specific arms procurement are decided in the Elysée (last source) and it is hard to assess whether the influence of a seller takes place.
Michel Cabirol, La Tribune, Rafale : Dassault vise un contrat signé en Inde cet été, 06.02.2013
http://www.latribune.fr/entreprises-finance/industrie/aeronautique-defence/20130205trib000747034/rafale-dassault-vise-un-contrat-signe-en-inde-cet-ete.html (accessed Dec.1, 2014)
Liberation, La France reçoit ses deux drones américains, 19.12.2013 http://www.liberation.fr/monde/2013/12/19/la-france-recoit-ses-deux-drones-reaper-americains_967761 (accessed Dec.1, 2014)
Le Monde, Paris achète des drones américains pour rattraper son retard, Nathalie Guibert, 18.05.2013.
http://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2013/05/18/paris-achete-des-drones-americains-pour-rattraper-son-retard_3316410_3210.html (accessed Dec.1, 2014)
Guillaume Steuer, Drones Male : un choix élyséen, Air & Cosmos, 07.09.2012
http://www.air-cosmos.com/2012/09/07/19259-drones-male-un-choix-elyseen (accessed Dec.1,2014)
Survie. &quoute;Que fait la France en Angola(gate) ?&quoute;. 19 November 2008. (last accessed on 20 February 2015).
http://survie.org/publications/4-pages/article/que-fait-la-france-en-angola-gate
AFP. &quoute;Livraison des Mistral : la Russie appelle la France à « remplir ses obligations »&quoute;. Le Monde. 05 December 2014. (last accessed on 20 February 2015).
http://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2014/12/05/mistral-la-russie-appelle-la-france-a-remplir-ses-obligations_4535491_3214.html
Expert interviews, 2014.
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Survie. &quoute;Que fait la France en Angola(gate) ?&quoute;. 19 November 2008. (last accessed on 20 February 2015).
http://survie.org/publications/4-pages/article/que-fait-la-france-en-angola-gate
AFP. &quoute;Livraison des Mistral : la Russie appelle la France à « remplir ses obligations »&quoute;. Le Monde. 05 December 2014. (last accessed on 20 February 2015).
http://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2014/12/05/mistral-la-russie-appelle-la-france-a-remplir-ses-obligations_4535491_3214.html
Suggested score:
Opinion: Agree
Comment:
Suggested score:
The French Parliament has formal rights to control and question the government (art-34 and art-35). It can go as far as &quoute;censoring&quoute; the government when making use of Art 49 - &quoute;motion de censure&quoute;. According to article 45 of the National Assembly regulations, each legislative commission can audit a government member. There is evidence on the website of the National Assembly of frequent debate and scrutiny on issues of defence policy.
There is however, some degree of power imbalance between the executive (art-20: the government is in charge of lawmaking) and the legislative, which is particularly strong in the field of defence and security. In the field of defence and security, the executive makes extensive use of &quoute;décrets&quoute; (for example 35 legislative acts were authored by the executive to implement the 2005 law on the status of military personnel).
Two interviewees confirmed that art-49 (&quoute;motion de censure&quoute;) would not be used in practice because its use would be considered &quoute;disproportionate&quoute;. The power imbalance is reinforced by the fact that, although foreign affairs are a shared competency between the chief of Government and the President, the President has a stronger customary position, being the chief of armies (art-15). The Presidence, has with the Syracuse system, a satellite system to communicate with the military.
Marc Houben, in his 2005 book comparing Parliament’s controls of defence policy in Europe showed that there were gaps in both ex ante and ex post control by the Parliament in France in the security and defence fields. Although a 2008 reform increased the power of the Parliament on international interventions (duty for the executive to notify the Parliament after four months) some gaps still remain. In particular, enquiry commissions (&quoute;commissions d'enquête parlementaire&quoute;) have so far never investigated security and defence issues.
The Karachi scandal (retro-commissions on armament contract with Pakistan and possibly Saudi Arabia) could not be investigated by an enquiry commission, but only by an &quoute;information mission&quoute;, allegedly to protect the separation of powers between the legislative and the judiciary and to protect the ongoing judicial investigation. Additionally, there is, according to Transparency International France, a quite tautologic definition of “military secrecy” (secret défense) which has been strengthened in the military programmation law of 2009-2014. Yet, the Constitutional Council ensured that in this law, there was still a balance between the need for safeguarding &quoute;fondamental interests of the nation&quoute; and the rights of citizens to have access to information.