This country is placed in Band B

Australia’s GI ranking in Band B places it in the low risk of corruption category.  It scored in Band A, very low risk, for Personnel and Political risk (gaining the highest score in the region for Political risk). Australia’s aggregate score was brought down by Operations risk (Band D), the MoD’s highest risk area. To reduce corruption risk, TI suggests the following reforms of the security sector to build integrity.

Enhance Oversight of Secret Spending

The country demonstrates effective institutional structures to prevent corruption in its defence and security institutions, with some exceptionally good practices highlighted in the research, such as the appointment of an Independent National Security Legislation Monitor to ensure that secrecy on the basis of national security concerns does not infringe on the rights of its citizens. The impact of this measure could be increased by measures to reassure the public that the significant increases in funding to Australia’s intelligence agencies in recent years are being matched by appropriate oversight. There are provisions for the oversight of “secret” spending (defined here as spending on intelligence agencies and national security) by the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security. The Committee’s reports indicate that some information provided for oversight is omitted, and it was not possible to verify the extent of such exclusions.

We recommend that the Government ensure mandatory provisions are in place for oversight of all “secret” expenditure in closed Committee sessions and provides these committee members with extensive information on all spending on secret items, which includes detailed, line item descriptions of all expenditures. The exact proportion of expenditure for dedicated secret items does not appear to be available to the public.

Penalise Facilitation Payments

Facilitation payments in Australia are legal on the understanding that their value is small (though no financial limit has been stipulated in the Criminal Code) and their purpose narrow: namely, to expedite or secure a routine governmental action. The Australian Taxation Office notes special record-keeping obligations for facilitation payments, but it does not discourage them. In 2011, the government raised the possibility of an amendment to change Australia's law to exclude this exception, but the status of this proposal is unclear. The OECD 2012 report also expressed concern on this issue.  Although a follow up report in 2015 stated that good progress has been made on the previous report's recommendations, they also noted that changes in the legal framework were still required.

Build Integrity for Engagement in Military Operations

Australia has deployed approximately 2,241 personnel in overseas and in-country operations (as of September 2015), including significant deployment to complex operational environments in the Middle East. The increased risk of corruption in operations can undermine the legitimacy of missions, particularly to fragile and conflict-ridden environments. There appears to be limited recognition of corruption as a strategic issue in operations beyond the general anti-fraud framework in the Department of Defence. We recommend the incorporation of anti-corruption controls into Australia’s existing fraud control arrangements for military operations and the adoption of a comprehensive and detailed military doctrine addressing corruption issues for peace and conflict. The MoD could provide comprehensive guidelines and staff training on addressing corruption risks whilst on deployed operations or peacekeeping missions. It could also deploy trained professionals capable of monitoring corruption in the field who regularly report while on mission, with these reports made available to the public in summary form, at a minimum.

Leadership 30
01.
score
4

Is there formal provision for effective and independent legislative scrutiny of defence policy?

Australia is a federation and the national government under the Constitution has the power to legislate on defence matters (sections 51 (vi) and 119). The Australian bicameral Parliament has long adopted a process of legislative scrutiny through committees (1). This applies to Defence which is subject to scrutiny by ten Parliamentary committees (2, 3). The principal committees scrutinising defence matters are the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, one looking at legislation specifically and the other scrutinising more general policy matters (4, 5).

A common feature of Westminster Parliamentary systems, and Australia is no exception, is that members and Senators vote along party lines rather than as trustees or delegates. A feature of Westminsterian parliamentary systems, such as Australia, is that members of parliament typically vote along party lines, rather than as trustees or delegates. Nonetheless, this does not necessarily mean that parliament is unable to exercise effective oversight of defence policy. For example, in 2013, the prime minister issued a report “Strong and Secure: A Strategy for Australia’s National Security,” (6) which outlines steps the legislature is taking to support national security, for example, through updating laws, introducing better coordination of national security budgets, and appointing a national security advisor.

There is evidence of the parliamentary oversight of defence as can be seen in the sections relating to external oversight/accountability in Defence Annual Reports (2, 3). Parliament has also scrutinised individual Defence actions, for example, Defence providing incorrect information to parliament regarding a tender to procure a submarine (7).

Response to Peer Reviewers: Defence is accountable to four Senate committees: Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade—Legislation Committee (budget estimates), Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade—Legislation Committee (bills on defence trade export controls and legislative amendments), Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade—References Committee (procurement procedures), and Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs Legislation (bills regarding military courts) It is also accountable to six joint committees: Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade (defence annual reports), Joint Parliamentary Committee on Intelligence and Security (review of expenditures, reforms of national security legislation), Joint Standing Committee on the National Capital and External Territories (amenity within the Parliamentary Triangle), Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit (report on major projects), Parliamentary Standing Committee on Public Works (logistics facilities and housing), and Joint Standing Committee on Treaties (defence treaties). The main answer has been edited to reflect the correct number of committees.

Score challenges accepted. Score raised from 3 to 4, with further information added to the main comments for justification.

COMMENTS -+

(1) Australian Public Service Commission Foundations of Governance (accessed 8 April 2014) http://www.apsc.gov.au/publications-and-media/archive/publications-archive/foundations-of-governance
(2) Defence Annual Report 2012-13 (pages 119-120) http://www.defence.gov.au/AnnualReports/12-13/pdf/Defence%20Annual%20Report%202012-13.pdf (accessed 8 April 2014)
(3) Defence Annual Report 2013-14, Volume 1, Part 3 : Governance and Accountability,
http://www.defence.gov.au/annualreports/13-14/part-three/chapter-ten.asp (accessed 1 September 2015)
(4) Joint Standing Committee of Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade. History of the Committee http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Foreign_Affairs_Defence_and_Trade/History (accessed 8 April 2014).
(5) Senate Standing Committees on Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade. Role of the Committee http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Foreign_Affairs_Defence_and_Trade/Role_of_the_Committee (accessed 8 April 2014)
(6) Australian Policy Online &quoute;Strong and Secure: A Strategy for Australia’s National Security,” (2013) http://apo.org.au/files/Resource/dpmc_nationalsecuritystrategy_jan2013.pdf (accessed 23 September 2015)
(7) Brian Toohey, Let's get the facts right on submarines Australia may buy, Financial Review (1 May 2015), http://www.afr.com/opinion/lets-get-the-facts-right-on-submarines-australia-may-buy-20150301-13rv91(accessed 1 September 2015)

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: Although the Assessor's claims are correct (with the exception that in Source 2 there are nine joint committees listed instead of eight), I believe the claim that Australia's Westminster Parliamentary system dilutes legislative oversight is misplaced. Measures such as the National Security Legislation Amendment Act 2010 have been designed to be elastic and subject to regular parliamentary reviews and updates, while an independent National Security Legislation Monitor was established in 2011 to ensure that parliament provides the legislative oversight and scrutiny necessary to meet Australia's defence challenges (source for key points: http://apo.org.au/files/Resource/dpmc_nationalsecuritystrategy_jan2013.pdf).

Suggested score: 4

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: Parliament appears to have oversight over security, exercises budgetary power, and reviews or approves major arms procurements and decisions, and there is no evidence that this oversight is unclear or of uncertain quality. Specifically, Tables 5.3 and 5.4 of source (2) indicate that the following parliamentary committees have been involved in defence inquiries:
* Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence andTrade—Legislation Committee (budget estimates)
* Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence andTrade—Legislation Committee (bills on defence trade export controls and legislative amendments)
* Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence andTrade—References Committee (procurement procedures)
* Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs Legislation (bills regarding military courts)
* Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence andTrade (defence annual reports)
* Joint Parliamentary Committee on Intelligence and Security (review of expenditures, reforms of national security legislation)
* Joint Standing Committee on the National Capital and ExternalTerritories (amenity within the Parliamentary Triangle)
* Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit (report on major projects)
* Parliamentary Standing Committee on Public Works (logistics facilities and housing)
* Joint Standing Committee onTreaties (defence treaties)

Suggested score: 4

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

02.
score
4

Does the country have an identifiable and effective parliamentary defence and security committee (or similar such organisation) to exercise oversight?

Two committees have specific oversight obligations relating to defence. These are the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade and the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade. Both committees have the authority to call for witnesses and documents and request explanation for proposed expenditures from government officials and ministers (1) and (2). Committee proceedings, submissions and reports are made publicly available indicative of an effective scrutiny system which is transparent and promotes accountability (3).

The resolution establishing the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade does not discuss how the committee is to be funded. In terms of personnel resources, however, the committee is to consist of 32 members -- including 12 members of the House nominated by the governing party, 8 members of the House nominated by the opposition, 5 senators nominated by the governing party, 5 senators nominated by the opposition, and 2 senators nominated by any minority group or independent. (1, para. 3). The Joint Standing Committee regularly issues inquiries and reports on a wide range of topics. During the 43rd parliament (September 2010 to August 2013), the committee published the proceedings of 13 inquiries and 5 other reports. Of these, 2 inquiries and 3 other reports expressly related to defence. The inquiries related to reviews of the defence annual reports of 2010-2011 and 2011-2012. Thus far, the committee has only issued 2 reports during the current parliament. One of these was an inquiry relating to review of the defence annual report of 2012-2013. All of these reports are available on the Parliament website (5).

Per a 2009 order, the Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee consists of 2 committees: a Legislation Committee and a References Committee (6). The Legislation Committee deals with legislative issues, while the References Committee deals with other matters.

Each of these committees has 6 members. For the Legislation Committee, 3 are nominated by the senate leader, 2 by the opposition leader, and 1 by minority groups and independent senators. For the Reference Committee, 2 are nominated by the senate leader, 3 by the opposition leader, and 1 by minority groups and independent senators. These committees have the power to send for persons and documents, to move from place to place, and to meet and transact business in public or private session (regardless of whether parliament is in session). The standing order establishing the committee provides, &quoute;A committee shall be provided with all necessary staff, facilities and resources and shall be empowered to appoint persons with specialist knowledge for the purposes of the committee, with the approval of the President&quoute; (7).

COMMENTS -+

(1) Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence, and Trade. (2013) Resolution of Appointment http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/~/link.aspx?_id=D70AAF162277482DB939202EE1B1C4D3&_z=z (accessed 9 April 2014).
(2) Standing Orders of the Senate (2014) http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Senate/Powers_practice_n_procedures/~/media/8E3179C64A5F4DCB83D7A542741E1CB3.ashx (accessed 9 April 2014).
(3) OECD (no date) Profile of Committees of the Australian Parliament Undertaking Budget Review
http://www.oecd.org/governance/budgeting/42466703.pdf (accessed 9 April 2014).
(4) Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence, and Trade (no date) http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Foreign_Affairs_Defence_and_Trade
(5) Parliament of Australia website, Completed inquiries and reports, http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Foreign_Affairs_Defence_and_Trade/Completed_inquiries (accessed 22 August 2015)
(6) Senate Standing Committees on Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade, Role of the Committee, http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate (accessed 22 August 2015)2015)/Foreign_Affairs_Defence_and_Trade/Role_of_the_Committee
(7) Standing Order of the Senate 25, http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Senate/Powers_practice_n_procedures/standingorders (accessed 22 August 2015)

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: An additional link for the Senate Standing Committee: http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Foreign_Affairs_Defence_and_Trade

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

03.
score
4

Is the country's national defence policy debated and publicly available?

The major vehicle for the articulation and development of Australia’s defence policy is a series of ‘Defence White Papers’. The first Defence White Paper was released in 1976 and followed a major reassessment of Australia’s strategic defence interests following the Vietnam war. Since then, a further five Defence White Papers have been released, the latest in May 2013 (1). Following the change of government late in 2013, another Australian defence white paper process was announced for release in 2015 (yet to be released as of 10 October 2015) (2, 3). Defence White Papers are published online (2). An expert panel is selected to assist in the development of the White Paper and provide independent advice (4). There is a formal community consultation process; the Defence White Paper Community Consultation Program. Submissions to this program are published online (5, 6). While defence policy matters are openly discussed in the Australian Parliament, the Defence White Paper process is aimed at the community and preceded by a Ministerial announcement (7, 8, 9, 10, 11).

The debate about Australia’s defence policy takes place at an academic level as well as in the mainstream media. The article by Nicholas Stuart (7) is indicative of the interest that the mainstream media in Australia take in defence policy.

At least one political party (the Liberal Democratic Party) has a platform about the issue of Australia’s national defence (12).

COMMENTS -+

(1) Peter Jennings (2013) The Politics of Defence White Papers Security Challenges, Vol. 9, No. 2 (2013), pp. 1-14 http://www.securitychallenges.org.au/ArticlePDFs/SC9-2Jennings.pdf (accessed 9 April 2014). (2) Australian Government. Department of Defence 2013 Defence White Paper http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper2013/index.htm (accessed 9 April 2014)
(3) Australian Government. Department of Defence. 2015 Defence White Paper. http://www.defence.gov.au/Whitepaper/ (accessed 10 October 2015)
(4) Australian Government. Department of Defence. 2015 Defence White Paper. Expert Panel. http://www.defence.gov.au/Whitepaper/ExpertPanel.asp (accessed 10 October 2015)
(5) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Public Submissions to the 2013 Defence White Paper http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper2013/submissions.htm. (accessed 9 April 2014).
(6) Australian Government. Department of Defence. 2015 Defence White Paper. Community Consultation. http://www.defence.gov.au/Whitepaper/CommunityConsultation.asp (accessed 10 October 2015)
(7) Nicholas Stuart (2014) New enemies, new challenges for next defence white paper. Sydney Morning Herald, February 18, 2014. http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-opinion/new-enemies-new-challenges-for-next-defence-white-paper-20140217-32we9.html (accessed 9 April 2014).
(8) Richard Brabin Smith, Four Principles of Australian Defence Policy, APSI (17 May 2013), http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/four-principles-of-australian-defence-policy/ (accessed 1 September 2015)
(9) James Brown and Rory Medcalf, Fixing Australia's Incredible Defence Policy, Lowy Institute (8 Oct. 2013), http://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/fixing-australias-incredible-defence-policy (accessed 1 September 2015)
(10) Peter FitzSimons, Guess what, there's a `US' army unit here already, Sydney Morning Herald (18 Sept. 2003), http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2003/09/17/1063625090235.html?from=storyrhs (accessed 1 September 2015)
(11) Cynthia Banham, Dad’s Army: Age Shall Weary Them, Sydney Morning Herald (30 Dec. 2006), http://www.smh.com.au/news/world/dads-army-age-shall-weary-them/2006/12/29/1166895480077.html (accessed 1 September 2015)
(12) Liberal Democratic Party, Policies - Defence, http://www.ldp.org.au/index.php/policies/1218-policy-on-defence (accessed 1 September 2015)

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: While there is strong debate at the academic level and coverage in mainstream media, the level of understanding of Defence issues in the broader Australian public is weak. 'Popularist' media will often distort the real underlying issues which in turn will influence the short term views of politicians.

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

04.
score
2

Do defence and security institutions have a policy, or evidence, of openness towards civil society organisations (CSOs) when dealing with issues of corruption? If no, is there precedent for CSO involvement in general government anti-corruption initiatives?

Defence institutions are open towards civil society organisations although there does not appear to be evidence of engagement specifically on corruption issues.

While the Department of Defence has elaborate arrangements for community consultation on defence issues, including the Defence White Paper (1), these consultation arrangements do not specifically relate to anti-corruption activities. For the development of White Papers, an expert panel is selected to assist in its development and provide independent advice. This expert panel does not include representative specifically from civil society organisations, however (2). Similarly, the consultation arrangements through the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (3) have created a formal structure to engage civil society, however again, these do not specifically include anti-corruption issues. Transparency International Australia is active in anti-corruption consultations at the whole of government level but does not specifically focus upon corruption in defence administration (4).

The Civil-Military Operations doctrine of the Australian Defence Forces (ADF) states that the ADF must work with international organisations, non-government organisations (NGOs) and the civilian community (5). Again, there are no specific examples of engagement on anti-corruption.

COMMENTS -+

(1) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Consultation arrangements
http://www.defence.gov.au/consultation.asp. (accessed 24 November 2014).
(2) Australian Government. Department of Defence. 2015 Defence White Paper. Expert Panel. http://www.defence.gov.au/Whitepaper/ExpertPanel.asp (accessed 10 October 2015)
(3) Australian Strategic Policy Institute. About ASPI. https://www.aspi.org.au/about-aspi. (accessed 10 April 2014).
(4) Transparency International. http://transparency.org.au. (accessed 1 September 2015).
(5) ADF Operations Series ADDP 3.11 “Civil- Military Operations”, Edition 2, 2009, Defence Publishing Service, Department of Defence, Canberra ACT 2600, http://www.defence.gov.au/adfwc/Documents/DoctrineLibrary/ADDP/ADDP3.11-Civil-MilitaryOperations.pdf.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Although the Defence White Paper (1) discusses consultation with &quoute;stakeholders,&quoute; it does not specifically refer to civil society organisations.

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: There is a general apathy, particularly at a Federal Government level, that corruption might be a possibility.

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

05.
score
4

Has the country signed up to international anti-corruption instruments such as, but not exclusively or necessarily, UNCAC and the OECD Convention? (In your answer, please specify which.)

Australia has signed and ratified both the UNCAC (ratified December 2005) and the OECD Anti- Bribery Convention (ratified October 1999) (1). Also Australia is a member of the G20 Anti-Corruption Working Group and participated in the negotiation and development of the G20 Anti-Corruption Action Plan. Additionally, Australia is actively engaged in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Anti-Corruption and Transparency Experts Task Force and the Asian Development Bank OECD Anti-Corruption Initiative for the Asia Pacific.

The 2012 UNCAC implementation review of Australia is generally positive, although it does note issues with regard to facilitation payments in Australia. However, it should be noted that this review was a desk review of legislation, rather than a review of Australia's enforcement of its laws (2).

A 2012 report on the implementation of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention in Australia highlighted that the overall enforcement of the foreign bribery offence was &quoute;extremely low&quoute; (3). In another follow-up report in April 2015, however, the OECD noted that Australia had made good progress on implementing the 2012 report's recommendations, with &quoute;16 out of 33 recommendations fully implemented, 9 partially implemented and 8 not implemented&quoute;. Significantly, the report noted that improvements had been made in regard to policy and operations in relation to foreign bribery (4).

Response to Peer Reviewer 1: Accepted. The 2015 follow up report by the OECD (added to the main answer) highlights progress made in regard to foreign bribery. Score 3 does not stand up in Australia's case as it signifies limited compliance to both conventions. Score maintained.

COMMENTS -+

(1) Australia. Attorney-General’s Department. Global leadership in Combatting Corruption. http://www.ag.gov.au/CrimeAndCorruption/AntiCorruption/Pages/Globalleadershipincombatingcorruption.aspx. (accessed 11 April 2014).
(2) Conference of the States Parties to the United Nations Convention against Corruption, Review of implementation of the United Nations Convention against Corruption, 18 - 22 June 2012, Australia, www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/WorkingGroups/ImplementationReviewGroup/ExecutiveSummaries/V1253616e.pdf (accessed 10 October 2015)
(3) OECD, Australia - OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, &quoute;Phase 3 Report on Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention in Australia&quoute; October 2012, www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/Australiaphase3reportEN.pdf (accessed 10 October 2015)
(4) OECD, Australia - OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, &quoute;Australia: Follow up to the Phase 3 Report and Recommendations, April 2015&quoute;, www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/Australia-Phase-3-Follow-up-Report-ENG.pdf (accessed 10 October 2015)

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: The OECD Working Group on Bribery's annual report on bribery for 2013 (http://www.oecd.org/corruption/anti-bribery/CompilationofRecommendationsP3Reports_December2013.pdf) finds that Australia has had extremely low enforcement of its agreement to combat foreign bribery. The report notes that in Australia's most recent evaluation period 28 foreign bribery referrals were received by the Australian Federal Police, only one case led to prosecutions, while 21 others were dismissed without charges.

Suggested score: 3

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Australia is also a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: Although Australia has 'signed-up' to all the relevent anti-corrution instruments, the last OECD country review (2013) indicated there were deficiencies in the area of facilitation payments and prosecutions. I don't believe there is justification to give the top rating in this case.

Suggested score: 3

TI Reviewer-+

06.
score
4

Is there evidence of regular, active public debate on issues of defence? If yes, does the government participate in this debate?

There is ongoing vigorous debate on defence issues in Australia. This debate is multi-layered. Academic think tanks like the Lowy Institute (1) and the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (2) actively research and comment upon defence issues, each having online journals. As discussed in Question 3, the expert panel formulated for consultation on the 2015 Defence White Paper hosts two representatives from the Australian Strategic Policy Institute and one from academia (3). Further, there is a formal community consultation process; the Defence White Paper Community Consultation Program (4). There are a number of other specialty journals which are specifically dedicated to Australian defence issues (5, 6). At the level of the mainstream media, there is frequent discussion of defence issues. One national newspaper has a specific defence column which regularly publishes on defence issues (7) and a number of mainstream media journalists specialise in defence matters. Defence issues feature often on television news programs, a recent community debate about sexual harassment in defence forces received widespread publicity; the reference is indicative of this recent debate (8). A number of interest groups also contribute to the public debate on defence issues (9). The debate on defence issues also is encouraged by the Department of Defence, the Australian Defence Force (ADF) and the government. The Department of defence has an active media unit (10) and fulfils its obligations under the Freedom of Information Act to publish key documents about defence issues (11). As well as the Defence White Paper discussed earlier, the Department sponsors the Australian Defence Force Posture Review in which the public is directly involved and informed of the Australian defence forces capability to meet future strategic challenges (12). At the political level Ministers of Defence are very keen to have their views heard. The current Minister of Defence issues between 8 and 10 media releases each month. In summary, there is an active community debate on defence which involves all levels from academic experts through to community groups (13).

New legislation passed in late September 2014 makes it unlawful to disclose information about a special intelligence operation. (14). Offenders can face up to 5 years imprisonment. Soon after the act was passed, Prime Minister Tony Abbott appointed an independent national security legislation monitor, in order to review the effect of this act. (15). The national security monitor has issued a call for submissions regarding 35P (16), and Human Rights Watch has already submitted a letter raising issues with the law. (17). Despite a flurry of media activity immediately following passage of the act, the media appears to have paid little attention to the law since late 2014. It is unclear whether the new legislation may impact the level of debate in the country. Consultations with the public and the appointment of an independent monitor are likely to be strong safeguards, however.

COMMENTS -+

(1) Lowy Institute (no date), 2013 Defence White Paper, http://www.lowyinstitute.org/news-and-media/hot-topic/2013-defence-white-paper. (accessed 11 April 2014).
(2) ASPI Journal articles. (no date) https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/journal-articles. (accessed 11 April 2014).
(3) Australian Government. Department of Defence. 2015 Defence White Paper. Expert Panel. http://www.defence.gov.au/Whitepaper/ExpertPanel.asp (accessed 10 October 2015)
(4) Australian Government. Department of Defence. 2015 Defence White Paper. Community Consultation. http://www.defence.gov.au/Whitepaper/CommunityConsultation.asp (accessed 10 October 2015)
(5) Australia Pacific Defence Review (no date) http://www.asiapacificdefencereporter.com (accessed 15 April 2014).
(6) Security Challenges. (no date) http://www.securitychallenges.org.au. (accessed 11 April 2014).
(7) The Australian National Affairs – Defence (no date) http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/defence. (accessed 11April 2014).
(8) Australian Broadcasting Corporation. Four Corners Culture of Silence (2011) http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/content/2011/s3239681.htm. (accessed 15 April 2014).
(9) Australian Defence Association Preliminary comment on the 2013 Defence White Paper. (no date) http://ada.asn.au/commentary/formal-comment/2013/2013-defence-white-paper.html. (accessed 9 April 2014).
(10) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Publications, reports & documents. (no date) http://www.defence.gov.au/header/publications.htm. (accessed 11April 2014).
(11) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Australian Defence Force Posture Review. http://www.defence.gov.au/oscdf/adf-posture-review/docs/final/default.htm (accessed 11 April 2014).
(12) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Information Publication Scheme (no date) http://www.defence.gov.au/ips/index.htm. (accessed 11 April 2014).
(13) Minister for Defence. Media Releases (2014) http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/johnston-media-release-archive/ (accessed 15 April 2014)
(14) Paul Farrell, Journalists and whistleblowers will go to jail under new national security laws, Guardian (25 Sept. 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/sep/26/journalists-and-whistleblowers-will-go-to-jail-under-new-national-security-laws (accessed 10 October, 2015)
(15) Paul Farrell, Roger Gyles appointed Australia's national security monitor, Guardian (7 Dec. 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2014/dec/08/roger-gyles-appointed-australias-national-security-monitor (accessed 10 October, 2015)
(16) Australian Government. Office of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. Independent National Security Legislation Monitor, http://www.dpmc.gov.au/pmc/about-pmc/core-priorities/independent-national-security-legislation-monitor (accessed 10 October, 2015)
(17) Human Rights Watch, Australia: Submission to the Office of the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor (20 Apr. 2015), https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/04/20/australia-submission-office-independent-national-security-legislation-monitor; (accessed 10 October, 2015)
(8) Law Council of Australia, Section 35P –
Unauthorised Disclosure of Information relating to a special intelligence operation, http://www.lawcouncil.asn.au/lawcouncil/images/2015_02_23_Section_35P_factsheet_web.pdf (accessed 10 October, 2015)

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

07.
score
3

Does the country have an openly stated and actively implemented anti-corruption policy for the defence sector?

The approach of the Australian Government to governance matters is to have broad whole-of-government policies which may be then tailored to fit specific sectors. Currently, there is no whole-of-government anti-corruption policy. In September 2011, Australia announced the development of a National Anti-Corruption Plan and conducted a public consultation process that was not completed before the change in government in 2013. Among other bodies, Transparency International Australia made a detailed submission (1). However, as of April 2014 the government has not committed to a National Anti-Corruption Plan (2). The lack of action on the Plan has been the subject of media comment, including by Transparency International Australia. (3).

The Australian Government does have a whole-of-government fraud control policy, with the centrepiece the Commonwealth Fraud Control Framework 2014 (4) that have the authority of a legislative instrument by virtue of the Legislative Instruments Act 2003 and regulations under the Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997. It establishes 'Fraud Rules' and a 'Fraud Policy' which is binding on all non-corporate Commonwealth entities. Further, it requires fraud risk assessments to be undertaken and followed up with fraud control plans by all institutions covered, for which each institution is to adopt the methodology of the government's recognised standards &quoute;Australian/New Zealand Standard AS/NZ ISO 31000-2009 Risk Management—Principles and Guidelines and Australian Standard AS 8001-2008 Fraud and Corruption Control&quoute;. The Department of Defence has also developed its own fraud control plan which considers corruption and ethics within the scope of the plan (5). Its 2013-2014 annual report discusses implementation of its fraud control program, which has included embedding personnel in the Commonwealth Fraud and Anti-Corruption Centre and providing face to face and e-learning courses for defence personnel (6).

Interviewee A indicated that, notwithstanding the lack of a national anti-corruption plan, Defence was proceeding to develop a specific anti-corruption plan. That process would occur within the legal framework of the fraud control arrangements. The Secretary of Defence has agreed to that process and specific anti-corruption training has commenced for senior officers and will be rolled out to Defence personnel in the future. The next Defence fraud control plan will include an anti-corruption plan.

COMMENTS -+

(1) Transparency International Australia. (2012) A Ten-Point Integrity Plan for the Australian Government: Submission by Transparency International Australia on the Proposed National Anti-Corruption Plan http://transparency.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/2012-TIA-NACP-Subv2-FINAL.pdf. (accessed 10 April 2014).
(2) Australian Government. Attorney-General’s Department. Global Leadership in combatting corruption.(no date) http://www.ag.gov.au/CrimeAndCorruption/AntiCorruption/Pages/Globalleadershipincombatingcorruption.aspx. (accessed 15 April 2014).
(3) Robert Wyld (2013) Australia's lack of a clear corruption policy is disturbing. Sydney Morning Herald March 19, 2013 http://www.smh.com.au/comment/australias-lack-of-a-clear-corruption-policy-is-disturbing-20130319-2gcou.html. (accessed 10 April 2014). https://senate.aph.gov.au/submissions/comittees/viewdocument.aspx?id=32b4684d-1cb8-4210-a8b0-9a310bb6d85f. (accessed 16 April 2014).
(4) Australian Government. Commonwealth Fraud Control Framework 2014, https://www.ag.gov.au/CrimeAndCorruption/FraudControl/Pages/FraudControlFramework.aspx#frame (Accessed 10 October 2015)
(5) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Defence Fraud Control Plan No. 10. http://www.defence.gov.au/afc/pdf/FraudControlPlan10.pdf
(6) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Annual Report 2013 - 2014. Part III. http://www.defence.gov.au/annualreports/13-14/part-three/chapter-nine.asp
(7) Interviewee A – Official of the Department of Defence, 18 February 2015.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: An update from June 2014 (http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-06-23/national-corruption-plan-didnt-include-independent-watchdog/5541908) which reviews the proposed national anti-corruption plan found serious flaws in the proposed legislative framework, including the lack of an independent anti-corruption watchdog.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

08.
score
3

Are there independent, well-resourced, and effective institutions within defence and security tasked with building integrity and countering corruption?

Neither the Department of Defence nor the Australian Defence Force (ADF) have a specifically targeted anti-corruption administrative element. The Department has actively implemented the whole-of-government policies on fraud control (1). The Department has a dedicated Audit and Fraud Control Division (2) and a branch specifically for the investigation of audit and fraud issues.

Defence also has a sophisticated military justice structure overseen by the Inspector General of the Australian Defence Forces, who, within the defence administration, has an autonomous role overseeing fraud control issues. That includes the promotion of ethical conduct throughout the Australian Defence Forces (3) (4). This administrative element is responsible for a range of military justice issues that impact upon, but do not explicitly include, corruption.

The Australian Attorney-General's Department leads Australia's engagement and compliance with UN and OECD anti-corruption measures. To this end, it publishes information about foreign bribery on its website (6). The Commonwealth Ombudsman also operates as the Defence Ombudsman and independently handles complaints about maladministration (7).

The Department of Defence’s 2013-14 Annual Report indicates that Defence registered 288 fraud investigations during that time period, with 322 investigations completed (some were registered in previous years) (8). Around 25 per cent of the investigations led to criminal, disciplinary, or administrative action.

The score has been selected on the basis that while dedicated institutions do exist which address fraud and the promotion of ethics, there cab be a more comprehensive approach to building integrity and countering corruption.

COMMENTS -+

(1) Australia. Attorney-General’s Department. Fraud Control Framework. http://www.ag.gov.au/CrimeAndCorruption/FraudControl/Pages/FraudControlFramework.aspx (accessed 22 May 2014).
(2) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Audit and Fraud Control Division http://www.defence.gov.au/AuditFraudControl/(accessed 15 April 2014)
(3) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Defence and the Private Sector: An Ethical Relationship http://www.defence.gov.au/AFC/pdf/PrivateSector.pdf. (accessed 15 April 2014).
(4) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Ethics Matters Handbook. http://www.defence.gov.au/AFC/pdf/Ethics-Matter-Handbook.pdf (accessed 15 April 2014).
(5) Transparency International Australia. (2011) Submission to the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Inquiry into Procurement Procedures for Defence capital projects.
(6) Attorney-General's Department, Foreign Bribery,
http://www.ag.gov.au/CrimeAndCorruption/Foreignbribery/Pages/default.aspx (last visited 31 Aug. 2015
(7) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Military Justice: Organisations. http://www.defence.gov.au/mjs/Organisations.asp. (accessed 10 October 2015).
(8) Australian Government. Department of Defence’s 2013-14 Annual Report of http://www.defence.gov.au/annualreports/13-14/DAR_1314_V1.pdf p. 153

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

09.
score
3

Does the public trust the institutions of defence and security to tackle the issue of bribery and corruption in their establishments?

General trust in institutions in Australia is mid-range in global comparisons but is improving (1) and (2). Defence and the ADF have an excellent record in terms of corruption and public trust in the Defence overall is high. One opinion poll surveying respondents about trust in national institutions found that Defence was rated as the most trustworthy Australian public-sector institution, noting that this was a general rating and did not specifically relate to corruption (1). Some indication that corruption in Defence is not concerning the public can be ascertained from polling that found Defence is rated as efficient as other government entities in the management of its funding (3).

At the same time, even though trust in Defence is high compared to trust in other public institutions, it is not a perfect trust. According to a February 2012 poll by Essential Report, only 41 per cent of those surveyed had “a lot of trust” in the ADF, with 37 per cent at “some trust,” 13 per cent at “a little trust,” and 4 per cent at “no trust” (4). The Global Corruption Barometer 2013 found that from the 12 institutions surveyed, the military was perceived to be the fourth most corrupt institution, with 25 per cent of respondents perceiving it as &quoute;extremely corrupt&quoute; (5). A few incidents of concern have arisen in recent years that may have undermined trust (6, 7).

In short, while there is general trust in Defence, there are shortcomings as well. Note, however, that this trust largely relates to Defence's general functioning, not to corruption specifically.

Response to Peer Reviewer 1: The conclusion and scoring for this question is geared towards overall trust in Defence, not in comparison to other government institutions or wider government more broadly. Score maintained.

(Relevant information from both Peer Reviewers has been added to the main answer)

COMMENTS -+

(1) Australian Government. Australian Bureau of Statistics. Trust. http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Lookup/1370.0main+features422013 (accessed 22 May 2014).
(2) Edelman Trust Barometer. Global Results (page 6)
http://www.edelman.com/insights/intellectual-property/2014-edelman-trust-barometer/about-trust/global-results/ (accessed 22 May 2014).
(3) McAllister, I. (2009). Public Opinion Towards Defence and Foreign Affairs: Results form the ANU Poll (page 5). https://lyceum.anu.edu.au/wp-content/blogs/3/uploads//ANU%20Poll%20Defence%20Report%201.pdf (accessed 22 May 2014).
(4) Essential Report. (2013) Trust in Institutions http://www.essentialvision.com.au/trust-in-institutions (Accessed 31 August 2015)
(5) Transparency International, Global Corruption Barometer 2013, Australia, http://www.transparency.org/gcb2013/country?country=australia (Accessed 31 August 2015)
(6) Brian Agnew, Building Trust: Civil-Military Relations in Australia, Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies Shedden Papers (Dec. 2012), http://www.defence.gov.au/ADC/Publications/Shedden/2012/AGNEW%20CM%20Relations%202.pdf (Accessed 31 August 2015)
(7) Department of Defence, Beyond Compliance: Professionalism, Trust and Capability in the Australian Profession of Arms (2011), http://www.defence.gov.au/pathwaytochange/docs/personalconductpersonnel/Review%20of%20Personal%20Conduct%20of%20ADF%20Personnel_full%20report.pdf (Accessed 31 August 2015)

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: I do not disagree with anything the Assessor claimed. However, I believe the evidence presented as well as the sources provided indicate that trust in defence exceeds the middling trust placed in governmental institutions as a whole and warrant the score of 4, despite a shortage of explicit and direct evidence linking public trust and defence anti-corruption efforts.

Suggested score: 4

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Essential Research notes that trust in the Australian Defence Force is higher than trust in other Australian institutions. See Essential Report, Trust in Institutions (2012), http://essentialvision.com.au/trust-in-institutions; see also Bernard Keane, Essential: still bad for Labor; ADF most trusted institution, Crikey (2012), http://www.crikey.com.au/2012/02/06/essential-still-bad-for-labor-adf-most-trusted-institution/?wpmp_switcher=mobile.

Note that discussions have occurred both within and without the Australian Defence Force regarding trust in the Australian Defence Force. See Brian Agnew, Building Trust: Civil-Military Relations in Australia (2012), http://www.defence.gov.au/ADC/docs/cdss2012/AGNEW%20CM%20Relations%202.pdf; Australian Department of Defence, Beyond Compliance: Professionalism, Trust and Capability in the Australian Profession of Arms: Report of the Australian Defence Force Personal Conduct Review (2011), http://www.defence.gov.au/PathwayToChange/Docs/PersonalConductPersonnel/Review%20of%20Personal%20Conduct%20of%20ADF%20Personnel_full%20report.pdf;

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

10.
score
3

Are there regular assessments by the defence ministry or another government agency of the areas of greatest corruption risk for ministry and armed forces personnel, and do they put in place measures for mitigating such risks?

According to assessments by Australian state institutions, there is a low risk of corruption in defence: recent annual reports of the Australian Federal Police (1), (2) and the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions (3), (4) do not record any corruption investigations nor prosecutions relating to Defence. There are occasional media reports on corruption in Defence (5) and (6).

While there is no specific requirement for a regular assessment of corruption risk, the Commonwealth Fraud Control Framework 2014 (7) requires regular in depth risk assessments of all Commonwealth functions. It establishes 'Fraud Rules' and a 'Fraud Policy' which is binding on all non-corporate Commonwealth entities, requiring fraud risk assessments to be undertaken and followed up with fraud control plans by all institutions covered. Its 2013-2014 annual report discusses implementation of its fraud control program, which has included embedding personnel in the Commonwealth Fraud and Anti-Corruption Centre and providing face to face and e-learning courses for defence personnel (8). Fraud risk assessments and fraud control plans may be subject to review by the Australian National Audit Office and also the Home Affairs Minister has the discretion to direct Attorney-General’s Department to review risk assessments and control plans.

Interviewee A indicated that, notwithstanding the lack of a national anti-corruption plan, Defence was proceeding to develop an anti-corruption plan. That process would occur within the legal framework of the fraud control arrangements. The Secretary of Defence has agreed to that process and specific anti-corruption training has commenced for senior officers and will be rolled out to Defence personnel in the future. The next Defence fraud control plan will include an anti-corruption plan.

Response to Peer Reviewer 2: The Commonwealth Fraud Control Framework 2014 requires fraud risk assessments to be undertaken and followed up with fraud control plans by all institutions covered, for which each institution is to adopt the methodology of the government's recognised standards &quoute;Australian/New Zealand Standard AS/NZ ISO 31000-2009 Risk Management—Principles and Guidelines and Australian Standard AS 8001-2008 Fraud and Corruption Control&quoute;. As mentioned above, implementation of the fraud control program has included embedding personnel in the Commonwealth Fraud and Anti-Corruption Centre and providing face to face and e-learning courses for defence personnel (8). Further, as stated by you, the Department's Ethics Matters Handbook does indicate a broader understanding of fraud to include corruption, bribery and abuse of office within its scope. While there is room to focus the remit of the risk assessments more strongly on corruption, score 1 is too low, given the regularity of assessments and their scope, which does encompass corruption as well. Score 3 awarded.

COMMENTS -+

(1) Australian Federal Police. Annual report 2011-12 http://www.afp.gov.au/media-centre/publications/annual-reports/~/media/afp/pdf/a/afp-annual-report-2011-2012.ashx. (accessed 17 April 2014).
(2) Australian Federal Police. Annual report 2012-13. http://www.afp.gov.au/media-centre/publications/~/media/afp/pdf/a/afp-annual-report-2012-2013.ashx. (accessed 17 April 2014).
(3) Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions. Annual report 2011-12. Page 119. http://www.cdpp.gov.au/wp-content/uploads/CDPP-Annual-Report-2011-2012.pdf.(accessed 17 April 2014).
(4) Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions. Annual report 2012-13. Page 128 http://www.cdpp.gov.au/wp-content/uploads/CDPP-Annual-Report-2012-2013.pdf. (accessed 17 April 2014).
(5) Richard Baker and Nick McKenzie (2012) When things go wrong at sea. Sydney Morning Herald (29/09/2012) www.smh.com.au/national/when-things-go-wrong-at-sea-20120928-26qrs.html. (accessed 17 April 2014)
(6) Des Houghton (2012) The security breach Defence tried to hide. Courier Mail 3 March 2012, http://www.couriermail.com.au/ipad/the-security-breach-defence-tried-to-hide/story-fn6ck620-1226287784790. (accessed 17 April 2014).
(7) Attorney-General's Department, Fraud Control Framework https://www.ag.gov.au/CrimeAndCorruption/FraudControl/Pages/FraudControlFramework.aspx (Accessed 31 Aug. 2015)
(8) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Annual Report 2013 - 2014. Part III. http://www.defence.gov.au/annualreports/13-14/part-three/chapter-nine.asp
(9) Interviewee A – Official of the Department of Defence, 18 February 2015

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: Risk assessment for fraud occurs, but not for corruption generally. The meaning of the term &quoute;fraud&quoute; is unclear in Department of Defence materials. Defence Fraud Control Plan No. 10 (2013) defines fraud as only one part of the more general term of corruption. See p.2, http://www.defence.gov.au/afc/pdf/FraudControlPlan10.pdf. However, the Department's Ethics Matters Handbooks defines fraud more broadly to include bribery, corruption, and abuse of office. See p.9, http://www.defence.gov.au/AFC/pdf/Ethics-Matter-Handbook.pdf. Thus, it is unclear to what extent the mandatory fraud training includes corruption more generally. Given that the Defence Fraud Control Plan directly deals with the obligation of conducting a risk assessment, it would seem that this definition would apply in this case. Thus, an assessment of fraud would count only as a &quoute;partial assessment&quoute; of corruption. Furthermore, news reports cited by the assessor show that a risk of corruption exists, making a full corruption risk assessment all the more important.

Suggested score: 1

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

11.
score
4

Does the country have a process for acquisition planning that involves clear oversight, and is it publicly available?

Yes. Acquisition planning in Australian Defence is subject to comprehensive policies and procedures set out in two publicly available documents: the Defence Procurement Policy Manual (1) and the Defence Capability Development Handbook (2). In July 2015, the Defence Materiel Organisation (DMO) was superseded by the Capability Acquisition and Sustainability Group (CASG) which is the primary organisation dealing with acquisition planning (3).

The most recent version of the Defence Capability Plan (2012) (4). The 2013 Defence White Paper indicated that a new DCP was in the process of development, but this does not appear to have occurred yet (5). A 10 year DCP is to be developed following release of the 2015 Defence White Paper (6).

The CASG’s website explains that it is accountable to the Australian government, Secretary of Defence, Chief of Defence Force, capability managers and capability development group, ADF personnel, Australia’s defence industry, international partners, Australia’s public, and each other (7).

Ministerial oversight of Defence procurement is the responsibility of the Minister for Defence and Assistant Minister for Defence. Ministers administer the acquisition function through the CASG (formerly the DMO) that is part of the Department of Defence. Governance and accountability arrangements for the CASG are set out in the Defence Annual Report (8).

The Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) undertook reviews of major projects of the DMO every two years. The most recent version (2013-2014) is avaiable on the CASG website (9). In addition, the ANAO has regularly audited defence activities. For example, one of the current audits in process deals with
procurement issues (10).

In the past there has been criticism of the acquisition process (11) and there is a history of reviews leading to the current arrangements (12), (13).

COMMENTS -+

(1) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Defence Procurement Policy Manual, September 2015, www.defence.gov.au/casg/Multimedia/DPPM_September_2015-9-5247.pdf.
(2) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Defence capability development handbook 2012. http://www.defence.gov.au/publications/DefenceCapabilityDevelopmentHandbook2012.pdf. (accessed 19 April 2014).
(3) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Capability Acquisition and Sustainability Group http://www.defence.gov.au/casg/AboutCASG/
(4) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Defence Capability Plan 2012. http://www.defence.gov.au/publications/CapabilityPlan2012.pdf)
(5) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Defence White Paper 2013. p. 89 of http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/2013/docs/WP_2013_web.pdf
(6) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Defence White Paper 2015. http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/
(7) Department of Defence, About CASG, Who We Are (last visited 1 Sept. 2015), http://www.defence.gov.au/dmo/AboutCASG/WhoWeAre/
(8) Defence Annual Report 2013-14, http://www.defence.gov.au/annualreports/13-14/ (accessed 1 September 2015)
(9) Australian National Audit Office. 2013–14 Major Projects Report. Defence Materiel Organisation.
http://www.defence.gov.au/dmo/Multimedia/ANAO-Report_2013-2014.pdf.
(10) Australian National Audit Office. &quoute;Test and Evaluation of Major Defence Equipment Acquisitions&quoute;) (ANAO, Audit Work Program (July 2015), http://www.anao.gov.au/html/Files/Audit%20Work%20Programs/2015/section_2/defence.html).
at http://www.defence.gov.au/dmo/Multimedia/ANAO-Report_2013-2014.pdf.
(11) Parliament of Australia. Parliamentary Library. Lessons of the Collins submarine program for improved oversight of Defence procurement. Research Paper 3 2001-02. http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/rp0102/02RP03. (accessed 19 April 2014).
(12) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Defence Procurement Review (Kinnaird Review, 2003) http://www.defence.gov.au/publications/dpr180903.pdf. (accessed 19 April 2014).
(13) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Going to the next level: The report of the Defence procurement and sustainment review. (Mortimer Report 2008) http://www.defence.gov.au/publications/mortimerreview.pdf. (accessed 19 April 2014).

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

12.
score
4

Is the defence budget transparent, showing key items of expenditure? This would include comprehensive information on military R&D, training, construction, personnel expenditures, acquisitions, disposal of assets, and maintenance.

All expenditures by the Australian government occur through appropriation bills passed by both Houses of Parliament. Details of the budget are available publicly (1). For particular areas of the budget like Defence, the budget is described broadly by Ministerial statement (2) and in detail in the portfolio budgetary statements (3).

COMMENTS -+

(1) Australian Government. Budget 2014-15. www.defence.gov.au/Budget/14-15/pbs/index.htm. (accessed 19 April 2014).
(2) Minister for Defence – Budget 2013-14: Defence Budget Overview. http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/2013/05/14/minister-for-defence-budget-2013-14-defence-budget-overview/. (accessed 19 April 2014). (3) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Portfolio Budget Statements 2013-13. http://www.defence.gov.au/budget/12-13/pbs/index.htm. (accessed 19 April 2014).

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Source 3 links to the defence budget for 2012-13. The link for the most recent Portfolio Budget Statement (2014-15) is http://www.defence.gov.au/Budget/14-15/pbs/index.htm.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

12A.
score
4

Is there a legislative committee (or other appropriate body) responsible for defence budget scrutiny and analysis in an effective way, and is this body provided with detailed, extensive, and timely information on the defence budget?

Under the 2012 Defence Capability Development Handbook (1, 2), approval of capability development projects is a two phase process. First, the relevant defence committee submits a 'First Pass' capability development proposal for government approval, which may rest with the minister, Cabinet's National Security Committee, or with the cabinet as a whole, depending on the importance of the project. After First Pass approval is obtained, the Defence Materiel Organisation (DMO) and other groups refine (if necessary) the proposal in preparation for Second Pass approval. Once Second Pass approval is obtained, Defence may proceed to tender. In 2015, DMO was replaced with CASG. It is unclear whether CASG follows this same two pass system with regard to developing projects.

Budgetary oversight occurs through the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade which reviews each Defence Annual Report, including its reports on expenditure (3). The resolution of appointment of the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade (2013) establishes the Committee's powers to call witnesses, conduct proceedings, sit in public or private (4, 4). Defence also falls within the purview of the Senate Estimates Committee process where senior officials are called before the Senate to answer questions on budgetary and other issues. Specifically, the Senate Estimates (Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation) Committee (6) conducts hearings into Defence matters and publishes transcripts and reports. Both committees are provided with detailed information to perform scrutiny.

COMMENTS -+

(1)tAustralian Government. Department of Defence, Defence Capability Development Handbook 2012. http://www.defence.gov.au/publications/DefenceCapabilityDevelopmentHandbook2012.pdf;
(2)tAustralian Government. Department of Defence. &quoute;Going to the Next Level: The Report of the Defence Procurement and Sustainment Review&quoute; Mortimer Report. p. 11 http://www.defence.gov.au/publications/mortimerReview.pdf
(3) Joint Standing Committee of Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade. History of the Committee http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Foreign_Affairs_Defence_and_Trade/History (accessed 8 April 2014).
(4) Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Resolution of Appointment. http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Foreign_Affairs_Defence_and_Trade/~/link.aspx?_id=D70AAF162277482DB939202EE1B1C4D3&_z=z
(5) Derek Wollner, Getting in Early: Lessons of the Collins Submarine Program for Improved Oversight of Defence Procurement, Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Group, Research Paper 3 2001-02 (2001), http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/rp0102/02RP03#).
(6) Senate Estimates (Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation) Committee. http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Senate_Estimates/fadtctte/estimates/index. (accessed 22 April 2014).

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

12B.
score
4

Is the approved defence budget made publicly available? In practice, can citizens, civil society, and the media obtain detailed information on the defence budget?

As well as the measures described in Question 12; Australia follows the Westminster system of a budget speech every year by the Treasurer. The Opposition Leader has the right of reply two days later. As well, there is a convention of the Treasurer and senior officials spending the day before the budget behind locked doors briefing media outlets and any interested parties. In that lockout, the participants have advanced access to budget documents so that when the budget is formally presented, the media can make informed commentary on the budget. Defence, as a major budget item of expenses (approximately 2 per cent of GDP) plays a central role in that process and attracts a lot of media attention. Additionally, specialist defence publications like the Australian Defence Magazine (4), the Australian Defence Business Review (5) and the Asia Pacific Defence Reporter (6) provide commentary on the annual Defence budgets.

Australia’s government website contains detailed information about its overall state budget (1). The Parliament of Australia publishes a defence budget overview for each fiscal year (7). This does not discuss specific defence expenses in detail, but does provide a general overview of how defence spending has changed over the past years.

In addition, the Department of Defence publishes three statutory reports on the budget portion of its website: Portfolio Budget Statements, Portfolio Additional Estimates Statements, and Annual Reports (8).

Citizens can request information from the Department of Defence (DOD) under the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (FOI Act). The DOD website includes instructions on how to make such a request (9, 10).

In addition, the public has the ability to follow parliamentary debates regarding the Defence budget.

COMMENTS -+

(1) Australian Government, Budget 2015, http://budget.gov.au/2015-16/index.htm
(2) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Portfolio Budget Statements 2013-13. http://www.defence.gov.au/budget/12-13/pbs/index.htm. (accessed 19 April 2014).
(3) Australian Broadcasting Corporation What happens inside the budget lockup? http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-05-15/james-glenday-inside-the-budget-lockup/4689884. (accessed 22 April 2014).
(4) Australian Defence Magazine http://www.australiandefence.com.au. (accessed 22 April 2014).
(5) Australian Defence Business Review http://adbr.com.au. (accessed 22 April 2014).
(6) Asia Pacific Defence Reporter. http://www.asiapacificdefencereporter.com. (accessed 22 April 2014).
(7) David Watt, Budget Review 2014-15 Index, http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/BudgetReview201415/DefenceBudget
(8) Australian Government, Department of Defence, Defence Budget Home Page (last visited 1 Sept. 2015), http://www.defence.gov.au/budget/)
(9) DOD, How to Make a Freedom of Information Request (last visited 1 Sept. 2015), http://www.defence.gov.au/FOI/Request.asp;
(10) DOD, Freedom of Information (last visited 1 Sept. 2015), http://www.defence.gov.au/FOI/

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The most recent source for Source 2 is http://www.defence.gov.au/Budget/14-15/pbs/index.htm, covering the 2014-2015 budget year.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The Parliament of Australia publishes a defence budget overview, http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/BudgetReview201314/DefenceBudget (last accessed 19 June 2014). In addition, the Department of Defence publishes its own budget reports each year, http://www.defence.gov.au/Budget/.

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

13.
score
4

Are sources of defence income other than from central government allocation (from equipment sales or property disposal, for example) published and scrutinised?

Australian Defence is primarily funded through appropriations legislated by the Australian Parliament. Own-source income is reported in the Defence Annual Report (1). According to the 2013 - 3014 report, total own-source income (e.g., rental income, sale of goods, foreign currency gains) for the period was 1,158,065. Defence also received 78,780 from investing activities (e.g., sale of land, military equipment, and infrastructure), although investments spent far exceeding investments received (the net cash flow in this area was –7,172,733) (p. 3). Defence has received interest income on loans to Defence Housing Australia (p. 77) and it appears that for the most part monies involving DHA are going into that entity as investments, not coming out as income. This annual report (along with older annual reports) is published on Defence's website and thus subject to public scrutiny.

The Australian Military Sales Office (2) within the Defence Materiel Organisation deals with the disposal of defence equipment in accordance with policies and procedures published on its website. The Australian National Audit Office (3) provides external audit oversight for all Australian government organizations including Defence. It has reviewed property management practices in Defence, including property sales (4), and has signalled that it will conduct and order specifically focused on Defence disposal of surplus equipment. Interviewee B indicated that the Australian National Audit Office was satisfied with its powers and authority to independently audit all Defence and intelligence agency activities (further discussed in Question 15).

COMMENTS -+

(1) Defence Annual Report 2013 - 2014, p. 1 of http://www.defence.gov.au/annualreports/13-14/DAR_1314_V2.pdf
(2) Australian Military Sales Office. http://www.defence.gov.au/dda/whatshouldyouknow.htm#policy (accessed 22 April 2014).(2)
(3) Australian National Audit Office (2005) Defence's Management of Long-term Property Leases. http://www.anao.gov.au/Publications/Audit-Reports/2004-2005/Defences-Management-of-Long-term-Property-Leases. (accessed 22 April 2014).
(4) ANAO. Defence: Audit Review Strategy http://www.anao.gov.au/html/Uploads/Audit%20Work%20Program/anao_audit_work_program_2013%20FA/section_2/defence.html. (accessed 22 April 2014).
(5) Interviewee B – Official of the Australian National Audit Office, 12 February 2015.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

14.
score
4

Is there an effective internal audit process for defence ministry expenditure (that is, for example, transparent, conducted by appropriately skilled individuals, and subject to parliamentary oversight)?

Defence has an Audit and Fraud Control Division that is jointly accountable to the Secretary of the Department of Defence and the Chief of the Defence Force (CDF) (1, 6). The Audit Branch of the Division conducts the internal audit function in accordance with an annual Audit Work Program approved by the Defence Audit and Risk Committee as well as by the Secretary and the CDF (1). The Materiel Audit and Risk Committee undertook a similar role for the Defence Materiel Organisation (DMO) until mid-2015, when DMO was disbanded and replaced by the Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group (CASG).

The Department of Defence Annual Report is structured according to requirements set forth by the Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit (2). Among other things, in the 2013-14 Annual Report Defence reported that it had concluded a review of its existing audit processes, called “Rethinking Systems of Inquiry, Investigation, Review and Audit within Defence,” and as a result planned to restructure ADF’s internal complaint and investigation functions and amend certain policies and practices (2, p. 48 of volume 1).

As an entity covered by the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (see Department of Finance, PGPA Legislation and Associated Instruments (3), Defence is required to submit a Certificate of Compliance with financial management requirements to the Finance Minister as well as to the Minister of the Department of Defence (4). The Finance Minister then compiles all of the various agency reports into a final report to parliament (5).

Volume 1 of the Annual Report provides substantive information about the governance of the Department of Defence, including discussing performance of each of Defence’s proposed outcomes and programs (1). Volume 2 contains Defence's audited financial statements, as well as statements by representatives of the Australian National Auditing Office (2). This is indicative of the transparency of the process.

There is not much clarity in regard to the resources available to the Audit and Fraud Control Division. Its website page provides background information regarding the Division Head without further information on resourcing (6). Implementation of audit recommendations by Defence is detailed in reports published on the ANAO website (7). The latest report pertains to the period 2012 - 2013. The ANAO report states that there is &quoute;clear process for assigning responsibility, and systematic monitoring and reporting on progress by Defence internal audit&quoute; and that overall, audits &quoute;contribute to the improvement of management and administrative practices so that better outcomes may be achieved&quoute;. This indicates there are unlikely to be problems with resourcing (8).

There is clear information provided on the closure of internal audit recommendations, which indicates that the government takes its findings into account (8)

COMMENTS -+

(1)tDepartment of Defence, Annual Report 2013-14, Volume 1, http://www.defence.gov.au/annualreports/13-14/DAR_1314_V1.pdf, p. 154
(2)tDepartment of Defence. Defence Annual Report 2013-14, http://www.defence.gov.au/annualreports/13%2D14/
(3)tPublic Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013, last visited 1 Sept. 2015, http://www.finance.gov.au/resource-management/pgpa-legislation/
(4)tDepartment of Finance, PGPA Framework Compliance Reporting (last visited 1 Sept. 2015), http://www.finance.gov.au/resource-management/accountability/compliance-reporting/
(5)tDepartment of Finance, 2013-2014 Certificate of Compliance: Report to Parliament, http://www.finance.gov.au/sites/default/files/2013-14%20Certificate%20of%20Compliance.pdf
(6)tDepartment of Defence, Audit and Fraud Control Division, http://www.defence.gov.au/afc/
(7) Australian National Audit Office, Defence’s Implementation of Audit Recommendations, http://www.anao.gov.au/publications/audit-reports/2012-2013/defences-implementation-of-audit-recommendations
(8) Australian National Audit Office, Defence’s Implementation of Audit Recommendations, Audit Report No.25 2012–13, www.anao.gov.au/~/media/Files/Audit%20Reports/2012%202013/Audit%20Report%2025/2012-13%20Audit%20Report%20No%2025.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

15.
score
4

Is there effective and transparent external auditing of military defence expenditure?

The principal external audit mechanism for Defence is regular audits by the Australian National Audit Office (1) that is an institution independent from the Executive and reporting directly to Parliament. Reports of the ANAO are published online and reviewed by the Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit. (2). The ANAO in its 2013 Defence Audit review strategy (3) indicated that 6 audits of various Defence activities were in train and another 16 planned for the future.

Implementation of audit recommendations by Defence is detailed in reports published on the ANAO website. The latest report pertains to the period 2012 - 2013 (4). There is no evidence that indicates the effectiveness of the ANAO should be doubted.

Leading up to the 2009 Defence White Paper, a one-off comprehensive review of the totality of the Defence budget was undertaken by a private sector accounting firm. That audit is also available online (5).

(Relevant information from Peer Reviewer 1's comments have been incorporated in the main answer)

COMMENTS -+

1) Australian National Audit Office. http://www.anao.gov.au. (accessed 22 April 2014).
(2) Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Public_Accounts_and_Audit. (accessed 22 April 2014).
(3) ANAO. Defence: Audit Review Strategy http://www.anao.gov.au/html/Uploads/Audit%20Work%20Program/anao_audit_work_program_2013%20FA/section_2/defence.html. (accessed 22 April 2014).
(4) Australian National Audit Office, Defence’s Implementation of Audit Recommendations, Audit Report No.25 2012–13, www.anao.gov.au/~/media/Files/Audit%20Reports/2012%202013/Audit%20Report%2025/2012-13%20Audit%20Report%20No%2025.pdf
(5) Australian Government. Department of Defence. 2008 Audit of the Defence Budget.
http://www.defence.gov.au/publications/DefenceBudgetAudit.pdf. (accessed 22 April 2014).

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Source 4 was not undertaken by an accounting firm but by a consultancy to review the Department of Defence's &quoute;finances, operations and management processes&quoute; to achieve savings instead of a line audit of expenditures. The methodology for reaching the cost estimates and policy reforms outlined in the audit was redacted. However, the overall balance of sources demonstrates that there is effective and transparent external auditing.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

16.
score
4

Is there evidence that the country's defence institutions have controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country's natural resource exploitation and, if so, are these interests publicly stated and subject to scrutiny?

There is no evidence that Australian Defence institutions have financial interests associated with resource exploitation. Mining remains under exclusive control of state and territorial governments, and companies listed on the Australian Securities Exchange are required to report on all resources 'under their control'.

The Defence annual report exhaustively lists income and assets and no such interests are indicated. They have not been any media reports of Defence having interest in resource exploitation.

COMMENTS -+

(1) Defence Annual Report 2012-13 (page 205-11) http://www.defence.gov.au/AnnualReports/12-13/pdf/Defence%20Annual%20Report%202012-13.pdf
(2) &quoute;Australia's Identified Mineral Resources&quoute; Government of Australia, Geoscience Australia. http://www.ga.gov.au/minerals/mineral-resources/aimr.html
(3) Search on the Department of Defence website and wider internet search.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Although there is no evidence that Australian Defence institutions currently have any financial interests associated with resource exploitation, it is not clear that there is any statutory or constitutional bar to this occurring.

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

17.
score
4

Is there evidence, for example through media investigations or prosecution reports, of a penetration of organised crime into the defence and security sector? If no, is there evidence that the government is alert and prepared for this risk?

There is no evidence of the penetration by organized crime of Defence (1, 2).

Defence is well placed to deal with any possible incursions by organized crime and has a robust risk assessment process. While there is no specific requirement for regular assessment of the risk from organized crime, the Commonwealth Fraud Control Framework 2014 (3) which requires regular in-depth risk assessments of all Commonwealth functions, although they largely relate to fraud. That requirement has been in place since 1994. Defence has fulfilled this requirement.

Internally, there is the Audit and Fraud Control Division (4). The Inspector General of Defence also performs independent oversight of the military (5). The Australian Defence Force Investigative Service (ADFIS) is responsible for a range of military justice issues that impact upon, but do not explicitly include, corruption or organised crime (6) . More broadly, the Australian Crime Commission (ACC) assesses serious and organised crime in Australia (7). The National Organised Crime Response Plan 2015–2018 (the Response Plan) details the framework in place for tackling organised crime in the country (8).

COMMENTS -+

(1) Australian Crime Commission. Organised Crime in Australia 2013. https://www.crimecommission.gov.au/sites/default/files/ACC%20OCA%202013-1.pdf. (accessed 23 April 2014).
(2) Australian Crime Commission, Organised Crime in Australia 2015, https://www.crimecommission.gov.au/publications/intelligence-products/organised-crime-australia/organised-crime-australia-2015
(3) Australian Government. Attorney-General's Department, Fraud Control Framework (last visited 1 Sept. 2015), https://www.ag.gov.au/CrimeAndCorruption/FraudControl/Pages/FraudControlFramework.aspx
(4) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Audit and Fraud Control Division http://www.defence.gov.au/AuditFraudControl/(accessed 15 April 2014).
(5) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Military Justice: Organisations. http://www.defence.gov.au/mjs/.
(6) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Inspector General of Defence. http://www.directory.gov.au/directory?ea0_lf99_120.&organizationalUnit&e62e5f08-db52-4568-b2dc-253097db8ae4
(7) Australian Crime Commission, Organised Crime in Australia 2015. https://www.crimecommission.gov.au/publications/intelligence-products/organised-crime-australia/organised-crime-australia-2015
(8) Attorney-General's Department, National Organised Crime Response Plan 2015–2018 (the Response Plan), www.ag.gov.au/CrimeAndCorruption/OrganisedCrime/Documents/NationalOrganisedCrimeResponsePlan2015-18.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The military has undergone major reforms in the past five years since reviews discovered that members of biker gangs had infiltrated the defence forces (http://www.smh.com.au/nsw/bikies-infiltrate-defence-bases-20110218-1azlw.html), and there is no indication that criminal infiltration has reoccurred.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

18.
score
3

Is there policing to investigate corruption and organised crime within the defence services and is there evidence of the effectiveness of this policing?

The Department has a dedicated Audit and Fraud Control Division (1) including a branch specifically for the investigation of audit and fraud issues. The capability of the Audit and Fraud Control Division can be verified by the Australian National Audit Office's report from 2012 - 2013 (2). However, it reports directly to the Secretary Department of Defence and as such, cannot be considered independent (1).

There is an Inspector General of Defence who, within the defence administration, has an autonomous role for the oversight of fraud control issues (3). The Australian Defence Force Investigative Service (ADFIS) is responsible for a range of military justice issues that impact upon, but do not explicitly include, corruption or organised crime (4). ADFIS arose from a comprehensive review of Australia’s military justice system (4, 5).

Response to TI Chapter Reviewer: Agreed. Score lowered from 4 to 3.

COMMENTS -+

1) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Audit and Fraud Control Division http://www.defence.gov.au/afc/ (accessed 15 April 2014).
(2) Australian National Audit Office, Defence’s Implementation of Audit Recommendations, Audit Report No.25 2012–13, www.anao.gov.au/~/media/Files/Audit%20Reports/2012%202013/Audit%20Report%2025/2012-13%20Audit%20Report%20No%2025.pdf
(3) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Inspector General of Defence. http://www.directory.gov.au/directory?ea0_lf99_120.&organizationalUnit&e62e5f08-db52-4568-b2dc-253097db8ae4
(3) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Military Justice: Organisations. http://www.defence.gov.au/mjs/. (accessed 16 April 2014).
(4) Australian Government. Department of Defence. (2006) Report of an audit of the Australian Defence force investigative capability. http://www.defence.gov.au/publications/spauditreport.pdf (accessed 23 April 2014).
(5) Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade. (2007) Review of the implementation of reforms to Australia’s military justice system. http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Foreign_Affairs_Defence_and_Trade/Completed%20inquiries/~/link.aspx?_id=D3C2B48CAC4248F999D23B61B2C5F09E&_z=z. (accessed 23 April 2014).

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: There needs to be greater focus and recognition on the corruption risk by the designated agencies as recognised by the assessor. I think this deserves a lower rating.

Suggested score: 3

TI Reviewer-+

19.
score
4

Are the policies, administration, and budgets of the intelligence services subject to effective, properly resourced, and independent oversight?

There are a number of organisations undertaking intelligence activities for the Australian government. The Office of National Assessments – ONA (providing political and strategic assessments to the Executive), the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation – ASIO (internal intelligence gathering), the Australian Secret Intelligence Service –ASIS (collecting overseas human intelligence), the Australian Signals Directorate – ASD (1) - collecting, analysing and distributing foreign signals intelligence, Defence Intelligence Organisation – DIO (2) –intelligence assessment to support Defence, and the Defence Imagery and Geospatial Organisation – DIGO (3) - providing geospatial intelligence in support of Australia’s defence. With the exception of the last three organisations, the intelligence agencies are independent of the Department of Defence and the Australian Defence Forces.

The Directors of those organisations that deal with the defence intelligence are responsible to the Minister of Defence. The activities of all the agencies mentioned are subject to review by the Inspector General of Intelligence and Security – IGIS (4). The purpose of this review is to ensure that those agencies act legally and with propriety, complying with ministerial guidelines and directives and respecting human rights. The functions of IGIS are set down in the Commonwealth Inspector General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986 (5).

All the intelligence organisations mentioned above are also subject to the review of their activities by the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security (6). The Committee's completed and ongoing inquiries and reports can be found on its website (7). The Inspector General of Intelligence and Security is an independent organisation and details of its funding can be found in its Annual Report (8). The Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security is administered through the Department of Parliamentary Services, Australian Parliament and is resourced by appropriation from the Parliament (8).

Recent media reports have alleged that Australian national security officials have paid bribes to human traffickers in return for them returning migrants to Indonesia (10, 11) which has been considered a violation of Australian and international law, with calls for investigations (12). These events suggest a need for additional oversight of security officials. However, given it is not clear whether intelligence agencies were involved and as such, this has not been taken into account in the scoring,

COMMENTS -+

(1) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Australian Signals Directorate. http://www.asd.gov.au/about/rolesigint.htm (accessed 25 April 2014).
(2) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Defence Intelligence Organisation. http://www.defence.gov.au/dio/index.shtml (accessed 25 April 2014).
(3) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Defence Imagery and Geospatial Organisation. http://www.defence.gov.au/digo/ (accessed 25 April 2014).
(4) Inspector General of Intelligence and Security. http://www.igis.gov.au/about/index.cfm. (accessed 25 April 2014).
(5) Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986, https://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2006C00722.
(6) Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security. Role of Committee. http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Intelligence_and_Security/Role_of_the_Committee (accessed 25 April 2014).
(7) Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security. Completed inquiries and reports. http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Intelligence_and_Security/completed_inquiries (accessed 30 June 2015).
(8) Inspector General of Intelligence and Security. Annual Report http://www.igis.gov.au/annual_report/index.cfm (accessed 25 April 2014).
(9) Parliament of Australia. Department of Parliamentary Services. http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Department_of_Parliamentary_Services (accessed 25 April 2014).
(10) Jonathan Pearlman, Australian spies have paid off people smugglers for years in 'state bribery', Telegraph (16 June 2015), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/australiaandthepacific/australia/11677489/Australian-spies-have-paid-off-people-smugglers-for-years-in-state-bribery.html
(11) Matt Siegel, Australian police asked to examine '€26k bribe' to human-traffickers, Reuters (2 Sept. 2015), http://www.independent.ie/world-news/australian-police-asked-to-examine-26k-bribe-to-humantraffickers-31303746.html
(12) The Guardian, Did Australia pay people-smugglers to turn back asylum seekers? 17 June 2015 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/17/did-australia-pay-people-smugglers-to-turn-back-boats

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

20.
score
4

Are senior positions within the intelligence services filled on the basis of objective selection criteria, and are appointees subject to investigation of their suitability and prior conduct?

Employees of the Office of National Assessments (with the exception of the Director-General), the Australian Signals Directorate, the Defence Intelligence Organisation Defence Imagery and Geospatial Organisation are employed under the Public Service Act 1999 (7). Selection for recruitment and promotion for all employees under that legislation is on the basis of the merit principle and objective selection criteria (1). Except for bulk recruitment positions, selection criteria are specific to the particular position being considered. The Australian Public Service Commission publishes a framework around which specific selection criteria for senior positions can be set (2) and the review processes (3). Employees of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation and the Australian Secret Intelligence Service are covered by employment provisions in the specific legislation for those two organisations. Both adhere to the general principles of the Public Service Act, including selection on merit against objective selection criteria (Commonwealth Intelligence Services Act 2001, s35) and ASIO has published a framework for selection criteria (4). The Director-Generals of the Office of National Assessments, the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation and the Australian Secret Intelligence Service are appointed under specific legislative provisions in their respective Acts. They are appointed by the Governor General on the advice of the Prime Minister. The provisions covering the appointment of the directors general of ASIO and ASIS require consultation with the Leader of the Opposition. All officials in the Commonwealth public sector who deal with confidential information are required to have security clearances at the level of sensitivity of the information they access (5). In 2004 there was a comprehensive review of the operation of all Australian intelligence agencies, the Flood Report that provided a comprehensive description of the activities of all the agencies and provides a commentary on their administration (6).

COMMENTS -+

(1) Department of Defence. Recruitment process. http://www.defence.gov.au/apscareers/faqs/what-does-the-recruitment-process-involve.htm#Q10 (accessed 25 April 2014).
(2) Australian Public Service Commission. Senior Executive Service: Selection, mobility and separation
http://www.apsc.gov.au/aps-employment-policy-and-advice/movements/the-senior-executive-service-selection,-mobility-and-separation (accessed 26 April 2014).
(3) Australian Public Service Commission. Review of Actions. http://www.apsc.gov.au/aps-employment-policy-and-advice/merit-protection/review-of-actions (accessed 25 April 2014).
(4) Australian Security Intelligence Organisation. People Capability Framework http://www.asio.gov.au/img/files/ASIO-People-Capability-Framework.pdf (accessed 26 April 2014).
(5) Australian Public Service Commission. Info sheet: Security clearances. http://www.apsc.gov.au/publications-and-media/current-publications/recruitment-guidelines-toolkit/security-clearances (accessed 26 April 2014).
(6) Australian Government. (2004) Inquiry into Australian Intelligence Agencies. Chapter 7 Resourcing and effectiveness of the agencies. http://www.dpmc.gov.au/publications/intelligence_inquiry/chapter7/2_ona.htm (accessed 25 April 2014).
(7) Public Service Act 1999, https://www.comlaw.gov.au/Series/C2004A00538
(8) Intelligence Services Act 2001, https://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2013C00283

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

21.
score
3

Does the government have a well-scrutinised process for arms export decisions that aligns with international protocols, particularly the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)?

The international arms control protocols observed by Australia include: a) Nuclear Weapons Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, Nuclear Disarmament, Nuclear Weapons Free Zone, Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, Canberra Commission, International Commission Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament b) Chemical Weapons Chemical Weapons Convention, Biological Weapons Biological Weapons Convention. c) Conventional Weapons and Missiles Landmines, Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, Man-portable Air Defence Systems Could (MANPADS), Small Arms and Light Weapons, Cluster Munitions d) Export Control Regimes Nuclear Export Controls, Australia Group (AG), Missile Technology Control Regime, Wasssenar Arrangement e) Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Measures to Prevent Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction f) ) IAEA and Peaceful Nuclear Uses, International Atomic Energy Agency, International Safety Standards and Regulatory Regime (1).

In 2013 Australia became a signatory to the Arms Trade Treaty and went on to ratify it in 2014 (2). No specific evidence in relation to adherence to the three anti-corruption articles of the ATT could be found. The Defence Materiel Organisation alerts potential purchasers of Defence equipment of the restrictions those protocols involve (3) and (4).

The Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade has oversight for arms trade. For example, current inquiries include a review of Government Support for Australian Defence Industry Exports and a review of the Department of Defence's 2013-14 Annual Report (Government Support for Australian Defence Industry Exports) (7).

COMMENTS -+

(1) Australian Government. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Non-proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament. http://www.dfat.gov.au/security/ (accessed 26 April 2014).
(2) United Nations Office on Disarmament Affairs, http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/att
(3) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Defence Materiel Organisation. Welcome to disposal and sales. http://www.defence.gov.au/dda/Index.htm (accessed 28 April 2014).
(4) Defence Annual Report 2012-13 (Sale of assets, page 246) http://www.defence.gov.au/AnnualReports/12-13/pdf/Defence%20Annual%20Report%202012-13.pdf (accessed 28 April 2014).
(5) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Defence Export Control Office. The Arms Trade Treaty. http://www.defence.gov.au/deco/AAT.asp (accessed 22 May 2014).
(6) Arms Control Association. (2012) The Australia Group at a Glance. http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/australiagroup (accessed 26 April 2014).
(7) Defence Annual Report 2013-14, Volume 1, Part 3 : Governance and Accountability,
http://www.defence.gov.au/annualreports/13-14/part-three/chapter-ten.asp (accessed 1 September 2015)

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Risk management 60
22.
score
4

How effective are controls over the disposal of assets, and is information on these disposals, and the proceeds of their sale, transparent?

Disposal of defence assets are covered by policies with a legislative base in the Commonwealth Defence Act 1903 (1) and whole of government policies under the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (2). The process of identifying which assets are to be disposed is set down in the Capability Systems Life-Cycle Simulation Support Disposal Phase Guide which is a publicly available document (3). Final approval for disposal rests with the Defence Capability and Investment Committee, and rules surrounding disposal are set out by the Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group (which superseded the Defence Materiel Organisation). Specific policies on defence disposals are promulgated by the Defence Materiel Organisation on its website (4) including the details of the policy framework and the current tenders for disposals. Details of income derived from the disposal of defence assets are reported in the Department of Defence Annual Report which goes to Parliament (5).

COMMENTS -+

(1) Defence Act 1903 https://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2012C00270
(2) Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 https://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2013A00123
Australian Government. Department of Finance. Land , property and asset management. http://www.finance.gov.au/property/ (accessed 28 April 2014).
(3) Defence. Australian Defence Simulation Office (2012) Capability Systems Life Cycle Simulation Support Disposal Phase Guide http://www.defence.gov.au/vcdf/Demo2/media/Disposal_Phase_Guide_Feb_12.pdf (accessed 28 April 2014)
(4) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group. Disposals. http://www.defence.gov.au/casg/EquippingDefence/default.aspx?c=9.
(5) Defence Annual Report 2013-14, Volume 1, Part 3 : Governance and Accountability,
http://www.defence.gov.au/annualreports/13-14/part-three/chapter-ten.asp

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

23.
score
4

Is independent and transparent scrutiny of asset disposals conducted by defence establishments, and are the reports of such scrutiny publicly available?

The Department of Defence, like all Commonwealth organisations, is required to publish a detailed annual report that contains information about performance including financial statements. This annual report goes to Parliament and is signed off by the Secretary of the Department of Defence and the Chief Finance Officer. (1) As well, the Commonwealth Auditor General signs each annual report. The Australian National Audit Office provides regular external audit oversight for all Australian government organisations including Defence. It has reviewed property management practices in Defence and has signalled that it will conduct an audit specifically focused upon disposal of surplus equipment (3). As well as this external audit oversight, The Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade reviews each annual report from the Department of Defence and publishes a report on it (4).

COMMENTS -+

(1) Defence Annual Report 2012-13 (Independent Auditor’s Report, page 213-14) http://www.defence.gov.au/AnnualReports/12-13/pdf/Defence%20Annual%20Report%202012-13.pdf
(2) Australian National Audit Office (2005) Defence's Management of Long-term Property Leases. http://www.anao.gov.au/Publications/Audit-Reports/2004-2005/Defences-Management-of-Long-term-Property-Leases.
(3) Australian National Audit Office. Defence: Audit Review Strategy http://www.anao.gov.au/html/Uploads/Audit%20Work%20Program/anao_audit_work_program_2013%20FA/section_2/defence.html.
(4) Joint Standing Committee of Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade. Completed inquiries and reports. http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Foreign_Affairs_Defence_and_Trade/Completed_inquiries

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

24.
score
0

What percentage of defence and security expenditure in the budget year is dedicated to spending on secret items relating to national security and the intelligence services?

The exact proportion of expenditure for dedicated secret items is not available to the public. Following 9/11, there has been an extraordinary growth in the funding of the agencies within the Australian intelligence community (1). There is some capacity to determine the broad outline of the budget parameters of these agencies because some budgets come with specific appropriations. These are the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation ($334 million) Australian Secret Intelligence service ($316 million) and the Office of National Assessments ($33 million) (2), (3) and (4). Information relating to the budgets of other intelligence agencies detailed in Question 19 could not be found in Defence Annual reports or their respective websites.

The lack of transparency of intelligence agencies has been covered in the media (5). The degree to which activities of the intelligence agencies are opaque is indicated by the public reaction to the revelation by Edward Snowden that Australian Signals Directorate was conducting espionage activities of Australia's near neighbours (6).

COMMENTS -+

(1) Carl Ungerer (2008) The intelligence reform agenda: What’s next? ASPI Policy Analysis No 20 https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/the-intelligence-reform-agenda-what-next-by-carl-ungerer/Policy_analysis20.pdf
(2) Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Annual Report (p. 78) http://www.asio.gov.au/img/files/ASIO-Report-to-Parliament-2012-13.pdf
(3) Australian Government. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. ASIS Agency resources and planned performance. P164 http://www.dfat.gov.au/dept/budget/2012-2013_pbs/2012-2013_DFAT_PBS_07_Part_B_ASIS.pdf
(4) Office of National Assessments. Portfolio Budget Statement 2013-14. http://www.ona.gov.au/about-ona/corporate-governance/portfolio-budget-statements.html
(5) Sally Neighbour (2010) Hidden Agendas: Our intelligence services. The Monthly November 2010. http://www.themonthly.com.au/issue/2010/november/1289174420/sally-neighbour/hidden-agendas
(6) Philip Dorling and Michael Bachelard (2014) Edward Snowden documents reveal Indonesian phone networks penetrated by Australian spies. Sydney Morning Herald 17 February 2014. http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/edward-snowden-documents-reveal-indonesian-phone-networks-penetrated-by-australian-spies-20140216-32tyu.html

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

25.
score
2

Is the legislature (or the appropriate legislative committee or members of the legislature) given full information for the budget year on the spending of all secret items relating to national security and military intelligence?

As noted in question 24 above, there is limited public information on the specific items of expenditure of the organisations in the Australian intelligence community.

The Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security is empowered by the Intelligence Services Act (2001) to regularly review administration and expenditure of the Australian intelligence agencies (1) and publishes the reports (2). The Committee has powers to conduct enquiries into matters (including expenditure) into ASIO, ASIS, ASD, DIGO, ONA and DIO. While it is difficult to ascertain if this translates in practice to actual access to secret spending in intelligence, it seems likely that much of the secret expenditure is accounted for given the breadth of the reports and reviews the committee has published and presented to Parliament (3). Additional Parliamentary oversight of Australian intelligence agencies comes from other Parliamentary committees. The Senate Finance and Public Administration Committee (4), by virtue of its oversight of the Prime Minister and Cabinet portfolio covers ONA and IGIS. The Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee (5) covers the Defence portfolio and therefore DIGO, ASD, DIO and DSD. The Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Committee (6) reviews the Attorney General’s portfolio which contains ASIO. Besides this there is a Senate Estimates Committee process which examines budget appropriations for all government agencies (7).

As observed by the 2004 Flood Report into Australian intelligence agencies (8), Australia appears to balances the need for the confidentiality of operational intelligence issues by a robust system of Parliamentary oversight (although this is a dated report). While the parliamentary reports indicate that some information is classified, it is not possible to determine determine the level of disclosure. The score has been selected accordingly.

Response to Peer Reviewer 1: There is no evidence that the information provided is limited. Given this ambiguity, score 2 fits best. Score maintained.

COMMENTS -+

(1) Intelligence Services Act (2001)https://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2014C00820
(2) Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security. Completed inquiries and reports. http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Intelligence_and_Security/completed_inquiries
(3) Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security Review of Administration and Expenditure No. 10 (2010 - 2011) - Australian Intelligence Agencies (p27-33) www.aph.gov.au/parliamentary_business/committees/house_of_representatives_committees?url=pjcis/adminexp10/report.htm
(4) Senate Finance and Public Administration http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Finance_and_Public_Administration/Role_of_the_Committee
(5) Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence & Trade Committee. http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Foreign_Affairs_Defence_and_Trade/Role_of_the_Committee
(6) Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Committee, Senate/Legal_and_Constitutional_Affairs http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Legal_and_Constitutional_Affairs/Role_of_the_Committee
(7) Senate Estimates (Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee) http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Senate_Estimates/fadtctte/estimates/index
(8) Australian Government. (2004) Inquiry into Australian Intelligence Agencies. (page 56) http://www.dpmc.gov.au/publications/intelligence_inquiry/

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: Although source (2) suggests the possibility that the legislature receives information about spending on secret items, whether this actually occurs is not entirely clear from the public documents that appear to be available. Without further information on how expenditures for secret/confidential items are broken down in reports to the legislature, one would expect that they very well may be presented as an aggregate value.

Suggested score: 1

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

26.
score
4

Are audit reports of the annual accounts of the security sector (the military, police, and intelligence services) and other secret programs provided to the legislature (or relevant committee) and are they subsequently subject to parliamentary debate?

Yes. Section 57 of the Commonwealth Financial Accountability and Management Act 1997 requires all organisations covered by that act to have a copy of the audited financial statements accompanied by an Auditor-General’s report on that statement included in the annual report tabled in Parliament (1). Intelligence organisations covered by this requirement are ASIO, ASD, DIGO, ONA, DIO and the Australian Federal Police (2). The Australian Secret Intelligence Service has a specific requirement in its legislation to have its accounts audited by the Australian National Audit Office (3). Not only are these reports submitted to Parliament but they are specifically subject to scrutiny by the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Public Accounts (4) Other Parliamentary Committees with a scrutiny function over the intelligence organisations are the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security (5). Senate Finance and Public Administration Committee (5), the Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee (6) and the the Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Committee (7). Interviewee B indicated that the Australian National Audit Office was satisfied with its powers and authority to independently audit intelligence agency activities.

COMMENTS -+

(1) Australian Government. Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. Requirements for annual reports for departments, executive agencies and FMA Act Bodies. (page 15) http://www.dpmc.gov.au/guidelines/docs/annual_report_requirements_2012-13.pdf.
(2) Australian Government. Department of Finance. Flipchart of FMA Act Agencies/CAC Act bodies. http://www.finance.gov.au/publications/flipchart/
(3) Australian Secret Intelligence Service. Accountability http://www.asis.gov.au/Governance/Accountability.html
(4) Parliamentary Joint Committee on Public Accounts http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Public_Accounts_and_Audit
(5) Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security. Role of Committee. http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Intelligence_and_Security/Role_of_the_Committee
(6) Senate Finance and Public Administration Committee. http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Finance_and_Public_Administration/Role_of_the_Committee
(6) Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence & Trade Committee. http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Foreign_Affairs_Defence_and_Trade/Role_of_the_Committee
(7) Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Committee http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Legal_and_Constitutional_Affairs/Role_of_the_Committee
Senate Estimates (Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee) http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Senate_Estimates/fadtctte/estimates/index
(8) Interviewee B – Official of the Australian National Audit Office, 12 February 2015

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

27.
score
4

Off-budget military expenditures are those that are not formally authorised within a country's official defence budget, often considered to operate through the 'back-door'. In law, are off-budget military expenditures permitted, and if so, are they exceptional occurrences that are well-controlled?

All military expenditures are listed in the Department of Defence Annual Report which is signed off by the Commonwealth Auditor General (1, 2). The Australian government has a comprehensive institutional framework of accountability which has its legal basis in the Commonwealth Constitution Act 1901 (3), the Auditor General Act 1997 (4), the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (which superseded the Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997) (5) and the Commonwealth Authorities and Companies Act 1997 (6). Accountability expert Professor Warwick Funnell after describing the comprehensive institutional framework concludes that it would be very difficult for these controls to be circumvented (7). In a recent High Court case, the Executive’s inability to make payments outside appropriations was confirmed meaning that legally, no off budget expenditure is allowed in Australian government administration (8).

COMMENTS -+

(1) Defence Annual Report 2012-13 (Financial statement, pages 205-378) http://www.defence.gov.au/AnnualReports/12-13/pdf/Defence%20Annual%20Report%202012-13.pdf
(2) Defence Annual Report 2013-14, http://www.defence.gov.au/annualreports/13-14/ (accessed 1 September 2015)
(3) Commonwealth Constitution Act 1901, https://www.comlaw.gov.au/Series/C2004Q00685
(4) Auditor General Act 1997, https://www.comlaw.gov.au/Series/C2004A05248
(5) Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013, https://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2013A00123/Download
(6) Commonwealth Authorities and Companies Act 1997 https://www.comlaw.gov.au/Series/C2004A05250
(7) Funnell, W., Cooper, K. and Lee, J. (2012) The institutional framework of accountability. In Public sector accounting and accountability in Australia. 2nd Edition. (pages 79-109) Sydney: University of New South Wales Press.
(8) Gabrielle Appleby (2012) High Court school chaplains case and what it means for Commonwealth funding. The Conversation, 20 June 2012. http://theconversation.com/the-high-court-school-chaplains-case-and-what-it-means-for-commonwealth-funding-7795 (accessed 30 April 2014)

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

28.
score
N/A

In practice, are there any off-budget military expenditures? If so, does evidence suggest this involves illicit economic activity?

None evident and no discernible evidence of illicit activity found in sources that would be likely to report such activity (1), (2).

COMMENTS -+

(1) Trading economics. Australia/ economic indicators. http://www.tradingeconomics.com/australia/indicators. (accessed 28April 2014).
(2) Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Response could use media coverage to highlight the transparency of military expenditures (such as http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/australia-buys-up-enters-asian-arms-race-20140615-3a5xk.html, which also quotes SIPRI), and the Small Arms Survey is another useful reference for monitoring Australian trade in weapons.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

29.
score
3

In law, are there provisions regulating mechanisms for classifying information on the grounds of protecting national security, and, if so, are they subject to effective scrutiny?

The mechanism for classifying information is set down in the Australian Government Security Classification System (1). That system sits within the Australian Government Protective Security Policy Framework (2). The sanctions for unauthorised release of information that has a security classification are contained in a variety of secrecy provisions in legislation (3). While the Framework has a review mechanism (page 14), that mechanism is aimed at ensuring all government organisations that hold confidential information are abiding by the policy. Australia has freedom of information legislation (Commonwealth Freedom of Information Act 1982) that creates the right for citizens to request access to government information. That Act contains two main exemptions: these are section 33(a) (documents whose disclosure would reasonably be expected to cause damage to the security, defence, or international relations of the Commonwealth) and section 38 (documents subject to secrecy because of a provision of an enactment). If individuals are dissatisfied with a decision to refuse access, they can seek judicial review by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. Access to documentation through the FOI Act is subject to fees and the likelihood of a successful appeal against a rejection on the basis of section 38 is limited. There has been public criticism of the Australian government refusing access to information based upon security grounds. In 2009 that led to a reference to the Australian Law Reform Commission (3) which was critical of many aspects of the information security regime. There is occasional criticism in the media about government secrecy (5). There is no evidence of the framework in place being bypassed, however.

Australia recently amended the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (ASIO Act) (6). One of the more controversial amendments was the additional of section 35P, which criminalises the unauthorised disclosure of information related to a special intelligence operation. An offender can be imprisoned for 5 years or 10 years in cases where the offender intended to or the disclosure of the information will “endanger the health or safety of any person or prejudice the effective conduct of a special intelligence operation” (section 35P(2)(c)). A number of media outlets have decried this provision as leading to the potential imprisonment of journalists for reporting on special intelligence operations (7, 8, 9). Following promulgation of this law, Australia appointed an independent national security legislation monitor to review the legislation (10). Human Rights Watch has already submitted its views to the monitor that the threat of prosecution may chill legitimate press debates (11).

Response to Peer Reviewer 2: Given the controversy regarding the recent amendments to the ASIO and occassional reports of excessive secrecy, score is maintained.

COMMENTS -+

(1) Australian government. (2011) Information security management guidelines. Australian Government security classification system. http://www.protectivesecurity.gov.au/informationsecurity/Documents/Australian%20Government%20classification%20system.pdf
(2) Australian Government. Protective security policy framework, http://www.protectivesecurity.gov.au/pspf/Documents/Protective%20Security%20Policy%20Framework%20-%20amended%20June%202013.pdf
(3) Australian Law Reform Commission. Secrecy laws and government in Australia (ALRC Report 112). Chapter 3 http://www.alrc.gov.au/publications/report-112
(4) Office of the Australian information commissioner. http://www.oaic.gov.au/freedom-of-information/applying-the-foi-act/foi-guidelines/part-5-exemptions/documents-to-which-secrecy-provisions-apply-s-38
(5) Bernard Keane (2014) When governments drape a flag over their secrets, we need whistleblowers. Crikey 27 February 2014. http://www.crikey.com.au/2014/02/27/when-governments-drape-a-flag-over-their-secrets-we-need-whistleblowers/?wpmp_switcher=mobile
(6) Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979, https://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2015C00105/Html/Text#_Toc415479785
(7) The Guardian, &quoute;Journalists and whistleblowers will go to jail under new national security laws&quoute; 26 September 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/sep/26/journalists-and-whistleblowers-will-go-to-jail-under-new-national-security-laws
(8) Reuters, &quoute;Australia passes security law, raising fears for press freedom&quoute;, October 1 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/01/us-australia-security-idUSKCN0HQ2WX20141001;
(9) The Guardian, &quoute;Australia's national security laws are ushering in a reign of terror&quoute; 18 October 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/oct/18/australias-national-security-laws-are-ushering-in-a-reign-of-terror
(10) Australian Government, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Independent National Security Legislation Monitor, http://www.dpmc.gov.au/pmc/about-pmc/core-priorities/independent-national-security-legislation-monitor
(11) Human Rights Watch, &quoute;Australia: Submission to the Office of the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor&quoute; April 20 2015, https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/04/20/australia-submission-office-independent-national-security-legislation-monitor

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: Another relevant exception to Australia's Freedom of Information Act is section 33 (http://www.oaic.gov.au/freedom-of-information/applying-the-foi-act/foi-guidelines/part-5-exemptions/documents-affecting-national-security-defence-or-international-relations-s-33), which deals with documents affecting national security.

The Australian Law Reform Commission's report Secrecy laws and government in Australia (ALRC Report 112, source 3 above) illustrates that Australia's freedom of information framework is subject to scrutiny. The report addressed how the framework is currently being upheld and suggested weaknesses in the framework that could be improved upon.

Suggested score: 4

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

30.
score
4

Do national defence and security institutions have beneficial ownership of commercial businesses? If so, how transparent are details of the operations and finances of such businesses?

The Australian government sometimes creates government business enterprises for reasons of promoting competition in a market or to maximise efficiencies of operations using private sector structures. Australian defence operates a number of such entities and these are publicly listed (1). The two major government business enterprises in the Defence area are Defence Housing Australia and ASC Pty Ltd (formerly the Australian submarine Corporation a wholly owned Australian naval shipbuilding company). Like other government business enterprises, these are covered by corporations law and the Commonwealth Authorities and Companies Act 1997. While government business enterprises are expected to operate on an equal footing with private sector competitors they are governed by financial accounting and reporting obligations.

However, these are not Defence-owned businesses and the score has been selected accordingly.

COMMENTS -+

(1) Australian Government. Department of Finance. Flipchart of FMA Act Agencies/CAC Act bodies. http://www.finance.gov.au/publications/flipchart/
(2) Defence Housing Australia. Annual Reports. http://www.dha.gov.au/about-us/media-and-publications/annual-reports
(3) ASC Pty Ltd Annual Report 2013 https://www.asc.com.au/Documents/AnnualReports/ASC_Annual_Report_2013.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

31.
score
N/A

Are military-owned businesses subject to transparent independent scrutiny at a recognised international standard?

As discussed in the previous question, there are no businesses owned or operated by Defence.

COMMENTS -+

N/A

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: A better point of reference for the Commonwealth Authorities and Companies Act 1997: http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2013C00259

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997 (FMA Act) governs Australian government business enterprises. It is available online at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act//fmaaa1997321/. Regulations implementing the FMA Act are available at http://www.finance.gov.au/financial-framework/fma-legislation/fma-regulations.html.

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

32.
score
4

Is there evidence of unauthorised private enterprise by military or other defence ministry employees? If so, what is the government's reaction to such enterprise?

Defence Instructions (2005) on the &quoute;Employment and voluntary activities of Australian Defence Force Members in off–duty hours&quoute; allows members of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) to engage in paid employment during off-duty hours as long as this is approved in line with the instruction (1). It defines the policy, the approving authorities and approval process, with a focus on ensuring this does not include conflicts of interest. There is also a Defence Workplace Relations Manual that does into further depth (2) on the Defence Audit and Fraud Control website page.

There also exists a Military Personnel Policy Manual which defines the conditions and process for off-duty employment (3). Further ethical guidelines regarding Defence's relationship with the private sector are set are in place as well (4, 5).

Reports by the Director of Military Prosecutions provide information on significant cases but it is not clear how many related to unauthorised private enterprise. There are some cases listed which are a result of &quoute;obtaining financial advantage&quoute; (6, 7).

COMMENTS -+

(1) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Defence Instructions (2005) Employment and voluntary activities of Australian Defence Force Members in off–duty hours. www.defence.gov.au/afc/pdf/DIG-Pers-25_02.pdf
(2) Australian Public Service Commission, Procedures for determining breaches of the Code of Conduct and for determining sanctions is defined by the (Public Service Act 1999) http://www.apsc.gov.au/about-the-apsc/the-commission/apsc-code-breaches-and-sanction
(3) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Military Personnel Policy Manual. 2013. www.defence.gov.au/dpe/pac/MILPERSMAN.pdf
(4) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Defence and the Private Sector: An Ethical Relationship http://www.defence.gov.au/AFC/pdf/PrivateSector.pdf. (accessed 15 April 2014).
(5) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Ethics Matters Handbook. http://www.defence.gov.au/AFC/pdf/Ethics-Matter-Handbook.pdf (accessed 15 April 2014).
(6) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Director of Military Prosecutions. Annual Report 2014. www.defence.gov.au/publications/DMP_Annual_Report_2014.pdf
(7) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Director of Military Prosecutions. Annual Report 2013. www.defence.gov.au/publications/DMP_Annual_Report_2013.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The Annual Defence Report (http://www.defence.gov.au/AnnualReports/12-13/pdf/Defence%20Annual%20Report%202012-13.pdf) noted that Defence employees were at fault for USD 800 thousand in losses due to fraud in the 2012-2013 financial year, providing circumstantial evidence that there is some degree of unauthorised private enterprise in operation in the defence sector.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Policies & codes 90
34.
score
2

Do the Defence Ministry, Defence Minister, Chiefs of Defence, and Single Service Chiefs publicly commit - through, for example, speeches, media interviews, or political mandates - to anti-corruption and integrity measures?

Between 2010 and 2012 there were a raft of press reports about sexual harassment in the Australian Defence Forces. The Minister (1) and senior defence officials (2), (3) and (4) made strong public statements condemning that activity. The tenor of all of those statements was about the integrity of Defence culture. Having said that, while this indicates that leaders in Defence are prepared to talk publicly about integrity, the topic was about sexual harassment rather than issues of corruption.

Defence has a fraud and audit control unit which indicates commitment from the institution which is not publicly stated as such (5). Apart from that, there has been aknowledgement of governance and anti-corruption measures in the new Afghanistan strategy (6), statements regarding corruption in police forces in Australia when addressing the UN International Women’s Day Conference (7) and an article highlighting defence fraud investigators in the Defence magazine (8). None can be directly considered as evidence of commitment to anti-corruption in Defence, however.

COMMENTS -+

1) Ian McPhedran (2012) Government apologises to Australian Defence abuse victims. Herald Sun 26 November 2012. http://www.heraldsun.com.au/news/sexual-abuse-inquiry-expected-for-defence/story-e6frf7jo-1226523923993 (accessed 1 May 2014).
(2) Ali Moore (2011) Houston defends ADF culture. Lateline 27 June 2011. http://www.abc.net.au/lateline/content/2011/s3255024.htm (accessed 30 April 2014)
(3) David Hurley, Chief of Defence Force 26 November 2012 Response to DLA Review of Allegations of Sexual and other Forms of Abuse in Defence. http://news.defence.gov.au/2012/11/26/statement-from-general-david-hurley-chief-of-the-defence-force/ (accessed 30 April 2014)
(4) Lieutenant General David Morrison, Chief of Army. Address 4 July 2014. New Army value ‘Respect’ http://www.army.gov.au/Our-work/Speeches-and-transcripts/Chief-of-Army-announces-new-Army-value-Respect (accessed 30 April 2014).
(5) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Audit and Fraud Control Unit. http://www.defence.gov.au/afc/
(6) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Minster for Defence John Faulkner, 2009, http://www.defence.gov.au/minister/93tpl.cfm?currentid=9800
(7) Australian Government. Army. Address by the Chief of Army Lieutenant General David Morrison, AO at the United Nations International Women’s Day Conference, 8-9 March 2013. http://www.army.gov.au/Our-work/Speeches-and-transcripts/United-Nations-International-Womens-Day-Conference
(8) Defence, First Priorities August 2015, p. 52-53 of http://www.defence.gov.au/defencemagazine/docs/defmagaug15b.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Definitely an area that requires greater focus across Defence.

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

35.
score
4

Are there effective measures in place for personnel found to have taken part in forms of bribery and corruption, and is there public evidence that these measures are being carried out?

Defence personnel are employed under two employment regimes. Civilians in the Department of Defence are employed under the Commonwealth Public Service Act 1999 (1). That legislation contains a Code of Conduct (s13) (2, 3) breaches of which can result in disciplinary action including termination of employment (s29). Military personnel are employed under the Commonwealth Defence Force Discipline Act 1982 (4) which include a wide range of offences (Part III) including fraudulent conduct. Breaches of that legislation can result in suspension or termination (s92). Neither the Australian Public Service Code of Conduct nor the Commonwealth Defence Force Discipline Act 1982 specifically mention corruption. Personnel are also subject to the Criminal Code Act 1995 (5) which includes offences including bribery of foreign officials (Division 7.7), bribery and related offences (Part 7.6) and fraudulent conduct (Part 7.3). Personnel convicted of such offences are likely to be dismissed from Defence employment. Defence is responsible for the investigation of breaches of the Australian Public Service Code of Conduct and offences under the Commonwealth Defence Force Discipline Act 1982. It has a branch specifically dedicated to the investigation of audit and fraud issues. There is an Inspector General of defence who, within the defence administration, has an autonomous role over citing fraud control issues including investigations (6). Defence also has a sophisticated Military Justice structure oversighted by the Inspector General of the Australian Defence Forces. This administrative element is responsible for range of military justice issues under the legislation (7). In the event that offences under Criminal Code Act 1995 are detected they are referred to the Australian Federal Police for investigation. The Department of Defence reports on the number of investigations it conducts. In 2013 - 14, 322 fraud investigations were completed and about 35 per cent of them led to criminal, disciplinary, or administrative action. About 44 per cent of those that led to such actions involved discipline under the Defence Force Discipline Act 1982, which governs discipline of military personnel (8, p. 153). In 2012-2013, 333 fraud investigations were completed, 19 per cent of which led to criminal, disciplinary, or administrative action. Approximately 55 per cent of the disciplinary actions fell under the Defence Force Discipline Act 1982 (9, p. 114).

The 2013-2014 Annual Report explains the complaint system for defence personnel who have experienced or witnessed unacceptable conduct in the workplace. In 2013 - 14, 827 complaints were made, and they fell into 6 categories, including abuse of power and conflicts of interest/inappropriate workplace relationships (other categories related to harassment and discrimination). The Annual Report does not provide a breakdown of these complaints by category but does explain that 10-15 per cent of complaints received are serious enough that formal disciplinary action occurs, but most other complaints are resolved informally (8, p. 141).

Reports by the Director of Military Prosecutions provide information on the number of cases dealt with and further details on the subject matter and outcomes of significant cases. It also provides provides figures relating to the class of offence by services, which include the classes &quoute;Fraud, Deception and other Offences&quoute; and &quoute;Specific Military Discipline Offences&quoute; (10).

Interviewee A indicated that Defence whistleblowing arrangements had detected a small number of corrupt activities and that these had been dealt with.

COMMENTS -+

(1) The Public Service Act 1999, https://www.comlaw.gov.au/Series/C2004A00538.
(2) Australian Public Service Commission Code of Conduct, http://www.apsc.gov.au/publications-and-media/current-publications/aps-values-and-code-of-conduct-in-practice.
(3) Australian Public Service Commission. Australian Public Service Code of conduct. http://www.apsc.gov.au/aps-employment-policy-and-advice/aps-values-and-code-of-conduct/code-of-conduct (accessed 30 April 2014).
(4) Defence Force Discipline Act 1982 is at https://www.comlaw.gov.au/Series/C2004A02711
(5) The Criminal Code Act 1995, https://www.comlaw.gov.au/Series/C2004A04868
(6) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Audit and Fraud Control Division http://www.defence.gov.au/AuditFraudControl/(accessed 15 April 2014)
(7) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Military Justice: Organisations. http://www.defence.gov.au/mjs/organisations.htm#1. (accessed 16 April 2014).
(8) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Defence Annual Report 2013-14, http://www.defence.gov.au/annualreports/13-14/dar_1314_v1.pdf, p 153
(9) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Defence Annual Report 2012-13 (Financial statement, page 114) http://www.defence.gov.au/AnnualReports/12-13/pdf/Defence%20Annual%20Report%202012-13.pdf, p 114
(10) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Director of Military Prosecutions. Report for period 1 January to 31 December 2103, http://www.defence.gov.au/publications/DMP_Annual_Report_2013.pdf.
(9) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Director of Military Prosecutions. Annual Report 2014. www.defence.gov.au/publications/DMP_Annual_Report_2014.pdf
(11) Interviewee A – Official of the Department of Defence, 18 February 2015.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: A guide to the APS Code, called APS Values and Code of Conduct in practice: A guide to official conduct for APS employees and agency heads, explicitly addresses bribery and related offences, explaining. &quoute;Accepting or offering a benefit that may be defined as a bribe may breach the APS Code and the Criminal Code.&quoute; See sections 4.12, http://www.apsc.gov.au/publications-and-media/current-publications/aps-values-and-code-of-conduct-in-practice (last accessed 20 June 2014). Department of Defence guidance also clarifies that unethical conduct includes the payment of bribes. See, e.g., Defence Instructions (General) PERS 25–7: Gifts, hospitality and sponsorship, http://www.dtc.org.au/Documents/185.pdf. The publication Defence and the Private Sector: An Ethical Relationship also discusses the responsibility to report unethical behavior, including bribery and corruption. See p.10, http://www.defence.gov.au/afc/pdf/privatesector.pdf.

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

36.
score
4

Is whistleblowing encouraged by the government, and are whistle-blowers in military and defence ministries afforded adequate protection from reprisal for reporting evidence of corruption, in both law and practice?

In January 2014, the Commonwealth Public Interest Disclosure Act 2013 came into effect (1). This legislation encourages Commonwealth employees to come forward with reports of wrongdoing and contains effective measures for their protection. Those measures are set out in Part 2 of the Act and include making reprisals against whistleblowers an offence, providing rights of compensation to whistleblowers who suffer reprisals and the capacity for the Federal Court to provide whistleblowers with injunctions against reprisals, apologies or any other orders. The Act includes a strong oversight function from the Commonwealth Ombudsman (s 74) (1, 2). This recent legislation was based upon recommendations arising from a comprehensive research project into public sector whistleblowing (3) and replaced a rather weak whistleblower protection scheme under the Commonwealth Public Service Act 1999. Following the PID Act, the Australian Public Service Commission issued new guidance on whistleblowing. Among other things, the Commonwealth Ombudsman is tasked with promoting awareness of the whistleblower law. (4)

Even though the previous scheme was less than optimal, Defence had taken the pro-active approach of creating its own Defence Whistleblower Scheme (5) which in 2012-2013 received 253 reports (6). In its 2013-2014 Annual Report, the Commonwealth Ombudsman reports that there is also a Defence Force Ombudsman, which handles complaints from the Australian Defence Force, Department of Veterans’ Affairs, Defence Housing Authority, and Department of Defence. During the 2013-2014 time period, that office received 518 complaints (7). The Defence Whistleblower Scheme was replaced by the Defence Public Interest Disclosure (PID) Scheme in January 2014 after the Commonwealth Public Interest Disclosure Act (2013) came into effect (8). It &quoute;facilitates and encourages public officials to report suspected wrongdoing, supports and protects disclosers, and ensures that suspected wrongdoing is investigated appropriately&quoute; (7, 8). The Commonwealth Ombudsman reported that these complaints “typically” involved employment matters. The Commonwealth Ombudsman handles complaints related to defence from members of the public.

Australia recently amended the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (ASIO Act) (9). One of the more controversial amendments was the additional of section 35P, which criminalises the unauthorised disclosure of information related to a special intelligence operation. An offender can be imprisoned for 5 years or 10 years in cases where the offender intended to or the disclosure of the information will “endanger the health or safety of any person or prejudice the effective conduct of a special intelligence operation” (section 35P(2)(c)). A number of media outlets have decried this provision as leading to the potential imprisonment of journalists for reporting on special intelligence operations and being detrimental to whistleblowing (10, 11, 12). Following promulgation of this law, Australia appointed an independent national security legislation monitor to review the legislation (13). Human Rights Watch has already submitted its views to the monitor that the threat of prosecution may chill legitimate press debates (14). It is unclear how this may impact whistleblowing in Defence.

COMMENTS -+

(1) Public Interest Disclosure Act 2013 (PID Act) is at https://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2013A00133
(2) Commonwealth Ombudsman. Public Interest Disclosure Scheme. http://www.ombudsman.gov.au/pages/pid/index.php (accessed 30 April 2014).
(3) Roberts, P., Brown, A. J., & Olsen, J. (2011). Whistling While They Work: A good practice guide for managing internal reporting of wrongdoing in public sector organisations. In J. Wanna (Series Ed.) Australia and New Zealand School of Government (ANZSOG) Monographs, Retrieved from http://epress.anu.edu.au/whistling_citation.html
(4) Australian Public Service Commission. Sect 4.17 Whistleblowing. http://www.apsc.gov.au/publications-and-media/current-publications/aps-values-and-code-of-conduct-in-practice/whistleblowing
(5) Roberts, P., Brown, A. J., & Olsen, J. (2011). Whistling While They Work: A good practice guide for managing internal reporting of wrongdoing in public sector organisations. In J. Wanna (Series Ed.) Australia and New Zealand School of Government (ANZSOG) Monographs, Retrieved from http://epress.anu.edu.au/whistling_citation.html
(6) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Defence Annual Report 2012-13 (page 115) http://www.defence.gov.au/AnnualReports/12-13/pdf/Defence%20Annual%20Report%202012-13.pdf (accessed 30 April 2014).
(7) Australian Government.Commonwealth Ombudsman. Annual Report 2013 - 2014. http://www.ombudsman.gov.au/pages/publications-and-media/reports/annual/ar2013-14/5_what_we_do.html#a10
(8) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Public Interest Disclosure Scheme. Audit and Fraud Control Defence. http://www.defence.gov.au/afc/DisclosureScheme.asp
(9) Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979, https://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2015C00105/Html/Text#_Toc415479785
(10) The Guardian, &quoute;Journalists and whistleblowers will go to jail under new national security laws&quoute; 26 September 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/sep/26/journalists-and-whistleblowers-will-go-to-jail-under-new-national-security-laws
(11) Reuters, &quoute;Australia passes security law, raising fears for press freedom&quoute;, October 1 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/01/us-australia-security-idUSKCN0HQ2WX20141001;
(12) The Guardian, &quoute;Australia's national security laws are ushering in a reign of terror&quoute; 18 October 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/oct/18/australias-national-security-laws-are-ushering-in-a-reign-of-terror
(13) Australian Government, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Independent National Security Legislation Monitor, http://www.dpmc.gov.au/pmc/about-pmc/core-priorities/independent-national-security-legislation-monitor
(14) Human Rights Watch, &quoute;Australia: Submission to the Office of the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor&quoute; April 20 2015, https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/04/20/australia-submission-office-independent-national-security-legislation-monitor

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The publication Defence and the Private Sector: An Ethical Relationship also discusses the responsibility to report unethical behavior, including bribery and corruption. See p.10, http://www.defence.gov.au/afc/pdf/privatesector.pdf (last accessed 20 June 2014). Whistleblowing is also discussed on the website of the Fraud and Investigations branch of the Department of Defence. See http://www.defence.gov.au/afc/fraudcontrolinvestigations.asp (last accessed 20 June 2014).

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

37.
score
3

Is special attention paid to the selection, time in post, and oversight of personnel in sensitive positions, including officials and personnel in defence procurement, contracting, financial management, and commercial management?

Normal practice in the Australian public sector is not to define particular employment categories or positions and to place specific employment requirements upon them. General policies are promulgated which take into account the varying circumstances of that public sector position. In the case of Defence Officials, they are covered by the broad security vetting arrangements that apply to the rest of the Commonwealth sector (1). The vetting for security clearance takes into account the sensitivity of the information the person will handle and involves checks of criminal records among other things. Also, the vetting process is not restricted to recruitment but can take place whenever an official moves into a sensitive position and clearances are regularly updated. The APSC website also sets forth work level standards for APS and executive level classifications. Although it explains that some positions (e.g., executive level) require a degree of sensitivity, it does not set forth specific vetting or oversight requirements for such positions.

For Defence procurement the Defence Procurement Policy Manual sets out security arrangements for procurement (2). General requirements for post-separation employment (3) and conflicts of interest (4) are set down in Defence Instructions. There are no specific requirements for rotation of post, although the risk management processes set down in the Defence Procurement Policy Manual (5) should identify where this control should be applied.

The Military Personnel Policy Manual Annex 3B discusses the selection criteria for an Aide de Camp (ADC) which it considers requires &quoute;a high level of tact and discretion&quoute;. This appears to be only reference to vetting of potential employees that discusses the need to consider the sensitivity of the position (6). Job descriptions relating to procurement, finance, contracting, and commercial management on the Defence Jobs website (7) do not publicly set forth specific vetting requirements – aside from the general substantive knowledge and experience requirements that one would expect in these sorts of positions.

Additionally, the Defence Fraud and Audit Control website (8) page on 'Policy' details policies on:
- Employment and voluntary activities of Australian Defence Force Members in off-duty hours
- Gifts, hospitality and sponsorship
- Notification of Post Separation Employment
- Conflicts of interest and declarations of interests
- The reporting and management of notifiable incidents
- Defence Whistleblower Scheme
- Defence Workplace Relations Manual
- Defence and the Private Sector - An Ethical Relationship
- Ethics Matters Handbook.

There is evidence that special attention is provided to personnel in certain positions. For example, the &quoute;Notification of Post Separation Employment&quoute; policy states that while the procedures apply to all personnel where there may be a risk, they are &quoute;most pertinent to Defence personnel who are in senior positions or have a significant role in procurement decisions, where real or apparent conflict between their Defence service/employment and proposed private employment are more likely&quoute; (9). In the &quoute;Conflicts of interest and declarations of interests&quoute; policy, the decision-making process in considering whether something constitutes a conflict of interest is to include the person's position, duties, level of decision-making responsibility, autonomy in decision-making etc. (10).

COMMENTS -+

(1) Australian Public Service Commission. Info sheet: Security clearances. http://www.apsc.gov.au/publications-and-media/current-publications/recruitment-guidelines-toolkit/security-clearances (accessed 26 April 2014).
(2) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Defence Procurement Policy Manual, September 2015, Defence security arrangements, www.defence.gov.au/casg/Multimedia/DPPM_September_2015-9-5247.pdf
(3) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Defence Instructions (General). Notification of Post Separation employment. http://pdf.aigroup.asn.au/sector/defence/Post_separation_employment_Instructions_General_August_2011_AMDT_2_August.pdf (accessed 30 April 2014).
(4) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Defence Instruction (General) - PERS 25-6 Conflicts of Interest and declarations of interests
http://www.defencereservessupport.gov.au/media/166354/defence-general-instructions-conflicts-and-declarations-of-interest.pdf (accessed 1 May 2014).
(5) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Defence Procurement Policy Manual, Ethics in Procurement, September 2015, www.defence.gov.au/casg/Multimedia/DPPM_September_2015-9-5247.pdf
(6) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Military Personnel Policy Manual, http://www.defence.gov.au/dpe/pac/MILPERSMAN.pdf.
(7) Defence Jobs website (http://www.defencejobs.gov.au)
(8) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Fraud and Audit Control. http://www.defence.gov.au/afc/Policy.asp
(9) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Notification of Post Separation Employment. www.defence.gov.au/afc/pdf/GP25_04.pdf
(10) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Conflicts of Interest and Declarations of Interests. Australian Government. Department of Defence. www.defence.gov.au/afc/pdf/2011GP25_06.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

38.
score
4

Is the number of civilian and military personnel accurately known and publicly available?

That information is published in the Department of Defence Annual Report (1).

COMMENTS -+

(1) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Defence Annual Report 2013-14,
http://www.defence.gov.au/annualreports/13-14/

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

39.
score
4

Are pay rates and allowances for civilian and military personnel openly published?

Yes. That information is published in the Department of Defence Annual Report (1).

COMMENTS -+

(1) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Defence Annual Report 2013-14.
http://www.defence.gov.au/annualreports/13-14/ (accessed 1 September 2015)

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

40.
score
4

Do personnel receive the correct pay on time, and is the system of payment well-established, routine, and published?

Payment systems in Australian Government administration are well established and routine. It is most unusual for problems in the payroll systems. The Australian Defence payroll system makes in excess of 2.5 million payments per year and undertakes over 20,000 leave audits per year. It has a sophisticated payroll assurance process (1). The Australian National Audit Office looked at payroll management across the Australian Government some years ago and found that, overall, payroll practices were of a high standard (2).

In 2010, the Minister for Defence Personnel, Materiel and Science announced the “immediate establishment of a high powered ADF Payroll Remediation Task Force” (1) in response to public scrutiny that had “highlighted a range of issues relating to the delivery of payroll services to members of the ADF [Australian Defence Force]” (2). The task force’s directives include to review and report on existing payroll procedures, put in place revised checks and balances, develop a forward looking audit program, and issue advice regarding ways to improve the payroll system (1).

In 2011, Defence announced that it was developing a Payroll Assurance Framework that would “reduce the instances and impact of payroll anomalies” (3, p. 22). A booklet was released in connection with this project (4). This framework sets forth the process of payroll in defence.

Pay scales are published, as noted in Question 39. There appear to be no reported complaints or issues since the overhaul of the system in 2011.

COMMENTS -+

(1) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Payroll Remediation. What will the Task Force do? http://web.archive.org/web/20130411130453/http://www.defence.gov.au/payrollremediation/index.htm
(2) Parliament of Australia, Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Review of the Defence annual report 2009-2010, http://www.aph.gov.au/parliamentary_business/committees/house_of_representatives_committees?url=jfadt/defenceannualreport_2009_2010/report/chapter%203.htm; 3.9 to 3.10
(3) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Defence Magazine. Issue 2, 2011. http://www.defence.gov.au/defencemagazine/editions/2011_02/mag.pdf
(4) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Defence Support Group Defence Payroll Assurance Framework. http://web.archive.org/web/20140302163221/http://www.defence.gov.au/payrollremediation/Documents/Defence%20Payroll%20Assurance%20Framework.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

41.
score
4

Is there an established, independent, transparent, and objective appointment system for the selection of military personnel at middle and top management level?

The appointment system for senior military personnel is established, objective and comprehensive and set out in the Military Personnel Manual (1) and associated Defence Instructions. Senior civilian staff are covered by a comprehensive system under the Commonwealth Public Service Act 1999 (2), (3). Transparency is limited by requirements for personal confidentiality although both appointment systems have general grievance processes.

Independent oversight is provided for by the Independent Selection Advisory Committee (4). The Australian Public Service Commission provides a strong, independent, and formal institution for managing personnel advancement, which includes the Office of the Merit Protection Commissioner (5). In addition, Australia has had a workplace relations tribunal since the early 1900s. That tribunal is now called the Fair Work Commission, and concerns itself with disputes regarding employment and promotion, including for government employees (6).

There are no indications that the system is not adhered to in practice.

COMMENTS -+

(1) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Military Personnel Manual www.defence.gov.au/dpe/pac/MILPERSMAN.pdf‎ (accessed 2 May 2014).
(2) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Defence Workplace Relations Manual Chaper 6 Promotion. http://www.defence.gov.au/dpe/pac/DWRM/DW_06_02_02_promotion.htm (accessed 2 May 2014).
(3) Australian Public Service Commission. Senior Executive Service: Selection, mobility and separation
http://www.apsc.gov.au/aps-employment-policy-and-advice/movements/the-senior-executive-service-selection,-mobility-and-separation (accessed 26 April 2014).
(4) Australian Public Service Commission. Info sheet: Independent Selection Advisory Committee. http://www.apsc.gov.au/publications-and-media/current-publications/recruitment-guidelines-toolkit/isac
(5) Australian Public Service Commission. Office of the Merit Protection Commissioner. http://www.apsc.gov.au/merit
(6) Australian Government. Fair Work Commission, https://www.fwc.gov.au/about-us/history and https://www.fwc.gov.au/resolving-issues-disputes-and-dismissals/workplace-issues-disputes

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

42.
score
4

Are personnel promoted through an objective, meritocratic process? Such a process would include promotion boards outside of the command chain, strong formal appraisal processes, and independent oversight.

Civilian staff in Defence are employed under a merit based system (1) which has promotion committees structured to enhance independence, formal appraisal processes and oversight from the independent Australian Public Service Commission (2). Military personnel are employed under a separate system set out in the Military Personnel Manual (3). Some, but not all the Defence Instructions where the details of the promotion and appraisal system are described, are publicly available. Surveys undertaken by Defence indicate some level of dissatisfaction with the promotion process (4) (dating back to 2010 however). One of the consequences of the revelations about sexual harassment in Defence (6) has been a commitment to improving the culture (7) including recognition to improve the promotion appraisal system (8).

The Australian Public Service Commission provides a strong, independent, and formal institution for managing personnel advancement, which includes the Office of the Merit Protection Commissioner (9). In addition, Australia has had a workplace relations tribunal since the early 1900s. That tribunal is now called the Fair Work Commission, and concerns itself with disputes regarding employment and promotion, including for government employees (10).

Response to Peer Reviewer 1: Accepted. Information added to the main answer and score raised from 3 to 4.

COMMENTS -+

(1) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Defence Workplace Relations Manual Chaper 6 Promotion. http://www.defence.gov.au/dpe/pac/DWRM/DW_06_02_02_promotion.htm
(2) Australian Public Service Commission. Recruitment and selection in the APS: The legislative framework. http://www.apsc.gov.au/aps-employment-policy-and-advice/recruitment-and-selection/recruitment-and-selection-in-the-aps; http://www.apsc.gov.au/publications-and-media/current-publications/recruitment-guidelines-toolkit/isac
(3) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Military Personnel Manual www.defence.gov.au/dpe/pac/MILPERSMAN.pdf‎
(4) Parliament of Australia. Budget Estimates Hearing 2009-2010. 3-4 June 2009. Career Guidance/Human Resource management of service personnel. Question W6 http://www.defence.gov.au/ips/parliament/qons/42nd/ssc/0910_budget_jun09/responses/w06.htm
(5) Allan K Warren (1998) Submission to the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade for inquiry and report on the conduct of military boards and courts of inquiry and defence force discipline (MBCI and DFD). http://www.bmartin.cc/dissent/documents/Warren/submission.html
(6) Australian Human Rights Commission (2014) Audit Report Review into the Treatment of Women in the Australian Defence Force • https://defencereview.humanrights.gov.au
(7) Australian Government.. Department of Defence, (2012). Defence Committee, Pathway to Change: Evolving Defence Culture. http://www.defence.gov.au/pathwaytochange/docs/120410%20Pathway%20to%20Change%20-%20Evolving%20Defence%20Culture%20-%20web%20version.pdf
(8) Major General Angus Campbell, Dr Corinne Manning and Brigadier Paul Nothard (2013) Organisational Culture Securing Army’s Future: Enhancing Career Management Australian Army Journal Volume X (3) p142. http://www.army.gov.au/Our-future/Publications/Australian-Army-Journal/~/media/Files/Our%20future/LWSC%20Publications/AAJ/2013Winter/AustralianArmyJournal_V10N3Winter_OrganistaionalCulture-SecuringArmysFuture.pdf
(9) Australian Public Service Commission. Office of the Merit Protection Commissioner. http://www.apsc.gov.au/merit
(10) Australian Government. Fair Work Commission, https://www.fwc.gov.au/about-us/history and https://www.fwc.gov.au/resolving-issues-disputes-and-dismissals/workplace-issues-disputes

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: Civilian defence employees working for the Australian Public Service can have their promotions reviewed by the independent Office of the Merit Protection Commissioner (http://www.apsc.gov.au/aps-employment-policy-and-advice/office-of-the-merit-protection-commissioner). Military and civilian employees can also obtain non-binding promotion decisions from the Independent Selection Advisory Committee.

Suggested score: 4

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

43.
score
N/A

Where compulsory conscription occurs, is there a policy of not accepting bribes for avoiding conscription? Are there appropriate procedures in place to deal with such bribery, and are they applied?

Australia has not had conscription since 1972 (1) and there is no prospect of it returning.

COMMENTS -+

(1) Australian War Memorial Encyclopedia. Conscription https://www.awm.gov.au/encyclopedia/conscription/ (accessed 3 May 2014)

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

44.
score
3

With regard to compulsory or voluntary conscription, is there a policy of refusing bribes to gain preferred postings in the recruitment process? Are there appropriate procedures in place to deal with such bribery, and are they applied?

Australia does not have compulsory conscription (1). It has an active recruitment program (2) as well a work experience program (3) and is contemplating a ‘gap year’ program (4). Defence initiates these programs to promote recruitment and it is unlikely that individuals would pay to get preferred postings. Any such bribery would be contrary to explicit Defence policies (5),(6). As well all Defence personnel are subject to the Criminal Code Act 1995 which includes offences including bribery and related offences (Part 7.6) and fraudulent conduct (Part 7.3). There is no evidence of cases of bribery relating to preferred postings.

The score has been selected on the basis that there is no specific policy against bribery for preferred postings, although this would be covered under general policies and penalties against bribery in Defence.

COMMENTS -+

(1) Australian War Memorial Encyclopedia. Conscription https://www.awm.gov.au/encyclopedia/conscription/
(2) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Careers and recruiting. http://www.defence.gov.au/header/careers.htm
(3) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Defence Work Experience Program. http://www.defence.gov.au/workexperience/
(4) Government brings back military gap year. Sky News (28 April 2014). http://www.skynews.com.au/news/national/2014/04/28/government-brings-back-military-gap-year.html
(5) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Ethics Matters Handbook. http://www.defence.gov.au/AFC/pdf/Ethics-Matter-Handbook.pdf
(6) Defence Instructions (General) PERS 25-6 Conflicts of Interest and declaration of interests. http://www.defencereservessupport.gov.au/media/166354/defence-general-instructions-conflicts-and-declarations-of-interest.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

45.
score
4

Is there evidence of 'ghost soldiers', or non-existent soldiers on the payroll?

There is no evidence of ghost soldiers and the tight Australian government financial management system (2), (3) would make that sort of fraud most unlikely.

COMMENTS -+

(1) Survey of media and government sources.
(2) Funnell, W., Cooper, K. and Lee, J. (2012) The institutional framework of accountability. In Public sector accounting and accountability in Australia. 2nd Edition. (pages 79-109) Sydney: University of New South Wales Press.
(3) Australian Government. Attorney-General’s Department. Commonwealth Fraud Control Guidelines 2011. http://www.ag.gov.au/CrimeAndCorruption/FraudControl/Pages/CommonwealthFraudControlGuidelines.aspx.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

46.
score
4

Are chains of command separate from chains of payment?

All salaries issues come under the control of the Defence Force Remuneration Tribunal (1) that is appointed under s58H of the Defence Act 1903 and is independent of the military chain of command. Day to day administration is undertaken by the Directorate of Military Salaries and Allowances (2). Personnel can appeal to the Tribunal about any salaries and allowances issues.

COMMENTS -+

(1) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Defence Force Remuneration Tribunal http://www.defence.gov.au/dpe/pac/dfrt.htm
(2) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Directorate of Military Salaries and Allowances - Policy http://www.defence.gov.au/dpe/pac/ADF_SalAllowSup.htm

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

47.
score
4

Is there a Code of Conduct for all military and civilian personnel that includes, but is not limited to, guidance with respect to bribery, gifts and hospitality, conflicts of interest, and post-separation activities?

The code of conduct for all Australian public servants is set forth in section 13 of the Public Service Act 1999 (1). It appears that the code of conduct in the Public Service Act 1999 only covers defence employees that are civil servants (that is, not military personnel) (;). Nonetheless, the APSC publication &quoute;APS Values and Code of Conduct in practice: A guide to official conduct for APS employees and agency heads&quoute; (cited above) discusses the application of the APS Code of Conduct to defence personnel as well as other government employees, which may lead to some confusion. Note, however, that this publication is in the process of being revised following legislative updates (4).

In 2011, the Australian Defence Force (ADF) issued a review of personal conduct among ADF employees. In it, they stated that each branch of the armed services has its own code of conduct (5, p. 27). The report stated, “Encouragingly, each of the Services not only now has such codes of conduct but is refining them further in response to this review. Less encouragingly, because such codes of conduct are likely to be based on the respective Service values, issues associated with the plethora of values . . . may weaken their overall usefulness” (ibid.). The report recommended the establishment of a universal code of conduct (p. 40, 42). I have been unable to find the individual codes of conduct for the separate services, aside from a code of conduct for Army trainees, which is not dated (but based on some of the pictures in the annexes, appears to be an older publication) (6). There exists general Defence policy on ethics that applies universally to Defence as well (7)

The Defence Force Discipline Act 1982 sets forth penalties for certain offences by military personnel (8). These tend to deal with criminal and property offences, rather than the way military personnel should act on a day to day basis. The law does not contain a code of conduct or a directive that service units should create codes of conduct. A number of defence policies have been issued in accordance with section 9A of the Defence Act 1903 (9), for example, Defence Instruction PERS 35-3, Management and reporting of unacceptable behaviour (2009) (10).

There are also specific policies for ADF personnel on a number of ethics-related matters, including Notifications of Post Separation Employment (11), Conflicts of interest and declarations of interests (12), PERS 25-2 Employment and voluntary activities of Australian Defence Force Members in off-duty hours (13), and PERS 25-7 Gifts, hospitality and sponsorship (14). These policies have been issued under section 9A of the Defence Act 1903. These are discussed in the Defence Ethics Matters handbook as well (7). The Audit and Fraud Control Unit oversees issues related to these specific policies (15).

The APS code of conduct appears to be widely discussed in online publications (such as those cited above) and is readily available online. The ADF instructions/policies are available online as well. Some materials, such as the Army trainee materials cited above, suggest that service-specific codes of conduct are made available to service members as soon as they enlist. No specific instructions regarding the distribution of such policies were found.

Aside from instructions regarding reporting misconduct, there is no further evidence of oversight mechanisms but there is likely to be one which may not be public.

Both interviewees indicated that the structure and procedures were robust but that the number of Defence personnel moving into the private sector contracting area required extra vigilance. Interviewee A expressly indicated that the anti-corruption training processes currently being rolled out addressed this issue.

COMMENTS -+

(1) Public Service Act 1999 https://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2013C00310/Html/Text#_Toc360194259
(2) Australia Law Reform Commission. Regulating Beyond the Australian Public Service. http://www.alrc.gov.au/publications/13-regulating-beyond-australian-public-service/commonwealth-employees-outside-aps, section 7
(3) PACMATE, Appendix 6 APS Values and Code of Conduct, http://www.defence.gov.au/dpe/pac/PACMATE_Pt5_app6.htm
(4) Australia Public Service Commission. APS Values and Code of Conduct in practice: A guide to official conduct for APS employees and agency heads. Last updated: 07 Aug 2015. http://www.apsc.gov.au/publications-and-media/current-publications/aps-values-and-code-of-conduct-in-practice
(5) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Beyond Compliance: Professionalism, Trust and Capability in the Australian Profession of Arms: Report of the Australian Defence Force Personal Conduct Review (2011). http://www.defence.gov.au/pathwaytochange/docs/personalconductpersonnel/Review%20of%20Personal%20Conduct%20of%20ADF%20Personnel_full%20report.pdf
(6) HEADQUARTERS ROYAL MILITARY COLLEGE OF AUSTRALIA. ROYAL MILITARY COLLEGE OF AUSTRALIA, GENERAL SERVICE OFFICER ENTRY – JULY 2015. Annex M, http://www.army.gov.au/~/media/files/army%20life/army%20careers/rmc-d/joining%20rmcd/courses/ara/ftgsofac/jijan2014/150106%20-%20ji%20-%20rmc-a%20-%20general%20service%20officer%20entry%20-%20jul%2015.pdf
(7) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Ethics Matters Handbook. http://www.defence.gov.au/AFC/pdf/Ethics-Matter-Handbook.pdf
(8) Defence Force Discipline Act 1982 https://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2015C00370
(9) Defence Act 1903. https://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2015C00395/Html/Text#_Toc427149854
(10) Defence Instruction PERS 35-3, Management and reporting of unacceptable behaviour (2009). https://www.defglis.com.au/resources/UnacceptableBehaviour.pdf
(11) DI(G) PERS 25-4 Notification of Post Separation Employment. http://www.defence.gov.au/afc/pdf/GP25_04.pdf
(12) DI(G) Pers 25-6 Conflicts of interest and declarations of interests. http://www.defencereservessupport.gov.au/media/166354/defence-general-instructions-conflicts-and-declarations-of-interest.pdf
(13) DI(G) PERS 25-2 Employment and voluntary activities of Australian Defence Force Members in off-duty hours. http://www.defence.gov.au/afc/pdf/DIG-Pers-25_02.pdf
(14) DI(G) PERS 25-7 Gifts, hospitality and sponsorship. http://www.defence.gov.au/afc/pdf/gp25_07.pdf
(15) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Fraud and Audit Control Unit. Policy. http://www.defence.gov.au/afc/Policy.asp
(16) Interviewee A – Official of the Department of Defence, 18 February 2015.
(17) Interviewee B – Official of the Australian National Audit Office, 12 February 2015.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Although a strong Code of Conduct exists, there remains space to increase focus on anti-corruption issues.

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

48.
score
4

Is there evidence that breaches of the Code of Conduct are effectively addressed ,and are the results of prosecutions made publicly available?

The Defence annual report indicates that there were 358 investigations of fraud investigated by the Fraud Control and Investigations branch (p 114) and 58 matters brought before the Inspector-General of the ADF (p.115). Also there were reported two cases under the Defence Force Discipline Act 1982 brought before the courts (p 121). Some indication of the proportion of investigations that relate to disciplinary matters can be ascertained by a survey of Defence staff with experience of inquiries, investigations and reviews (2). Some 10 per cent dealt with fraud and 19 per cent with disciplinary or criminal misconduct. That would indicate that Defence dealt with around 700 cases of disciplinary or criminal misconduct – out of a total workforce of around 80,000. Personal details of individuals dealt with under disciplinary provisions (either civilian or military) are not divulged for privacy reasons in line with the Commonwealth Privacy Act 1988.

A more recent annual report has been issued (2013-2014), indicates that Defence registered 288 fraud investigations during that time period, with 322 investigations completed (some were registered in previous years) (p. 153). Around 25 per cent of the investigations led to criminal, disciplinary, or administrative action, and about 44 per cent of those investigations were related to offences under the Defence Force Discipline Act 1982 (3).

Additionally, the Director of Military Prosecutions publishes an annual report which provides an overview of case load, including cases of Defence Force Magistrate (DFM), General Court Martial (GCM) and Restricted Court Martial (RCM). Information related to &quoute;significant&quoute; cases is also provided and Appendix B provides figures relating to the class of offence by service. It is assumed that breaches of the conduct standards come under the category &quoute;Specific Military Discipline Offences&quoute;. Further, there is a category entitled &quoute;Fraud, Deception and other Offences&quoute; (4).

Successful prosecutions are referred to the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions and publicly reported (5).

COMMENTS -+

(1) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Defence Annual Report 2012-13 http://www.defence.gov.au/AnnualReports/12-13/pdf/Defence%20Annual%20Report%202012-13.pdf
(2) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Defence Annual Report 2013-14 http://www.defence.gov.au/AnnualReports/13-14/
(3) Australian Government. Department of Defence. (2102) Re-thinking inquiries: Survey report (Page 7). http://www.defence.gov.au/header/documents/AnnexA.pdf
(4) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Director of Military Prosecutions. Annual Report 2014. www.defence.gov.au/publications/DMP_Annual_Report_2014.pdf
(5) Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions. Case Reports http://www.cdpp.gov.au/case-reports/

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The Defence annual report said that 358 cases were resolved in the reporting period instead of simply investigated. There were 333 fraud cases registered, with an unknown number of those opened to investigation. The 58 matters brought before the Inspector-General is found on page 117, not page 115. Finally, on page 121 there is mention of only one case brought before the courts, although that proceeding was framed as a constitutional dispute over a serviceman's right to a trial by jury under the Constitution after being charged with the Defence Force Discipline Act.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

49.
score
2

Does regular anti-corruption training take place for military and civilian personnel?

Defence and the Defence Materiel Organisation conduct regular ethics and fraud awareness programs, both face-to-face and through eLearning. Training is mandatory and in 2012-13 more than 45,000 employees undertook training, while in 2013 - 2014, this figure was 69,000. Defence staff must receive this training at least every two years. While not strictly anti-corruption training, such programs would clearly have a beneficial anti-corruption effect. Interviewee A indicated that, notwithstanding the lack of a national anti-corruption plan, Defence was proceeding to develop an anti-corruption plan. That process would occur within the legal framework of the fraud control arrangements. The Secretary of Defence has agreed to that process and specific anti-corruption training has commenced for senior officers and will be rolled out to Defence personnel in the future.

Response to Peer Reviewer 1: Agreed. The score reflects this.

COMMENTS -+

(1)tAustralian Government. Department of Defence. Defence Annual Report 2012-13 (page 114). http://www.defence.gov.au/AnnualReports/12-13/pdf/Defence%20Annual%20Report%202012-13.pdf
(2) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Defence Annual Report 2013-14
http://www.defence.gov.au/annualreports/
(3) Interviewee A – Official of the Department of Defence, 18 February 2015.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Fraud and ethics training is mandatory for all defence personnel every two years, according to the Defence Annual Report 2012-13 (p.114). It is unclear under Department of Defence materials whether &quoute;fraud&quoute; includes bribery and other types of corruption. Defence Fraud Control Plan No. 10 (2013) defines fraud as only one part of the more general term of corruption. See p.2, http://www.defence.gov.au/afc/pdf/FraudControlPlan10.pdf. However, the Department's Ethics Matters Handbooks defines fraud more broadly to include bribery, corruption, and abuse of office. See p.9, http://www.defence.gov.au/AFC/pdf/Ethics-Matter-Handbook.pdf. Thus, it is unclear to what extent the mandatory fraud training includes corruption more generally.

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The training measures need to be reinforced through strong leadership behaviour.

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

50.
score
4

Is there a policy to make public outcomes of the prosecution of defence services personnel for corrupt activities, and is there evidence of effective prosecutions in recent years?

Internally there is a policy that all breaches of the military disciplinary code are notified up the chain of command (1). The Director of Military Prosecutions publishes an annual report which provides an overview of case load, including cases of Defence Force Magistrate (DFM), General Court Martial (GCM) and Restricted Court Martial (RCM). Information related to &quoute;significant&quoute; cases is also provided and Appendix B provides figures relating to the class of offence by service, which include the classes &quoute;Specific Military Discipline Offences&quoute; and &quoute;Fraud, Deception and other Offences&quoute; (2). Civilian cases are referred to the Australian Federal Police for Investigation. Successful prosecutions are referred to the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions and publicly reported (3). Those sources indicate only a small number of prosecutions of Defence personnel have occurred – around 2-5 per year.

There are no suggestions of prosecutions being suppressed or inappropriately sanctioned.

COMMENTS -+

(1) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Defence Instructions (General) PERS ADMIN 45-2 The reporting and management of notifiable incidents. http://www.defence.gov.au/AFC/pdf/GA45_02.pdf
(2) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Director of Military Prosecutions. Annual Report 2014. www.defence.gov.au/publications/DMP_Annual_Report_2014.pdf
(3) Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions. Case Reports http://www.cdpp.gov.au/case-reports/

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

51.
score
1

Are there effective measures in place to discourage facilitation payments (which are illegal in almost all countries)?

Facilitation payments in Australia are legal under the Criminal Code as long as their value is small (although no financial limit has been provided) and with the purpose of expediting or securing a routine government action. The Australian Taxation Office notes special record-keeping obligations for facilitation payments, but does not discourage them (2).

In November 2011, the government raised the possibility of an amendment to change Australia's law to exclude this exception (3). A document about the proposed change explained that the Attorney General’s Department would accept submissions regarding this proposed change until 20 February 2012 (4). Information about the proposed change was to be published on the Attorney General’s website. Although this information still appears on a webpage entitled &quoute;Planned Regulatory Changes,&quoute; no changes to Australia's law have occurred and it is unclear whether the consultation is still ongoing or has been abandoned.

The legal status of facilitation payments has attracted criticism from the OECD in 2012 (5). A follow up report in 2015 stated that good progress had been made on the previous report's recommendations on the subject but changes in the legal framework were still required (6).

Response to Peer Reviewer 2: The follow up report of the OECD in 2015 stated that there has been some improvement although legal changes are still needed. The score has been selected on that basis.

COMMENTS -+

(1) Australian Government. Criminal Code Act 1995. https://www.comlaw.gov.au/Series/C2004A04868
(2) Australian Tax Office, Tax Office guidelines for understanding and dealing with the bribery of Australian and foreign public officials, https://www.ato.gov.au/About-ATO/About-us/In-detail/How-we-do-things/ATO-guidelines-for-understanding-and-dealing-with-the-bribery-of-Australian-and-foreign-public-officials/
(3) Attorney General. Recent Developments: Assessing the 'facilitation payments' defence under Australian Foreign Bribery law. http://www.ag.gov.au/Publications/Pages/Plannedregulatorychanges.aspx
(4) Attorney General. Possible changes to anti-foreign bribery laws to remove the facilitation payments defence and other technical measures.http://www.ag.gov.au/Publications/Documents/Plannedregulatorychanges/Possible%20changes%20to%20anti%20foreign%20bribery%20laws%20to%20remove%20the%20facilitation%20payments%20defence%20and%20other%20technical%20measures%20%20CRJD.pdf
(5) OECD (2012) Phase 3 Report on implementing the OECD anti-bribery convention in Australia. http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/Australiaphase3reportEN.pdf.
(6) OECD, Australia - OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, &quoute;Australia: Follow up to the Phase 3 Report and Recommendations, April 2015&quoute;, www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/Australia-Phase-3-Follow-up-Report-ENG.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Source 2 is not provided, but I believe the Assessor's statement comes from this OECD review of Australia's bribery practices: http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/Australiaphase3reportEN.pdf

An additional source for understanding facilitation payments: https://www.ato.gov.au/About-ATO/About-us/In-detail/Key-documents/Bribes-and-facilitation-payments--A-guide-to-managing-your-tax-obligations/?page=4

Australia has also progressively tightened controls on facilitation payments, limiting facilitation payments to small values for routine government functions and banning certain forms of payment. Reporting and record-keeping requirements have also been established to regulate the practice.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: In its Phase 3 review of Australia's implementation of the Convention Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, the OECD Working Group on Bribery observed the perception among Australian companies that the practice of making facilitation payments is common. See Phase 3 Report on Implementing the OECD Anti-bribery Convention in Australia (2012), p.10, http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/Australiaphase3reportEN.pdf. Although some companies are beginning to prohibit facilitation payments, they are permissible under Australia's laws, so long as certain record-keeping requirements are met. See ibid.

Suggested score: 0

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: There needs to be greater focus on training lower level managers with financial delegation operating in foreign environments where corruption risk is high.

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Training 60
52.
score
2

Do the armed forces have military doctrine addressing corruption as a strategic issue on operations?

No specific doctrines addressing corruption as a strategic operations issue could be located. However, military personnel would be covered by the general ethics framework (1), (2) and (3). On recent overseas operations Australian Defence Forces have been proactive in promoting anti-corruption, both in the Solomon Islands (4) and Afghanistan (5). Interviewee A indicated that, notwithstanding the lack of a national anti-corruption plan, Defence was proceeding to develop an anti-corruption plan. That process would occur within the legal framework of the fraud control arrangements. The Secretary of Defence has agreed to that process and specific anti-corruption training has commenced for senior officers and will be rolled out to all Defence personnel in the future.

COMMENTS -+

(1) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Ethics Matters Handbook. http://www.defence.gov.au/AFC/pdf/Ethics-Matter-Handbook.pdf (accessed 3 May 2014)
(2) Defence Instructions (General) PERS 25-6 Conflicts of Interest and declaration of interests. http://www.defencereservessupport.gov.au/media/166354/defence-general-instructions-conflicts-and-declarations-of-interest.pdf (accessed 3 May 2014).
(3) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Defence Instructions (General) PERS 25-7 Gifts, hospitality and sponsorship http://www.dtc.org.au/Documents/185.pdf (accessed 3 May 2014).
(4) Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands. Anti-corruption. http://www.ramsi.org/our-work/anti-corruption.html (accessed 5 May 2014).
(5) Stephen Smith, Minister of Defence (2010) Media release 17 December 2010 United States’ Afghanistan-Pakistan Strategy Review. www.defence.gov.au/minister/93tpl.cfm?CurrentId=9800 (accessed 5 May 2014).
(6) Interviewee A – Official of the Department of Defence, 18 February 2015.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

53.
score
2

Is there training in corruption issues for commanders at all levels in order to ensure that these commanders are clear on the corruption issues they may face during deployment? If so, is there evidence that they apply this knowledge in the field?

A guidance document on peacekeeping operations from 2009 does not address corruption risks in relation to peacekeeping operations, except for one small reference to conflicts of interest and another short reference to the EU's work on corruption issues (1). Another document from 2007 on leadership does not make any reference to corruption, although it does reflect on ethics (2).

On reviewing the courses available on the Australian Warfare Centre's ADF Peacekeeping Training Centre, none of the information specifies corruption or fraud awareness training, although there is a UN Staff Officers Course &quoute;Conduct & Discipline / Sexual Exploitation & Abuse / Consequences of Misconduct / HIV / AIDS & UN PKOs&quoute; (3). There is also general fraud and ethics training for all defence personnel, taking place biennially (4). .

On recent overseas operations Australian Defence Forces have been proactive in promoting anti-corruption, both in the Solomon Islands (5) and Afghanistan (6). This is in accordance with general ethics training (4, 7), policy obligations (4, 8) and leadership training (2).
It can therefore be concluded that some form of training in corruption issues for commanders does exist, given application in the field and the overall policy framework.

Interviewee A indicated that, notwithstanding the lack of a national anti-corruption plan, Defence was proceeding to develop an anti-corruption plan. That process would occur within the legal framework of the fraud control arrangements. The Secretary of Defence has agreed to that process and specific anti-corruption training has commenced for senior officers and will be rolled out to all Defence personnel in the future.

Response to Peer Reviewer 1: Agreed. Score lowered from 3 to 2.

COMMENTS -+

(1) Australian Government, Australian Defence Force, 'OPERATIONS SERIES ADDP 3.8: PEACE OPERATIONS,' Australian Defence Doctrine Publication, December 14, 2009, http://www.defence.gov.au/jwdtc/Documents/DoctrineLibrary/ADDP3.8-PeaceOperations.pdf
(2) Australian Government, Australian Defence Force, 'Executive Series ADDP 00.6: Leadership in the Australian Defence Force (Chapter 2-33) (2007) http://www.defence.gov.au/adc/docs/Publications/ADDP%2000.6-Leadership.pdf (accessed 3 May 2014).
(3) Australian Warfare Centre, ADF Peacekeeping Training Centre, http://www.defence.gov.au/ADFWC/peacekeeping/unsoc.asp
(4) Australian Government, Australian Defence Force, Fraud Control Plan 10. http://www.defence.gov.au/afc/pdf/FraudControlPlan10
(5) Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands. Anti-corruption. http://www.ramsi.org/our-work/anti-corruption.html (accessed 5 May 2014).
(6) Stephen Smith, Minister of Defence (2010) Media release 17 December 2010 United States’ Afghanistan-Pakistan Strategy Review. www.defence.gov.au/minister/93tpl.cfm?CurrentId=9800 (accessed 5 May 2014).
(7) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Ethics Matters Handbook. http://www.defence.gov.au/AFC/pdf/Ethics-Matter-Handbook.pdf (accessed 3 May 2014).
(8)tDepartment of Defence, Annual Report 2013-14, http://www.defence.gov.au/annualreports/13%2D14/
(9) Interviewee A – Official of the Department of Defence, 18 February 2015.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: &quoute;Fraud and ethics&quoute; training is mandatory for all defence personnel every two years, according to the Defence Annual Report 2012-13 (p.114). In addition, as noted in sources (1) and (2), Australian Defence Forces have been proactive in promoting anti-corruption measures in specific locations. However, it is unclear that commanders at all levels and in all locales are receiving anti-corruption training. One thing that is unclear under Department of Defence materials is whether &quoute;fraud&quoute; includes bribery and other types of corruption. Defence Fraud Control Plan No. 10 (2013) defines fraud as only one part of the more general term of corruption. See p.2, http://www.defence.gov.au/afc/pdf/FraudControlPlan10.pdf. However, the Department's Ethics Matters Handbooks defines fraud more broadly to include bribery, corruption, and abuse of office. See p.9, http://www.defence.gov.au/AFC/pdf/Ethics-Matter-Handbook.pdf. Thus, it is ambiguous to what extent the mandatory fraud and ethics training addresses corruption as a general matter.

Suggested score: 2

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

54.
score
1

Are trained professionals regularly deployed to monitor corruption risk in the field (whether deployed on operations or peacekeeping missions)?

The Attorney General's Department has set out detailed framework regarding the control of fraud in all Australian government operations (1). It includes risk management training in its fraud awareness courses that all Defence staff are required to undertake (2). Also Defence applies those risk management techniques to all of its activities and reports on the results in the Defence Fraud Control Plan (3).

A 2011 report entitled “The Australian Defence Force's Mechanisms for Learning from Operational Activities” states “all commanders are responsible for evaluating the performance of force elements (FE) under their command during all activities in which they participate” (4). However, it is not clear whether this includes monitoring and evaluating how corruption issues are handled.

An audit of the ADF’s investigative capability, undertaken in 2006, does mention issues with the role of personnel tasked with policing in operations but again, it is not clear whether this was geared towards investigating how corruption issues were handled.

Interviewee A indicated that, notwithstanding the lack of a national anti-corruption plan, Defence was proceeding to develop an anti-corruption plan. That process would occur within the legal framework of the fraud control arrangements. The Secretary of Defence has agreed to that process and specific anti-corruption training has commenced for senior officers and will be rolled out to Defence personnel in the future. The next Defence fraud control plan will include an anti-corruption plan. Also, Defence is developing a corruption intelligence capacity to complement this process.

COMMENTS -+

(1) Australian Government. Attorney-General’s Department. Commonwealth Fraud Control Framework 2014. http://www.ag.gov.au/CrimeAndCorruption/FraudControl/Pages/FraudControlFramework.aspx Australian Government.
(2) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Defence Annual Report 2013-14 (1),thttp://www.defence.gov.au/annualreports/13%2D14/
(3) Department of Defence. Defence Fraud Control Plan No 10 http://www.defence.gov.au/AFC/pdf/FraudControlPlan10.pdf
(4) Australian National Audit Office. The Australian Defence Force's Mechanisms for Learning from Operational Activities 2011, www.anao.gov.au/~/media/Uploads/Audit%20Reports/2011%2012/201112%20Audit%20Report%20No%2001.pdf
(5) Australian National Audit Office. REPORT OF AN AUDIT OF THE AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE INVESTIGATIVE CAPABILITY 2006, www.defence.gov.au/publications/spauditreport.pdf
6) Interviewee A – Official of the Department of Defence, 18 February 2015.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: There is some ambiguity with regard to whether the Audit and Fraud Control Division defines &quoute;fraud&quoute; to include corruption. At least one policy document---Defence Fraud Control Plan No. 10 (2013)---defines fraud as only one part of the more general term of corruption. See p.2, http://www.defence.gov.au/afc/pdf/FraudControlPlan10.pdf. Other documents, such as that cited above, define fraud to include corruption.

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: From personal experience I am not aware of any corruption monitoring occurring other than financial auditing.

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

55.
score
2

Are there guidelines, and staff training, on addressing corruption risks in contracting whilst on deployed operations or peacekeeping missions?

Besides the general anti-corruption guidelines mentioned in Question 54, Defence has guidelines on peacekeeping operations that include promoting good governance (1). Overseas operations and deployments usually include Defence personnel working with the Australian Aid agency (AUSAid). That agency works within an anti-corruption framework (2) and has a contract with the U4 Anti-corruption Resource Centre. It is not clear whether this framework covers corruption in contracting on operations specifically.

There is evidence of an Operational Contract Management Course which was listed as one of the courses being provided at the Australian Defence College (3). It was rolled out in 2009 (4). Whether the content of this course provides training on corruption in contracting is unclear.

Interviewee A indicated that, notwithstanding the lack of a national anti-corruption plan, Defence was proceeding to develop an anti-corruption plan. That process would occur within the legal framework of the fraud control arrangements. The Secretary of Defence has agreed to that process and specific anti-corruption training has commenced for senior officers and will be rolled out to Defence personnel in the future. The next Defence fraud control plan will include an anti-corruption plan. Following on the scope of the fraud control plan, this anti-corruption plan will apply to Defence contractors.

Response to Peer Reviewer 2: Agreed. Score lowered from 3 to 2.

COMMENTS -+

(1) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Operations Series ADDP 3.8 Peace Operations (Para 4.52) http://www.defence.gov.au/adfwc/Documents/DoctrineLibrary/ADDP/ADDP3.8-PeaceOperations.pdf
(2) Australian Government. Australian Agency for International Development. Annual Report 2010-11. Cross Regional Activities http://aid.dfat.gov.au/anrep/rep11/program1_a.html (accessed 7 May 2014)
(3) Australian Defence College. Proposal to Restructure the Australian Defence Force Warfare and Relocate the Peace Operations Training Centre to the ACSC, FOI/03/12/13 www.defence.gov.au/foi/docs/disclosures/034_1213_Documents.pdf
(4) The Link, Australian Defence Logistics Magazine, Issue 8, www.defence.gov.au/jlc/documents/defence_logistics_magazine_the_link_issue_8.pdf
(5) Grant agreement deed between the Commonwealth of Australia for U4 Anti-corruption Resource Centre. http://aid.dfat.gov.au/aidissues/governance/anti-corruption/Documents/u4-anti-corruption-resource-centre-grant-agreement.pdf (accessed 7 May 2014).
(6) Interviewee A – Official of the Department of Defence, 18 February 2015.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: Australia's guidelines specifically deal with fraud. While fraud is part of corruption, it is unclear whether this term is meant to include all corrupt activities. See Defence Fraud Control Plan No. 10 (2013), p.2, http://www.defence.gov.au/afc/pdf/FraudControlPlan10.pdf. Other documents, such as that cited above, define fraud to include corruption (defining fraud as only one part of the more general term of corruption)..

Suggested score: 2

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

56.
score
2

Private Military Contractors (PMCs) usually refer to companies that provide operational staff to military environments. They may also be known as security contractors or private security contractors, and refer to themselves as private military corporations, private military firms, private security providers, or military service providers.

A 2015 report by the Australian Civil –Military Centre was released on the nature of Australia’s engagement with private security companies (PSCs), stating that they had become a regular component of the government’s operations in conflict and disaster zones. Defence was listed as one of the government departments most frequently interacting with PSCs (1).

While stating that the Attorney-General’s Department was responsible for several aspects of legislation relevant to the private security industry, the report also highlighted the lack of formal policies on PSCs within government departments, including defence, other than for the establishment and execution of contracts. It further went on to say that while the government was leading on the regulation of PSCs abroad (through its involvement in the ICoC, discussed below), this was not reflected at home. Some of the recommendations in the report included the ADF factoring in “private security liaison” into its mission planning and civil-military actors having awareness of reporting and investigating procedures in case of issues/events related to PCSs (1).

Like all government contractors, such companies, are subject to the Fraud Control Plan (2). The most recent Defence Policy Procurement Manual (3) discusses fraud risks as well as ethics in procurement (e.g., conflicts of interest). PSCs are regulated as any other government business under the Criminal Code Act 1995, which criminalizes bribery of domestic and foreign officials. A company that is convicted of bribery can be fined the greater of AUD 18 million, 3 times value of benefit received from the corruption, or 10% of annual turnover during relevant period. An individual can receive up to 10 years imprisonment and/or a fine of up to AUD 1.8 million (see CC sections 70.2 for foreign officials and 141.1 for other officials). Other offences related to bribery include giving corrupting benefits (CC section 142.1) and abuse of public office (CC section 142.2); these crimes have slightly lower penalties. Australia’s states and territories also have their own anti-corruption laws.

Australia is also a signatory of the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers’ Association (ICoC) aims to improve accountability of the PMSC industry by establishing an international, independent oversight mechanism (5, 6). While it is geared towards establishing standards in the industry primarily in relation to humanitarian law, it does reference corruption by PMSCs as well. Participating governments thereby commit to report on the implementation of the Montreux Document (which applies during armed conflict only) and on the ICoC and to promote compliance with the ICoC in their contracting policies and practices. An oversight mechanism to deal with allegations of member private companies violating the ICoC is still in development (5).

Whether PMCs are subject to scrutiny is not clear. There is no clear information on how sanctions are imposed in cases of corruption either.

COMMENTS -+

(1) Australian Civil –Military Centre, Civil-Military Occasional Papers, Privateers in Australia’s Conflict and Disaster Zones, January 2015, https://www.acmc.gov.au/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/1-2015-Privateers-in-Australias-Conflict-and-Disaster-Zones.pdf
(2) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Defence Fraud Control Plan No. 10. www.defence.gov.au/afc/pdf/FraudControlPlan10.pdf
(3) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Defence Policy Procurement Manual. http://www.defence.gov.au/dmo/Multimedia/DPPM-9-5247.pdf
(4) Australian Government. Criminal Code Act 1995, https://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2015C00507
(5) International Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers’ Association http://www.icoca.ch/en/the_icoc
(6) Australian Government. Australia taking lead role in international efforts to raise standards and accountability for private security contractors, 15 August 2013, http://dfat.gov.au/news/media-releases/Pages/australia-taking-lead-role-in-international-efforts-to-raise-standards-and-accountability-for-private-security-contractors.aspx

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Personnel 50
57.
score
3

Does the country have legislation covering defence and security procurement and are there any items exempt from these laws?

The Financial Framework (Supplementary Powers) Act 1997 (FMA Act) was in place since 1997 (1) and until 2014 was the primary legislation governing government procurement in Australia. In July 2014, the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (PGPA Act) went into force, replacing the FMA Act with regard to procurement (2).

The PGPA Act framework includes the Public Governance Performance and Accountability Rule 2014 (3), which expressly applies to the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation and Defence Materiel Organisation (clauses 6 and 10, respectively).

Commonwealth Procurement Rules (CPRs) have also been issued in accordance with section 101 of the PGPA Act (4). The rules do not specifically address corruption risks in procurement, but they do have chapters on &quoute;Efficient, effective, economical and ethical procurement,&quoute; &quoute;Accountability and transparency in procurement,&quoute; and &quoute;Procurement risk&quoute; (chapters 6, 7, and 8, respectively).

There is a transition document in place to assist the move to CPRs 2014 (5).

Following establishment of this new legal framework, the Department of Defence issued its own Defence Procurement Policy Manual (DPPM) (6). However, the PGPA Act, PGPA Rule, CPRs, and the Financial Delegations Manual (FINMAN 2) are still considered to be a higher authority when conflicts arise.

Division 1 rules of the CPRs govern all Defence procurement. However, certain procurement that reach certain monetary thresholds are subject to additional rules (under Division 2). The monetary thresholds are (i) $80,000 for non-construction procurement by non-corporate Commonwealth entities (such as Defence), (ii) $400,000 for non-construction procurement by relevant prescribed corporate Commonwealth entities (such as Defence Housing Authority), and (iii) $7.5 million for construction procurement.

The 2015 DPPM refers to “Exempt Procurement,” but such procurement is still subject to Division 1 rules. The real difference is that they are not subject to Division 2 rules (even if they meet the monetary thresholds listed above). Note, though, that the DPPM suggests using Division 2 rules as “best practice.” The types of procurement listed in Appendix A of the Commonwealth Procurement Rules (CPRs) are “exempt” in this sense, as is procurement in a few other cases outlined on pages 1.2-4 to 1.2-5 of the 2015 DPPM. It does not appear this would cover much defence procurement, as private construction or engineering contracts with private companies do not appear to be covered.

The Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee in 2012 found a series of issues with the procurement procedures in place for Defence capital projects (7). Overall the committee found that serious issues with Defence’s management structure, that Defence lacked a robust “risk management structure” and seemed “incapable of learning from past mistakes”, particularly in relation to learning from earlier project failures. The recommendations, recognising that Defence was making efforts to reform already, focused on changing the alignment of responsibilities in the organisation structure and ensuring agencies had the skills and resources required for the fulfilment of their obligations.

After the report, Australia’s Department of Defence produced an additional White Paper (in 2013) which set new, more realistic goals. (8). It is also in the process of updating that goal-making process by producing a 2015 white paper (9). Given the broad consultation process that is going into the 2015 White Paper (10), as well as the fact that it is producing this white paper so soon after the 2013 White Paper, it appears that Defence is attempting to take into account the committee’s recommendations.

The 2012 Senate committee report also noted that inconsistent application of policies and non-compliance was an issue that affected the “whole of the DMO level” (page 85). The DMO reform that ultimately resulted in this complete organizational overhaul resulted from a series of reports on the issue (11) and the reorganization appears to be an attempt to deal with committee’s recommendations head-on (12). This is discussed further in questions 61 and 67.

Since the changes to DMO/CASG occurred in 2015, they are not yet reflected in annual reports, although one would expect them to be reflected in future reports.

A score of 3 has been selected on the basis that these procurement guidelines do not expressly deal with corruption risks.

COMMENTS -+

(1) Financial Framework (Supplementary Powers) Act 1997, available at https://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2015C00191.
(2) Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013, https://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2013A00123
(3) Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Rule 2014, https://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/F2014L00911
(4) Australian Government. Ministry of Finance. Commonwealth Procurement Rules (CPRs), http://www.finance.gov.au/procurement/procurement-policy-and-guidance/commonwealth-procurement-rules/
(5) Australian Government. Ministry of Finance. Transitioning to the PGPA Compliant Procurement Framework, www.finance.gov.au/sites/default/files/Transitioning%20to%20the%20PGPA%20compliant%20procurement%20framework.pdf
(6) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Defence Procurement Policy Manual, September 2015, www.defence.gov.au/casg/Multimedia/DPPM_September_2015-9-5247.pdf
(7) Senate References Committee on Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade, “Procurement Procedures for Defence Capital Projects,” http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Foreign_Affairs_Defence_and_Trade/Completed%20inquiries/2010-13/procurement/index.
(8) Australian Government. Department of Defence 2013 Defence White Paper http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper2013/index.htm (accessed 9 April 2014).
(9) Australian Government. Department of Defence. 2015 Defence White Paper. http://www.defence.gov.au/Whitepaper/ (accessed 10 October 2015)
(10) Australian Government. Department of Defence. 2015 Defence White Paper. FAQs. http://www.defence.gov.au/Whitepaper/FAQs.asp
(11) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Capability Acquisition and Sustainability Group, “Current Reviews” at http://www.defence.gov.au/casg/AboutCASG/
(12) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Capability Acquisition and Sustainability Group website, http://www.defence.gov.au/casg/AboutCASG/

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

58.
score
4

Is the defence procurement cycle process, from assessment of needs, through contract implementation and sign-off, all the way to asset disposal, disclosed to the public?

The Defence procurement cycle is sent out in detail in the Defence Procurement Policy Manual (1). Defence procurement follows a long term planning process set out in the regular Defence Capability Plan (2). Information on ongoing procurement is further made available through the AusTender website.

COMMENTS -+

(1) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Defence Procurement Policy Manual, September 2015, www.defence.gov.au/casg/Multimedia/DPPM_September_2015-9-5247.pdf
(2) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Defence Capability Plan 2012. http://www.defence.gov.au/publications/CapabilityPlan2012.pdf
(3) Australian Government. AusTender Homepage https://www.tenders.gov.au/?event=public.home

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

59.
score
4

Are defence procurement oversight mechanisms in place and are these oversight mechanisms active and transparent?

Defence procurement is subject to external audit by the Australian National Audit Office (1), which as discussed in Question 15, is independent from the Executive and reports directly to Parliament. As of July 2015, the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) had 5 audits in progress. One of those audits expressly deals with procurement issues (&quoute;Test and Evaluation of Major Defence Equipment Acquisitions&quoute;). ANAO has explained that the objective of the audit is mainly focused on (but not restricted to) &quoute; examining the effectiveness of Defence’s management of the Testing & Evaluation aspects of its capital equipment acquisition program” and to “report on Defence’s progress in implementing relevant recommendations made in the 2012 Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee report Procurement Procedures for Defence Capital Projects”. It goes on to further state that it is considering 14 additional potential audits, including one on selected aspects of Defence procurement management of procurement activities”.

The same audit was also mentioned as a potential audit in ANAO's 2014 audit plan, but it was not carried out. (2) The ANAO reports its audit work plans since 2010 on its website. All of these work plans have included a defence component.

Based on the terms of reference (3), it appears that the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade engaged in its review of defence procurement procedures following issuance of the 2009 defence white paper, Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030 (4). In other words, this review appears to have arisen in relation to a particular report, not as part of a regular work stream of review of defence procurement procedures. It analysed 28 major procurement projects and identified significant problems. Those 28 projects accounted for A$7.8 billion of cost overruns and combined schedule slippage of 760 months (page 34).

A few recent news articles have highlighted a lack of transparency in defence procurement as well as allegations that Defence has provided clearly false information about potential procurements to Parliament (5, 6, 7). Earlier allegations of unethical conduct in relation to defence procurements have also arisen (8, 9).

Although there are allegations that the procurement process may not be entirely transparent, the ANAO has been active over the past few years in reviewing defence procurement issues during each yearly cycle and the Senate has also investigated concerns that have arisen. No press allegations that ANAO or the Senate's review processes have been biased or ineffective.

COMMENTS -+

1) Australian Government. Australian National Audit Office (2013). Defence: Audit Review Strategy http://www.anao.gov.au/html/Uploads/Audit%20Work%20Program/anao_audit_work_program_2013%20FA/section_2/defence.html.
(2) Australian Government. Australian National Audit Office. Defence. http://www.anao.gov.au/html/Files/Audit%20Work%20Programs/2015/section_2/defence.html
(3) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030 (http://www.defence.gov.au/CDG/Documents/defence_white_paper_2009
(4) Australian Parliament. Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade (2012) Procurement procedures for Defence capital projects http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Foreign_Affairs_Defence_and_Trade/Completed%20inquiries/2010-13/procurement/index
(5) The Diplomat, &quoute;Australia's Botched Sub Bidding Process Upsets Sweden&quoute;, March 16, 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/03/australias-botched-sub-bidding-process-upsets-sweden/;
(6) Australian Financial Review, &quoute;Let’s get the facts right on the submarines Australia may buy&quoute;, March 1 2015, http://www.afr.com/opinion/lets-get-the-facts-right-on-submarines-australia-may-buy-20150301-13rv91;
(7) Navy-technology, &quoute;Australia establishes new panel to monitor future submarine evaluation process&quoute;, 9 June 2015, http://www.naval-technology.com/news/newsaustralia-establishes-new-panel-to-monitor-future-submarine-evaluation-process-4596564
(8) Sydney Morning Herald National, &quoute;Officials implicated in bribery scandal&quoute;, September 24, 2012, http://www.smh.com.au/national/officials-implicated-in-bribery-scandal-20120923-26f6c.html;
(9) Sydney Morning Herald National, &quoute;Pledge to probe defence contract&quoute;, September 3 2010, http://www.smh.com.au/national/pledge-to-probe-defence-contract-20100902-14ro9.html

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Source 1 outlines six audits in progress as of July 2013 and 18 potential projects at that time. It is unclear how the Reviewer attained the figures for three audits in progress and six other audits in the foreseeable future.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

60.
score
3

Are actual and potential defence purchases made public?

Clause 7 of the Commonwealth Procurement Rules (CPRs), &quoute;Accountability and Transparency in Procurement,&quoute; requires the publication of any open tender (1). The Commonwealth Procurement Rules (CPRs), clause 7, deals with publication of tenders as well (2). The Public Defence Capability Plan (2012) provides information on major capital acquisition proposals for a four year period (until the end of FY 2015 – 2016), without information on sensitive or previously approved proposals (3). Additional, the Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group (which replaced the Defence Materiel Organisation) publishes detailed information on approved projects online (4).

The Department of Defence's tenders (open and closed) and annual procurement plans are available on AusTender's website (5). These plans appear to contain planned procurements for the next year, but not the next few years. Information classified for national security reasons do not appear to have to be disclosed, as is mentioned in a Major Projects Report (2012 – 2013) by the ANAO (6). It is not clear what percentage of projects or information in specific projects is not disclosed based on this exception. Without having a basis for comparison, it seems that a large number of defence procurements are actually disclosed (on AusTender and/or in ANAO's reports).

The Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) audits defence projects each year (7). Procurement issues arise in some of these audits; however, there is no yearly comprehensive audit of defence procurement practices. Rather, a particular acquisition or project may be audited. Note, though, that the ANAO website states that up to 80 per cent of Defence’s major capital equipment acquisitions are to be replaced over the next 15 years and that major capital equipment acquisitions are a priority of the ANAO audit strategy. Additionally, an audit of &quoute;Defence Procurement&quoute; was on the list of potential audits in both the 2014 and 2015 work program (8).

There have been media reports stating that incorrect information was allegedly provided to the public and parliament regarding Australia's submarine replacement programme, which is considered the largest defence procurement program in its history (9).

COMMENTS -+

(1) Australian Government. Ministry of Finance. Commonwealth Procurement Rules (CPRs). http://www.finance.gov.au/sites/default/files/2014%20Commonwealth%20Procurement%20Rules.pdf
(2) Australian Government. Ministry of Finance. Commonwealth Procurement Rules (CPRs), http://www.finance.gov.au/procurement/procurement-policy-and-guidance/commonwealth-procurement-rules/
(3) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Defence Capability Plan (2012), www.defence.gov.au/publications/capabilityplan2012.pdf
(4) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group. http://www.defence.gov.au/casg
(5) Australian Government. AusTender. https://www.tenders.gov.au
(6) Australian Government. Major Projects Report 2012 – 2013, http://www.defence.gov.au/dmo/Multimedia/ANAO-Report_2013-2014.pdf
(7) Australian Government. Australian National Audit Office (2013). Defence: Audit Review Strategy http://www.anao.gov.au/html/Uploads/Audit%20Work%20Program/anao_audit_work_program_2013%20FA/section_2/defence.html.
(8) Australian Government. Australian National Audit Office. Defence. http://www.anao.gov.au/html/Files/Audit%20Work%20Programs/2015/section_2/defence.html
(9) Australian Financial Review, &quoute;Let’s get the facts right on the submarines Australia may buy&quoute;, March 1 2015, http://www.afr.com/opinion/lets-get-the-facts-right-on-submarines-australia-may-buy-20150301-13rv91;

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

61.
score
1

What procedures and standards are companies required to have - such as compliance programmes and business conduct programmes - in order to be able to bid for work for the Ministry of Defence or armed forces?

The Commonwealth Procurement Rules (CPRs) provide that a government entity may specify conditions for participation in a procurement but then goes on to state, “Conditions for participation must be limited to those that will ensure that a potential supplier has the legal, commercial, technical and financial abilities to fulfil the requirements of the procurement” (1). The section entitled ‘Ethical procurement’ states entities must “not seek to benefit from supplier practices that may be dishonest, unethical or unsafe. This includes not entering into contracts with tenderers who have had a judicial decision against them (not including decisions under appeal) relating to employee entitlements and who have not satisfied any resulting order. Officials should seek declarations from all tenderers confirming that they have no such unsettled orders against them”. It further goes on to state that procurement officials must recognise and deal with conflicts of interest (actual and potential) and comply with directions involving gifts and hospitality. The DPPM also provides that a contract may include provisions requiring compliance with certain standards, in order to “ensure that what is delivered will satisfy the identified requirement” (2, p. 3.2-8).

Chapter 4.2 of the DPPM (starting at p. 4.2-1) deals with overseas procurement, including export compliance. It indicates that the contractor is generally responsible for obtaining any necessary export licence or other approval required to perform a contract (p. 4.2-7). It does not discuss the need for a compliance program in the contractor, however (2).

Contractors that “store[] or transport[] Defence weapons or explosive ordnance; store[] or handle[] specified levels of Defence official information or specific security-protected assets; or provide[] security services on behalf of Defence” must have Defence Industry Security Program (DISP) membership (p. 2 of). To obtain membership, the business must submit information about its ownership structure, revenue sources, and relationships with foreign entities, and it must have an appointed security officer that has a security clearance. There is no requirement of any special compliance program (3).

There is government policy for companies wishing to comply with export control requirements (4, 5, 6). None of these resources set forth a requirement that a company have an export compliance policy in place in order to bid on a defence contract. As noted above, the DPPM provides only that the contractor is responsible for complying with export control requirements.

In short, neither the Australian government nor the Department of Defence appear to require any type of compliance program in order to bid for a government contract. As anti-fraud requirements are imposed by the government, this has been taken as some reference for the need for companies to avoid corruption.

In terms of debarment, individuals interviewed as part of the OECD Working Group on Bribery's 2012 Phase 3 review indicated that government agencies have the discretion to debar a company convicted of a corruption offense; however, debarment is a discretionary sanction and it is unclear whether debarment has even been applied to a company that has been convicted of a corruption offence (7). During the 2015 follow-up to this review, the OECD Working Group on Bribery indicated that Australia has not yet “put in place transparent debarment policies for procuring agencies” (8). In short, although debarment is said to be available, it is unclear how it would apply in practice, including the range of corruption offences it might be applied to.

(Relevant information from Peer Reviewer 2 has been included in the main comments)

COMMENTS -+

(1) Australian Government. Department of Finance. Commonwealth Procurement Rules 2014 http://www.finance.gov.au/sites/default/files/2014%20Commonwealth%20Procurement%20Rules.pdf, p. 29
(2) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Defence Procurement Policy Manual, October 2014, http://www.defence.gov.au/dmo/Multimedia/DPPM-9-5247.pdf
(3) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Defence Security Manual. http://www.defence.gov.au/DSVS/resources/DSM/PUBLIC%20DSM%20Part%202.42.pdf
(4) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Defence Export Control Office. Export Control Policy http://www.defence.gov.au/DECO/Policy.asp;
(5) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Defence Export Control Office. Internal Compliance. http://www.defence.gov.au/deco/InternalCompliance.asp; and
(6) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Australian Best Practice Guide for the Management of Controlled Exports and Technology 2014, http://www.defence.gov.au/deco/_Master/docs/Australian-Best-Practice-Guide-for-the-management-of-controlled-exports-and-technology-May14.pdf
(7) OECD, Australia - OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, &quoute;Phase 3 Report on Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention in Australia&quoute; October 2012, www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/Australiaphase3reportEN.pdf (accessed 10 October 2015)
(8) OECD, Australia - OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, &quoute;Australia: Follow up to the Phase 3 Report and Recommendations, April 2015&quoute;, www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/Australia-Phase-3-Follow-up-Report-ENG.pdf (accessed 10 October 2015)

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Companies are required to have compliance programs in place to address concerns such as compliance with export controls (source 5 above), but they are not explicitly required to have in place an anti-corruption program.

Individual agencies, including the Department of Defence, have discretion to debar companies based on foreign or domestic bribery. See Phase 3 Report on Implementing the OECD Anti-bribery Convention in Australia (2012) p.46, http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/Australiaphase3reportEN.pdf

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

62.
score
3

Are procurement requirements derived from an open, well-audited national defence and security strategy?

The government last issued a national security strategy in 2010 in the form of the Defence Strategy Framework (1). This strategy document points out the need for stronger ties between defence strategy and procurement decisions. The Defence Materiel Organisation (DMO) issued its own strategy document for 2013-2015 (2). However, the DMO has been superseded by the Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group (CASG), which does not appear to have issued any similar strategy document.

The Strategic Policy Division is noted as the organisation managing capability needs identification, which involves “contributing strategic guidance to capability documents to ensure that the development, acquisition, and evaluation of capabilities aligns with Defence’s strategic priorities”. One of the key outcomes is listed is an “auditable logic trail” between government direction and Defence Capability development decisions. The Capability Development Group staff are to use this strategic guidance in finalising the Need Phase, followed by the Requirements Phase where the goals and programs are more refined.

The Defence Capability Development Handbook (2012) directs the Military Strategy Branch to draft a Statement of Strategic Guidance (SSG) in connection with defence procurements. The SSG is to &quoute;articulate[] a clear strategic need for the capability that forms the foundation of the CSS, which is drafted in subsequent steps of the process&quoute; (3). The relation between this 2012 document and the new DPPM (which was drafted after the PGPA Act was enacted) is unclear.

Reviews of the Defence budget (the Pappas Review) and Defence procurement (the Mortimer Review) in 2008 led to the conclusion that “Defence’s strategy and its capability decisions needed to link more effectively in a transparent and auditable manner”, while the 2009 Defence White Paper outlined the need for a five-year planning cycle for major Defence Defence decisions, which is set out in the Strategic Framework (1). It goes on to state that the Defence Planning Guidance (DPG) sets strategic guidance for procurement consistent with national security priorities.

While there is a process laid out to ensure clear linkages between national strategic direction and procurement, with an identified need for this to be “auditable”, reports by think tanks indicate that successive governments have failed to provide a well-defined national strategy that can provide a strategic guidance to acquisition and that decision-making in some cases of procurement may have been driven by opportunism (4, 5).

COMMENTS -+

(1) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Defence Strategy Framework 2010.
http://www.defence.gov.au/publications/TheStrategyFramework2010.pdf
(2) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Defence Material Organisation, Strategic Framework 2013 – 2015. http://www.defence.gov.au/dmo/Multimedia/Strategic_Framework.pdf
(3) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Defence Capability Handbook 2012. http://www.defence.gov.au/publications/DefenceCapabilityDevelopmentHandbook2012.pdf
(4) Alan Dupont, “Full spectrum defence: Re-thinking the fundamentals of Australian defence strategy”, The Lowy Institute, 13 March 2015, http://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/full-spectrum-defence-re-thinking-fundamentals-australian-defence-strategy
(5) Stephan Frühling “The 2013 Defence White Paper: Strategic Guidance Without Strategy”, 2013, www.securitychallenges.org.au/ArticlePDFs/SC9-2Fruehling.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

63.
score
4

Are defence purchases based on clearly identified and quantified requirements?

Defence embarked on a strategic reform process &quoute;The Strategic Reform Program 2009: Delivering Force 2030&quoute; following the 2009 Defence White Paper, which set forth a goal that Australia strengthen its national defence. The programme elements includes improving strategic planning and forecasting of acquisitions aimed at delivering good value-for-money procurement outcomes (1)

Australian defence procurement is conducted through the Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group (CASG) in accordance with provisions of Defence Procurement Policy Manual (2, 3) and the framework set forth under the Public Governance Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (4), the PGPA Rule 2014 (5), and the Commonwealth Procurement Rules (CPRs) (6). Matching defence purchases to identified requirements is addressed in the Defence Capability Plan (7) and the Defence Capability Guide (8).

The Defence Strategy Framework 2010 notes the Strategic Policy Division as the organisation managing capability needs identification, which involves “contributing strategic guidance to capability documents to ensure that the development, acquisition, and evaluation of capabilities aligns with Defence’s strategic priorities”. One of the key outcomes is listed is an “auditable logic trail” between government direction and Defence Capability development decisions. The Capability Development Group staff is to use this strategic guidance in finalising the Need Phase, followed by the Requirements Phase where the goals and programs are more refined (9).

The Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee in 2012 found a series of issues with the procurement procedures in place for Defence capital projects (10). A problem highlighted was the disconnect between words and practice in the 2009 Defence White Paper. Specifically, the Senate committee report said that this white paper set unrealistic goals and expectations that Defence was unable to deliver on. One of committee's recommendations was that future white papers be prepared “in such a way that all procurement proposals are costed and scheduled realistically and that Defence undertake comprehensive consultation with industry before decisions on inclusion are made” (“Procurement Procedures,” page xxvii). The recommendations recognised that Defence was making efforts to reform already and future white papers have reflected more realistic goals (11). Further, a major reform to bring about efficiency was the complete organisational overhaul that led to the replacement of the Defence Materiel Organisation (DMO) by the CASG.

The media has reported on the Australian government's attempts to cut costs for defence in accordance with this strategic reform process (12). In addition, on specific projects -- for instance, a 2014 government decision to buy 58 F-35s for $12 billion -- the government has threatened to pull out of the deal if the costs rise too high (13).

COMMENTS -+

(1) Australian Government. Department of Defence.The Strategic Reform Program 2009: Delivering Force 2030. http://www.defence.gov.au/publications/reformBooklet.pdf
(2) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Capability Acquisition and Sustainability Group website, http://www.defence.gov.au/casg/AboutCASG/
(3) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Defence Procurement Policy Manual, September 2015, www.defence.gov.au/casg/Multimedia/DPPM_September_2015-9-5247.pdf
(4) Public Governance Performance and Accountability Act 2013, https://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/2013A00123
(5) Public Governance Performance and Accountability Rules https://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/F2014L00911
(6) Australian Government. Department of Finance. Commonwealth Procurement Rules, http://www.finance.gov.au/procurement/procurement-policy-and-guidance/commonwealth-procurement-rules/
(7) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Defence Capability Plan 2012. http://www.defence.gov.au/publications/CapabilityPlan2012.pdf
(8) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Defence Capability Guide 2012. http://www.defence.gov.au/Publications/CapabilityGuide2012.pdf
(9) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Defence Strategy Framework 2010.
http://www.defence.gov.au/publications/TheStrategyFramework2010.pdf
(10) Senate References Committee on Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade, “Procurement Procedures for Defence Capital Projects,” http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Foreign_Affairs_Defence_and_Trade/Completed%20inquiries/2010-13/procurement/index.
(11) Australian Government. Department of Defence 2013 Defence White Paper http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper2013/index.htm (
(12) Sean Parnell (2011) Spending review puts spotlight on cost of Defence contracts The Australian 9 September 20111. http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/foi/spending-review-puts-spotlight-on-cost-of-defence-contracts/story-fn8r0e18-1226217649851#
(13) Australian Broadcasting Corporation. ABC News 23 April 2014. Joint Strike Fighters: Government to spend $12 billion on 58 more next-generation F-35s. http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-04-23/australia-to-buy-58-more-joint-strike-fighters/5405236

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

64.
score
2

Is defence procurement generally conducted as open competition or is there a significant element of single-sourcing (that is, without competition)?

While open tender processes for procurement are preferred, the Defence Procurement Policy Manual (1) allows for other procurement methods (Page 3.1-3); prequalified tender process using a shortlist of potential suppliers or a limited tender process. All methods have to be in accordance with the Commonwealth Procurement Rules. For a country like Australia, while open tender processes for procurement are preferred, there are a limited number of suppliers and Governments sometimes will depart from the principle (3) and (4) to assist Australian industry. One specific example of this was the procurement of the Collins class submarines that involved a mix of overseas supplier and local construction through a Government owned company (Australian Submarine Corporation). The Country Assessor was unable to locate any data quantifying single source procurement for Australian Defence. In an exhaustive review of Defence procurement in 2012, the Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee (5), analysed 28 major procurement projects and identified significant problems. Those 28 projects accounted for A$7.8 billion of cost overruns and combined schedule slippage of 760 months (page 34). The Committee’s analysis of the procurement problems did not mention single source contracting as a risk. However, it did note that there were probity risks in Defence engaging in consultation with industry early in the procurement cycle that potentially could favour particular suppliers. Nevertheless, Committee endorsed the practice, noting that these probity risks could be overcome (page 237).

In early 2015, press allegations arose that the government was not following its defence procurement policies (6) along with press allegations that the Department of Defence was providing incorrect information to Parliament about the capability of Sweden and/or Germany to deliver in relation to a submarine procurement (7,8).

The score has been selected on the basis that while it is unlikely that single sourcing accounts for a major proportion of defence purchases, it is not possible to verify this with public information.

COMMENTS -+

(1) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Defence Procurement Policy Manual, September 2015, www.defence.gov.au/casg/Multimedia/DPPM_September_2015-9-5247.pdf
(2) Australian Government. Department of Finance. Commonwealth Procurement Rules. http://www.finance.gov.au/procurement/procurement-policy-and-guidance/commonwealth-procurement-rules/
(3) Markowski, S, Hall, P and Wylie, R. (2010) Defence procurement and industry policy: A small country perspective (pages 203-205). Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge.
(4) Ergas, H and Flavio, M. (2007) The role of competition in Australian defence procurement. The Melbourne Review 3 (1). Ergas and Menezes (2007), The role of competition in Australian defence procurement, The Melbourne Review, http://www.defence.gov.au/library/IPortal/IPortal1.nsf/LookupByIdentifier/DLSR-78R5RX/$File/The_role_of_competition_in_Australian_defence_procurement_(May_07_ed)[1].pdf?OpenElement
(5) Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee. (2012) Procurement procedures for Defence capital projects. http://www.senator.fawcett.net.au/SFADT%20Proc%20Report.pdf
(6) ABC News, “Defence Minister Kevin Andrews won't commit to 'open tender' for Australia's next submarine fleet”, February 11, 2015 ,http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-02-10/submarine-kevin-andrews-takes-backwards-step/6082254
(7) Australian Financial Review, &quoute;Let’s get the facts right on the submarines Australia may buy&quoute;, March 1 2015, http://www.afr.com/opinion/lets-get-the-facts-right-on-submarines-australia-may-buy-20150301-13rv91;
(8) The Diplomat, &quoute;Australia's Botched Sub Bidding Process Upsets Sweden&quoute;, March 16, 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/03/australias-botched-sub-bidding-process-upsets-sweden/;

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

65.
score
3

Are tender boards subject to regulations and codes of conduct and are their decisions subject to independent audit to ensure due process and fairness?

Procedures for evaluation of tenders are set down in the Defence Procurement Policy Manual (1). All Defence procurements by tender require a Tender Evaluation Plan which includes the creation of a Tender Evaluation Board (Chapter 5.6). All Defence officials are required to abide (page 3.13-2) by the Australian Public Service Code of Conduct (2). The Manual provides a detailed mechanism for dealing with complaints (Chapter 5.7) requiring referral to the Commonwealth Ombudsman where complaints are not resolved. Defence procurements are externally audited by the Australian National Audit Office with openly published reports (3).

COMMENTS -+

(1) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Defence Procurement Policy Manual, September 2015, www.defence.gov.au/casg/Multimedia/DPPM_September_2015-9-5247.pdf
(2) Australian Public Service Commission. APS Values and Code of Conduct in practice: A guide to official conduct for APS employees and agency heads. http://www.apsc.gov.au/publications-and-media/current-publications/aps-values-and-code-of-conduct-in-practice (accessed 3 May 2014).
(3) Australian National Audit Office . Defence: Audit Review Strategy http://www.anao.gov.au/html/Uploads/Audit%20Work%20Program/anao_audit_work_program_2013%20FA/section_2/defence.html. (accessed 8 May 2014).

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

66.
score
3

Does the country have legislation in place to discourage and punish collusion between bidders for defence and security contracts?

Under the Commonwealth Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (s45), Australia has strict prohibition on collusion (1). Section 45 of the Commonwealth Competition and Consumer Act 2010 forbids corporations from entering into collusion agreements. Section 76 of this act sets forth financial penalties, which are the greater of $10 million, 3 times the value of the benefit received, or (if the value cannot be determined) 10 per cent of the corporation's annual turnover during. Please note that this legislation is not specific to defence. The competition law does not list debarment as a potential sanction.

The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission issued a publication in 2011 titled &quoute;Cartels: Deterrence and Detection a Guide for Government Procurement Officers,&quoute; which provides guidance on how to recognise collusion in the government procurement process (2).

The Defence Procurement Policy Manual specifically requires Procurement Officers to be alert to the possibility of collusion in tenders (3). Procurement Officers are advised to initiate action and advise the regulator, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission should collusion in defence procurement be suspected (3). Interviewee A observed that the recent enactment of the Commonwealth Public Interest Disclosure Act 2013, with its extensive coverage into contracting areas, provided a good basis for detecting and dealing with malpractice in procurement.

An academic blog called &quoute;Australian Competition Law&quoute; contains information about collusion cases that have arisen in Australia, showing that companies have been sanctioned for collusion (5). None of the recent cases appear to have involved defence contracts. One case was concluded in 2015 (thus far), 6 in 2014, and 8 in 2013.

COMMENTS -+

(1) Commonwealth Competition and Consumer Act 2010. https://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2011C00003
(2) Australian Competition and Consumer Commission. Cartels: Deterrence and Detection a Guide for Government Procurement Officers. 2011. http://www.accc.gov.au/system/files/Cartels%20deterrence%20and%20detection%20-%20and%20checklist.pdf
(3) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Defence Procurement Policy Manual, September 2015, www.defence.gov.au/casg/Multimedia/DPPM_September_2015-9-5247.pdf
(4) Interviewee A – Official of the Department of Defence, 18 February 2015.
(5) Australian Competition Law. Competiton law cases by year. http://www.australiancompetitionlaw.org/casesyear.html

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The publication Cartels: Deterrence and Detection a Guide for Government Procurement Officers (2011) provides additional information about Australia's stance against collusion in government contracting. See http://www.accc.gov.au/system/files/Cartels%20deterrence%20and%20detection%20-%20and%20checklist.pdf

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

67.
score
3

Are procurement staff, in particular project and contract managers, specifically trained and empowered to ensure that defence contractors meet their obligations on reporting and delivery?

The Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee in 2012 found a series of issues with the procurement procedures in place for Defence capital projects (1). Overall the committee found that serious issues with Defence’s management structure, that Defence lacked a robust “risk management structure” and seemed “incapable of learning from past mistakes”, particularly in relation to learning from earlier project failures. More specifically, the following problems were outlined:

• There is &quoute;a culture of non-compliance with policy and guidelines; where personnel get 'bogged down' with too much paper work, produce a 'certain amount of nugatory work' and 'miss the important things going on'&quoute;;
• There were &quoute;confused or blurred lines of responsibility&quoute;;
• The framework for &quoute;accountability that is too diffuse to be effective—the organisation is unable or unwilling to hold people to account&quoute;;
• There is &quoute;a poor alignment of responsibility due to an excessive number of groups and agency functions, which gives rise to unhealthy management and organisational relationships—for example capability managers sidelined from active participation in an acquisition&quoute;;
• There is &quoute;a 'One Defence' view that does not produce an integrated enterprise: Defence remains an organisation composed of separate groups working to their own agendas&quoute;;
• &quoute;Defence remains an organisation composed of separate groups working to their own agendas;
difficulty attracting and retaining people with the required level of skill and experience to support acquisition activities, particularly engineering&quoute;.

The 2012 Senate committee report also noted that inconsistent application of policies and non-compliance was an issue that affected the “whole of the DMO level” (page 85). The recommendations, recognising that Defence was making efforts to reform already, focused on changing the alignment of responsibilities in the organisation structure and ensuring agencies had the skills and resources required for the fulfilment of their obligations.

Defence also attempted to remedy these issues by disbanding the Defence Materiel Organisation (DMO) and replacing it with the The Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group (CASG). The DMO reform that ultimately resulted in this complete organizational overhaul resulted from a series of reports on the issue (2) and the reorganization appears to be an attempt to deal with committee’s recommendations head-on.

Since CASG is such a new organization, it remains to be seen whether it will achieve a better culture of compliance than DMO, but the reorganization appears to be an attempt to deal with committee’s recommendations head-on. In response to some of the committee report’s specific concerns, accountability in CASG is now aligned among distinct lines – commercial, joint/systems/air, land/maritime, and submarines (3). Each of these lines of accountability is divided into separate divisions, with leadership information available online in many instances.

CASG explains on its website that it provides a range of procurement training opportunities, including training courses that can lead to vocational qualifications (4). No information is provided about how often these training sessions are offered, whether they are offered to all staff, or whether they are mandatory. In addition, no information is provided regarding the outcomes of such training in terms of staff empowerment or what CASG's capacities are generally.

CASG also supports staff who wish to participate in professional development activities hosted by the Chartered Institute of Purchasing and Supply (CIPS) Australasia or the Australian Association of Procurement and Contract Management (AAPCM) (5).

COMMENTS -+

(1) Senate References Committee on Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade, “Procurement Procedures for Defence Capital Projects,” (2012) http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Foreign_Affairs_Defence_and_Trade/Completed%20inquiries/2010-13/procurement/index.
(2) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Capability Acquisition and Sustainability Group website, http://www.defence.gov.au/casg/AboutCASG/
(3) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Capability Acquisition and Sustainability Group, Our Structure” at http://www.defence.gov.au/casg/AboutCASG/
(4) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Procurement Training. http://www.defence.gov.au/dmo/DoingBusiness/ProcurementDefence/Professionalisation/Procurementtraining/
(5) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Professional Bodies. http://www.defence.gov.au/dmo/DoingBusiness/ProcurementDefence/Professionalisation/ProfessionalBodies/

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

68.
score
4

Are there mechanisms in place to allow companies to complain about perceived malpractice in procurement, and are companies protected from discrimination when they use these mechanisms?

The Defence Procurement Policy Manual provides a detailed mechanism for dealing with complaints (Chapter 5.7B) outlining procedures for internal review (including &quoute;specialist advice&quoute; and &quoute;independent internal review&quoute;) as well as external grievance redressal mechanisms which included the Commonwealth Ombudsman and the civil legal system. It is mandatory policy not to discriminate against those lodging complaints in future procurement processes (1).

Additionally, paragraph 6.8 of the Commonwealth Procurement Rules (2) says ‘If a complaint about procurement is received, agencies must apply equitable and non‑discriminatory complaint-handling procedures. Agencies should aim to manage the complaint process internally, where possible, through communication and conciliation’. Interviewee A observed that the recent enactment of the Commonwealth Public Interest Disclosure Act 2013, with its extensive coverage into contracting areas, provided a good basis for detecting and dealing with malpractice in procurement.

COMMENTS -+

(1) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Defence Procurement Policy Manual, September 2015, www.defence.gov.au/casg/Multimedia/DPPM_September_2015-9-5247.pdf
(2) Australian Government. Department of Finance. Commonwealth Procurement Rules. http://www.finance.gov.au/procurement/procurement-policy-and-guidance/commonwealth-procurement-rules/
(3) Interviewee A – Official of the Department of Defence, 18 February 2015.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

69.
score
2

What sanctions are used to punish the corrupt activities of a supplier?

Under the Defence Procurement Policy Manual (1), Procurement Officers are required to assess probity risks in the tender process and the possible responses are set down in Annex 3A. These probity risks are likely to be of a minor nature and could involve the sanction of Defence retendering. For more serious issues, the Procurement Officers are under an active obligation to report any suspicions (2). Under the Defence Fraud Control Plan (3), Defence has a policy of seeking recovery of monies fraudulently obtained. For cases involving possible criminal conduct, for example, offences including bribery of foreign officials (Division 7.7), bribery and related offences (Part 7.6) and fraudulent conduct (Part 7.3).under the Commonwealth Criminal Code Act 1995, matters would be referred to the Australian Federal Police for possible prosecution. These offences can carry a custodial sentence. Where collusion is suspected, s45 of the Commonwealth Competition and Consumer Act 2010 can result in significant fines. Successful prosecutions are referred to the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions and publicly reported (3). Those sources indicate only a small number of prosecutions relating to Defence have occurred.

Although government agencies have the discretion to debar a company convicted of a corruption offense, debarment is a discretionary sanction and it is unclear whether debarment has even been applied to a company under such circumstances. During the 2012 review of Australia’s compliance with the OECD Anti-Corruption Convention and the 2015 follow-up, the OECD Working Group on Bribery indicated that Australia has not yet “put in place transparent debarment policies for procuring agencies” (6, 7). Civil society reports have also indicated that Australia's debarment system is not robust enough with regard to foreign bribery (8, 9). The competition law does not list debarment as a potential sanction.

COMMENTS -+

(1) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Defence Procurement Policy Manual, October 2014, http://www.defence.gov.au/dmo/Multimedia/DPPM-9-5247.pdf
(2) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Defence Instructions (General) PERS ADMIN 45-2. The reporting and management of notifiable incidents. http://www.defence.gov.au/AFC/pdf/GA45_02.pdf
(3) Department of Defence. Defence Fraud Control Plan No 10 http://www.defence.gov.au/AFC/pdf/FraudControlPlan10.pdf
(4) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Director of Military Prosecutions. Report for period 1 January to 31 December 2102. http://www.defence.gov.au/publications/DMP_Annual_Report_2012.pdf
(5) Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions. Case Reports http://www.cdpp.gov.au/case-reports/
(6) OECD, Australia - OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, &quoute;Phase 3 Report on Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention in Australia&quoute; October 2012, www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/Australiaphase3reportEN.pdf (accessed 10 October 2015)
(7) OECD, Australia - OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, &quoute;Australia: Follow up to the Phase 3 Report and Recommendations, April 2015&quoute;, www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/Australia-Phase-3-Follow-up-Report-ENG.pdf (accessed 10 October 2015)
(8) The Conversation, “Case grows for corrupt companies to be barred from government work” October 2013, http://theconversation.com/case-grows-for-corrupt-companies-to-be-barred-from-government-work-19235
(9) Transparency International Australia, “13 April 2015: Transparency International Calls on the Australian Government to Stop Dragging its Feet on Foreign Bribery”, 13 April 2015, http://transparency.org.au/index.php/current-news/the-australian-government-is-dragging-its-feet-on-foreign-bribery/

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

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Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

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Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

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Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

70.
score
N/A

When negotiating offset contracts, does the government specifically address corruption risk by imposing due diligence requirements on contractors? Does the government follow up on offset contract performance and perform audits to check performance and integrity?

In the Australian Industry Capability Toolkit (1), it is stated in paragraph 1.4.4 that Australian Defence does not support offset contracts. Also, in Building Defence Capability, it states ‘Government procurement policy … has moved away from offsets programs towards competitive procurement based on value for money criteria that encourages Australian industry to be internationally competitive and globally integrated’. (Paragraph 2.26)

COMMENTS -+

(1) Australian Government. Department of Defence. DMO (No date) Australian Industry Capability Toolkit. http://www.defence.gov.au/dmo/id/aic/aic_toolkit_v1_2a.pdf
(2) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Building Defence Capability: A policy for a smarter and more agile defence industry base.
http://www.defence.gov.au/dmo/id/dips/dips_2010.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

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Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

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Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

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Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

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TI Reviewer-+

71.
score
N/A

Does the government make public the details of offset programmes, contracts, and performance?

The Australian Defence Ministry does not use offset contracts.

COMMENTS -+

(1) Australian Government. Department of Defence. DMO (No date) Australian Industry Capability Toolkit. http://www.defence.gov.au/dmo/id/aic/aic_toolkit_v1_2a.pdf
(2) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Building Defence Capability: A policy for a smarter and more agile defence industry base.
http://www.defence.gov.au/dmo/id/dips/dips_2010.pdf .

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

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Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

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Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

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Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

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TI Reviewer-+

72.
score
N/A

Are offset contracts subject to the same level of competition regulation as the main contract?

The Australian Department of Defence does not use offset contracts.

COMMENTS -+

(1) Australian Government. Department of Defence. DMO (No date) Australian Industry Capability Toolkit. http://www.defence.gov.au/dmo/id/aic/aic_toolkit_v1_2a.pdf
(2) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Building Defence Capability: A policy for a smarter and more agile defence industry base.
http://www.defence.gov.au/dmo/id/dips/dips_2010.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

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Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

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Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

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TI Reviewer-+

73.
score
3

How strongly does the government control the company's use of agents and intermediaries in the procurement cycle?

The Defence Procurement Policy Manual (DPPM) states a preference against the use of agents that act as intermediaries between the Department of Defence and a contractor (1, p. 3.7-4). However, as the use of agents is permitted through the Goods and Services Tax (GST) Act, it further provides the terms of the use of resident agents. The Australian Standard for Defence Contracting (ASDEFCON) (Strategic Materiel) and ASDEFCON (Support) provide mechanisms for the recording of resident agents in contracts (1).

The DPPM also states that all defence contracts must include provisions that require the contractor as well as its officers, employees, agents, and subcontractors to follow Defence Instruction (General) Personnel 35-3 - Management and Reporting of Unacceptable Behaviour (2).

Departmental Procurement Policy Instructions (3) amends procurement standards so that ‘Tenderers and Related Bodies Corporate, and their officers , employees, agents and advisers must:

•tComply with the ethical framework (4)
•tNot offer unlawful inducements
•tMeet all probity assurance requirements
•tAvoid conflicts of interest, and
•tEmploy former Defence staff without approval

The Defence Procurement Policy Manual (1) requires that the tenderer fulfill all security requirements set down in the standards (5).

COMMENTS -+

(1) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Defence Procurement Policy Manual, October 2014, http://www.defence.gov.au/dmo/Multimedia/DPPM-9-5247.pdf
(2) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Defence Instructions (General) PERS 35-3 Management and reporting of unacceptable behaviour. http://www.defence.gov.au/fr/policy/gp35_03.pdf
(3) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Defence Departmental Procurement Policy Instruction No 1/2012. Release of updated probity provisions for the ASDEFCON suite of templates. http://www.defence.gov.au/dmo/gc/Contracting/dppi/DPPI_01_12.pdf (accessed 7 May 2014).
(4) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Defence and the Private Sector: An Ethical Relationship http://www.defence.gov.au/AFC/pdf/PrivateSector.pdf (accessed 15 April 2014).
(5) Australian Government. Department of Defence. ASDEFCON (Services) Handbook http://www.defence.gov.au/dmo/gc/asdefcon/asdefcon_services_handbook_v1_0/asdefcon_ser_v1_0_hb_all.pdf (accessed 9 May 2014).

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

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Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

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Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

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Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

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TI Reviewer-+

74.
score
1

Are the principal aspects of the financing package surrounding major arms deals, (such as payment timelines, interest rates, commercial loans or export credit agreements) made publicly available prior to the signing of contracts?

All contracts over $10,000 are reported publicly (1) through AusTender as required by the Commonwealth Procurement Rules (2) and through Annual Report requirements. However, this applies only to successful bids and commercial-confidentiality as well as security obligations limit the amount of information made public.

COMMENTS -+

(1) Australian Government. Department of Finance. Transparency in Australia Government Procurement http://www.finance.gov.au/procurement/procurement-policy-and-guidance/buying/accountability-and-transparency/transparency-procurement/principles.html
(2) Australian Government. Department of Finance. Commonwealth Procurement Rules. http://www.finance.gov.au/procurement/procurement-policy-and-guidance/commonwealth-procurement-rules/

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

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Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

75.
score
1

Does the government formally require that the main contractor ensures subsidiaries and sub-contractors adopt anti-corruption programmes, and is there evidence that this is enforced?

According to Part 8 of the Commonwealth Fraud Control Framework 2014 on &quoute;Fraud prevention, awareness and training&quoute;, “If not already required, all officials and contractors should take into account the need to prevent and detect fraud as part of their normal responsibilities. Appropriate fraud awareness and training measures include a rolling program of regular fraud awareness raising and prevention training for all officials and, where deemed appropriate, for contractors” (1).

Further, the Defence Procurement Policy Manual does provide, &quoute;The contractor retains responsibility for ensuring appropriate subcontractor performance&quoute; (2, p.6.2-6,). It also includes additional information about hiring subcontractors. For example, certain clauses must be included in contracts for complex procurements to clarify that subcontracting does not relieve a contractor of its obligations. In addition, a contractor may have to obtain approval to hire a subcontractor under certain circumstances (2, p. 6.2-7). Further, part of the DOOM mandatory policy is &quoute;Any Defence contract for services must require the contractor, its officers, employees, agents and subcontractors to comply with Defence Instruction (General) Personnel 35-3 - Management and Reporting of Unacceptable Behaviour&quoute;.

The score has been selected on the basis that prevention and detection of fraud is a contractor’s responsibility as is holding subcontractor performance to standards, which should include this as well.

Response to Peer Reviewers: Agreed. Relevant information has been added to the main answer. Score lowered from 2 to 1.

COMMENTS -+

(1) Australian Government. Attorney-General’s Department. Commonwealth Fraud Control Framework 2014, http://www.ag.gov.au/CrimeAndCorruption/FraudControl/Documents/CommonwealthFraudControlFramework2014.pdf
(2) Australian Government. Department of Defence. Defence Procurement Policy Manual, September 2015, www.defence.gov.au/casg/Multimedia/DPPM_September_2015-9-5247.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: Section 8 of the Commonwealth Fraud Control Guidelines 2011 (http://www.ag.gov.au/CrimeAndCorruption/FraudControl/Documents/CommonwealthFraudControlGuidelinesMarch2011.pdf) says that anti-fraud training should only be delivered &quoute;when appropriate&quoute; to contractors instead of any formal requirement to do so. Although contractors must adhere to a fraud policy statement about their responsibilities to report fraud, this programme is more reactive than a preventative means to stem corruption.

Suggested score: 1

Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: Although theoretically all government contractors are required to develop fraud control plans, Australia's policy documents do not specifically speak to whether these contractors must ensure that their subsidiaries and subcontractors also must have such plans. The Department of Defence, Defence Procurement Policy Manual does provide, &quoute;The contractor retains responsibility for ensuring appropriate subcontractor performance&quoute; (p.6.2-7, at http://www.defence.gov.au/dmo/gc/dppm/DPPM.pdf).

Australia's guidelines (1 and 2 above) focus on fraud, rather than corruption. Source (2) listed above notes that fraud is one type of corruption, but no guidelines deal with other types of corruption. I am not aware of any evidence that Australia is informally requiring contractors to ensure that subsidiaries and subcontractors adopt anti-corruption programmes.

Suggested score: 1

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Third Party due diligence and compliance is an area that requires greater focus for contractors.

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

76.
score
2

How common is it for defence acquisition decisions to be based on political influence by selling nations?

There have been media reports stating that incorrect information was allegedly provided to the public and parliament regarding Australia's sub-replacement programme, which is considered the largest defence procurement program in its history

Historically, United States has been Australia’s major supply of military equipment. With very few exceptions, the Collins class submarine being one, most purchases of capital equipment have come from the United States (1). In 2013, there was an active debate in Australia about the purchase of F-35 strike fighters (2). Defence links between Australia and the United States are very strong and there are military, economic and political dimensions to the relationship but not without critics (1).

Allegations have arisen that Australia may not always take a neutral attitude towards the countries bidding to supply military equipment. For example, allegations arose in early 2015 that Australia's Department of Defence discounted the possibility of obtaining a submarine from Sweden (3) and allegedly provided incorrect information to Parliament about the capability of Sweden and/or Germany to deliver in relation to a submarine procurement (4). At the same time, Australia appeared to favour Japan's tender (5). One news source suggests that the favouritism towards Japan may stem from a desire to help the U.S. rebalance its power in the Asia Pacific region, given that Japan is a U.S. ally and the contract would strengthen Japan's defence industry (6). After the change in Prime Minister when the ruling party voted to replace Tony Abbott, reports surfaced suggesting that the preference for Japan was due to the previous PM and his “pro-Japan” National Security Advisor (7). The submarine program is the largest defence procurement program in Australia's history (6).

COMMENTS -+

(1) Mark Beeson Australia’s relationship with the United States: The Case for Greater Independence. https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/eserv.php?pid=UQ:11015&dsID=mbajps03.pdf
(2) Adam Lockyer (2013) The logic of interoperability. Australia’s acquisition of the F-35 Strike Fighter. International Journal, 71 Winter 2013-13 http://ussc.edu.au/ussc/assets/media/docs/publications/130430_InternationalJournal_Lockyer.pdf
(3) The Diplomat, &quoute;Australia's Botched Sub Bidding Process Upsets Sweden&quoute;, March 16, 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/03/australias-botched-sub-bidding-process-upsets-sweden/;
(4) Australian Financial Review, &quoute;Let’s get the facts right on the submarines Australia may buy&quoute;, March 1 2015, http://www.afr.com/opinion/lets-get-the-facts-right-on-submarines-australia-may-buy-20150301-13rv91;
(5) The Japan Times, “Australia to get classified Japanese data on stealthy submarines ahead of bid, sources say”, May 7 2015, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/05/07/national/australia-get-classified-japanese-data-stealthy-submarines-ahead-bid-sources-say/#.Vdy29Xj_Qqo
(6) The Diplomat, “Can Japan Win Australia's Submarine Contract?” July 28, 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/07/can-japan-win-australias-submarine-contract/t
(7) Reuters, “Australian leader swap further dents Japanese submarine bid”, September 18, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/09/18/us-australia-japan-defence-idUSKCN0RI0KA20150918

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

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Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

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Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

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Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

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TI Reviewer-+