This country is placed in Band C

Italy’s GI ranking in Band C places it in the Medium Risk category for corruption in the defence and security sector. Italy’s strongest scores are in Political and Personnel Risks, which scored in Band B. Operations (Band D) is the highest risk area.

The Italian Government completed a government review of the GI 2015 research, which shows a willingness to engage in dialogue with an international NGO on defence corruption issues. Italy has scored highly for designing and implementing a defence specific anti-corruption strategy, conducting systematic corruption risk assessments, and for nominating an Anti-Corruption Supervisor (“Responsabile della prevenzione della corruzione”) Lieutenant Fabbri, who is also the MOD’s dedicated Transparency Supervisor. While the appointment is overseen by the MoD and could therefore potentially lack independence, an activity report published in 2014, shows evidence of active and independent scrutiny. Italy also scores well for having a specific Code of Conduct for military and civilian personnel, with evidence of enforcement, results of prosecutions are available and there is a policy to make them public. The Mod also conducts anti-corruption training. However there are serious issues that need addressing, TI suggests the following reforms of the security sector to build integrity.

Lack of Implementation of International Anti-Corruption Instruments

Italy is the eighth-largest exporter of major weapons in the world; among its principal export countries are the UAE, India, and Turkey -- all of which are graded as “high” or “very high” (corruption risk bands D and E). While Italy signed and ratified the ATT in 2014, there is a distinct lack of evidence of compliance with ATT anti-corruption principles.

There is also no evidence that upcoming arms exports are subject to parliamentary approval and debate, though this is stipulated by law. According to sources, the information reported to the Parliament is “so generic, incomplete and aggregated that it is not possible to understand who receives the arms; which companies have been authorised to export arms, which specific systems are exported ,nor their quantity and value. It it is impossible to tell if helicopters are exported for humanitarian reasons or to be used as attack helicopters.”

We recommend that Italy significantly increase its efforts to comply with the ATT, in particular its anti-corruption articles, as well as put in place mechanisms to avoid the risk of arms diversion. These controls will need to include thorough anti-corruption risk assessments before arms export licenses are granted. Italy could also release greater information to the legislature and media, at an earlier stage of arms procurement discussions, to ensure that upcoming arms exports are subject to robust parliamentary approval and media debate.

Italy has yet to address shortcomings in complying fully with other international anti-corruption instruments. Two recent reports from the OECD and the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) highlight continuing deficiencies in relation to the independence of the anti-corruption authorities, sanctions for individuals and companies, the protection of whistle-blowers, and the statute of limitations for corruption offences.

Building Integrity for Engagement in Military Operations

Italy regularly deploys personnel on international engagements such as stabilisation and peace keeping operations, while commanders receive broad training on corruption. Operations risks scored low given the lack of a comprehensive and detailed military doctrine addressing corruption issues for peace and conflict. Italy could benefit from more systematic and specific anti-corruption training that is conducted regularly for civilian and military personnel, in particular those on deployment or contracting in operational environments. This training could include a detailed understanding of what corruption issues personnel may face during deployment. We recommend the MoD consider publishing its guidelines and policies, as well as partnering with and providing training to other contributing nations to share best practices for this area and to ensure the integrity of its military operations.

Increase Parliamentary Powers of Scrutiny

Parliamentary Committees are transparent, with regular updates posted online and via a dedicated parliamentary web-tv. However our assessment identified that Parliament’s ability to effectively scrutinise defence strategy and spending is hindered by a lack formal powers to influence budgetary decisions. Parliamentary committees play a consultative function and can only make non-binding recommendations. Independent scrutiny of defence spending is also overseen by internal and external audit functions, such as the Supreme Audit Institution (Corte dei Conti). Our assessment was unable to identify any evidence that audit findings and recommendations are acted upon by government and the effectiveness of these institutions is brought into question. There was also no evidence that detailed audit reports of security secret programs are provided to the legislature or a relevant committee, nor subject to debate.We recommend a review to ensure that audit findings are appropriately communicated to Parliament. Audit findings should be actioned promptly to ensure that the reduced defence budget is appropriately administered and spent on equipment that meets Italy’s strategic priorities and needs.

Increasing Competition to Reduce the Risk of Collusion in Procurement

There is a significant element of non-competitive single-sourcing for defence procurement. From the sources available it appears that defence contracts with a value of more than €40,000 are not tendered through a competitive bidding procedure. Single source procurement usually leads to higher costs and lower quality for goods and services, while the lack of transparency and potential for collusion greatly increases the risk of corruption. We recommend that Italy make greater efforts to open up defence procurement to competition, except in clearly defined and limited circumstances. We recommend that less than 10% of tenders should be single-sourced, with these exceptions justified to independent body for scrutiny.

This heightened risk is not offset by legislation specific to defence to prevent collusion. Enforcement is the responsibility of the Italian Competition Authority ("Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato"), but there is a lack of evidence of enforcement proceedings or sanctions imposed on companies. We recommend that the Anti-Corruption Supervisor or relevant body conduct a review of the laws and procedures and ensure that appropriate sanctions (such as prosecution and debarment) are available and actively enforced.

Leadership 30
01.
score
3

Is there formal provision for effective and independent legislative scrutiny of defence policy?

Parliament exercises formal legislative scrutiny over the defence policy, especially in relation to the Italian involvement in international missions and acquisition of armaments. However, the effectiveness of such scrutiny is limited by the fact that the Parliament has only consultative rather than binding powers. As a matter of fact, Article 87 of the Italian Constitution calls for the establishment of the &quoute;Supreme Council of Defence&quoute; overseen by the President of the Republic and composed of the Prime Minister, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defence, Internal Affairs, the Economy and Finance, Economic Development, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. According to Law n. 624/1950 the Supreme Council of Defence &quoute;examines the general political and technical problems of national defence and determines the criteria and fixes the guidelines for the organisation and the coordination of all related activities.&quoute; Since most Italian legislation takes shape in the form of Decrees or Legislative Decrees, Parliamentary control of the country's defence policy develops mostly indirectly through the approval, and eventual amendments, of funding allocations. In the Italian political system, the Parliament only assists and controls the government in the crafting and implementation of the national defence policy and the overall rules of conduct of Italy's armed forces

As it emerges from Legislative Decree 15 March 2010, n. 66 and from the overview of the Parliament activity in relation to Defence and Armed Force, the prerogatives of the Parliament are more significant in defence financial matters, because the funding for international operations have to be authorized/extended each year by law. Other than that, the Parliament cannot influence any decision dealing with defence/security issues (e.g. armaments acquisition). It can only express preventive and non-binding opinions.


Response to Peer Reviewer: Comments added.

COMMENTS -+

Legislative Decree 15 march 2010, n. 66, Code of the military system (Codice dell’ordinamento militare), available at http://www.normattiva.it/uri-res/N2Ls?urn:nir:stato:decreto-legislativo:2010-03-15;66!vig=, modified by Law 21 December 2012, n. 244, available at http://www.normattiva.it/uri-res/N2Ls?urn:nir:stato:legge:2012-12-31;244.

Overview of the Parliament activity in relation to Defence and Armed Forces: http://www.camera.it/leg17/292?area=13

A Marrone and F Di Camillo, &quoute;Italy&quoute;, in Heiko Biehl, Bastian Giegerich and Alexandra Jonas (eds.), Strategic Culture in Europe, Heidelberg, Springer, June 2013, p. 193-206

Transparency International, Government Defence Index 2013 Italy assessment


https://www.senato.it/documenti/repository/istituzione/costituzione_inglese.pdf
http://www.normattiva.it/uri-res/N2Ls?urn:nir:stato:legge:1950;624
http://www.camera.it/temiap/leg16/leg17.temi16.area-12.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Italy's defence policy is rigidly controlled by the executive in its dual configuration: the cabinet and the President of the Republic. As a matter of fact, art. 87 of the Italian Constitution (https://www.senato.it/documenti/repository/istituzione/costituzione_inglese.pdf) calls for the establishment of the &quoute;Supreme Council of Defence&quoute; overseen by the President of the Republic and composed of the Prime Minister, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defence, Internal Affairs, the Economy and Finance, Economic Development, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. According to Law n. 624/1950 (http://www.normattiva.it/uri-res/N2Ls?urn:nir:stato:legge:1950;624) the Supreme Council of Defence &quoute;examines the general political and technical problems of national defence and determines the criteria and fixes the guidelines for the organisation and the coordination of all related activities&quoute;.
In addition, since most of the Italian legislation takes shape in the form of Decrees or Legislative Decrees, Parliamentary control of the country's defence policy develops mostly indirectly through the approval, and eventual amendments, of funding allocations. In the Italian political system, the Parliament &quoute;only&quoute; assists and controls the government in the crafting and implementation of the national defence policy and the overall rules of conduct of Italy's armed forces (http://www.camera.it/temiap/leg16/leg17.temi16.area-12.pdf).

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

02.
score
3

Does the country have an identifiable and effective parliamentary defence and security committee (or similar such organisation) to exercise oversight?

Italy has two committees within its Parliament which exercise oversight over the Government’s activity in defence and security matters. Within each of the two Chambers of the Parliament, for example, there is a permanent “Defence Committee” with competence over issues concerning defence, the military system, the juridical and economic status of the armed forces, as well as personnel and resources of the armed forces.
Although such Committees are active in monitoring and advising the Government on the legislation touching upon the latter issues (see the example related to JSF purchase and the overview of the Parliament activity in relation to Defence and Armed Force and an example in King), their role is limited by the fact that they cannot exercise any binding power over defence/security decisions. The publicity and transparency of the Committees’ work is guaranteed by the regular update of the website of the respective Chambers.

Besides the Chambers' websites, the Ministry of Defence has also made available a web-tv covering parliamentary activity (i.e. hearings and question-time) of the Minister.

COMMENTS -+

-- Camera dei Deputati:

Procedure (last modified: 25 September 2012):
http://leg16.camera.it/application/xmanager/projects/camera/file/conoscere_la_camera/regolamento_camera_25_settembre_2012.pdf

Defence Committee's List of Members (from 2013): http://www.camera.it/leg17/99?shadow_organo_parlamentare=2078

About the sectors of competence of its Commission: Circular Directive of President of the Chamber of Deputies of 16 October 1996, n. 3 Senato della Repubblica:

Procedure (last modified: 21 November 2012): https://www.senato.it/documenti/repository/istituzione/Regolamento_testo_completo.pdf

Defence Committee's List of Members (from 15 March 2013): http://www.senato.it/leg/17/BGT/Schede/Commissioni/0-00004.htm

Transparency International, Government Defence Index 2013 Italy assessment

Overview of the Parliament activity in relation to Defence and Armed Forces: http://www.camera.it/leg17/292?area=13

Example related to JSF purchase: Kingston T. (2014) 'Italian Lawmakers Back Cuts to JSF Purchase', Defence News, 19 May http://www.defencenews.com/article/20140319/DEFREG01/303190039/Italian-Lawmakers-Back-Cuts-JSF-Purchase #

Webstv, Ministerio Della Difesa, http://webtv.difesa.it/Detail/Dettaglio?ChannelId=a87c5c4c-8702-4284-b5f5-11120a94776e.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The Defence Commissions of both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate are standing committees. They have mostly control, investigative, and policy-settings prerogatives, but these functions are relatively modest in terms of real policy scrutiny.

Besides the Chambers' websites, the Ministry of Defence has also made available a web-tv covering parliamentary activity (i.e. hearings and question-time) of the Minister (http://webtv.difesa.it/Detail/Dettaglio?ChannelId=a87c5c4c-8702-4284-b5f5-11120a94776e).

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

03.
score
4

Is the country's national defence policy debated and publicly available?

Substantial information concerning the Italian defence policy can be found on the websites of the Parliament’s Defence Committees, the relevant ministries (Defence, Foreign Affairs, Economy), and the Presidency of the Council of Ministers. One can also read the summaries of the meetings of the Supreme Defence Council chaired by the President of the Republic, where general political and technical issues concerning the national security and defence are discussed.

In June 2014, the Ministry of Defence released the guidelines on the new Defence White Paper, which will outline (once fully published) the strategy for the evolution of the Armed Forces over the next fifteen years. In order to receive suggestions and comments from the public (librobianco@difesa.it) regarding its strategy, the Ministry activated an email address. The White Paper was formally released in May 2015.

Nonetheless, most public debate takes place across newspapers or on TV. It often concerns politically sensitive issues such as the authorization/extension of military missions or, more recently, the expenditures of the Ministry of Defence. While public debate on defence matters has progressed in the last few years, but remains largely dispersed among a wide range of institutional and party actors, media, social groups, and think tanks. In particular, the Rome-based &quoute;Institute for International Affairs&quoute; (IAI, Istituto Affari Internazionali) publishes every year an array of studies, research, and working working papers on Italy's security and, at large, foreign policy. Their main objective is to promote an understanding of the problems of international politics through studies, research, meetings and publications, “with the aim of increasing the opportunities of all countries to move in the direction of supranational organization, democratic freedom and social justice.”

Response to Peer Reviewer: Comments added.
Response to Government Reviewer: Given evidence that the government actively sought public feedback on its new White Paper on Defence, published in May 2015, score changed to 4.

COMMENTS -+

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Fact Sheet, Trends in world military expenditure 2013, available at http://books.sipri.org/product_info?c_product_id=476.

Supreme Defence Council ‘s website (in Italian) http://www.quirinale.it/qrnw/statico/attivita/csd/csd.htm

Summary of the latest Supreme Defence Council’s meeting (18 June 2014) http://www.difesa.it/Primo_Piano/Pagine/Consiglio_Supremo_Difesa_GIUGNO.aspx

Examples of defence-related issues debated in (on-line) newspapers: http://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2014/10/03/f-35-la-pinotti-non-dimezza-anzi-annuncia-ne-compero-subito-altri-due/1142812/; http://video.repubblica.it/rubriche/fischia-il-vento/f35-grasso-i-soldi-delle-spese-militari-per-risolvere-problemi-piu-urgenti/178594/177356; http://tv.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2014/10/02/f35-generale-tricarico-errore-dimezzare-fondi-per-caccia-e-scanu-pd-sinfuria/299326/; http://ilmanifesto.info/kurdi-le-armi-da-inviare-non-esistono-e-nemmeno-il-decreto-legge/

Examples of defence-related issues debated in TV :
Mogherini: ampio appoggio del Parlamento su invio armi Iraq, 20 August 2014, SkyTG24, http://video.sky.it/news/politica/mogherini_ampio_appoggio_del_parlamento_su_invio_armi_iraq/v210620.vid;
Iraq, Pinotti: inizio consegna armi entro 10 Settembre, 3 September 2014, SkyTG24, http://video.sky.it/news/mondo/iraq_pinotti_inizio_consegna_armi_entro_10_settembre/v212133.vid;
Le spese militari e il dibattito attorno all'F-35. Il Gen. Massimo Fogari commenta i titoli dei Tg, 5 July 2013, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZQ5DSH9hz8w

Guidelines on the new Defence White Paper (in English), Ministry of Defence, http://www.difesa.it/EN/Documents/White%20Paper%20-%20Guidelines.pdf

IAI Institute homepage (in English): http://www.iai.it/index_en.asp

http://www.iai.it/en/pubblicazioni/white-paper-strategy-italys-defence-policy

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: In recent last years, public debate about the country's national defence policy has considerably increased, in particular for what concern expenditures for &quoute;peace keeping missions&quoute; and for the supply of new military aircrafts.
Costs and, in the case of the aircrafts, contract penalties have been widely discussed on media and through public campaigns.

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Italy does not possess a formal National Security (or Defence) Strategy. The public debate on defence matters has progressed in the last few years, but remains largely dispersed among a wide range of institutional and party actors, media, social groups, and think tanks. In particular, the Rome-based &quoute;Institute for International Affairs&quoute; (IAI, Istituto Affari Internazionali) publishes every year an array of studies, research, and working papers on Italy's security and, at large, foreign policy:
- http://www.iai.it/pdf/dociai/iai1307.pdf;
- http://www.iai.it/pdf/quaderni/quaderni_34.pdf;
- http://www.iai.it/content.asp?langid=1&contentid=1139.
Overall, the mainstream public discourse on defence matters remains anchored and, to some extent, &quoute;outsourced&quoute; to Italy's participation to multilateral inter-governmental institutions such an the European Union, NATO, and the United Nations.
In some cases, as the F-35 acquisition programme reveals, the debate is still driven by emotional/ideological reactions (http://www.beppegrillo.it/movimento/parlamento/difesa/2014/05/f35-domani-beppe-grillo-a-cameri-nella-fabbrica-dei-caccia.html).

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: Guidelines for a new Defence White Paper have been published on the website of the Italian Defence Ministry. Through a detailed analysis of the international scenario, threats, security requirements and national interests, the new White Paper will redefine the strategic framework for our military instrument, its objectives and the organizational structure it must adopt to be most effective against potential threats menacing Italy and Europe. The e-mail address librobianco@difesa.it has been activated to receive any ideas or contributions that may be useful for drawing up the White Paper.

Suggested score: 4

Government Reviewer-+

04.
score
3

Do defence and security institutions have a policy, or evidence, of openness towards civil society organisations (CSOs) when dealing with issues of corruption? If no, is there precedent for CSO involvement in general government anti-corruption initiatives?

One can find limited evidence of recent attempts by the Ministry of Defence to engage with CSOs in general, such as the meeting promoted by the Ministry of Defence with an undefined group of &quoute;representatives from civil society&quoute; in order to discuss the Guidelines on the new Defence White Paper.

Response to Government Reviewer: Evidence suggests that the Ministry of Defence has tried to engage CSOs in discussion of its new Defence White Paper, score increased to 3. Though we found no evidence of Italy's Transparency Days and how they related to the defence sector more specifically.

COMMENTS -+

•tInterview with Italian Civil Society Organization, 05/05/2014
•tInterviewed Italian Civil Society Organization’s website: confidential, lastly accessed 8/10/2014
•tGuidelines on the new Defence White Paper (in English), Ministry of Defence, http://www.difesa.it/EN/Documents/White%20Paper%20-%20Guidelines.pdf
•tMeeting promoted by the Ministry of Defence with group of &quoute;representatives from civil society&quoute; in order to discuss the Guidelines on the new Defence White Paper (http://www.difesa.it/Primo_Piano/Pagine/LibroBianco_Societacivile.aspx)

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: There is no record of contact, or cooperation initiatives, between defence and security institutions and CSOs on anti-corruption issues. Last June the Ministry of Defence presented initial guidelines for a &quoute;White Paper for International Security and Defence&quoute; (http://www.difesa.it/News/Documents/Linee%20Guida.pdf).
Recently, the Ministry of Defence has promoted a meeting with an unspecified group of &quoute;experts from civil society&quoute; (http://www.difesa.it/Primo_Piano/Pagine/LibroBianco_Societacivile.aspx).
However, it is unclear (and, if so, to what extent) whether and how anti-corruption issues are going to be treated.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: This policy is provided for in the National Anti-Corruption Plan, which establishes channels for stakeholders and representatives of civil society to present proposals concerning the Administration's activities, also with a view to improving and implementing the corruption prevention strategy. While preparing the Three-Year Corruption Prevention Plan 2013-2016, the Defence Administration activated an online consultation mode with stakeholders. Moreover, as provided for in Legislative Decree No. 33 of 14 March 2013 and in the Guidelines of the Anti-Corruption National Authority, Transparency Days will be established to provide information on the Three-Year Programme for Transparency and Integrity to all stakeholders concerned.

Suggested score: 4

Government Reviewer-+

05.
score
3

Has the country signed up to international anti-corruption instruments such as, but not exclusively or necessarily, UNCAC and the OECD Convention? (In your answer, please specify which.)

Italy has signed and ratified the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, UNCAC, the Council of Europe’s Criminal and Civil Conventions on Corruption. However, it has signed but not yet ratified the Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe’s Criminal Law Convention. With regards to the compliance with such instruments, the two most recent reports from the OECD and the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) highlight some deficiencies in relation to the independence of the anti-corruption authority, sanctions for individuals and companies, the protection of whistle-blowers, and the statute of limitations for corruption offences.

According to Transparency International, Italy has demonstrated &quoute;moderate enforcement&quoute; of the OECD Convention. There is evidence of compliance with the UNCAC as well as room for improvement.

COMMENTS -+

•tStatus of signatures and ratifications of the OECD Anti-bribery Convention: http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/WGBRatificationStatus.pdf
•tStatus of signatures and ratifications of the Council of Europe’s Criminal Convention on Corruption: http://www.conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/QueVoulezVous.asp?NT=173&CM=8&DF=25/09/2014&CL=ENG
•tStatus of signatures and ratifications of the Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe’s Criminal Convention on Corruption: http://www.conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/QueVoulezVous.asp?NT=191&CM=8&DF=25/09/2014&CL=ENG
•tStatus of signatures and ratifications of the Council of Europe’s Civil Convention on Corruption: http://www.conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/QueVoulezVous.asp?NT=174&CM=8&DF=25/09/2014&CL=ENG
•tStatus of signatures and ratifications of the UNCAC: https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/signatories.html
•tGRECO’s Evaluation Report on Italy, Third Evaluation Round, June 2014, available at http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/round3/GrecoRC3%282014%299_Italy_EN.pdf
•tOECD Phase Three Report on Italy, December 2011, available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/anti-briberyconvention/Italyphase3reportEN.pdf.
• Transparency International, Exporting Corruption, Italy, http://www.transparency.org/exporting_corruption/Italy
• UNCAC Implementation Review Group, 2013, Italy, https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/WorkingGroups/ImplementationReviewGroup/26-27November2013/V1387842e.pdf
•tTransparency International, Government Defence Index 2013 Italy assessment

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: According to the last &quoute;EU Anti-Corruption Report&quoute; presented by the EU Commission (3rd February 2014) in Italy personal bribery experiences are rare, but the collective expectation of corruption remains high (http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/e-library/documents/policies/organized-crime-and-human-trafficking/corruption/docs/acr_2014_en.pdf).

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

06.
score
2

Is there evidence of regular, active public debate on issues of defence? If yes, does the government participate in this debate?

The public debate on defence issues mostly takes places on the media (newspaper or in TV), where members of the Government participate (sometimes the Minister of Defence participates as well). The frequency of such debate is irregular and depends on the sensitivity of the themes. While in recent years the most discussed issue was the authorisation/extension of the military missions, more recently public attention has concentrated on expenditures of the Ministry of Defence, such as the decision to order 90 Lockheed Martin F-35 fighters in spite of their technical problems and national budget contingencies.

Response to Government: While public debate on defence issues has increased in recent years, it is irregular and relates, as you suggest, to external shocks. Score of 2 maintained.

COMMENTS -+

•tText of the Constitution in English: http://www.quirinale.it/qrnw/statico/costituzione/pdf/costituzione_inglese.pdf
•tTV interview of the Minister of Defence on 19 March 2014: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6VIhR2upPRU
•tNewspaper Article on the participation of the Minister of Defence in a public debate on 6 September 2014 in Genoa: http://genova.repubblica.it/cronaca/2014/09/07/news/pinotti-95228311/
•tMagazine Article on the technical probelms of the F-35 fighters, 4 September 2014: http://espresso.repubblica.it/attualita/2014/09/04/news/f35-ancora-guai-per-i-super-caccia-1.178743

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: Although still developing on an irregular basis, in most cases as a reaction to external shocks rather than as a well-informed and structured reflection on the country's role in the international arena, in the last fifteen years (since the Kosovo conflict onward) the public debate on security and defence issues has significantly increased with the strong participation of the government.

The ongoing debate over Italy's partial cut in the acquisition of F-35 jet fighters (but not the country's complete pull out from the programme) is a case in point (http://www.defence-aerospace.com/article-view/feature/152466/italy-to-revise,-cut-f_35-buy.html).
Equally, the most recent example of this &quoute;securitization&quoute; of the public sphere is the form of Italy's support to the US-led raids in Syria against ISIS (http://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/notizie/2014-10-13/raid-anti-isis-l-italia-potrebbe-rafforzare-suo-impegno-militare--183304.shtml?uuid=ABimrn2B).

Suggested score: 3

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

07.
score
3

Does the country have an openly stated and actively implemented anti-corruption policy for the defence sector?

Pursuant to Article 1(5)(a) of Law n. 190/2012, each branch/department of the Public Administration has to define an Anti-Corruption Prevention Plan containing an assessment of the corruption risk within its offices and the organizational arrangements to deal with the issues emerging from the latter analysis.
The Ministry of Defence has adopted its Triennial Anti-Corruption Plan in January 2014 and, pursuant to Article 1(7), on 14 March 2014 it nominated its Anti-Corruption Supervisor (“Responsabile della prevenzione della corruzione”) in the person of Lieutenant Fabbri. The latter released its first Report on 31 December 2014.
Although the effectiveness of Law n. 190/2012 can only be measured on the long run, the latter plans and reports are detailed and focus on the specific activities/risks of the Ministry of Defence.

Response to Government Reviewer: Agreed. Score changed from 2 to 3 and sources added.

COMMENTS -+

•tTriennial Anti-Corruption Plan of the Ministry of Defence 2013-2016 of 29 January 2014, available at http://www.difesa.it/Amministrazionetrasparente/bilandife/Documents/Anti_Corr/PTPC_2013_16.pdf
•tLaw n. 190 of 6 November 2012, available at http://www.normattiva.it/uri-res/N2Ls?urn:nir:stato:legge:2012-11-06;190.
•tNational Anti-corruption Action Plan http://www.funzionepubblica.gov.it/media/1092881/p_n_a.pdf.
•tCircular Directive n. 1/2013 of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, Department of Public Function, on Law n. 190 of 6 November 2012, available at http://www.funzionepubblica.gov.it/media/1051175/circolare%20n1_2013.pdf.
•tDecree of the Ministry of Defence of 14 March 2014 nominating the Anti-Corruption Supervisor, available at www.difesa.it/Amministrazionetrasparente/bilandife/Documents/Anti_Corr/decr_nomina_RPC_RTI.pdf
•tReport of the Ministry of Defence’s Anti-Corruption Officer of 31 December 2014: http://www.difesa.it/Amministrazionetrasparente/bilandife/Pagine/RelazionedelResponsabiledellaprevenzionedellacorruzione.aspx
•tThree-Year Programme for Transparency and Integrity 2013-2016 www.difesa.it/Amministrazionetrasparente/bilandife/Documents/Anti_Corr/PTPC_2013_16.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The Ministry of Defence has also nominated an Anti Corruption Officer, in compliance with the requirements of Law 190/2012

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Law n. 190/2012 (also known as the &quoute;anti-corruption law&quoute;) established the CIVIT (Independent Commission for the assessment, transparency and integrity of the public administration) which operates also as ANAC (Anti-Corruption National Authority: http://www.anticorruzione.it/). The Ministry of Defence, as a part of the public sector, is subjected to the provisions of this law. Yet, due to its relatively recent adoption, it is still hard to judge the effectiveness of CIVIT.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: A &quoute;Three-Year Corruption Prevention Plan&quoute; is published every year in the website of the Italian Defence, in the section named &quoute;Amministrazione Trasparente&quoute; (Transparent Administration). The document is approved by the Minister of Defence and drawn up according to risk management procedures. It includes a list of the areas with the highest corruption risk, the relevant prevention and/or risk control measures, and the Three-Year Programme for Transparency and Integrity (http://www.difesa.it/Amministrazionetrasparente/bilandife/Documents/Anti_Corr/PTPC_2013_16.pdf).

Suggested score: 4

Government Reviewer-+

08.
score
3

Are there independent, well-resourced, and effective institutions within defence and security tasked with building integrity and countering corruption?

Pursuant to Article 1(7) of Law n. 190/2012, each branch of the Public Administration has to appoint a supervisor for the prevention of corruption. On 14 March the Ministry of Defence appointed Lieutenant Fabbri as Anti-Corruption Supervisor as well as Supervisor for Transparency. Although the law establishes that the Supervisor is identified by the political organs of the Ministry, and thus its independence is not formally guaranteed, the first Report of the Anti-Corruption supervisor released on 31 December 2014 represents an element which speaks in favour of its potential effectiveness.

Response to Government Reviewer: Agreed. Score changed from 2 to 3 and sources added.

COMMENTS -+

•tDecree of the Ministry of Defence of 14 March 2014, available at www.difesa.it/Amministrazionetrasparente/bilandife/Documents/Anti_Corr/decr_nomina_RPC_RTI.pdf.
•tLaw n. 190 of 6 November 2012, available at http://www.normattiva.it/uri-res/N2Ls?urn:nir:stato:legge:2012-11-06;190.
•tNational Anti-corruption Action Plan http://www.funzionepubblica.gov.it/media/1092881/p_n_a.pdf.
•tCircular Directive n. 1/2013 of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, Department of Public Function, on Law n. 190 of 6 November 2012, available at http://www.funzionepubblica.gov.it/media/1051175/circolare%20n1_2013.pdf.
•tReport of the Ministry of Defence’s Anti-Corruption Officer of 31 December 2014: http://www.difesa.it/Amministrazionetrasparente/bilandife/Pagine/RelazionedelResponsabiledellaprevenzionedellacorruzione.aspx

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: According to the website of the Ministry of Defence, the first Annual Report of Lieutenant General Giuseppe Fabbri is going to be published in December 2014 (http://www.difesa.it/Amministrazionetrasparente/bilandife/Pagine/RelazionedelResponsabiledellaprevenzionedellacorruzione.aspx).

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: In compliance with Law 190/2012 and the National Anti-Corruption Plan, a Head of the Corruption Prevention and Transparency office has been appointed within the Ministry of Defence. He operates in close connection with the Independent Performance Review Body in order to define anti-corruption objectives and achieve coordination with the performance cycle.

Suggested score: 3

Government Reviewer-+

09.
score
3

Does the public trust the institutions of defence and security to tackle the issue of bribery and corruption in their establishments?

According to the most recent findings of the Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer (2013), 25% of respondents in Italy felt that the military was corrupt/extremely corrupt, the least corrupt institution from the twelve institutions surveyed. Earlier on, in the 2010/2011 Barometer, the military sector was also deemed quite corrupt, with a score of 2.8 out of 5 (where 5 is most corrupt). That said, the military was perceived as less corrupt than other Italian institutions. Political parties and the legislature, in comparison, were considered corrupt by 89% and 77% of respondents in 2013 and had a score of 4.4 and 4 each respectively in 2013.

COMMENTS -+

•tTransparency International 2013 Global Corruption Barometer, available at http://www.transparency.org/gcb2013.
•tTransparency International 2010/2011 Global Corruption Barometer, available at http://transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/gcb/2010/in_detail

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

10.
score
2

Are there regular assessments by the defence ministry or another government agency of the areas of greatest corruption risk for ministry and armed forces personnel, and do they put in place measures for mitigating such risks?

In January 2014, the Ministry of Defence released its Triennial Anti-Corruption Prevention Action Plan for the years 2013-2016 pursuant to Article 1(5)(a) of Law n. 190/2012. The latter identifies the areas where the risk of corruption is greater and the measures to prevent such risk; furthermore, it deals with methodology issues of risk assessment. Finally, on 14 March 2014 ,the Ministry of Defence nominated an Anti-Corruption Supervisor, who released its first Report on 31 December 2014.

Despite the fact that the Triennial Anti-Corruption Prevention Action Plan represents a recent assessment of the corruption risk in the sector, answer no. 2 of the Report states that in 2014 no control over the risk-management measures has been carried out in spite of the fact that it was provided for by the Anti-Corruption Plan. This element testifies shortcomings surrounding the effective implementation of the measures.

Response to Government Reviewer: Evidence suggests that the Triennial Anti-Corruption Prevention Action Plan has yet to be fully implemented.

COMMENTS -+

•tTriennial Anti-Corruption Action Plan of the Ministry of Defence 2013-2016 of 29 January 2014, available at http://www.difesa.it/Amministrazionetrasparente/bilandife/Documents/Anti_Corr/PTPC_2013_16.pdf
•tLaw n. 190 of 6 November 2012, available at http://www.normattiva.it/uri-res/N2Ls?urn:nir:stato:legge:2012-11-06;190
•tReport of the Ministry of Defence’s Anti-Corruption Officer of 31 December 2014: http://www.difesa.it/Amministrazionetrasparente/bilandife/Pagine/RelazionedelResponsabiledellaprevenzionedellacorruzione.aspx

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: Same as Question 8.

Suggested score: 4

Government Reviewer-+

11.
score
3

Does the country have a process for acquisition planning that involves clear oversight, and is it publicly available?

Law 25/1997 and its implementing legislation (i.e. Decree of the President of the Republic 556/1999) define the acquisition process and regulate the responsibilities of the highest defence officials. Furthermore, both through the official website of the Ministry of Defence and the hearings of Ministry of Defence’s high officials in front of the Defence Parliamentary Committees, the Defence Acquisition Process is formally monitored and accessible to the public. In spite of these elements, the fact that the Parliamentary Committees can only express preventive advisory (thus not binding) opinions within the acquisition process (see overview of the Parliamentary activity on the arms acquisition process), represents a shortcoming concerning the effectiveness of the oversight mechanisms.

Response to Government Reviewer: Though Law 25/1997 and the implementing Presidential Decree 556/1999 provide explicit regulation for the military acquisition process, it remains a very sensitive issue for both political actors and interest groups. Seeing as Parliament has only an advisory role in the acquisitions process, a score of 3 is maintained.

COMMENTS -+

•tLaw of18 February 1997, n. 25 available at http://www.normattiva.it/uri-res/N2Ls?urn:nir:stato:legge:1997-02-18;25@originale, and its implementing Regulation through Decree of the President of the Republic of 25 October 1999, n. 556 http://www.normattiva.it/uri-res/N2Ls?urn:nir:presidente.repubblica:decreto:1999;556.
•tLegislative Decree 30 July 1999, n. 300, http://www.normattiva.it/uri-res/N2Ls?urn:nir:stato:decreto.legislativo:1999-07-30;300~art11!vig=.
•tMinistry of Defence website, Defence Procurement Overview in Italian http://www.difesa.it/Segretario-SGD-DNA/SGD-DNA/Pagine/Le_Procedure_di_Acquisizione.aspx, and in English (2009) http://www.difesa.it/Segretario-SGD-DNA/SGD-DNA/DPI/Pagine/DPI2009.aspx
•tHearing of Secretary General of Defence and National Armaments Director at the Chamber of Deputies’ Defence Committee of 16 July 2013, available at http://documenti.camera.it/leg17/resoconti/commissioni/stenografici/pdf/04c04/audiz2/audizione/2013/07/16/leg.17.stencomm.data20130716.U1.com04c04.audiz2.audizione.0007.pdf.
•tHearing of Secretary General of Defence and National Armaments Director at the Senate’s Defence Committee of 25 March 2014, available at http://www.senato.it/application/xmanager/projects/leg17/file/repository/commissioni/stenografici/17/congiunte/4a-IV-20140325-AU_BOZZA.pdf
•tOverview of the Parliamentary activity in relation to the armaments acquisition process: http://www.camera.it/leg17/465?tema=programmi_d_arma

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Although Law 25/1997 and the implementing Presidential Decree 556/1999 provide explicit regulation for the military acquisition process, it remains a very sensitive issue for both political actors and interest groups. The institutional body devoted to the acquisition planning is the Secretary General of Defence, but the related webpage does not supply any material on this (http://www.difesa.it/SGD-DNA/Pagine/home.aspx). Even though the current government is expected to issue a &quoute;White Paper&quoute; on Defence next year, it appears that the executive branch and the President of the Republic (the two institutions that form the Supreme Council of Defence) remain highly jealous of their decision-making prerogatives in the defence policy area, military acquisitions included (http://www.analisidifesa.it/2013/05/la-nuova-lista-della-spesa-della-difesa-italiana/) (http://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2014/03/19/f35-il-consiglio-supremo-rinvia-la-decisione-al-2015-intanto-il-programma-di-acquisto-va-avanti/919249/).

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: Paragraph 6 of the Performance Plan, published yearly in the website of the Italian Ministry of Defence - Transparent Administration, contains details of the process followed by the Ministry to define its budget and relevant responsibilities. An Estimated Expenditure Document is published as well. Furthermore, many planning documents that clearly regulate this process are included in public documents available online, such as the DPP (Documento Programmatico Pluriennale - Long Term Programmatic Document) published in the Defence institutional website. Finally, the Central Office of the State General Accounting Department at the Ministry of Defence is in charge of auditing all expenditure commitments.

Suggested score: 4

Government Reviewer-+

12.
score
3

Is the defence budget transparent, showing key items of expenditure? This would include comprehensive information on military R&D, training, construction, personnel expenditures, acquisitions, disposal of assets, and maintenance.

The budget of the Ministry of Defence is detailed in the Provisional State of Expenses (“Stato Provisionale delle Spese”), a document which is published in the website of the Ministry of Defence and contains the relevant measures of the General National Budget Law, the technical-financial planning, the allocated expenses in a detailed list of chapters, and budget information regarding Missions and Programs. Furthermore, the Ministry of Defence regularly publishes and presents to the Parliament the Multi-year Plan for Defence (“Documento Programmatico Pluriennale per la Difesa”) and the Additional Note to the Provisional State of Expenses (“Nota Aggiuntiva allo Stato di Previsione per la Difesa”) which illustrate, respectively, the long- and short-term budgetary issues of the Ministry of Defence.

In spite of these documents, which report comprehensive information on military R&D, training, construction, personnel expenditures, acquisitions, disposal of assets, and maintenance, the transparency of the defence budget could be certainly improved. Firstly, one has argued that efforts should be focused on improving the clarity of the Defence Function (“Funzione Difesa”) (it does not include the spending for Carabinieri but includes the Ministry of Economy’s fund for defence Research & Development ), because it provides a more accurate and realistic view of the budget generated by the military. Secondly, there is lack of transparency in so far as the costs for retirement pensions and the expenses sustained by the Ministry are referred to as ‘other administrations or functions’.

Response to Government Reviewer: There is a lack of clarity in the Italian Defence Budget surrounding personal expenditures. Score of 3 maintained.

COMMENTS -+

•tMinistry of Defence, 2014 Provisional State of Expenses, available at http://www.difesa.it/Content/Pagine/statoprevisionespesa2013.aspx.
•tMinistry of Defence, 2013 Additional Note to the Provisional State of Expenses, available at http://www.difesa.it/Content/Pagine/Notaaggiuntiva.aspx.
•tMinistry of Defence, 2014 Multiyear Plan for the Defence 2014-2016, available at http://www.difesa.it/Content/Documents/nota_aggiuntiva/01_DPP_2014_2016.pdf.
•tA Marrone and F Di Camillo, &quoute;Italy&quoute;, in Heiko Biehl, Bastian Giegerich and Alexandra Jonas (eds.), Strategic Culture in Europe, Heidelberg, Springer, June 2013, p. 193-206
•tTransparency International, Government Defence Index 2013 Italy assessment

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: Besides the above-mentioned DPP published on the website of the Ministry of Defence, which contains information on broad budget categories (functions/ expenditure areas), an Estimated Expenditure Document is published every year. It contains details of estimated expenditure of each programming body (Army, Navy, Air Force, Carabinieri, etc.), according to the technical/financial planning of the Defence Administration. In this respect, further information is regularly notified to the Ministry of Economy and Finance and the National Institute of Statistics.

Suggested score: 4

Government Reviewer-+

12A.
score
2

Is there a legislative committee (or other appropriate body) responsible for defence budget scrutiny and analysis in an effective way, and is this body provided with detailed, extensive, and timely information on the defence budget?

In Italy there is not any Parliament Committee which is specifically responsible for scrutiny of the defence budget. However, the Defence Committees in Parliament discuss budget-related documents of the Ministry of Defence.

As it emerges from the overview of the Parliament activity in relation to Defence and Armed Forces, the effectiveness of the latter Committees is limited by the fact that they cannot exercise any binding power over the defence budget, but they can only discuss the budget documents with the Ministry of Defence. The latter framework testifies that the Committees’ possibilities to influence decision making is limited.


If one takes the publicly available report of the Chamber of Deputies’ Defence Commission discussion of the 2014 National Budget (p. 87) one could read, for example, that the Deputy Massimo Artini of the Five Stars Movement lamented the vagueness of information concerning the acquisition of the plane MC-27 J and that the response of the Ministry of Defence was quite vague (‘the plane MC-27 J has been identified as an operational need and thus there is no final decision about its purchase). Furthermore, the limited length of the report gives evidence of the weak influence capacity of the Committees, whose task is to approve the aggregated information provided to them.


This situation is confirmed by the analysis of a defence analyst (Giovanni Martinelli) who in 2012 stressed the rapidity of the discussions taking place within the Defence Committees and their long-standing marginal role in scrutinizing the defence budget allocated by the Government.


Response to Government Reviewer: While the Defence Committees of the Chamber of Deputies and of the Senate are provided with detailed information and documents concerning procurement programmes, they lack formal powers to influence budgetary decisions. Score of 2 is maintained.

COMMENTS -+

•tReport of Chamber of Deputies’ Defence Commission discussion of 2014 National Budget with regard to defence expenses, 5 December 2013: http://documenti.camera.it/leg17/resoconti/commissioni/bollettini/pdf/2013/12/05/leg.17.bol0135.data20131205.com04.pdf.
•tMartinelli G., ‘Il bilancio della Difesa 2012, inizio della fine o punto di svolta?’, Documenti di Analisi Difesa, Anno 13, n. 125, February 2012, p.1 http://cca.analisidifesa.it/downloads/2804553076_it.pdf.
•tTransparency International, Government Defence Index 2013 Italy assessment
•tOverview of the Parliament activity in relation to Defence and Armed Forces: http://www.camera.it/leg17/292?area=13

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: On 25th September 2014, the Chamber of Deputies approved a motion promoted by MP Mr. Gian Piero Scanu (group leader of the Democratic Party in the Defence Committee of the Chamber of Deputies) committing the government &quoute;to halve&quoute; the programmed budget for the acquisition of the F-35 joint strike fighters (http://www.gianpieroscanu.it/f35-camera-da-ok-a-mozione-pd-per-dimezzamento-budget/).
As it emerges, the legislative branch does not possess a binding power on the executive's budget powers on defence matters. The Defence Committees of both houses of the Parliament receive information about military acquisitions, but their control and scrutiny powers are limited.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: The Defence Committees of the Chamber of Deputies and of the Senate are provided with detailed information and documents concerning procurement programmes. The same Committees must by law be notified of every new programme in detail (except for programmes concerning the maintenance of equipment and supplies). Besides, it should be noted that the low rating attributed to this question appears to be at odds with the maximum rating of the next one.

Suggested score: 4

Government Reviewer-+

12B.
score
4

Is the approved defence budget made publicly available? In practice, can citizens, civil society, and the media obtain detailed information on the defence budget?

The budget of the Ministry of Defence in the Provisional State of Expenses (“Stato Provisionale delle Spese”) is published yearly in the website of the Ministry of Defence and contains the relevant measures of the General National Budget Law, the technical-financial planning, the allocated expenses in a detailed list of chapters, and budget information regarding Missions and Programs. The same is true for the Multi-year Plan for the Defence (“Documento Programmatico Pluriennale per la Difesa”) and the Additional Note to the Provisional State of Expenses (“Nota Aggiuntiva allo Stato di Previsione per la Difesa”), the Ministry of Defence’s documents which illustrate, respectively, the long- and short-term budgetary issues to the Parliament.

Although improvements are possible (see comments on questions 12 and 12A), citizens are allowed to request information on defence budget by contacting the relevant Public Administration’s Offices for Public Relation (“Uffici per le Relazioni con il Pubblico” or URP) established through Article 12 of Legislative Decree n.129/1993.

COMMENTS -+

•tMinistry of Defence, 2014 Provisional State of Expenses, available at http://www.difesa.it/Content/Pagine/statoprevisionespesa2013.aspx.
•tMinistry of Defence, 2013 Additional Note to the Provisional State of Expenses, available at http://www.difesa.it/Content/Pagine/Notaaggiuntiva.aspx.
•tMinistry of Defence, 2014 Multiyear Plan for the Defence 2014-2016, available at http://www.difesa.it/Content/Documents/nota_aggiuntiva/01_DPP_2014_2016.pdf.
•tLaw establishing the Public Administration’s Offices for Public Relation (Uffici per le Relazioni con il Pubblico – URP): Article 12, Legislative Decree 3 February 1993, n. 29.
•tTransparency International, Government Defence Index 2013 Italy assessment

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

13.
score
N/A

Are sources of defence income other than from central government allocation (from equipment sales or property disposal, for example) published and scrutinised?

Researcher4009: The Provisional State of Expenses (“Stato Provisionale delle Spese”) reporting the budget of the Ministry of Defence contains a list of relevant income sources (“Parte V. Capitoli d’Entrata”). The large majority of sources come from the Ministry of Economy and Finances, even though a few of them are from the Ministry of Defence itself (e.g. the use of the ‘Armed Forced’ brand for commercial use).
However the most significant shortcoming of the document is that it does not report the amount of resources for each source. As a consequence, it is not possible to carry out any detailed scrutiny on them.

Response to Government Reviewer: Accepted. N/A selected.

COMMENTS -+

•tMinistry of Defence, 2014 Provisional State of Expenses, Part V. List of relevant income sources, available at http://www.difesa.it/Content/Documents/prev_spesa_2014/14_parte_V_elencocapitoli.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The lack of explicit income sources provided by the Ministry of Defence (Provisional State of Expenses, Part V) is totally inadequate. Once more, it reveals the substantial degree of opacity that has historically characterised the military acquisition process in Italy and, accordingly, the negligible powers of the legislative in checking the executive in relation to the country' defence policy.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: The Ministry has no other sources of income than from central government allocation. For instance, resources from property disposal are not allocated directly to the Ministry of Defence, but to the Ministry of Economy and Finance which can afterwards redistribute them.

Suggested score: N/A

Government Reviewer-+

14.
score
2

Is there an effective internal audit process for defence ministry expenditure (that is, for example, transparent, conducted by appropriately skilled individuals, and subject to parliamentary oversight)?

According to Article 84 of the Decree of the President of the Republic 90/2010, a Consulting Committee established within the Ministry and composed of the MoD’s High Officials, Audit Magistrates and Experts has the task to audit draft contracts for weapons purchases whose value is beyond the thresholds set by Article 215 of Legislative Decree n. 163/2006 (General Public Contracts Code).

In spite of the presence of Audit Magistrates, the composition and the lack of public results make its work not particularly transparent. Furthermore, there is no evidence that the Government takes its findings into account, nor that is subject to transparency or parliamentary scrutiny.

Response to Government Reviewer: While all Programming Bodies seem to have an internal management control service, accountable to the central audit service of the Defence General Staff, evidence could not be found that the central government takes their findings into account. Score of 2 is maintained.

COMMENTS -+

•tDecree of the President of the Republic 15 March 2010, n. 90, available at http://www.normattiva.it/uri-res/N2Ls?urn:nir:stato:decreto.del.presidente.della.repubblica:2010-03-15;90!vig=.
•tLegislative Decree 12 April 2006, n. 163 (General Public Contracts Code), available at http://www.normattiva.it/uri-res/N2Ls?urn:nir:stato:legge:2006-04-12;163!vig.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The Ministry of Defence established a Consultive Committee (&quoute;Comitato consultivo sui progetti di contratto&quoute;) with the duty to give non-binding opinions regarding projects of contracts deriving from international cooperation agreements in the armaments sector as well as those implementing already approved programmes. However, there is no available information about its members, the way they work, and their eventual results.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: All Programming Bodies have an internal management control service, accountable to the central audit service of the Defence General Staff. Most of the personnel employed in the internal auditing bodies have attended specific training courses. The data concerning their activities are gathered, commented and circulated within the Ministry every three months. The Chiefs of Staff report to the Parliament on the relevant results on a regular basis.

Suggested score: 3

Government Reviewer-+

15.
score
2

Is there effective and transparent external auditing of military defence expenditure?

Being part of the State budget, the military defence expenditure is subject to the auditing of the Supreme Audit Institution (Corte dei Conti), a judicial body having exclusive jurisdiction in matters of public accounting which, pursuant to Article 100 of the Constitution, exercises “preventive control over the legitimacy of Government measures, and also ex-post auditing of the administration of the State Budget. It participates, in the cases and ways established by law, in auditing the financial management of the entities receiving regular budgetary support from the State”. Several laws ensure the independence of the Italian Supreme Audit Institution and its members, which belong to the Magistracy Body, an autonomous power of the State: firstly the immovability of the magistrates (art. 107 of the Constitution); secondly the provision of a self-governing body (Law n.117/1988 ); thirdly the appointment of the President among the magistrates of the Institution itself (Law n. 202/2000); finally the financial and organizational autonomy.

Response to Peer Reviewer: Comments added.
Response to Government Reviewer: Seeing as no evidence exists that the government abides by the rulings of the Court of Auditors' recommendations as they pertain to the defence budget, a score of 2 is maintained.

COMMENTS -+

•tText of the Constitution in English: http://www.quirinale.it/qrnw/statico/costituzione/pdf/costituzione_inglese.pdf;
•tLaw n. 117/1988: http://www.normattiva.it/uri-res/N2Ls?urn:nir:stato:legge:1988-04-13;117!vig
•tLaw n.202/2000: http://www.normattiva.it/uri-res/N2Ls?urn:nir:stato:legge:2000;202
•tEUROSAI (European Organisation of Supreme Audit Institutions), Presentation of Italian Supreme Audit Institution at the Seminar on Independence of Supreme Audit Institutions, Budapest (Hungary), 28 March 2014, available at http://www.eurosai.org/handle404?exporturi=/export/sites/eurosai/.content/documents/training/training-events/InSem2014/6.-Roundtable-disc-Round-2-Italy.pdf
•tTransparency International, Government Defence Index 2013: http://government.defenceindex.org/sites/default/files/documents/GI-assessment-Italy.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: In accordance with art. 100 of the Italian Constitution (&quoute;The Court of Auditors exercises preventive control over the legitimacy of Government measures, and also ex-post auditing of the administration of the State Budget&quoute;), the Ministry of Defence elaborates a Performance Plan (&quoute;Piano della performance&quoute;) and, accordingly, send it to the Court of Auditors for appropriate screening and authorization (http://www.difesa.it/Amministrazionetrasparente/SMD/Documents/MINDIFEPianoperformance1416TomoI.pdf). Yet, it is unclear to what extent the government abides by the rulings of the Court of Auditors in terms of defence budget.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: Data on the Ministry Performance are published every year on the websites of the Ministry of Defence and of the National Anti-Corruption Authority. Those data are included within the following documents: Report on Performance (drawn up by the Defence Administration) and Performance Validation Document (drawn up by the Internal Assessment Body). Furthermore, a Performance Report containing the same data is made every year by the Internal Assessment Body and forwarded to the Defence Committees of the Chamber of Deputies and of the Senate for relevant assessment.

Suggested score: 3

Government Reviewer-+

16.
score
4

Is there evidence that the country's defence institutions have controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country's natural resource exploitation and, if so, are these interests publicly stated and subject to scrutiny?

There is no evidence that the Italian defence institutions have control or financial interests in domestic natural resources-related businesses. It should be nevertheless mentioned that such businesses are not very significant in the context of Italy. However, one should take note of Law 56/2012 which introduces the possibility for the Government to exercise the so-called “golden share” in strategic sectors such as energy, transportation and communication “in case a serious prejudice threatens the fundamental interests of the defence and the national security”.
Although the Government retains the discretion to exercise such power, there is no evidence of direct involvement of the defence institutions; plus, Law 56/2012 contains some degree of parliamentary scrutiny and involvement.
Response to Peer and Chapter Reviewers: Agreed. Score changed from 2 to 4 and sources added.

COMMENTS -+

•tLaw 56/2012 available at http://www.normattiva.it/uri-res/N2Ls?urn:nir:stato:decreto.legge:2012-03-15;21!vig=
•tChamber of Deputies, Information Page on the Safeguards of Strategic Assets (last update: 1 August 2014): http://www.camera.it/leg17/465?area=9&tema=560&La+salvaguardia+degli+assetti+strategici#paragrafo4904
•tTransparency International, Government Defence Index 2013: http://government.defenceindex.org/sites/default/files/documents/GI-assessment-Italy.pdf
•tENI Governance: http://www.eni.com/it_IT/governance/azionisti/partecipazioni-significative/partecipazioni-significative.shtml.
•tENEL Profile: https://www.enel.com/it-IT/doc/group/profile/enel_profilo_societario.pdf.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: Italy has very limited &quoute;natural resources&quoute; (old mines in Sardinia and gas/oil fields on&offshore).
the positive separation between the MoD (and related small production activity, carried out as GOGO &quoute;Government-Owned Government-controlled&quoute; arsenals as per US DoD definition) and the State-participated PLC (Public Listed co's, such as ENEL, ENI, Finmeccanica) is strict.
The presence of a &quoute;golden share&quoute; does matter on simple &quoute;anti-takeover poison pills&quoute; in case of unfriendly/unacceptable bid by foreign countries in violation of the NAtional Security.
The three large conglomerates are all controlled at around 26-34% , so a hostile takeover could be mounted if not barred by the Golden Share. We raise rating proposal to 3 (reviewed together with VITALI)

Suggested score: 3

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: It is a hard question to answer. Although the defence and the energy sectors inevitably share common strategic interests, especially in the hydrocarbon industry, the Ministry of Defence does not officially participate in the corporate governance of two key Italian energy companies, ENI and ENEL. In both cases it is the Ministry of Economy and Finance to act as the largest shareholder with, respectively, 30.10% and 31.24% of the capital. What is more, the Ministry of Economy and Finance appears as the only public institution involved in the governance of the aforementioned groups.
- ENI: http://www.eni.com/it_IT/governance/azionisti/partecipazioni-significative/partecipazioni-significative.shtml.
- ENEL: https://www.enel.com/it-IT/doc/group/profile/enel_profilo_societario.pdf.
Nevertheless, the presence of individual members of the Armed Forces in shareholders' community, as well as their personal influence toward the Board of Directors, with obvious consequences in terms of conflicts of interest, cannot be disregarded so easily.
Although the related legislation is pretty new, there is evidence of Parliamentary scrutiny. On the contrary, the continuous centralization of defence-related policy issues in the hands of the government contributes to the maintenance of some &quoute;grey areas&quoute;.

Suggested score: 3

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

17.
score
2

Is there evidence, for example through media investigations or prosecution reports, of a penetration of organised crime into the defence and security sector? If no, is there evidence that the government is alert and prepared for this risk?

A controversial, yet seemingly solid, prosecution concerning an alleged negotiation between part of the Italian Intelligence and the Sicilian Mafia in the early 90s (the so-called State-Mafia negotiation or “Trattativa Stato-mafia&quoute;) also involves former high-officials of the defence and security sector.
Although the latter alleged episode does not involve direct penetration of the organized crime in the defence and security sector, the prosecution itself give some alarming evidence of suspicious colluding practices at an high military level.
More generally, one should stress that the “Carabinieri”, a military branch of the armed forces, are often essential to carry out successful anti-mafia operations.
Response to Peer Reviewer: Score maintained given there is recent evidence of organised criminal linkages.

COMMENTS -+

•tOnline news from newspaper “Il Fatto Quotidiano” on the alleged negotiation between part of the Italian Intelligence and the Sicilian Mafia in the 90s, including news concerning the alleged involvement of former high-officials of the defence and security sector in: http://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/tag/trattativa-stato-mafia/
•tExample of news concerning an anti-mafia operation carried out by the Carabinieri, 23 September 2014: http://www.si24.it/2014/09/23/operazione-antimafia-nel-palermitano-fermati-5-uomini-del-mandamento-di-corleone/67003/

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The largest investigation and trial today relates to the money laundering of certain payments allegedly directed towards Foreign Governments but in reality diverted to personal accounts in non-EU countries. The debate is totally open, the trial was discussed and reasoning behind the decision by the MILAN court were disclosed as per all Trials in Italy. The overall strategy was once more discussed last November 2014 in a 2-day workshop (&quoute;C5Milan&quoute;) by the Public Prosecutor FUSCO towards some 60 Corporate Compliance and Corporate Legal Counsels coming from G8 countries, to the full satisfaction of all the attendees.

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: While the effort of military branches such as the Carabinieri to fight organised remains undisputed, it must not be ignored that several recent investigations have shown a considerable level or criminal infiltration into the defence and military sector. Three cases are briefly cited below:

- In 2013, Carabinieri Marshall Saverio Masi and another unidentified military officer provided information on how high level officials prevented or delayed the arrest of Mafia boss Bernardo Provenzano between years 2001-2004.
Sources:
http://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2013/05/14/mafia-altro-carabiniere-denuncia-ecco-chi-ritardo-arresto-provenzano/593918/
http://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2010/12/21/trattativa-stato-mafia-il-papello-di-toto-riina-il-capitano-angeli-ordino-di-non-sequestrarlo/83038/

- In one of the biggest and most recent anti-Mafia operations in Italian history, &quoute;Crimine Infinito&quoute; (Infinite Crime), prosecutors have identified military personnel providing intelligence to 'Ndrangheta, allegedly the most powerful Italian criminal organisation, based in Calabria.
Sources:
http://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operazione_Crimine-Infinito
http://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/tag/operazione-infinito/

- Carabiniere Francesco Anania has been arrested in August 2014, accused of belonging to a Sicilian Mafia group and to be responsible for their weapon arsenal.
Source: http://www.gazzettadelsud.it/news//103241/Carabiniere-arrestato----Non.html


Suggested score: 1

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The argument is highly controversial: rather than penetration as such it would be more correct to talk about collusion and facilitating practices between organised crime (i.e. mafia) and defence and security institutions, mostly the Carabinieri and the military intelligence service. The most important case of alleged &quoute;dirty relations&quoute; is the so-called &quoute;trattativa stato-mafia&quoute; (State-mafia negotiation) with an ongoing process in the tribunal of Palermo. According to the prosecutor's thesis, between 1992 and 1993 the Sicilian mafia, in retaliation for stricter jail penalties introduced in the late 1980s, took advantage of the collapse of the old party system (the &quoute;First Republic&quoute;) to launch a devastating bombing campaign with the aim of extorting from the Italian State a relaxation of the newly introduced criminal code for sentencing mafia members. According to the investigations, three top officials of the Carabinieri conducted a massive negotiation on behalf of the Italian State with the mafia to stop the bombings.
- http://www.lastampa.it/2014/09/25/italia/cronache/trattativa-statomafia-le-cinque-cose-da-sapere-sul-processo-di-palermo-e-il-ruolo-di-napolitano-H1RCEP1EVjvRh1dYP3ogaP/pagina.html
Related to this process is the famous case of former top police official, Mr. Bruno Contrada, senteced to 10 years of imprisonment for mafia association.
- http://www.linkiesta.it/contrada-libero.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

18.
score
2

Is there policing to investigate corruption and organised crime within the defence services and is there evidence of the effectiveness of this policing?

The Italian Criminal Military Codes do not address crimes of corruption or organized crime participation, therefore no policing function is conducted by military tribunals, which, according to Article 103 of the Constitution, “In times of peace […] have jurisdiction only for military crimes committed by members of the armed forces”. In any case the Italian judicial system, whose independence is set in the Constitution (Article 104(1): “The Judiciary branch is autonomous and independent of all other powers”) may apply the relevant provisions of the Italian Criminal Code.

Response to Chapter Reviewer: I could not find information regarding the Department referred to by TI Chapter reviewer, but I do not think it deals with corruption or organized crime (also Government says “there isn't a specific Defence internal policy”). Agree with score challenge. Score changed from 0 to 1 and sources added.

COMMENTS -+

•tText of the Constitution: http://www.quirinale.it/qrnw/statico/costituzione/
•t The Military Justice System at a glance (in Italian): http://www.difesa.it/Giustizia_Militare/Pagine/default.aspx
•tItalian Criminal Code: http://www.altalex.com/?idnot=36653
•tTransparency International, Government Defence Index 2013 Italy assessment

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: All Ministries (not only the MOD) have an Internal Department for Compliance & Control but the effectiveness of their functions is unknown.

Suggested score: 1

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: There isn't a specific Defence internal policy. Other national institutions, operating across all public administrations, are responsible for the fight against organized crime.

Suggested score: N/A

Government Reviewer-+

19.
score
3

Are the policies, administration, and budgets of the intelligence services subject to effective, properly resourced, and independent oversight?

Pursuant to Article 30 of Law 3 August 2007, n. 124, which updated the Intelligence System for the Security of the Republic, a Parliamentary Committee for the Security of the Republic (Comitato parlamentare per la sicurezza della Repubblica) has been established. It is composed of five Deputies and five Senators to be appointed by the Presidents of the two Houses of Parliament within twenty days of the opening of every Parliament by taking into consideration the number of members in the parliamentary groups as well as the equal representation of both the majority and the opposition groups. Such a Committee can constantly and systematically verify that the Security Intelligence System’s activities are carried out in observance of both the Constitution and of the laws. As also highlighted in the Government Defence Index 2013, the prerogatives of such Committee include: the powers to call for hearings of the Intelligence Services personnel, to consult documents covered by State secret, to make inspections in Intelligence Services buildings, and to control the expenses’ documentation regarding its activities. Finally, the Committee has advisory powers on any law relating to the organization and the personnel status of the Intelligence Services. The Committee prepares an annual report and presents any informative or reports about urgent issues to the Parliament. Although the content of the meetings of the Committee is not made public and thus is hard to assess its effectiveness, the institutional framework set by Law 124/2007 seem to ensure a properly resourced and independent parliamentary oversight of the intelligence service.

Response to chapter Reviewer: Agreed. Score changed from 4 to 3.

COMMENTS -+

•tLaw of Reform of Intelligence Services: Law 3 August 2007, n. 124 (in English) https://www.sicurezzanazionale.gov.it/sisr.nsf/english/law-no-124-2007.html
•tInstitutional Website of the Parliamentary Committee for the Security of the Republic , including current composition and activities (as from 15 March 2013) http://www.parlamento.it/leg/17/BGT/Schede/Bicamerali/v3/4-00065.htm
•tIntelligence Services, Executive summary of the report on security intelligence policy and the results achieved in 2013, available in English at http://www.sicurezzanazionale.gov.it/sisr.nsf/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/relazione-2013.pdf.
•tStatewatch, Explanatory note on the Law reforming intelligence services, available at http://www.statewatch.org/news/2007/sep/03italy-intell.htm.
•tTransparency International, Government Defence Index 2013 Italy assessment

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: It is too difficult to ascertain the true effectiveness of Copasir, there is too little information about its activities that are not published nor accessible.

Suggested score: 3

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

20.
score
2

Are senior positions within the intelligence services filled on the basis of objective selection criteria, and are appointees subject to investigation of their suitability and prior conduct?

Following Law 3 August 2007, n. 124, which updated the Intelligence System for the Security of the Republic, the prerogatives and responsibility of the Prime Minister in the appointment of senior positions within the intelligence services have been increased. Pursuant to Article 1 of Law 124/2007, the Prime Minister is vested the exclusive powers (among others) to exercise oversight of and overall responsibility for security intelligence policy in the interests and defence of the Republic and its underlying democratic institutions as established by the Constitution; to appoint and dismiss the Director General and one or more Deputy Directors General of the Security Intelligence Department; to appoint and dismiss the Directors and Deputy Directors of the Security Intelligence Services. The Law 124/2007 does not set specific criteria for the appointment of senior positions, but it only establishes that the director general “shall be a top-echelon official or equivalent” and shall be appointment after prior consultation with CISR (Interministerial Committee for the Security of the Republic, which it formed by Ministries). Hence, as also contended by the Government Index 2013, the selection of senior positions is mostly guided by unclear and subjective criteria.

COMMENTS -+

•tLaw of Reform of Intelligence Services: Law 3 August 2007, n. 124 (in English): https://www.sicurezzanazionale.gov.it/sisr.nsf/english/law-no-124-2007.html
•tOrganizational chart of the Information System for Security (in English): http://www.sicurezzanazionale.gov.it/sisr.nsf/english.html.
•tStatewatch, Explanatory note on the Law reforming intelligence services, available at http://www.statewatch.org/news/2007/sep/03italy-intell.htm.
•tF Di Camillo and L Marta, “National Security Strategies: The Italian Case&quoute;, Madrid, Elcano Royal Institute, 2009 (Working Papers Elcano; 39/2009), October 2009

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: According to Law n. 124/2007, the appointment and dismissal of top official of the intelligence services are of exclusive competence of the Prime Minister.
The most recent appointments have been made in May 2012 by then-Prime Minister, Mr. Mario Monti:
- http://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/notizie/2012-05-12/gennaro-delega-servizi-massolo-081544.shtml?uuid=AbAy2RbF.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: Such selection does not fall within the competence of the Defence General Staff, as there is no actual intelligence service under its authority.

Suggested score: N/A

Government Reviewer-+

21.
score
2

Does the government have a well-scrutinised process for arms export decisions that aligns with international protocols, particularly the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)?

Law n.185 of 1990 (later modified and integrated by Law n.148 of 2003 and Legislative Decree n. 105 of 2012) regulates the export, import and transit control of arms setting principles, prohibition and constraints applying to the political action of the Italian Government in this field (see, in particular Article 1). Such Law also establishes a four-phase procedure for the issuing of authorizations which duly takes into account the plurality of stakeholders involved in the import-export operations of security and defence equipment. Most recently, Legislative Decree n. 105 of 2012, attributes a crucial role to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and to its ‘Unit for the authorization of arms’ (“Unità per le autorizzazioni dei materiali d’armamento” or UAMA).

The latter discipline also reflects Italy’s involvement in some international fora such as United Nations, the EU, OSCE, Wassenaar Arrangement: in this context one should stress that Italy updates the UN International registrar for the transfer of conventional arms, follows the principles of the Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP, actively cooperates with the 1540 Committee established pursuant to UN Resolution 1540, and participates to the Wasseenaar Arrangement as well as to the COARM Working Group of the EU Council. Italy voted for the adoption of the ATT, signed it on 3 June 2013, and ratified it on 2 April 2014; however, there is not yet evidence of compliance with its anti-corruption articles. Few concerns raised by the civil society regard the scrutiny of arms control decisions which, although are reported each year (lastly in 2014) to the Parliament (“Relazione sulle operazioni autorizzate e svolte per il controllo dell'esportazione, importazione e transito dei materiali di armamento nonché dell'esportazione e del transito dei prodotti ad alta tecnologia”) and a report is published (lastly in 2011) in the Prime Minister’s website (“Rapporto annuale sui lineamenti di politica del Governo in materia di esportazione, importazione e transito dei materiali d’armamento”), no debate is usually carried out by the relevant Committees of the Parliament (lastly in 2008) despite being provided for by law.

Furthermore, as contended by a member of the civil society in a newspaper article of February 2015, the information reported to the Parliament is “so generic, incomplete aggregated that it is not possible to understand who receives the arms at the end; towards which countries the Italian government has authorized export companies; which specific systems are exported, as well as their quantity and value. It is indicated the number of helicopters exported, but it is not specified whether it is about first aid or assaulting vehicles.”

COMMENTS -+

•tLaw n.185 of 1990 (as modified and integrated by Law n.148 of 2003 and Legislative Decree n. 105 of 2012): “Nuove norme sul controllo dell'esportazione, importazione e transito dei materiali di armamento”, available at http://www.governo.it/Presidenza/UCPMA/normativa/Legge_185_90.pdf.
•tGovernment’s Coordination Service for the Production of Armaments material (where yearly reports are published) http://www.governo.it/Presidenza/UCPMA/
•tBaranes A., “Legge 185/90 e commercio di armi in Italia”, available at www.bancaetica.org; see also the work of the ‘Istituto di ricerche Economiche e Sociali, Economia della Difesa’, http://www.irestoscana.it/ricerca/edd/edd.html
•t“Libia, l’Italia fa affari su export armi. Ma il Parlamento non ne parla da 8 anni”, Il Fatto Quotidiano, 15 February 2015, available at: http://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2015/02/18/libia-guerra-non-per-litalia-sempre-ottimo-affare/1435158/

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Although Law n. 185/1990 established the government's Coordination Service for the Production of Armaments Materials (UCPMA), the institutional website reveals that the most recent annual report issued by the Prime Minister dates back to 2011 (http://www.governo.it/Presidenza/UCPMA/Rapporto_annuale_index.html). Unfortunately, this is not a particularly good news in terms of transparency standards.
In addition, it should be worth noting that the overall system for the production and export of armaments involves a wider set of institutional actors, such as the Ministries of Defence, Internal Affairs, Economy and Finance, and International Trade (http://www.governo.it/Presidenza/UCPMA/Rapporto_annuale_index.html).

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Risk management 60
22.
score
3

How effective are controls over the disposal of assets, and is information on these disposals, and the proceeds of their sale, transparent?

The law governing the disposal of public properties was recently modified by Law n. 147 of 2014, which provided for a special plan for the disposal of public real estate, including real estate owned by the Ministry of Defence which is not used for institutional purposes. More generally, the procedures involves the Council of the Prime Minister, the Ministry of Economy and Finance, the Agency of the Territory (“Agenzia del Territorio”) and the Agency of Government Property (“Agenzia del Demanio”), whose website publicizes the public auctions. As for the controls, they are exercised by the Supreme Audit Institution, which is an independent judiciary organ (see Answer 15). With specific regard to the defence sector, in April 2014 the Minister of Defence established a “Disposal Task-Force” (“Task force per le dismissioni”) in order to speed up the projects of disposal of those areas and public properties which are not used anymore by the Armed Forces.
In spite of the latter procedures and controls, there is limited information on the latter task force’s activity and, more generally, on the proceeds of the disposals of Public Administration’s public properties. Such scarcity of information may change in the future when the Law n. 147 of 2014 will display its results.

COMMENTS -+

•tPublic assets disposal on the Camera dei Deputati’s website (lastly updated 11 July 2014): http://www.camera.it/leg17/465?area=28&tema=455&Immobili+pubblici+-+Valorizzazioni+e+dismissionihttp://www.camera.it/561?appro=359&La+disciplina+degli+immobili+pubblici#paragrafo1786
•tLaw of 27 December 2013, n. 147, available at http://www.normattiva.it/uri-res/N2Ls?urn:nir:stato:legge:2013;147
•tWebsite of the Agency of Government Property (Agenzia del Demanio): www.agenziademanio.it
•tTransparency International, Government Defence Index 2013 Italy assessment
•tMinistry of Defence Booklet on the “Disposal Task-Force”, April 2014: http://www.difesa.it/Primo_Piano/Documents/2014/02_Novembre/PDF_IMMOBILI.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Perplexities about the transparency and effectiveness of the disposal of assets have been highlighted by the media. A telling instance is a bid to sell barracks at auctions in 2011, later suspended and then dismissed for unclear reasons in 2013. This has caused distrust among potential bidders. While in 2003 60% of public assets were sold on auctions, in 2012 the figure was 12%, and the situation is not better now. Source: http://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2014/04/07/vendita-degli-immobili-pubblici-solo-promesse-in-5-anni-dismessi-beni-per-660-milioni/941505/

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: During the last decade controls over asset disposals of the Armed Forces has significantly increased. The dark sides are the highly bureaucratised procedures and ever-changing legislation. See, for instance, at: http://www.camera.it/leg17/1050?appro=578&Dismissione+degli+immobili+del+ministero+della+difesa.
However, last April of Minister of Defence, Mrs. Roberta Pinotti, established a task force between the Ministry of Defence and the Agency of Government Property (&quoute;Agenzia del Demanio&quoute;) with goal to speed up the sale of no longer used real estates of the Ministry of Defence. See at: http://www.difesa.it/Primo_Piano/Pagine/Immobili_Difesa_task_force.aspx.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

23.
score
3

Is independent and transparent scrutiny of asset disposals conducted by defence establishments, and are the reports of such scrutiny publicly available?

Asset disposals conducted by defence establishments were last modified by Legislative Decree n. 90/2010 (Code of the military system – “Codice dell’ordinamento militare”), and are managed by the Agency of Government Property (“Agenzia del Demanio”). In order to streamline and accelerate the process of property disposal, in April 2014 the Ministry of Defence set up a “Disposal Task-Force” in coordination with Difesa Servizi S.p.a. (an in-house company of the Ministry of Defence in charge of increasing the value of the Ministry's property) and the Agency of Government Property. The controls are exercised by Supreme Audit Institution, which is an independent judiciary organ (see Answer 15). Nevertheless, as also confirmed by the Government Defence Index 2013, the result of its scrutiny is not publicly available.

COMMENTS -+

•tLegislative Decree 15 march 2010, n. 66, Code of the military system (Codice dell’ordinamento militare), available at http://www.normattiva.it/uri-res/N2Ls?urn:nir:stato:decreto-legislativo:2010-03-15;66!vig=, modified by Law 21 December 2012, n. 244, available at http://www.normattiva.it/uri-res/N2Ls?urn:nir:stato:legge:2012-12-31;244
•tInstitution of Property Disposal Task-Force within the Ministry of Defence, April 2014: http://www.difesa.it/Primo_Piano/Pagine/Immobili_Difesa_task_force.aspx
•tDifesa Servizi s.p.a. Statue: http://www.difesa.it/Content/DSspa/Documents/Statuto.pdf
•tDifesa Servizi s.p.a. Website: www.difesaservizi.it/
•tTransparency International, Government Defence Index 2013 Italy assessment

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

24.
score
4

What percentage of defence and security expenditure in the budget year is dedicated to spending on secret items relating to national security and the intelligence services?

Researcher4009: Article 553 of Legislative Decree No. 66 of 15 March 2010 establishes some expenditure in the budget year which are “of reserved nature” (“natura riservata”). The amount of the latter sum is established each year through a Ministerial Decree within the allocation of resources decided with the budget law.
The 2014 Ministry of Defence’s Provisional State of Expenses sets the amount of such expenditure (chapter line 1120) at approximately € 1.5 million, which is less than 1% of the budget allocated to the Ministry of Defence.
In spite of this information, it was not possible to find the Ministerial Decrees established by law for the years 2013 and 2014, and it is not possible to ascertain whether such sum refers also to national security and the intelligence services.

Response to Government Reviewer: Agreed. Score changed from 3 to 4 and sources added.

COMMENTS -+

Legislative Decree 15 march 2010, n. 66, Code of the military system (“Codice dell’ordinamento militare”), available at http://www.normattiva.it/uri-res/N2Ls?urn:nir:stato:decreto-legislativo:2010-03-15;66!vig=, modified by Law 21 December 2012, n. 244, available at http://www.normattiva.it/uri-res/N2Ls?urn:nir:stato:legge:2012-12-31;244
•tMinistry of Defence, 2014 Provisional State of Expenses, available at http://www.difesa.it/Content/Pagine/statoprevisionespesa2013.aspx

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The last budget law (n. 148 of December 2013) makes no reference, in the part related to the Ministry of Defence, to the intelligence services. See:
- http://www.difesa.it/Amministrazionetrasparente/bilandife/Documents/Bilancio2014/DM_106303_rip_cap.pdf
-
http://www.difesa.it/Amministrazionetrasparente/bilandife/Documents/Bilancio2014/Stralcio_L_Bil_2014.pdf.
- http://www.difesa.it/Amministrazionetrasparente/bilandife/Documents/Bilancio2014/Stralcio_All_LBil_2014.pdf.

In addition, also the 2014 Preliminary Note for the budget of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, the institution that is primarily responsible for the Intelligence System for the Security of the Republic (SISR), is silent on this aspect. See at:
- http://www.governo.it/AmministrazioneTrasparente/Bilanci/BilancioPreventivoConsultivo/BilancioPrevisione/2014/Nota_preliminare.pdf.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: Expenditure on secret items covers less than 1% of the defence yearly budget. The amount related to this cost component (chapter line 1120) is published every year in the publication &quoute;Stato di Previsione della Spesa per l'Anno Finanziario&quoute; (Estimate of Expenditure for the Budget Year), available on the Italian defence website. Expenditure on secret items is provided for by a law contained in the &quoute;Code of Military Regulations&quoute; (Art. 553 of Legislative Decree No. 66 of 15 March 2010). The Ministerial Decree of 4 January 2013 regulates the recording and reporting methods for expenditure on secret items. Proposed rating: 4.

Suggested score: 4

Government Reviewer-+

25.
score
1

Is the legislature (or the appropriate legislative committee or members of the legislature) given full information for the budget year on the spending of all secret items relating to national security and military intelligence?

Researcher4009: The public documents of the Parliament’s Defence Committees and of the Parliamentary Committee for the Security of the Republic do not report any information related to the spending of all secret items relating to national security and military intelligence. Attempts to gain interviews were not successful.

According to the International Budget Partnership report on Italy in 2009, &quoute;the legislature is provided information on spending on secret items, but some details are excluded, or some categories are
presented in an aggregated manner, or the legislature is provided no information on secret items&quoute;.

Response to Government Reviewer: Agreed. Score changed from n/a to 1.

COMMENTS -+

•tOverview of the Parliament activity in relation to Defence and Armed Forces: http://www.camera.it/leg17/292?area=13
•tInstitutional Website of the Parliamentary Committee for the Security of the Republic , including current composition and activities (as from 15 March 2013) http://www.parlamento.it/leg/17/BGT/Schede/Bicamerali/v3/4-00065.htm
•tInternational Budget Partnership, OPEN BUDGET QUESTIONNAIRE, Italy 2009,
http://internationalbudget.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/Italy-OBI2010QuestionnaireFinal.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Art. 4 of Law n. 244 of December (http://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/2013/01/16/13G00013/sg) grants the Parliament a more significant role in controlling the government in its budget allocations for the whole defence sector. However, as showed in the “Simplified Budget” document for the years 2014-2016, the information given to the Parliament at an aggregate and general level, with no breakdown of data for secret items related to the intelligence services.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: The Parliamentary Committee for the Security of the Republic (COPASIR) is a body of the Italian Parliament. It exercises control over the secret services and systematically and continuously monitors all national security activities.

Suggested score: 3

Government Reviewer-+

26.
score
1

Are audit reports of the annual accounts of the security sector (the military, police, and intelligence services) and other secret programs provided to the legislature (or relevant committee) and are they subsequently subject to parliamentary debate?

Researcher4009: According to the International Budget Partnership's 2012 report on Italy, which cites comments received from the Supreme Audit Institution, “audits reports on security sectors are provided to the legislature” while “other secret programs (like secret service) are not audited.”
As for the parliamentary debate, the public documents of the Parliament’s Defence Committees and of the Parliamentary Committee for the Security of the Republic do not report any information related to audit reports concerning secret items.

Response to Government Reviewer included in answer above. Score maintained.

COMMENTS -+

•tInternational Budget Partnership, Open Budget Questionnaire 2012 on Italy, p. 148, available at http://internationalbudget.org/wp-content/uploads/Italy_Questionnaire_OBS2012.pdf
•tTransparency International, Government Defence Index 2013 Italy assessment
•tOverview of the Parliament activity in relation to Defence and Armed Forces: http://www.camera.it/leg17/292?area=13
•tInstitutional Website of the Parliamentary Committee for the Security of the Republic , including current composition and activities (as from 15 March 2013) http://www.parlamento.it/leg/17/BGT/Schede/Bicamerali/v3/4-00065.htm

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: Same as Question 25.

Suggested score: 3

Government Reviewer-+

27.
score
N/A

Off-budget military expenditures are those that are not formally authorised within a country's official defence budget, often considered to operate through the 'back-door'. In law, are off-budget military expenditures permitted, and if so, are they exceptional occurrences that are well-controlled?

Researcher4009: In law, off-budget expenditure by all branches of the Italian Public Administration have been abolished by Law n. 559 of 23 December 1993.

COMMENTS -+

•tLaw n. 559 of 23 December 1993, available at http://www.normattiva.it/uri-res/N2Ls?urn:nir:stato:legge:1993-12-23;559~

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: The off-balance funds managed by the MoD are not comparable with ones managed by other ministries such as the social sector or the health ministries.
The information available is too scarce to ascertain a correct evaluation.

Suggested score: N/A

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Although their existence is likely, there is no available record of off-budget expenditures, defence sector included. The issue is characterised by a complete degree of opacity.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: Off-budget expenditures are not allowed by the Italian law. Law No. 559 of 23 December 1993 abolished off-budget management for public Administrations.

Suggested score: N/A

Government Reviewer-+

28.
score
N/A

In practice, are there any off-budget military expenditures? If so, does evidence suggest this involves illicit economic activity?

Researcher4009: Off-budget expenditure by all branches of the Italian Public Administration have been abolished by Law n. 559 of 23 December 1993. In practice, there is no evidence of off-budget expenditure by the Ministry of Defence.

Response to Peer and Chapter Reviewer: Agreed. Score changed from to n/a and sources added.

COMMENTS -+

•tLaw n. 559 of 23 December 1993, available at http://www.normattiva.it/uri-res/N2Ls?urn:nir:stato:legge:1993-12-23;559~

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: There is no evidence of off-budget expenditures by the MoD

Suggested score: N/A

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: Same as Question 27.

Suggested score: N/A

Government Reviewer-+

29.
score
2

In law, are there provisions regulating mechanisms for classifying information on the grounds of protecting national security, and, if so, are they subject to effective scrutiny?

Researcher4009: The procedure to classify information on the grounds of protecting national security is established in the Decree of the President of the Council of Minister 8 April 2008, which states that such decision is a prerogative of the Prime Minister, who may classify an information “autonomously or upon request of the competent administration through the Director General of the Intelligence Department”. The latter Decree does not provide for any scrutiny mechanism and the same holds true for Law 3 August 2007, n. 124 which, although instituting a Parliamentary Committee for the Security of the Republic (Comitato parlamentare per la sicurezza della Repubblica) with some powers of scrutiny, did not grant it any prerogative over the process of classifying information on the grounds of protecting national security.

Response to peer Reviewer: Agreed. Score changed from n/a to 2 and sources added.

COMMENTS -+

•tLaw of Reform of Intelligence Services: Law 3 August 2007, n. 124 (in English) https://www.sicurezzanazionale.gov.it/sisr.nsf/english/law-no-124-2007.html
•tDecree of the President of the Council of Minister 8 April 2008 http://www.vigilfuoco.it/aspx/ReturnDocument.aspx?IdDocumento=2836

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: Some classification of information, as for NATO's scorecard, exist, but there is not a comprehensive and effective national law regulations

Suggested score: 2

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Just to add on the assessor's comments: the fact that the Prime Minister may autonomously and arbitrarily classify information engenders a considerable political risk. This is especially true when, as in Italy, policies against conflict of interests of high level public officials are not properly enforced. See GRECO evaluation's of the matter: http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/round2/GrecoRC1&2%282011%291_Italy_EN.pdf

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The right to classify information (&quoute;segreto di Stato&quoute;) is an act granted exclusively to the Prime Minister. See also: https://www.sicurezzanazionale.gov.it/sisr.nsf/cosa-facciamo/tutela-delle-informazioni/segreto-di-stato.html.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: Mechanisms for classifying information on the grounds of protecting national security refer to other national institutions.

Suggested score: N/A

Government Reviewer-+

30.
score
3

Do national defence and security institutions have beneficial ownership of commercial businesses? If so, how transparent are details of the operations and finances of such businesses?

The Budget Law 2010 established an in-house company within the Ministry of Defence called “Difesa Servizi s.p.a.”, whose object is the “economic management, as dealer or agent, of the goods (also immaterial) and services related to the institutional activity of the Ministry, which do not concern the operational activity of the Armed Forces” (Article 4 of Difesa Servizi s.p.a.'s Statue). Its tasks also concern real estate properties, which nevertheless cannot be sold by Difesa Servizi s.p.a. The website of the company yearly reports the balance sheets as well as the ongoing tender competitions. It also has a section dedicated to transparency (Amministrazione Transparente). In light of these information the overall level of transparency over the operations and finances can be regarded satisfactory.

Difesa Servizi S.p.a is subject to the auditing requirements provided for by Law for any company of its type, as well as scrutinised by a magistrate of the Supreme Audit Institution (currently Counsellor Claudio Galtieri), who participates in the meeting of the Board of Administrators and the Board of Auditors (Article 26 of Difesa Servizi s.p.a.’s Statute). In 2011 some members of the Defence Committee of the Senate raised concerns about the opacity of its governance. The public disclosure of information on its website has in part addressed the latter issue and improved the overall possibility of scrutinising all the Difesa Servizi s.p.a.’s activities.

COMMENTS -+

•tLaw 23 December 2009, n. 191 (Budget Law 2010), available at http://www.normattiva.it/uri-res/N2Ls?urn:nir:stato:legge:2009-12-23;191.
•tDifesa Servizi s.p.a.’s website: http://www.difesaservizi.it/.
•tDifesa Servizi s.p.a. Statue: http://www.difesa.it/Content/DSspa/Documents/Statuto.pdf
•tDifesa Servizi s.p.a. Balance Sheets of years 2011, 2012, and 2013: http://www.difesaservizi.it/it/bilanci
•tDifesa Servizi s.p.a.’s ‘Transparency Section': http://www.difesaservizi.it/it/amministrazionetrasparente.
•tService Contract between the Ministry of Defence and Difesa Servizi s.p.a.: http://www.difesa.it/Content/DSspa/Documents/Contratto_di_Servizio.pdf
•tTransparency International, Government Defence Index 2013

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The level of disclosure of financial economical performance by the GoGo is comparable to other European countries; some activities are performed as legal separate companies (usually Ltd. equivalent structures the &quoute;SRL&quoute; and immediately this attracts the full applicability of several provisions including separate audit & compliance committees with fully staffed Board of Directors)

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The answer to this question shall be positive as &quoute;Difesa Servizi SpA&quoute; proves to be a properly organised and, overall, transparent enterprise.
In addition, in order to avoid confusion or misunderstandings, it is worth stressing the existence of &quoute;Marina Militare Sportswear&quoute; which is, in fact, a brand of a different and totally independent company. See: http://www.marinamilitare-sportswear.com/ist_footer.asp?ln=_ita&idlink=1.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

31.
score
2

Are military-owned businesses subject to transparent independent scrutiny at a recognised international standard?

Difesa Servizi S.p.a. (the MoD's in-house company, see also question no. 30) is subject to the auditing requirements provided for by Law for any company of its type, as well as scrutinised by a magistrate of the Supreme Audit Institution (currently Counsellor Claudio Galtieri), who participates in the meeting of the Board of Administrators and the Board of Auditors (Article 26 of Difesa Servizi s.p.a.’s Statute). In 2011 some members of the Defence Committee of the Senate raised concerns about the opacity of its governance. The public disclosure of information on its website has in part addressed the latter issue and improved the overall possibility of scrutinising all the Difesa Servizi s.p.a.’s activities.

COMMENTS -+

•tDifesa Servizi s.p.a. Statue: http://www.difesa.it/Content/DSspa/Documents/Statuto.pdf
•tDifesa Servizi s.p.a. Balance Sheets of years 2011, 2012 and 2013: http://www.difesaservizi.it/it/bilanci
•tDifesa Servizi s.p.a.’s website: http://www.difesaservizi.it/
•tDifesa Servizi s.p.a.’s ‘Transparency Section': http://www.difesaservizi.it/it/amministrazionetrasparente.
•tReport of the Parliamentary Debate of June 7 2011 between the Senate Defence Committee and the (then) Vice Minister of the Defence, Cossiga: http://www.ilnuovogiornaledeimilitari.it/categorie/prima-pagina/938/difesa-servizi-spa:-risponde-il-sottosegretario-cossiga-_leggi-tutto_
•tTransparency International, Government Defence Index 2013

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

32.
score
2

Is there evidence of unauthorised private enterprise by military or other defence ministry employees? If so, what is the government's reaction to such enterprise?

There is some judicial or media evidence of the military or other defence ministry employees participating in unauthorised private enterprise. Recently, some examples were provided by a member of the Chamber of Deputies (Mr. Mauro Pili), who on 23/10/2014 presented a written point of order in the Parliament to the Ministry of Defence on the matter.
There is no evidence of defence of military employees being sanctioned for unauthorized private enterprises. This may be due to the fact that there is no specific criminal provision addressing illegal private enterprises. Hence, sanctions are provided for by the provisions of the Italian Criminal Code dealing with offences against the Public Administration in general (Articles 314 and ff.)

COMMENTS -+

•tWritten point of order present by Chamber of Deputy Member Mr. Mauro Pili to the Ministry of Defence on 23/10/2014: http://banchedati.camera.it/sindacatoispettivo_17/showXhtml.Asp?idAtto=26117&stile=7&highLight=1&paroleContenute=%27INTERROGAZIONE+A+RISPOSTA+SCRITTA%27+|+%27CAMERA%27
•tItalian Criminal Code: http://www.altalex.com/?idnot=36653
•tTransparency International, Government Defence Index 2013

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Some participation could surface under the presence of relatives in minor legal entities providing goods and services to the MoD, but the new set of regulations as per Law 231/2001 and Law 190/2012 heavily condemn any and whatever conflict of interest in bidding for specific contracts with the Public Sector if not declared in full.

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: There is evidence of high-level military officials being involved illegally in the arms industry. Parliamentary Deputy Mauro Pili has recently brought to the attention of the Parliament several episodes related to the matter. Yet, the issue is not yet openly discussed in media. Source: http://www.ilnuovogiornaledeimilitari.it/categorie/prima-pagina/4863/vertici-militari-nelle-industrie-che-vendono-armi-all_esercito-_leggi_

Suggested score: 2

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: Italy's defence and security forces, the intelligence services in particular, have a long, at times obscure, history of improper relations with unauthorised private enterprises, especially secret associations. The darkest page is by far constituted by the masonic group &quoute;P2&quoute;, a secret organisation that in 1970s was plotting for a subversive, anti-democratic political change in Italy. The lodge was acting as a political and logistic bridge for different types of people, particularly from the far-right, the intelligence services and the mafia. The discovery in 1981 of the lodge and the list of its approximately 1,000 affiliates produced one of the greatest political scandals of the whole Italian republic. Among its members there were over 50 top officials of the armed forces and a vast majority of the high-level officials of the secret services. The lodge was declared illegal with an ad hoc law in January 1982 (http://www.normattiva.it/uri-res/N2Ls?urn:nir:stato:legge:1982;17!vig=).
For a summary of the history of the P2 scandal see, for instance: http://archiviostorico.corriere.it/1994/aprile/18/mistero_perdoni_condanne_co_0_940418467.shtml.
The long shadow of the P2 scandal, however, seems to endure. As it has recently been reported, a former chief of the Carabinieri, Gen. Mario Mori, now under trial for the &quoute;trattativa Stato-mafia&quoute; that allegedly took place in the 1990s, was in the 1970s one of the closest collaborators of a top military official involved in the P2 scandal. The accusation is that Gen. Mori had a role, unknown as yet, in that secret organisation (http://www.antimafiaduemila.com/2014091651291/primo-piano/trattativa-lombra-della-p2-dietro-mario-mori.html).
The main issue is that, up to now, all Italian governments have acted in a quite controversial way, officially blaming the organisation and their members for conspiracy and illicit association, but in reality leaving most of the activity to the judiciary and, thus, to the opacity of bureaucratic procedures. Many grey areas still persist, including classified information.

Suggested score: 2

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Policies & codes 90
34.
score
2

Do the Defence Ministry, Defence Minister, Chiefs of Defence, and Single Service Chiefs publicly commit - through, for example, speeches, media interviews, or political mandates - to anti-corruption and integrity measures?

On the one hand the Ministry of Defence committed to anti-corruption and integrity measures through the Triennial Anti-Corruption Plan adopted in January 2014 and the appointment of the Anti-Corruption Supervisor on 14 March 2014, who released its first Report on 31 December 2014.
On the other hand neither NGO sources, nor media articles give evidence of speeches or interviews of Ministers and high-officials officially explicitly committing against corruption or fostering transparency within the defence and security sector. One could only find a statement of 2007, when the then Minister Arturo Parisi expressed his satisfaction for a successful operation of the Carabinieri for a case of fraud to the European Union’s interests.

COMMENTS -+

•tFormer Minister of Defence Arturo Parisiìs statement of 2007 against corruption, available on the Ministry of Defence website: http://www.difesa.it/Ministro/Compiti_e_Attivita/Comunicati38/2007-04/Pagine/Compiacimento_del_Ministro_Paris_1721Europea.aspx
•tDecree of the Ministry of Defence of 14 March 2014, available at www.difesa.it/Amministrazionetrasparente/bilandife/Documents/Anti_Corr/decr_nomina_RPC_RTI.pdf
•tReport of the Ministry of Defence’s Anti-Corruption Officer of 31 December 2014: http://www.difesa.it/Amministrazionetrasparente/bilandife/Pagine/RelazionedelResponsabiledellaprevenzionedellacorruzione.aspx

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: The Under Secretary of Defence, Mrs. Roberta Pinotti, made a public commitment during a long interview on a national TV channel:
http://www.la7.it/le-invasioni-barbariche/video/lintervista-al-ministro-della-difesa-roberta-pinotti-20-03-2014-128635

Suggested score: 2

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: It is a straightforward, but in practice deeply controversial question. The anti-corruption record of current and former Ministers of Defence and senior defence and military officials on this topic is one of embarassing silence. No public speech or declaration is available. As a case in point, in February 2013 a great corruption scandal hit the leadership of Finmeccanica (a leading Italian company in weaponry and military technology), with the detention of then-President and CEO of the group, Mr. Giuseppe Orsi (see http://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/notizie/2013-02-12/tangenti-elicotteri-india-arrestato-073210.shtml?uuid=AbiWtYTH). However, there is no evidence of a public declaration of then-Minister of Defence, Admiral Giampaolo di Paola, condemning this fact. What is more, in Janaury 2014 the same Adm. di Paola has been nominated as external consultant of the Finmeccaninca group, thus reinforcing the speculations about the existence of a tacit &quoute;silent pact&quoute; regarding corruption cases in the defence sector.
However, the attitude of current Minister of Defence, Mrs. Roberta Pinotti, should be positively taken into account, for at least two reasons. First, in January 2013, before she was appointed as a Minister, she signed anti-corruption, pro-transparency petition (&quoute;politicians against corruption&quoute;) promoted by two renowned anti-mafia associations (http://www.iodonna.it/attualita/primo-piano/2013/campagna-digitale-riparte-il-futuro-401232713489.shtml). Second, the guidelines of the &quoute;White Paper for International Security and Defence&quoute;, an unprecedented attempt to streamline the country's defence and military sector, contain several references to a better, more functional and rational use of the resources, also by calling for a higher role of the legislative and the judiciary in the control of the expenditures. Put it differently, this can be considered as a sort of indirect anti-corrution attitude the new, current Minister is pursuing. The real consequences of all this is, of course, all but certain.
To sum up, the overall record is negative; but it seems there is evidence of some, though still little, improvement.

Suggested score: 1

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: In compliance with Art. 10 of Legislative Decree No. 33/2013, the Ministry of Defence has adopted a three-year Programme for transparency and integrity in order to ensure an adequate level of transparency, in accordance with the guidelines established by the National Anti-Corruption Authority (Art. 11 of Legislative Decree No. 150/2009), as well as to promote legality and the development of a culture of integrity.
- On 29/1/2014, the Minister of Defence approved the three-year Corruption Prevention Plan 2013-2016, which provides a strategic framework for planning activities and measures aimed at preventing and countering corruption within the Ministry. The main goals of the Plan are to reduce corruption opportunities, to create conditions unfavourable to corruption and to discipline behaviour according to the different risk areas. The Plan also indicates the actors involved in the prevention, the areas with the highest risk of corruption, the measures identified, the possibility to assess the Plan’s effectiveness, and – in cooperation with the National Administration School – details about specific training courses. Therefore, approval of the three-year Plan is an important step towards implementing corruption prevention policies in strategic areas of the Defence Administration.
- On 31/12/2013, corruption prevention measures were approved within the Ministry.
- On 7/3/2014, a Head of corruption prevention was appointed within the Ministry of Defence, with specific duties concerning ministerial transparency.
- On 26/3/2014, the circular for attendance of anti-corruption courses was approved, in accordance with the indications of the three-year anti-corruption Plan.
- Decision 1/2014 of the Head of corruption prevention of the Defence Ministry.
- An annual report on corruption prevention will be published in December 2014.
- The Defence website difesa.it is updated in compliance with the laws on transparency.

Suggested score: 2

Government Reviewer-+

35.
score
3

Are there effective measures in place for personnel found to have taken part in forms of bribery and corruption, and is there public evidence that these measures are being carried out?

No anti-bribery measures are contained in the Peacetime Military Criminal Code (the other criminal provisions in the realm of “public resources” can be found in articles 230 ff. of the Code). Therefore, the ordinary Criminal Code provisions against corruption (and its sanctions) apply (see Articles 318 ff.). Furthermore, according to the Ministry of Defence’s “Technical Handbook for disciplinary measures and procedures” of 2008, disciplinary measures can be enforced pursuant to Law 97/2001, which regulates the relationship between criminal and disciplinary proceedings, and the effects of criminal sanctions on public officials.
Against this regulatory background, the report of the Ministry of Defence’s Anti-Corruption Officer of 31 December 2014) gives evidence that measures have been also carried out towards the personnel (see point no. 12 of the report). However, although the report concerns the whole MoD, it provides specific figures only with respect to the Civilian Personnel Department (“Personale Civile” or “Persociv”). Hence, one can doubt whether such sanctions are applied consistently throughout the MoD’s Departments.

COMMENTS -+

•tThe Peacetime Military Criminal Code http://www.difesa.it/Giustizia_Militare/Legislazione/PeacetimeMilitarycriminalcodes/Pagine/default.aspx.
•tMinistry of Defence, Technical Handbook for disciplinary measures and procedures, 2008, available at http://www.difesa.it/Segretario-SGD-DNA/DG/PERSOMIL/Documents/48577_Guida_t_Mbpdf.pdf.
•tLaw 27 March 2001, n. 97 “Norme sul rapporto tra procedimento penale e procedimento disciplinare ed effetti del giudicato penale nei confronti dei dipendenti delle amministrazioni pubbliche”, available at http://www.normattiva.it/uri-res/N2Ls?urn:nir:stato:legge:2001-03-27;97
•tReport of the Ministry of Defence’s Anti-Corruption Officer of 31 December 2014: http://www.difesa.it/Amministrazionetrasparente/bilandife/Pagine/RelazionedelResponsabiledellaprevenzionedellacorruzione.aspx

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: scandalo MARo? è considerato un caso mondiale ....
per mancanza di consistency metterei 2, ma FUSCO varrebbe un &quoute;4&quoute;...

Suggested score: 2

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The Quality of Government Institute of Gotenburg University has produced a study providing data on perceived corruption levels of the police forces across several EU Regions. The dataset provides further evidence of a (perceived) lack of effectiveness of anti-corruption measures in this sector. Source: http://www.qog.pol.gu.se/digitalAssets/1358/1358344_final-report---parts-1-3.pdf

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: In January 2014 the Ministry of defence published, for the first time, a &quoute;Code of Conduct for the Employees of the Ministry of Defence&quoute;. The document sets down a collection of duties and prohibitions with the aim &quoute;to ensure the quality of services and the prevention of corruption phenomena, representing one of the instruments of the Triennial Plan for the Prevention of Corruption.&quoute; (art. 1). Among other provisions: the impossibility for the employee to ask or to accept gifts (art. 3); the need to communicate his/her participation to private associations or organisations (art. 4) or situations creating potential conflicts of interests (art. 5); his/her &quoute;aware and continuous participation to the process of corruption risk management&quoute; (art. 7.1). The document concludes by making clear that: &quoute;The Manager or the Chief of the Office, as soon as he/she comes across an event that potentially violates the obligations of the Code, starts immediately, according to the applicable disciplinary rules for the type of employee, a disciplinary procedure.&quoute; (art. 22.1).
The document, however, does not clarify what is an &quoute;employee of the Ministry of Defence&quoute; by making no difference between civil and military officials. Therefore, one could be allow to assume that it applies to both groups. As for its effectiveness, there is no evidence that it provisions have been applied as yet.
See: http://www.difesa.it/SGD-DNA/Staff/DG/PERSOCIV/Documents/CodiceComportamento/Cod_Comp_Finale.pdf.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

36.
score
2

Is whistleblowing encouraged by the government, and are whistle-blowers in military and defence ministries afforded adequate protection from reprisal for reporting evidence of corruption, in both law and practice?

Pursuant to Article 1(51) of Law n. 190 of 2012, whistleblowers are granted some protection in case they highlight illicit conduct experienced during their work.
The Triennial Anti-Corruption Plan of the Ministry of Defence 2013-2016, in its paragraph II (2)(3)(8), gives evidence of a specific mechanism set up within the Ministry of Defence (a whistle-blowing form annexed to the plan and a special email address), and of a general commitment to train and make the personnel aware of the rights and obligation linked to the reporting of illicit activities.
The report of the Ministry of Defence’s Anti-Corruption Officer released on 31 December 2014 confirms the latter information (see point 10 of the report) and states that no discrimination took place towards whistleblowers; however, the lack of information concerning figures and the ranking of the actual whistleblowers raise some doubts over the effective implementation of the MoD’s whistleblowing policy.

COMMENTS -+

•tTriennial Anti-Corruption Plan of the Ministry of Defence 2013-2016 of 29 January 2014, available at http://www.difesa.it/Amministrazionetrasparente/bilandife/Documents/Anti_Corr/PTPC_2013_16.pdf
•tLaw n. 190 of 6 November 2012, available at http://www.normattiva.it/uri-res/N2Ls?urn:nir:stato:legge:2012-11-06;190
•tReport of the Ministry of Defence’s Anti-Corruption Officer of 31 December 2014: http://www.difesa.it/Amministrazionetrasparente/bilandife/Pagine/RelazionedelResponsabiledellaprevenzionedellacorruzione.aspx

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Civil society is starting an advocacy campaign to encourage more effective whistleblowing support policies and infrastructures. See the Riparte il Futuro initiative: http://www.riparteilfuturo.it/

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The &quoute;Behavioural Code of the Employees of the Ministry of Defence&quoute;, which defines itself as &quoute;one of the instruments&quoute; for the implementation the Triennial Plan for the Prevention of Corruption, makes in fact no reference to whistleblowing.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: In public speeches and interviews, the Chief of Defence Staff always points out that service men and women are expected to behave exemplarily in all situations. The 2013 Communication Programme also includes transparency-related issues.

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

37.
score
1

Is special attention paid to the selection, time in post, and oversight of personnel in sensitive positions, including officials and personnel in defence procurement, contracting, financial management, and commercial management?

Researcher4009: The Ministry of Defence’s website has a section where competitions are published, including the detailed requirements which change for each position. Nevertheless, there is no legislative evidence that special attention is paid to personnel in sensitive positions.

COMMENTS -+

•tMinistry of Defence’s website on open competitions for recruitment: https://concorsi.difesa.it/default.aspx
•tA Vannucci, “L’evoluzione della corruzione in Italia: evidenza empirica, fattori facilitanti, politiche di contrasto”, 2010, available at http://www.uilpadirigentiministeriali.com/Documentazione/Articoli,%20interventi,%20contributi/2010/settembre%202010/8-9-2010/Alberto%20VANNUCCI%20-%20L_evoluzione%20della%20corruz.pdf
•tTransparency International, Government Defence Index 2013

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: There is a &quoute;gardening leave&quoute; of three years for the former Ministry heads before joining corporations active in tenders towards the Public Sector. This is enforced, but any advisor/consultant role is easily hidden.

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: In December 2013 the Parliament approved a law delegating the government (&quoute;legge delega&quoute; as foreseen by art. 76 of the Constitution) to legislate for the re-arrangement of the careers of the armed forces and police personnel. The law establishes a twelve months period to issue the decree, but it has not been passed yet.
See: http://www.forzearmate.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/bozza-riordino-carriere-Circolare09gen2014.pdf.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

38.
score
4

Is the number of civilian and military personnel accurately known and publicly available?

The precise number of civilian and military personnel is yearly published in the Additional Note to the Provisional State of Expenses (Nota Aggiuntiva allo Stato di Previsione per la Difesa) which lists in detail the components of each branch of the Ministry, either civilian or military.

COMMENTS -+

•tMinistry of Defence, 2013 Additional Note to the Provisional State of Expenses, available at http://www.difesa.it/Content/Pagine/Notaaggiuntiva.aspx

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

39.
score
3

Are pay rates and allowances for civilian and military personnel openly published?

The Ministry of the Defence’s website section dedicated to “Transparent Administration” publishes the pay rate of the high ranking personnel even though, as of September 2014, some information is missing in relation to some branches of the Ministry. The most exhaustive information is provided in relation to the high ranking civilian employees because for each of them is provided the exact pay rate as well as the allowances. For a more general overview of the aggregated amount of expenses allocated for the personal, one could refer to the budget-related documents such as the Multiyear Plan for the Defence 2014-2016.

COMMENTS -+

•tMinistry of Defence, Pay rates for high ranking personnel : http://www.difesa.it/Amministrazionetrasparente/Pagine/Dirigenti.aspx
• Ministry of Defence, Pay rates and allowances for higher civilian personnel (last update: June 2014): http://www.difesa.it/Amministrazionetrasparente/persociv/civile/Documents/tabella_retribuzione_dirigenti.pdf
•tMinistry of Defence, 2014 Multiyear Plan for the Defence 2014-2016, available at http://www.difesa.it/Content/Documents/nota_aggiuntiva/01_DPP_2014_2016.pdf.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Partial information about allowances for civilian and military personnel is found here: http://www.difesa.it/Amministrazionetrasparente/persociv/Pagine/Sovvenzionicontributisussidivantaggieconomici.aspx

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

40.
score
3

Do personnel receive the correct pay on time, and is the system of payment well-established, routine, and published?

Researcher4009: No public denounce has been publicly made in recent times by the media or by the labour unions of the Ministry of Defence’s workers about problems in receiving the correct pay on time. If one couples the outcome of the latter research with the results of the Government Index 2013, one can confidently come to the conclusion that the current system of payment of the personnel does not represent a significantly problematic issue.

COMMENTS -+

•tWebsite of “Civil Defence Personnel Labour Union”: http://flpdifesa.org/
•tWebsite of “Grassroots Labour Union” for Ministry of Defence’s personnel: http://difesa.usb.it/
•tTransparency International, Government Defence Index 2013: http://government.defenceindex.org/sites/default/files/documents/GI-assessment-Italy.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: Personnel receive the correct pay on time. The payment system is well-established, routine, and published, and basic pay is non-discretionary.

Suggested score: 4

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: The salary payment issue seems to reflect a typical trend of all today's public administrations, particularly in a country like Italy with a high government debt (according to Moody's in 2014 it will be more than 130% of GDP, http://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2014/08/11/crescita-moodys-taglia-le-stime-per-litalia-questanno-pil-in-calo-dello-01/1088213/) and the requirement to fulfill the provisions for a &quoute;balanced budget deficit&quoute; contained in the 2012 European Fiscal Compact Treaty. As a matter of fact, this summer salaries were blocked but it seems the regular payment has been re-established.
- http://donnemanagerdinapoli.com/2014/07/23/sblocco-dello-stipendio-per-gli-uomini-e-le-donne-delle-forze-armate-e-di-polizia-oggi-la-verita/.
- http://flpdifesa.org/2014/06/chiusa-la-trattativa-nazionale-sul-fua-2014-quota-fus-piu-alta-rispetto-alle-previsioni/.
As for civil members of the Ministry of Defence, their online payroll service is now centralised by a new website provided by the Ministry of Economics and Finance (http://www.difesa.it/SGD-DNA/Staff/DG/PERSOCIV/Pagine/PortaleStipendiPA.aspx).

Suggested score: 2

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

41.
score
2

Is there an established, independent, transparent, and objective appointment system for the selection of military personnel at middle and top management level?

The appointment system for the selection of military personnel at middle and top management level is established by law (Legislative Decree 15 march 2010, n. 66), which gives evidence of an established system for the appointment of military personnel. The Ministry of Defence’s website has sections dedicated to the curricula of all high-ranking officials and to the competitions for high level civilian personnel, including the detailed requirements for each position.
However, the latter sections are not exhaustive in relation to some branches of the Ministry, and more generally, there is no evidence which proves the existence of a transparent appointment system such as meeting minutes or reports. Furthermore, the report of the Ministry of Defence’s Anti-Corruption Officer released on 31 December 2014 (see point 4.B.1. of the report) states that information obligations concerning high-level officials pursuant to Article 15 of Legislative Decree no. 33 of 14 March 2013 (including the publishing of the act of appointment) were not fulfilled by the MoD in 2014. One can thus conclude that there is some degree of risk that appointments take place in a discretionary manner and that the system may not be adhered to in practice.

COMMENTS -+

•tLegislative Decree 15 march 2010, n. 66, Code of the military system (Codice dell’ordinamento militare), available at http://www.normattiva.it/uri-res/N2Ls?urn:nir:stato:decreto-legislativo:2010-03-15;66!vig=, modified by Law 21 December 2012, n. 244, available at http://www.normattiva.it/uri-res/N2Ls?urn:nir:stato:legge:2012-12-31;244.
•tMinistry of Defence’s website on open competitions for high level civil personnel: http://www.difesa.it/SGD-DNA/Staff/DG/PERSOCIV/Dirigenza/Pagine/PostiVacanti.aspx
•tMinistry of Defence, Curricula of high-ranking civilian personnel (last update: June 2014): http://www.difesa.it/Amministrazionetrasparente/persociv/civile/Pagine/CVdirigenti.aspx
•tReport of the Ministry of Defence’s Anti-Corruption Officer of 31 December 2014: http://www.difesa.it/Amministrazionetrasparente/bilandife/Pagine/RelazionedelResponsabiledellaprevenzionedellacorruzione.aspx
•tLegislative Decree no. 33 of 14 March 2013: http://www.normattiva.it/uri-res/N2Ls?urn:nir:stato:decreto.legislativo:2013-03-14;33

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: Legislative Decree No. 66 of 15 March 2010, Code of the Military Organization (COM), and Presidential Decree No. 90 of 15 March 2010, Military Organization Consolidation Act (TUOM), have rearranged the primary and secondary legislation pertaining to military personnel. According to such provisions, the promotions of high-ranking managers (Lieutenant Generals and corresponding ranks) and the assignments of high offices are based on a complex system of evaluation and promotion that guarantees a series of cross-checks at different institutional levels, both internal and external to the Defence. The highest officers' rank is assigned by an ad-hoc Top Level Committee, chaired by the Chief of Defence Staff (Article 1036 COM). However, this not only requires that the rankings are approved by the Ministry of Defence, in the same manner as all other promotions, but also needs the prior sanction of the Council of Ministers and to be formalized by Presidential Decree. The provisions issued are submitted to the State General Accounting Office and the Court of Auditors for endorsement. The latter bodies examine the provisions both from the accounting point of view and in terms of legitimacy. In addition, in Italy, the terms and timeline of administrative activities are governed by Law 241/1990 on Administrative Procedure, and the parties involved can appeal through the hierarchical or jurisdictional channels (including administrative courts such as Regional Administrative Courts and the State Council), as well as through an extraordinary appeal to the President of the Republic. This complex and multifaceted system works also retroactively to protect the choices made in this area. At the core of the whole system lies a sophisticated procedure for drafting efficiency reports and standardized promotions, which in general applies to all ranks, as established by current regulations and regulated in detail by the relevant bodies.

Suggested score: 3

Government Reviewer-+

42.
score
2

Are personnel promoted through an objective, meritocratic process? Such a process would include promotion boards outside of the command chain, strong formal appraisal processes, and independent oversight.

The promotion system for the military personnel is established by law (Legislative Decree 15 march 2010, n. 66), which indicates the existence of formal processes, boards and oversight of the promotions process.
However, the law does not give evidence of independent, transparent and objective scrutiny, and this is confirmed by the report of the Ministry of Defence’s Anti-Corruption Officer of 31 December 2014 (see point no. 12.E.1 of the report), which states that in 2014 there have been criminal proceedings in relation to the “appointment and promotion of personnel” (no exact number of this kind of proceedings is provided although requested by the questionnaire).
On top of this, one can notice a low degree of publicity concerning promotions. Although the Ministry of Defence’s website has a section with open competitions for promotion of military personnel, including the detailed requirements for each position, similar sections could not be found in relation to other branches of the Ministry.
In conclusion, as also confirmed by a peer reviewer of the 2013 Government Defence Index, there is some potential for corrupt or inappropriate behaviour in the promotions processes.

COMMENTS -+

•tMinistry of Defence’s website on open competitions for military personnel promotions: http://www.difesa.it/SGD-DNA/Staff/DG/PERSOMIL/ConcorsiAvanzamto/Pagine/default.aspx
•tTransparency International, Government Defence Index 2013 assessment
Legislative Decree 15 march 2010, n. 66, Code of the military system (Codice dell’ordinamento militare), available at http://www.normattiva.it/uri-res/N2Ls?urn:nir:stato:decreto-legislativo:2010-03-15;66!vig=, modified by Law 21 December 2012, n. 244, available at http://www.normattiva.it/uri-res/N2Ls?urn:nir:stato:legge:2012-12-31;244.
•tReport of the Ministry of Defence’s Anti-Corruption Officer of 31 December 2014: http://www.difesa.it/Amministrazionetrasparente/bilandife/Pagine/RelazionedelResponsabiledellaprevenzionedellacorruzione.aspx

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: In December 2013 the Parliament approved a law delegating the government (&quoute;legge delega&quoute; as foreseen by art. 76 of the Constitution) to legislate for the re-arrangement of the careers of the armed forces and police personnel. The law establishes a twelve months period to issue the decree, but it has not been passed yet.
See: http://www.forzearmate.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/bozza-riordino-carriere-Circolare09gen2014.pdf.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: Articles 1021 to 1029 of Legislative Decree 15 March 2010, Code of Military Organization (COM), list the documentation that has to be created for military personnel in order to fulfil the obligations under said Code in the matter of recruitment, training, promotion, employment and service, and management. Personnel are evaluated periodically, whenever there is a change of assignment either for the person evaluated or for the compiler. If the person evaluated occupies a command post, the evaluation is carried out also when the first reviewer changes. Beside the main compiler and the first reviewer, a second reviewer is also in charge of drawing up and summarising the efficiency report following the chain of command. The efficiency reports have to be drawn up using the appropriate forms and respecting the criteria set out by the General Directorate of Military Personnel. This General Directorate is unconnected to the normal chain of command. On receipt of the efficiency reports, the General Directorate checks them and often sends them back to the compilers, if any inconsistency between the synthetic part and the analytical assessment is found. The efficiency report and regimental sheet are also checked by the person concerned. When he/she is included in the advance party, he/she has to state that said documents are complete. Articles 1030 to 1033 of COM govern the terms of promotion of military personnel applied by the special Boards set up in compliance with Articles 1034 and 1035. The composition of said Promotion Boards is provided for by the COM and differs by type of rank. These Boards provide assessments on officers’ promotions by seniority or choice. The standardised promotion of Officers foresees a minimum stay in ranks and the fulfilment of command obligations and specific assignments. In addition, officers can be included in the assessment party only after their physical and moral fitness has been checked. Promotions by seniority require just a judgment of fitness or non-fitness for promotion to a higher rank, while promotions by choice require also the assignment of a score, so that those who rank first are promoted, based on the number of promotions provided for by law. A special commission chaired by the Chief of Service Staff / Commanding General of Carabinieri deals with the promotion of higher-ranking officers (from Colonel to Major General and corresponding ranks). The relevant minutes must be signed by the Minister of Defence, just like in the case of all other promotions.

Suggested score: 3

Government Reviewer-+

43.
score
N/A

Where compulsory conscription occurs, is there a policy of not accepting bribes for avoiding conscription? Are there appropriate procedures in place to deal with such bribery, and are they applied?

According to Law 23 August 2004, n.226 compulsory conscription was suspended with effect starting from 1st January 2005.

COMMENTS -+

•tLaw 23 August 2004, n. 226, available at http://www.normattiva.it/uri-res/N2Ls?urn:nir:stato:legge:2004;226.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Law n. 226 of August 2004 does not abolish conscription, but suspends its compulsory obligation.
See http://www.corriere.it/Primo_Piano/Cronache/2004/07_Luglio/29/Servizio_di_leva.shtml

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

44.
score
N/A

With regard to compulsory or voluntary conscription, is there a policy of refusing bribes to gain preferred postings in the recruitment process? Are there appropriate procedures in place to deal with such bribery, and are they applied?

According to Law 23 August 2004, n.226 compulsory conscription has suspended with effect starting from 1st January 2005. Furthermore in Italy, there are no voluntary conscription programmes.

COMMENTS -+

•tLaw 23 August 2004, n. 226, available at http://www.normattiva.it/uri-resN2Ls?urn:nir:stato:legge:2004;226.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Not Qualified

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

45.
score
4

Is there evidence of 'ghost soldiers', or non-existent soldiers on the payroll?

From media inquiry, there is no news nor rumour about the existence of ‘ghost soldiers’ in Italy. Hence it is reasonable to believe that the latter phenomenon is unlikely to occur.

COMMENTS -+

From media inquiry, there is no news nor rumour about the existence of ‘ghost soldiers’ in Italy. Hence it is reasonable to believe that the latter phenomenon is unlikely to occur.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Following the end of the Cold War and the unveal in 1990 of the CIA/NATO-led &quoute;Operation Gladio&quoute; (http://www.nytimes.com/1990/11/16/world/evolution-in-europe-italy-discloses-its-web-of-cold-war-guerrillas.html), there is no evidence of &quoute;ghost soldiers&quoute; or similar structures in today's Italy.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

46.
score
4

Are chains of command separate from chains of payment?

As shown by the organizational chart of the Ministry of Defence, there is a separation between the Technical-Operational Area and the Technical-Administrative Area which deal, respectively, with operational and administrative issues. Although both the General Defence Secretary/ National Armaments Director (Segretario Generale della Difesa e Direttore Generale degli Armamenti) depend on the Chief of the Defence General Staff (Capo di Stato Maggiore della Difesa), from a formal perspective the chains of command and the chains of payment are separated.

COMMENTS -+

•tMinistry of Defence, Organizational Charter (in English): http://www.difesa.it/EN/Organisation/Pagine/default.aspx.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

47.
score
3

Is there a Code of Conduct for all military and civilian personnel that includes, but is not limited to, guidance with respect to bribery, gifts and hospitality, conflicts of interest, and post-separation activities?

Pursuant to Article 44 of Law 190/2012 modifying Legislative Decree 165/2001, on 29 January 2014 the Ministry of Defence has adopted a Code of Conduct for all military and civilian personnel, which is also taken into consideration by the Triennial Anti-Corruption Plan. The Code of Conduct deals comprehensively with the following issues: gifts and other utilities (Article 3), participation to organizations or associations (Article 4), conflicts of interest (Article 5), corruption prevention (Article 7), transparency (Article 8), abuse of power (Article 9), and case where to abstain from contracting (Article 14). Furthermore, it identifies areas with higher risks (Art. 16) and for some of them introduces specific obligations (Articles 17-20). However, the Code of Conduct does not cover issues concerning post-separation activities.
As for the monitoring mechanism on the Code of Conduct, it is regulated by its Article 15 and envisages the oversight of the “relevant high-officials of each branch, the internal control structures and the discipline offices” together with the Office for disciplinary proceedings set up by Article 55-bis(4) of Legislative Decree n. 165/2001. The latter mechanism examines violation warnings and keeps data; plus, it may ask an optional advise to the National Anti-Corruption Authority.
Although an oversight mechanism exists, the wording of the Code of Conduct is not precise in relation to responsibilities and procedures; thus is it hard to consider it particularly robust.

COMMENTS -+

•tMinistry of Defence, Code of Conduct for Personnel of the Ministry of Defence, 29 January 2014, available at http://www.difesa.it/SGD-DNA/Staff/DG/PERSOCIV/Documents/CodiceComportamento/Cod_Comp_Finale.pdf.
•tArticle 1(44) of Law n. 190 of 6 November 2012, available at http://www.normattiva.it/uri-res/N2Ls?urn:nir:stato:legge:2012-11-06;190.
•tTriennial Anti-Corruption Plan of the Ministry of Defence 2013-2016 of 29 January 2014, available at http://www.difesa.it/Amministrazionetrasparente/bilandife/Documents/Anti_Corr/PTPC_2013_16.pdf
•tLegislative Decree n. 165/2001: http://www.normattiva.it/uri-res/N2Ls?urn:nir:stato:decreto.legislativo:2001-03-30;165!vig=

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The &quoute;Code of Conduct&quoute; approved in January 2014 by the Ministry of Defence is a meticulous and well-detailed document in which the issues of bribery, gifts, conflicts of interest, corruption and mobbing prevention, and enhanced transparency are addressed. Due to its very recent adoption, however, it is hard to assess the effectiveness of its oversight mechanism. See also answer 35.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

48.
score
3

Is there evidence that breaches of the Code of Conduct are effectively addressed ,and are the results of prosecutions made publicly available?

The Code of Conduct foresees disciplinary proceedings for those who breach the Code of Conduct, and the first data on its enforcement are contained in the report of the Ministry of Defence’s Anti-Corruption Officer of 31 December 2014 (see point no. 12 of the report).
The latter document gives evidence that breaches of the Code of Conduct are addressed. In particular, results of prosecutions are also available in terms of outcome (fine, suspension, dismissal), eventual criminal provision breached, and belonging to area of risk. However, no other information is disclosed (exact figures are only provided in relation to the Civil Personnel Department) and thus the results of prosecution are not fully available.

Response to Government Reviewer: Score maintained.

COMMENTS -+

•tMinistry of Defence, Code of Conduct for Personnel of the Ministry of Defence, 29 January 2014, available at http://www.difesa.it/SGD-DNA/Staff/DG/PERSOCIV/Documents/CodiceComportamento/Cod_Comp_Finale.pdf
•tGeneral Code of Conduct for public servants (2004): http://www.difesa.it/trasparenza_valutazione_merito/Documents/codicedicomportamento2010.pdf
•tLegislative Decree of 27 October 2009, n. 150: http://www.normattiva.it/uri-res/N2Ls?urn:nir:stato:decreto.legislativo:2009-10-27;150
•tTransparency International, Government Defence Index 2013: http://government.defenceindex.org/sites/default/files/documents/GI-assessment-Italy.pdf
•tReport of the Ministry of Defence’s Anti-Corruption Officer of 31 December 2014: http://www.difesa.it/Amministrazionetrasparente/bilandife/Pagine/RelazionedelResponsabiledellaprevenzionedellacorruzione.aspx

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: The Code of Conduct for public servants is provided for by Presidential Decree No. 62/2013, which prosecutes all forms of corruption of public employees and lays down the prohibition for all public servants to solicit or accept payments, gifts or other benefits for any reason in connection with the performance of their duties, allowing only gifts of small value. The violation of the duties covered by the Code generates disciplinary liability and is relevant for civil, administrative and accounting liability, when in connection with the breach of duties, obligations, laws and regulations. It should be noted that, among public employees' duties, the new Code of Conduct suitably highlights the duties related to the principle of transparency. The Defence Administration has integrated and clarified the above-mentioned Presidential Decree by adopting its own Code of Conduct (Ministerial Decree of 29 January 2014) widely disseminated among employees. It contains provisions that have the force of principle with regard to the military personnel subject to the disciplinary obligations transposed into Legislative Decree No. 66 of 2010 and Presidential Decree No. 90 of 2010.

Suggested score: 4

Government Reviewer-+

49.
score
3

Does regular anti-corruption training take place for military and civilian personnel?

According to the report of the Ministry of Defence’s Anti-Corruption Officer of 31 December 2014, corruption-prevention courses have been organized in 2014 and have dealt with the legal framework, the Anti-Corruption Prevention Plan, and the Code of Conduct (see point no. 5 of the report). Training was mostly provided by the National School of Administration (“Scuola Nazionale dell’Amministrazione”) which is part of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers. However, the latter courses were not addressed to the internal control organs, nor to high-level officials. Plus, the Anti-Corruption Supervisor hopes for the possibility to give training to a larger number of public officials (see point no. 5.G of the report).
Some anti-corruption training has also been organized by the “Training Centre of the Defence” (“Centro di Formazione della Difesa”) of the Ministry of Defence since the beginning of 2012. The content of such courses or seminars changes according to type of personnel to which they are addressed (new employees, executives, officials, and civil servants). In 2014, as reported in the General Catalogue of Training Courses 2014, several courses have touched upon issues of integrity and corruption pursuant to the commitments introduced in the latest anti-corruption and integrity laws (Law n. 190 of 6 November 2012 and Legislative Decree 150/2009).
In light of the latter information, there is reason to believe that anti-corruption training will be offered on at least an annual basis. However, there is wide margin to improve the number of MoD officials involved in such training.

COMMENTS -+

•tHomepage of the ‘Training Centre of the Defence’ (Centro di Formazione della Difesa) of the Ministry of Defence: http://www.difesa.it/SGD-DNA/Staff/Reparti/I/CEFODIFE/Pagine/default.aspx.
•tMinistry of Defence, General Catalogue of Training Courses 2014, available at http://www.difesa.it/SGD-DNA/Staff/Reparti/I/CEFODIFE/Documents/Catalogo_2014.pdf.
•tLaw n. 190 of 6 November 2012, available at http://www.normattiva.it/uri-res/N2Ls?urn:nir:stato:legge:2012-11-06;190
•tLegislative Decree of 27 October 2009, n. 150: http://www.normattiva.it/uri-res/N2Ls?urn:nir:stato:decreto.legislativo:2009-10-27;150
•tReport of the Ministry of Defence’s Anti-Corruption Officer of 31 December 2014: http://www.difesa.it/Amministrazionetrasparente/bilandife/Pagine/RelazionedelResponsabiledellaprevenzionedellacorruzione.aspx
•tTriennial Anti-Corruption Plan of the Ministry of Defence 2013-2016 of 29 January 2014, available at http://www.difesa.it/Amministrazionetrasparente/bilandife/Documents/Anti_Corr/PTPC_2013_16.pdf
•tMinistry of Defence, Code of Conduct for Personnel of the Ministry of Defence, 29 January 2014, available at http://www.difesa.it/SGD-DNA/Staff/DG/PERSOCIV/Documents/CodiceComportamento/Cod_Comp_Finale.pdf
•tNational School of Administration website (in English): http://sna.gov.it/en/

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Whether the courses are repeated on at least an annual basis still remains an uncertain matter.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

50.
score
3

Is there a policy to make public outcomes of the prosecution of defence services personnel for corrupt activities, and is there evidence of effective prosecutions in recent years?

The report of the Ministry of Defence’s Anti-Corruption Officer of 31 December 2014 gives evidence that there is a policy to make outcomes of the prosecution of MoD personnel for corrupt activities public (see point no. 12 of the report), and represents an example that prosecutions were carried out effectively in recent years.
Results of prosecutions are available in terms of outcome (fine, suspension, dismissal), criminal provision breached, and belonging to area of risk. However, no other information is disclosed (exact figures are only provided by the Civil Personnel Department).

COMMENTS -+

•tReport of the Ministry of Defence’s Anti-Corruption Officer of 31 December 2014: http://www.difesa.it/Amministrazionetrasparente/bilandife/Pagine/RelazionedelResponsabiledellaprevenzionedellacorruzione.aspx

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: There has been a recent, and very important, corruption scandal in the defence sector that have been covered by news and publicly debated, although it was not referred to military officials. See http://www.repubblica.it/economia/finanza/2014/10/09/news/finmeccanica_tangenti_agustawestland_condannati_orsi_e_spagnolini_a_due_anni-97705349/.
The Ministry of Defence established the position of Supervisor for the Prevention of Corruption whose 2014 Annual Report will be published in December 2014. See http://www.difesa.it/Amministrazionetrasparente/bilandife/Pagine/RelazionedelResponsabiledellaprevenzionedellacorruzione.aspx.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: Same as Question 48.

Suggested score: 4

Government Reviewer-+

51.
score
2

Are there effective measures in place to discourage facilitation payments (which are illegal in almost all countries)?

If the facilitating payments have more than a modest value, the ordinary provisions of the criminal code against corruption may also apply (see Articles 318 ff.). It is nevertheless hard to assess whether the latter provisions are effective against facilitating payments.
One can also refer to Article 3 of the Code of Conduct for Personnel of the Ministry of Defence prohibiting the request and the acceptance of gifts and benefits which are worth (approximately) more than 150 Euros and which are given outside “normal relations of courtesy and within international customs”. As for the effectiveness of the latter provision, Article 3(7) of the Code of Conduct establishes that “the supervisor of the office monitors the adequate application of the present Article”. However, no evidence regarding the latter issue is available, and no information is provided by the report of the Ministry of Defence’s Anti-Corruption Officer of 31 December 2014.

COMMENTS -+

•tMinistry of Defence, Code of Conduct for Personnel of the Ministry of Defence, 29 January 2014, available at http://www.difesa.it/SGD-DNA/Staff/DG/PERSOCIV/Documents/CodiceComportamento/Cod_Comp_Finale.pdf
•tItalian Criminal Code, Article 288, available (in Italian) at http://www.altalex.com/?idnot=36653
•tReport of the Ministry of Defence’s Anti-Corruption Officer of 31 December 2014: http://www.difesa.it/Amministrazionetrasparente/bilandife/Pagine/RelazionedelResponsabiledellaprevenzionedellacorruzione.aspx

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The heavy squeeze on cash payments for all transactions in Italy (any amount above €999,99 must be paid via bank / internetbanking and it is tracked for 10 years) created a substantial shift towards reducing the risk of indirect grafting on &quoute;relatives' bank a/c&quoute;.

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Training 60
52.
score
1

Do the armed forces have military doctrine addressing corruption as a strategic issue on operations?

The Triennial Anti-Corruption Plan of the Ministry of Defence does not refer to any military doctrine addressing corruption as a strategic issue on operations. Moreover, the importance of flexibility in expenses related to military operations notwithstanding anti-pcorruption policies has been identified as a priority by the Crisis Monitoring Group coordinated by the CeSPI (Centro Studi Politica Internazionale - Centre for International Politics Study), giving evidence of the absence of any significant operational commitment in this field. Nevertheless the awareness of corruption is presumed to be present within armed forced when conducting operations as an aspect of governance.

COMMENTS -+

•tTriennial Anti-Corruption Plan of the Ministry of Defence 2013-2016 of 29 January 2014, available at http://www.difesa.it/Amministrazionetrasparente/bilandife/Documents/Anti_Corr/PTPC_2013_16.pdf.
•tObservatory of International Politics, Report on International Missions 2011, p. 6, available at http://www.iai.it/pdf/Oss_Polinternazionale/pi_r_0005.pdf.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: The relevance of subject rose heavily thanks to recent scandals. We can assume a better rating reflects the typical scattered attitude in Italy, in which many little autonomous initiative are taken at local/peripherical level without a formal co-ordinated effort heavily publicised

Suggested score: 2

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The executive summary of the 2011 &quoute;Italian Military Doctrine&quoute; (the document's only part that is available part in the internet) does not make any reference to the risk of corruption as it focuses uniquely on the strategic role and operational capabilities of the country's armed forces (see at http://www.difesa.it/SMD_/Staff/Reparti/III/CID/Dottrina/Documents/Executive%20summary_dottrina_militare.pdf). Equally, the website of the Carabinieri, in the section dedicated to the corp's involvement in international peacekeeping operations, is silent on the issue of corruption (see at http://www.carabinieri.it/Internet/Arma/Oggi/Missioni/Oggi/).
In the same manner, if one looks at think tanks studies on Italy's foreign and security policies, corruption is never mentioned as the attention is put only to the strategic objectives and deploying instruments of the armed forces of the country. See, for instance, at:
- http://www.iai.it/pdf/Convegni/ISPI_STUDY_MISSIONI.pdf;
- http://www.iai.it/pdf/Oss_Polinternazionale/pi_a_0087.pdf;
- http://www.iai.it/pdf/Oss_Polinternazionale/pi_a_0090.pdf.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: Although there is no specific doctrine on corruption (such as publications, directives, etc.), all administrative activities performed by military personnel at all levels are governed by accurate and specific binding laws and regulations, which include provisions intended to prevent corruption in any form. It is self-evident that the administrative sector is the most sensitive and the one most easily affected by corruption. For many decades, the Italian Armed Forces have been working in compliance with the appropriate laws and regulations governing administrative activities. These operating procedures, in combination with effective control systems, ensure that administrative activities are characterized by the greatest transparency, fairness and regularity. The various administration and accounting regulations issued over the years (first RACEA, then RAU in 1976, RAD in 2006, and, finally, the Code of Military Organization and the relevant Consolidation Act) set forth, for example, that administrative activities shall be managed by different actors in order to allow cross-checks and prevent single individuals from concentrating decision-making power in their hands without any syndicatability and monitoring. The same regulations, moreover, provide for the establishment of bodies at different levels, whose function is to check the actions of individual budget centres (peripheral bodies for Employees' detachments, Joint and Service Departments of Administration, the Central Office for Administrative Inspections). Checks and inspections are regularly carried out in an ordinary/extraordinary fashion and both at centralized and decentralized level. Of course, all the legislation that applies to the public administration as a whole, applies to the military and the personnel of the Ministry of Defence too, including the Code of Public Contracts, whose provisions are permeated by the principles of effectiveness, transparency, cost-effectiveness and sound administration; the establishment of Consip and of the Electronic Market; the increasingly stringent controls that the personnel in charge has to carry out with regard to the companies that ask to establish business relations with the PA; the inspections ordered by the Ministry of Economy and Finance that concern also institutions of the Armed Forces; and the audit of expenditure titles performed by the Court of Auditors. In addition, the NATO CIMIC doctrine (AJP-3.4.9) – fully implemented at national level – sets the principle of zero tolerance for any corruption and, when describing a joint operational function, i.e. an activity that needs to be taken into account by a Commander managing an operation, de facto identifies in the fight against corruption a strategic aspect (in the sense of relevant or essential) for the effective conduct of operations.

Suggested score: 2

Government Reviewer-+

53.
score
1

Is there training in corruption issues for commanders at all levels in order to ensure that these commanders are clear on the corruption issues they may face during deployment? If so, is there evidence that they apply this knowledge in the field?

Beginning from 2012, anti-corruption training has been organized by the “Training Centre of the Defence” (“Centro di Formazione della Difesa”) of the Ministry of Defence. The content of such courses or seminars changes according to type of personnel to which they are addressed (new employees, executives, officials, and civil servants). However, the anti-corruption issues touched on such training are of domestic nature, and there is no evidence that commanders are trained to face corruption during operations or that they apply such knowledge in the field.

COMMENTS -+

•tHomepage of the ‘Training Centre of the Defence’ (Centro di Formazione della Difesa) of the Ministry of Defence: http://www.difesa.it/SGD-DNA/Staff/Reparti/I/CEFODIFE/Pagine/default.aspx.
•tMinistry of Defence, General Catalogue of Training Courses 2014, available at http://www.difesa.it/SGD-DNA/Staff/Reparti/I/CEFODIFE/Documents/Catalogo_2014.pdf.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

54.
score
2

Are trained professionals regularly deployed to monitor corruption risk in the field (whether deployed on operations or peacekeeping missions)?

Italy contributes to monitor corruption risk in the field within the framework of the International Organizations to which it belongs. In the latter context, Italy participates to anti-corruption International Organizations’ initiatives by sending trained personnel like any other State Parties. In particular, many International Organizations to which Italy belongs are committed in the anti-corruption training of foreign local police forces, and the European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan is one of such examples. This kind of missions are documented and reports on their activities are available on the internet. The Ministry of Defence contributes by publishing job openings related to Anti-Corruption trainings. In spite of these elements, there is no evidence that the professionals involved in such initiatives will be deployed regularly.

COMMENTS -+

•tEuropean Union External Action, Ongoing Missions and Operations: http://consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/eu-operations?lang=en.
•tEuropean Union External Action, Homepage of the EU Police Mission in Afghanistan: http://consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/eu-operations/eupol-afghanistan.
•tEuropean Union External Action, Factsheet on the EU Police Mission in Afghanistan, 2 February 2014 http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/missionPress/files/FACTSHEET%20EUPOL%20Afghanistan%20-%20version%2027EN01.pdf.
•tMinistry of Defence, Job Openings for Expert Position in International Organizations’ missions abroad http://www.difesa.it/Segretario-SGD-DNA/DG/PERSOCIV/Circolari_europee_int/News394/Pagine/elenco.aspx.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Italy is one of the greatest, and most respected, contributors in international peacekeeping operations and state-building missions worldwide. As a matter of fact, on 3 September 2014 the Italian Major Gen. Francesco Paolo Figliuolo was appointed Commander of NATO KFOR mission in Kosovo (http://www.aco.nato.int/kfor/about-us/welcome-to-kfor/bio-commander-kfor.aspx) while on 15 October 2014 the Italian diplomat, Mr. Gabriele Meucci, was appointed as Head of EULEX Mission in Kosovo, which is a civilian, EU-led mission (see http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eulex-kosovo/mission-description/index_en.htm). Anti-corruption is a key issue in the state-building process of Kosovo and it is a task requiring both military and civilian aspects.

However, a caveat should be formulated when answering such a question. Italy's participation takes place, like all other countries, through inter-governmental organisations such as the United Nations, NATO, the EU, and OSCE. In all of these cases the outcome of operations are developed on a multilateral basis and reports are presented, indeed, as the outcome of a collective effort. For, the assessment to question should probably switch from 3 to 4 if considering the whole work done by the country within the specific multilateral context.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

55.
score
1

Are there guidelines, and staff training, on addressing corruption risks in contracting whilst on deployed operations or peacekeeping missions?

Researcher4009: At the domestic level, no kind of document nor training has been prepared and made public by the Ministry of Defence, so one can infer a general lack of commitment in this context. Furthermore, among the anti-corruption training courses and seminars organized by the Ministry of Defence and illustrated in the 2014 General Catalogue, none of them referred to the corruption risks in contracting whilst on deployed operations or peacekeeping missions.

COMMENTS -+

•tMinistry of Defence, General Catalogue of Training Courses 2014, available at http://www.difesa.it/SGD-DNA/Staff/Reparti/I/CEFODIFE/Documents/Catalogo_2014.pdf.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Although the risk of corruption has started to be treated by the Ministry of Defence, guidelines and training appear to be focussed only to the domestic activities of the armed forces. There is no evidence that the existing guidelines and training for military staff are also related to corruption risks in contracting in international missions and operations. As a matter of fact, neither the Triennial Anti-Corruption Plan (http://www.difesa.it/Amministrazionetrasparente/bilandife/Documents/Anti_Corr/PTPC_2013_16.pdf) nor the Code of Conduct (http://www.difesa.it/SGD-DNA/Staff/DG/PERSOCIV/Documents/CodiceComportamento/Cod_Comp_Finale.pdf), both issued on 29 January 2014, deal with this issue.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: Before entering the operational theatre, those who have been tasked to perform the duties of Directors of Administrative Centres in charge of out-of-area forces’ administrative support take a dedicated preparatory course that covers contractual activities.

Suggested score: 2

Government Reviewer-+

56.
score
2

Private Military Contractors (PMCs) usually refer to companies that provide operational staff to military environments. They may also be known as security contractors or private security contractors, and refer to themselves as private military corporations, private military firms, private security providers, or military service providers.

Italy prohibits all mercenary activity after having ratified the 1989 “UN Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries” through Law n. 210/1995, which sets penalties of a minimum range of 2-7 years of imprisonment (see Article 2 of Law 210/1995). On top of this, Article 244 of the Italian Criminal Code punishes whoever, without the Government’s approval, carries out enlistment or any other hostile act toward a foreign State threatening the Italian State to the danger of war. Plus, Article 288 of the Criminal Code punishes those who hire Italian citizens as mercenaries for a foreign state.
In spite of the latter legal framework, there seems to be Private Military Contractors in Italy, although many of the companies dealing with PMCs formally operate in the grey “security” or “personnel training” sectors.
The latter finding emerges from recent investigative reports from Italian newspapers which touch upon such issue. One investigative report of February 2013 from newspaper Corriere della Sera, in particular, states that enlistment of mercenary activity in Italy is carried out by intermediaries of large multinational security companies. Furthermore, it maintains that “public prosecutor offices do not inquiry into the issue” and that “circumventing the law is not at all impossible”.

COMMENTS -+

•tInternational Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries, 4 December 1989, available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/INTRO/530?OpenDocument
•tHomepage of the Working Group on the use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination: http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Mercenaries/WGMercenaries/Pages/WGMercenariesIndex.aspx
•tLaw 12 May 1995, n. 210, available at http://www.normattiva.it/uri-res/N2Ls?urn:nir:stato:legge:1995-05-12;210@originale
•tItalian Criminal Code available at http://www.altalex.com/?idnot=36653
•t“È di moda il mercenario. Duemila dollari al giorno con licenza di uccidere”,Corriere della Sera/Sette, 18 February 2013: http://www.corriere.it/sette/13_febbraio_18/2013-08-pinotti-mercenari_09f9f2b6-79dc-11e2-9a1e-b7381312d669.shtml
•t“Iraq, mille mercenari italiani pronti a proteggere i pozzi di petrolio di Erbil”, La Stampa, 4 August 2014: http://www.lastampa.it/2014/08/18/esteri/iraq-mille-mercenari-italiani-pronti-a-proteggere-i-pozzi-di-petrolio-di-erbil-xWjLac2nShHQT58dosoRGI/pagina.html

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: Although Italy has ratified the 1989 UN convention against the use of mercenaries, and then approved a law sanctioning the practice, there is evidence that not only legal punishment has not been significantly applied, but most of all that private military contracts are used and the profession results somehow appealing. Recent newspaper articles claim PMCs are re-emerging and active. See:
- http://www.lastampa.it/2014/08/18/esteri/iraq-mille-mercenari-italiani-pronti-a-proteggere-i-pozzi-di-petrolio-di-erbil-xWjLac2nShHQT58dosoRGI/pagina.html.
- http://www.entercv.com/7mila-euro-mese-fare-il-mercenario-ecco-le-offerte-di-lavoro-della-blackwater-contractor/.
- http://www.corriere.it/sette/13_febbraio_18/2013-08-pinotti-mercenari_09f9f2b6-79dc-11e2-9a1e-b7381312d669.shtml.


http://www.entercv.com/7mila-euro-mese-fare-il-mercenario-ecco-le-offerte-di-lavoro-della-blackwater-contractor/

Suggested score: 2

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Personnel 50
57.
score
2

Does the country have legislation covering defence and security procurement and are there any items exempt from these laws?

Italian legislation covering defence and security procurement is well established and consists of Legislative Decree 208/2011 (for contracts worth more than 400 000 Euro) and General Contract Code (Legislative Decree 163/2006) (for contracts worth less than 400 000 Euro). Legislative Decree 208/2011 was enacted following the adoption of two European instruments (EC Directive 2009/81/EC and EU Regulation 1251/2011). According to Article 33 of Legislative Decree 208/2011, a special regime applies for “secret contracts or contracts which need to be secured”: although the latter items are subject by law to the control of an independent institution (Supreme Audit Institution – “Corte dei Conti”), there is neither evidence that they have a particular national importance or sensitivity, nor that the outcome of such scrutiny is public.

COMMENTS -+

•tLegislative Decree 15 November 2011, n. 208 (Discipline for Defence and Security Procurement), available at http://www.normattiva.it/uri-res/N2Ls?urn:nir:stato:decreto.legislativo:2011;208
•tLegislative Decree 12 April 2006, n. 163 (General Public Contracts Code), available at http://www.normattiva.it/uri-res/N2Ls?urn:nir:stato:legge:2006-04-12;163!vig
•tEC Directive 2009/81/EC on the coordination of procedures for the award of certain works contracts, supply contracts and service contracts by contracting authorities or entities in the fields of defence and security, and amending Directives 2004/17/EC and 2004/18/EC, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32009L0081&from=EN
•tEU Regulation 1251/2011amending Directives 2004/17/EC, 2004/18/EC and 2009/81/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council in respect of their application thresholds for the procedures for the awards of contract, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2011:319:0043:0044:EN:PDF.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: Italian law has implemented the European Directive 2009/81/EC. All exemptions, concerning the procurement of specific sensitive items, are subject to independent forms of control.

Suggested score: 3

Government Reviewer-+

58.
score
2

Is the defence procurement cycle process, from assessment of needs, through contract implementation and sign-off, all the way to asset disposal, disclosed to the public?

The public becomes aware of the Ministry of Defence’s procurement cycle either when the MoD presents the armaments purchases in front of the Parliamentary Committees or when relevant information is posted on the website. The level of transparency is thus limited because the information is disclosed to the public in summary or in a limited way.
In this sense one could read, for example, the report of a Chamber of Deputies’ Defence Commission discussion of the 2014 National Budget, where the Deputy Massimo Artini of the Five Stars Movement lamented the vagueness of information concerning the acquisition of the plane MC-27 J. It is also significant to stress the response of the Ministry of Defence, which justified the scarcity of information on the ground that “the plane MC-27 J has been identified as an operational need and thus there is no final decision about its purchase”.
The Government Defence Index 2013 confirms the shortcomings regarding the publicity of the defence procurement process in so far as it reports that the relevant threats and requirements are only disclosed in internal documents of the Armed Service Staff.

COMMENTS -+

•tReport of Chamber of Deputies’ Defence Commission discussion of 2014 National Budget with regard to defence expenses, 5 December 2013: http://documenti.camera.it/leg17/resoconti/commissioni/bollettini/pdf/2013/12/05/leg.17.bol0135.data20131205.com04.pdf.
•tMinistry of Defence, Defence Procurement Overview (in Italian:) http://www.difesa.it/Segretario-SGD-DNA/SGD-DNA/Pagine/Le_Procedure_di_Acquisizione.aspx; and in English (2009) http://www.difesa.it/Segretario-SGD-DNA/SGD-DNA/DPI/Pagine/DPI2009.aspx.
•t Transparency International, Government Defence Index 2013 Italy assessment

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Some minor &quoute;local&quoute; tenders for &quoute;ordinary&quoute; supplies are also published on Local /regional newspapers, so falling directly on a daily basis under the supervision by the single citizen. Nothing comparable howerver with the FEDBIZOPPS.gov platform of the US MoD

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The Defence Committees of both chambers of the Italian Parliament have a control function in relation, also, to the government's military procurement, though their powers remain limited (see: http://leg16.camera.it/465?area=13&tema=117&Controllo+parlamentare+sull%27acquisizione+di+armamenti). Information on procurement and acquisitions by the Ministry of Defence takes usually the form of parliamentary hearings.
As for the website of the Ministry of Defence, the section of the General Secretariat of Defence does not disclose so much evidence and information (see http://www.difesa.it/SGD-DNA/Pagine/home.aspx). in addition, the Ministry possesses a sort of special form for the acquisition of goods and services out of military procurement (&quoute;Procedura in Economia&quoute;) especially aimed at non-foreseeable needs. In this case too, however, relevant information is missing and/or not showed. See http://www.difesa.it/SGD-DNA/Staff/DT/TELEDIFE/Pagine/Acquisizionebeniservizi_ProceduraEcon.aspx.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: The defence procurement cycle process, including the definition of procurement strategies and capability requirements and gaps, is specifically described and disclosed, as confirmed by the rating of question 62. Furthermore, the items concerned by every single procurement process are published by the contracting authorities.

Suggested score: 3

Government Reviewer-+

59.
score
2

Are defence procurement oversight mechanisms in place and are these oversight mechanisms active and transparent?

Article 84 of the of the Decree of the President of the Republic 90/2010 establishes an “Advisory Committee for Draft Contracts” (“Comitato consultivo sui progetti di contratto”) composed by the Ministry of Defence’s High Officials, experts and two magistrates (one from the Council of State, the other from the Supreme Audit Institution). The task of the Committee is to audit draft contracts for weapons purchases whose value is beyond the thresholds (400 000 Euro) set by Article 215 of Legislative Decree n. 163/2006 (General Public Contracts Code).
Though the Committee’s task is to advise on technical, administrative and economic issues and two magistrates from independent institutions are part of the Committee, the outcome of such overview is not made public and thus the overall level of transparency is limited. More generally one should also take into account the general oversight activity of the Supreme Audit Institution over the defence expenditure (see answer 15), which may also receive warnings from the “Monitoring Authority on Public Works” (“Autorità per la vigilanza sui lavori pubblici”), whose activity is hard to trace in practice.
Lastly, the Defence Committees of the Parliament exercise formal oversight over the acquisition of armaments; however, its powers over such issues are non-binding and the effectiveness of their activity is limited.

COMMENTS -+

•tDecree of the President of the Republic 15 March 2010, n. 90, available at http://www.normattiva.it/uri-res/N2Ls?urn:nir:stato:decreto.del.presidente.della.repubblica:2010-03-15;90!vig=.
•tLegislative Decree 15 November 2011, n. 208 (Discipline for Defence and Security Procurement), available at http://www.normattiva.it/uri-res/N2Ls?urn:nir:stato:decreto.legislativo:2011;208.
•tLegislative Decree 12 April 2006, n. 163 (General Public Contracts Code), available at http://www.normattiva.it/uri-res/N2Ls?urn:nir:stato:legge:2006-04-12;163!vig.
•tHomepage of the ‘Monitoring Authority on Public Works’ (Autorità per la vigilanza sui lavori pubblici) (in English): http://www.avcp.it/portal/public/classic/_english.
•tTransparency International, Government Defence Index 2013 Italy assessment
•tOverview of the Parliament activity in relation to acquisition of armaments: http://www.camera.it/leg17/465?tema=programmi_d_arma

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: With the decree n.90 of 24th June 2014 the Monitoring Authority on Public Works was merged with the National Anticorruption Authority that incorporated its duties and its staff.

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: In addition to ministerial and judicial oversight mechanisms, the Parliament is trying to raise its control powers in relation to military procurement. They still remain, however, quite limited.
See: http://leg16.camera.it/465?area=13&tema=117&Controllo+parlamentare+sull%27acquisizione+di+armamenti#paragrafo3063.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: Both internal and external oversight mechanisms are transparent. The procurement activity is controlled by the Court of Auditors, which guarantees greater independence from the Government than the Central Budget Offices of the Ministry of Economy and Finance. The results of both preliminary and subsequent audits, besides being public, are reported to the Parliament.

Suggested score: 3

Government Reviewer-+

60.
score
3

Are actual and potential defence purchases made public?

According to Law 436/1988, the Ministry of Defence yearly presents to the Parliament a Provisional State of Expenses and an Additional Note to the Provisional State of Expenses identifying the expenses and the purchases made in the previous year.
Those documents are made available in the Ministry’s website. Annex C of the Additional Note, in particular, makes a detailed list of purchases and its relative costs.
Information on forward purchases is more limited. After the publication of the General National Budget Law, the Ministry of Defence regularly publishes a Multiyear Plan for the Defence and the General National Budget Law’s parts concerning the budget of its competence; however, information in these documents is only disclosed in generic or aggregated manner. On top of that one should note that the Ministry of Defence’s website contains a section where procurement bids and call for contracts are published, and that the Defence Committees of the Parliament have to express a non-binding opinion to the MoD’s armaments purchases decisions.

COMMENTS -+

•tMinistry of Defence Website, Public Procurement Section: http://www.difesa.it/Amministrazionetrasparente/Pagine/Publicprocurement.aspx.
•tMinistry of Defence, 2014 Provisional State of Expenses, available at http://www.difesa.it/Content/Pagine/statoprevisionespesa2013.aspx.
•tMinistry of Defence, 2013 Additional Note to the Provisional State of Expenses, available at http://www.difesa.it/Content/Pagine/Notaaggiuntiva.aspx.
•tLaw 4 October 1988, n. 436, available at http://www.normattiva.it/uri-res/N2Ls?urn:nir:stato:legge:1988-10-04;436
•tMinistry of Defence’s Preventive Budget Webpage: http://www.difesa.it/Amministrazionetrasparente/bilandife/Pagine/Bilanciopreventivoeconsuntivo.aspx
•tMinistry of Defence, 2014 Multiyear Plan for the Defence 2014-2016, available at http://www.difesa.it/Content/Documents/nota_aggiuntiva/01_DPP_2014_2016.pdf
•tOverview of the Parliament activity in relation to acquisition of armaments: http://www.camera.it/leg17/465?tema=programmi_d_arma

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Long term commitments are hardly trackable by the public as reporting history is scarce and past contracts are less transparent, so review ex-post of past procurements is non feasible on OPEN DATA basis.

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The Ministry of Defence reveals a quite satisfactory degree of transparency in its current and, to a minor extent, short-run future expenditures. As a matter of fact, the website of the Ministry of Defence disclosures a preventive budget, though not particularly up-to-date, regarding the next fiscal year. See at http://www.difesa.it/Amministrazionetrasparente/bilandife/Pagine/Bilanciopreventivoeconsuntivo.aspx.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

61.
score
1

What procedures and standards are companies required to have - such as compliance programmes and business conduct programmes - in order to be able to bid for work for the Ministry of Defence or armed forces?

Companies bidding for work for the Ministry of Defence are generally not required to have any procedure or standards such as compliance programmes and business conduct programmes according to relevant legal framework (i.e. Legislative Decree 15 November 2011, n. 208 (Discipline for Defence and Security Procurement), which was adopted to comply with EC Directive 2009/81/EC). On the other hand, Article 12 of the Legislative Decree 208/2011 refers to Article 38 of the General Public Contracts Code and prohibits companies which have been prosecuted for corruption offences from bidding. As a consequence, the latter is the only corruption-related standard/requirement for companies to enter into a contract with the Ministry of Defence.

COMMENTS -+

•tLegislative Decree 15 November 2011, n. 208 (Discipline for Defence and Security Procurement), available at http://www.normattiva.it/uri-res/N2Ls?urn:nir:stato:decreto.legislativo:2011;208.
•tLegislative Decree 12 April 2006, n. 163 (General Public Contracts Code), available at http://www.normattiva.it/uri-res/N2Ls?urn:nir:stato:legge:2006-04-12;163!vig. Articles 11 and 12, Legislative Decree 15 November 2011, n. 208, Discipline for Defence and Security Procurement
•tEC Directive 2009/81/EC on the coordination of procedures for the award of certain works contracts, supply contracts and service contracts by contracting authorities or entities in the fields of defence and security, and amending Directives 2004/17/EC and 2004/18/EC, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32009L0081&from=EN
•tTransparency International, Government Defence Index 2013 Italy assessment

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: Law 231/2001 is among the best in the world for preventing corruption in private companies, so most perspective vendors have a overall stringent internal and independent governance infrastructure (rules/procedures/independent auditors/OdV, and the likes) which make the risk of deviating from transparent bidding a real risk for both the individuals (managers, Board members, owners, consultants. Furthermore, the innovative provision since Spring of 2014 which allows the newly formed ANAC Anti-corruption Authority capable of seizing whole companies/divisions of companies and entrust a &quoute;temporary management&quoute; to clear the field.

A big multinational already saw its profitable italian business seized on a temp basis due to collusive relationship with illegality...(I think the reviewer accidentally deleted their comments here)

Suggested score: 3

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

62.
score
3

Are procurement requirements derived from an open, well-audited national defence and security strategy?

According to the Code of the military system, each year (before 30 April) the Ministry of Defence presents in front of the competent Parliament’s Committees the national defence and security strategy, which includes expenses, programs and contractual activity. With specific reference to the Procurement strategy, the Chief of Defence Staff (“Capo di Stato Maggiore della Difesa”) is responsible, among other things, to elaborate the general financial and the operative planning, but also to define the relevant technical-financial programs. Therefore, it is the Defence Staff (“Stato Maggiore della Difesa”) which, together with the Minister defines the operative needs and requirements, which are then transformed in possible technical solutions by the Technical-Administrative area which is under the responsibility Secretary General of Defence/National Armaments Director (“Segretario Generale della Difesa/Direttore Generale degli Armamenti”).
Although the national defence and security strategy is communicated to the Parliament, the level of detail in the content and follow-up mechanisms are not clearly defined.
Lastly, one should also note that in June 2014 the Ministry of Defence released the Guidelines on the new Defence White Paper: although that latter Paper will outline the strategy for evolution of the Armed Forces over the next fifteen years, there is no evidence that it will undergo through audit verification.

COMMENTS -+

•tLegislative Decree 15 march 2010, n. 66, Code of the military system (Codice dell’ordinamento militare), available at http://www.normattiva.it/uri-res/N2Ls?urn:nir:stato:decreto-legislativo:2010-03-15;66!vig=, modified by Law 21 December 2012, n. 244, available at http://www.normattiva.it/uri-res/N2Ls?urn:nir:stato:legge:2012-12-31;244.
•tMinistry of Defence, 2014 Provisional State of Expenses, available at http://www.difesa.it/Content/Pagine/statoprevisionespesa2013.aspx.
•tMinistry of Defence, 2013 Additional Note to the Provisional State of Expenses, available at http://www.difesa.it/Content/Pagine/Notaaggiuntiva.aspx.
•tMinistry of Defence website, Defence Procurement Overview in Italian http://www.difesa.it/Segretario-SGD-DNA/SGD-DNA/Pagine/Le_Procedure_di_Acquisizione.aspx, and in English (2009) http://www.difesa.it/Segretario-SGD-DNA/SGD-DNA/DPI/Pagine/DPI2009.aspx
•tGuidelines on the new Defence White Paper (in English), Ministry of Defence, http://www.difesa.it/EN/Documents/White%20Paper%20-%20Guidelines.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Law n. 244 of December 2012 delegates the government to reform &quoute;the national military instruments&quoute;, procurement included. In practice, however, the country's overall defence and security policy is still run by the government (i.e. the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defence, and the Chieff Defence Staff) in strict coordination with the President of the Republic who is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces and chairs the Supreme Council of Defence (art. 87.4 of the Italian Constitution, see https://www.senato.it/documenti/repository/istituzione/costituzione_inglese.pdf). This role of the President of the Republic has turned manifest in recent years, especially with the ongoing debate about the controversial acquisition programme of the F-35 joint strike fighters and the increasing willingness of the Parliament to expand its (so far limited) prerogatives in defence policy. A course that, apparently, the President is not eager to support. See http://www.dirittiglobali.it/2014/06/linea-colle-camere-silenziate-sulle-spese-militari/.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

63.
score
3

Are defence purchases based on clearly identified and quantified requirements?

The requirements for most defence purchases are clearly detailed in the tender solicitations, which are generally published in the Ministry of Defence’s website. Furthermore, the Additional Note to the Provisional State of Expenses publishes the list of purchases and contracts by the Ministry of Defence, with a short description for each of them. In spite of this situation, some improvements in the level of detail is desirable, especially in relation to Parliamentary oversight over armament acquisition. For example, in the report of the Chamber of Deputies’ Defence Commission discussion of 2014 National Budget with regard to defence expenses one could read that, when the Deputy Massimo Artini of the Five Stars Movement lamented the vagueness of information concerning the acquisition of the plane MC-27 J, the response of the Ministry of Defence was quite vague because it justified the scarcity of information on the ground that ‘the plane MC-27 J has been identified as an operational need and thus there is no final decision about its purchase’.

COMMENTS -+

•tMinistry of Defence Website, Public Procurement Section: http://www.difesa.it/Amministrazionetrasparente/Pagine/Publicprocurement.aspx.
•tLegislative Decree 15 march 2010, n. 66, Code of the military system (Codice dell’ordinamento militare), available at http://www.normattiva.it/uri-res/N2Ls?urn:nir:stato:decreto-legislativo:2010-03-15;66!vig=, modified by Law 21 December 2012, n. 244, available at http://www.normattiva.it/uri-res/N2Ls?urn:nir:stato:legge:2012-12-31;244.
•tMinistry of Defence, 2014 Provisional State of Expenses, available at http://www.difesa.it/Content/Pagine/statoprevisionespesa2013.aspx.
•tMinistry of Defence, 2013 Additional Note to the Provisional State of Expenses, available at http://www.difesa.it/Content/Pagine/Notaaggiuntiva.aspx.
•tReport of Chamber of Deputies’ Defence Commission discussion of the 2014 National Budget with regard to defence expenses, 5 December 2013: http://documenti.camera.it/leg17/resoconti/commissioni/bollettini/pdf/2013/12/05/leg.17.bol0135.data20131205.com04.pdf
•tOverview of the Parliament activity in relation to acquisition of armaments: http://www.camera.it/leg17/465?tema=programmi_d_arma
•tMinistry of Defence, 2014 Multiyear Plan for the Defence 2014-2016, available at http://www.difesa.it/Content/Documents/nota_aggiuntiva/01_DPP_2014_2016.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The economic and fiscal environment of Italy is a peculiar one: on the one side, the EU framework and the necessity to respect the Maastricht criteria and their enhanced version formulated in the 2012 European fiscal compact; on the other side, the US-led commitment to increase NATO's European allies defence expenditure up to 2% of their GDP. In this context, particularly for reasons of political opportunity rather than proper defence planning, it seems there could be some room for some unplanned defence purchases or, at large, for the preservation of some space for maneuver by the government in terms of military expenditures, particularly in investment for R&D.
See http://www.airpressonline.it/2862/spese-la-difesa-il-patto-renzi/.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: Defence purchases are clearly and regularly defined within the planning cycle and stated in the annual Mandate Report. They also correspond to the relevant procurement activities performed by the contracting Authorities.

Suggested score: 4

Government Reviewer-+

64.
score
2

Is defence procurement generally conducted as open competition or is there a significant element of single-sourcing (that is, without competition)?

Defence procurement is generally conducted through an open competition (“procedura aperta”), or by means of restricted-sourcing or single-sourcing purchases which take place through different schemes such as the “restricted procedure” (“procedura ristretta”) and the “negotiated procedure” (“procedura negoziata”). The latter category is regulated by Article 18 of Legislative Decree 208/2011 and by Article 57 of the General Public Contracts Code, which define the requirements and conditions to use such procedure.
Although it is difficult to know the exact percentage of the value of contracts awarded through either procedure, one can assess the procurement data which are to be published by each branch of the Public Administration pursuant to Article 1(32) of Law 190/2012.
Analysing the available data published by the Ministry of Defence in relation to the year 2014 (e.g. the data of Land Weapons Directorate, Naval Weapons Directorate, and Defence General Staff) one realizes that almost all defence contracts with relevant value (more than € 40 000) are not awarded through open competition. Among them, the single-sourcing or “negotiated” procedure represents the most used one, and 50% is a realistic estimate of its use in the set of examined data.

COMMENTS -+

•tLegislative Decree 15 November 2011, n. 208, available at http://www.normattiva.it/uri-res/N2Ls?urn:nir:stato:decreto.legislativo:2011;208. .
•tLegislative Decree 12 April 2006, n. 163, available at http://www.normattiva.it/uri-res/N2Ls?urn:nir:stato:legge:2006-04-12;163!vig
•t“Tenders and Contracts Notice” section of the Ministry of Defence website: http://www.difesa.it/Amministrazionetrasparente/Pagine/Publicprocurement.aspx
•t2014 Procurement Data of Land Weapons Directorate: http://www.difesa.it/Amministrazionetrasparente/segredifesa/terrarm/Documents/Informazioni_sulle_singole_procedure_Anno_2014.pdf
•t2014 Procurement Data of Naval Weapons Directorate: http://www.difesa.it/Amministrazionetrasparente/segredifesa/navarm/Documents/febbraio2015/navarm2014_tabella_generale.pdf
•t2014 Procurement Data of Defence General Staff: http://www.difesa.it/Amministrazionetrasparente/SMD/Pagine/2014.aspx
•tLaw n. 190 of 6 November 2012, available at http://www.normattiva.it/uri-res/N2Ls?urn:nir:stato:legge:2012-11-06;190

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: All defence contracts comply with the procedures provided for in Directives 2004/18/EC and 2009/81/EC, as implemented in our law. Only in very few cases they are conducted without competition, but this is always due to objective reasons evaluated by external controlling bodies.

Suggested score: 4

Government Reviewer-+

65.
score
2

Are tender boards subject to regulations and codes of conduct and are their decisions subject to independent audit to ensure due process and fairness?

Article 84 of the of the Decree of the President of the Republic 90/2010 established an “Advisory Committee for Draft Contracts” composed by the Ministry of Defence’s High Officials, experts and two magistrates (one from the Council of State, the other from the Supreme Audit Institution). The task of the Committee is to audit draft contracts for weapons purchases whose value is beyond the thresholds set by Article 215 of Legislative Decree n. 163/2006 (General Public Contracts Code).
Though the Committee’s task is to advise on technical, administrative and economic issues, and two magistrates from independent institutions are part of the Committee and should ensure due process and fairness (see answer no. 15), Article 84 of Decree 90/2010 does not provide for any codes of conduct and the outcome of such overview is not publicly available. Furthermore, no information about such tender boards and the associated auditing process is available.
If one examines the documents published in tender solicitations webpage of the DG Aeronautic Weapons (announcements, post-adjudication information, revocations), for example, one cannot find any information about the composition of the tender boards or the outcome of the auditing processes. As a consequence one can infer a limited level of transparency in this context.

COMMENTS -+

•tDecree of the President of the Republic 15 March 2010, n. 90, available at http://www.normattiva.it/uri-res/N2Ls?urn:nir:stato:decreto.del.presidente.della.repubblica:2010-03-15;90!vig=.
•tLegislative Decree 12 April 2006, n. 163 (General Public Contracts Code), available at http://www.normattiva.it/uri-res/N2Ls?urn:nir:stato:legge:2006-04-12;163!vig.
•tTransparency International, Government Defence Index 2013 Italy assessment
•tDG Aeronautic Weapons, tender solicitations webpage (including announcements, post-adjudication information, revocations): http://www.difesa.it/SGD-DNA/Staff/DT/ARMAEREO/Bandi/Pagine/Elenco.aspx

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: Although the decisions of tender boards are not subject to specific audit, auditing activities are regularly performed both internally (decisions are subject to formal approval by the heads of contracting Authorities) and externally (evaluation results are among the criteria according to which external controlling bodies assess the regularity and legitimacy of each procedure).

Suggested score: 3

Government Reviewer-+

66.
score
2

Does the country have legislation in place to discourage and punish collusion between bidders for defence and security contracts?

Generally speaking competition among companies is fostered by the European Union, which regularly adopts instruments or recommendations to discourage and eliminate collusion, also in the defence sector. For the latter purpose, the EU institutions have adopted EC Directive 2009/81/EC, and in June 2014 the EU Commission adopted a road map to follow up on an earlier Communication and set the premises to promote a more competitive Euro-wide defence industry.
In spite of the European efforts, neither Legislative Decree 15 November 2011, n. 208 (Discipline for Defence and Security Procurement) nor more specific domestic legislation aim at tackling collusion between bidders in the defence sector at the Italian level.
As for enforcement, the Italian Competition Authority (&quoute;Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato&quoute;) is currently undertaking few proceedings on companies operating in the military and defence field. At the same time, its recent annual reports do not provide any evidence about robust sanctions being imposed in the latter sector.

COMMENTS -+

•tEC Directive 2009/81/EC on the coordination of procedures for the award of certain works contracts, supply contracts and service contracts by contracting authorities or entities in the fields of defence and security, and amending Directives 2004/17/EC and 2004/18/EC, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32009L0081&from=EN.
•tReport from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, &quoute;A New Deal for European Defence Implementation Roadmap for Communication COM (2013) 542; Towards a more competitive and efficient defence and security sector&quoute;, COM/2014/0387 final, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM:2014:387:FIN
•tLegislative Decree 15 November 2011, n. 208 (Discipline for Defence and Security Procurement), available at http://www.normattiva.it/uri-res/N2Ls?urn:nir:stato:decreto.legislativo:2011;208
•tExample of antitrust proceeding initiated by Italian Competition Authority on companies operating the military and defence field (12 June 2014) : http://www.agcm.it/trasp-statistiche/doc_download/4285-i782.html
•tAnnual Reports of the Italian Competition Authority (in English): http://www.agcm.it/en/annual-report.html

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: 80% seems to be an excessive estimate, 60-70% (also considering several joint ventures with French and German companies) seems a more plausible amount - can you please verify this?

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The Italian legal framework has adopted all EEC/EU legislation regarding the promotion of competition and the limit of collusions between the public sector and private enterprises. Yet, no national law has ever been adopted. Accordingly, the Italian Competition Authority (&quoute;Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato&quoute;, established by law n. 287 of 1990) has coined the notion of &quoute;recalcitrant legislation&quoute; to highlight both the lack of a national legislative regulation and the delay with which the Italian parliament has regularly translated European laws into Italian laws. See http://www.agcm.it/segnalazioni/segnalazioni-e-pareri/download/C12563290035806C/1B26CF5A07259B0AC12578A9003E2FBD.html?a=AS005.PDF.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: The law regulating defence contracts contains measures that forbid collusion between bidders aimed at altering the tender results. Compliance with these measures is subject to the control of contracting Authorities, and infringement is an offence under the Criminal Code.

Suggested score: 3

Government Reviewer-+

67.
score
3

Are procurement staff, in particular project and contract managers, specifically trained and empowered to ensure that defence contractors meet their obligations on reporting and delivery?

Researcher4009: Procurement staff is trained to ensure that defence contractors meet their obligations. Evidence in this sense is provided by the General Catalogue of Training Courses 2014, which contains a whole section of courses which is dedicated to the “contract, quality, logistic, and procurement area” (“Area contratti, qualità, logistica e procurement”). In particular, the courses offered in this area concern, among other things, the following issues: contract’s conclusion and execution, price adequacy, quality control, configuration management.
Given the detailed content of the latter courses one can infer that MoD’s personnel is substantially trained and empowered to ensure that defence contractors meet their obligations. As for empowerment, the wide range of addressee of the courses and the outcomes of the Government Defence Index 2013 lead to conclude that the relevant departments is substantially equipped to fulfil its obligations.

COMMENTS -+

•tMinistry of Defence, General Catalogue of Training Courses 2014, available at http://www.difesa.it/SGD-DNA/Staff/Reparti/I/CEFODIFE/Documents/Catalogo_2014.pdf
•tTransparency International, Government Defence Index 2013: http://government.defenceindex.org/sites/default/files/documents/GI-assessment-Italy.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: Technicians and engineers - mostly military - working within the defence contracting authorities are specifically trained and constantly updated in order to ensure that defence contractors meet both technical and operational requirements.

Suggested score: 3

Government Reviewer-+

68.
score
3

Are there mechanisms in place to allow companies to complain about perceived malpractice in procurement, and are companies protected from discrimination when they use these mechanisms?

Complaints about perceived malpractice in procurement may be filed by companies in front of the competent judicial authorities such as the T.A.R. (First Instance Administrative Tribunal – “Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale”) and the Council of State (“Consiglio di Stato”) which, being part the Italian judiciary system, are to be considered independent institutions (according to Article 104(1) of the Constitution “the Judiciary branch is autonomous and independent of all other powers”).
Although companies would be well protected towards discrimination in so far as the public administration would undergo through an independent trial carried out by the judicial authorities, there is no case-law on cases of discrimination due to the use of the above mentioned mechanisms. Furthermore, one should also note that a problem of the judiciary, which is often pointed out by international organizations and which may practically affect the decision of private actors to complain against discrimination in procurement, is the lengthy timing of the judicial proceedings.

COMMENTS -+

•tText of the Constitution in English: http://www.quirinale.it/qrnw/statico/costituzione/pdf/costituzione_inglese.pdf
•tIMF, “Judicial System Reform in Italy—A Key to Growth”, IMF Working Paper WP/14/32, February 2014, available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2014/wp1432.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: The slowness and often byzantinian complexity of Italian bureaucracy is renowned. Equally, there is plenty of studies and analyses pointing out that a structural reform of the judiciary will be likely to help Italy's economy recover from persistent stagnation (see http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2014/car091814a.htm). However, due to the high sensitivity of defence-related issues, and the impossibility to find in the internet a case between a defence company and the Italian State, it seems reasonable to assume that companies barely make use of legal instruments to complain about potential malpractices in procurement. For, the score &quoute;2&quoute; seems more appropriate.

Suggested score: 2

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

69.
score
2

What sanctions are used to punish the corrupt activities of a supplier?

The Italian legal framework provides for two ways to punish the corrupt activity of a supplier. At the criminal level, the Italian Criminal Code sanctions a supplier which has corrupted (or tried to corrupt) a public official with a punishment ranging from 6 months to 5 years of imprisonment. If the offence concerns the award of a contract by the branch of the administration where the official works, the sanction may be raised discretionally by the judge. The latter criminal conviction has also consequences at the administrative level, because those who have been convicted for corruption-related offences are prohibited to participate in future bids pursuant to Article 38(1)(c) of Legislative Decree n. 163/2006 (General Public Contracts Code).
Although formally the legal framework may be considered dissuasive, the lack of substantial evidence provided by the relevant authorities (National Anti-Corruption Authority and Ministry of Defence) concerning the regular enforcement of such sanctions is indicative of their scarce application.

COMMENTS -+

•tLegislative Decree 12 April 2006, n. 163 (General Public Contracts Code), available at http://www.normattiva.it/uri-res/N2Ls?urn:nir:stato:legge:2006-04-12;163!vig
•tItalian Criminal Code, available at http://www.altalex.com/?idnot=36653
•tNational Anti-Corruption Authority (“Autorità Nazionale Anti-Corruzione”) website: www.anticorruzione.it

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: Procurement managers have an obligation to report any corrupt activities, which are sanctioned in as much as they are held as an offence against the Public Administration. The law regulating public contracts contains measures that forbid the participation of companies whose employees have previous convictions or are under preventive detention for such offences.

Suggested score: 3

Government Reviewer-+

70.
score
1

When negotiating offset contracts, does the government specifically address corruption risk by imposing due diligence requirements on contractors? Does the government follow up on offset contract performance and perform audits to check performance and integrity?

Although there is some evidence of research on the issue of offset contracts in Italy by the CeMiSS (“Centro Militare di Studi Strategici” – Military Centre of Strategic Studies) and the IAI (“Istituto Affari Internazionali” – International Affairs Institute), there is no indication that the Government imposes anti-corruption due diligence requirements on contractors. The lack of information in this field is in part due to the fact that the legal basis on offsets is represented by an Internal Directive of 2012 by the Secretariat General of Defence (“Segretariato General della Difesa”) which is not publicly online.
According to the information provided by Italy to the European Defence Agency (‘EDA’), the Italian policy on offset contracts envisages the monitoring of the implementation of the offset plan by the Secretariat General of Defence - National Armaments Directorate (“Segretario Generale della Difesa e Direzione Generale degli Armamenti”), which in turn informs the European Defence Agency about the domestic offset operations pursuant to the EDA’s Code of Conduct on Offsets. Plus, a status reports from defence contractor to the procuring Directorate is to be released biannually.
Although the Ministerial Decree of 16 January 2013 sets the relevant responsibilities within each division of the Secretariat General of Defence - National Armaments Directorate, there is no public evidence of any status reports and, more generally, on information about due diligence or auditing requirements. Hence, one can seriously doubt their effectiveness at ensuring integrity.

COMMENTS -+

•tRoberto Rufo, ‘I ritorni industriali negli approviggionamenti internazionali: la negoziazione, il concordamento ed il controllo dell’esecuzione’, CeMiSS Paper, n. 124, Abstract available at http://www.difesa.it/SMD_/CASD/IM/CeMiSS/Pubblicazioni/ricerche/Pagine/Iritorniindustriali.aspx.
•tEuropean Defence Agency, Italian policy on offset contracts: http://www.eda.europa.eu/offsets/viewpolicy.aspx?CountryID=IT
•tAlessandro Riccardo Ungaro, “Le compensazioni industriali nel mercato della difesa e il caso indiano”, IAI Notebooks, n. 4, July 2012 (IAI Institute’s Notebook on Offsets): http://www.iai.it/content.asp?langid=1&contentid=790
•tEuropean Defence Agency’s Code of Conduct on Offsets: http://www.eda.europa.eu/docs/documents/brochure_offsets.pdf
•tMoD Ministerial Decree of 16 January 2013: http://www.difesa.it/Amministrazionetrasparente/segredifesa/Documents/DM_16_gennaio_2013.pdf#search=%22compensazioni%20industriali%22

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: A total unbalance exists between Italy and other countries, specifically US as few if none is capable of penetring offset contracts with the Pentagon.

Italy prefers fostering JV with European partners (France, Germany, etc...) with sharing of &quoute;scope of work&quoute; managed at a Project level rather than at OFFSET level

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: On 1 July 2009 the European Defence Agency (EDA) issued a new &quoute;Code of Conduct on Offsets&quoute; with the double aim to raise transparency and the capability-driven and competence-based performance of the European defence industry (http://www.eda.europa.eu/docs/documents/brochure_offsets.pdf). Equally, the EU Directive on Defence and Security Procurement (2009/81/EC), offset contracts included (see http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/publicprocurement/docs/defence/guide-offsets_en.pdf). Italy being a founding member of the European Union (and, at large, the overall European integration process), it is fair to assume that Italy respects/is in the process to respect the EU provisions on this aspect.
That said, there is no significant evidence that the government imposes due diligence requirements on contractors during offset contract negotiations.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

71.
score
1

Does the government make public the details of offset programmes, contracts, and performance?

Although the Italian Government has provided some information about offsets on the website of the European Defence Agency (offset policy, offset requirements, modalities/implementation), no details about specific offset programs, contracts, and performance are known to be publicly available.
Limited evidence also emerge from the research work carried out on offset contracts issues by the CeMiSS (“Centro Militare di Studi Strategici” – Military Centre of Strategic Studies) and the IAI (“Istituto Affari Internazionali” – International Affairs Institute). In particular, the latter studies provide some information on the institutional actors involved, the basic criteria, the key strategic activities’ definition, the (flexible) compensation rate (between 70% and 100%), and the general compensation procedure.

COMMENTS -+

•tEuropean Defence Agency, Italian policy on offset contracts: http://www.eda.europa.eu/offsets/viewpolicy.aspx?CountryID=IT
•tRoberto Rufo, ‘I ritorni industriali negli approviggionamenti internazionali: la negoziazione, il concordamento ed il controllo dell’esecuzione’, CeMiSS Paper, n. 124, Abstract available at http://www.difesa.it/SMD_/CASD/IM/CeMiSS/Pubblicazioni/ricerche/Pagine/Iritorniindustriali.aspx.
•tAlessandro Riccardo Ungaro, “Le compensazioni industriali nel mercato della difesa e il caso indiano”, IAI Notebooks, n. 4, July 2012 (IAI Institute’s Notebook on Offsets): http://www.iai.it/content.asp?langid=1&contentid=790

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Being Italy a founding member of the EU, it is fair to assume that Italy respects/is in the process to respect the EU provisions on this aspect, especially the EU Directive on Defence and Security Procurement (2009/81/EC).

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

72.
score
1

Are offset contracts subject to the same level of competition regulation as the main contract?

According to the information provided by Italy to the European Defence Agency, ‘offset requirements, terms and conditions are embedded in the main procurement contract, of which the relevant General Directorate is the contractual executor. The Directorates, in coordination with the General Secretariat of Defence, evaluate, on a case by case basis, the offset plan before the contract signature.’
In spite of these elements, there is no substantial evidence that the offset contracts are subject to a degree of competition regulation comparable to the one provided for the main contract. Moreover, no element on these issues can be found in the research work carried out by the CeMiSS (“Centro Militare di Studi Strategici” – Military Centre of Strategic Studies) and the IAI (“Istituto Affari Internazionali” – International Affairs Institute).

COMMENTS -+

•tEuropean Defence Agency, Italian policy on offset contracts: http://www.eda.europa.eu/offsets/viewpolicy.aspx?CountryID=IT
•tRoberto Rufo, ‘I ritorni industriali negli approviggionamenti internazionali: la negoziazione, il concordamento ed il controllo dell’esecuzione’, CeMiSS Paper, n. 124, Abstract available at http://www.difesa.it/SMD_/CASD/IM/CeMiSS/Pubblicazioni/ricerche/Pagine/Iritorniindustriali.aspx
•tAlessandro Riccardo Ungaro, “Le compensazioni industriali nel mercato della difesa e il caso indiano”, IAI Notebooks, n. 4, July 2012 (IAI Institute’s Notebook on Offsets): http://www.iai.it/content.asp?langid=1&contentid=790

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

73.
score
2

How strongly does the government control the company's use of agents and intermediaries in the procurement cycle?

Law n. 185 of 1990 (later modified by Law n. 148 of 2003) provides for the discipline on the export, import and transit of armaments. In this context, the provisions also address the “intermediation activity” of agents and intermediaries who negotiate or organize transnational armaments transactions; who purchase, sell or transfer armaments across countries. In application of the latter law, the Inter-ministerial Decree n. 19 of 7 January 2013 has also provided for a special authorization procedure for intermediation.

COMMENTS -+

•tLaw n. 185 of 1990 (as later modified): http://www.normattiva.it/uri-res/N2Ls?urn:nir:stato:legge:1990;185
•tInter-ministerial Decree n. 19 of 7 January 2013: http://www.esteri.it/mae/doc_uama/regolamento_l185_90_modific_dlgs105_2012.pdf
•t“Panama President to Face Corruption Charges in Italy”, Newsmax, 15 April 2014, available at http://www.newsmax.com/Newsfront/Panama-Canal-Ricardo-Martinelli-Italy/2014/04/15/id/565764/;
•t“Finmeccanica, a giudizio Lavitola e l’ex direttore commerciale&quoute;, LaStampa, 18 March 2014, available at http://www.lastampa.it/2014/03/18/italia/cronache/finmeccanica-a-giudizio-lavitola-e-lex-direttore-commerciale-6kcSKafD9s83kJqe5bA41M/pagina.html
•t“Finmeccanica, ex consulente Haschke chiede di patteggiare un anno e 10 mesi”, Il Fatto Quotidiano, 2 April 2014, available at http://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2014/04/02/finmeccnica-consulente-haschke-chiede-di-patteggiare-un-anno-e-10-mezi/936166/
•t“Tangenti Finmeccanica, l’India interrogherà Gerosa e Haschker”, La Repubblica, 3 February 2015, available at http://www.repubblica.it/esteri/2015/02/03/news/tangenti_finmeccanica_l_india_interrogher_gerosa_e_haschke-106402253/

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: Pursuant of Law n. 185 of July 1990, the Italian government established the Office for the Coordination for the Production of Armaments Materials (UCPMA, &quoute;Ufficio di Coordinamento della Produzione di Materiali di Armamento&quoute;). Among its aims, indeed, there is the supervision of the production and export of Italian armaments (see http://www.governo.it/presidenza/ucpma/).
A similar position has been expressed, for instance, in an &quoute;instant study&quoute; paper by Lieutenant Colonel, Volfango Monaci, former Vice-Director of CEMISS, about the ethics of armaments intermediation and &quoute;best practices&quoute; regarding the export of defence-related materials (see http://www.difesa.it/SMD_/CASD/IM/CeMiSS/Pubblicazioni/Documents/Contributi/Monaci/Instant_Study_20121212_1212_abbreviato.pdf).

Suggested score: 2

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: Agents and intermediaries in public contracts are subject to control and limitations. Control mechanisms and measures are in place to ensure that contract documents come exclusively from representatives of the participating companies (national, European or non-EU) with general or special power of attorney.

Suggested score: 3

Government Reviewer-+

74.
score
2

Are the principal aspects of the financing package surrounding major arms deals, (such as payment timelines, interest rates, commercial loans or export credit agreements) made publicly available prior to the signing of contracts?

Once a company is assigned a tender, the Ministry of Defence publishes some information concerning the aspects of the contract through the “Award Notice”/“Post-information Notice” (“Avviso di aggiudicazione”/“Avviso di post-informazione”). In particular, in the latter document one can read the overall sum (divided into planned and unplanned activities), the time-frame, together with the identity of the provider, the type of procurement procedure, the name of selected company/companies and the discount offered by the latter on the planned activity. However, the latter information touch upon few key financial elements, since other details such as interest rates and rules/regulations surrounding default penalties are not publicly reported.

COMMENTS -+

•tMinistry of Defence Website, Public Procurement Section: http://www.difesa.it/Amministrazionetrasparente/Pagine/Publicprocurement.aspx.
•tDecree of the President of the Republic of 20 April 1994, n. 367, setting up the SICOGE, available at http://www.normattiva.it/uri-res/N2Ls?urn:nir:presidente.repubblica:decreto:1994-04-20;367.
•tExample of “Award Notice”/“Post-information Notice” (“Avviso di aggiudicazione”/“Avviso di post-informazione”), 3 December 2014: http://www.difesa.it/Amministrazionetrasparente/segredifesa/armaereo/Documents/postiifoPW.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

75.
score
0

Does the government formally require that the main contractor ensures subsidiaries and sub-contractors adopt anti-corruption programmes, and is there evidence that this is enforced?

Subcontracting in the defence and security procurement is regulated by Article 27 of Legislative Decree 208/2011 and by Article 118 of the General Public Contracts Code. Neither one of the latter instruments mentions any requirement for the main contractor to ensure that its subcontractors adopt anti-corruption programs.

COMMENTS -+

•tLegislative Decree 15 November 2011, n. 208 (Discipline for Defence and Security Procurement), available at http://www.normattiva.it/uri-res/N2Ls?urn:nir:stato:decreto.legislativo:2011;208.
•tLegislative Decree 12 April 2006, n. 163 (General Public Contracts Code), available at http://www.normattiva.it/uri-res/N2Ls?urn:nir:stato:legge:2006-04-12;163!vig.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: metteri un bel 2 per la law 231, che poi non sia possibile verificare chje verifichino la compliance 231 a livelli di sub e terzo frnitore è un0'altra storia sempre il Codice lavor i pubblici sospeso menzionato?

Suggested score: 2

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: The relevant regulations do not require that subsidiaries and sub-contractors adopt anti-corruption programmes, but a process has been launched to raise awareness on this issue.

Suggested score: 1

Government Reviewer-+

76.
score
3

How common is it for defence acquisition decisions to be based on political influence by selling nations?

There is some allegations that foreign nations exercise political influence on defence acquisition decisions. This is the case in relation to the controversial and debated purchase of 90 F-35 fighters from the US company Lockheed Martin. In this sense, in March 2014 the leader of the Five Stars Movement (one of major political group represented in the Parliament) commented that one of the political reasons of a recent visit in Italy of US President Obama was to convince Italian authorities not to cut defence expenditure and, in particular, not to modify the purchase of the F-35 fighters.
However, being Italy a selling nation, the political influence is considered to be more significant at the domestic level. One should in fact consider that Italy has an advanced and well established defence industry (e.g. the State-controlled company “Finmeccanica”). In this context, there are a few examples which give evidence of substantial influence by the Italian companies operating in the latter sector.
Firstly, according to the Report of Chamber of Deputies’ Defence Committee session of 15 January 2015, the Democratic Party Group Leader in the Committee (Mr. Gian Piero Scanu) “manifested his disappointment for the pressures which – from many parts – have been exercised with intensity on many Committee’s members in order to guide the Commission’s opinion.” Furthermore, he wished that the Committee could carry out a serious and careful work, without the “pressures of lobbies”. The discussion concerned the decision to purchase 4 warships.
Secondly, on 9 February 2015 the CEO of Finmeccanica (Mr Moretti) intervened in a conference organized by the “Centre for High Defence Studies” (“Centro Alti Studi di Difesa”) and asserted that Italy should “spend more” in the defence system in order to “align with other countries”; furthermore, it declared that “to politics, we should ask not only more money, but also more certain multiyear plans”.
Although expenditure may well be formally justified by reference to military needs, the latter examples lead to question the real drivers of some acquisition decisions.

COMMENTS -+

•tFinmeccanica’s website, Share capital and Shareholders base: http://www.finmeccanica.com/en/investors/titolo-borsa-share-price/capitale-azionariato-1
•t“Grillo: «Obama in Italia per gli F35» Pinotti rassicura sui tagli”, Corriere della Sera, 28 March 2014, available at http://www.corriere.it/politica/14_marzo_28/grillo-contro-obama-teme-tagli-f35-pinotti-no-passi-indietro-066edb4a-b66f-11e3-ac02-19a792716bb3.shtml
•tReport of Chamber of Deputies’ Defence Committee session of 15 January 2015: http://documenti.camera.it/leg17/resoconti/commissioni/bollettini/pdf/2015/01/15/leg.17.bol0370.data20150115.com04.pdf
•t“Difesa: Moretti, Italia investa di piu' come altri Paesi”, Corriere della Sera, 9 February 2015: http://www.corriere.it/notizie-ultima-ora/Economia/Difesa-Moretti-Italia-investa-piu-altri-Paesi/09-02-2015/1-A_015869505.shtml

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The purchase of the F-35, was considered useless - it was made during a period of economic crisis, lobbying by the US is certainly one of the reason for this expensive decision.

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Italy has played a crucial role for the US during the Cold War for its geostrategic location and the electoral strength of then-Communist party (PCI). Equally, the US has turned into a fundamental major partner for the legitimisation of Italian political elites as well as a crucial market for Italian export. It is logical, therefore, that the US and Italy continue to have a &quoute;special relationship&quoute; also in the early 21st century. This mutual, though asymmetrical, interdependence can be a factor to explain the ongoing debate about the F-35 Joint Strike Fighters produced by the American Lockheed Martin, whose both cost and strategic necessity is constantly questioned. As a matter of fact, some commentators support the thesis that Italy should leave the programme and rather purchase the Eurofighter Typhoon. See:
- http://www.analisidifesa.it/2014/07/limitiamo-i-danni-e-rinunciamo-ora-allf-35/.
- http://www.repubblica.it/politica/2014/04/22/news/piano_governo_taglio_f35-84158866/.
In addition, as showed by the company's website, the shareholder base of Finmeccanica (Italy's by far largest defence company) reveals that only 7% of shares are Italian, while 43% comes from North America.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: Defence acquisition decisions are independent from political influence, because planning is made on a long-term basis according to the identification of capability gaps and technical and operational requirements to be fulfilled. Furthermore, the national defence industry is well-established, highly specialized and renowned at an international level. Foreign industry is very competitive and relations with foreign companies are often based on bilateral or multilateral defence cooperation. Most SMEs operate within highly specialized technology fields and well-established technological and scientific clusters.

Suggested score: 4

Government Reviewer-+