This country is placed in Band B

Poland’s GI ranking in Band B places it in the low risk category for corruption in the defence and security sector. The highest risk area is Operations, which fell in Band D (high risk of corruption). The Polish government has embarked upon a large modernisation programme for the armed forces and has announced its intent to increase defence spending to the NATO-recommended 2% of GDP in 2015. In parallel, it has been working on diagnosing and addressing corruption risks within the defence sector and putting in institutional and legal solutions mitigating risks.  The MOD’s internal Anti-Corruption Bureau has been engaged in risk monitoring, establishing of corruption reporting lines, and monitoring confidential procurement procedures, and its activities are examples of good practice.  The government should build on progress made and address outstanding issues such as whistleblower protection and inclusion of corruption issues in military doctrine.

Preventing corruption: approach and implementation

The MOD’s Anti-Corruption Bureau, a small internal unit, is responsible for designing corruption-proof procedures and overseeing confidential procurement processes. This is an example of good practice, as is the stipulated involvement of external audit institutions and the government-wide Public Procurement Office in determining the kind of procurement procedure that should apply to a particular acquisition. The MOD and the audit institutions can build on this by ensuring that audits are carried out regularly and their results are public (at least in abbreviated form where confidential information needs to be protected) and ensuring that national security exemptions from regular procedures are well justified.

The MOD has made great progress in making its procurement procedures more robust, but much remains to be done when it comes to requirements placed on suppliers. The MOD should consider introducing regulations promoting the adoption of anti-corruption and compliance programmes among contractors and subcontractors.

The Anti-Corruption Bureau has established reporting mechanisms for whistleblowers. However, there are no comprehensive whistleblower protection mechanisms and the procedures for handling complaints are not clear.  The MOD and the Armed Forces should build on available solutions to put in place a clear, comprehensive system dealing with whistleblower signals and protecting whistleblowers afterwards.

Corruption and military operations

While there is evidence that individual Polish military officers are aware of the risks corruption poses during military operations and have responded to the issue when they encountered it, there is no recognition of it in military doctrine or training and this operational issues remain the greatest corruption risk in the Polish system. There are also no specific guidelines on operational contracting and corruption monitors are not deployed in theatre. The exposure to large-scale stabilisation missions in Afghanistan and Iraq has yielded experience which could be turned into comprehensive doctrines and training programmes for the armed forces, contributing to NATO training through the NATO Joint Force Training Centre in Bydgoszcz.

Leadership 30
01.
score
3

Is there formal provision for effective and independent legislative scrutiny of defence policy?

The Constitution of the Republic of Poland states in article 26, paragraph 2, that “the Armed Forces shall observe neutrality regarding political matters and shall be subject to civilian and democratic control”.

Civil authority over the armed forces is exercised by the President of the Republic of Poland (who, according to article 134 paragraphs 1 and 2, “shall be the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland”, exercising his authority through the Minister of National Defence). The president also appoints the Chief of Defence Staff as well as heads of individual branches of the military. In the time of war, following the Prime Minister’s request, the President “shall appoint the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces”, who can be dismissed in an analogous procedure (article 134 paragraph 4).

General legislative and financial scrutiny of the Lower House of the Parliament (Sejm) over government policy is guaranteed by article 95 paragraph 2 of the Constitution. Scrutiny over defence and security matters is exercised by the parliamentary Committee on National Defence and the Intelligence Oversight Committee. Further parliamentary control is exercised through the political control over the Minister of National Defence and the government, as well as the parliamentary control over the budget (article 219): the parliament passes, and can amend, the annual budget bills.

There is no evidence on the undue influence of the executive outside of normal political procedure stemming from the parliamentary system of government (that is: the unity of the executive branch and the parliamentary majority). The legislature exercises full powers through scrutiny of and amendments to legislative projects submitted by the executive branch (for example, the law providing for increase of military expenses [4]), including the budgetary provisions as well as by receiving direct information from the MoD in the reports presented to the Parliament. Furthermore, the National Defence Committee exercises its scrutiny through the intermediary of the Supreme Chamber of Control, initiating supervisory reports [5].

Parliament also has input into arms procurement. While the choice of specific items and suppliers lies with the MOD, the parliament shapes and approves the overall direction of the modernisation of the armed forces through the Law on the Modernisation of the Polish Armed Forces, which stipulates parliamentary input, through the National Defence Committee, into the major elements of the programme. [8]

However, the Polish Sejm does not have an official prerogative to accept or reject the official security policy. The Law on Polish Defence states that the National Security Strategy is prepared by the Cabinet and approved by the President. In 2014, when the current National Security Policy was adopted, individual MPs were consulted unofficially, but the National Defence Committee only reviewed the strategy in early 2015, after it had been officially accepted and released [6].

COMMENTS -+

1. Franciszek Puchała, &quoute;Cywilna i demokratyczna kontrola nad Siłami Zbrojnymi Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej (geneza, rozwój i doświadczenia)&quoute;, Głos Weterana i Rezerwisty, accessed: 15.04.2014 http://www.gwir.pl/aktualnosci/356/cywilna-i-demokratyczna-kontrola-nad-silami-zbrojnymi-rzeczypospolitej-polskiej/

2. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, April 2, 1997 (Dziennik Ustaw No. 78, item 483)

3. Annex 1 to the Statute of Sejm of the Republic of Poland, July 30, 1992

4. Government bill no. 3190 amending the bill on the reconstruction and technical modernisation and financing of the Armed Forces of Poland as well as the law on public finances, (currently proceeded by the legislative), accessed: 06.04.2015, http://www.sejm.gov.pl/Sejm7.nsf/druk.xsp?nr=3190

5. Supreme Chamber of Control, Professionalisation of the Armed Forces Report, KOB-4101-05-00/2010, accessed: 06.04.2015, https://www.nik.gov.pl/plik/id,3650,vp,4648.pdf.

6. Maksymilian Dura, 'Sejm ocenił zatwierdzoną w listopadzie 2014 r. „Strategię Bezpieczeństwa RP”', defence24.pl, http://www.defence24.pl/188833,sejm-ocenil-zatwierdzona-w-listopadzie-2014-r-strategie-bezpieczenstwa-rp#, 6 February 2015, accessed September 2015.

7. Ustawa z dnia 21 listopada 1967 r. o powszechnym obowiązku obrony Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej (Law on the defence of Poland, 21 November 1967), http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/Download?id=WDU19670440220&type=3, accessed September 2015.

8. Ustawa z dnia 25 maja 2001 r.o przebudowie i modernizacji technicznej oraz finansowaniu Sił Zbrojnych Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej (Law on the Modernisation of the Polish Armed Forces, 25 May 2001), https://www.google.co.uk/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CB4QFjAAahUKEwjEo5zL_JnIAhWDuxQKHbxLCvY&url=http%3A%2F%2Fisip.sejm.gov.pl%2FDownload%3Fid%3DWDU20090670570%26type%3D3&usg=AFQjCNEqtf0xaf7hJ0NC8nyPVy0OM0KjQA, accessed September 2015.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

02.
score
3

Does the country have an identifiable and effective parliamentary defence and security committee (or similar such organisation) to exercise oversight?

The Committee on National Defence exercises scrutiny over defence policy and implementation. The scrutiny encompasses government departments, defence agencies and state-owned enterprises and is underpinned by extensive formal rights. Proceedings of the Committee are open, unless the topic of the motion is classified [3]. The Committee can demand reports and information from the Minister of National Defence and can ask for the participation of the Ministry of National Defence personnel in the Committee's sessions [3]. The working agenda as well as draft resolutions, opinions, motions and bills are publicly available on the Committee’s website [1, 5] .

The National Defence Committee consists of 31 permanent Members of Parliament. It also comprises of four permanent subcommittees (budget and infrastructure, social aspects of the military, Polish defence industry, international cooperation and NATO relations) as well as five ad hoc subcommittees, established to proceed on specific bills and issues. Since the beginning of the 2011 parliamentary term, eight additional ad hoc subcommittees have ceased to exist after completing their tasks. [1]

In the Polish parliamentary system, both committees and subcommittees are authorised to hire experts on permanent or semi-permanent basis as well as utilise Parliament's own resources and commission external reports. [4]. The Committees are entitled to demand information from the executive branch, demand scrutiny from the Supreme Chamber of Control as well as conduct on-site visits (including defence industry and enterprises). In case of the risk of the leakage of sensitive information, the Committees may proceed under secrecy. The National Defence Committee work plan for 2015 foresees a number of hearings of the executive as well as on-site visits [5], and the website of the Committee indicates that it is active (between January and September 2015, the Committee met 33 times).

COMMENTS -+

1. Sejm RP, Committee on National Defence, accessed: 15.04.2014 http://www.sejm.gov.pl/sejm7.nsf/agent.xsp?symbol=PRACEKOMST&NrKadencji=7&KodKom=OBN,

2. &quoute;Act of 21 June 2013 Amending Previous Acts on the Minister of National Defence&quoute;, Dziennik Ustaw 2013, item 852

3. Annex 1 to the Statute of Sejm of the Republic of Poland, July 30, 1992

4. Wiesław Staśkiewicz, Role of Experts in the Parliamentary Proceedings, Office of the Parliament of the Republic of Poland, accessed: 06.04.2015, http://biurose.sejm.gov.pl/seminarium/staskiewicz.pdf

5. 1. Sejm RP, Committee on National Defence Work Plan for 2015, accessed: 06.04.2015, http://orka.sejm.gov.pl/opinie7.nsf/nazwa/plan_obn/$file/plan_obn.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

03.
score
4

Is the country's national defence policy debated and publicly available?

Documents on Polish national defence policy are widely available and discussed [5]. The website of the Ministry of National Defence contains provisions on Polish defence policy, international co-operation, armed forces modernisation priorities and external missions [7]. The 2014 National Security Strategy was discussed in parliament, including a dedicated session of the National Defence Committee. [12]

The National Security Bureau (BBN) publishes a quarterly online journal, “Bezpieczeństwo narodowe” (&quoute;National Security&quoute;), reports, analyses, key bills and international legislation on armed forces and defence (http://www.bbn.gov.pl/pl/prace-biura/publikacje/kwartalnik-bezpieczens). In 2010, BBN launched a debate on national security, with the participation of civil servants, military personnel, academics, independent experts and civil society representatives. The result was the “White Paper on National Security”, which is to serve as the basis for future national security strategy and is publicly available online (http://www.spbn.gov.pl). This is not the first time that such a document has been made accessible to the general public – every Polish defence and security strategy prepared after 1989 was officially published [5,6,7].

The recently adopted bill on the reform of the Armed Forces command was subject to debate in the framework of the Strategic Security Forum, encompassing Members of Parliament and European Parliament, representatives of academia, representatives of the Club of Generals of the Republic of Poland, experts and analysts [2]. The timeframe was made public and the ratio legis of the reform was extensively explained in the media. [8]

The on-going technical modernisation of the Polish Armed Forces also falls under public scrutiny. Parliamentary Committee on State Treasury held a comprehensive session dedicated to the issue, while the Committee on National Defence created, back in 2012, a separate subcommittee dedicated to the “state of the Polish defence sector and the technical modernisation of the Armed Forces” [10]. A horizontal conference involving representatives of the MoD, Ministry of State Treasury, policy makers, experts and industry representatives was held on March 17, 2014 in Siemanowice Śląskie. A detailed, multi-annual plan on the modernisation – including costs and the draft timeframe – is available online [4].


RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER: The report certainly sheds more light on the issue. However, one has to take into account the limitations on the role of CSO's in the formulation of the security and defence policy. The report mentions a number of organisations -veteran's unions or civil protection bodies - involved in regular dialogue with the MoD.
Furthermore, as evidenced by a number of public debates with experts, academics and government officials from other sectors, the defence policy as such is widely discussed, even if formal CSO cooperation remains somewhat lacking.

COMMENTS -+

1. &quoute;Act of 21 June 2013 Amending Previous Acts on the Minister of National Defence&quoute;, Dziennik Ustaw 2013, item 852

2. National Security Bureau, &quoute;Reform of the Command Chain&quoute;, accessed: 15.04.2014, http://www.bbn.gov.pl/pl/wydarzenia/4396,Reforma-systemu-kierowania-i-dowodzenia.html

3. Biuro Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego, &quoute;Debata o współpracy sił zbrojnych z przemysłem obronnym&quoute;, March 20, 2014, accessed: 15.04.2014, http://www.bbn.gov.pl/pl/wydarzenia/4481,Debata-o-wspolpracy-sil-zbrojnych-z-przemyslem-obronnym.html,

4. Committee on the State Treasury, &quoute;Information on the Structural Transformation of the Defence Sector&quoute;, accessed: 15.04.2014, http://www.sejm.gov.pl/sejm7.nsf/biuletyn.xsp?documentId=7461306E1BC808D4C1257C6F003DB1A1

5. National Security Bureau, Legislative Acts and Strategic Documents on National Security, accessed: 06.04.2015, http://www.bbn.gov.pl/pl/bezpieczenstwo-narodowe/akty-prawne-i-dokumenty-1/5973,Akty-prawne-i-dokumenty-strategiczne.html

6. Stanisław Koziej, 25 Years of Security Planning in Poland, &quoute;Bezpieczeństwo narodowe&quoute;, no. 30/2014, accessed: 06.04.2015, http://www.bbn.gov.pl/pl/wydarzenia/5731,Kwartalnik-quotBezpieczenstwo-Narodowe-nr-30quot-25-lat-polskiej-strategii-bezpi.html

7. Ministry of National Defence, Documents, accessed: 06.04.2015, http://mon.gov.pl/dokumenty/

8. Antoni Bohdanowicz, The Military Reform. See What the New Bill Means for the Polish Armed Forces, Natemat.pl, accessed: 06.04.2015, http://natemat.pl/87137,reforma-wojska-zobaczcie-jak-wygladaja-zmiany-w-rodzajach-sil-zbrojnych-w-polsce

9. Paramilitaries will help Polish Armed Forces, TVN 24, accessed: 06.04.2015, http://www.tvn24.pl/wiadomosci-z-kraju,3/kongres-organizacji-proobronnych-w-warszawie,525185.html

10. Sejm, National Defence Committee - Subcommittee for the state of Polish defence sector and the technical modernisation of the Armed Forces, http://orka.sejm.gov.pl/SQL2.nsf/Skladpkom7?OpenAgent&OBN04S, accessed September 2015.

11. Ministry of Defence, 'Sprawozdanie z przebiegu konsultacji społecznych projektu strategii' ('Societal consultations on the strategy for the Polish Armed Forces'), 2013, http://mon.gov.pl/z/pliki/dokumenty/rozne/2013/09/zalacznik1.pdf, accessed September 2015.

12. National Defence Committee, Committee Meeting on 4 February 2015, http://search.sejm.gov.pl/SejmSearch/ADDL.aspx?SelectResult, accessed September 2015.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Generally speaking, I agree with the score but I would recommend taking into consideration the following report (admittedly not the most recent source):
Piotr Frączak, Katarzyna Sadło, ,&quoute;The public consultations with the nongovernmental organizations and citizens at the central level. A report on the study of the ministries,” (The report was commissioned by the Ministry of Labor and Social Policy Within the &quoute;Studies On the Effectiveness Of Mechanisms For Public Consultation&quoute;), February 2011, pp. 43-47; 103-104, accessed June 6, 2014:t http://partycypacjaobywatelska.pl/wp-content/uploads/beks_raport_ministerstwa_po_redakcji.pdf

According to this report, the public consultation of legislation between the MoD and CSOs is very weak. Of course I would not reduce the term &quoute;public debate&quoute; only to the formal consultations between MoD and CsO - that is why I generally agree with the score.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Sources:
http://promilitaria21.org/fresh/showpage.php?pageID=252&idgtxe10=12286
A series of public debates on defence policy at the strategic level takes place at the National Defence University.

&quoute;Development Strategy of National Security System of The Republic of Poland - 2022&quoute; with public consultation outcome document are published on the MOD website:
http://mon.gov.pl/dokumenty/

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

04.
score
3

Do defence and security institutions have a policy, or evidence, of openness towards civil society organisations (CSOs) when dealing with issues of corruption? If no, is there precedent for CSO involvement in general government anti-corruption initiatives?

The co-operation between the Ministry of National Defence and civil society organisations is regulated by Decision no. 187/MON and is based on the principles of subsidiarity, transparency, efficiency, non-discriminatory treatment and mutual respect of autonomy (article 4). The Ministry or individual military unit commanders may engage in such co-operation, with the intention of reinforcing the popular support for the state's security policy, promoting voluntary work for the benefit of the national defence and improving the image of the Armed Forces, including reaching out to potential recruits. The ministry organises annual summits. [6] However, this co-operation is centred around military training and education, history, and promotion of patriotism rather than anti-corruption and transparency issues.

No specific provisions on anti-corruption co-operation are in force. While the Ministry of Defence has signed an agreement with the Polish chapter of Transparency International, the closure of the chapter has left a void in the sphere of institutional collaboration. There is a certain amount of ad-hoc co-operation between the Ministry and some CSOs such as the Batory Foundation and the Institute of Public Affairs, consisting mainly of exchanges of experience and points of view. The MoD and affiliated agencies also participated in the 2013 conference on &quoute;Anti-corruption mechanisms in the public administration&quoute;. [3,4] In April 2015, the MOD hosted an anti-corruption conference co-organised by the Batory Foundation and with the participation of a TI-DSP representative.

The reported CSOs are partially funded by the government and the European institutions. They have not received any funds from the MoD, nor any funding unrelated to specific projects outside of the scope of the defence policy. Their financial reports can be found on their websites and are public.[7, 8]

No cases of hiring external CSO experts while dealing with anti-bribery and transparency issues were reported.

RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: As there are examples of engagement with CSOs on anti-corruption issues, the score has been raised to 3.

COMMENTS -+

1. Aleksandra Kobylińska, Grzegorz Makowski, Marek Solon-Lipinski (ed.), &quoute;Anti-Corruption Mechanisms in Poland&quoute;, Instytut Spraw Publicznych, Warsaw, 2012

2. Minister of National Defence, &quoute;Decision no. 187/MON on the rules and processes of co-operation with non-governmental organisations and other social partners&quoute;, Dziennik Urzędowy Ministra Obrony Narodowej, No. 12, Position 131, 2009. Available at http://www.mw.mil.pl/zasoby/archiwum/upload/Decyzja_187_z_9_06_2009.pdf, accessed September 2015.

3. Interview with Interviewee 1: Senior Ministry of Defence Official, Warsaw, Poland, 25 April 2014

4. The Batory Foundation,The Annual Report of Anti-Corruption Activities 2013, accessed: 06.04.2015, http://www.antykorupcja.gov.pl/ak/aktualnosci/10968,Sprawozdanie-z-dzialalnosci-Fundacji-im-S-Batorego-w-2013-r.html

5. Batory Foundation, 'Konferencja Wyzwania polityki antykorupcyjnej w resorcie obrony narodowej', 21 April 2015. http://www.batory.org.pl/programy_operacyjne/przeciw_korupcji/spoleczny_monitoring_konfliktu_interesow/wydarzenia_12/konferencja_wyzwania_polityki_antykorupcyjnej_w_resorcie_obrony_narodowej, accessed September 2015.

6. Witold Zakrzewski, 'NGO forum has been active for years', 22 October 2014, http://wiadomosci.ngo.pl/x/1023334, accessed September 2015.

7. Institute of Public Affairs, 'Annual reports', http://isp.org.pl/o-isp,sprawozdania,40.html, accessed September 2015.

8. Batory Foundation, 'Annual Reports', http://www.batory.org.pl/o_fundacji/sprawozdania, accessed September 2015.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: I agree with the lead researcher and I would only like to refer to the report on &quoute;The public consultations with the nongovernmental organizations and citizens at the central level &quoute; - the report makes the lead researcher's point stronger (hovewer I have to admit that this is not the most recent source). The report is a systematic analysis of the relations and extent of consultations between CSOs and ministries. If we assume that the consultation process indicates a level of general cooperation and openess between CSOs and MoD, we can rate this cooperation as very weak. In the report, the MOD received the weakest score out of 17 ministries.

Piotr Frączak, Katarzyna Sadło, ,,The public consultations with the nongovernmental organizations and citizens at the central level. A report on the study of the ministries,” (The report was commissioned by the Ministry of Labor and Social Policy Within the &quoute;Studies On the Effectiveness Of Mechanisms For Public Consultation&quoute;), February 2011, pp. 43-47; 103-104, accessed June 6, 2014:t http://partycypacjaobywatelska.pl/wp-content/uploads/beks_raport_ministerstwa_po_redakcji.pdf

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: In the anticorruption field, the MOD has cooperated with 2 programmes:
- &quoute;Conflict of interest - regulations&quoute; - with the Batory Foundation;
- &quoute;Code of Conduct for potential suppliers&quoute; - with the Euro-Atlantic Association.
The Ministry remains open to cooperation in this field.

Suggested score: 4

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

05.
score
3

Has the country signed up to international anti-corruption instruments such as, but not exclusively or necessarily, UNCAC and the OECD Convention? (In your answer, please specify which.)

Poland has adopted:
-tthe OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions of 21 November 1997 (ratified by Poland in 2000)
-t the United Nations Convention against Corruption of 31 October 2003 (ratified by Poland in 2006)
-t The Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption of 27 January 1999 (ratified by Poland in 2002)
-t The Council of Europe Civil Law Convention on Corruption of 4 November 1999 (ratified by Poland in 2002)
-t The Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism of 16 May 2005

The OECD Phase 3 Report on Implementing the Anti-Bribery Convention in Poland, issued in June 2013, commends Poland’s “efficient and effective response to mutual legal assistance requests concerning foreign bribery and active cooperation with foreign jurisdictions“, as well as tax administration bribery awareness [1]. Nevertheless, the situation has not improved significantly in most of the analysed areas. Poland’s “framework for fighting foreign bribery is still inadequate” as authorities are yet to successfully prosecute a case of foreign corruption [1] .

Poland was the subject of an UNCAC review in 2014, following the adoption of the latest government anti-corruption programme for 2014-2019, adopted on 01.04.2014 [4]. The Review noted of progress being made, both in legislation and actual anti-corruption efforts, however it calls for a number of additional measures to be implemented, notably better protection of whistle-blowers, improvement of liability of legal persons in corruption cases and more effective forfeiting of assets of criminal origin [4].

COMMENTS -+

1. OECD, Phase 3 Report on Implementing the Anti-Bribery Convention in Poland, July, 2013, accessed: 15.04.2014, http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/Polandphase3reportEN.pdf

2. Celina Nowak, Dostosowanie prawa polskiego do instrumentów międzynarodowych dotyczących korupcji. Raport, Batory Foundation, Warsaw, 2008, accessed: 15.04.2014, http://www.batory.org.pl/doc/kor_instr.pdf,

3. Interview with Interviewee 1: Senior Ministry of Defence Official, Warsaw, Poland, 25 April 2014

4. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, &quoute;Country Review Report:Poland&quoute;, accessed 06.04.2015, http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/CountryVisitFinalReports/FINAL_Country_Review_Report_Poland.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

06.
score
4

Is there evidence of regular, active public debate on issues of defence? If yes, does the government participate in this debate?

Defence issues frequently appear in the media, both in the international (e.g. external threats, Polish participation in NATO's out-of-area missions) and internal (reform of the Armed Forces, modernisation of the defence industry) context.

Minister of Defence Tomasz Siemoniak and the BBN (National Security Bureau) Head Stanisław Koziej often appear on TV and in newspapers and engage with the general public on social media. Former President Bronisław Komorowski, former Minister of Foreign Affairs Radosław Sikorski (also a former Minister of Defence) and former Prime Minister Donald Tusk have increasingly marked their positions on defence issues.

A wide array of print and online journals such as “Polska Zbrojna” (http://www.polska-zbrojna.pl), “Dziennik Zbrojny” (http://dziennikzbrojny.pl), “Militis” (http://www.militis.pl) and the Altair Publishing House magazines “Raport” and “Broń i amunicja” (http://www.altair.com.pl), specialising in various aspects of the defence and security policy, is available.

Furthermore, defence is a subject of frequent debates organised by civil society organisations. In this regard, it is useful to mention the works of the National Strategic Studies Centre (Narodowe Centrum Studiów Strategicznych, http://ncss.org.pl), Casimir Pulaski Foundation (http://pulaski.pl), the Freedom Institute (Instytut Wolności http://instytutwolnosci.pl) and the Polish chapter of the German Marshall Fund (http://www.gmfus.org).

It has to be noted that the national defence policy is mostly debated in the mainstream media in reference to international crises. As such, the 2014 crisis in Ukraine served as an additional catalyst for the public debate on the internal and external aspects of Polish defence policy (see opinion pieces 1-5).

Due to the recent changes in the regional security landscape the Ministry of Defence has intensified the co-operation with the defence -focused CSOs, notably the paramilitary organisations. Minister of Defence and Deputy Prime Minister Tomasz Siemoniak participated in the debate of the Freedom Institute dedicated to the Polish security policy, focusing on the ballistic missile threat and the consequences of the war against Ukraine [7]. Furthermore, in March 2015, the first Congress of Pro-defence Organisations and Military Schools was held under the MoD auspices [6].

In turn, the National Security Bureau has engaged in the organisation of the first edition of the Warsaw Security Forum (http://warsawsecurityforum.org), a semi-open event dedicated to the issues of traditional and asymmetric security policy, defence industry and international relations.

COMMENTS -+

Examples of ongoing debate on defence issues in Polish media:

1. A. Bilski, &quoute;Putin wskrzesza NATO&quoute;, Rzeczpospolita, 18 April 2014, http://www.rp.pl/artykul/1103162.html;

2. Bogdan Klich, &quoute;NATO: kotwice i drogowskazy&quoute;, Rzeczpospolita, 3 April 2014, http://www.rp.pl/artykul/1098973.html;

3. Andrzej Talaga, &quoute;Warto wydawać na wojsko&quoute;, Rzeczpospolita, 3 April 2014; http://www.rp.pl/artykul/1098970.html;

4. Tomasz Bielecki, &quoute;Więcej NATO w naszych stronach&quoute;, Gazeta Wyborcza, 4 April 2014, http://wyborcza.pl/1,75968,15739315,Wiecej_NATO_w_naszych_stronach.html;

5. Paweł Wroński, &quoute;Armia nasza może być zwycięska jeśli się dozbroi&quoute;, Gazeta Wyborcza, 4 March 2014, http://wyborcza.pl/politykaekstra/1,136826,15567826,Armia_nasza_moze_byc_zwycieska__jesli_sie_dozbroi.html.

6. Polish Army, &quoute;Pro-defence Congress&quoute;, 20 March 2015, accessed: 06.04.2015, http://www.wojsko-polskie.pl/pl/spoleczna-inicjatywa-proobronna-/kongres/38673,kongres-proobronny-.html

7.Stanisław Żaryn, &quoute;War in Poland, Russian Missiles and a Nuclear Attack...Interesting Debate in the Freedom Institute&quoute;, Wpolityce.pl, March 10, 2015, accessed: 10.07.2015, http://wpolityce.pl/polityka/236779-wojna-w-polsce-rosyjskie-rakiety-i-atak-atomowy-ciekawa-debata-instytutu-wolnosci-debata-ktora-nie-uspokaja-nasza-relacja

Other sources:
8. 'Polska Zbrojna' (http://www.polska-zbrojna.pl)
9. 'Dziennik Zbrojny' (http://dziennikzbrojny.pl)
10. 'Militis' (http://www.militis.pl) and the
11. Altair Publishing House magazines 'Raport' and 'Broń i amunicja' (http://www.altair.com.pl)

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

07.
score
3

Does the country have an openly stated and actively implemented anti-corruption policy for the defence sector?

Poland’s anti-corruption efforts are based on a multi-annual Government Plan on Combating Corruption 2013 – 2018. The Plan builds on the conclusions of the previous strategy for the 2002 – 2009 period, the experiences of the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau and the Prosecutor's Office, and the legal framework for public investments related to the 2007 – 13 EU funds and the Euro 2012 football tournament. It also takes into account the findings of the Efficient State 2010 report. The priorities of the Government Plan lie in prevention and education against illicit practices with the intent of permanently and in sustainable reduction of the level of corruption in Poland [Government Programme on Combating Corruption 2013 – 2018, p. 3].

The Government Plan highlights corruption in the defence sector as one of the areas of potentially high risk. It mentions “limited transparency of military procurements”, “unclear offset criteria” and “lack of adequate intellectual property oversight” among the high-risk factors in the defence sector [pp. 11 - 12]. Though no defence–specific measures are proposed in the Plan, the emphasis on the administrative efficiency and transparency corresponds with key problems underlined in reference to the defence corruption.

Furthermore, the Ministry of National Defence has adopted internal regulations in regard to the “interaction of the MoD employees with external contractors” as an element of a wider Armed Forces code of conduct [2].

The Ministry of National Defence is the first government body to introduce a sector-specific anti-corruption strategy [4]. In April 2015, the MOD announced that it was about to begin to implement the strategy, focusing on analysis of corruption risks and preparation of a programme to address them. [6] Thus both the plan and the implementation plan seem to exist, but it is too early to assess the effectiveness of implementation.

Monitoring for the overall implementation of the Plan is carried out by the Inter-departmental Group for Implementation and Coordination of the Government Anti-Corruption Plan. [7]

RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER: I agree with the comments reflecting the chaotic nature of the anti-corruption policy planning. Apparently, the new policy is intended to be better embedded in the overall administration approach to accountability and transparence and is expected to remain valid for a longer time. Previous experience indeed suggests some scepticism.
However, the current score is largely based on the MoD-specific anti-corruption policy, to be implemented in 2014/15, rather than the overall governement approach. I would retain the score in respect to the defence policy, where the anti-corruption activities seem more stringent than in other sectors.

COMMENTS -+

1. Ministry of the Interior, &quoute;Government Programme on Combatting Corruption 2013 – 2018&quoute;, Warsaw, June 2013

2. Minister of National Defence, &quoute;Decision No. 125/MON on the Introduction of the Code of Conduct Among Employees and Soldiers&quoute;, Dziennik Urzędowy Ministra Obrony Narodowej, No. 8, 2011

3. Anna Kubiak, Aneta Krzewińska, „Raport z badań nad skutecznością wdrażania strategii antykorupcyjnych rządów RP w wybranych instytucjach centralnych w latach 2007–2011“, in Polityka antykorupcyjna. Ocena skuteczności polityki antykorupcyjnej polskich rządów prowadzonej w latach 2001–2011, Batory Foundation, Warsaw, 2011

4. Interview with Interviewee 1: Senior Ministry of Defence Official, Warsaw, Poland, 25 April 2014

5. Government Anti-corruption Programme for 2014 - 19, (accessed: 19.05.20150, http://cba.gov.pl/pl/newsy-serwisu-antykorup/3062,Uchwala-RM-ws-Rzadowego-programu-przeciwdzialania-korupcji-na-lata-2014-2019.html

6. 'The MOD begins to implement the Government Anti-corruption Programme', Polish Press Agency, 21 April 2015. http://wiadomosci.onet.pl/kraj/mon-rozpoczyna-wdrazanie-rzadowego-programu-przeciwdzialania-korupcji/9ek6dx, accessed September 2015.

7. Polish Cabinet, Regulations re.the Inter-departmental Group for Implementation and Coordination of the Government Anti-Corruption Plan, 2 December 2014. Available at http://antykorupcja.gov.pl/download/4/13464/uchwala12014Zespol.pdf, accessed September 2015.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: I would downgrade the score to 2, mainly because during the last 4 years the so-called “Governmental Plan on Combating Corruption” has become a peculiar and confusing phenomenon. Between 2009-2011, there was no publicly available anti-corruption plan or document. Then the 'Governmental Programme of Combating Corruption for 2012-2016' had appeared, to be subsequently replaced by the 'Governmental Programme on Combating Corruption for 2013 – 2018'. But now, we have the “Governmental Programme on Combating Corruption for 2014 – 2019”. It does not look for me like a cohesive and well-planned strategy. The new Plan does address corruption risk in the defence sector, but not as a special issue. Lack of a proper strategic anti-corruption approach has been pointed out by the EU Anticorruption Report 2014. Moreover, a lot of critical remarks (pointing at the systemic weaknesses) towards the mentioned Programmes have been expressed in the official statements of various CSOs, including the Anticorruption Coalition of Nongovernmental Organizations.

Poland. Annex to the EU Anticorruption Report, Brussels 2014, European Commission: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/organized-crime-and-human-trafficking/corruption/anti-corruption-report/docs/2014_acr_poland_chapter_en.pdf (accessed on June 6, 2014)

The remarks of the Institute of Public Affairs towards the “Governmental Programme on Combating Corruption for 2013 – 2018”, Institute of Public Affairs, August 2013: http://isp.org.pl/uploads/filemanager/pdf/Binder2.pdf (accessed on June 6, 2014)

The opinion on the “Governmental Programme on Combating Corruption for 2013 – 2018”, Anticorruption Coalition of Nongovernmental Organizations, August 2013, http://www.akop.pl/public/files/Opinia%20nt.%20Rz%C4%85dowego%20Programu%20Przeciwdzia%C5%82ania_02.08.2013.pdf (accessed on June 6, 2014).

Suggested score: 2

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Source:
'Multi-annual Government Plan on Combating Corruption 2014-2019' and Resolution no 37 of the Council of Ministers from 1 April 2014:
http://antykorupcja.gov.pl/ak/strategia-antykorupcyj/10978,Uchwala-RM-ws-Rzadowego-programu-przeciwdzialania-korupcji-na-lata-2014-2019.html

Among the areas which show particular vulnerability to corruption, the Strategy lists defence and includes a discussion of specific issues, including public procurement, research and development, and offsets (pp 14-16).

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

08.
score
3

Are there independent, well-resourced, and effective institutions within defence and security tasked with building integrity and countering corruption?

The MOD's Bureau of Anti-Corruption Procedures has been operating since 2006 and reports directly to the Minister. The Bureau is responsible for preventive monitoring of public procurement at all stages, submitting opinions on classified tenders and evaluating legislative acts of the Ministry of National Defence from an anti-corruption perspective [1, pp. 157 - 160]. From 2011 onwards, it has been operating an easily recognisable e-mail address (stop.korupcji@mon.gov.pl), to which corruption cases can be anonymously reported. The bureau personnel consists of five employees, tasked both with handling specific corruption cases as well as preparing the necessary legislative framework, the so-called &quoute;anti-corruption shield&quoute; [4].

The Bureau co-operates with the Department of Audit of the Ministry of National Defence. The information exchanges focus on monitoring of the public procurement laws exemptions. The aforementioned bodies also collaborate during the formulation of post-audit recommendations.

Further institutions include the Military Police and the Military Counter-Intelligence Service, both of which are tasked with preventing and investigating crimes, including corruption, in the armed forces.[5, 6, 7] The Counter-Intelligence Service, while generally well-perceived, has also struggled with extensive reorganisation. [6] No commentary regarding the capacities and efficacy of the Military Police was found; however, in 2014 the MP did conduct investigations of an arms disposal procedure thought to have breached Polish export regulations. [7]

Finally, the responsibilities of the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau (CBA), tasked with preventing and detecting corruption in state institutions, extend to the MOD. In 2013, the CBA and the MOD signed a memorandum of understanding on cooperation in preventing corruption. [8, 9]

Score 3 selected as implementation plans are still being prepared.

RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER: Indeed. However, this argument can be used with regard to virtually any anti-corruption body reporting to any central political authority (e.g. Prime Minister's office in case of Central Anti-Corruption Bureau). One could argue that this simple and streamlined chain of command safeguards the independence of the Bureau, as it limits the influence of bureaucratic factors. Political interventions on behalf of the Minister himself cannot be ruled out - but such blatant corruption is more difficult to conceal (thus is more risky) than that of a tangled web of institutions. There is so far no evidence suggesting that the political leadership of MoD intervened in the Bureau of Anti-Corruption Procedures. Score 3 maintained.

COMMENTS -+

1. Anna Kubiak, Aneta Krzewińska, „Raport z badań nad skutecznością wdrażania strategii antykorupcyjnych rządów RP w wybranych instytucjach centralnych w latach 2007–2011“, in Polityka antykorupcyjna. Ocena skuteczności polityki antykorupcyjnej polskich rządów prowadzonej w latach 2001–2011, Batory Foundation, Warsaw, 2011

2. Janusz, Olbrycht, Marcin Szaładziński, &quoute;Walka z korupcją w resorcie obrony narodowej&quoute;, in I. Międzynarodowa Konferencja Antykorupcyjna (Warszawa 9 grudnia 2010). Materiały pokonferencyjne, Warsaw, 2011

3. Interview with Interviewee 1: Senior Ministry of Defence Official, Warsaw, Poland, April 25 2014

4. Z Wojska, &quoute;Above All - Prevention&quoute;, 15 January 2015, accessed: 06.04.2015, http://zwojska.pl/4217/piec-osob-z-biura-ds-procedur-antykorupcyjnych-mon-wielkie-programy-modernizacyjne/

5. Government Anti-corruption Programme for 2014 - 19, (accessed: 19.05.20150, http://cba.gov.pl/pl/newsy-serwisu-antykorup/3062,Uchwala-RM-ws-Rzadowego-programu-przeciwdzialania-korupcji-na-lata-2014-2019.html

6. Barbara Dziedzic, 'Seven Difficult Years for Polish Counter-Intelligence Service', PolskaTheTimes, 13 April 2014. http://www.polskatimes.pl/artykul/805179,siedem-nielatwych-lat-sluzby-kontrwywiadu-wojskowego,id,t.html, accessed September 2015.

7. 'Military Police to investigate the sale of the 'Arrow' systems', 26 September 2014. http://wiadomosci.wp.pl/kat,1342,title,Zandarmeria-Wojskowa-zbada-sprzedaz-zestawow-Strzala,wid,16913557,wiadomosc.html?ticaid=115ac0&_ticrsn=3, accessed September 2015.

8. Central Anti-Corruption Bureau,Tasks, (accessed: 19.05.2015), http://www.cba.gov.pl/pl/o-cba/zadania/350,zadania.html

9. Krzysztof Sobczak, &quoute;MON i CBA będą wspólnie walczyć z korupcją w wojsku&quoute;, Lex, October 21, 2013, (accessed: 15.04.2014), http://www.lex.pl/czytaj/-/artykul/mon-i-cba-beda-wspolnie-walczyc-z-korupcja-w-wojsku

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: My only comment, or addition, is that because the Bureau of Anti-Corruption Procedures reports directly to the Minister of Defence its independence can be questioned.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

09.
score
3

Does the public trust the institutions of defence and security to tackle the issue of bribery and corruption in their establishments?

There are no polls which would explicitly ask about respondents' perception of how effective defence institutions are in fighting corruption. However, though Poles remain distrustful towards government authorities in general, the Armed Forces remain the most respected institution: according to the &quoute;Public Institutions Opinion Poll&quoute; conducted by CBOS, 72% of Poles trust the Armed Forces [1]. While 83% of respondents perceive corruption as either an important or a very important problem in Poland, only 1% of them point to the army as a possible source of corruption, according to a 2013 CBOS survey on the corruption issues [2].

Poles have a generally positive and stable opinion on the functioning of the Armed Forces, with 66% of respondents evaluating it as 'good', with only 4% perceiving it negatively in 2013; in March 2015, the numbers were 62% and 8% respectively. [3, 5]

The belief in the relatively low level of corruption seems to persist despite the general media coverage of existing cases of corruption [4]. Since there has been no reported change in attitudes between 2010 and 2013 and very little between 2013 and 2015, it is safe to assume that the military institutions have sufficient public trust when it comes to corruption problems.

COMMENTS -+

1. Mateusz Lubiński, &quoute;Wojsko Polskie cieszy się największym zaufaniem Polaków, Sejmowi nie ufamy najbardziej&quoute;, Interia.pl, http://fakty.interia.pl/raport-jacy-jestesmy/wyniki/news-wojsko-polskie-cieszy-sie-najwiekszym-zaufaniem-polakow-sejm,nId,960278 (accessed 15.04.2014)

2. &quoute;CBOS, Opinions on Corruption in Poland&quoute;,Komunikat badań, BS/105/2013, Warsaw, 2013, http://www.batory.org.pl/upload/files/Programy%20operacyjne/Przeciw%20Korupcji/CBOS_korupcja-2013.pdf,(accessed: 25.04.2015)

3. CBOS, &quoute;Public Institutions Opinion Poll&quoute;, Komunikat badań, BS/130/2013, Warsaw, 2013, http://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2013/K_130_13.PDF (accessed: 15.04.2014)

4. CBOS, &quoute;Public Opinion on Corruption and Lobbying, Komunikat badań, BS/63/2010, Warsaw, 2010,http://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2010/K_063_10.PDF (accessed: 15.04.2014)

5. CBOS, &quoute;Public Institutions Opinion Poll&quoute;, Komunikat badań, Warsaw, March 2015. http://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2015/K_042_15.PDF, accessed September 2015.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Not Qualified

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

10.
score
3

Are there regular assessments by the defence ministry or another government agency of the areas of greatest corruption risk for ministry and armed forces personnel, and do they put in place measures for mitigating such risks?

The Central Anti-Corruption Bureau is tasked with the regular monitoring, prevention and investigation of corruption and bribery cases in Poland. Apart from policing, it is also tasked with preparing an analysis of the corruption risks. Many of the Bureau's publications are disseminated for the general public. In 2013 it has signed a memorandum of co-operation with the Ministry of National Defence. [1]

In 2008, the government undertook extraordinary measures in creation of a so-called &quoute;anti-corruption shield&quoute;, tasking the Military Counter-intelligence Service and Internal Security Agency with monitoring the biggest transactions involving public authorities (including military procurement), state-owned enterprises and the ongoing privatisation of state property. [2]

The Supreme Chamber of Control serves as an independent audit body, controlling the expediency and efficiency of public policies as well as the quality of bookkeeping [5]. Inside the Chamber, the Department of National Defence and Internal Security covers not only actions of the Ministry of National Defence and the Armed Forces, but also subsidiary bodies such as the Agency of Military Property (Agencja Mienia Wojskowego). The Supreme Chamber of Control issues legal, economic and policy recommendations [4,5].
CBA is legally tasked with conducting analysis and corruption risk assesment, including the defence-related risks [6]. The 2013 memorandum included regulations on increasing the MOD ownership on the risk assesment and development of MOD's own analysis capabilities. It is to be followed through in 2015, with the implementation of the Governement Anti-Corruption Plan for 2014-19 and the introduction of a more efficient risk analysis mechanisms in MOD [7].

The risk assessment is conducted on an ad-hoc basis for especially sensitive tenders or positions, while a general administration risk assessment forms the basis the multi annual government anti-corruption programme [8]. MoD Anti-corruption Procedures Bureau conducted a risk assesment in 2014 and, with the previously mentioned implementation of the 2014-2019 Anti-Corruption Programme, it is expected to conduct it regularly in the future. [7,8].

COMMENTS -+

1. Krzysztof Sobczak, &quoute;MON i CBA będą wspólnie walczyć z korupcją w wojsku&quoute;, Lex, October 21, 2013, (accessed: 15.04.2014), http://www.lex.pl/czytaj/-/artykul/mon-i-cba-beda-wspolnie-walczyc-z-korupcja-w-wojsku

2. Izabela Kacprzak, &quoute;Jak powstała tarcza antykorupcyjna?&quoute;, Rzeczpospolita, September 7, 2011, (accessed: 15.04.2014), http://www.rp.pl/artykul/713306.html

3. Cezary Trutkowski, Piotr Koryś, &quoute;Przeciwdziałanie korupcji w praktyce. Polityka antykorupcyjna w polskiej administracji publicznej.&quoute;, Instytut Spraw Publicznych, Warsaw, 2013

4. Example of a report by Supreme Chamber of Control: Najwyższa Izba Kontroli, &quoute;Informacja o wynikach kontroli stanu realizacji wybranych inwestycji podjętych w ramach „Programu inwestycyjnego NATO w dziedzinie bezpieczeństwa”&quoute;, Warsaw, KOB-4101-02-00/2010, July 2011

5. Legal basis of the Functioning of the Supreme Chamber of Control, (accessed: 19.05.2015), https://www.nik.gov.pl/o-nik/podstawy-prawne-dzialania-nik/

6. Central Anti-Corruption Bureau,Tasks, (accessed: 19.05.2015), http://www.cba.gov.pl/pl/o-cba/zadania/350,zadania.html

7. 'The Challenges of the Anti-Corruption Policy&quoute;, Conference held by MoD on February 21 2015, (accessed: 19.05.2015), http://www.antykorupcja.gov.pl/ak/aktualnosci/11602,Wyzwania-polityki-antykorupcyjnej-w-resorcie-obrony-narodowej.html

8. Interview with Interviewee 1: Senior Ministry of Defence Official, Warsaw, Poland, 25 April 2014

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: In 2014, an assessment of corruption risk in the defence sector was conducted within the Polish MOD and Polish Armed Forces. The MoD's Anticorruption Procedures Bureau was responsible for this process. This audit was also connected with Government Anticorruption Strategy 2014-2019.

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The example of a relevant assessment is &quoute;Przewidywane zagrożenia korupcyjne w Polsce&quoute; (accessed 11.06.14) https://cba.gov.pl/ftp/zdjecia/Przewidywane_zagrozenia_korupcyjne_w_Polsce_15_02.pdf

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

11.
score
3

Does the country have a process for acquisition planning that involves clear oversight, and is it publicly available?

The Polish acquisitions process is publicly available. The main legal and executive acts structuring the process are the MOD Decisions on acquisition planning, budget planning, procurement and disposal of assets, as well as the 2015 law on the Military Property Agency and attendant Cabinet decisions [2-5, 7-9].

Since March 2011, the Shared Services Centre has had the status of the central government procuring body, responsible for public procurement for the central government departments and under direct supervision of the Head of Chancellery of the Prime Minister. The Centre publishes a list of all public procurement projects (with the financial data and criteria clearly stipulated), including the list of the participants and winners of the tenders [1]. The Ministry of National Defence decision 103/MON from 2014 regulates the acquisition rules for the Armed Forces (under the supervision of the Chief of General Staff), while the decision 92/MON from 2011 establishes the budgetary procedures, including clear, hierarchical oversight.

The users of each product are identified as responsible for its maintenance and repairs. Toward the end of the product's life cycle, the Military Property Agency is responsible for its disposal (it also deals with military real estate). The MPA's activities are regulated by the 2015 Law on MPA and related Cabinet decisions on processes and procedures.[4-5] It is overseen by the Minister of National Defence and subject to audits by the Supreme Chamber of Control.


RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 1: Agree. Score changed to 3.

RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: Comments incorporated/analysis updated.

COMMENTS -+

1. Centrum Usług Wspólnych, &quoute;Zadania i kompetencje&quoute;, accessed: 20.04.2014, http://www.bip.cuw.gov.pl/cuw/zadania-i-kompetencje/1130,Zadania-i-kompetencje.html

2. Minister of National Defence, &quoute;Decision no. 103/MON on the execution of acquistion planning&quoute;, 31 March 2014, Dziennik Urzędowy Ministra Obrony Narodowej, Warsaw. http://www.dz.urz.mon.gov.pl/dziennik/pozycja/decyzja-105-decyzja-nr-103mon-z-dnia-31-marca-2014-r-w-sprawie-zasad-opracowywania-i-realizacji-centralnych-planow-rzeczowych/, accessed September 2015.

3. Minister of National Defence, &quoute;Decision no. 92/MON on the budget planning and implementation&quoute;, Dziennik Urzędowy Ministra Obrony Narodowej, Warsaw, 2014. http://www.dz.urz.mon.gov.pl/dziennik/pozycja/decyzja-101-decyzja-nr-92mon-z-dnia-21-marca-2014-r-w-sprawie-szczegolowego-trybu-postepowania-w-zakresie-kwalifikacji-zamowien-i-oceny-wystepowania-p/, accessed September 2015.

4. Law on the Military Property Agency, July 2015. http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/DetailsServlet?id=WDU20150001322, accessed September 2015.

5. Cabinet and MOD decisions related to the functioning of the Military Property Agency, The Online Legal Acts Repository. http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/KeyWordServlet?viewName=thasA&passName=Agencja%20Mienia%20Wojskowego, accessed September 2015.

6. 'Anticorruption Mechanisms in Poland. A Monitoring Report', published by the Institute of Public Affairs ed. Aleksandra Kobylińska, Marek Solon-Lipiński, Grzegorz Makowski, Warsaw 2012, p.77.

7. Minister of National Defence, &quoute;Decision no. 25/MON on introducing &quoute;Guidelines for the Review of Needs of the Polish armed forces&quoute;&quoute;, 7 February 2014. http://www.dz.urz.mon.gov.pl/zasoby/dziennik/pozycje/tresc-aktow/pdf/2014/02/Poz._44_dec._Nr_25.pdf, accessed October 2015.

8. Minister of National Defence, &quoute;Decision no. 72/MON on procurement of military equipment and services for the Polish armed forces', 25 March 2013. http://www.dz.urz.mon.gov.pl/zasoby/dziennik/pozycje/tresc-aktow/pdf/2013/03/Poz._78_dec._Nr_72.pdf, accessed October 2015.

9. &quoute;Decision 444/MON on introducing new military equipment and withdrawing from use equipment which no longer fulfils the requirements of the armed forces.&quoute; 30 December 2013. http://www.dz.urz.mon.gov.pl/zasoby/dziennik/pozycje/tresc-aktow/pdf/2013/12/Poz._397_dec__Nr_444.pdf, accessed October 2015.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: I suggest score 3. According to Poland’s National Integrity System study, the Shared Services Centre does not fulfill its new function in a comprehensive way, as the majority of public procurement is still processed separately by the ministries.

Source: 'Anticorruption Mechanisms in Poland. A Monitoring Report', published by the Institute of Public Affairs ed. Aleksandra Kobylińska, Marek Solon-Lipiński, Grzegorz Makowski, Warsaw 2012, p.77

Suggested score: 3

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Ministry of National Defence decision no. 103/MON dated 31 March 2014 has replaced the Ministry of National Defence decision no. 7/MON, but rules described in the comment above haven't changed.
Source:
http://www.dz.urz.mon.gov.pl/dziennik/pozycja/decyzja-105-decyzja-nr-103mon-z-dnia-31-marca-2014-r-w-sprawie-zasad-opracowywania-i-realizacji-centralnych-planow-rzeczowych/

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

12.
score
4

Is the defence budget transparent, showing key items of expenditure? This would include comprehensive information on military R&D, training, construction, personnel expenditures, acquisitions, disposal of assets, and maintenance.

Both acquisition and budgetary rules are clear and publicly available with a clear chain of command, expenditures, priorities and property. The budget is broken down into detailed lines of expenditures, available both in legal documents [3,4, 7] and in a more comprehensible format for the general public [5]. In particular, the acquisition budgeting, personnel costs, scientific grants, disposal and acquisitions of assets are singled out in the aforementioned documents It is worth mentioning that the transparent budgeting not only discloses expenditures formally labeled as defence, but also those paid for by the R&D and state academic subsidies [5].

The budgeting rules are formalised in the MoD 2014 decision [4], while the the long-term technical modernisation is regulated by the the &quoute;Rebuilding and Technical Modernization and Polish Armed Forces' Finance Act&quoute;, which sets the level of expenditure on national defence at a level not lower than 1.95% of GDP and the priority tasks established by the government [6].

RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER AND PEER REVIEWER 2: Incorporated sources and comments.

COMMENTS -+

1. &quoute;Rebuilding and Technical Modernization and Polish Armed Forces' Finance Act of 25 May 2001&quoute;, Dziennik Ustaw, no. 67, 2009

2. Minister of National Defence, &quoute;Decision no. 103/MON on the execution of acquisition planning&quoute;, Dziennik Urzędowy Ministra Obrony Narodowej, Warsaw, No. 4, position 105, 2014

3. Minister of National Defence, &quoute;Decision no. 63/MON on the budget planning and implementation&quoute;, Dziennik Urzędowy Ministra Obrony Narodowej, Warsaw, 6.03.2014, position 76, 2014

4. Minister of National Defence, &quoute;Decision no. 34/MON on the budgetary planning for 2015&quoute;, Dziennik Urzędowy Ministra Obrony Narodowej, Warsaw, position 32, 2015, accessed: 20.05.2015, http://www.dz.urz.mon.gov.pl/zasoby/dziennik/pozycje/tresc-aktow/pdf/2015/02/Poz._32_dec._Nr_34.pdf

5. &quoute;Basic Information on the Military Budget for 2015&quoute;, Ministry of National Defence, (accessd: 20.05.2015), http://mon.gov.pl/z/pliki/dokumenty/rozne/2015/04/budzet_2015_pol.pdf

6. Council of Ministers, &quoute;The priority tasks of technical modernization of Polish Armed Forces&quoute;
established by resolution of the Council of Ministers no 164 from 17 September 2013. We can find there amounts, and priority tasks of modernization with financials guarantees.&quoute;, accessed: 03.04.2014, http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/Download;jsessionid=E7C639A63E9599A0F21CE2A58B65BBDD?id=WMP20130000796&type=2

7. Budgetary Act 2015. Dziennik Ustaw Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, 29 January 2015. file:///C:/Users/karolina/Downloads/D20150153.pdf, accessed September 2015.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Additional sources:

Minister of National Defence, &quoute;Decision no. 7/MON on the execution of acquisition planning&quoute;, Dziennik Urzędowy Ministra Obrony Narodowej, Warsaw, No. 1, position 6, 2008, was replaced with decision: no 103/MON on the execution of acquisition planning
Source:
http://www.dz.urz.mon.gov.pl/dziennik/pozycja/decyzja-105-decyzja-nr-103mon-z-dnia-31-marca-2014-r-w-sprawie-zasad-opracowywania-i-realizacji-centralnych-planow-rzeczowych/

I would also add the governmental multiannual program (2014-2022), &quoute;The priority tasks of technical modernization of Polish Armed Forces&quoute;, adopted by resolution of the Council of Ministers no 164 from 17 September 2013. The program contains priority tasks for modernization with financial guarantees and amount of spending.

Source:
https://www.premier.gov.pl/wydarzenia/decyzje-rzadu/uchwala-w-sprawie-ustanowienia-programu-wieloletniego-priorytetowe-zadania.html
http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/Download;jsessionid=E7C639A63E9599A0F21CE2A58B65BBDD?id=WMP20130000796&type=2

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Defence budget overview can be found at the web-page of the Ministry of Defence (accessed 11.06.14) http://mon.gov.pl/z/pliki/dokumenty/rozne/2014/04/podstawowe_informacje_o_budzecie_resortu_ON_na_2014_r.pdf.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

12A.
score
4

Is there a legislative committee (or other appropriate body) responsible for defence budget scrutiny and analysis in an effective way, and is this body provided with detailed, extensive, and timely information on the defence budget?

The National Defence Committee gives its opinion and recommendations on the defence budget and oversees its implementation, as stipulated in Paragraph 14 of Annex 1 to the Statute of Sejm of the Republic of Poland, July 30, 1992 [1]. Day-to-day analysis and recommendations are prepared by the Subcommittee on Budget and Military Infrastructure.

The National Defence Committee submits an opinion during the drafting of the budget proposal as well as an evaluation of the implementation of the Ministry of National Defence's budget plan . The evaluation covers the Ministry's income, revenue, underutilised funds (e.g. due to the lagging public procurement payments) and labour costs.

The Committee's assessment takes into consideration the evaluations submitted by the Supreme Chamber of Control and the budget information it receives is detailed, as the budget itself contains detailed categories. [3]

The Committee's opinion weighs heavily on the acceptance of the draft budget or the evaluation of the budgetary implementation. A negative recommendation could possibly influence the vote in the Committee on Public Expenses, and, in turn, the plenary vote; however in the analysed period that was not the case, so its effective power is hard to asses. The Committee accepted the 2015 budget proposal by 14 votes to 6. [2, 4]

COMMENTS -+

1. Annex 1 to the Statute of Sejm of the Republic of Poland, July 30, 1992

2. Sejm of Republic of Poland, &quoute;National Defence Committee Agenda for 2014&quoute;, accessed: 20.04.2014 http://www.sejm.gov.pl/sejm7.nsf/agent.xsp?symbol=PRACEKOMST&NrKadencji=7&KodKom=OBN

3. National Defence Committee, &quoute;Opinion no. 6 on the Implementation of Ministry of National Defence Budget in 2012&quoute;, 19 July, 2013, accessed: 20.04.2014, http://orka.sejm.gov.pl/opinie7.nsf/nazwa/obn_o6/$file/obn_o6.pdf

4. 'Komisja Obrony Narodowej przyjęła projekt budżetu na 2015 r.', Defence 24.pl, 23 October 2015, http://www.defence24.pl/news_komisja-obrony-narodowej-przyjela-projekt-budzetu-na-2015-r, accessed September 2015.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

12B.
score
3

Is the approved defence budget made publicly available? In practice, can citizens, civil society, and the media obtain detailed information on the defence budget?

The defence budgets are available in official legislative papers, as well as on the Ministry's website.
The Access to Public Information Act of 2001 is mentioned on the Ministry of National Defence's website as a legal base for applying for public information [7]. There are also specific rules on the acces to the public information regarding the MoD documents. [5]

The budget plan, available on the Ministry's website covers (among others) military personnel costs, exercises and technical modernisation expenditures, military education and healthcare system and Poland's contributions to EDA research programmes [3.4].

While media reports cricise the lack of in-depth transparency of budgeting, all requested information, including sensitive (but not classified) information on modernisation programmes, acquisitions etc. was made available under the Access to the Public Infomation Act. [6]. However, broader application of the Public Information Act has been criticised (see Question 29) which could impact budget transparency as well. Accordingly, a top score has not been awarded.

COMMENTS -+

1. Ministry of National Defence, &quoute;Assets&quoute;,20.04.2014, accessed: 20.04.2014 http://www.bip.mon.gov.pl/79.html

2. Minister of National Defence, &quoute;Decision no. 29/MON on the budgetary planning for 2014&quoute;, Dziennik Urzędowy Ministra Obrony Narodowej, Warsaw, item 45, 2013, accessed: 20.04.2014, http://www.dz.urz.mon.gov.pl/zasoby/dziennik/pozycje/tresc-aktow/pdf/2014/02/Poz._45_dec._Nr_29.pdf
Minister of National Defence, &quoute;Basic Information on the MoD Budget for 2014&quoute;, accessed: 03.08.2014,
http://mon.gov.pl/z/pliki/dokumenty/rozne/2014/04/podstawowe_informacje_o_budzecie_resortu_ON_na_2014_r.pdf

3. Minister of National Defence, &quoute;Decision no. 34/MON on the budgetary planning for 2015&quoute;, Dziennik Urzędowy Ministra Obrony Narodowej, Warsaw, position 32, 2015, accessed: 20.05.2015, http://www.dz.urz.mon.gov.pl/zasoby/dziennik/pozycje/tresc-aktow/pdf/2015/02/Poz._32_dec._Nr_34.pdf

4. &quoute;Basic Information on the Military Budget for 2015&quoute;, Ministry of National Defence, (accessd: 20.05.2015), http://mon.gov.pl/z/pliki/dokumenty/rozne/2015/04/budzet_2015_pol.pdf

5. Minister of National Defence, &quoute;Decision no 209/2014 regarding access to the public information&quoute;, Dziennik Urzędowy Ministra Obrony Narodowej, position 172, Warsaw, 2015, (accessed: 20.05.2015), http://bip.mon.gov.pl/u/pliki/udostepnianie-informacji-publicznej/2014/07/Poz._172_dec._Nr_209.pdf

6. Maciej Miłosz Tajna modernizacja Siemoniaka: MON wydaje miliardy na modernizację armii, ale nie wiadomo co kupuje, &quoute;Dziennik Gazeta Prawna&quoute;, 12.02.2015, (accessed: 20.05.2015), http://biznes.gazetaprawna.pl/artykuly/853058,tajna-modernizacja-siemoniaka-mon-wydaje-miliardy-na-modernizacje-armii-ale-nie-wiadomo-co-kupuje.html

7. &quoute;Public Information Act of 2001&quoute;, Dziennik Ustaw, pos. 782, 2014, accessed: 10.07.2015, http://bip.mon.gov.pl/u/pliki/udostepnianie-informacji-publicznej/2014/07/Dz.U._2014_poz_782.pdf

8. Waiting for Open Government, Opening Report by the Polish Open Government Coalition. Conclusions and recommendations (2014) http://otwartyrzad.org.pl/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/Waiting_for_Open_Government_Poland.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: I would add one source:
http://mon.gov.pl/z/pliki/dokumenty/rozne/2014/04/podstawowe_informacje_o_budzecie_resortu_ON_na_2014_r.pdf
It's a Power Point presentation posted on the MOD website with information about budget plan and description of main tasks.

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

13.
score
4

Are sources of defence income other than from central government allocation (from equipment sales or property disposal, for example) published and scrutinised?

Alternative military income is listed in the defence budget, even when managed by semi-autonomous agencies such as the Military Property Agency, which is tasked with selling or otherwise managing real estate and other military property.

This policy is stipulated by executive decision of the Ministry (Decision 42/MON in 2014). The details are published in subsequent annexes to said decision [2]. The general income structure is published in annex 3, while a detailed alternative income source (e.g. the Military Property Agency) is published in annex 7. The Law on the Modernisation of the Armed Forces obliges the MPA to convey 93% of the income that it generates to the Fund for the Modernisation of the Armed Forces. [3, 4]

Public scrutiny is likely as the data is made available online. The Supreme Chamber of Control also oversees the execution of the overall budget and occasionally audits the Agency's performance (the last audit was conducted in 2006, analysing performance between 2002-2005). [5]

COMMENTS -+

1. Minister of National Defence, &quoute;Decision no. 42/MON on the budget for 2013&quoute;, Dziennik Urzędowy Ministra Obrony Narodowej, item 49, 2014, accessed: 25.04.2014, http://www.bip.mon.gov.pl/pliki/file/PRAWO_inne/Poz__49_dec__Nr_42_budzet.pdf

2. &quoute;Appendix to the decision no. 42/MON&quoute;, Dziennik Urzędowy Ministra Obrony Narodowej, item 49, 2014, accessed: 25.04.2014, http://www.dz.urz.mon.gov.pl/zasoby/dziennik/pozycje/zalaczniki/2013/02/Zal._do_Poz._49_2.pdf

3. The Agency for Military Property, 'About the Agency'. http://www.amw.com.pl/pl/a/o-agencji-1, accessed September 2015.

4. Law on the Modernisation of the Polish Armed Forces, 2014. http://isip.sejm.gov.pl/Download?id=WDU20090670570&type=3, accessed September 2015.

5. Supreme Chamber of Control, 'Gospodarowanie przez Agencję Mienia Wojskowego składnikami mienia Skarbu Państwa w latach 2002 - 2005', 2006. https://www.nik.gov.pl/kontrole/wyniki-kontroli-nik/pobierz,px_2006127.pdf,typ,k.pdf, accessed September 2015.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

14.
score
3

Is there an effective internal audit process for defence ministry expenditure (that is, for example, transparent, conducted by appropriately skilled individuals, and subject to parliamentary oversight)?

The Public Finance Act of 2009 stipulates (in article 272) that &quoute;independent and objective&quoute; internal audit must be conducted in all ministries. The audit report can be obtained by the general public upon request (article 284 of The Public Finance Act of 2009) as this report is &quoute;public information&quoute; (&quoute;public information&quoute; is understood in accordance with the Access to Information Act of 2001). There is a degree of parliamentary scrutiny, with MOD staff providing briefings for the Sejm's National Defence Committee on the tasks and focus of internal control. [6] The Supreme Chamber of Control also assesses the effectiveness of internal audit departments and the degree to which their recommendations have been implemented; 2012 report found that the recommendations of the audit department had been implemented.

The 2014 decision of the Minister of National Defence (no. 63/MON) determines the units involved in the budgetary planning and oversight, with the coordinating roles of the Department of Budgets (in the implementation phase) and the Department of Internal Audit (in the oversight phase). Additionally, the Department of Control oversees the general functioning of the MOD and the effectiveness of different departments, including the way they spend allocated budgets.

In 2013, the MOD implemented the Regulation of the System of Internal Control, amending the procedures of internal control audit. However, a 2015 report of the Supreme Chamber of Control noted a delay in the implementation of the system within the armed forces. [4]

COMMENTS -+

1. Interview with Interviewee 1: Senior Ministry of Defence Official, Warsaw, Poland, April 25

2. Minister of National Defence, &quoute;Decision no. 63/MON on the planning and implementation of the Ministry of National Defence budget&quoute;, Dziennik Urzędowy Ministra Obrony Narodowej, item 76, 2014, accessed: 25.04.2014, http://www.iwsz.wp.mil.pl/plik/file/pobranie2/Poz__76_dec__Nr_63.pdf

3. Committee on National Defence, &quoute;Work Timetable&quoute;, accessed: 25.04.2014, http://orka.sejm.gov.pl/opinie7.nsf/nazwa/plan_obn/$file/plan_obn.pdf

4. Supreme Chamber of Control, 'Audit Summary', 25 January 2015. https://www.nik.gov.pl/kontrole/wyniki-kontroli-nik/pobierz,kon~p_14_011_201410151255591413377759~01,typ,kk.pdf, accessed September 2015.

5. Supreme Chamber of Control, 'Audit Summary', 10 January 2012. https://www.google.co.uk/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CCAQFjAAahUKEwigsqaj_Z7IAhWB1hoKHVyHCeU&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.nik.gov.pl%2Fkontrole%2Fwyniki-kontroli-nik%2Fpobierz%2Ckbf~p_11_022_201203021123551330683835~id3~01%2Ctyp%2Ckj.pdf&usg=AFQjCNEItZwrfTVK6eXIIB7u1hr_rAo1Qw&bvm=bv.103627116,d.bGQ, accessed September 2015.

6. Committee for National Defence, Sejm, 'Official Report of the meeting of 10 September 2014'. http://orka.sejm.gov.pl/zapisy7.nsf/0/2A83215E0DF9603FC1257D56003038AD/%24File/0367607.pdf, accessed September 2015.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: I think that it is worth adding that according to the 'Report for 2013 on the execution of tasks of the Audit Committee within the National Defence Sector Administration', in 2013 the Regulation of the System of Internal Control has been implemented in the MoD (the tangible effect of the Audit Committee's reccommendation). The conclusions of the Report were positive.

,,Report for 2013 on execution of tasks of the Audit Committee within the National Defence Sector Administration&quoute;, pp. 5-6: http://www.bip.mon.gov.pl/pliki/file/KOMITET%20AUDYTU/Sprawozdanie%20Komitetu%20audytu%20za%202013%20r%20.pdf (accessed June 6, 2014).

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

15.
score
4

Is there effective and transparent external auditing of military defence expenditure?

The Supreme Chamber of Control is an independent institution, with its President elected by the Lower Chamber of the Parliament (with the consent of the Upper Chamber) for a 7-year term. It is tasked with budgetary and efficiency auditing of the state's and local government programmes and institutions, including the military. It conducts an annual budget review, presenting its findings to the Committee on National Defence and the general public. [1, 2, 4] In addition, it conducts programme-oriented audits, assessing their efficiency and financing and highlighting potential areas of improvement [2].

Supreme Chamber's plans of the external audits for 2014 included [3]:
- way of use governmental subsidies and grants (Military Health Service);
- procurement of munitions for the Polish Armed Forces;
- way of use governmental subsidies and support implemented in the Polish Defence Holding (research, development and implementation)..
- part 29 of budget (defence budget - MOD and Armed Forces expenses).

The audit report for 2012 points to shortcomings in implementing the Chamber's recommendations; the 2014 report indicates improvement, stating that most of the Chamber's recommendations have been implemented. [2, 4]

COMMENTS -+

1. Supreme Chamber of Control, &quoute;The Analysis of the Implementation of the State Budget and the Monetary Policy Guidelines for 2012&quoute;, accessed: 25.04.2014, http://www.nik.gov.pl/kontrole/analiza-budzetu-panstwa

2. Supreme Chamber of Control, &quoute;Information on the Implementation of the State Budget Part 29: National Defence and the Implementation of the Financial Guidelines of the Armed Forces Modernisation Fund in 2012&quoute;, accessed: 25.04.2014, http://www.nik.gov.pl/kontrole/wyniki-kontroli-nik/kontrole,12072.html

3. Supreme Chamber of Control, &quoute;Agenda for 2014&quoute;, accessed: 03.04.2014, https://www.nik.gov.pl/plik/id,5824.pdf

4. Supreme Chamber of Control, &quoute;Information on the Implementation of the State Budget Part 29: National Defence and the Implementation of the Financial Guidelines of the Armed Forces Modernisation Fund for 2014&quoute;, May 2015. https://www.nik.gov.pl/plik/id,8949.pdf, accessed September 2015.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Plan of the external audits for 2014 includes:
- use of governmental subsidies and grants (Military Health Service);
- supply of munitions for the Polish Armed Forces;
- use of governmental subsidies and support implemented in the Polish Defence Holding (research, development and implementation)..
- part 29 of the budget (defence budget - MOD and Armed Forces expenses).
Source:
https://www.nik.gov.pl/plik/id,5824.pdf

Finished audits (examples):
- Regularity of the spending public funds for real estate investments of Ministry of National Defence;
-“NATO investment programme in the area of security” where Supreme Chamber showed that the planned costs had been significantly exceeded in each of them, in the extreme case they were even doubled and negatively evaluated four investments;
- Supreme Chamber has completed the audit of military special forces, positively evaluating their ability to conduct operational activities.

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

16.
score
4

Is there evidence that the country's defence institutions have controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country's natural resource exploitation and, if so, are these interests publicly stated and subject to scrutiny?

There is no evidence that defence institutions have controlling or financial interests in businesses connected with the natural resources industry. Two of Poland's most important resources are coal and gas, and there are no reports of the armed forces being involved in exploitation of either. The strength of oversight over the defence budget makes the likelihood of this information not becoming public very small.

COMMENTS -+

1. &quoute;Proclamation of the Minister of the National Defence of May 31 2011 on the list of the organizational units subjected or subordinated to the Minister of National Defence&quoute;, accessed: 27.04.2014, http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/DetailsServlet?id=WMP20110450506

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

17.
score
2

Is there evidence, for example through media investigations or prosecution reports, of a penetration of organised crime into the defence and security sector? If no, is there evidence that the government is alert and prepared for this risk?

There are several examples of corruption, ties between the military and organised crime and even the existence of organised crime within the Armed Forces themselves. Observers point to the negative selection in the Armed Forces during the conscription era (the conscription was mostly limited to people who were not able to go to the university), enabling criminal elements to infiltrate the military and exploit its assets [5]. The main areas of activity include corruption in small public procurement (usually on the local scale, which is more difficult for the Prosecution and the media to spot [3], fraud and extortion. Annual loses are estimated at hundreds of millions of zloty [1].

A recent case in Gdynia, involving corruption during tenders to provide the security services with military equipment in northern Poland, not only highlights the aforementioned problems but also the informal networks influencing the military procurement system from outside [4]. The security services business in Poland is largely comprised of former soldiers, intelligence officers and policemen who utilise their contacts to obtain lucrative public contracts [5].

State institutions appear to be aware of the issue: the 2014-2019 Anti-Corruption Plan notes that corruption and organised crime often go hand in hand and some cases have been uncovered by the police, military police and the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau.[6, 7] However, there is no specific analysis of the degree to which the defence sector is at risk from organised crime. [6]

COMMENTS -+

1. Newsweek Polska, &quoute;Przestępczość w armii przyniosła w 2011 setki milionów złotych strat&quoute;, January 23, 2012, accessed: 28.04.2014, http://polska.newsweek.pl/przestepczosc-w-armii-przyniosla-w-2011-r--setki-mln-zl-strat,86486,1,1.html

2. Wirtualna Polska, &quoute;Afera korupcyjna w bazie lotniczej w Malborku zatacza coraz szersze kregi&quoute;, September 19, 2013, accessed: 28.04.2014, http://konflikty.wp.pl/kat,1020231,title,Afera-korupcyjna-w-bazie-lotniczej-w-Malborku-zatacza-coraz-szersze-kregi,wid,16001754,wiadomosc.html?ticaid=112a37

3. Polskie Radio, &quoute;Kierował grupą przestępczą w armii: więzienie i degradacja&quoute;, 31 December, 2013, accessed: 28.04.2014, http://www.polskieradio.pl/5/3/Artykul/1013965,Kierowal-grupa-przestepcza-w-armii-wiezienie-i-degradacja,

4. Dziennik Bałtycki, &quoute;Afera korupcyjna w Gdyni. 7 podejrzanych ws. przetargów na ochronę obiektów wojskowych&quoute;, February 27, 2014, accessed: 28.04.2014, http://www.dziennikbaltycki.pl/artykul/3348265,afera-korupcyjna-w-gdyni-7-podejrzanych-ws-przetargow-na-ochrone-obiektow-wojskowych,id,t.html,

5. Interview with Interviewee 1: Senior Ministry of Defence Official, Warsaw, Poland, 25 April 2014

6. Government Anti-corruption Programme for 2014 - 19, (accessed: 19.05.20150, http://cba.gov.pl/pl/newsy-serwisu-antykorup/3062,Uchwala-RM-ws-Rzadowego-programu-przeciwdzialania-korupcji-na-lata-2014-2019.html.

7. Zofia Magdziak, 'Dziesięć lat więzienia grozi zatrzymanym w sprawie korupcji w wojsku', Rzeczpospolita, 15 February 2013. http://www4.rp.pl/artykul/981189-Dziesiec-lat-wiezienia-grozi-zatrzymanym-w-sprawie-korupcji-w-wojsku.html, accessed September 2015.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: I would add 2 other cases detected by the Military Police in cooperation with the police:
- a corruption and organised crime group in the Navy - military vessel repairs (16 people involved)
source:
http://www.radiogdansk.pl/index.php/wydarzenia/item/14507-ustawiali-przetargi-na-okrety-korupcja-w-marynarce-wojennej.html

- corruption and organised crime group in military infrastructure
source:
http://www.rp.pl/artykul/981189.html

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The alleged involvement of high-ranking MOD officials in corrupt practices validates the score.

Source: http://www.forbes.pl/lobbysci-atakuja-ministerstwo-obrony-narodowej-skrzypczak-ich-wrogiem,artykuly,165045,1,1.html (accessed on 11.06.14)

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

18.
score
3

Is there policing to investigate corruption and organised crime within the defence services and is there evidence of the effectiveness of this policing?

The central Anti-Corruption Bureau has operated in Poland since 2006 and is tasked specifically with combating corruption, bribery and fraud [5]. It has conducted several successful investigations in the &quoute;wider&quoute; security sector, such as the recent IT corruption investigation in the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. [6]

In 2013, it signed an agreement of co-operation with the Ministry of National Defence with the intention of tackling corruption in the Armed Forces [1,3]. However, especially in the 2005 - 2007 period, the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau has been accused of acting on a partisan agenda and pursuing cases serving the political interest of the then-government. It is worth noting that these accusations seem to have been addressed by the reform following the Constitutional Court rule on the necessary limits of the CBA activity [7].

Other institutions tasked with handling military corruption and organised crime include: the Military Prosecutor's Office, the Military Counterintelligence Service and the Military Police. The Military Police and the Prosecutor's Office have been accused of being inefficient, understaffed and lacking proper oversight of the Armed Forces. The Military Counterintelligence Service has been criticised for the handling of Deputy Minister Skrzypczak's case, in which the Secretary of State in the Ministry of National Defence has been denied security clearance due to the suspicions of unregistered lobbying activity - but no charges were filed [4]. The lack of transparency of the Counterintelligence Service raised questions about the influence of lobbying from defence companies involved in arms procurement. As a result, both the Deputy Minister Skrzypczak and the Head of the Military Counterintelligence Service were forced to resign. [4]

In 2011-2012, the Military Police in cooperation with the police detected 3 cases connected with corruption and organised crime groups (2 cases in Gdynia and 1 in Malbork), 41 cases connected with corruption. Military Police also cooperates with Central Anticorruption Bureau and Counterintelligence Service. In 2013, the Military Police conducted 35 investigations into corruption-related offences.[9, 10]

RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: Information incorporated and score 3 selected. The policing institutions are specifically mandated to investigate corruption, though less so organised crime; there is evidence of their effectiveness; but at the same time, there are doubts as to their independence from political and/or lobbying influence.

COMMENTS -+

1. Krzysztof Sobczak, &quoute;MON i CBA będą wspólnie walczyć z korupcją w wojsku&quoute;, Lex, October 21, 2013, accessed: 15.04.2014, http://www.lex.pl/czytaj/-/artykul/mon-i-cba-beda-wspolnie-walczyc-z-korupcja-w-wojsku

2. Konrad Kołek, &quoute;Kompetencje Żandarmerii Wojskowej i Policji w zakresie ścigania tzw. przestępstw pospolitych popełnionych przez żołnierzy w służbie czynnej&quoute;, Edukacja Prawnicza, October 12, 2009, accessed: 15.04.2014, http://www.edukacjaprawnicza.pl/newslettery/a/pokaz/c/aktualnosc/art/kompetencje-zandarmerii-wojskowej-i-policji-w-zakresie-scigania-tzw-przestepstw-pospolitych-popelnionych-przez-zolnierzy-w-sluzbie-czynnej/login/przypomnij.html?print=1&cHash=ac3175130ade690af55bd4462b7e3c65

3. Izabela Kacprzak, &quoute;Jak powstała tarcza antykorupcyjna?&quoute;, Rzeczpospolita, September 7, 2011, accessed: 15.04.2014, http://www.rp.pl/artykul/713306.html,

4. Stanisław Żaryn, &quoute;Rządzącym domniemana korupcja w wojsku nie przeszkadza? Rząd przyznaje: sprawa Skrzypczaka nas już nic nie obchodzi&quoute;, April 4, 2014, accessed: 15.04.2014,
http://wpolityce.pl/polityka/190054-rzadzacym-domniemana-korupcja-w-wojsku-nie-przeszkadza-rzad-przyznaje-sprawa-skrzypczaka-nas-juz-nic-nie-obchodzi

5. &quoute;Bill of June 9 2006 on the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau&quoute;, accessed: 01.07.2015, isip.sejm.gov.pl/Download?id=WDU20061040708&type=3

6. Onet.pl, &quoute;The Tendergate in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs&quoute;, November 19 2013, accessed: 01.07.2015, http://wiadomosci.onet.pl/kraj/afera-przetargowa-w-msz-akcja-cba/4fv6s

7. Gazeta Prawna, &quoute;The Constitutional Court: Parts of the CBA Bill Unconstitutional&quoute; June 23 2009, accessed: 01.07.2015, http://www.gazetaprawna.pl/wiadomosci/artykuly/331342,tk_czesc_ustawy_o_cba_sprzeczna_z_konstytucja_bedzie_reforma_biura.html

8. Zofia Magdziak, 'Dziesięć lat więzienia grozi zatrzymanym w sprawie korupcji w wojsku', Rzeczpospolita, 15 February 2013. http://www4.rp.pl/artykul/981189-Dziesiec-lat-wiezienia-grozi-zatrzymanym-w-sprawie-korupcji-w-wojsku.html, accessed September 2015.

9. Central Anti-Corruption Bureau, 'Mapa korupcji 2013', November 2014. http://antykorupcja.gov.pl/download/4/13359/MapakorupcjiStanprzestepczoscikorupcyjnejwPolscew2013r.pdf, accessed September 2015.

10. Central Anti-Corruption Bureau, 'Mapa korupcji 2012', issued 2013. https://cba.gov.pl/ftp/filmy/Mapa%20korupcji%202013.pdf, accessed September 2015.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: In 2011-2012, the Military Police in cooperation with the police detected 3 cases connected with corruption and organised crime groups (2 cases in Gdynia and 1 in Malbork), 41 cases connected with corruption. Military Police also cooperates with Central Anticorruption Bureau and Counterintelligence Service (special agreements). More details and evidence about detection of corruption cases are available in the 'Map of Corruption', a tailored statistical document.

Source:
http://www.antykorupcja.gov.pl/ftp/filmy/Mapa%20korupcji%202013.pdf

Suggested score: 3

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

19.
score
3

Are the policies, administration, and budgets of the intelligence services subject to effective, properly resourced, and independent oversight?

Intelligence services in Poland include the Military Intelligence Service, the Military Counter-Intelligence Service, the Agency for Internal Security and the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau.

The intelligence services oversight apparatus has been undergoing profound changes. Both the legislative acts regulating the work of individual intelligence agencies and the oversight structure within the Chancellery of the Prime Minister of Poland are being reformed, with the intent of providing clearer division of labour and more accountable oversight [2,3].

Among the most recent changes, the old Intelligence Services Council will be replaced by the Council of Ministers Committee on State Security, encompassing the Chancellery of the Prime Minister, heads of intelligence services and ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defence, Interior, Finance and Justice. The Intelligence Agency will be answering directly to the Prime Minister, while other secret services will be assigned to their respective ministries, with the Minister of National Defence acting as a supervisor of the Military Intelligence Service and the Military Counterintelligence Service [2].

Legislative oversight over budgets, procedures and administration of the intelligence services is delivered by the Intelligence Oversight Committee. The Committee has the formal right to supervise budgets and operations of the intelligence service, including cross- examination of the heads of the intelligence services during the committee's session[1]. Committee members can also access classified information, subject to a security check. [10] The committee's sessions are closed to the public.

Recent media accusations, however, stipulate that the budgetary oversight has been compromised by long-term fraud in the Intelligence Agency, which, while known to the criminal justice authorities, has not been properly prosecuted, with only one low-ranking officer being put on trial [6]. Whether this negligence is motivated by security issues associated with the Intelligence Agency's sensitive position or is an example of state inefficiency remains unclear. Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights and other civil society organisations have long pointed out to the limitations of judicial and political oversight of the state service's surveillance competencies. Recently their voices were seconded by the report of the Supreme Chamber of Control, criticising the lack of political control and oversight of the intelligence services. According to the classified report's published overview, the secret services are left alone to 'police themselves [8]'.

COMMENTS -+

1. Sejm's Committee for Security Services website, accessed: 15.09.2015, http://www.sejm.gov.pl/Sejm7.nsf/agent.xsp?symbol=PRACEKOMST&NrKadencji=7&KodKom=KSS

2. Head of the Chancellery of the Prime Minister of Republic of Poland, &quoute;Order no. 7 Changing the Scope of the Competences of Senior Positions in the Chancellery&quoute;, March 25, 2014, accessed: 15.04.2014, http://bip.kprm.gov.pl/kpr/bip-kancelarii-prezesa/kierownictwo-kprm/2530,Zarzadzenie-Szefa-KPRM-w-sprawie-zakresu-zadan-osob-zajmujacych-kierownicze-stan.html?search=727851879

3. Ministry of the Interior, &quoute;Reform of the Intelligence Services - the Infographic&quoute;, accessed: 15.04.2014, http://www.thinglink.com/scene/42200642839222681

4. Paragraph 2 of Annex 1 to the Statute of Sejm of the Republic of Poland, July 30, 1992

5. Lucjan Bełza, &quoute;Positions of heads of the non-military security services&quoute;, National Security 20/2011, pp. 123-124

6. Polskie Radio, &quoute;Afera w Agencji Wywiadu. Przywłaszczyli sobie 1,5 mln zł?&quoute;, January 27, 2014, accessed: 15.04.2014, http://www.polskieradio.pl/5/3/Artykul/1034799,Afera-w-Agencji-Wywiadu-Przywlaszczyli-sobie-15-mln-zl

7. Helsinki Foundation of Human Rights, &quoute;Statement on the Reform of Security Services&quoute;, December 16, 2013, accessed: 01.09.2014, http://programy.hfhr.pl/monitoringprocesulegislacyjnego/stanowisko-hfpc-w-sprawie-reformy-sluzb-specjalnych/

8. Supreme Chamber of Control, &quoute;Statement on the Oversight of Secret Services&quoute;, August 26, 2014, accessed: 01.09.2014, http://www.nik.gov.pl/aktualnosci/nadzor-nad-sluzbami-specjalnymi.html,

9. Law on Protection of Classified Information, 5 August 2010. https://www.google.co.uk/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&sqi=2&ved=0CB0QFjAAahUKEwjBtpWUnJ_IAhUGOBoKHSYOAxA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fisip.sejm.gov.pl%2FDetailsServlet%3Fid%3DWDU20101821228&usg=AFQjCNE_-hnaMvPD8573FAwJMQ6wH8j3uA&bvm=bv.103627116,d.d24, accessed September 2015.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: We can also point to the statement made by the Helsinki Foundation of Human Rights regarding the above-mentioned reform of the intelligence services. In the statement the Foundation indicates that the new legislation does not meet expectations concerning clear regulations of the Internal Security Agency's competences, especially the one associated with the &quoute;electronic surveillance&quoute;.

The statement of the Helsinki Foundation of Human Rights on the reform of security services, 16.12. 2013: http://programy.hfhr.pl/monitoringprocesulegislacyjnego/stanowisko-hfpc-w-sprawie-reformy-sluzb-specjalnych/ (accessed on June 4, 2014)

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

20.
score
2

Are senior positions within the intelligence services filled on the basis of objective selection criteria, and are appointees subject to investigation of their suitability and prior conduct?

The laws on Military Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence Services and their personnel [5, 6], as well as associated government directives [7] lay out the procedure for appointments to posts within the secret services. It is, however, uncertain whether the recruitment criteria identified apply to senior management positions. The laws state that Directors of both services are appointed by the Prime Minister upon an application by the Defence Minister. The parliamentary Intelligence Oversight Committee, as well as the Council for Security Services composed of relevant government ministers and other high-ranking officials, are to scrutinise and provide opinions on the proposed appointments.[1, 5, 8]

However, media commentators point out that in practice, their nominations are political acts, with the government usually attempting to bring the services under its political control either through negotiating with the existing personnel or introducing people from outside the service under the banner of &quoute;fresh blood&quoute;. [2,3] While the positions of secret services heads are deemed naturally political, the observers point out that this politicisation and unclear criteria spread to middle ranks,sometimes undermining the independence of the services [4].

COMMENTS -+

1. Lucjan Bełza, &quoute;Positions of heads of the non-military security services&quoute;, National Security 20/2011, pp. 123 - 124

2. W Polityce, &quoute;Czystek w służbach specjalnych ciąg dalszy&quoute;, November 4, 2013, accessed: 29.04.2014, http://wpolityce.pl/polityka/170178-czystek-w-sluzbach-specjalnych-ciag-dalszy,

3. Gazeta Wrocławska, &quoute;Mariusz Kaminski - szef CBA - będzie zdymisjonowany&quoute;, October 7, 2009, accessed: 29.04.2014, http://www.gazetawroclawska.pl/artykul/170886,mariusz-kaminski-szef-cba-bedzie-zdymisjonowany,id,t.html

4. Kulisy24, &quoute;Secret services in dire need of reform&quoute;, July 1, 2015, accessed: 02.07.2015, http://kulisy24.com/prawo-i-bezprawie/tarnowski-sluzby-specjalne-wymagaja-pilnej-reformy

5. 'Law on the Military Intelligence Service and the Military Counter-Intelligence Service', 9 June 2006. https://www.google.co.uk/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CB0QFjAAahUKEwi6ldHroJ_IAhXKthQKHS8cBvU&url=http%3A%2F%2Fisap.sejm.gov.pl%2FDetailsServlet%3Fid%3DWDU20061040709&usg=AFQjCNEI7vBuyDQFrr8je45wI_yayVHKoQ&bvm=bv.103627116,d.bGg, accessed September 2015.

6. 'Law on the personnel of the Military Intelligence Service and the Military Counter-Intelligence Service', 9 June 2006. http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/Download;jsessionid=B4F48E5F837D6ADA4B620D565283E19F?id=WDU20061040710&type=1, accessed September 2015.

7. 'Directive of the Minister of National Defence on appointing staff to the Military Intelligence Service and the Military Counter-Intelligence Service', 25 September 2015, with annexes. http://www.nettax.pl/dzienniki/du/2006/173/poz.1242.htm, accessed September 2015.

8. 'Law on the Internal Security Agency and the Intelligence Service', 14 June 2002. http://bip.kprm.gov.pl/download.php?s=75&id=2, accessed September 2015.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

21.
score
2

Does the government have a well-scrutinised process for arms export decisions that aligns with international protocols, particularly the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)?

Poland signed the ATT in 2013 and ratified it in December 2014. [5, 6] It is also a signatory of other agreements on arms export control.

As an EU Member State, Poland signed the 1998 &quoute;EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports&quoute; establishing a notification and consultation mechanism for export licence denials. This includes a transparency mechanism through the publication of the EU annual reports on arms exports and the eight criteria established for the export of conventional arms [1].

The &quoute;Code of Conduct&quoute; is a political document of a coordinating nature, not a legally binding regulation. The military export regime in Poland is regulated by the 2000 &quoute;Bill on the Trading Operations in Goods of Strategic Importance&quoute;. The bill was amended in May 2012 to eliminate a number of solutions that had not contributed to raising the level of international security and placed an additional burden on Polish manufacturers and exporters, as well as the government administration. The amendment allowed the implementation of national regulations such as the Directive 2009/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council simplifying terms and conditions of transfers of defence-related products within the Community, as well as the Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008 defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment [3,4].

The Department of Economic Security within the Ministry of the Economy is tasked with the implementation of aforementioned regulations as well as the general compliance of the Polish military and of dual-use technology exports system with international law, including the Arms Trade Treaty [2]. There is no evidence of upcoming arms exports being approved by Parliament, although the National Defence Committee does debate broad issues related to arms exports. [7]

Poland is also a member of the following export control regimes: the Zangger Committee, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Australia Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the Wassenaar Group [1].

According to SIPRI, Poland exported arms to Algeria, which indicates the process of oversight for exports to countries with objectionable human rights records is not robust. Further, this impacts compliance with the ATT.

COMMENTS -+

1. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, &quoute;Legal Basis of Exports Control&quoute;, (accessed: 30.04.2014) https://www.msz.gov.pl/pl/polityka_zagraniczna/polityka_bezpieczenstwa/kontrola_eksportu/prawo/

2. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, &quoute;Exports of Arms and Military Equipment from Poland. 2012 Report&quoute;, Warsaw, 2013, (accessed: 30.04.2014), http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/transfers/transparency/national_reports/Poland/poland-2011-2012.pdf

3. &quoute;Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008 defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment&quoute;, Official Journal of the European Union, L 335/99, accessed: 30.04.2014, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:335:0099:0103:EN:PDF

4. &quoute;Council Regulation no 428/2009 of 5 May 2009 setting up a Community regime for the control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit of dual-use items&quoute;, Official Journal of the European Union, L 134/1, accessed: 30.04.2014, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:134:0001:0269:en:PDF

5. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'Poland signs Arms Trade Treaty', 1 july 2013. http://www.msz.gov.pl/en/news/poland_signs_arms_trade_treaty, accessed September 2015.

6. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'Poland ratifies Arms Trade Treaty', 17 December 2014. http://www.msz.gov.pl/en/news/poland_ratifies_arms_trade_treaty;jsessionid=C0A0AE4FB5C8FC25C85136F582FEB409.cmsap2p, accessed September 2015.

7. National Defence Committee, 'Meeting on 27 July 2014'. http://www.sejm.gov.pl/Sejm7.nsf/biuletyn.xsp?documentId=9D218CB967AFABB1C1257D2E0049AC1D, accessed September 2015.

8. SIPRI, Poland Arms Exports 2010 - 2014, http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/html/export_values.php .

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Not Qualified

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Risk management 60
22.
score
3

How effective are controls over the disposal of assets, and is information on these disposals, and the proceeds of their sale, transparent?

The overall procedure of withdrawing assets from use was established by Decision 444/MON.

The Military Property Agency is tasked with the disposal of the military property, including arms, equipment and real estate [3]. It organises public tenders, available on their website and advertised in the main newspapers. 93% of proceeds of the Agency go to the Armed Forced Modernisation Fund and to the Public Security Modernisation Fund [1]. The Military Property Agency is also entrusted with the management of all redundant (that is - not used by the Armed Forces) military equipment, not classified as waste. This equipment can be stored, leased or sold. However, should it be classified by the Military Institute of Technical Armaments as waste, military equipment has to be disarmed and either utilised or recycled. For instance, according to the Government Waste Management Plan, the Military of National Defence was responsible for the disarmament and destruction of ammunition and explosives classified as waste in the years 2003 - 2014. The whole procedure is subject to the regular oversight in the Ministry [4]. The utilisation reports are also periodically reviewed by the Ministry of Environment.

The asset disposal proceeds are included in the Budget Decisions annexes, as explained in Q17.

The Agency operates under the control of the Minister of National Defence and is subjected to the anti-corruption procedures and code of conduct of the Ministry. However, the press has reported possible corruption cases and on-going bribery investigations, indicating some weakness in the procedures and controls. [2]

COMMENTS -+

1. &quoute;Act of 30 May 1996 on Managing Certain Assets of the Military Property Agency&quoute;, Dziennik Ustaw no.163/2004, position 1711, accessed: 30.04.2014, http://www.amw.com.pl/uploads/assets/prawo/gospodarowanie_niektorymi_skladnikami_mienia_skarbu_panstwa_oraz_o_agencji_mienia_wojskowego.pdf

2. &quoute;Corruption in Poland. CBA will Investigate the Military Property Agency Tenders&quoute;, Money.pl, 27 November 2013, accessed: 30.04.2014, http://prawo.money.pl/aktualnosci/wiadomosci/artykul/korupcja;w;polsce;cba;sprawdza;przetargi;w;agencji;mienia;wojskowego,40,0,1430056.html

3. Military Property Agency's Website: http://www.amw.com.pl

4. Marek Nienartowicz, &quoute;The State of Utilisation Programme of the Redundant Military Equipment in the Ministry of National Defence&quoute;, 2006, accessed: 19.05.2014, http://yadda.icm.edu.pl/yadda/element/bwmeta1.element.baztech-article-PWAA-0024-0003/c/httpwww_witu_mil_plwwwbiuletynzeszyty20060098p25.pdf

5.&quoute;Decision 444/MON on introducing new military equipment and withdrawing from use equipment which no longer fulfils the requirements of the armed forces.&quoute; 30 December 2013. http://www.dz.urz.mon.gov.pl/zasoby/dziennik/pozycje/tresc-aktow/pdf/2013/12/Poz._397_dec__Nr_444.pdf, accessed October 2015.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

23.
score
4

Is independent and transparent scrutiny of asset disposals conducted by defence establishments, and are the reports of such scrutiny publicly available?

The Supervisory Board of the Military Property Agency is composed of representatives of the Minister of National Defence, Minister of the State Treasury, Minister of Interior Affairs and Administration, and the Minister of Finance. It is a body responsible for evaluating the annual financial plan of the Agency, evaluating the annual financial statements and reports on activities of the Agency, and choosing the expert auditor to carry out audits of financial statements of the Agency. The annual financial plan and financial statements - including the financial value of the acquisition or disposal of the assets - are presented to the Council of Ministers and are available to the public.They are also audited by the Supreme Chamber of Control [4]. These audits are publicly available.

The Supreme Chamber of Control can also conduct ad hoc audits of the activities of specific government departments and agencies. The last specific audit of the Agency of Military Property was conducted in 2006. [5]

RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER: As the information is publicly available, score 4 was maintained.

COMMENTS -+

1. &quoute;The State of Audit of the Military Property Agency&quoute;,accessed: 30.04.2014, http://www.amw.com.pl/uploads/assets/prawo/Oswiadczenie_o_stanie_kontroli_zarzadzajacej_Prezesa_Agencji_Mienia_Wojskowego_za_rok_2011.pdf

2. &quoute;Act of 30 May 1996 on Managing Certain Assets of the Military Property Agency&quoute;, Dziennik Ustaw no.163/2004, position 1711, accessed: 30.04.2014, http://www.amw.com.pl/uploads/assets/prawo/gospodarowanie_niektorymi_skladnikami_mienia_skarbu_panstwa_oraz_o_agencji_mienia_wojskowego.pdf

3. Military Property Agency's Website: http://www.amw.com.pl.

4. Supreme Chamber of Control, 'Informacja o wynikach kontroli wykonania budżetu państwa w 2013 r.
w części 29 Obrona narodowa oraz wykonania planu finansowego Funduszu Modernizacji Sił Zbrojnych', issued 2014. https://www.nik.gov.pl/plik/id,6844.pdf, accessed September 2015.

5. Supreme Chamber of Control, 'Summary of Audit', 9 May 2006. http://amw.com.pl/uploads/assets/prawo/px_nik.pdf, accessed September 2015.

6. Law on the Military Property Agency, July 2015. http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/DetailsServlet?id=WDU20150001322, accessed September 2015.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: I would downgrade the score to 3, as the audit reports are not published on the Military Property Agency’s website. There is an element called &quoute;The State of Audit of the Military Property Agency&quoute; (I refer here to the source provided by the country assessor), but it is difficult to find it on the agency’s website - although possible to find online.

However, these assessments for 2011, 2012 and 2013 contain an admission by the director of the agency that in the Military Property Agency the “adequate, efficient and effective internal control was functioning to a limited degree”. I think that we should take this information into account, particularly since it appears for 3 years in a row.

&quoute;The State of Audit of the Military Property Agency for 2011&quoute;,t http://www.amw.com.pl/uploads/assets/prawo/Oswiadczenie_o_stanie_kontroli_zarzadzajacej_Prezesa_Agencji_Mienia_Wojskowego_za_rok_2011.pdf (accessed on June 6, 2014)

&quoute;The State of Audit of the Military Property Agency for 2012&quoute;,t http://www.amw.com.pl/uploads/assets/prawo/Oswiadczenie_o_stanie_kontroli_zarzadczej_za_rok_2012.pdf(accessed on June 6, 2014)


&quoute;The State of Audit of the Military Property Agency for 2013&quoute;,
http://www.amw.com.pl/uploads/assets/prawo/Oswiadczenie_o_stanie_kontroli_zarzadczej_za_rok_2013.pdf (accessed on June 6, 2014)

Suggested score: 3

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

24.
score
2

What percentage of defence and security expenditure in the budget year is dedicated to spending on secret items relating to national security and the intelligence services?

Altogether, the expenditure on the security and intelligence services which are under MOD control (Military Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence Services as well as special forces) amounts to 1.79% of the Defence Budgets, according to the MOD's own calculation. [1]

The aggregate budgets of secret services are determined by the budgetary law and are described in a fairly detailed manner. For 2015, the budget for the Internal Security Agency (ABW) is set at 520 million zloty, the Intelligence Agency at 153 million złoty, the Anti-Corruption Bureau (CBA) for 110 million złoty, for the Military Counterilligence (SKW) 200 million złoty and for the Military Intelligence at 230 million złoty [1, 2,3]. The budget project is scrutinised and evaluated by the Parliamentary Intelligence Committee.
Expenses for HR (salaries etc.) are singled out in the specific budgets and analysed separately from expenses on specific activities, assets acquisition, informants etc [4]. This leads the assessor to conclude that the information is likely correct.

Factoring in external secret services as well, the percentage of secret spending as a proportion of the defence and security budget (taken here as the defence budget and the budgets of external secret services together) is 5.8%.

COMMENTS -+

1. Ministry of Defence, 'MOD budget 2015: the basics', January 2015. http://dbmon.wp.mil.pl/plik/file/Basic_information_on_the_MoND_budget_for_2015.pdf, accessed September 2015.

2. Onet.pl, &quoute;Majority of Parliamentary Intelligence Committee Approves the 2015 Budget&quoute;, October 22, 2014, accessed: 01.07.2015, http://wiadomosci.onet.pl/kraj/wiekszosc-speckomisji-pozytywnie-o-projektach-budzetow-sluzb-na-2015-r/z1j41

3. Ministry of Finance, &quoute;Budget for 2015 Project&quoute;, accessed: 01.07.2015, http://www.mf.gov.pl/ministerstwo-finansow/dzialalnosc/finanse-publiczne/budzet-panstwa/ustawy-budzetowe/2015/ustawa;jsessionid=51BD11177C907F318491C764FB3A1303

4. Internal Security Agency, &quoute;Budget Review for 2014&quoute;, Warsaw, 2014, accessed: 01.07.2015, www.abw.gov.pl/download/1/1646/raport2015int.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Not Qualified

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

25.
score
4

Is the legislature (or the appropriate legislative committee or members of the legislature) given full information for the budget year on the spending of all secret items relating to national security and military intelligence?

According to the Regulation on Internal Organisation of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland (which is a document regulating the remits of Sejm's committees) members of the Intelligence Oversight Committee have access to the classified data [1]. Budget oversight is one of the main tasks of the Intelligence Oversight Committee. The Committee submits evaluations of the budget proposals and, later, the evaluation of the budget implementatio to the Committee on Public Finances. It is later discussed by the Parliament during the plenary sessions. The Parliament has to consider the recommendations of relevant committees before deciding whether to approve the government's execution of the budget. [3]

COMMENTS -+

1. Intelligence Oversight Committee, &quoute;Opinion no. 3 on the Budget Plan Bill&quoute;, 22 December, 2011, accessed: 01.05.2014, http://orka.sejm.gov.pl/opinie7.nsf/nazwa/kss_o3/$file/kss_o3.pdf

2. &quoute;Annex I to the Regulation on International Organisation&quoute;, Sejm, 30 July 1992

3. Sejm RP, &quoute;Rules on budgetary discharges&quoute;, (accessed: 20.05.2015) http://www.sejm.gov.pl/sejm7.nsf/BASLeksykon.xsp?id=8367AEF250EB72D5C1257A7800285831&litera=A

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

26.
score
1

Are audit reports of the annual accounts of the security sector (the military, police, and intelligence services) and other secret programs provided to the legislature (or relevant committee) and are they subsequently subject to parliamentary debate?

The &quoute;Open Budget Questionnaire&quoute; of 2011 (Q94) indicates that audit reports on secret expenditures are not produced [1]. However, the Supreme Chamber of Control does conduct audits of secret budgets and the way the services spend allocated resources as part of its annual control of the execution of the budget. The 2014 report of the SCC indicates that such audit was conducted, but it remains classified due to its content. [2]

No explicit confirmation that these audits are provided to Parliament could be found. However, given that the members of the Intelligence Oversight Committee hold security clearances and are responsible for scrutinising budget planning and execution, it is likely that they receive these audits in some form. To reflect uncertainty, score 1 has been selected.

COMMENTS -+

1. International Budget Partnership &quoute;Open Budget Questionnaire. Poland&quoute;, June 2011, accessed 01.05.2014, p. 145, International Budget Partnership,http://internationalbudget.org/wp-content/uploads/Poland_Questionnaire_OBS2012.pdf

2. Supreme Chamber of Control, 'Informacja o wynikach kontroli wykonania budżetu państwa w 2013 r.
w części 29 Obrona narodowa oraz wykonania planu finansowego Funduszu Modernizacji Sił Zbrojnych', issued 2014. https://www.nik.gov.pl/plik/id,6844.pdf, accessed September 2015.

3. Intelligence Oversight Committee, &quoute;Opinion no. 3 on the Budget Plan Bill&quoute;, 22 December, 2011, accessed: 01.05.2014, http://orka.sejm.gov.pl/opinie7.nsf/nazwa/kss_o3/$file/kss_o3.pdf

4. &quoute;Annex I to the Regulation on International Organisation&quoute;, Sejm, 30 July 1992

5. Sejm RP, &quoute;Rules on budgetary discharges&quoute;, (accessed: 20.05.2015) http://www.sejm.gov.pl/sejm7.nsf/BASLeksykon.xsp?id=8367AEF250EB72D5C1257A7800285831&litera=A

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

27.
score
4

Off-budget military expenditures are those that are not formally authorised within a country's official defence budget, often considered to operate through the 'back-door'. In law, are off-budget military expenditures permitted, and if so, are they exceptional occurrences that are well-controlled?

The Polish MOD has at its disposal one ring-fenced fund devoted to the modernisation of the Polish armed forces. These expenditures are regulated by article 6 of &quoute;Rebuilding and Technical Modernisation and Polish Armed Forces' Financing&quoute; law and are composed of direct budgetary expenditures, income derived from the privatisation of the state-owned defence industry and income from the Technical Modernisation Fund (i.e. the income of the Military Property Agency). This expenditure is part of the official budget framework.

There are no legal provisions allowing for off-budget expenditures and there is no evidence that such expenditures exist. Alternative income sources and expenditures such as American military aid, R&D expenditures or special funds are included in the budgetary framework. [2]

COMMENTS -+

1. &quoute;Rebuilding and Technical Modernisation and Polish Armed Forces Financing Act&quoute;, Dziennik Ustaw, no. 76, position 804, 2001, accessed: 01.05.2014, http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/DetailsServlet?id=WDU20010760804

2. &quoute;Basic Information on the Military Budget for 2015&quoute;, Ministry of National Defence, (accessd: 20.05.2015), http://mon.gov.pl/z/pliki/dokumenty/rozne/2015/04/budzet_2015_pol.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

28.
score
N/A

In practice, are there any off-budget military expenditures? If so, does evidence suggest this involves illicit economic activity?

There is no evidence that there are any off-budget military expenditures and the probability of the existence of alternative, unrecognised sources of income is extremely low, given the Polish budgetary legal framework [2].

As the score of 4 was selected in Q27, N/A applies here.

COMMENTS -+

1. &quoute;Rebuilding and Technical Modernisation and Polish Armed Forces Financing Act&quoute;, Dziennik Ustaw, no. 76, position 804, 2001, accessed: 01.05.2014, http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/DetailsServlet?id=WDU20010760804

2. &quoute;Bill Public Finances of 27 August 2009&quoute;, Dz.U. 2009 no. 157 position. 1240

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: This is a difficult question and another possible score would be N/A as we deal here with something that is secret from its very nature. However, we can come to reasonable conclusions about lack of off-budget expenditures on the basis of both the European budgetary legal framework and the independent media activity.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

29.
score
2

In law, are there provisions regulating mechanisms for classifying information on the grounds of protecting national security, and, if so, are they subject to effective scrutiny?

The &quoute;Protection of Classified Information Act&quoute; of 2010 outlines the cases in which public information can be classified. The “top secret” clause can be given to information that may pose a threat to the security of Poland, its citizens or its allies as well as cases when it may lead to the identification and endangering of the Polish security, military, or intelligence service and police officers. The “secret” clause is given to information that might weaken Poland’s international standing and relations with other countries, disrupt its defence policy or the work of the judicial and police systems. The “confidential” clause is given to information that might endanger the foreign or financial policy of Poland or disrupt the proceedings of the administration. The bill establishes the procedures regulating the evaluation of the classification clause and the process accompanying the security clearance evaluation. [1]

However, independent reports highlight the excessive reliance on the classification clauses by the public administration, diminishing the transparency of the government [3]. Moreover, according to the Helsinki Foundation of Human Rights, there are doubts concerning the transparency of the classified information protection, including but not limited to: the limitation of an effective judiciary control over the classified information is severly limited to a quasi-court procedure [4, pp. 10 - 11], retention of classified data [5] and classification of operational material [6].

RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWERS 1 AND 2: Agree, score changed to 2.

COMMENTS -+

1. &quoute;Protection of Classified Information Act&quoute;, Dziennik Ustaw no. 182, pos. 1228, 2010, accessed: 01.05.2014, http://isip.sejm.gov.pl/DetailsServlet?id=WDU20101821228

2. Stanisław Smykia, &quoute;Najważniejsze zmiany w systemie ochrony informacji niejawnych wprowadzone przez nową ustawę o ochronie informacji niejawnych&quoute;, Przegląd Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego, no. 3, 2010, pp. 105 - 110

3. &quoute;An Open Letter to the President of Poland on the Access to the Public Information&quoute;, Krytyka Polityczna, 21 September 2011, accessed: 01.05.2014, http://www.krytykapolityczna.pl/Aktualnosci/Apeldoprezydentawsprawieustawyodostepiedoinformacjipublicznej/menuid-1.html

4.Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights, &quoute;Remarks Concerning the Draft Law on the Internal Security Agency, Intelligence Agency and Intelligence Services Committee&quoute;, 13.12.2013, (accessed: 19.05.2015), http://legislacja.rcl.gov.pl/docs//2/181401/181409/181413/dokument116493.pdf

5. Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights, &quoute;Remarks Concerning the Data Retention Law&quoute;, 11.07.2011, (accessed: 19.05.2015), ]http://www.europapraw.org/files/2011/07/uwagi-do-raportu.pdf

6. Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights, &quoute;Amicus Curiae for the Constitutional Court Case K23/11&quoute;, 13.06.2012, http://www.hfhrpol.waw.pl/precedens/images/stories/opinia_srodki_techn_13_06_12.pdf

7. Bodnar and Pacho, ‘POLISH LAW ON RIGHT TO INFORMATION AND CLASSIFICATION,’ Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights, Poland, May 2011, p.14 http://www.right2info.org/resources/publications/national-security-expert-papers/Bodnar_PachoPolishlawonclassification.pdf (accessed on June 8, 2014).

8. Panoptykon Foundation: Letter from the Counter-Intelligence Service dated 5 June 2014. Available at http://panoptykon.org/sites/panoptykon.org/files/szary_pdf_9.pdf (accessed on June 8, 2014).

9. Katarzyna Szymielewicz, 'Silence remains the easiest answer: Polish non-reactions to Snowden’s disclosures', Open Democracy, 15 May 2014. http://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/katarzyna-szymielewicz/silence-remains-easiest-answer-polish-nonreactions-to-snow, accessed September 2015.

10. Sustainable Governance Indicators, 'Access to Information'. http://www.sgi-network.org/2014/Democracy/Quality_of_Democracy/Access_to_Information/Access_to_Government_Information, accessed September 2015.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: I would downgrade the score to 2 because of the concerns expressed by the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights. The Foundation concludes that the new Classified Information Protection Act “does not constitute an effective remedy of reviewing the correctness of classification”. This is mainly because the new law does not give a right to challenge decisions of Prime Minister or security services before a court. Lack of sanctions for improper classification of information is another weakness. Thus the classification is regulated, but it can be misused and thereby violate the right to freedom of information.

In this context it is worth adding that according to the Panoptykon Foundation (a watchdog NGO) the Military Counter-Intelligence Service’s stance on the Freedom of Information Act of 2001 is that the act is unconstitutional (and that the act does not apply to the Military Counter Intelligence Service because this service does not use public money - sic!) . The security service thus seems to question the very idea of the freedom of information.


1. Bodnar and Pacho, ‘POLISH LAW ON RIGHT TO INFORMATION AND CLASSIFICATION,’ Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights, Poland, May 2011, pp.14 http://www.right2info.org/resources/publications/national-security-expert-papers/Bodnar_PachoPolishlawonclassification.pdf (accessed on June 8, 2014).

2. Panoptykon Foundation: http://panoptykon.org/sites/panoptykon.org/files/szary_pdf_9.pdf (accessed on June 8, 2014).

Suggested score: 2

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: Based on the reports on the activities of Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights, media coverage of these issues (e.g. http://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/katarzyna-szymielewicz/silence-remains-easiest-answer-polish-nonreactions-to-snow or http://www.hfhr.pl/en/kasacja-ws-odmowy-wykreslenia-z-wykazu-cudzoziemcow-ktorych-pobyt-jest-niepozadany-w-polsce/ ) as well as on recent indices (e.g. http://www.sgi-network.org/2014/Democracy/Quality_of_Democracy/Access_to_Information/Access_to_Government_Information and reports e.g. http://www.right2info.org/resources/publications/national-security-page/national-security-expert-papers/jacobsen_nat-sec-and-rti-in-europe), I would lower the score to 2.

Suggested score: 2

Peer Reviewer-+

30.
score
3

Do national defence and security institutions have beneficial ownership of commercial businesses? If so, how transparent are details of the operations and finances of such businesses?

The Ministry of National Defence does not have ownership of commercial businesses, but exercises property rights (in consultation with the Ministry of Treasury), on behalf of the State Treasury, over certain commercial businesses, especially munitions, surveillance and repair companies operating mainly for the Armed Forces[1]. The State Treasury exercises ownership of the biggest Polish military procurement companies, grouped in the Polish Armament Group, thus separating the armaments customer (MoD) and the suppliers [2]. The Polish Armament Group operates under the rules of market economy and performs commercial endeavours, engaging i.a. in weapons exports. The entities over which MoD exercises joint control with the Ministry of Treasury operate within the boundaries of the Polish law, including submitting - when required - their books and operations for public scrutiny.

COMMENTS -+

1. Minister of National Defence, &quoute;Proclamation of 31 May2011 on the list of the organisational units subjected or subordinated to the Minister of National Defence&quoute;,Monitor Polski, no. 45, item 506, accessed: 01.05.2014, http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/DetailsServlet?id=WMP20110450506

2. &quoute;Ministry of Treasury Wants to Finish the Consolidation Process of the Polish Armament Group by the End of the Year&quoute;, Puls Biznesu, 24 February, 2014, accessed: 01.05.2014, http://www.pb.pl/3572682,13334,msp-chce-zakonczyc-budowe-polskiej-grupy-zbrojeniowej-w-tym-roku

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

31.
score
3

Are military-owned businesses subject to transparent independent scrutiny at a recognised international standard?

The military maintenance, armament and production companies under the control of the Ministry of National Defence have a diverse legal status, with the majority of them being public joint-stock companies while others remain limited liability entities (thus, their audit details are not available to the public). Nevertheless, they are subject to the same accounting, tax and scrutiny rules of the &quoute;Code of Commercial Companies&quoute; as other enterprises [1].

It is important to distinguish between the limited number of budgetary units formed as military maintenance or construction companies [2] and state-owned defence contractors operating in the free market economy. The latter, such as Polska Grupa Zbrojeniowa S.A. are owned by the State Treasury and are public companies.

Polish accounting standards were already brought to the conformity with the EU law according to the World Bank report of 2005 [3]. Poland also adheres to International Financial Regulation System (IFRS) rules [4,5].

Finally, some aspects of the work of publicly owned companies are also subject to scrutiny by the Supreme Chamber of Control. [6]

COMMENTS -+

1. &quoute;Code of Commercial Companies&quoute;, Dziennik Ustaw no. 94, item 1037, 2000, accessed: 02.05.2014, http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/DetailsServlet?id=WDU20000941037

2. Minister of National Defence, &quoute;Proclamation of 31 May 2011 on the list of the organisational units subjected or subordinated to the Minister of National Defence&quoute;,Monitor Polski, no. 45, item 506, accessed: 01.05.2014, http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/DetailsServlet?id=WMP20110450506

3. World Bank, &quoute;REPORT ON THE OBSERVANCE OF STANDARDS AND CODES (ROSC) Republic of Poland&quoute;, February 2005, accessed: 01.07.2015, http://www.worldbank.org/ifa/rosc_aa_pol_eng.pdf

4.&quoute;IFRS APPLICATION AROUND THE WORLD JURISDICTIONAL PROFILE: Poland&quoute;, updated on September, 2013, accessed: 01.07.2015, http://www.ifrs.org/Use-around-the-world/Documents/Jurisdiction-profiles/Poland-IFRS-Profile.pdf

5. Konrad Grabinskia, Marcin Kedziora and Joanna Krasodomska, &quoute;The Polish accounting system
and IFRS implementation process in the view of empirical research&quoute;, Accounting and Management Information Systems Vol. 13, No. 2, pp. 281–310, 2014, accessed: 01.07.2015,
http://www.cig.ase.ro/revista_cig/Fisiere/13_2_5.pdf

6. Supreme Chamber of Control, 'Audit Summary: Bumar', 26 March 2009. https://www.nik.gov.pl/kontrole/wyniki-kontroli-nik/pobierz,px_remote_lwa_p_08_051_200905070904401241679880_id0_01,typ,kj.pdf, accessed September 2015.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

32.
score
2

Is there evidence of unauthorised private enterprise by military or other defence ministry employees? If so, what is the government's reaction to such enterprise?

The Professional Soldiers' Military Service Act of 2003, article 56, generally forbids meaningful employment for the military personnel in private enterprises, as long as they remain on duty. Military personnel can hold additional posts if these do not collide with performing of duties, and provided that permission has been granted by the commanding officer of the unit. [2, 4] The Civil Service Act of 2008 article 80 paragraph 2 applies similar regulations to the civil service, including the civilian employees of the Ministry of National Defence [2].

A legal analysis indicates that the sanctions available are disciplinary only and that the execution of limitations is left to the soldiers' or civil servants' supervisors, and concludes that the regime is not strong. Combined with the interview material, this merits a score of 2.

COMMENTS -+

1. &quoute;The Civil Service Act of 21 November 2008&quoute;, Dziennik Ustaw, no. 227, item1505, 2008, accessed: 02.05.2014, http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/Download?id=WDU20082271505&type=3

2. &quoute;Professional Soldiers' Military Service Act of 11 September 2003&quoute; , Dziennik Ustaw, no. 179, item 1750, 2003, accessed: 02.05.2014, http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/Download?id=WDU20140001414&type=3

3. &quoute;Rozporządzenie Ministra Obrony Narodowej w sprawie wykonywania pracy zarobkowej lub prowadzenia działalności gospodarczej przez żołnierzy zawodowych&quoute;, 7 October 2009. http://prawo.legeo.pl/prawo/rozporzadzenie-ministra-obrony-narodowej-z-dnia-7-pazdziernika-2009-r-w-sprawie-wykonywania-pracy-zarobkowej-lub-prowadzenia-dzialalnosci-gospodarczej-przez-zolnierzy/, accessed September 2015.

4. Małgorzata Jankowska, 'Kiedy funkcjonariusz może podjąć dodatkowe zatrudnienie', Rzeczpospolita, 15 April 2015. http://www4.rp.pl/artykul/1191164-Kiedy-funkcjonariusz-moze-podjac-dodatkowe-zatrudnienie.html, accessed September 2015.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Policies & codes 90
34.
score
3

Do the Defence Ministry, Defence Minister, Chiefs of Defence, and Single Service Chiefs publicly commit - through, for example, speeches, media interviews, or political mandates - to anti-corruption and integrity measures?

Anti-corruption efforts enjoy widespread official and public support both on the Prime Minister level [5] as well as the MoD level. [6]. The Ministry of National Defence is publicly committed to fighting corruption and maintaining transparency in its actions [2]. Senior Ministry political and military officials have underlined the importance of streamlining the rule of law, accountability and good governance practices, especially after the 2013 controversies surrounding Deputy Minister Skrzypczak [1]. The Ministry has issued an official Code of Conduct, signed an agreement of co-operation with the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau and is the only government institution to introduce a sectoral anti-corruption strategy by the end of 2014 [3,4]. Internationally, Poland is one of the lead nations of the NATO Building Integrity programme and contributes to its trust fund. [8]

However, it was not possible to locate public statements on anti-corruption commitments made by the Chiefs of Defence Staff or other high-ranking officers. While the interview material [1] indicates that such commitment is seen internally, the focus of the question is on public commitment. Lack thereof on the military level underpins the choice of score 3.

COMMENTS -+

1. Interview with Interviewee 1: Senior Ministry of Defence Official, Warsaw, Poland, 25 April 2014

2. Janusz Olbrycht, Marcin Szaładziński, &quoute;Walka z korupcją w resorcie obrony narodowej&quoute;, in I. Międzynarodowa Konferencja Antykorupcyjna (Warszawa 9 grudnia 2010). Materiały pokonferencyjne, Warsaw, 2011

3. Ministerstwo Obrony Narodowej, &quoute;Decision No. 125/MON on the Introduction of the Code of Conduct Among Employees and Soldiers&quoute;, Official Journal of the Ministry of National Defence, No. 8, 2011

4. Krzysztof Sobczak, &quoute;MON i CBA będą wspólnie walczyć z korupcją w wojsku&quoute;, Lex, October 21, 2013, accessed: 15.04.2014, http://www.lex.pl/czytaj/-/artykul/mon-i-cba-beda-wspolnie-walczyc-z-korupcja-w-wojsku

5. Money.pl, &quoute;Tusk's Government Adopts New Anti-corruption plan&quoute;, April 1 2014, accessed: 01.07.2015, http://prawo.money.pl/aktualnosci/wiadomosci/artykul/rzad;ma;nowy;program;walki;z;korupcja,79,0,1507663.html

6. Wirtualna Polska, &quoute;Minister of Defence Siemoniak Sacked the Malbork Base Commander&quoute;, Septemebr 19, 2014, accessed: 01.07.2015, http://konflikty.wp.pl/kat,1020223,title,Minister-Tomasz-Siemoniak-odwolal-dowodce-bazy-w-Malborku,wid,16002508,wiadomosc.html?ticaid=1152ae

7. Polish Defence Academy, 'Korupcja – jak leczyć i jak zapobiegać', 5 February 2014. http://www.aon.edu.pl/2014/02/05/korupcja-jak-leczyc-i-jak-zapobiegac/, accessed September 2015.

8. NATO, Building Integrity programme homepage. http://buildingintegrity.hq.nato.int/BI.aspx?accor=8, accessed October 2015.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: I would add one source, i.e. the Agreement of co-operation between the MOD and the Central Anti-corruption Bureau.

http://www.bip.mon.gov.pl/pliki/file/porozumienie%20MON%20i%20CBA/tekst%20porozumienia.pdf
and link to website of National Defence Academy - &quoute;Security Forum&quoute; - public debate about corruption:
http://www.aon.edu.pl/2014/02/05/korupcja-jak-leczyc-i-jak-zapobiegac/

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

35.
score
3

Are there effective measures in place for personnel found to have taken part in forms of bribery and corruption, and is there public evidence that these measures are being carried out?

Administrative and criminal justice measures are taken with respect to personnel found to have taken part in corruption, including immediate suspension from the post or duty, criminal prosecution as well as freezing of illegal assets. Additionally, military personnel involved in the corruption are to be demoted in rank or dishonourably discharged [2]. In articles related to corruption of public officials (228-230, covering bribery and influence peddling), the Polish Criminal Code establishes sanctions comprising fines and imprisonment of up to 2 years. The Code's definition of public officials incorporates military personnel.

In this context, it is worth pointing to the activities of the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau, undertaking comprehensive, cross-sectoral investigations, the Military Counterintelligence Service, providing a so-called &quoute;anti-corruption shield&quoute;, and the Bureau of Anti-Corruption Procedures within the Ministry of National Defence, undertaking administrative measures [4,5].

However, the efficiency of these endeavours is limited by the deficiencies of the Polish administrative and judicial system. Judicial proceedings are notoriously lagging and, in certain cases (especially with regards to corruption in the 1990s), successful prosecution was impossible due to the the statue of limitations. This situation even led to an adoption of the so-called FOZZ-law, prolonging the time in which prosecution was possible. [3]

COMMENTS -+

1. Paweł Chodak, &quoute;Corruption in the Armed Forces of Poland&quoute; (PhD thesis), Przegląd Antykorupcyjny, no. 1A (4), 2013, pp. 213 - 372

2. &quoute;Three and a Half Years of Prison and Demotion for Corruption in the Army&quoute;, 16 May 2011, Wirtualna Polska, accessed: 18.05.2014, http://wiadomosci.wp.pl/kat,1342,title,35-roku-wiezienia-i-degradacja-za-korupcje-w-wojsku,wid,13413111,wiadomosc.html?ticaid=112be9

3. RMF 24, &quoute;15 Year Lapse or the Introduction of the FOZZ-law&quoute;, August 4, 2005, accessed: 01.07.2015, http://www.rmf24.pl/fakty/news-15-lat-do-przedawnienia-czyli-fozz-lex-wchodzi-w-zycie,nId,108967

4. Krzysztof Sobczak, &quoute;MON i CBA będą wspólnie walczyć z korupcją w wojsku&quoute;, Lex, October 21, 2013, accessed: 15.04.2014, http://www.lex.pl/czytaj/-/artykul/mon-i-cba-beda-wspolnie-walczyc-z-korupcja-w-wojsku

5. Izabela Kacprzak, &quoute;Jak powstała tarcza antykorupcyjna?&quoute;, Rzeczpospolita, September 7, 2011, accessed: 15.04.2014, http://www.rp.pl/artykul/713306.html

6. Polish Criminal Code, 6 June 1997. http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/Download?id=WDU19970880553&type=3, accessed September 2015.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: To support the score, I would add the link on investigation carried on the case of irregularities (accessed 15.06.14)

http://wiadomosci.gazeta.pl/wiadomosci/1,114883,15505146,Dalszy_ciag_afery_korupcyjnej_w_wojsku__Zatrzymano.html

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

36.
score
1

Is whistleblowing encouraged by the government, and are whistle-blowers in military and defence ministries afforded adequate protection from reprisal for reporting evidence of corruption, in both law and practice?

Due to lack of formal legal instruments, whistleblowers are dealt with in an ad-hoc manner [2,3,5]. In 2011,The Bureau of Anti-Corruption Procedures within the Ministry of National Defence introduced a special email address (stop.korupcji@mon.gov.pl ) and an anti-corruption hotline within the Defence Ministry. So far, the line has proven useful, with several cases reportedly analysed internally, according to a senior MOD official who was interviewed [1]. When deemed necessary, the cases presented to the Anti-Corruption Bureau are passed on the Military Police, the Military Prosecutor's Office and the Military Counter-intelligence Service.

However, lack of clear procedures is hampering the expansion of the programme [5]. The MOD announced that it would introduce a comprehensive system of whistleblower protection, including follow-up to ensure that no adverse career consequences have followed whistleblowing; however, this is work in progress. [7]
The biggest obstacle lies in the legal uncertainty, lack of formal whistle-blower protection mechanisms (there are only the provisions of the Labour Code on unfair dismissal) and lack of clear answers as to the legal grounds for any further proceedings. The procedural uncertainty may lead to certain administrative steps being challenged before the court of law in the future [3,5].

Furthermore, in general, whistleblowing is rare in Poland. It is discouraged by the fear of the employer's or peer retaliation, lack of specific legislation as well as the ineffective judiciary, which leads to the disproportionate risk for the whistleblower [5,6].

RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER AND PEER REVIEWER 2: Included relevant information.

COMMENTS -+

1. Interview with Interviewee 1: Senior Ministry of Defence Official, Warsaw, Poland, April 25

2. Anna Wojciechowska-Nowak , &quoute;Whistleblowing in Poland - Legal and Social Frameworks&quoute;, 2010, accessed: 25.04.2014, http://www.whistleblowing-cee.org/countries/poland/research/

3. Jakub Zabłocki, &quoute;Przeciwdziałanie patologiom w administracji publicznej na przykładzie zjawiska whistleblowingu&quoute;, Acta Erasmiana, Vol. 4, 2012, pp. 109 - 120

4. European Commission, &quoute;Poland - Annex to the EU Anti-corruption Report&quoute;, February 3, 2014, accessed: 02.09.2014, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/organized-crime-and-human-trafficking/corruption/anti-corruption-report/docs/2014_acr_poland_chapter_en.pdf

5. Aleksandra Kobylińska, Maciej Folta, &quoute;Whistleblowers - People Who Cannot Stay Silent&quoute;, Institute for Public Affairs, Warsaw, 2015, accessed: 01.07.2015, http://www.isp.org.pl/uploads/pdf/1056799547.pdf

6. Krzysztof Sobczak, &quoute;Polish Law Does Not Protect Whistleblowers Enough&quoute;, August 28, 2014, accessed: 01.07.2015, http://www.lex.pl/czytaj/-/artykul/polskie-prawo-nie-chroni-dobrze-sygnalistow

7. 'MON zaczyna wdrażanie rządowego programu przeciwdziałania korupcji', 21 April 2015. http://www.lex.pl/czytaj/-/artykul/mon-zaczyna-wdrazanie-rzadowego-programu-przeciwdzialania-korupcji, accessed September 2015.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The MOD is currently designing whistleblowing procedures with strong whistleblower protections (possibility of anonymous reporting).

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The EU anti-corruption report states that: &quoute;There is no specific legislation concerning the protection of whistleblowers apart from general provisions in the Labour Code on unfair dismissal. Training courses and manuals prepared by the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau encourage public officials to be proactive in identifying corruption. However, whistleblowing is reportedly discouraged in Poland by fear of retaliation by the employer&quoute;.
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/organized-crime-and-human-trafficking/corruption/anti-corruption-report/docs/2014_acr_poland_chapter_en.pdf (accessed 15.06.14)

Elsewhere, Poland is reported to have only some &quoute;partial provisions.&quoute; http://euobserver.com/social/121989 (accessed 15.06.14)

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

37.
score
3

Is special attention paid to the selection, time in post, and oversight of personnel in sensitive positions, including officials and personnel in defence procurement, contracting, financial management, and commercial management?

Military and civilian personnel working in finance units must submit their financial disclosure, to be verified by the Military Police. In addition, personnel directly tasked with procurement must submit declarations of their lack of conflict of interest. [2] Tenders and other financial activities of the Ministry are verified by the Department of Audit, the Anti-Corruption Procedures Bureau and the external institutions (such as the Supreme Chamber of Control and adequate policing institutions) [1]. The staff selection process can be monitored by Military Counter-Intelligence Agency and other relevant services. The delicate nature of the position usually requires a 'secret' or 'top secret' certificate, which can only be obtained after a detailed screening procedure [2]. The 2014 Batory Foundation Report described MoD conflict of interests procedures as &quoute;well designed and developed&quoute; [3, p.12].

The Professional Soldiers' Military Service Act (art. 122) also states that professional soldiers who were at one time obliged to submit a declaration of conflict of interest are prohibited from accepting employment with private companies working in related areas for three years after separation.Employers disregarding the law can be sanctioned through fines or imprisonment. [4] No similar procedures for civilian employees have been found. There are also no regulations regarding rotation and time in post and it is not clear that oversight of these positions is implemented effectively.

COMMENTS -+

1. Interview with Interviewee 1: Senior Ministry of Defence Official, Warsaw, Poland, 25 April 2014

2. Marcin Szaładziński, &quoute;Prevention of the conflict of interest in contacts with entrepreneurs on the example of relations: the Ministry of National Defence - Armament Industry&quoute;,&quoute;, paper presented at the I International Anticorruption Conference held by Central Anticorruption Bureau, Warsaw, December 9, 2010, pp. 130 - 144, accessed 02.05.2014, http://cba.gov.pl/ftp/mp3/materialy_pokonferencyjne-srodek.pdf

3. Grzegorz Makowski et al, &quoute;Conflict of Interest in Polish Public Administration - Law, Practice and Attitudes of Civil Servants&quoute;, Batory Foundation, Warsaw 2014, accessed: 01.07.2015, http://www.batory.org.pl/upload/files/Programy%20operacyjne/Odpowiedzialne%20Panstwo/Konflikt_interesow_w_administracji_rzadowej_raport.pdf

4. &quoute;Professional Soldiers' Military Service Act of 11 September 2003&quoute; , Dziennik Ustaw, no. 179, item 1750, 2003, accessed: 02.05.2014, http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/Download?id=WDU20140001414&type=3

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

38.
score
3

Is the number of civilian and military personnel accurately known and publicly available?

The MOD's information on the budget presents the upper limits of the armed forces' numbers: 100,000 active soldiers, 20,000 reserves, and up to 2,650 professional trainees. [2]

Decision 448/MON establishes the numbers of MOD employees and limits for specific employee categories, with the overall number pegged at about 45,000 in 2014-2016. [4] The MOD has also been known to submit responses to questions on its employee numbers, showing itself willing to provide that information.[5]

The exact personnel numbers are available through the SEW-online system, which contains the data on military and reserve personnel as well as candidates. Due to the sensitive content the system is closed for external access [3].

COMMENTS -+

1. Michał Wąsowski, &quoute;Jak silne jest polskie wojsko&quoute;, Na temat, accessed: 01.05.2014, http://natemat.pl/94183,jak-silne-jest-polskie-wojsko-sprawdzamy-jak-dokladnie-wyglada-stan-naszej-armii-zmiesci-sie-na-stadionie

2. Ministry of National Defence, &quoute;Basic Infromations on the Ministry of Defence's Budget&quoute; 2015, accessed: September 2015, http://mon.gov.pl/z/pliki/dokumenty/rozne/2015/04/budzet_2015_pol.pdf.

3. Minister of National Defence, &quoute;Decision no. 44/MON on the Implementation of the Networked Personnel System SEW-Online&quoute;, February 15, 2013, accessed: 01.07.2015, http://www.dz.urz.mon.gov.pl/zasoby/dziennik/pozycje/tresc-aktow/pdf/2013/02/Poz._50_dec._Nr_44.pdf

4. Minister of National Defence, 'Decision No. 448 /MON on the employment and salaries for MOD employees', 31 December 2013. http://www.dz.urz.mon.gov.pl/zasoby/dziennik/pozycje/tresc-aktow/pdf/2014/01/Poz__6_dec__Nr_448.pdf, accessed September 2015.

5. Response of the Under-Secretary of State for Defence to Parliamentary Question 8333 regarding the number of employees at the MOD, 26 January 2011. http://orka2.sejm.gov.pl/IZ6.nsf/main/62D78EE8, accessed September 2015.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Not Qualified

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

39.
score
4

Are pay rates and allowances for civilian and military personnel openly published?

The pay rates and allowances for military personnel are published by the Ministry's Department of Human Resources [1]. Civilian personnel's wages and allowances are regulated by the Civil Service Act, annual budget laws and corresponding executive decisions, which are publicly available [3, 4, 5, 6, 7]: depending on the post, a civilian official receives a salary based on multiplying the 'basic amount' by a coefficient assigned to that post. This can be accompanied by specified allowances and bonuses.

Independent surveys present average wages in the public institutions, including the Ministry of National Defence [2].

COMMENTS -+

1. Department of Human Resources of the Ministry of National Defence, &quoute;Salaries and allowances of Professional Soldiers&quoute;, accessed: 01.05.2014, http://www.dkadr.wp.mil.pl/plik/file/Uposazenia/0002-131029-uposazenia.pdf

2. &quoute;This is What Soldiers Earn&quoute;, HotMoney.pl, http://www.hotmoney.pl/nabiezaco/Tyle-zarabiaja-polscy-policjanci-inbspzolnierze-a21024 (accessed 28.08.2014)

3. &quoute;Civil Service Act of 2008&quoute;, Dziennik Ustaw No. 227, Pos. 1505, 2009, accessed: 01.07.2015, isap.sejm.gov.pl/Download?id=WDU20082271505&type=3

4. &quoute;Executive Decision o 2009 on the Professional Requirements, Civil Servants' Grades and the Payment System&quoute;, Dziennik Ustaw, No. 211, Pos. 1630, 2009, accessed: 01.07.2015, http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/DetailsServlet?id=WDU20092111630

5. Chancellery of the Prime Minister, &quoute;FAQ: The Payment System in the Civil Service&quoute;, accessed: 01.07.2015, http://dsc.kprm.gov.pl/wynagrodzenia-w-sluzbie-cywilnej

6. 'Law on Salaries in the Public Sector', 1 January 2000, http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/Download?id=WDU19991101255&type=3, accessed September 2015.

7. 'Decision of the Prime Minister regulating the requirements, salaries and allowances of public officials', 16 January 2007. https://www.google.co.uk/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=11&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CBwQFjAAOApqFQoTCL_4pb6socgCFct6PgodifgMOw&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdsc.kprm.gov.pl%2Fwynagrodzenia-w-sluzbie-cywilnej&usg=AFQjCNFH5YAZ0VUo7w0gH-b_mVovHH-txA&bvm=bv.104226188,d.cWw, accessed September 2015.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

40.
score
4

Do personnel receive the correct pay on time, and is the system of payment well-established, routine, and published?

The hierarchy [1] and payment system [3] are clear and publicly available in a easily understandable form. Payments are digitised through the SEW-ONLINE programme, which also enables verification of current personnel numbers and corresponding changes in the payment chains. [9]

There are no signals of payment delays or systemic errors in the media. In general the public administration wages in Poland are accounted for and paid on time and regularly; employment in the public sector in Poland is perceived as a stable source of income (this applies to the defence sector as well), which is one of the basic advantages of this type of employment. The portal http://www.wojskowe.info offers data to candidates to the Polish Armed Forces, and here we can find information about main advantages of working in army.

Basic pay is non-discretionary and set by respective laws and government decisions. [3-5, 7-8]

COMMENTS -+

1. The organogram of the Department of Human Resources of the Ministry of National Defence, accessed: 01.05.2014,http://www.dkadr.wp.mil.pl/pl/14.html

2. Tasks of the Department of Human Resources of the Ministry of National Defence, accessed: 01.05.2014, http://www.dkadr.wp.mil.pl/pl/13.html

3. Department of Human Resources of the Ministry of National Defence, &quoute;The Payment System of Professional Soldiers&quoute;, accessed: 01.05.2014, http://www.dkadr.wp.mil.pl/plik/file/Uposazenia/0002-131029-uposazenia.pdf

4. &quoute;Civil Service Act of 2008&quoute;, Dziennik Ustaw No. 227, Pos. 1505, 2009, accessed: 01.07.2015, isap.sejm.gov.pl/Download?id=WDU20082271505&type=3

5. &quoute;Executive Decision o 2009 on the Professional Requirements, Civil Servants' Grades and the Payment System&quoute;, Dziennik Ustaw, No. 211, Pos. 1630, 2009, accessed: 01.07.2015, http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/DetailsServlet?id=WDU20092111630

6. Chancellery of the Prime Minister, &quoute;FAQ: The Payment System in the Civil Service&quoute;, accessed: 01.07.2015, http://dsc.kprm.gov.pl/wynagrodzenia-w-sluzbie-cywilnej

7. 'Law on Salaries in the Public Sector', 1 January 2000, http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/Download?id=WDU19991101255&type=3, accessed September 2015.

8. 'Decision of the Prime Minister regulating the requirements, salaries and allowances of public officials', 16 January 2007. https://www.google.co.uk/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=11&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CBwQFjAAOApqFQoTCL_4pb6socgCFct6PgodifgMOw&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdsc.kprm.gov.pl%2Fwynagrodzenia-w-sluzbie-cywilnej&usg=AFQjCNFH5YAZ0VUo7w0gH-b_mVovHH-txA&bvm=bv.104226188,d.cWw, accessed September 2015.

9. Minister of National Defence, &quoute;Decision no. 44/MON on the Implementation of the Networked Personnel System SEW-Online&quoute;, February 15, 2013, accessed: 01.07.2015, http://www.dz.urz.mon.gov.pl/zasoby/dziennik/pozycje/tresc-aktow/pdf/2013/02/Poz._50_dec._Nr_44.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

41.
score
3

Is there an established, independent, transparent, and objective appointment system for the selection of military personnel at middle and top management level?

Formal rules of appointment and promotion are regulated by the &quoute;Professional Soldiers' Military Service Act&quoute; of 2003, articles 40 - 43, while the dismissal and discharge rules are regulated by articles 44 and 45 [3].

The selection of military personnel for the middle-ranking and top positions is a two-step procedure. The top-ranking officers are appointed by the President upon the request of the Minister of National Defence, while the middle ranks are appointed by Minister of Defence, or in case of lower ranks, local military commanders. The procedure, including relevant educational requirements and professional qualifications (such as length of service and examinations) was established by the 2010 &quoute;Regulation on the Appointment of the Military Rank&quoute; and the nominations, undertaken in the form of the decision of the President, are announced publicly [1].

While this procedure is aimed at reducing the influence of the government among the military ranks, it has created a very strong position of the President, lacking any oversight. It has been criticised as enabling corruption, fostering informal political ties and cronyism considering top posts [2].

COMMENTS -+

1. Minister of National Defence, &quoute;Regulation of 30 April 2010 on the Award of Military Ranks&quoute;, Dziennik Ustaw, no. 2, item 1284, 2013, accessed: 02.05.2014, http://mojepanstwo.pl/dane/prawo/135745

2. Paweł Wroński, &quoute;Three Things in the Army to be Changed&quoute;, Gazeta Wyborcza, 8 September 2011, accessed: 02.05.2014, http://m.wyborcza.pl/wyborcza/1,105226,10085388,Trzy_rzeczy_do_zmiany_w_armii.html

3. &quoute;Professional Soldiers' Military Service Act of 11 September 2003&quoute; , Dziennik Ustaw, no. 179, item 1750, 2003, accessed: 02.05.2014, http://www.bip.mon.gov.pl/pliki/file/USTAWY/Dz_U_2010_90_593.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

42.
score
3

Are personnel promoted through an objective, meritocratic process? Such a process would include promotion boards outside of the command chain, strong formal appraisal processes, and independent oversight.

Formal rules of appointment and promotion are regulated by the &quoute;Professional Soldiers' Military Service Act&quoute; of 2003, articles 40 - 43, while the dismissal and discharge rules are regulated by articles 44 and 45 [3].

2013 and 2014 saw the introduction of a reform aimed at streamlining the appointment and promotion system, making it more transparent and based on individual competences and efficiency.[2] This reform was introduced in response to the complaints voiced by some observers, accusing the current system of lowering the army's standards and creating duplicate, fictional positions in order to manage the expectations of experienced soldiers [1].

The new system highlights the transparent physical and psychological exam requirements (art.5), the necessity of obtaining a master's degree (art. 11, for new promotions as well as, retroactively, the old ranks), regular assessment of the soldier's military and professional progress and a motivational system. It also enables promotion for extraordinary bravery in the field.

Article 10 of the Law stipulates that the orders appointing military personnel to particular posts and ranks are issued by the Minister of National Defence for the highest-ranking posts, the MOD's Human Resources Department and commanders of respective services in other cases. While this indicates that in at least some cases, the promotions are effected separately from the chain of command, it is unclear what the extent of independent oversight is and whether promotion boards outside the direct chain of command are used, and how widely.

COMMENTS -+

1. Artur Radwan, &quoute;The End of Fictional Promotions in the Army&quoute;, Gazeta Prawna, 12 March 2012, accessed: 01.05.2014, http://serwisy.gazetaprawna.pl/praca-i-kariera/artykuly/601663,koniec_z_fikcyjnymi_awansami_w_wojsku.html

2. Aleksander Kiszniewski, &quoute;Virtual Ranks Will Disappear from the Army&quoute;, Onet Technowinki, 8 January 2014, accessed: 01.05.2014, http://technowinki.onet.pl/z-wojska-znikna-martwe-stopnie/bhpte

3. &quoute;Professional Soldiers' Military Service Act of 11 September 2003&quoute; , Dziennik Ustaw, no. 179, item 1750, 2003, accessed: 02.05.2014, http://www.bip.mon.gov.pl/pliki/file/USTAWY/Dz_U_2010_90_593.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

43.
score
N/A

Where compulsory conscription occurs, is there a policy of not accepting bribes for avoiding conscription? Are there appropriate procedures in place to deal with such bribery, and are they applied?

Compulsory conscription was abandoned in 2009.

COMMENTS -+

&quoute;No More Conscription after 2009&quoute;, Gazeta Wyborcza, 3 August 2008, accessed: 01.05.2014, http://wiadomosci.gazeta.pl/wiadomosci/1,114873,5549561,Od_2009_nie_bedzie_poboru_do_wojska.html

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

44.
score
N/A

With regard to compulsory or voluntary conscription, is there a policy of refusing bribes to gain preferred postings in the recruitment process? Are there appropriate procedures in place to deal with such bribery, and are they applied?

There is no compulsory or voluntary conscription within the Polish armed forces - they are an entirely volunteer-based, professional service.

Personnel corruption was widespread before 2009, when potential conscripts sought to avoid military service; since that time it has diminished considerably. The last known criminal sentence related to military conscription was issued in 2011. There is little incentive for potential corruption related to entering the military, since it is the Armed Forces that have trouble finding suitable candidates, not the other way around.

Any forms of bribery are prohibited by Polish Penal Code art. 228. This includes conscription-related payments.

COMMENTS -+

1. Wojciech Kubica, &quoute;The Specifity and Range of Corruption Threats in the Polish Armed Forces&quoute;, Przegląd Antykorupcyjny, no. 1, 2011, pp. 51 - 53, accessed: 02.05.2014, http://www.cba.gov.pl/ftp/mp3/PRZEGLAD_ANTYKORUPCYJNY.pdf

2. Łukasz Cieśla, &quoute;Last Judgement of the Conscription Corruption in Polish Army&quoute;, Głos Wielkopolski, 12 September 2011, accessed: 18.05.2014, http://www.gloswielkopolski.pl/artykul/449651,afera-korupcja-przy-poborze-do-armii-ostatni-wyrok,id,t.html?cookie=1

3. &quoute;National Reserve Force Has Problems With Conscription&quoute;, Banzaj.pl, accessed: 18.05.2014, http://www.banzaj.pl/Narodowe-Sily-Rezerwowe-maja-problem-z-naborem-ochotnikow-34160.html

4. &quoute;No More Conscription after 2009&quoute;, Gazeta Wyborcza, 3 August 2008, accessed: 01.05.2014, http://wiadomosci.gazeta.pl/wiadomosci/1,114873,5549561,Od_2009_nie_bedzie_poboru_do_wojska.html

5. Polish Criminal Code, 6 June 1997. http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/Download?id=WDU19970880553&type=3, accessed September 2015.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

45.
score
4

Is there evidence of 'ghost soldiers', or non-existent soldiers on the payroll?

There have been no reports whatsoever of the existence of ghost soldiers. Personnel salaries and allowances are established, published and managed by the MOD's Department for Human Resources (i.e. separate from the chain of command); the payment chain is clear and digitised through the SEW-ONLINE programme [5]; and the SEW-online system also provides ways to monitor actual personnel numbers and reflect it in monthly payments. Thus, the risk of 'ghost soldiers' is minimal.

COMMENTS -+

1. Tasks of the Department of Human Resources of the Ministry of National Defence, accessed: 01.05.2014 http://www.dkadr.wp.mil.pl/pl/13.html

2. Michał Wąsowski, &quoute;Jak silne jest polskie wojsko&quoute;, Na temat, accessed: 01.05.2014, http://natemat.pl/94183,jak-silne-jest-polskie-wojsko-sprawdzamy-jak-dokladnie-wyglada-stan-naszej-armii-zmiesci-sie-na-stadionie

3. Ministry of National Defence, &quoute;Basic Information on the Milnistry of Defence's Budget&quoute;, accessed: 01.05.2014, http://mon.gov.pl/z/pliki/dokumenty/rozne/2013/09/informator_o_budzecie_resortu_ON_na_2013_r..pdf

4. Department of Human Resources of the Ministry of National Defence, &quoute;The Payment System of Professional Soldiers&quoute;, accessed: 01.05.2014, http://www.dkadr.wp.mil.pl/plik/file/Uposazenia/0002-131029-uposazenia.pdf

5. Minister of National Defence, &quoute;Decision no. 44/MON on the Implementation of the Networked Personnel System SEW-Online&quoute;, February 15, 2013, accessed: 01.07.2015, http://www.dz.urz.mon.gov.pl/zasoby/dziennik/pozycje/tresc-aktow/pdf/2013/02/Poz._50_dec._Nr_44.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The current number of soldiers and civilian staff is confirmed every month in a special electronic system (database), which is called SEW-ONLINE. This procedure give us clear tools to find gaps and oversights.

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

46.
score
4

Are chains of command separate from chains of payment?

The Department of Human Resources is under control of the Minister of National Defence, independent and separated from the chain of command [1,2]. The payment system is stipulated in the Law on Professional Military Service art. 74: the wages are paid by the legal entities - military units or civilian institutions - constituting the primary point of service for the soldier rather than their immediate command [3].

COMMENTS -+

1. The organogram of the Department of Human Resources of the Ministry of National Defence, accessed: 01.05.2014, http://www.dkadr.wp.mil.pl/pl/14.html

2. Disposition no 40/MON of the Minister of National Defence on the Organisation of the Ministry of National Defence, Dziennik Urzędowy MON from 12 December 2006,

3. &quoute;Professional Soldiers' Military Service Act of 11 September 2003&quoute; , Dziennik Ustaw, no. 179, item 1750, 2003, accessed: 02.05.2014, http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/Download?id=WDU20140001414&type=3.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

47.
score
3

Is there a Code of Conduct for all military and civilian personnel that includes, but is not limited to, guidance with respect to bribery, gifts and hospitality, conflicts of interest, and post-separation activities?

There are at least three Codes of Conduct for military and civilian personnel connected to the Polish MOD and armed forces. Prime Minister's Decision no. 70 [6] regulates ethical behaviour for members of the civil service, regulating issues of conflict of interest, limiting additional employment, and obliging civil servants to abide by the law, which in effect refers also to issues of bribery and influence peddling. There are, however, no regulations on post-separation activities. Oversight is provided by the Director of the Civil Service, an independent institutions monitoring the activities of the civil service.

The Code of Honour of the Professional Military Soldier, applying to all military personnel, is quite generic, only referring to general need for integrity. [5]

The most comprehensive is the Code of Conduct introduced by Decision 125/MON in 2011. The Code is publicly available and based on the principles of honour, dignity, transparency and personal responsibility. It goes into detail, outlining suggested behaviour in a wide range of cases such as possible conflict of interest, social contacts (art. 6), real estate lease (art. 7), post-separation activities and the receipt of gifts (art. 5) as well as expenses rules (art. 2). [1,2,3] The Code also contains the mechanism of written clarifications of rules by the Anti-Corruption Bureau in the Ministry of National Defence and a reporting duty on part of the MoD officials and soldiers. Its limitation is that it applies to contacts between military and civilian personnel on one side and external stakeholders on the other, which makes it less than comprehensive.There is no oversight mechanism except for the normal policing/intelligence services activities, however, referring to previous whistleblowing experiences in the MoD, an informal mechanism exists [2].

Furthermore, the post-separation activities and potential conflicts of interest are regulated by art. 122A of the Professional Military Service Act. It prohibits the employment of former soldier by certain companies, among them defence contractors, within a 3-year period. [4]

Score 3 was selected due to the existence of a number of Codes and legal regulations, some of the documents not being comprehensive, and unclear effectiveness of oversight.

COMMENTS -+

1. Minister of National Defence, &quoute;Decision No. 125/MON on the Introduction of the Code of Conduct Among Employees and Soldiers&quoute;, Dziennik Urzędowy Ministra Obrony Narodowej, No. 8, 2011. http://g.ekspert.infor.pl/p/_dane/akty_pdf/U23/2011/8/100.pdf#zoom=90l, accessed September 2015.

2. Marcin Szaładziński, &quoute;Prevention of the conflict of interest in contacts with entrepreneurs on the example of relations: the Ministry of National Defence - Armament Industry&quoute;, paper presented at the International Anticorruption Conference held by Central Anticorruption Bureau, Warsaw, December 9, 2010, pp. 130 - 144, accessed 02.05.2014, http://cba.gov.pl/ftp/mp3/materialy_pokonferencyjne-srodek.pdf

3. Interview with Interviewee 1: Senior Ministry of Defence Official, Warsaw, Poland, 25 April 2014

4. &quoute;Professional Soldiers' Military Service Act of 11 September 2003&quoute; , Dziennik Ustaw, no. 179, item 1750, 2003, accessed: 02.05.2014, http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/Download?id=WDU20140001414&type=3.

5. 'Code of Honour of the Professional Military Soldier', 3 March 2008, http://mon.gov.pl/z/pliki/dokumenty/rozne/2013/09/kodeks_honorowy2008.pdf, accessed September 2015.

6. Prime Minister of the Republic of Poland, &quoute;Decision No. 70 on the execution of rules and ethical principles of the civil servant corps', 6 October 2011. http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/Download?id=WMP20110930953&type=2, accessed September 2015.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: I would change the score to 3 because the Code is applicable only to the relations between military/civilian staff and contractors/potential contractors. Relations with those who, for example, apply for the posts within the armed forces, are not covered.

Suggested score: 3

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Post-duty actvities are regulated in article 122a of the Professional Military Service Act.

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

48.
score
3

Is there evidence that breaches of the Code of Conduct are effectively addressed ,and are the results of prosecutions made publicly available?

The Codes of Conduct foresee disciplinary sanctions for breaches. [1]. Military and civilian personnel are also subject to possible sanctions resulting either from Labour law or the Law on Military Discipline [6] (depending on their civilian or military status) as well as formal criminal investigations. The former are more common in cases falling within the criminal justice 'grey zone', such as social contacts or cronyism [2]. When the breach of the Code is considered to be a criminal offence, the Ministry will notify the Military Police and/or the Military Prosecution [2]. Corruption prosecutions and/or investigations into possible wrongdoing are often very visible in the media and widely reported [e.g. 3, 4,5]

The Civil Service Act and the Professional Soldiers' Military Service Act regulate the employment of the officials tasked with military procurement, preventing them from taking a post in a private company in the defence sector for three years after the termination of his duties. Interestingly, breaches of the law carry the sanctions of fine and imprisonment, but for the employer, not the employee. [1, 2]

However, the interviewee suggests that legal obstacles are circumvented through the creation of virtual companies, unofficial advisory positions (without any legal contract or official job agreement) and other creative efforts aimed at utilising the networks of former civil service and military officials [3]. The laws analysed do not foresee specific sanctions for breaking the limitations on private enterprise and no instances of sanctions being applied have been found.

COMMENTS -+

1. Minister of National Defence, &quoute;Decision No. 125/MON on the Introduction of the Code of Conduct Among Employees and Soldiers&quoute;, Dziennik Urzędowy Ministra Obrony Narodowej, No. 8, 2011. http://g.ekspert.infor.pl/p/_dane/akty_pdf/U23/2011/8/100.pdf#zoom=90l, accessed September 2015

2. Interview with Interviewee 1: Senior Ministry of Defence Official, Warsaw, Poland, 25 April 2014

3. Wojciech Cieśla, &quoute;The Fall of the Commander. General Skrzyczak has Resigned&quoute;, Nesweek Polska, 28 November 2013, accessed: 02.05.2014, http://polska.newsweek.pl/dymisja-skrzypczaka-kontrowersje-mon-armia-wojsko-newsweek-pl,artykuly,271876,1.html

4. Wirtualna Polska, &quoute;Afera korupcyjna w bazie lotniczej w Malborku zatacza coraz szersze kregi&quoute;, September 19, 2013, accessed: 28.04.2014, http://konflikty.wp.pl/kat,1020231,title,Afera-korupcyjna-w-bazie-lotniczej-w-Malborku-zatacza-coraz-szersze-kregi,wid,16001754,wiadomosc.html?ticaid=112a37

5. Polskie Radio, &quoute;Kierował grupą przestępczą w armii: więzienie i degradacja&quoute;, 31 December, 2013, accessed: 28.04.2014, http://www.polskieradio.pl/5/3/Artykul/1013965,Kierowal-grupa-przestepcza-w-armii-wiezienie-i-degradacja,

6. &quoute;Military Discipline Law of October 9, 2009&quoute;, Dziennik Ustaw, No. 190, pos. 1474, 2009. http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/Download?id=WDU20091901474&type=3, accessed September 2015.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

49.
score
2

Does regular anti-corruption training take place for military and civilian personnel?

Though there is no regular and wide-ranging anti-corruption training programme, both the Ministry's Anti-Corruption Procedures Bureau and the Central Anti-corruption Bureau organise such educational exercises for selected personnel [2]. The upcoming sectoral anti-corruption strategy for the Ministry of National Defence and the Armed Forces is to focus on the 'prevention through education' approach [1]. The Central Anti-corruption Bureau has launched an e-learning platform with a special anti-corruption course on its website (https://szkolenia-antykorupcyjne.edu.pl/). The Central Anti-corruption Bureau is preparing an educational and training system based on this e-tool to be launched in 2014. As of 2015, the system is functional [3].

COMMENTS -+

1. Interview with Interviewee 1: Senior Ministry of Defence Official, Warsaw, Poland, 25 April 2014

2. &quoute;Agreement between the Minister of National Defence and the Head of the Central Anti-corruption Bureau on the Rules of Co-operation of the Ministry of National Defence and the Central Anti-corruption Bureau&quoute;, 21 October 2013, accessed: 02.05.2014, http://www.bip.mon.gov.pl/pliki/file/porozumienie%20MON%20i%20CBA/tekst%20porozumienia.pdf

3. Central Anti-Corruption Bureau, Anti-corruption Online Training Module, accessed: 10.07.2015, https://szkolenia-antykorupcyjne.edu.pl/

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Central Anti-corruption Bureau has launched the e-learning platform with special anti-corruption courses (https://szkolenia-antykorupcyjne.edu.pl/). The MOD is currently setting up an educational and training system based on this e-tool.

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

50.
score
2

Is there a policy to make public outcomes of the prosecution of defence services personnel for corrupt activities, and is there evidence of effective prosecutions in recent years?

Court verdicts issued by civilian courts are published electronically at the http://orzeczenia.ms.gov.pl, a website run by the MInistry of Justice. Examples of successful prosecution and subsequent sentences have been brought to the attention to the general public by anti-corruption agencies [e.g. 1]. It is unclear whether a similar policy applies to military courts, though the statistics on investigations and prosecutions are included in the annual/bi-annual 'Map of corruption' publication issued by the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau.

However, the coverage given to arrests and accusations made by the Military Police and Prosecutor's Office is much more substantial. The media have stated that judicial procedures took too long and spectacular police operations could yield disappointing results when it comes the material to be presented before the courts. Reported sentences for corruption in the Armed Forces vary from 2 to 4 years, depending on the case. [1-3]

Due to recent controversies surrounding the efficiency and transparency of the Military Prosecutor's Office, the government presented plans of dissolving the institution and introducing military prosecution units within a general civilian framework. However, these plans were postponed [3] and as of 2015 the Military Prosecutor's Office remains active.

Score 2 was selected as it is unclear whether it is a policy to make outcomes of prosecutions public. Some cases have received publicity; the information is collected and used in statistical publications, but this does not necessarily amount to a proactive policy to make the results of investigations and prosecutions public. The score should be between 2 and 3 but 3 could not be awarded due to the aforementioned reasons.

COMMENTS -+

1. &quoute;The Judgment on the Organised Crime Group Acting Against the Interests of the Polish Army is Here&quoute;, Centralne Biuro Antykorupcyjne, accessed: 02.05.2014, http://www.cba.gov.pl/pl/aktualnosci/151,Sa-wyroki-w-sprawie-grupy-przestepczej-dzialajacej-na-szkode-WP.html

2. &quoute;The Statement of Colonel Przybył. Is the Army Run by Mafia?&quoute;, Newsweek Polska, 9 January 2013, accessed: 02.05.2014, http://polska.newsweek.pl/oswiadczenie-plk--przybyla--w-wojsku-rzadzi-mafia,86954,1,1.html

3. Agata Łukaszewicz, &quoute;Military Prosecution to Be Disbanded&quoute;, November 18, 2013, accessed: 10.07.2015, http://prawo.rp.pl/artykul/1065411.html

4. Ministry of Justice, The Court Verdicts Database. http://orzeczenia.ms.gov.pl, accessed September 2015.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: I would add some information and sources about verdicts and sentencing in corruption cases:
1) The court has sentenced 2 lieutenant-colonels to 3,5 years in prison after prosecution of corruption in infrastructural procurement in Zielona Gora.
Source:
http://www.rmf24.pl/fakty/polska/news-poznan-dwie-osoby-skazane-za-korupcje-w-wojsku,nId,340340

2) The court has sentenced 14 medical consultants (doctors) from Military Health Commissions to 2 to 3 years in prison after prosecution of corruption (bribes for medical opinions, sick leaves)
Source:
http://www.tvp.info/9305768/informacje/polska/14-lekarzy-skazanych-za-korupcje/

3) The court has sentenced the head of barrack administration in Bialystok to 4 years in prison after prosecution of corruption (bribes for building renovations).
Source:
http://www.naszdziennik.pl/polska-kraj/56084,rusza-proces-dotyczacy-korupcji-w-wojsku.html
All of these prosecutions and verdicts were published.

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

51.
score
3

Are there effective measures in place to discourage facilitation payments (which are illegal in almost all countries)?

Facilitations payments in Poland are strictly illegal [2]. Polish Criminal Code art. 228 para 1 penalises the acceptance, demanding or offering of &quoute;any material of personal benefit or a promise thereof in connection with the performance of a public function&quoute; [3].

However, a general gap between a clear legal framework and the efficiency of the law enforcement persists, despite improvements in this regard in recent years (see: Corruption Perception Indexes across the years, [4]). This situation is reflected in the Global Integrity Index, which gives Polish anti-corruption law a very strong score, while pointing out the deficiencies of the law enforcement agencies [1]. Consistent with the improving international scoring, the number of people convicted on the corruption charges is slowly falling [5[. The repeat offender ratio remains very low [5].

COMMENTS -+

1. &quoute;Global Integrity Report: Poland-2010&quoute;, accessed: 2.05.2014, http://www.globalintegrity.org/report/Poland/2010/

2. Regional Prosecutor's Office - Kalisz, &quoute;Corruption in Polish Law&quoute;, accessed: 18.05.2014, http://www.prokuratura.kalisz.pl/obywatelska-karta-antykorupcyjna/109-korupcja-w-polskim-prawie-karnym.html

3. &quoute;Criminal Code Act of 6th June 1997&quoute;, &quoute;Dziennik Ustaw&quoute;, no. 88, item 554, 1997. http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/Download?id=WDU19970880553&type=3, accessed September 2015.

4. Transparency International, &quoute;Corruption Perception Index&quoute;, accessed: 01.07.2015, http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview

5. Central Anti-Corruption Bureau, &quoute;Corruption Map 2013&quoute;, Warsaw, 2014, accessed: 01.07.2015, http://cba.gov.pl/pl/newsy-serwisu-antykorup/3215,Mapa-korupcji-2013.html

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: I would change the score to 3 due to general weakness of the law enforcement. In the Global Integrity Index 2010, Poland has received the score of 100 (which is the maximum) for the Anticorruption Law. However, enforcement of the law is scored at 67, showing that there is a gap between the legal framework and effectiveness of the law implementation. Similar conclusion comes from Poland’s Integrity System Study, where a discrepancy between legal and practical dimensions of the law enforcement institutions’ activity (police and public prosecutor) has been diagnosed.

'Anticorruption Mechanisms in Poland. A Monitoring Report', published by the Institute of Public Affairs ed. Aleksandra Kobylińska, Marek Solon-Lipiński, Grzegorz Makowski, Warsaw 2012, pp. 122-123.

Global Integrity Report: Poland-2010,t
https://www.globalintegrity.org/global/the-global-integrity-report-2010/poland/
(accessed June 7, 2012).

Suggested score: 3

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Training 60
52.
score
2

Do the armed forces have military doctrine addressing corruption as a strategic issue on operations?

While there is a declared awareness within the Ministry of National Defence of corruption posing a strategic issue for operations and individual officers have come into contact with its consequences during the ISAF deployment in Afghanistan [1, 6], no specific policy or doctrine has been introduced. The National Security Strategy only refers to corruption as a threat to the domestic and economic security of Poland. [4] The 'Vision for the Polish armed forces - 2030' refers to stabilisation missions and the future likelihood of missions supporting the establishment of democratic governments; it also states that Military Police units will likely be deployed on operations to support governance and disrupt organised crime. However, while these issues are connected to corruption, no direct mention of corruption appears. [5] There is also no direct mention of corruption in the publications of the Doctrine and Training Centre of the Polish Armed Forces.

Anti-corruption activities are conducted according to the general government anti-corruption programme [2] and the Ministry of National Defence Code of Conduct [3], covering the participation of military personnel in operations.

COMMENTS -+

1. Interview with Interviewee 1: Senior Ministry of Defence Official, Warsaw, Poland, 25 April 2014

2. Ministry of the Interior, &quoute;Government Programme on Combatting Corruption 2013 – 2018&quoute;, Warsaw, June 2013

3. Minister of National Defence, &quoute;Decision No. 125/MON on the Introduction of the Code of Conduct Among Employees and Soldiers&quoute;, Dziennik Urzędowy Ministra Obrony Narodowej, No. 8, 2011

4. 'National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland', 2014. https://www.bbn.gov.pl/ftp/SBN%20RP.pdf, accessed September 2015.

5. Ministry of National Defence, 'Vision for the Polish armed forces - 2030', May 2008. http://www.znp.wat.edu.pl/images/stories/Wizja_SZRP_2030.pdf, accessed September 2015.

6. Transparency International Defence and Security Programme, 'Corruption: Lessons from the International mission in Afghanistan'. February 2015. http://issuu.com/tidefence/docs/150217_briefing_for_policy_makers_-, accessed September 2015 (p47).

7. Doctrine and Training Centre of the Polish Armed Forces, publications page: http://cdis.wp.mil.pl/pl/25.html, accessed September 2015.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

53.
score
1

Is there training in corruption issues for commanders at all levels in order to ensure that these commanders are clear on the corruption issues they may face during deployment? If so, is there evidence that they apply this knowledge in the field?

There is no large-scale training programme addressing corruption issues for commanders [1]. However, certain activities of the Department of Education and Defence Promotion address pathological and criminal behaviour in the Army, including bribery and corruption [2]. Furthermore, the Anti-corruption Procedures Bureau organises training sessions in accordance with the “prevention through education” principle. Due to the personnel and financial constrains the programme remains limited, it is yet to form the core of the expected sectoral anti-corruption strategy for the Armed Forces. It is also unclear whether tailored courses for commanders are part of the package.

Cases of corruption in contracting among military officers stationed in Iraq have been uncovered [3]. These cases resulted in some convictions; however, questions remained about the degree of involvement of more senior officers and the effectiveness of the Military Counter-Intelligence Service. [5] On the other hand, there are also examples of Polish officers stationed in Afghanistan addressing corruption risks despite lack of systematic training. [4] Thus, the score of 1 seems to reflect the situation best.

COMMENTS -+

1. Interview with Interviewee 1: Senior Ministry of Defence Official, Warsaw, Poland, 25 April 2014

2. Beata Nowak, &quoute;Violence and Pathological Behaviour in the Military Environment - Problems, Risks, Consequences and the Possibility of Getting Help&quoute;, Ministry of National Defence, Department of Education and Defence Promotion, Warsaw, 2008.

3. Onet.pl, &quoute;Sentences in Baksheesh affair have been passed&quoute;, November 14 2011, accessed: 18.05.2014 http://wiadomosci.onet.pl/kraj/wydano-wyroki-ws-afery-bakszyszowej/52hkv

4. Transparency International Defence and Security Programme, &quoute;Corruption: Lessons from the International mission in Afghanistan.&quoute; February 2015. http://issuu.com/tidefence/docs/150217_briefing_for_policy_makers_-, accessed September 2015 (p47).

5.&quoute;Nangar Khel jak afera bakszyszowa&quoute;, Newsweek.pl, 5 February 2009. http://polska.newsweek.pl/nangar-khel-jak-afera-bakszyszowa,36260,1,1.html, accessed September 2015.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: I agree with the current assessment although I would argue that there should be a score in between of 1 and 0 which would suit for &quoute;corruption cases have been evident recently.&quoute;

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

54.
score
1

Are trained professionals regularly deployed to monitor corruption risk in the field (whether deployed on operations or peacekeeping missions)?

Both the Military Police and Military Counter-Intelligence Service are present in the field, during external operations and peacekeeping missions [e.g. see the list of deployed units contacting Military Police at KFOR mission, source 2; reports of the effectiveness of Counter-Intelligence Service officers being questioned after corruption cases have emerged in Iraq in 4]. However, their role is not clearly established and especially in the case of the Service, anti-bribery activities are not expected to take priority over field surveillance, unless local conditions require so (e.g. Afghanistan, due to the risks associated with the drug trade) [1].

No public data on deployment of anti-corruption specialists is available.

COMMENTS -+

1. Interview with Interviewee 1: Senior Ministry of Defence Official, Warsaw, Poland, 25 April 2014

2. Polish Military Contingent KFOR, accessed: 18.05.2014, http://www.22pkwkfor.wp.mil.pl/pl/21.html

3.&quoute;Sentences in Baksheesh affair have been passed&quoute;, Onet.pl, November 14 2011, accessed: 18.05.2014 http://wiadomosci.onet.pl/kraj/wydano-wyroki-ws-afery-bakszyszowej/52hkv

4. &quoute;Nangar Khel jak afera bakszyszowa&quoute;, Newsweek.pl, 5 February 2009. http://polska.newsweek.pl/nangar-khel-jak-afera-bakszyszowa,36260,1,1.html, accessed September 2015.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

55.
score
1

Are there guidelines, and staff training, on addressing corruption risks in contracting whilst on deployed operations or peacekeeping missions?

There is no common, comprehensive policy on addressing corruption risks whilst deployed on external missions. Some training takes place in individual cases and on an irregular basis [1]. There is, however, no public information about these courses.

Military and civilian personnel abroad are expected to act according to the 2011 Code of Conduct. However, the latter includes soft law measures, centred on possible conflict of interests between military personnel and defence contractors; it is not specifically tailored to the operational context.

Despite a documented case of corruption in the missions abroad [2], no comprehensive and dedicated programme has been established. However, there has also been some evidence of Polish officers stationed in Afghanistan addressing corruption risks despite lack of systematic training or guidance. [3]

COMMENTS -+

1. Interview with Interviewee 1: Senior Ministry of Defence Official, Warsaw, Poland, 25 April 2014

2. &quoute;Sentences in Baksheesh affair have been passed&quoute;, Onet.pl, November 14 2011, accessed: 18.05.2014 http://wiadomosci.onet.pl/kraj/wydano-wyroki-ws-afery-bakszyszowej/52hkv

3. Transparency International Defence and Security Programme, &quoute;Corruption: Lessons from the International mission in Afghanistan.&quoute; February 2015. http://issuu.com/tidefence/docs/150217_briefing_for_policy_makers_-, accessed September 2015 (p47).

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

56.
score
2

Private Military Contractors (PMCs) usually refer to companies that provide operational staff to military environments. They may also be known as security contractors or private security contractors, and refer to themselves as private military corporations, private military firms, private security providers, or military service providers.

Private military companies (PMC) in Poland mostly comprise civilian security guard agencies providing extensive protection services for the military installations in Poland [2,3]. Media reports highlight the opaque ties between these companies, often owned and controlled by former Communist state security services officers and the military police establishment. [1] It has led to the lack of proper oversight and reported corruption practices.

While the security agencies are regulated in Polish law according to the &quoute;Protection of Persons and Goods Act of 1997&quoute;, there are no specific regulation of the PMC industry. The &quoute;Vision for the Polish armed forces - 2030&quoute; notes that private security companies are likely to play an increasing part in future conflicts, but it doesn't offer recommendations on any actions or regulations. [4] Poland has been, since 1990, a signatory state of the UN &quoute;Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries&quoute;; however, this convention does not impose comprehensive limitations on the use of PMCs. No PMCs performing operational duties of the armed forces have been reported to operate in Poland.

Score 2 has been selected to reflect lack of legal regulation combined with no evidence of use of PMCs in operational environments.

COMMENTS -+

1. &quoute;Former Communist Secret Services Agent Protect the Majority of Military Installations in Poland&quoute;, W Polityce, December 2013, accessed: 02.05.2014, http://wpolityce.pl/polityka/172827-byli-ubecy-ochraniaja-wiekszosc-obiektow-wojskowych-w-polsce

2. Łukasz Szozda, &quoute;Private Military Companies&quoute;, Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe, no. 11, vol. 2, 2006, pp. 206 - 218.

3. Marcin Górka, &quoute;Retirees Will Guard the Polish Army&quoute;, Gazeta Wyborcza, 9 November 2011, accessed: 02.05.2014, http://wyborcza.pl/1,76842,10613015,Emeryt_chroni_wojsko.html#ixzz1pPv0wbUH

4. Ministry of National Defence, &quoute;Vision for the Polish armed forces - 2030&quoute;, May 2008. http://www.znp.wat.edu.pl/images/stories/Wizja_SZRP_2030.pdf, accessed September 2015.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Personnel 50
57.
score
3

Does the country have legislation covering defence and security procurement and are there any items exempt from these laws?

Public procurement is normally regulated by the Public Procurement Law of 2004, which, in order to assure transparency, requires that all tenders and records of the proceedings are published on-line in the Public Procurement Bulletin [1].

The Public Procurement Law was amended on 14 September 2012, in order to bring it into compliance with the EU directive 2009/81/EC, which regulates defence and security contracts for the procurement of military equipment, works and services, and all sensitive purchases involving classified information. As a result, the Polish military procurement market was in principle opened for EU companies [2]. However, article 4 paragraph 5 allows certain exemptions in the case of procurement &quoute;classified as secret or top secret, if there is a paramount security or defence interest of the state&quoute;. The Public Procurement Law also allows for exemptions from the rules governing the EU Single Market in &quoute;case of acquisitions or production of arms and munitions, if justified by the security interest of Poland, as long as the fair competition between the tender participants is maintained&quoute; [1,4]. A 2013 Cabinet directive established the procedure and named those responsible for deciding whether a national interest is concerned in a given procurement process. [9] Furthermore, government-to-government deals can also be excluded from the provisions of the Law.

An exemption form the Law due to an interest of national security does not leave the procurement procedures unsupervised: the process is still controlled by the Supreme Chamber of Control and by internal MOD bodies. The Director or the Public Procurement Office, which is responsible for coordinating and monitoring procurement procedures, can also initiate an investigation as to whether the exemption was justified. [8] Decision 118/MON also stipulates that the MOD's internal Anti-Corruption Procedures Bureau (which is a separate cell within the MOD only answering to the Minister) provides oversight over the procurement process, verifying the terms of particular tenders and monitoring potential corruption risks as well as the legality and utility of the procedures. [3] Furthermore, in 2013 the MOD's Anti-Corruption Procedures Bureau signed an agreement with the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau (CBA), a country-wide institution, stipulating greater CBA oversight over the armed forces' modernisation programme and attendant procurement. [10]

The Public Procurement Law also does not apply to contract awarded to countries outside the EU and to contract below the value of 30,000 euro. Article 5a of the Public Procurement Law stipulates that in the latter case, tenders should still be public and contracts should be awarded with public notice. [1, 7]

Given that the government decisions implementing the Public Procurement Law contain specific anti-corruption provisions, these would seem to bring Poland close to a score of 4. However, it is not clear to what extent the independent controls foreseen - including the prerogatives of the Supreme Chamber of Control - are carried out, as no specific reports could be located. Moreover the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the European Commission have expressed doubts as to whether the national exemption is only used in exceptional cases. [11] Therefore, the score of 3 has been retained.

COMMENTS -+

1. &quoute;Public Procurement Law Act of 29 January 2004&quoute;, Dziennik Urzędowy, 2010, no. 113, item 795, accessed: 03.05.2014, http://www.uzp.gov.pl/cmsws/page/?F;248;ustawa_pzp.html, accessed October 2015.

2. European Union, &quoute;Directive 2009/81/EC on the coordination of procedures for the award of certain works contracts, supply contracts and service contracts in the fields of defence and security&quoute; of 13 July 2009, Official Journal of the European Union, L 216/76

3. Minister of National Defence, &quoute;Decision no. 118/MON&quoute; of 25 April, 2013, Dziennik Urzędowy, Item 119. http://www.dz.urz.mon.gov.pl/zasoby/dziennik/pozycje/tresc-aktow/pdf/2013/04/Poz._119_dec._Nr_118.pdf, accessed October 2015.

4. Annex no. 1 to &quoute;Decision no. 118/MON&quoute;: &quoute;Regulations on defence and security procurement in the field of weapons and munitions production and acquisitions exempted from the Law of Public Acquisitions in accordance with art. 346 paragraph 1B of the Treaty on Functioning of the European Union&quoute;, accessed: 28.04.2014, http://www.iu.wp.mil.pl/userfiles/file/prawo/Poz__119_dec__Nr_118.pdf

5. Artur Szymonik, Jakub Szuszczykiewicz, &quoute;Public Procurement Law and Military Procurements&quoute;, Systemy Logistyczne Wojsk, no. 39, 2013, pp. 341 - 349

6. &quoute;Response of the Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of National Defence to parliamentary question no. 579 regarding acquisition of military weapons and equipment exempt from the Law on Public Procurement', 20 January 2012. http://www.sejm.gov.pl/Sejm7.nsf/InterpelacjaTresc.xsp?key=772E35D1, accessed September 2015.

7. Marek Okniński, 'Podwyższenie progu stosowania ustawy Pzp. Nowa ustawa już w obowiązuje!', 20 May 2015, http://www.komunikaty.pl/komunikaty/1,124833,15516532,Podwyzszenie_progu_stosowania_ustawy_Pzp__Nowa_ustawa.html, accessed October 2015.

8. &quoute;Response of the Director of the Public Procurement Bureau to parliamentary question no. 6670 regarding the amendment of the Public Procurement Law', 13 April 2010. http://orka2.sejm.gov.pl/IZ6.nsf/main/0CDC1D6A, accessed October 2015.

9. &quoute;Cabinet Directive regarding the process of identifying basic national security interests&quoute;, 12 February 2013. https://www.google.pl/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CB8QFjAAahUKEwidz637qKvIAhVBv3IKHchSDMA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fisip.sejm.gov.pl%2FDownload%3Fid%3DWDU20130000233%26type%3D2&usg=AFQjCNELwfVx0Ab58lIHM93D9xcMSiRp_g&bvm=bv.104317490,d.bGg, accessed October 2015.

10. &quoute;CBA będzie współpracować z armią&quoute;, Wprost, 13 October 2013. http://www.wprost.pl/ar/420507/CBA-bedzie-wspolpracowac-z-armia/, accessed October 2015.

11. Rzeczpospolita, &quoute;MFA: EU Worried About the Military Procurement Regime&quoute;, January 25, 2015, accessed: 10.07.2015, http://prawo.rp.pl/artykul/1174202.html

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

58.
score
4

Is the defence procurement cycle process, from assessment of needs, through contract implementation and sign-off, all the way to asset disposal, disclosed to the public?

Defence procurement is regulated by the &quoute;Public Procurement Law Act&quoute; unless it falls within the scope of the art. 345 paragraph 1b of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Member State security exemption), in which case it is regulated by the Minister's &quoute;Decision no. 118/MON&quoute;. [1, 2, 3].

Decisions 103/MON, 25/MON, 72/MON and 444/MON establish in detail the procurement process, from assessment of needs to awarding of contracts to withdrawing equipment from use when it no longer fulfils the requirements of the armed forces. They are available to the public online and in print.

The procurement procedure for exempt items is regulated by the 118/MON decision is public (art. 5 paragraph 1, corresponding with art. 8 of the general procurement law) and can take place in the form of an 'open tendering' or 'restricted negotiations'. Information about the starting open tender and electronic bidding should be publicised on the website of the Public Information Bulletin and the website of the procuring entity. While the negotiations can be classified, in order to protect the commercial secret or the state security interest, the final outcome must still be publicly announced.

RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: Added relevant information.

COMMENTS -+

1. &quoute;Public Procurement Law Act of 29 January 2004&quoute;, Dziennik Urzędowy, 2010, no. 113, item 795, accessed: 03.05.2014, http://www.uzp.gov.pl/cmsws/page/?F;248;ustawa_pzp.html

2. Minister of National Defence, &quoute;Decision no. 118/MON&quoute; of 25 April, 2013, Dziennik Urzędowy, Item 119

3. &quoute;Directive 2009/81/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on the coordination of procedures for the award of certain works contracts, supply contracts and service contracts by contracting authorities or entities in the fields of defence and security, and amending Directives 2004/17/EC and 2004/18/EC&quoute;, Official Journal of the European Union, L 216/76, accessed: 03.05.2014, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:216:0076:0136:en:PDF

4. Minister of National Defence, &quoute;Decision no. 103/MON on acquisition planning&quoute;, 31 March 2014. http://www.dz.urz.mon.gov.pl/zasoby/dziennik/pozycje/tresc-aktow/pdf/2014/04/Poz._105_dec._Nr_103.pdf, accessed October 2015.

5. Minister of National Defence, &quoute;Decision no. 25/MON on introducing &quoute;Guidelines for the Review of Needs of the Polish armed forces&quoute;&quoute;, 7 February 2014. http://www.dz.urz.mon.gov.pl/zasoby/dziennik/pozycje/tresc-aktow/pdf/2014/02/Poz._44_dec._Nr_25.pdf, accessed October 2015.

6. Minister of National Defence, &quoute;Decision no. 72/MON on procurement of military equipment and services for the Polish armed forces', 25 March 2013. http://www.dz.urz.mon.gov.pl/zasoby/dziennik/pozycje/tresc-aktow/pdf/2013/03/Poz._78_dec._Nr_72.pdf, accessed October 2015.

7. &quoute;Decision 444/MON on introducing new military equipment and withdrawing from use equipment which no longer fulfils the requirements of the armed forces.&quoute; 30 December 2013. http://www.dz.urz.mon.gov.pl/zasoby/dziennik/pozycje/tresc-aktow/pdf/2013/12/Poz._397_dec__Nr_444.pdf, accessed October 2015.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: I would add that all procurement processes are regulated in the Minister of National Defence decisions (planning - decision no. 103/MON, assessment of needs and operational requirements - decisions no. 25/MON and 72/MON, public procurement - decision no. 118/MON and the Public Procurement Law Act, fulfillment of contract and asset disposal - decision no 444/MON and Management of Assets Act).

Sources:
http://www.dz.urz.mon.gov.pl/dziennik/pozycja/decyzja-105-decyzja-nr-103mon-z-dnia-31-marca-2014-r-w-sprawie-zasad-opracowywania-i-realizacji-centralnych-planow-rzeczowych/
http://www.dz.urz.mon.gov.pl/dziennik/pozycja/decyzja-119-decyzja-nr-118mon-z-dnia-25-kwietnia-2013-r-w-sprawie-zasad-i-trybu-udzielania-w-resorcie-obrony-narodowej-zamowien-w-dziedzinie-obronnosc/
http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/DetailsServlet?id=WDU20040190177
http://www.iu.wp.mil.pl/userfiles/file/prawo/Dec_Nr_444.pdf
http://www.dz.urz.mon.gov.pl/dziennik/pozycja/decyzja-78-decyzja-nr-72mon-z-dnia-25-marca-2013-r-w-sprawie-pozyskiwania-sprzetu-wojskowego-i-uslug-dla-sil-zbrojnych-rzeczypospolitej-polskiej/
http://www.amw.com.pl/en/a/legal-section

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

59.
score
3

Are defence procurement oversight mechanisms in place and are these oversight mechanisms active and transparent?

The Anti-Corruption Procedures Bureau provides oversight at all stages of the procurement procedure for the defence and security sector, as stipulated in article 2, paragraph 1, of the &quoute;Decision 118/MON&quoute; [1]. This is done for the purposes of legality, efficacy and good governance, as well as from the angle of potential corruption risks. The outcomes of the procurement processes are analysed by the Department of Audit and contracts are monitored by the Military Counterintelligence Service as a part of the &quoute;small anti-corruption shield&quoute; [2].

Further oversight is provided by the central Public Procurement Office (PPO), including its Ad Hoc Control Department and the Appeals Department: the former performs audits of selected procedures and the latter deals with complaints and appeals from tenderers and supports the National Chamber of Appeals, an independent body affiliated with the PPO and responsible for settling complaints. [6]

The Supreme Chamber of Control also audits MOD procurement decisions as part of its annual budgetary audit. [7]

The Inspectorate of the Armaments' activities in 2011 - 2014 were audited by the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau between February and November 2014 [3,4]. The control lasted 9 months, the longest possible period. However, as of September 2015, no report or post-control documents were released. Moreover, in 2013 the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau and the MOD signed an agreement on cooperation, aiming to provide greater anti-corruption controls for the armed forces' modernisation programme.[8]

In 2015, opposition MP's have asked the Supreme Chamber of Control to verify the procedural, financial and legal aspects of the ongoing tenders [5]. Accusations of misconduct have been rejected by the Ministry of National Defence. [6]

Score 3 has been selected to reflect general provision of oversight; publication of a greater number of audit reports/results is still an issue to be improved.

COMMENTS -+

1. Minister of National Defence, &quoute;Decision no. 118/MON&quoute; of 25 April, 2013, Dziennik Urzędowy, Item 119

2. Interview with Interviewee 1: Senior Ministry of Defence Official, Warsaw, Poland, 25 April 2014

3. &quoute;Central Anti-corruption Bureau Control in the Inspectorate of the Armaments'&quoute;, Defence24, 19 February 2014, accessed: 03.05.2014, http://www.defence24.pl/news_kontrola-cba-w-inspektoracie-uzbrojenia-mon

4. Onet.pl, &quoute;CBA Concluded Its Control in the Inspectorare of Armaments&quoute;, November 19, 2014, accessed: 01.07.2015, http://wiadomosci.onet.pl/kraj/cba-zakonczylo-kontrole-w-inspektoracie-uzbrojenia-mon/699hn

5. Gazeta Wyborcza, &quoute;PiS: Armaments Programmes to Be Checked by NIK&quoute;, January 16, 2015, accessed: 01.07.2015, http://wyborcza.pl/1,91446,17265478,PiS__programy_modernizacyjne_MON_do_kontroli_NIK_.html

6. Public Procurement Office, homepage/Structure. http://www.uzp.gov.pl/cmsws/page/?F;375, accessed October 2015.

7. Supreme Chamber of Control, &quoute;Information on the Implementation of the State Budget Part 29: National Defence and the Implementation of the Financial Guidelines of the Armed Forces Modernisation Fund for 2014&quoute;, May 2015. https://www.nik.gov.pl/plik/id,8949.pdf, accessed September 2015.

8. &quoute;CBA będzie współpracować z armią&quoute;, Wprost, 13 October 2013. http://www.wprost.pl/ar/420507/CBA-bedzie-wspolpracowac-z-armia/, accessed October 2015.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Members of the Military Police and the Counterintelligence Service act as observers in the main procurement decisions. It's a small &quoute;anticorruption shield&quoute; established by a decision (classified information) of Minister of National Defence.

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

60.
score
3

Are actual and potential defence purchases made public?

The Public Procurement Law (article 11) and Decision 118/MON regulating procurement of items exempt from the Law (articles 2.6,14.2 and 22.2.1) both stipulate that defence acquisitions need to be made public, both in the phase of tendering and when the contract is awarded. Restrictions may apply to features and requirements for items being considered or ordered. [6, 7]

The Ministry of National Defence publishes a long-term planning document &quoute;Armed Forces Technical Modernisation Plan 2013 - 2022&quoute;, indicating present and future purchasing programmes, their current status (the document appears to be updated at least once a year), costs and planned date of completion [5].

Defence purchases are also made public on the Inspectorate of the Armaments website, an Armed Forces unit tasked with the quantification of requirements for procurement of military equipment. There is detailed information on on-going and past procurement [1]. The list is detailed and is presented in the form of calls for tenders, detailing the financial and technical requirements (e.g. [3] or [4]) , as described by the military . However, the list of planned purchases has not been updated since 2012 [2].

COMMENTS -+

1. Inspectorate of the Armaments, &quoute;List of Procurement Tenders&quoute;, accessed: 03.05.2014, http://www.iu.wp.mil.pl/przetargi.lista.0.0.html

2. Inspectorate of the Armaments, &quoute;List of products and services planned to be purchased by the Inspectorate of the Armament in 2012&quoute;, accessed: 03.05.2014, http://www.iu.wp.mil.pl/strony.artykul.20.0.html

3. Inspectorate of the Armaments, &quoute;Call for Tenders for the Outboard Engine H-04&quoute; July 8, 2015, accessed: 10.07.2015, http://www.iu.wp.mil.pl/userfiles/file/zamowienia_publiczne/2015/105/ogloszenie_IU_105.pdf

4. Inspectorate of the Armaments, Call for Tenders for the Rosomak Command Vehicle&quoute;, July 10, 2015, accessed: 10.07.2015, http://www.iu.wp.mil.pl/userfiles/file/zamowienia_publiczne/2015/93/Ogloszenie_BMS.pdf

5. Ministry of National Defence, &quoute;Armed Forces Technical Modernisation Plan 2013 - 2022&quoute;, May 8 2015, accessed: 10.07.2015, http://mon.gov.pl/z/pliki/dokumenty/rozne/2015/05/program_uzbrojenia_8_maj_2015.pdf

6. &quoute;Decision no. 118/MON&quoute;: &quoute;Regulations on defence and security procurement in the field of weapons and munitions production and acquisitions exempted from the Law of Public Acquisitions in accordance with art. 346 paragraph 1B of the Treaty on Functioning of the European Union&quoute;, accessed: 28.04.2014, http://www.iu.wp.mil.pl/userfiles/file/prawo/Poz__119_dec__Nr_118.pdf

7. &quoute;Public Procurement Law Act of 29 January 2004&quoute;, Dziennik Urzędowy, 2010, no. 113, item 795, accessed: 03.05.2014, http://www.uzp.gov.pl/cmsws/page/?F;248;ustawa_pzp.html, accessed October 2015.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Sources:
Decision of Minister of National Defence no. 118/MON re. duties on public announcements: (articles 2.6,14.2 and 22.2.1):
http://www.iu.wp.mil.pl/userfiles/file/prawo/Poz__119_dec__Nr_118.pdf

Public Procurement Act re. duties as to public announcements, article 11:
http://www.iu.wp.mil.pl/userfiles/file/prawo/PZP_2013.pdf

Resolution of the Council of Ministers no 164 form 2013 regarding planned modernization programs:
https://www.premier.gov.pl/wydarzenia/decyzje-rzadu/uchwala-w-sprawie-ustanowienia-programu-wieloletniego-priorytetowe-zadania.html

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

61.
score
1

What procedures and standards are companies required to have - such as compliance programmes and business conduct programmes - in order to be able to bid for work for the Ministry of Defence or armed forces?

The &quoute;Public Procurement Law&quoute; art. 22 outlines the general criteria required of companies to participate in public tenders, while art. 24 lists conditions which preclude an entrepreneur from taking part in a tender bid. Contractors who have failed to fulfil the conditions of previous public tenders or have been lawfully sentenced for corruption offences are automatically banned from the tendering process. [2]

MOD's Decision no.118/MON outlines the conditions under which companies may apply for a military procurement contract. It includes a point on the necessity of compliance with the European Defence Agency's &quoute;Code of the Best Practice in the Supply Chain&quoute;. The Decision also states that those conducted for bribery (and companies which employ them) are precluded from taking part in tenders. [1]

However, no definitive provisions on the business best practices, transparency, ethical behaviour and anti-corruption practices exist beyond what is generally in the company law. Score 1 has been selected to reflect the existence of a ban on companies/individuals convicted of corruption and bribery, and the mention of the Code of Best Practice in the Supply Chain, which incorporates requirements of integrity.

RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 1: Information incorporated.

COMMENTS -+

1. Minister of National Defence, &quoute;&quoute;Decision no. 118/MON&quoute; of 25 April, 2013.on the Rules of Concluding Contracts Regarding Military Equipment and Armament&quoute;, Dziennik Urzędowy MInistra Obrony Narodowej, item 119, 2013, accessed: 01.09.2014,

2. &quoute;Public Procurement Law Act of 29 January 2004&quoute;, Dziennik Urzędowy, 2010, no. 113, item 795, accessed: 03.05.2014, http://www.uzp.gov.pl/cmsws/page/?F;248;ustawa_pzp.html

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: I agree but it must be noted that the &quoute;Decision no. 291/MON of 26 July 2006 on the Rules of Concluding Contracts Regarding Military Equipment and Armament&quoute; has been replaced by the &quoute;Decision no. 118/MON&quoute; of 25 April, 2013. The new regulation contains provisions concerning the &quoute;Code of Best Practices in Supply Chain&quoute;.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

62.
score
3

Are procurement requirements derived from an open, well-audited national defence and security strategy?

Procurement decisions are derived from a clear and public hierarchical defence and security strategy system, with the National Security White Paper setting an overall political direction of the modernisation of the Armed Forces and the &quoute;Strategy of the National Security System Development 2022&quoute; presenting a more detailed outlook, to be operationalised with a detailed timeline in the Ministry’s &quoute;Technical Modernisation Plan&quoute; [1, 2, 3]. The MOD Decision 25 also establishes a process of defining armed forces' requirements in a 10-year perspective. The Decision refers to strategic documents, including the National Security Strategy, as guidance in identifying requirements. [6, para 6]

The strategic plan seems to respond to the most pressing security issues for Poland and is usually subjected to a wider political consensus among major parliamentary groups. However, its execution and especially the tender results are sometimes subject to controversies and are under heavy political pressure and industrial lobbying; as a result, the procurement requirements are sometimes criticised and their legality questioned [5].

Technical modernisation is audited within annual budgetary audits conducted by the Supreme Chamber of Control - as a rule, a few procurement processes are audited for legality, efficacy and utility of acquisitions. However, no direct statements regarding links between general strategies and individual acquisitions have been made. [7] In addition, the Chamber has published a critical special report on the state of the modernisation in 2012 which pointed out some delays and deficiencies in financing of equipment modernisation.

COMMENTS -+

1. &quoute;White Paper on National Security of Poland&quoute;, 2013, accessed: 04.05.2014, http://www.spbn.gov.pl/sbn/biala-ksiega/4630,Biala-Ksiega.html

2. Council of Ministers, &quoute;Strategy of the National Security System Development 2022 adopted on 9 April 2013&quoute;, accessed: 04.05.2014, http://www.bbn.gov.pl/pl/publikacje-i-dokumenty/dokumenty/4901,Strategia-rozwoju-systemu-bezpieczenstwa-narodowego-Rzeczypospolitej-Polskiej-20.html

3. Ministry of National Defence, &quoute;Technical Modernisation Plan 2013 - 2022&quoute;, Warsaw, 2013, accessed: 04.05.2014, http://mon.gov.pl/z/pliki/rozne/2013/09/program_uzbrojenia_5_sierpnia.pdf

4. Supreme Chamber of Control, &quoute;State of the professionalisation of the Polish Armed Forces on the example of selected military units. Information about outcomes of inspection&quoute;, Warsaw, 2012, accessed: 04.05.2014, http://www.nik.gov.pl/plik/id,3650,vp,4648.pdf

5. W Gospodarce, &quoute;According to MoD, only Caracal Choppers Fulfill Tender Requirements&quoute;, April 21, 2015, accessed: 10.07.2015, http://wgospodarce.pl/informacje/19595-wedlug-mon-tylko-oferta-smiglowca-airbusa-spelnila-wymogi-formalne-w-pokonanym-polu-smiglowce-produkowane-w-polsce

6. Minister of National Defence, &quoute;Decision no. 25/MON on introducing &quoute;Guidelines for the Review of Needs of the Polish armed forces&quoute;&quoute;, 7 February 2014. http://www.dz.urz.mon.gov.pl/zasoby/dziennik/pozycje/tresc-aktow/pdf/2014/02/Poz._44_dec._Nr_25.pdf, accessed October 2015.

7. Supreme Chamber of Control, &quoute;Information on the Implementation of the State Budget Part 29: National Defence and the Implementation of the Financial Guidelines of the Armed Forces Modernisation Fund for 2014&quoute;, May 2015. https://www.nik.gov.pl/plik/id,8949.pdf, accessed September 2015.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Source:
http://www.dz.urz.mon.gov.pl/zasoby/dziennik/pozycje/tresc-aktow/pdf/2014/02/Poz._44_dec._Nr_25.pdf

Requirements and Operational Capabilities based on strategic documents (article 6 - decision of Ministry of National Defence no 25/MON - Review of needs for Operational Capabilities - Guidelines from 2014)
We have some examples of situations such as:
- unexpected needs (procurements);
- urgent operational needs;
when we use extraordinary procedures, however, generally procurement and requirements are based on the national defence and security strategy.

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

63.
score
3

Are defence purchases based on clearly identified and quantified requirements?

Decision 25/MON stipulates that operational requirements should be based on strategic security documents shaping Polish security policy and constituting the basis of the armed forces' operational requirements. Decision 72/MON (&quoute;Rules of Preparation and Implementation of Central Acquisition Plans&quoute;) regulates the assessment of needs and the resulting armaments procedures of the Armed Forces. The plans are prepared through a multi-step process of material requirements evaluation, being at the end approved by the Minister of National Defence [2]. The Decision further stipulates some exceptions to the previously defined military requirements in cases of unexpected needs [3].

The Armaments Council, an advisory body affiliated with the Ministry of National Defence, assesses defence procurement policy. The head of Anti-Corruption Procedures Bureau within the Ministry of National Defence is a member of the Armaments Council.

On the micro level (e.g. each tender), the requirements are clearly defined and illustrated and are accessible to the general public through the Inspectorate of the Armaments website. However, there are reported cases of corrupt tenders, with the requirements tailored for a particular supplier [4]. These, however, are usually conducted on a lower, base level and mainly apply to tenders for non-military services and equipment.

COMMENTS -+

1. Inspectorate of the Armaments, &quoute;List of Tenders&quoute;, accessed: 04.05.2014, http://www.iu.wp.mil.pl/przetargi.lista.0.0.html

2. Minister of National Defence, &quoute;Decision no. 7/MON of 14 January 2008 on the Rules of Preparation and Implementation of Central Acquisition Plans&quoute;, Dziennik Urzędowy MInistra Obrony Narodowej, no. 1, 2008, accessed: 04.05.2015, http://www.rzi.hg.pl/pliki/decyzja_7.pdf

3. Minister of National Defence, &quoute;Decision no. 72/MON of 25 March 2013 on acquisition of military equipment and services for the Polish Armed Forces&quoute;, Dziennik Urzędowy Ministra Obrony Narodowe, item 78, 2013, accessed: 02.09.2014, http://www.dz.urz.mon.gov.pl/zasoby/dziennik/pozycje/tresc-aktow/pdf/2013/03/Poz._78_dec._Nr_72.pdf

4. &quoute;Commander of the Air Base Dismissed&quoute;, Polska Zbrojna, 20 September 2013, accessed: 04.05.2014, http://www.polska-zbrojna.pl/home/articleshow/9612?t=Dowodca-bazy-lotniczej-odwolany

5. Minister of National Defence, &quoute;Decision no. 25/MON on introducing &quoute;Guidelines for the Review of Needs of the Polish armed forces&quoute;&quoute;, 7 February 2014. http://www.dz.urz.mon.gov.pl/zasoby/dziennik/pozycje/tresc-aktow/pdf/2014/02/Poz._44_dec._Nr_25.pdf, accessed October 2015.

6. Minister of National Defence, &quoute;Decision no. 72/MON on procurement of military equipment and services for the Polish armed forces', 25 March 2013. http://www.dz.urz.mon.gov.pl/zasoby/dziennik/pozycje/tresc-aktow/pdf/2013/03/Poz._78_dec._Nr_72.pdf, accessed October 2015.

7. &quoute;Decision 444/MON on introducing new military equipment and withdrawing from use equipment which no longer fulfils the requirements of the armed forces.&quoute; 30 December 2013. http://www.dz.urz.mon.gov.pl/zasoby/dziennik/pozycje/tresc-aktow/pdf/2013/12/Poz._397_dec__Nr_444.pdf, accessed October 2015.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Source:
http://www.dz.urz.mon.gov.pl/zasoby/dziennik/pozycje/tresc-aktow/pdf/2014/02/Poz._44_dec._Nr_25.pdf
http://www.dz.urz.mon.gov.pl/dziennik/pozycja/decyzja-78-decyzja-nr-72mon-z-dnia-25-marca-2013-r-w-sprawie-pozyskiwania-sprzetu-wojskowego-i-uslug-dla-sil-zbrojnych-rzeczypospolitej-polskiej/

In accordance with the decision of Minister of National Defence no 72/MON from 2013 (acquisition of military equipment and services for the Polish Armed Forces), procurement decisions are based on operational requirements defined in the phase of identification. However, there are some situations--such as unexpected needs (procurement) and urgent operational needs--in which we use extraordinary procedures.

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

64.
score
2

Is defence procurement generally conducted as open competition or is there a significant element of single-sourcing (that is, without competition)?

The Europeanisation of Polish defence procurement law introduced by the &quoute;Directive 81/2009/EC&quoute; [3] and subsequent changes in Polish law has reduced - but not eliminated - the ability of the government or other procuring bodies to single-source purchases. The Law stipulates that procurement tenders are conducted in conditions enabling meaningful competition and lists conditions which could lead to procurement being single-sourced (for example, the ability of only one offeror to fulfil stipulated requirements). While Polish defence industry, despite on-going reforms, still lacks the competitive advantage its larger, Western European competitors enjoy - such as advanced technology, capital and access to financial centres - it allegedly resorts to exercising political pressure on the government [1].

According to 2011 report of the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau, while the majority (324) of contracts were awarded through the competitive procedures, the overall value of 160 single sourcing contracts, stipulated in the &quoute;Decision 291/MON&quoute; was higher by 200 million zlotys [4, 6]. The single sourcing procedure grants authorities greater discretion in the procurer selection. While the number might seem excessive, two points have to be made: it does not necessarily prove that anti-competition measures are adopted in each and every case and, more importantly, the available data dates back to the time before the adoption of the &quoute;Directive 81/2009/EC&quoute;, transposed into Polish law in 2011. More recent data could not be located.

A recent tender for utility helicopters has provoked a fair amount of controversy after only one tender participant was invited to submit his product to the final examination. However, the MoD has repeatedly stated that the biding process was open and the limited negotiations were caused by either formal or substantial deficiencies of other offers [5].

Score 2 has been selected to reflect the difficulty of locating relevant data and the 2011 figures suggesting that around 50% of defence procurement procedures were conducted using single-sourcing.

COMMENTS -+

1. &quoute;The Defence Industry Fears the EU Directive and Prepares a Walkout&quoute;, Forbes, 2 August 2011, accessed: 05.05.2014, http://www.forbes.pl/artykuly/sekcje/Wydarzenia/zbrojeniowka-boi-sie-dyrektywy--bedzie-strajk,17910,1

2. Jarosław Lasecki, &quoute;How to Take Care of Polish Defence Industry&quoute;, Polska Zbrojna, 4 February, 2014, accessed: 05.05.2014, http://www.polska-zbrojna.pl/mobile/articleshow/11364?t=Jak-zadbac-o-polskie-firmy-zbrojeniowe-

3. European Union, &quoute;Directive 2009/81/EC on the coordination of procedures for the award of certain works contracts, supply contracts and service contracts in the fields of defence and security&quoute; of 13 July 2009, Official Journal of the European Union, L 216/76

4. Tadeusz Wnuk &quoute;Functioning of the Defence Market in Poland&quoute;, Polska Zbrojna, 08 June 2011, accessed: 05.05.2014, http://www.gazeta-internetowa.home.pl/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=12745:funkcjonowanie-rynku-uzbrojenia-w-polsce-plog-22011&catid=92:przegld-logistyczny&Itemid=177

5. Polskie Radio, &quoute;Controversies around the Military Tender for Helicopters. Minister Siemoniak Assures of the Diligent Tender&quoute;, April 22, 2015, accessed: 10.07.2015, http://www.polskieradio.pl/5/3/Artykul/1426964,Burza-wokol-wojskowych-przetargow-Tomasz-Siemoniak-smiglowce-i-zestawy-przeciwlotnicze-wybrane-prawidlowo

6. Central Anticorruption Bureau, &quoute;Corruption Map 2011&quoute;, p. 58. http://www.cba.gov.pl/ftp/mp3/Mapa_Korupcji.pdf, accessed on 7 June 2014.

7. Public Procurement Law Act of 29 January 2004&quoute;, Dziennik Urzędowy, 2010, no. 113, item 795, accessed: 03.05.2014, http://www.uzp.gov.pl/cmsws/page/?F;248;ustawa_pzp.html

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: According to the data provided by the Central Anticorruption Bureau, a single-sourcing procedure was applied to 160 contracts, while a competitive procedure to 324 contracts concluded by the MoD in 2011. However, the value of the single-sourced contracts exceeded the value of the competitive ones by 200 million PLN.

Corruption Map 2011, Central Anticorruption Bureau, pp. 58, accessed on 7 June 2014: http://www.cba.gov.pl/ftp/mp3/Mapa_Korupcji.pdf

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

65.
score
3

Are tender boards subject to regulations and codes of conduct and are their decisions subject to independent audit to ensure due process and fairness?

Tender boards are subject to anti-corruption regulations and the 2011 sectoral &quoute;Code of Conduct&quoute; [2]. Additionally, they fall under the scope of the &quoute;Inspectorate of the Armaments Code of Ethics&quoute;, [4] though the document is very general and does not provide detailed guidance. According to the &quoute;Decision no. 291/MON&quoute; article 7 paragraph 2, the tender committee members are obliged to issue a declaration precluding any possible conflict of interests and any other factors such as family or social ties with the bidders [5].

Decision 118/MON (para 13) regulating tender boards deciding tenders exempt from Public Procurement Law also stipulates that members of tender boards need to be excluded from particular proceedings if there is a conflict of interest. [11]

Difficult issues, such as the revolving door phenomenon, are sought to be addressed by the article 122a of the 2003 &quoute;Military Service Act&quoute; [6]; and agreement between the MOD and the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau (CBA) is reported to be focussed on monitoring employment of former soldiers by defence companies. [10]

Public tenders are subject to oversight by the Supreme Chamber of Control (samples) and the Public Procurement Office (Ad Hoc Control Department and the Appeals Department). Results of administrative complaints can be appealed to the National Appellate Court, in accordance with the Public Procurement Act of 2004 (amended i.a. in 2015) [7]. The MOD's Anti-Corruption Procedures Bureau also oversees the procedures exempt from the Public Procurement Act. [11] Overall, however, it is not clear what percentage of procurement procedures are overseen and how control tends to be triggered.

COMMENTS -+

1. Marcin Szaładziński, &quoute;Prevention of the conflict of interest in contacts with entrepreneurs on the example of relations: the Ministry of National Defence - Armament Industry&quoute;,&quoute;, paper presented at the I International Anticorruption Conference held by Central Anticorruption Bureau, Warsaw, December 9, 2010, pp. 130 - 144, accessed 02.05.2014, http://cba.gov.pl/ftp/mp3/materialy_pokonferencyjne-srodek.pdf

2. Minister of National Defence, &quoute;Decision No. 125/MON on the Introduction of the Code of Conduct Among Employees and Soldiers&quoute;, Dziennik Urzędowy Ministra Obrony Narodowej, No. 8, 2011

3. Interview with Interviewee 1: Senior Ministry of Defence Official, Warsaw, Poland, 25 April 2014

4. Inspectorate of the Armaments, &quoute; Code of Ethics&quoute;, accessed: 05.05.2014, http://www.iu.wp.mil.pl/userfiles/file/inne_publikacje/kodeks_etyczny.pdf

5. Minister of National Defence, &quoute;Decision no. 291/MON of 26 July 2006 on the Rules of Concluding Contracts Regarding Military Equipment and Armament&quoute;, Dziennik Urzędowy MInistra Obrony Narodowej, no. 14, item 179, 2006, accessed: 04.05.2014, http://www.iu.wp.mil.pl/userfiles/file/prawo/decyzja_291.pdf

6. &quoute;Professional Soldiers' Military Service Act of 11 September 2003&quoute; , Dziennik Ustaw, no. 179, item 1750, 2003, accessed: 02.05.2014, http://www.bip.mon.gov.pl/pliki/file/USTAWY/Dz_U_2010_90_593.pdf

7. &quoute;Public Procurement Act of September 2, 2004&quoute;, accessed: 10.07.2015, http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/DetailsServlet?id=WDU20040190177

8. Rzeczpospolita, &quoute;MFA: EU Worried About the Military Procurement Regime&quoute;, January 25, 2015, accessed: 10.07.2015, http://prawo.rp.pl/artykul/1174202.html

9. Supreme Chamber of Control, &quoute;Information on the Implementation of the State Budget Part 29: National Defence and the Implementation of the Financial Guidelines of the Armed Forces Modernisation Fund for 2014&quoute;, May 2015. https://www.nik.gov.pl/plik/id,8949.pdf, accessed September 2015.

10. &quoute;CBA będzie współpracować z armią&quoute;, Wprost, 13 October 2013. http://www.wprost.pl/ar/420507/CBA-bedzie-wspolpracowac-z-armia/, accessed October 2015.

11. Minister of National Defence, &quoute;Decision no. 118/MON&quoute;: &quoute;Regulations on defence and security procurement in the field of weapons and munitions production and acquisitions exempted from the Law of Public Acquisitions in accordance with art. 346 paragraph 1B of the Treaty on Functioning of the European Union&quoute;, accessed: 28.04.2014, http://www.iu.wp.mil.pl/userfiles/file/prawo/Poz__119_dec__Nr_118.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

66.
score
3

Does the country have legislation in place to discourage and punish collusion between bidders for defence and security contracts?

Article 305 of the Penal Code contains provisions on the unlawful obstruction of a public tender, including &quoute;entering into co-operation with another person, to the detriment of the owner of property or a person or institution for which the tender is to be held&quoute;. The perpetrator is subject to the penalty of imprisonment for up to 3 years, and a fine may be imposed. [1] The Law on the Protection of Competition and Consumers, which also prohibits collusion, similarly foresees fines as the main type of sanction. [5] Debarment, however, is not an automatic sanction.

There are also non-criminal law mechanisms implemented in order to deter possible corruptive activities. UOKIK (the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection), the Polish competition authority, instigated two proceedings aimed at verifying if bid-rigging practices have been applied by entrepreneurs bidding in tenders organised by the Military Property Agency in Warsaw [3]. In 2015, UOKIK fined the controlled enterprise with a 298,000 zloty penalty [4].

RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: Information included.

COMMENTS -+

1. &quoute;The Penal Code of 6 June 1997&quoute;, Dziennik Ustaw, no. 88, item 553, 1997, accessed: 05.05.2014, http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/DetailsServlet?id=WDU19970880553

2.&quoute;A Few Words on the Penal Code Article 305 - Obstruction of a Tender&quoute;, (S)prawny blog, 14 February 2011, accessed: 05.05.2014, http://sprawnyblog.blogspot.be/2011/02/kilka-sow-o-art-305-kk-utrudnianie.html

3. UOKIK (Office of Competition and Consumer Protection), &quoute;UOKiK's proceedings - entrepreneurs' collusions&quoute;, February 18, 2014, accessed: 02.09.2014, http://www.uokik.gov.pl/news.php?news_id=10888

4. Forbes, &quoute;UOKIK Confirmed Irregularities in the Police and Military Tenders&quoute;, February 22, 2015, accessed: 10.07.2015, http://www.forbes.pl/uokik-stwierdzil-nieprawidlowosci-w-przetargach-dla-policji-i-wojska,artykuly,190251,1,1.html#

5.&quoute; Law on the Protection of Competition and Consumers&quoute;, 16 February 2007. http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/Download?id=WDU20070500331&type=3, accessed October 2015.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The President of UOKiK (Office of Competition and Consumer Protection) instigated proceedings aimed at verifying if bid-rigging practices have been applied by entrepreneurs bidding in tenders for the supplies of uniforms and accessories organised by the Military Property Agency and Military Unit no. 4226 in Warsaw.

Source:
http://www.uokik.gov.pl/news.php?news_id=10888

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

67.
score
3

Are procurement staff, in particular project and contract managers, specifically trained and empowered to ensure that defence contractors meet their obligations on reporting and delivery?

Procurement staff are trained and educated by the Anti-Corruption Procedures Bureau in the Ministry of National Defence. However, with the Bureau's resources and personnel limits, regular and mass training rarely takes place [1]. Procurement staff attend training classes organised by the Ministry on the occasion of an amendment of the public procurement law or the &quoute;Directive 118/MON&quoute; as well as in the case of any other major legal changes, to keep the procedure streamlined and up to date with current regulations [2].

The procurement staff are authorised (article 13 of the &quoute;Decision no. 291/MON&quoute;) to demand any necessary documented proof of the ability of the tender bidder to deliver the product on time in accordance with accounting and reporting rules, including: necessary permits, testimonies of previous contractors highlighting the ability to deliver the product on time, financial and banking statements, and proof of the application of the EDA &quoute;Code of Best Practice in the Supply Chain.&quoute; In cases of contracts with long duration, procurement staff can demand that the contractor provides a deposit which is returned once the contract is fulfilled.[3]

RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER: Agreed. Score changed to 3.

COMMENTS -+

1. Interview with Interviewee 1: Senior Ministry of Defence Official, Warsaw, Poland, 25 April 2014

2. Katarzyna Portianko-Graca, &quoute;Training for Procurement Managers&quoute;, 15 March 2013, Polska Zbrojna, accessed: 05.05.2014, http://polska-zbrojna.pl/home/articleshow/6920?t=Szkolenie-dla-realizatorow-zakupow

3. Minister of National Defence, &quoute;Decision no. 291/MON of 26 July 2006 on the Rules of Concluding Contracts Regarding Military Equipment and Armament&quoute;, Dziennik Urzędowy MInistra Obrony Narodowej, no. 14, item 179, 2006, accessed: 04.05.2014, http://www.iu.wp.mil.pl/userfiles/file/prawo/decyzja_291.pdf

4. Military Center for Standardization, Quality and Codification, homepage.
http://www.wcnjk.wp.mil.pl/pl/index.html. Accessed October 2015.

5. &quoute;Law on the system of compliance assessment of products destined for defence and security&quoute;, 17 November 2006. x http://www.iu.wp.mil.pl/userfiles/file/prawo/ustawa_o_systemie_oceny_zgodnosci.pdf,17 November 2006.

6. Andrzej Mendel, ,&quoute;Quality clauses and compliance assessment in contracts for supply of military equipment”, Military Center for Standardization, Quality and Codification, January 2012. t http://www.iu.wp.mil.pl/userfiles/file/inne_publikacje/klauzule_jakosc.pdf, accessed June 7, 2014.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: I would upgrade the score to 3. There is a comprehensive system of supervision of contract fulfilment, which is aimed at ensuring that standards demanded by the procurement entity will be meet. This system is regulated by several regulations, mainly by the Act of 17 November 2006 on the system of compliance assessment of products destined for defence and security. A number of institutions are included in the process of supervision of quality of contract fulfilment (with special focus on meeting technical requirements), the most important being The Inspectorate of Armaments and subordinated Regional Military Subsidiaries. There is also a Military Center for Standardization, Quality and Codification which is responsible for, among other things, training of the Ministry of Defence staff in charge of defence contract supervision.

Military Center for Standardization, Quality and Codification,
http://www.wcnjk.wp.mil.pl/pl/index.htmlt

Act of 17 November 2006 on system of compliance assessment of products destined for defence and security, accessed June 7, 2014 http://www.iu.wp.mil.pl/userfiles/file/prawo/ustawa_o_systemie_oceny_zgodnosci.pdf


Andrzej Mendel, ,,Quality clauses and compliance assessment in contracts for supply of military equipment”, Military Center for Standardization, Quality and Codification, January 2012, accessed June 7, 2014t http://www.iu.wp.mil.pl/userfiles/file/inne_publikacje/klauzule_jakosc.pdf

Suggested score: 3

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

68.
score
3

Are there mechanisms in place to allow companies to complain about perceived malpractice in procurement, and are companies protected from discrimination when they use these mechanisms?

The &quoute;Public Procurement Law Act&quoute;, article 180, enables companies to appeal to the National Appeal Chamber affiliated with the Public Procurement Office, which is responsible for the examination of the appeals lodged in contract award procedures. Parties and participants of the appeal procedure may complain to the court against the Chamber's ruling. [1]

While the &quoute;Directive 81/2009/EC&quoute; gives the bidders the right to appeal, the &quoute;Decision 181/MON&quoute; contains no formal provisions on this subject [2, 3]. However, the Public Procurement Act, Part VI, contains detailed provisions on the appellate procedure, which is applied to the military tenders falling within the scope the said law [4].

RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER: While I agree that Decision no. 118/MON should contain these provisions, there are general appeal instruments available in the &quoute;Public Procurement Law&quoute;. As such, a score of 1 (lack of formal mechanism, discrimination in future procurements) does not appear adequate. Score 3 was awarded as there does not appear to be widespread fear of retaliation among companies.

COMMENTS -+

1. &quoute;Public Procurement Law Act of 29 January 2004&quoute;, Dziennik Urzędowy, 2010, no. 113, item 795, accessed: 03.05.2014, http://www.uzp.gov.pl/cmsws/page/?F;248;ustawa_pzp.html

2. Minister of National Defence, &quoute;Decision no. 118/MON&quoute; of 25 April, 2013, Dziennik Urzędowy, Item 119

3. European Union, &quoute;Directive 2009/81/EC on the coordination of procedures for the award of certain works contracts, supply contracts and service contracts in the fields of defence and security&quoute; of 13 July 2009, Official Journal of the European Union, L 216/76

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: I would downgrade the score to 1, because the &quoute;Decision no. 118/MON&quoute; of 25 April, 2013&quoute; does not give bidders the right to appeal (it should in my opinion).

Suggested score: 1

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

69.
score
3

What sanctions are used to punish the corrupt activities of a supplier?

Article 24 of the &quoute;Public Procurement Law&quoute; forbids contractors who have been lawfully sentenced for corruption offences from entering tenders. [1] The &quoute;Decision no. 118/MON&quoute;, regulating procurement exempt from the Law, contains similar provisions in article 26. [2]

In case of procurement based on Decision 291/MON, as well as 118/MON, conviction in criminal cases, including bribery and unlawful bidding process influence, also exclude individuals and companies who employ them from participating in tenders.

Score 3 has been selected as no information regarding the thoroughness of application of these on the extent to which these provisions are applied could be found, but at the same time, no major reports of corrupt suppliers being allowed to participate in tenders have been located.

COMMENTS -+

1. &quoute;Public Procurement Law Act of 29 January 2004&quoute;, Dziennik Urzędowy, 2010, no. 113, item 795, accessed: 03.05.2014, http://www.uzp.gov.pl/cmsws/page/?F;248;ustawa_pzp.html

2. Minister of National Defence, &quoute;Decision no. 118/MON&quoute; of 25 April, 2013, Dziennik Urzędowy, Item 119

3. Minister of National Defence, &quoute;Decision no. 291/MON of 26 July 2006 on the Rules of Concluding Contracts Regarding Military Equipment and Armament&quoute;, Dziennik Urzędowy MInistra Obrony Narodowej, no. 14, item 179, 2006, accessed: 04.05.2014, http://www.iu.wp.mil.pl/userfiles/file/prawo/decyzja_291.pdf.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: For major contracts, the Inspectorate of the Armaments (MOD) adds a special anticorruption contract clause establishing financial penalties in cases of corrupt activities of a supplier (5% of contract value).

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

70.
score
2

When negotiating offset contracts, does the government specifically address corruption risk by imposing due diligence requirements on contractors? Does the government follow up on offset contract performance and perform audits to check performance and integrity?

There are in effect two laws regulating offset contracts in Poland.

Until mid-2014, all offset contracts were regulated by the &quoute;Act on Certain Compensation Agreements Concluded in Regard to the Delivery Contracts for the Defence and Security of the State&quoute; [1]. Negotiations between the bidder and the Minister of Economy were consulted with the Offset Agreements Committee. According to the article 9A, offset offers submitted by the potential foreign supplier shall comprise, among other things: information on the legal form and the manner of representation of the foreign supplier, information on the financial results from the last three years of operations of the foreign supplier, information on the concluded or on-going offset agreements. The supplier is required to submit offset compliance information on the regular basis and upon the request of the Ministry. However, this oversight seems to be primarily of an economic, not anti-corruption nature.

The new offset law, introduced in July 2014 and applicable to contract signed after it entered into force [4] introduces a number of changes; for example it stipulates that only direct offsets are permitted. Most importantly, it transfers the executive and control authority from the Ministry of Economy to the Ministry of National Defence (art. 7) and introduces automatic financial penalties for the failure of execution of the offset contract (art. 23 - 25) based on the guarantees presented by the contractor (e.g. in blanco check, bank guarantees - as regulated by art. 19). Article 6 details conflict of interests provisions applicable to the awarding of offsets; Articles 12 and 13 [4] regulate the due diligence requirements and control mechanisms, including the possibility of the MoD contracting independent auditors to monitor the financial and operational capacity of the potential offset contractor. However, while some provisions contribute to reducing corruption risks at the moment of signing of the agreement, integrity is not a factor in the follow-up provisions of the law.

The offset performance is also evaluated by the Supreme Chamber of Control [3] and/or the Ministry of the Economy in cases of offset agreement contracted before the 2014 law entered into force.

Score 2 has been selected to reflect two different laws governing offsets

COMMENTS -+

1. &quoute;Act of September 10, 1999 on Certain Compensation Agreements Concluded in Regard to the Delivery Contracts for the defence and Security of the State&quoute;, Dziennik Ustaw, item 716, 2013

2. Ministry of Economy, &quoute;Offset Report for 2012&quoute;, June, 2013, accessed: 10.07.2015, http://www.mg.gov.pl/files/upload/8305/Sprawozdanie_offset_2012%20wersja%20skrócona.pdf

3. Supreme Chamber of Control, &quoute;Post-control Information on the Progress of the Offset Implementation Following the F-16 Purchase Contract&quoute; (143/2009/P08050/KGP), July, 2009, accessed: 10.07.2015, https://www.nik.gov.pl/plik/id,75,vp,75.pdf

4. &quoute;Act of July 26, 2014 on Certain Contracts Relating to the State Security&quoute;, Dziennik Ustaw, position 932, accessed: 10.7.2015, http://www.iu.wp.mil.pl/userfiles/file/prawo/2014_Ustawa_o_BP_D20140932.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The new &quoute;Offset Act&quoute; (source: http://www.sejm.gov.pl/sejm7.nsf/PrzebiegProc.xsp?nr=2167) contains some anticorruption instruments such as:
- conflict of interest declaration;
- new audit and control system;
- offsets connected only with essential interests (article 346 of Act);
- all needs equal for suppliers - only operational capabilities (non-economic reasons).

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Not Qualified

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

71.
score
2

Does the government make public the details of offset programmes, contracts, and performance?

According to art. 4 of the &quoute;Act on Certain Compensation Agreements Concluded in Regard to the Delivery of Contracts for the Defence and Security of the State&quoute;, &quoute;offset agreements are open to the public as regards their value, subject matter, the offset receiver, the offset granter as well as deadlines for the performance of particular offset obligations under the offset agreement&quoute; [1] Article 4 of the 2014 Law on offsets stipulates that elements of offset contracts that should be publicly available include the parties to the offset agreement, the value of the agreement, the agreed date of fulfilment of obligations, and the object of the agreement - unless the publication of this information is detrimental to national security. [5]

The website of the Ministry of Economy contains Polish and European provisions on offsets (the EDA &quoute;Code of Conduct on Offset&quoute;), the list of signed agreements with the tender subject, winning bidder and the sum highlighted as well as the &quoute;Offset Vademecum&quoute;, a document prepared by the Ministry offset specialists in 2009 in order to explain and publicise the offset deal [1,5].

Furthermore, the Minister of Economy is obliged to submit annual reports to the Council of Ministers on the fulfilment of offset obligations, with their short version available to the general public [4]. The 2014 Law imposes the same obligation on the Minister of Defence, although the Law does not stipulate public availability of these reports. [6] No such reports have been published yet by the MOD and the last available annual report prepared by the Ministry of Economy appears to cover year 2012.

The state of offset agreements is audited by the Supreme Chamber of Control. The results are available publicly [3, 7].

Offset details and contracts, however, are not published in the planning phase.

Score 2 has been selected due to apparent shortcomings in reporting and lack of clarity over what the 2014 Law mandates in terms of publication, and how it will be carried out.

COMMENTS -+

1. &quoute;Act of September 10, 1999 on Certain Compensation Agreements Concluded in Regard to the Delivery Contracts for the Defence and Security of the State&quoute;, Dziennik Ustaw, item 716, 2013

2. Ministry of Economy, &quoute;Offsets&quoute;, accessed: 05.05.2014, http://www.mg.gov.pl/Bezpieczenstwo%20gospodarcze/Offset

3. Supreme Chamber of Commerce, &quoute;The Implementation of the Offset Agreement in Regard to the Procurement of the Armoured Personnel Carriers&quoute;, Warsaw, 2011, accessed: 05.05.2014, http://www.nik.gov.pl/plik/id,4251,vp,5410.pdf

4. Ministry of the Economy, Summary of the Offset Fulfilment Report 2012&quoute;, Warsaw, 2013, accessed: 05.05.2014, http://www.mg.gov.pl/files/upload/8305/Sprawozdanie_offset_2012%20wersja%20skrócona.pdf

5. European Defence Agency, &quoute;The Code of Conduct on Offsets&quoute;, 3 May 2011, accessed: 05.05.2014, http://www.mg.gov.pl/files/upload/11536/Kodeks_Postepowania_w_Zakresie_Offsetu_en.pdf

6. &quoute;Act of July 26, 2014 on Certain Contracts Relating to the State Security&quoute;, Dziennik Ustaw, position 932, accessed: 10.7.2015, http://www.iu.wp.mil.pl/userfiles/file/prawo/2014_Ustawa_o_BP_D20140932.pdf

7. Supreme Chamber of Control, &quoute;Post-control Information on the Progress of the Offset Implementation Following the F-16 Purchase Contract&quoute; (143/2009/P08050/KGP), July, 2009, accessed: 10.07.2015, https://www.nik.gov.pl/plik/id,75,vp,75.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Not Qualified

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

72.
score
2

Are offset contracts subject to the same level of competition regulation as the main contract?

The offset procedure in Poland is centralised and the Ministry of National Defence acts as the main representative of the state, signing the offset agreement [4] (until mid 2014, offset agreements had been placed under the authority of the Ministry of Economy and this is still the case for agreements contracted prior to the 2014 Law entering into force [1, 4]). Only after the offset contract is signed can the proper agreement between the investor and the beneficent (i.e. the Polish defence procurement company participating in the process) be concluded. The potential pool of companies is selected by the Ministry itself, thus limiting (though not entirely disabling) free and fair competition. It is partially caused by the state-centred nature of the offset procedure, with its stated goal of &quoute;restructuring and development of the economy of the Republic of Poland&quoute;.

The 2014 Law on Offsets (Article 31) explicitly stipulates that offset contracts are not subject to the provisions of the Law on Protection of Competition. [4]

RESPONSE TO THE GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: While clear criteria are given, it doesn't change the fact of the limited competitor pool. Supreme Chamber of Commerce has indeed praised recent offset contracts, which, compared to the previous ones, were concluded through rather transparent procedures. [5] For instance, EU institutions reportedly expressed concerns about the level of competition of military procurements not falling under the Public Procurement Act [3]. Accordingly, the score was raised to 2.

COMMENTS -+

1. &quoute;Act of September 10, 1999 on Certain Compensation Agreements Concluded in Regard to the Delivery Contracts for the defence and Security of the State&quoute;, Dziennik Ustaw, item 716, 2013

2. Ministry of the Economy, &quoute;Offset Vademecum&quoute;, Warsaw, 2010, accessed: 05.05.2014, http://www.mg.gov.pl/Bezpieczenstwo+gospodarcze/Offset/Vademecum+Offsetowe

3. Rzeczpospolita, &quoute;MFA: EU Worried About the Military Procurement Regime&quoute;, January 25, 2015, accessed: 10.07.2015, http://prawo.rp.pl/artykul/1174202.html

4. &quoute;Act of July 26, 2014 on Certain Contracts Relating to the State Security&quoute;, Dziennik Ustaw, position 932, accessed: 10.7.2015, http://www.iu.wp.mil.pl/userfiles/file/prawo/2014_Ustawa_o_BP_D20140932.pdf

5. Supreme Chamber of Commerce, &quoute;The Implementation of the Offset Agreement in Regard to the Procurement of the Armoured Personnel Carriers&quoute;, Warsaw, 2011, accessed: 05.05.2014, http://www.nik.gov.pl/plik/id,4251,vp,5410.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: In each case, Minister of Economy provides offset parameters with clear criteria (article 8 of Certain Compensation Agreements Concluded in Regard to the Delivery Contracts for the defence and Security of the State - the &quoute;Offset Act&quoute;); thus offset contracts are generally subject to the same level of competition as the main contract. Generally offset is one of the criteria in public procurement but only when all suppliers are obliged to offer it (article 8c of Certain Compensation Agreements Concluded in Regard to the Delivery Contracts for the Defence and Security of the State&quoute;).

Source: the 1999 &quoute;Offset Act&quoute;, http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/DetailsServlet?id=WDU19990800903

Suggested score: 3

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Not Qualified

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

73.
score
3

How strongly does the government control the company's use of agents and intermediaries in the procurement cycle?

Arms trade, including brokering services as they are defined in the &quoute;Act on foreign trade in goods technologies and services of strategic importance to the security of the State and to maintaining international peace and security&quoute;, is controlled by the Ministry of Economy and monitored by the Internal Security Agency [1]. Brokerage licence, issues by the Ministry is needed for trade in armaments; unlicensed entities, including agents or intermediaries cannot operate.

The 2011 Code of Conduct of the Ministry of National Defence regulates the contacts of the Ministry employees and military personnel with agents and intermediaries as well as the problem of immediate transfers of employees from the public to the private sector [2].

However, media reports and interviewed sources suggest that due to loopholes in the rules concerning lobbying and brokering, some intermediaries operate as external consultants or PR specialists and seek contact with military personnel or civil servants which is not entirely transparent [3,4] .

RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 1 AND GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: Agree. Score raised to 3. (The score should be between 2 and 3 given the indications that the regime/framework suffers from corruption risk. However, score 3 was selected to acknowledge mechanisms for control and scrutiny.

COMMENTS -+

1. &quoute;Act of 29 November 2000 on foreign trade in goods, technologies and services of strategic importance to the security of the State and to maintaining international peace and security&quoute;, Dziennik Ustaw, item 194, 2013

2. Minister of National Defence, &quoute;Decision No. 125/MON on the Introduction of the Code of Conduct Among Employees and Soldiers&quoute;, Dziennik Urzędowy Ministra Obrony Narodowej, No. 8, 2011. http://g.ekspert.infor.pl/p/_dane/akty_pdf/U23/2011/8/100.pdf#zoom=90, accessed August 2015.

3. Michał Wąsowski, &quoute;Szeremietiew Uncovers the Nature of Lobbying in the Armed Forces: Expensive Watches and Facilitators&quoute;, Natemat.pl, accessed: 10.07.2015, http://natemat.pl/77425,szeremietiew-zdradza-zalatwiacze-drogie-zegarki-i-libacje-z-prostytutkami-tak-wyglada-lobbing-w-polskim-wojsku

4. Interview with Interviewee 1: Senior Ministry of Defence Official, Warsaw, Poland, 25 April 2014

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: I would upgrade to the score to 3, unless there is a large repository of sources questioning the effectiveness of controls is added.

Suggested score: 3

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: Generally I agree; however, the Ministry of National Defence is currently strengthening the rules. Decision no 125/MON includes some &quoute;checkpoints&quoute;, such:
- the duty to inform the Counterintelligence Service about contact with agents and intermediaries - Counterintelligence Service informs Ministry of National Defence about unregistered contacts;
- meetings with agents and intermediaries are to be witnessed.

Suggested score: 3

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

74.
score
2

Are the principal aspects of the financing package surrounding major arms deals, (such as payment timelines, interest rates, commercial loans or export credit agreements) made publicly available prior to the signing of contracts?

Information on the financial package is available publicly and is to be found either in the tender announcement or in the tender terms of reference on the Inspectorate of the Armaments website. The information is rather detailed, including not only payment timelines and currencies but also information on necessary deposits, banking guarantees and deadline payments [3]. However, the Supreme Chamber of Control points to the lack of legal grounds for the prepayment system employed by the Ministry of National Defence in its military expenditure system [1, p. 102]. Default penalties or interest rates are not published, unless the contract itself is made public.

COMMENTS -+

1. Supreme Chamber of Control, &quoute;The Analysis of the State Budget Planning and Implementation for 2010&quoute;, Warsaw, 2011, http://www.nik.gov.pl/plik/id,2859.pdf
Inspectorate of the Armaments, &quoute;List of Tenders&quoute;, accessed: 04.05.2014, http://www.iu.wp.mil.pl/przetargi.lista.0.0.html

2. Minister of National Defence, &quoute;Decision no. 285/MON&quoute;, September 20, 2012, accessed: 01.09.2014, http://www.dz.urz.mon.gov.pl/zasoby/dziennik/pozycje/tresc-aktow/pdf/2012/09/Poz._360__dec._Nr_285.pdf

3. Armaments Inspectorate, &quoute;Specification of Important Elements of Tender for Armed Forces Software&quoute; (tender terms of reference), July 6, 2015, accessed: 10.07.2015, http://www.iu.wp.mil.pl/userfiles/file/zamowienia_publiczne/2015/97/97_0607.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: We should remember about Ministry of National Defence decision no 285/MON regarding advanced payment rules in military equipment procurement (It's a public document and rules are the same for all suppliers).
Source:
http://www.dz.urz.mon.gov.pl/zasoby/dziennik/pozycje/tresc-aktow/pdf/2012/09/Poz._360__dec._Nr_285.pdf

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

75.
score
1

Does the government formally require that the main contractor ensures subsidiaries and sub-contractors adopt anti-corruption programmes, and is there evidence that this is enforced?

There are no direct references to a requirement for the main contractor to ensure that subcontractors adopt anti-corruption programmes. The &quoute;Code of the Best Practice in the Supply Chain&quoute; highlights the shared principles &quoute;of fairness, honesty and openness, efficiency and effectiveness, and professionalism&quoute; and repeatedly refers to transparency and accountability among the sub-contractors and subsidiaries. However, it contains no formal anti-corruption or anti-bribery provisions and neither the Law on Public Procurement nor the current MOD Decisions directly refer to it. (1, 3)

RESPONSE TO PEER REVIEWER 1 AND GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: Information incorporated and taken into account. However, good practices are &quoute;soft law&quoute; - neither binding nor treated as an entry requirement for a tender. Given lack of direct mention of the &quoute;Code,&quoute; score 1 has been retained.

COMMENTS -+

1. Minister of National Defence, &quoute;Decision no. 118/MON&quoute; of 25 April, 2013, Dziennik Urzędowy, Item 119. http://www.dz.urz.mon.gov.pl/zasoby/dziennik/pozycje/tresc-aktow/pdf/2013/04/Poz._119_dec._Nr_118.pdf, accessed October 2015.

2. European Defence Agency, &quoute;The Code of Best Practice in the Supply Chain&quoute;, 15 May 2006,
accessed: 04.05.2014, http://www.eda.europa.eu/docs/documents/EDA_Code_of_Best_Practice_in_the_Supply_Chain.pdf?sfvrsn=0

3. &quoute;Public Procurement Law Act of 29 January 2004&quoute;, Dziennik Urzędowy, 2010, no. 113, item 795, accessed: 03.05.2014, http://www.uzp.gov.pl/cmsws/page/?F;248;ustawa_pzp.html, accessed October 2015.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: I would downgrade the score to 0, because &quoute;Decision no. 291/MON of 26 July 2006 on the Rules of Concluding Contracts Regarding Military Equipment and Armament&quoute; has been replaced by &quoute;Decision no. 118/MON&quoute; of 25 April, 2013. The new regulation contains no provision concerning the &quoute;Code of Best Practices in Supply Chain&quoute;.

Suggested score: 0

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The MOD in conjunction with the Treasury and the Ministry of Economy are promoting the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions - Good Practice Guidance on Internal Controls, Ethics, and Compliance (annex II). Good Practice Guidance is addressed to companies for establishing and ensuring the effectiveness of internal controls, ethics, and compliance programmes or measures for preventing and detecting the bribery of foreign public officials in their international business transactions and to business organisations (subsidiaries and sub-contractors) and professional associations.

Source: conference materials - Industry Days - Warsaw, 2014
http://www.dpz.wp.mil.pl/pl/1_184.html
http://dpz.wp.mil.pl/plik/file/Dni_przemyslu_2014_materialy_po_konferencji.pdf.

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

76.
score
3

How common is it for defence acquisition decisions to be based on political influence by selling nations?

The bulk of small-scale military contracts seem to bear no political influence and are subjected to normal competition under the Public Procurement Act rules. [14]

However, larger contracts are subjected to essentially political negotiations [3,8], including heavy lobbying on part of not only private contractors but also interested governments [1,6,7,10]. This goes both ways, with reports of Polish governments utilising the military helicopter and missile shield tenders to exert influence over French security policy [12].

The national and private lobbying is also described in the 2014 Pulaski Foundation report on the Polish missile shield [13]. Additionally, past military contracts were viewed by media and some commentators as skewed politically [2,5] and relating to strategic and political interests, rather than operational capacity of the equipment. The F-16 offset contract, is, for instance, was analysed in the light of the NATO expansion and Poland's pro-American stance [2,11].

It is worth noting though, that none of the aforementioned purchases were reported to be inspired by the selling nations; they follow the logic of subsequent Security Strategies and medium-and-long term acquisition planning. It is rather the final choice of the defence contractor that contains a political component.

RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: Following a review of material available, score has been revised to 3 - though not necessarily due to examples provided, where it is not easy to verify whether pressure, and how intense, took place.

COMMENTS -+

1. Jędrzej Bielecki, &quoute;Americans Are Back in the Game&quoute;, Rzeczpospolita, 9 March 2014, accessed: 04.05.2014, http://www.rp.pl/artykul/1092785.html

2. Krzysztof Lepczyński, &quoute;Will the F-16s Defend Polish Sky? Not Necessarily&quoute; 10 April 2014, accessed: 04.05.2014, http://wiadomosci.gazeta.pl/wiadomosci/1,114871,15775244,Czy_F_16_obronia_polskie_niebo__Niekoniecznie___Wystarcza.html

3. &quoute;Modernisation of the Polish Military Goes Full Ahead. Who Will Profit?&quoute;, W Polityce, 5 January 2014, accessed: 04.05.2014, http://wpolityce.pl/polityka/182419-modernizacja-polskiego-wojska-pelna-para-do-czyjej-kieszeni-trafi-przeznaczone-na-to-8-mld-zl

4. Paweł Wroński, &quoute;The Competition in the Military Chopper Tender Grows Stronger&quoute;, Gazeta Wyborcza, 17 July 2013, accessed: 04.05.2014, http://wyborcza.pl/1,75478,14287439,Zaostrza_sie_rywalizacja_w_przetargu_na_zakup_smiglowca.html

5. Paweł Snarski, &quoute;F-16? Of Course!&quoute;, Przegląd, no. 2/2003, http://www.przeglad-tygodnik.pl/pl/artykul/oczywiscie-f-16

6. Polityka Insight Special Report, &quoute;Armaments&quoute;, April 2015

7. TVN 24, &quoute;Battle for Billions: The World Competes for Polish Armament Contracts&quoute;, 28.11.2013, accessed on 20.04.2015, http://www.tvn24.pl/wiadomosci-z-kraju,3/bitwa-o-miliardy-swiat-walczy-o-kontrakty-w-polskiej-zbrojeniowce,375637.html

8. Steven Erlanger, &quoute;Poland Is Pressed to Choose Between Europe and U.S&quoute;, New York Times, 04.06.2000, accessed: 20.04.2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2000/06/04/world/poland-is-pressed-to-choose-between-europe-and-us.html

9. Michał Woźniak, &quoute;Polish-American Military Co-operation after 2001&quoute;, 11.06.2013, accessed: 20.04.2015, http://www.stosunki.pl/?q=content/polsko-amerykańska-współpraca-wojskowa-po-2001-roku

10. Wojciech Łuczak, &quoute;The Vistula Programme in the Eyes of the U.S. Lobbyists&quoute;, Altair, 28.12.2014, accessed: 20.04.2015, http://www.altair.com.pl/news/view?news_id=15255

11. F. Stephen Larrabee, &quoute;NATO’s Eastern Agenda in a New Strategic Era&quoute;, RAND, Santa Monica, 2003, accessed: 20.04.2015, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/2005/MR1744.pdf

12. Wprost, &quoute;Is Poland Blackmailing France?&quoute;, 30.09.2014, accessed: 20.04.2015, http://www.wprost.pl/ar/471840/Polska-szantazuje-Francje-Siemoniak-Jesli-Mistrale-trafia-do-Rosji/

13. Rafal Ciaston, Robert Czulda, Kamil Mazurek, Tomasz Smura, &quoute;Polish Shield - Needs, Challenges, and Security Implications&quoute;, Warszawa, 2014, accessed: 10.07.2015, http://www.pulaski.pl/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=686:raport-pulaskiego-polska-tarcza-potrzeby-wyzwania-i-implikacje-dla-bezpieczenstwa-kraju&catid=19:raport-puaskiego&Itemid=793

14. &quoute;Public Procurement Law Act of 29 January 2004&quoute;, Dziennik Urzędowy, 2010, no. 113, item 795, accessed: 03.05.2014, http://www.uzp.gov.pl/cmsws/page/?F;248;ustawa_pzp.html, accessed October 2015.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: In my opinion, the acquisition system is independent from political influence of our partners. One of the examples is the purchase of submarines. Despite lobbying from the German government, Poland announced open (overt) technical dialogue.

Source:
http://www.defence24.pl/news_rozeslano-zaproszenie-do-dialogu-technicznego-na-okrety-podwodne-szkoda
http://argo.neon24.pl/post/101384,mon-ustawi-przetarg-na-dostawe-podwodnych-okretow-tak-aby-wygrali-go-niemcy
http://www.gazetapolska.pl/29689-tym-przetargiem-zainteresujemy-cba

Despite French and American lobbying, Poland (Inspectorate of the Armament) has announced open auction for helicopters (Agusta Westland, Sikorsky, Eurocopter):
http://iu.wp.mil.pl/przetargi.ogloszenie.85.0.html

Suggested score: 3

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+