Argentina

The sale of assets of the defence sector is subject to the same transparency norms of the entire system involved in managing the State resources. However, it it easier to get information about defence purchases than to access data on the sale of goods, although the contracts should be available in the government’s contracts’ platform.

Disposal of assets is not common and there is no available information about it.

As previously mentioned, internal and external mechanisms of scrutiny exist both within the defence sector and at the government level. The sale of assets is subject to these mechanisms. As described, the role of the Congress in the provision of greater transparency is unsatisfactory. Yet it is worth mentioning that, in the framework of important movements of capital in the defence sector, the sale of assets is not that common.

See previous points for further details on the Congress’s deficiencies on its comptroller role.

The disposal of assets is not common and there is no available information about it, although they are subject to the same control process and accountability established by the national system of comptroller and oversight of the State’s resources and expenses.

The percentage of spending on secret items within the defence budget is very low. In 2014, it only represents 0.06% of the total sector’s budget; that is to say, approximately, 2 million and 700 thousand dollars, within a total budget of, approximately, 4.400 million of dollars. The section of classified expenses is clearly identified in the national budget.

The main function of the Bicameral Committee for the Permanent Supervision of the Intelligence Bodies and Activities is to receive and request the management of the reserved expenses of the State institutions.

However, as indicated, this Committee does not fully comply with its function, even though it is led by legislators belonging to the opposition to the current government.

There is no reason that explains why the Bicameral Committee is so inactive in complying with its function.

The parliamentary committees can request audit reports to the sector’s bodies of internal control and to the State’s body SIGEN. In the past year, no specific audit reports of the sector of external control bodies, AGN, were found. Regarding the reserved expenses, the Bicameral Committee is not fully complying with its function: be it collecting information or generating relative debates.

All military expenditures are included in the national budget. There are no off-budget military expenditures authorised within the sector. As with any other sector, the initial budget approved by the Congress may undergo general modifications in some of its specific sections, due to unplanned spending.

However, these modifications are done over the national budget, according to the existing regulatory measures for such process, and not through the “back-door”.

No, there are not any off-budget military expenditures. If any, they would be due to cases of corruption that should have been judged accordingly. There is no evidence in order to give more details.

In Argentina, there is a legal framework that provides classified information and access to information mechanisms for civil society. The sanction of the Intelligence Law in 2001 should have been followed by the sanction of a law of access to information; although the latter was not made effective until a decree in 2003. As described earlier, the action of the Parliamentary Committee regarding the scrutiny of secret budgets of the State is very poor however. This in turn indicates limited practical control over the appropriate classification of information.

The Armed Forces do not own or manage commercial businesses. However, they carry out certain commercial and financial activities that produce profits, like the rental of land and buildings, or the credits given by the Institute for the Financial Support to the Payment of Military Retirements and Pensions (IAFPRPP). Not all of them aim at generating profits i.e. not all of the activities are planned in order to obtain a profit, but when they occur they are identified in the budget as &quoute;own resources&quoute;.

Not all the incomes from these resources are detailed in a de-segregated way. Details on the revenues from the credits of IAFPRPP are presented.

The rental of land and buildings is subject to oversight of the Ministry of Defence. There aren’t specific audits about it available.

The Armed Forces do not own or manage commercial businesses.

Private enterprise by military employees without the proper authorization is prohibited (Disciplinary Code of the Armed Forces, Annex IV of the Military Justice Law Nº 26.394., art. 9 inc. 7). The Public Ethics Law is applicable to all public servants, which also exercises some control in this area.

There is no evidence of unauthorised private enterprises by military or other defence ministry employees. Retired military personnel frequently take part in enterprises related to private security, but this does not appear to have occurred during active service. The sanctions for unauthorised private enterprise are not clear nor is there clear evidence of enforcement.

Research found many politicians publicly declare their opposition to corruption, and refer to the fight or specific measures being taken against corruption, in their speeches and on mass media.

There appears to be an even stronger voice against this in the Armed Forces, and a perception that they must hold a higher standard than the rest of the civil society. Commentators have noted the military are a highly traditionalist institution that have formed a strong set of moral and ethical institutional values through a sense of 'military honour'. Research did not find clear evidence that the Defence Minister, senior ministry staff and senior armed forces officers have expressed commitment to specific anti-corruption and integrity measures however.

There is a comprehensive framework against bribery and other corrupt practices that imposes sanctions within the penal and military systems provided through the Public Ethics Law (Law 25.188) and the Argentine Penal Code.

There is some evidence on cases of bribery and corruption within the defence sector that are public knowledge. The units of internal audit carry out their functions, and revealed that recent processes of purchases of food and uniforms for the Armed Forces have been intervened lately and are now under investigation.

There is no evidence on the cases mentioned by the interviewee. See for example the regulation on the functioning of the internal audit unit of the Ministry of Defence in the Decree 1451/2008, National Public Administration.

Whistleblower protection in Argentina is limited, without any specific legislation to facilitate it or protect whistleblowers. There is &quoute;piecemeal protection&quoute; through other legislation. According to a 2014 study, &quoute; Law 25.764 (Defendants and Witnesses Protection National Program Law of 2003) protects witnesses who disclose criminal activity that relates to either terrorism, kidnapping or drug trafficking (institutional violence), organised crime, human trafficking and crimes against humanity committed between 1976-1983. However, there are several governmental bodies to which whistleblowers can make disclosures (notably with no real protection), but those complaints can be made ‘anonymously’&quoute;. Further &quoute;Anonymity, whist proffered, is difficult to achieve as it is only relevant for the pre-trial stage. The constitutional principle of the ‘right to defence’ means that anonymity cannot be maintained for the trial of corruption charges&quoute;.

The website of the Ministry of Defence has information on how to report corrupt activities. Accusations can be made by telephone or email, thus avoiding the physical presence of the informant and the fear of reprisal it may entail. The process is conceived with the aim of fighting corruption as well as protecting the whistleblower.

Furthermore, the General Direction of the Defence Logistics Service has a telephone to report on fraud, bad administration and illegal levies. However, the specific characteristics of the military institution, a vertical structure and of “due obedience”, still generate fear when reporting a superior for corrupt activities.

At the level of administrative posts in defence procurement, contracting, financial management and commercial management, within the forces or the Ministry of Defence, even though there is a justification and an order of merit/capability to be destined to a certain post, no further attention is paid. On one side, there is no tradition within the Armed Forces of encouraging the professional development of the military in a specific area throughout an individual’s career. Individuals are assigned to different posts with no consideration given to one’s previous post or one’s specific capability (although one must comply with the candidate description of the post).

On the other side, there is no permanency in the post; the military must rotate, as any uniformed personnel, from one function to another, on average every 2 years.

At the level of civilian personnel, different situations can be identified. Some stay in their post over different administrations despite changes in government, which happens infrequently. This reinforces the capacity and the knowledge for compliance with the job. In other cases, and more frequently, with the replacement of government officials (even within the same government, when there is a change of Head, all personnel and government officials of the lower level or employees are removed.

In all cases, the task carried out by the audit units, which monitor correct performance, is very important.

Information about civilian personnel recruited by the Ministry of Defence is available on the Ministry’s website, however this does not appear to have been updated recently. According to the current legislation on access to public information the number of military personnel is available upon request from the appropriate authority or through a formal request to the Direction of Institutional Transparency. The information about the number of military personnel that the RESDAL'S Comparative Atlas has consistently presented over the years is based on data provided by the Ministry of Defence.

RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER: Agree. Score changed from 4 to 3.

The information about the pay rates and allowances of civilian personnel of the defence sector and members of the Armed Forces is not available on websites in all cases. However, this might be due to the almost constant changes of the salaries due to the inflation that the country is undergoing and the increasing precarious position of staff within public institutions, where most of the salary is composed of ad hoc compensations. According to the current legislation about access to public information, some salaries might be estimated by using the information provided by the budget laws (even though, because of the above-mentioned causes, this information is not up-to-date), or it can be requested from the Direction of Institutional Transparency of the Ministry or from each of the forces.

The salaries of the personnel aren’t available on websites, at the moment. The Ministry of Defence is obliged by law to provide information related, even though I don’t have evidences of the requests received and the answers given.

In general terms, there are no claims from military or civilian personnel in the defence sector regarding the correct salaries being paid on time. It seems that in general the state administration is effective. There is also no evidence of trade unions making demands about this topic.

At the top management level of the Armed Forces, it can be said that the appointment system is independent since staff are appointed by the Executive Power with the approval of Congress. However, this makes the appointment of senior posts extremely political. In many cases, there is some inquiry about the appointment of certain military senior officers, as nowadays regarding the appointment of the current Head of the Army.

In other important posts at the middle management level, the process of appointment is internal, within each force. As mentioned, although appointments must be justified on the basis of the competency and achievements of the candidate, there is no tradition within the Armed Forces of encouraging the professional development of the military in a specific area throughout an individual’s career. Individuals are assigned to different posts with no consideration given to one’s previous post or one’s specific capability (although one must comply with the candidate description of the post). On the other hand, there is no permanency in the post; the military must rotate, as any uniformed personnel, from one function to another, on average every 2 years.

Similar situations to those referred for the designation of certain posts occur regarding the promotions of military personal.

There is an established meritocratic and objective process, as well as appraisal boards. However, not all decisions pass through them.

Regarding the gender issue, for example, it happens very often that in the cases of promotions or posts for female officials merit is not fully taken into account. This is despite the fact that there is a strong ongoing gender policy in the Ministry of Defence to prevent such situations, among others. This indicates that processes are not always followed.

There is no compulsory conscription in Argentina.

There is no conscription in Argentina.

There is no evidence of this. The interviewed people didn’t made reference to it and no news appeared about it on the mass media. Moreover, the modern, efficient and banked payment systems prevent this to happen.

The payment system of the armed forces, as well as that of public employees, is banked. This makes more difficult the payment to non-existent employees; given that the personnel must assist to the bank with its Identity Card in order to receive its payment. The payment systems have the same internal and external oversight than any State body.

It is likely that chains of command are strictly separated from chains of payment throughout the ministry and armed forces. Research found that specific offices in the Ministry of Defence and the Armed Forces manage administrative and financial issues, including the disbursement of funds. There does not appear to be a published policy stating that chains of command should be separate from chains of payment however.

As mentioned previously, there is a Code of Conduct on military discipline with specific regulations for the personnel of each force. The Code includes issues such as corruption and bribery. As such it is not comprehensive enough to award a higher score.

Those irregular actions, perpetrated by members of the Armed Forces, that the Code of Conduct does not cover are tried by ordinary courts. The Codes of Conduct regulate these issues. However, as indicated, in case of any illegal action perpetrated by members of the armed forces, these acts are prosecuted by the ordinary justice. There is no statistical or analysis information available on the number of military members that have been prosecuted by the ordinary justice and/or their causes.

The results of the prosecutions are not publicly available online, but according to the current legislation on access to information, unless their dissemination interferes with the due process of law, they can be requested. There are institutional monitoring mechanisms for the corresponding disciplinary sanctions, such as the Direction of Institutional Transparency and the general audits of each force. There is no evidence that breaches of the Code of Conduct are effectively addressed.

There is no regular and formal anti-corruption training for military and civilian personnel of the defence sector. Research and events are organised with the aim to improve the transparency and effectiveness of how resources are used, but these are sporadic and do not include all the personnel. However, as previously mentioned, the military still keep its spirit deeply rooted in moral and ethical values transmitted through military education and training.

The mentioned events aren’t meant to be a training itself, but they tend to make public and disseminate new processes and systems for the effective and efficient use of resources. They are sporadic and situational, depending on the changes that have taken place. The personnel (civil and military) that participates in them, it is generally the one related to the work teams of those new designs, and public in general.

There is not a policy to make public outcomes of the prosecution of defence services personnel for corrupt activities. Some of them become public knowledge due to their relevance, and their progress is subject to media coverage, but public institutions themselves do not provide information in this regard (they are also not requested to do so by any policy aimed at reinforcing the fight against corruption). However, these outcomes can be requested as long as their dissemination does not interfere with the due process of law.

Facilitation payments are illegal in the country and currently there is legislation that criminally punishes those violating the law. Moreover, the institutions in charge of internal oversight monitor the occurrence of this type of offence. Organisms of internal control monitor this type of acts, verifying that they comply with the corresponding procedure for the tenders, contracting of the sector, etc.

One of the established aims established in the defence guidelines continues to be the updating and development of a joint and combined military doctrine. Within this debate, there is not a specific section addressing corruption, although, as mentioned, commentators have indicated that the military institutions have upheld a deeply rooted traditionalism in which strong ethical and moral values guide military action.

There is no specific doctrine. The guidelines referenced can be seen in the Decree 1691/2006, “Directiva de Organización y Funcionamiento de las Fuerzas Armadas”. See the listed publication in order to deepen on the characteristics of the military training.

There is no specific training in corruption issues for commanders.

However, as mentioned, observers have noted that the military institutions still demonstrate a military spirit that is deeply rooted in ethical and moral values, transmitted through military training and education. Military training and education itself appears to be similarly premised on moral and ethical values that are opposite to corruption.

There is no knowledge of personnel specifically deployed to monitor corruption risks in the field. Some military commanders pay general attention to the behaviour of the troops in this sense. But there isn’t a specific deployment or regular visits of personnel to respond to these issues.

RESDAL has carried out 2 fieldworks in Haiti (2011 and 2012), where the Argentinian troops are deployed, supporting the UN Peacekeeping Mission developed there (MINUSTAH). The listed source is relevant as it shows the results of that fieldtrip, where it could be observed that there isn’t personnel deployed that specifically responds to corruption risks and challenges.

Argentina has a clear legal framework aimed at ensuring transparency in public procurement. Several institutions exist in order to prevent the risk of corruption in defence tendering and contracting: the units of internal audit, the Direction of Institutional Transparency and the Defence Logistics Service. However, when it comes to addressing corruption risks, there were no specific guidelines or staff training found. However, given there are institutions in place to address such risks, there is likely to be something in place.

Those being sent to peacekeeping missions attend courses designed to prepare them for the challenges they may encounter once in the field. Nevertheless, these courses have nothing specific about corruption.

RESDAL has carried out 2 fieldworks in Haiti (2011 and 2012), where the Argentinian troops are deployed, supporting the UN Peacekeeping Mission developed there (MINUSTAH). The listed source is relevant as it shows the results of that fieldtrip, where it could be observed that there are no specific guidelines on corruption for the deployed personnel.

There is no evidence that Private Military Contractors are used or trained in the country. There is, however, no evidence of effective regulations banning the use of PMCs. Argentina also has a strong private security market that is &quoute;defined by informal, collaborative structures between state security actors and their private security peers&quoute; (Mani, 2015).

For the last several years, the country entered in the international logic seeking for more transparency, including the defence sector and the purchases of the sector.

On the other hand, and array of resolutions have been created in order to reformulate the procurement and contracting of the sector to increase the transparency an efficiency levels in the use of public resources. Currently, the General Direction of the Logistic Service of the Defence is the organism responsible for centralizing the purchases of the sector according to the needs of each force.

Most of the defence tender and purchase cycle process, which is centralized by the General Direction of the Defence Logistics Service, is available online at the website of “Argentina compra” (National Contracting Office). The information isn’t available for all the tenders, the available and updated information varies in each case.

The Defence Logistics Service is the office that centralizes all the issues related to the procurement and purchasing for the armed forces.

As mentioned, there are internal oversight mechanisms, within the sector (in each force and in the Ministry of Defence), at government level (SIGEN), and external (AGN). The units of internal audit carry out the monitoring of the purchases of the sector, monitoring that the legal procedure established is correctly executed.

There is a greater deficiency in the internal oversight mechanisms. In recent years, no audit reports from the AGN of the defence sector have been published, and the Congress does not comply with its control function.

The actual defence purchases are published on the website of “Argentina compra” (National Contracting Office). There is scarce information about the potential defence purchases due to the sector's poor strategic planning. The information available on ArgentinaCompra isn’t complete for all operations; the available and updated information varies from case to case.
The audit reports show the budget execution of the sector. The scarce resources of the defence area make difficult too to work for a better planning, with a budget that barely covers 1% of the GDP.

The standards that companies required to have in order to be able to bid for work for the State are nationally established in the legal framework and the Ministry of Defence and the Armed Forces are subject to them.

However, there is not always a transparent explanation about the adjudication; instead, the most common practice is “cronyism”.

In the last decades the defence sector in Argentina has not been characterized by being strategically planned (either at the operational level of resources, missions or available personnel). Indeed, the Law on Restructuring the Armed Forces has never been implemented.

However, in the last few years, the Ministry of Defence has undertaken important efforts in order to generate a strategic planning system that, based on military capabilities and on a results-oriented budgetary planning, encourages a better utilisation of the resources available and increases the transparency levels. As mentioned, this is still an ongoing process that requires more time to consolidate itself as a practice and an actual political decision that imposes over the budgetary tops annually determined by the Ministry of Economy.

This reveals that the procurement of the sector does not always correspond to an established strategy.

Most purchases do respond to a clearly identified requirement.

However, as mentioned, this requirement does not generally correspond to a strategically defined need. This gives place to purchases in order to maximize the available resources; this is an opportunity for acts of bribery and corruption to occur.

The sources referenced from 2009 explain the transformation process on the area over the past years; they also present legislation that is still valid.

Given that purchases don’t respond to a strategic planning, clearly established beforehand, this gives rise to purchases that are made taking the opportunity and the offer, which is usually linked to corruption and bribery acts.

Most defence purchases are made through public tender, the competition being opened to several companies. However, most of the purchases are made by “direct contracting”. This does not imply any obscure arrangement as direct contracting is permitted under the laws of Argentina.

Moreover, the administrative decision for each case is published - together with its pertinent justification - on the National Contracting Office’s website. Most defence purchases are made through public tender. However, some purchases, limited according to the current legislation, can be made by direct contracting.

The level of detail of the published justifications in the ArgentinaCompra website varies from case to case.

There aren’t tender boards in the country. However, as mentioned, the units of internal audit of the defence sector monitor all the steps taken in a tender. The norms and Code of Conduct are established in national legislation and the defence sector is subject to them. The procurement policy is defined in the Defence Logistics Service.

The country has a strong legislation that forbids and punishes collusion between bidders, and the defence sector is subject to it. The units of internal audit (i.e. the units of internal audit of the institutions of the defence sector and to the Auditoría General de la Nación) make sure that the law is enforced.

Even though it is one of the explicit aims of the Ministry of Defence, currently there are no specific activities of training for procurement staff of the sector.

However, government officials from the area participate in events and international congresses; this encourages its continuous updating and training on the topic.

National legislation establishes mechanisms to allow companies to complain about perceived malpractice in procurement. At the same time, within the defence sector, these acts can be reported through the Direction of Institutional Transparency or through the General Direction of the Defence Logistics Service.

National legislation establishes the procedures for the punishment for the different acts of corruptions of a State’s supplier; these includes sanctions from suspension to criminal prosecution.

Offset contracts are forbidden.

Offset contracts are forbidden.

Offset contracts are forbidden.

The company’s use of agents and intermediaries is allowed in Argentina, and they are subject to the same oversight by the process of internal audit as any other element of the defence procurement cycle (regulated by the Régimen de Contrataciones de la Administración Nacional (Decree 1023/01. Regulatory Decree 893/2012).

Argentina doesn’t make major procurements of arms. However, in those relevant cases which establish different payment timelines or credit agreements, the information is provided through the administrative decisions that are published on the National Contracting Office’s website, even though not all the detailed information about the agreement is available.

The administrative decisions vary in the information that they provide in each case. Some of them are very exhaustive, indicating the different stages of the contract, payment periods, etc., but not all of them have the same level of detail. These are available on the ArgentinaCompra’s website (Oficina Nacional de Contrataciones).

The national legislation establishes the necessary requirements for State suppliers, and these same requirements apply to sub-contractors.

The units of internal audit of the institutions of the defence sector and to the Auditoría General de la Nación are in charge of this control.

Certain defence acquisitions are made within the framework of a wider agreement with political elements. However, the acquisitions made by the country are not that much as to make of this an element of permanent negotiation.

The economic resources for the acquisitions in the defence sector are very scarce as to have an impact on wider commercial and political negotiations with other States. The defence budget for 2014, allocated 78.4% to cover personnel expenses. Only the 2.3% was allocated to investment expenses which also cover infrastructure expenses, maintenance, etc. The defence budget represents only 1% of the GDP.