

GOVERNMENT DEFENCE ANTI-CORRUPTION INDEX QUESTIONNAIRE WITH MODEL ANSWERS

Number	Topics, Sub-Topics, Explanations, and Questions
	POLITICAL If a corrupt individual or group is able to influence defence and security policy (for example, to create a requirement for procurement of fast jets when no such need truly exists), this is high-level corruption.
	Defence and Security Policy and Policy Transparency A defence process can be manipulated or complicated in order to hide corrupt decisions and illicit enrichment, for example, if a policy approval procedure is lacking or policy decisions are not published. In the most extreme cases, defence corruption at the highest level might represent 'state capture', if an elite is able to shape state decisions across much wider policy areas.
1	Is there formal provision for effective and independent legislative scrutiny of defence policy? <i>Answer guidelines</i> 4. Formal rights exist for parliament to scrutinise defence policy, and there is no evidence that the legislature is unduly influenced by the executive to vote in its favour. Parliament approves or vetoes laws on security, exercises budgetary power, and reviews or approves major arms procurements and decisions regularly. Parliament can turn down or amend defence policy. 3. As for score 4, there is considerable legislative scrutiny, yet some of the listed aspects of legislative scrutiny are missing, unclear, or of uncertain quality. 2. There are some formal rights (for example in law, statute, or custom) to review defence policy and there is evidence that defence policy is debated in parliament, although it cannot necessarily be vetoed. 1. There are few formal mechanisms for legislative scrutiny of defence policy, though an independent legislature does exist and there is some evidence of it having influence over defence issues in the last year. 0. Either no independent legislature exists at all, OR it exists but has no formal rights over defence policy, OR the significant presence of military officials within parliament has contributed to evidence that parliamentary scrutiny of defence is undermined. N/A. Only select if you are confident a N/A applies, and please justify why you have selected it.
2	Does the country have an identifiable and effective parliamentary defence and security committee (or similar such organisation) to exercise oversight?

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	<i>Answer guidelines</i> 4. There is defence committee or similar institution with extensive formal rights; there is public evidence that it is adequately sourced, it is active, and publishes documents. The committee is in a position to require expert witnesses to appear in front of it. The committee (or similar such organisation) has the power to scrutinise the performance of the defence ministry and, if applicable, defence agencies. 3. There is a defence committee or similar institution that, according to public evidence, is adequately resourced and is active. It is also largely effective, with only minor concerns over shortcomings in its ability to exercise oversight. 2. There is a defence committee or similar institution with some formal rights, but there are some concerns over its effectiveness. For example, the members of the committee may not have enough expertise in the sector. 1. There is a defence committee or similar institution, but it has minimal formal rights of oversight, OR there are considerable concerns over its effectiveness. 0. There is no independent parliament, or there is no defence committee or similar institution that is tasked with oversight and scrutiny of the defence sector. N/A. Only select if you are confident a N/A applies, and please justify why you have selected it.
3	Is the country's national defence policy debated and publicly available? <i>Answer guidelines</i> 4. The defence policy is debated by the executive, legislature, and the public; there are public consultations on it and there is evidence that the public can easily access regularly updated information on all aspects of it. 3. Most contentious parts of the defence policy have been debated publicly, a formal consultation has taken place, the legislature actively debates security policy, and security policy is regularly updated (every 5 years, for example). The policy is openly available to the public. 2. Some parts of the defence policy have been debated publicly (major threats, for example), but there is no formal consultation process involving the public and the legislature has limited or no influence over policy. It is largely available to the public. 1. The defence policy has not been debated publicly, and it is available to the public only in part or abbreviated form. 0. There is no defence policy, or there is one but it is not available to the public at all. N/A. Only select if you are confident a N/A applies, and please justify why you have selected it.
4	Do defence and security institutions have a policy, or evidence, of openness towards civil society organisations (CSOs) when dealing with issues of corruption? If no, is there precedent for CSO involvement in general government anti-corruption initiatives? <i>Answer guidelines</i> 4. There is a policy or strong evidence that defence and security institutions are open towards CSOs, protects them legally, and that they encourage their engagement. They have specifically engaged with CSOs on corruption issues.

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	3. <i>There is evidence that defence and security institutions are open towards CSOs and that they encourage their engagement, though they may not explicitly protect them legally. There has been engagement with them on corruption issues.</i> 2. <i>Defence and security institutions are seeking (or are beginning to seek) CSO engagement and examples of engagement can be found, including engagement on sensitive issues such as defence.</i> 1. <i>There has been some talk of engaging CSOs actively and meetings have taken place, but they tend to take place with CSOs that are either very supportive of, or are explicitly funded by, the government.</i> 0. <i>There is no evidence that CSO engagement has taken place on any significant subject, or that talking to CSOs is considered part of the institutions' work. Requests by CSOs to work with the government are likely to be rejected or considered inappropriate.</i> <i>N/A. Only select if you are confident a N/A applies, and please justify why you have selected it.</i>
5	Has the country signed up to international anti-corruption instruments such as, but not exclusively or necessarily, UNCAC and the OECD Convention? (In your answer, please specify which.) <i>Answer guidelines</i> 4. <i>The country has signed up to all relevant instruments, there has been formal ratification, and there is evidence of compliant activity.</i> 3. <i>The country has signed up to all relevant instruments, but there is limited evidence of compliance (for instance, partial shortcomings in complying with specific parts of the conventions).</i> 2. <i>The instruments have been signed up to and ratified, but there has been no evidence of compliance.</i> 1. <i>The country has signed up to, but not ratified, relevant instruments.</i> 0. <i>The country has not signed up to the instruments.</i> <i>N/A. Only select if you are confident a N/A applies, and please justify why you have selected it.</i>
6	Is there evidence of regular, active public debate on issues of defence? If yes, does the government participate in this debate? <i>Answer guidelines</i> 4. <i>Yes, there is constant and regular debate with academia, opinion-formers, and CSOs about defence policy issues, and there is tangible evidence of such debate: through the government co-organising discussions with independent think tanks or civil society organisations, for example, or through joint media briefings.</i> 3. <i>There is regular, but not always persistent debate between the public and the government via, for example, open forums, an active website, or at media briefings.</i> 2. <i>There is evidence of occasional debate between government and opinion-formers and some commitment to fostering dialogue.</i>

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	1. There is infrequent public consultation on defence and security issues. Where communication does occur, it is likely to be one-way: officials may provide some information but may not answer public questions. 0. There is no evidence of public debate over issues of defence. N/A. Only select if you are confident a N/A applies, and please justify why you have selected it.
7	Does the country have an openly stated and actively implemented anti-corruption policy for the defence sector? <i>Hint: Some countries may not refer to the word 'corruption' directly, in which case assessors should look for a comprehensive set of behaviours that may validly be construed as corrupt.</i> <i>Answer guidelines</i> 4. There is an openly stated anti-corruption policy explicit to the defence sector; implementation plans exist and there is evidence of such implementation. 3. There is a strong anti-corruption policy that, though not explicit to the defence sector, would effectively cover it; implementation plans exist and there is evidence of such implementation. 2. There is an openly stated anti-corruption policy, and evidence of some effective implementation that is likely to cover the defence sector. 1. There is an openly stated anti-corruption policy but little evidence of its effective implementation, OR there is evidence that the government is considering an anti-corruption policy but it is either not in place yet, or evidence that there is no serious action behind it. 0. There is no sign of an anti-corruption policy in existence now, nor is one likely to be in existence soon. N/A. Only select if you are confident a N/A applies, and please justify why you have selected it.
8	Are there independent, well-resourced, and effective institutions within defence and security tasked with building integrity and countering corruption? <i>Hint: If not an anti-corruption department in its own right, this may be part of the function of the Inspector General, audit office, ethics office, military police, supreme chamber of control, or military prosecutor's office.</i> <i>Answer guidelines</i> 4. There are identifiable institutions within defence and security that are independent, suitably staffed and funded, and there is evidence of the effectiveness of their work. 3. There are identifiable institutions within defence and security, and these are mostly independent, suitably staffed and funded, and there is some evidence of their effectiveness. OR effective institutions exist that apply to defence, even if they are not defence-specific. 2. Institutions in defence are in place, but they are scattered or uncoordinated or not sufficiently staffed and funded. Evidence of their effectiveness is limited. OR there may be compliance or ethics departments that span all government institutions, though their effectiveness is unclear. 1. There is no evidence of such institutions, but there is evidence that the country is making proactive efforts to establish them, OR there is evidence of such institutions, but they are under political control, or they are potentially misused. 0. There is no evidence of such institutions.

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	<i>N/A. Only select if you are confident a N/A applies, and please justify why you have selected it.</i>
9	Does the public trust the institutions of defence and security to tackle the issue of bribery and corruption in their establishments? <i>Hint: Polls and press articles may provide good evidence.</i> <i>Answer guidelines</i> 4. The public view is that there is a clear commitment from the defence establishment that bribery and corruption are not acceptable and must be prosecuted, and that their efforts to tackle the problem are sincere and effective. 3. The public view is that there is a clear commitment from the defence establishment that bribery and corruption are not acceptable and that prosecution may be appropriate. The public view the establishment's efforts to tackle the problem positively, there may be some minor shortcomings. 2. The public view is that bribery and corruption, though not acceptable to the defence establishment, is insufficiently addressed by the measures in place to tackle the problem. 1. The public view is that bribery and corruption are not, according to official rhetoric, acceptable to the defence establishment, but there is a widely-held belief that this is just that: rhetoric, and not seriously intended. 0. The public view the defence establishment as entirely indifferent to corruption within it, or as clearly corrupt, without the political will to tackle the problem. <i>N/A. Only select if you are confident a N/A applies, and please justify why you have selected it.</i>
10	Are there regular assessments by the defence ministry or another government agency of the areas of greatest corruption risk for ministry and armed forces personnel, and do they put in place measures for mitigating such risks? <i>Hint: Alternatively, does the defence ministry task an outside body to do such an assessment?</i> <i>Answer guidelines</i> 4. Yes – these risks are clearly identified on a regular basis, and appropriate risk mitigation measures are in place to cover all risks in every case. 3. Risks have been identified, and appropriate measures have been put in place in many cases. There may be minor concerns over the regularity of assessments or the degree to which the measures sufficiently address the risks identified. 2. There has been at least one recent assessment of corruption risk in the sector with measures put in place, but there are shortcomings surrounding the implementation of the measures or their true effectiveness. It is unlikely that the process is institutionalised as a regular practice. 1. There has been a partial assessment of such risk, or there is some awareness regarding some risk areas, but no mitigation measures have been put in place and there is no regular schedule for risk assessment. 0. No defence-specific assessment of corruption risk takes or has taken place. <i>N/A. Only select if you are confident a N/A applies, and please justify why you have selected it.</i>

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	Defence Budgets Transparency and openness in defence budgets, and effective auditing, help ensure that expenditure is subject to scrutiny and debate, which helps prevent wasteful, compromised, or illicit spending. It is important that the sources of income streams that make up the defence budget are identifiable, to ensure that these sources are legitimate and are not connected to corrupt activity.
11	Does the country have a process for acquisition planning that involves clear oversight, and is it publicly available? <i>Answer guidelines</i> 4. There is a clear, publicly available, process for acquisition planning in place, along with strong oversight mechanisms. 3. There is a clear, publicly available, process for acquisition planning in place, along with oversight mechanisms. There are minor shortcomings in the process or in the oversight mechanisms. 2. There is a defined process for acquisition planning in place, and some associated oversight. There is evidence of notable shortcomings regarding transparency or the quality of oversight. 1. The process for acquisition planning is poorly defined, and there is a lack of clarity over accountability and oversight. 0. There is no defined process for acquisition planning. N/A. Only select if you are confident a N/A applies, and please justify why you have selected it.
12	Is the defence budget transparent, showing key items of expenditure? This would include comprehensive information on military R&D, training, construction, personnel expenditures, acquisitions, disposal of assets, and maintenance. <i>Answer guidelines</i> 4: Yes, the defence budget contains fully transparent and detailed information on expenditure across functions. 3: The defence budget is generally disclosed in a detailed manner, yet transparency in some functions or areas may be questionable. 2: There is some degree of transparency. Information is broken down into some functions or areas, though the degree of detail is difficult to establish. 1: The defence budget is transparent only in a very limited way. If there is a break down by function or area, this is likely to be highly aggregated or vague. 0: The defence budget is not transparent at all. There is certainly no break down into functions or areas, or there may be no information on the budget at all. N/A. Only select if you are confident a N/A applies, and please justify why you have selected it.
12A	Is there a legislative committee (or other appropriate body) responsible for defence budget scrutiny and analysis in an effective way, and is this body provided with detailed, extensive, and timely information on the defence budget?

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	<i>Answer guidelines</i> <i>4: Yes, a legislative committee (or other appropriate body) is responsible for defence budget scrutiny and analysis, and it is provided with detailed information on proposed defence expenditures. There is evidence of its capacity to influence decision making.</i> <i>3: As per score 4, yet there are occasional slips in standards. For example, occasional lapses in detail on proposed defence expenditure, or evidence of the committee sometimes being overruled.</i> <i>2: A committee exists, though information on proposed defence expenditures tends to be aggregated. There is evidence that it has the capacity to influence decision making, but its effectiveness in doing so is inconsistent.</i> <i>1: A committee exists, but it is provided only with highly aggregated information of proposed defence expenditures. There is no evidence of its capacity to influence decision making.</i> <i>0: No such legislative committee exists OR it exists in law but in practice receives no or even misleading or inaccurate information on proposed defence expenditures, and has no impact on decision making.</i> <i>N/A. Only select if you are confident a N/A applies, and please justify why you have selected it.</i>
12B	Is the approved defence budget made publicly available? In practice, can citizens, civil society, and the media obtain detailed information on the defence budget? <i>Answer Guidelines</i> <i>4: The approved defence budget is publicly available, and there are clear provisions that are strictly upheld that allow citizens, civil society, and the media to request information on defence budgets.</i> <i>3: As per score 4, yet there is reason to acknowledge occasional slips in standards. For example, inconsistency in the timeliness of responses for information.</i> <i>2: The approved defence budget is publicly available, but there may be considerable slips in standards. For example, frequent delays in responding to requests for information.</i> <i>1: The approved defence budget is theoretically publicly available, but there are likely to be considerable problems surrounding access to information. Accessibility may vary according to the identity of the individual or organisation requesting information.</i> <i>0: The approved defence budget is not available at all, OR in practice it is likely to be extremely difficult or impossible to obtain any detail on the budget.</i> <i>N/A. Only select if you are confident a N/A applies, and please justify why you have selected it.</i>
13	Are sources of defence income other than from central government allocation (from equipment sales or property disposal, for example) published and scrutinised? <i>Answer guidelines</i>

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	<i>4: There is full publication of all sources of income, the money received and the destination, and mechanisms of scrutiny are in place involving a central government department like the audit office or a separate department within the defence ministry. There is likely to be public scrutiny through the publication of sources on a website.</i> <i>3: There is full publication of all sources of income, the money received and the destination, but there is no or little scrutiny.</i> <i>2: There is publication of income received, but inadequate attribution of money to ends.</i> <i>1: There is only selective publication of income, OR there is sufficient evidence to suggest that what is published is not reliable.</i> <i>0: There is no publication of non-central government sources of funding.</i> <i>N/A. Only select if you are confident a N/A applies, and please justify why you have selected it.</i>
14	Is there an effective internal audit process for defence ministry expenditure (that is, for example, transparent, conducted by appropriately skilled individuals, and subject to parliamentary oversight)? <i>Answer guidelines</i> <i>4: There is a transparent process of internal audit which is appropriately resourced, subject to parliamentary scrutiny, and there is clear evidence that its findings are acted upon by the government.</i> <i>3: There is a process of internal audit that is mostly transparent and subject to some degree of parliamentary scrutiny, and evidence that the government takes its findings into account.</i> <i>2: There is a process of internal audit that is active, but it lacks transparency or parliamentary scrutiny, or both.</i> <i>1: There is a process of internal audit, but there is no transparency or parliamentary scrutiny. There is likely to be evidence indicating that it is largely ineffective.</i> <i>0: There is no evidence of internal audit of defence ministry expenditure at all, OR evidence suggests that any such process is entirely inactive or ineffective.</i> <i>N/A. Only select if you are confident a N/A applies, and please justify why you have selected it.</i>
15	Is there effective and transparent external auditing of military defence expenditure? <i>Answer guidelines</i> <i>4: There is evidence of independent external auditing, its findings are fully transparent, and there is clear evidence that its findings are acted upon by the government.</i> <i>3: There is evidence of independent external auditing, with findings that are largely transparent, and there is evidence the government takes its findings into account.</i> <i>2: There is evidence of external auditing with some degree of independence and transparency, though its effectiveness is questionable.</i> <i>1: There is uncertainty over whether external auditing takes place, OR evidence suggests that 'external' auditing is not independent, or not effective, or both.</i> <i>0: There is no evidence of external audit at all, OR evidence suggests that 'external' auditing is fully undermined by the government.</i>

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	<i>N/A. Only select if you are confident a N/A applies, and please justify why you have selected it.</i>
	Nexus of Defence and National Assets Where countries are rich in natural assets, such as oil, timber, minerals or fish, the military or security forces can become closely or improperly connected with their exploitation.
16	Is there evidence that the country's defence institutions have controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country's natural resource exploitation and, if so, are these interests publicly stated and subject to scrutiny? <i>Hint: Natural resources are defined broadly, and include oil, gas, minerals, timber, fish, and precious stones. This is likely to be a hard question to answer; information could be found on Global Witness's website, in national newspaper articles, and on websites of NGOs that deal with resource exploitation.</i> <i>Answer guidelines</i> <i>4: Defence institutions are, by statutory or constitutional means, entirely removed from having controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country's natural resource exploitation. There is no evidence of individual personnel having controlling or financial interests in such businesses either.</i> <i>3: Defence institutions have limited financial or controlling interests in businesses associated with the country's natural resource exploitation, but these are publicly stated and subject to scrutiny that explicitly analyses the potential for impropriety. There is no evidence of individual personnel having controlling or financial interests in such businesses either.</i> <i>2: Defence institutions have financial or controlling interests in businesses associated with the country's natural resource exploitation, and are subject to some public and parliamentary scrutiny, yet this does not explicitly look to stem impropriety. There is some evidence of individual personnel being associated with businesses related to natural resource exploitation.</i> <i>1: Defence institutions have financial or controlling interests in businesses associated with the country's natural resource exploitation, and are subject to very limited public and parliamentary scrutiny that illustrates clear and obvious shortcomings and areas of non-coverage. There is considerable evidence of individual personnel having interests in businesses and activities related to natural resource exploitation.</i> <i>0: Defence institutions have financial or controlling interests in businesses associated with the country's natural resource exploitation, and there is no evidence of these interests being publicly stated, or subject to scrutiny. There is widespread evidence of individual personnel involvement in businesses relating to the country's natural resource exploitation.</i> <i>N/A. Only select if you are confident a N/A applies, and please justify why you have selected it.</i>
	Organised Crime

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	Organised crime is present in every country and is a growing transactional security threat. Increasingly technology-enabled, it does not respect national or international boundaries. Motivated by the acquisition of wealth, it is arguably beyond the power of any one agency or nation to contain effectively, and may have penetrated defence, security, and intelligence establishments.
17	Is there evidence, for example through media investigations or prosecution reports, of a penetration of organised crime into the defence and security sector? If no, is there evidence that the government is alert and prepared for this risk? <i>Answer guidelines</i> 4: No, there is no evidence that this is taking place, and there is evidence that the government is actively working to remain alert to the risk. 3: There is no evidence that this is taking place, but nor is there evidence that the government has the capability to tackle it. 2: There is evidence of some penetration, but that the government is actively working to tackle the problem. 1: There is evidence of considerable penetration but at least some government action to tackle the problem. 0: Yes, there is strong evidence that organised crime has penetrated the sector, yet no strong evidence that government is actively trying to tackle the problem. N/A. Only select if you are confident a N/A applies, and please justify why you have selected it.
18	Is there policing to investigate corruption and organised crime within the defence services and is there evidence of the effectiveness of this policing? <i>Answer guidelines</i> 4: Independent policing functions exist to tackle specific issues of corruption and organised crime amongst defence forces, and evidence of effective enforcement can found. 3: Effective independent policing functions exist but they are not specifically targeted on issues on corruption and organised crime. 2: Independent policing functions exist but there is an absence of evidence of effective enforcement action, OR there are question marks over independence, yet evidence suggests the policing has been effective in investigating corruption and organised crime. 1: A policing function exists but there is evidence to suggest its independence is questionable, and there is no evidence of effective enforcement action. 0: No policing function is exercised over the defence services to investigate corruption or organised crime. N/A. Only select if you are confident a N/A applies, and please justify why you have selected it.
	Control of Intelligence Services Intelligence services gather information that has potential economic and political leverage. This makes them highly prone to corruption.

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19	Are the policies, administration, and budgets of the intelligence services subject to effective, properly resourced, and independent oversight? <i>Answer guidelines</i> 4: There is provision for and evidence of effective, properly resourced and independent parliamentary oversight of the intelligence service's policies, administration, and budgets. 3: There is provision for, but limited evidence of, effective, properly resourced and independent parliamentary oversight of the intelligence services' policies, administration, and budgets. 2: There are provisions for limited independent oversight of the intelligence services. 1: There is evidence of internal controls, but no provision for independent external oversight. 0: There is no external oversight of any aspect of the intelligence services, and no evidence of internal controls. N/A. Only select if you are confident a N/A applies, and please justify why you have selected it.
20	Are senior positions within the intelligence services filled on the basis of objective selection criteria, and are appointees subject to investigation of their suitability and prior conduct? <i>Hint: information on recruitment for senior intelligence service posts should be available on the service's website, or on other government websites. News articles can also be consulted on recent appointments to the service.</i> <i>Answer guidelines</i> 4: Senior positions within the intelligence services are filled on the basis of objective selection criteria without the opportunity for intervention by third parties and there is full investigation of candidates' suitability. 3: There are objective selection criteria and candidates are subject to a full investigation of their suitability, however evidence is available to suggest that some outside influence may influence selection. 2: There are objective criteria for selection, but investigation of candidates' suitability is questionable, and impartiality may be an issue. 1: The criteria for selection of senior positions are unclear. 0: Evidence indicates that senior positions in the intelligence services are a gift of the executive without an investigation of individuals' suitability or prior conduct. N/A. Only select if you are confident a N/A applies, and please justify why you have selected it.
	Export Controls Arms export controls are susceptible to the risk of corruption as a vehicle for illegal arms transfers with negative consequences for international humanitarian law, human rights, and sustainable development. Arms deals tend to be surrounded by high levels of commercial and national security. This makes the trade particularly susceptible to the risk of corruption as a vehicle for illegal and undesirable arms transfers.

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21	Does the government have a well-scrutinised process for arms export decisions that aligns with international protocols, particularly the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)? <i>Guidelines: we are interested primarily in ATT provisions relevant to anti-corruption: articles 7.1.iv, 11.5, and 15.6.</i> <i>Answer guidelines</i> 4: The country has signed and ratified the ATT, and there is specific evidence of the country taking action to comply with each of three ATT articles: 7.1.iv, 11.5, and 15.6. Upcoming arms exports are subject to robust parliamentary approval and debate. 3: The country has signed and ratified the ATT, but there is a lack of specific evidence of the country taking action to comply with each of the three anti-corruption articles. Upcoming arms exports are subject to parliamentary approval and debate; there may be minor shortcomings. 2: The country has signed and ratified the ATT; however there is evidence of shortcomings in compliance with the treaty's anti-corruption provisions. Alternatively, the country has signed the ATT but not ratified it, though there is evidence of compliance with ATT anti-corruption principles. Upcoming arms exports are subject to parliamentary approval and debate; there may be some shortcomings. 1: The country has signed the ATT but not ratified it, and there is evidence of non-compliance with ATT anti-corruption provisions. Upcoming arms exports are unlikely to be subject to serious parliamentary approval and debate. 0: There is no evidence of effective scrutiny of arms exports. The country has not, and is unlikely to, sign the ATT. If it has, there is likely to be clear and persistent evidence of non-compliance with its anti-corruption principles. N/A. Only select if you are confident a N/A applies, and please justify why you have selected it.
	FINANCE In the defence sector a culture of secrecy can create an environment in which good financial practices such as auditing by an external division are not employed on the grounds of national security. Yet much public trust is gained by being more transparent. In any organisation or department, sound management of assets, with timely and efficient accounting systems, is one of the most powerful devices for maintaining integrity. The better the systems in place, the less opportunity there will be for corruption. As well as providing opportunity for fraud, a poor and disconnected accounting system makes it easy to conceal irregularities. Even if irregularities are found, poor accounting makes it impossible to identify those responsible, and hold them to account.
	Asset Disposals Asset disposals are a common category for corrupt management. This can occur through the misappropriation or sale of property portfolios and surplus equipment. Even large assets can be poorly controlled and easy to sell off corruptly or undervalued.
22	How effective are controls over the disposal of assets, and is information on these disposals, and the proceeds of their sale, transparent? <i>Answer guidelines</i>

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	4. There are strong controls over asset disposal. Planned disposals are known in advance and are published publicly. The financial results of disposals are also publicly available. 3. There are procedures and controls over asset disposals and these are public. However, there is limited information on the proceeds of the disposals and these are usually not made public. 2. There are controls over asset disposals, though there may be shortcomings in the strength of these controls. There is no or only highly abbreviated public information on procedures or controls. 1. There is little public knowledge about the procedures of asset disposal, nor of the controls that might be in place. The subject is unlikely to be referred to in defence and security documents. 0. There is no public knowledge about the procedures of asset disposal, nor of the controls that might be in place. There is likely to be considerable speculation in the media and among civil society organisations about corruption in asset disposals. N/A. Only select if you are confident a N/A applies, and please justify why you have selected it.
23	Is independent and transparent scrutiny of asset disposals conducted by defence establishments, and are the reports of such scrutiny publicly available? <i>Answer guidelines</i> 4. Asset disposals are scrutinised by an audit body that is generally regarded as independent. Audit reports are available to the public within a reasonable time frame. 3. Although asset disposals are independently scrutinised, the results of such scrutiny are not transparent. Summary information on asset disposals may, however, be publicly available. 2. There is publicly available evidence that asset disposals are scrutinised. However, the results of such scrutiny are not made available to the public and the degree of independence may be unclear or in doubt. 1. Scrutiny takes place, yet the independence of the scrutinising body is highly questionable, and there is definite lack of transparency. 0. There is no evidence that asset disposals are scrutinised by an oversight body of any form. N/A. Only select if you are confident a N/A applies, and please justify why you have selected it.
	Secret Budgets Secret defence and security budgets are a perennially difficult issue, but these are open to abuse. A broader risk is when there are budgets outside defence that are also used by the military or security forces, but are not identified as defence or security budgets. A crucial ingredient in the creation of accountable armed forces and defence and security establishments is an effective and transparent process of allocating, managing, and overseeing their resources. Secret budgets here are defined as the budgets allocated to intelligence agencies and national security.

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24	What percentage of defence and security expenditure in the budget year is dedicated to spending on secret items relating to national security and the intelligence services? <i>Hint: For researchers using the Open Budget Survey as a source, please note that it assesses the percentage of overall expenditure (not defence and security expenditure) in the budget year allocated towards secret items.</i> <i>Answer guidelines</i> 4. One per cent or less of expenditure is dedicated to secret items, OR the government explicitly confirms in relevant budget documents that its spending on such secret items is zero. 3. Three per cent or less, but more than one per cent, of expenditure is dedicated to secret items. 2. Eight per cent or less, but more than three per cent, of expenditure is dedicated to secret items, OR the government has announced, or has otherwise informally indicated that its spending on such secret items is zero, but although there is no clear reason to doubt this, this is not explicitly confirmed in relevant budget documents. 1. More than eight per cent of expenditure is dedicated to secret items. 0. The percentage is not available to the public, OR the government has announced informally or formally that its spending on such secret items is zero, but there is clear evidence to doubt the veracity of this claim. N/A. Only select if you are confident a N/A applies, and please justify why you have selected it.
25	Is the legislature (or the appropriate legislative committee or members of the legislature) given full information for the budget year on the spending of all secret items relating to national security and military intelligence? <i>Answer guidelines</i> 4. Yes, the appropriate legislative committee or members of the legislature are provided with extensive information on all spending on secret items, which includes detailed, line item descriptions of all expenditures. 3. The legislature is provided with the vast majority of spending on secret items, although there is evidence—albeit infrequent and rare—of some omissions. 2. The legislature is provided with some information on spending on secret items, but some details are excluded, or some categories are presented in an aggregated manner. 1. The legislature is provided with very limited or abbreviated information on secret items, or expenditure on secret items is entirely aggregated. 0. The legislature is provided with no information on spending on secret items. N/A. Only select if you are confident a N/A applies, and please justify why you have selected it.
26	Are audit reports of the annual accounts of the security sector (the military, police, and intelligence services) and other secret programs provided to the legislature (or relevant committee) and are they subsequently subject to parliamentary debate? <i>Answer guidelines</i>

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	4. Yes, legislators are provided with detailed audit reports related to the security sector and other secret programs and these audits are then subject to comprehensive parliamentary consideration and debate. 3. Yes, legislators are provided with audit reports related to the security sector and other secret programs, but legislative debate on their contents may be limited or non-existent. 2. Yes, legislators are provided with audit reports on secret items, but some details are excluded. 1. Yes, legislators are provided with very basic audit reports on secret items, but there are considerable omissions. 0. No, legislators are not provided audit reports on secret items, or secret programs are not audited at all. N/A. Only select if you are confident a N/A applies, and please justify why you have selected it.
27	Off-budget military expenditures are those that are not formally authorised within a country's official defence budget, often considered to operate through the 'back-door'. In law, are off-budget military expenditures permitted, and if so, are they exceptional occurrences that are well-controlled? <i>Answer guideline</i> 4. No, all defence-related expenditures are recorded in the official defence budget. 3. The only off-budget expenditures are those classified as state secrets through adequate and well-established legal processes. 2. Some off-budget military expenditures are permitted, but there is a clearly stated manner in which they are recorded in the respective budgets (military involvement in natural disaster relief efforts may, for example, be one such type of military expenditure). 1. Off-budget military expenditures are permitted by law, and though they are recorded, this recording is incomplete or is otherwise unreliable. 0. Off-budget military expenditures are permitted by law and are not reported on. N/A. Only select if you are confident a N/A applies, and please justify why you have selected it.
28	In practice, are there any off-budget military expenditures? If so, does evidence suggest this involves illicit economic activity? <i>Answer guidelines</i> 4. There is evidence of rare off-budget military expenditures. 3. There is evidence of occasional off-budget military expenditures but this is not a widely practiced phenomenon. 2. There is evidence of are some off-budget military expenditures, but the extent to which this is a practice is unclear. 1. There are substantial off-budget military expenditures but evidence suggests this involves licit economic activity. 0. There are substantial off-budget military expenditures and there is evidence this involves illicit economic activity. N/A. Only select if you are confident a N/A applies, and please justify why you have selected it. If score 4 has been selected in Question 27, N/A must be selected here.

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29	In law, are mechanisms for classifying information on the grounds of protecting national security subject to effective scrutiny? <i>Answer guidelines</i> 4. The classification of information is legally regulated with provisions made for who can request information to be classified on the grounds of protecting national security, and how. There is evidence that these legal requirements are upheld in practice and are subject to scrutiny. 3. The classification of information is legally regulated with provisions made for who can request information to be classified on the grounds of protecting national security, and how. Yet there is evidence of these rule being occasionally bypassed, OR of the process of scrutiny being potentially compromised or unreliable. 2. In law there are provisions made for the classification of information; however, little control is exercised and in practice there may be evidence of individuals or agencies influencing decisions. 1. There are informal classifications of information which are justified on the basis of protecting national security, yet there are no legal mechanisms in place to regulate them and in practice there is evidence of individuals or agencies influencing decisions. 0. Information is classified at the discretion of the individuals, parties, or groups in power with no specific or clearly defined legal basis. There is considerable evidence of individuals or agencies persistently being able to influence decisions. N/A. Only select if you are confident a N/A applies, and please justify why you have selected it.
	Military-owned Businesses In many countries, defence and security establishments maintain income sources separate to their state revenue streams. These include military-owned businesses, either civilian businesses or defence companies which are directly or indirectly owned by the defence establishment. These pose obvious corruption risks.
30	Do national defence and security institutions have beneficial ownership of commercial businesses? If so, how transparent are details of the operations and finances of such businesses? <i>Answer guidelines</i> 4. Defence and security institutions do not own commercial businesses of any significant scale. (Equivalent to 1% of the defence budget or less.) 3. Defence and security institutions do have some ownership of commercial businesses. These businesses are publicly declared, with details of their operations and finances being transparent, fully disclosed, and with standards of governance equivalent to publicly owned commercial enterprises. 2. Defence and security institutions do have ownership of some commercial businesses, but these are not major enterprises. These businesses are publicly declared, though details of their operations and finances are not transparent. 1. Defence institutions have ownership of significant commercial businesses. These businesses are publicly declared, though details of their operations and finances are not transparent.

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	<i>0. Defence institutions are known, or are widely believed to have ownership of commercial businesses but these businesses are not publicly declared and are wholly non-transparent.</i> <i>N/A. Only select if you are confident a N/A applies, and please justify why you have selected it.</i>
31	Are military-owned businesses subject to transparent independent scrutiny at a recognised international standard? <i>Answer guidelines</i> <i>4. Where military-owned businesses exist there is a full level of independent auditing at a recognised international standard and full audit details are available to the public.</i> <i>3. Military-owned businesses are subject to independent scrutiny, however this scrutiny may not be at a recognised international standard or the audit details, though available to the public, may be incomplete or abbreviated.</i> <i>2. Military-owned businesses are believed to be subject to scrutiny and auditing, though audit details are not generally made available to the public.</i> <i>1. Military-owned businesses are subject to some scrutiny, yet the details are not available to the public, and it is known that such processes lack independence or reliability.</i> <i>0. There is no evidence that military-owned businesses are subject to any scrutiny or auditing processes.</i> <i>N/A. Only select if you are confident a N/A applies, and please justify why you have selected it. If there are no military owned businesses, N/A must be selected here.</i>
	Illegal Private Enterprise Misuse of assets extends to illegal private enterprises, with individuals gaining an income from state-owned assets. This may be through the payment of exorbitant fees to cronies for consultancy or other services, or the use of service personnel for private work. It can also include bankrolling of the military by private enterprises in return for military protection of their business interests. The development of a system of patronage between the military and private business is highly detrimental; the more profitable it becomes, the more difficult it is to counter.
32	Is there evidence of unauthorised private enterprise by military or other defence ministry employees? If so, what is the government's reaction to such enterprise? <i>Hint: Such enterprises may operate under the pretence of being part of official military activity.</i> <i>Answer guidelines</i> <i>4. There is no evidence at all of unauthorised private enterprise by military or other defence ministry employees. The government strictly outlaws any unauthorised private enterprise, with heavy sanctions in place to deal with offenders.</i>

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	3. <i>There is some evidence of unauthorised private enterprise. The government outlaws such unauthorised private enterprise, and there are sanctions in place to deal with offenders that are usually applied.</i> 2. <i>There is some evidence of unauthorised private enterprise. The government outlaws such unauthorised private enterprise, but there is evidence that the sanctions for breaking these laws are weak or often not enforced.</i> 1. <i>The government does not explicitly outlaw private enterprise under the umbrella of the state's defence and security operations, though it might publicly discourage it, and there are no, or trivial, repercussions for those who engage in it.</i> 0. <i>The government does not outlaw private enterprise under the umbrella of the state's defence and security operations, and applies no sanctions to those who engage in it. There may be evidence or credible allegations that the government itself profits from such activity.</i> <i>N/A. Only select if you are confident a N/A applies, and please justify why you have selected it.</i>
	PERSONNEL Personnel can abuse their positions for personal gain or fall victim, directly or indirectly, to others' corruption. Personnel and recruitment processes are particularly susceptible to corruption, especially if it is endemic throughout a defence establishment. The most common effect of corruption in personnel is that it undermines the confidence of staff, making them increasingly prone to participating in or condoning corrupt practices. Staff with trust in the establishment they work for is key to the effective functioning of the armed forces and defence and security establishments.
	Leadership Behaviour For top officials and officers themselves, leadership behaviour requires committed and visible engagement by strong role models. They, in turn, need feedback through honest and objective assessment through, for example, third parties and opinion surveys. When leaders engage in corruption themselves, or knowingly permit it, the integrity of the organisations they lead is greatly compromised.
34	Do the Defence Ministry, Defence Minister, Chiefs of Defence, and Single Service Chiefs publicly commit—through, for example, speeches, media interviews, or political mandates—to anti-corruption and integrity measures? <i>Hint: This is an important question, but may be hard to answer and evidence may require reference to non-governmental resources, especially media articles.</i> <i>Answer guidelines</i> 4. <i>There is a clear and cohesive commitment to anti-corruption and integrity measures by the Defence Ministry, as declared by the Defence Minister, the Chief of Defence, and Single Service Chiefs. This commitment is publicly and strongly stated and is reflected throughout the defence ministry and armed forces by similar commitments from senior ministry staff and senior armed forces officers.</i>

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	3. There is good evidence of commitment to anti-corruption and integrity measures by the Defence Ministry, and this commitment is publicly stated – though perhaps not strongly. There is evidence that this is reflected throughout the defence ministry and armed forces by similar commitments from senior ministry staff and senior armed forces officers, though this is again not strongly publicly stated. 2. There is some evidence of commitment to anti-corruption and integrity measures by the Defence Ministry and senior members of the Armed Forces, though this commitment is not publicly stated. There is no evidence that this is reflected throughout the defence ministry and armed forces by similar commitments from senior ministry staff and senior armed forces officers. 1. There is no apparent commitment to anti-corruption and integrity measures by the Defence Ministry as an institution, but there is some evidence that a commitment is made by senior ministry staff and senior armed forces officers. 0. There is no evidence of any commitment by the Defence Minister, Chief of Defence, or Single Service Chiefs, and there is no evidence that any such commitments are made by senior ministry of defence or armed forces staff. N/A. Only select if you are confident a N/A applies, and please justify why you have selected it.
35	Are there effective measures in place for personnel found to have taken part in forms of bribery and corruption, and is there public evidence that these measures are being carried out? <i>Hint: Effective measures mean disciplinary sanctions, including dismissal and prosecution.</i> <i>Answer guidelines</i> 4. Effective measures are in place for personnel found to have taken part in forms of bribery and corruption. There is publicly available evidence that measures have been, or are being, carried out effectively and consistently. 3. Measures are in place for personnel found to have taken part in forms of bribery and corruption. There is some evidence that measures have been or are being carried out, though there is evidence that such sanctions are not always effectively or consistently applied. 2. Measures are in place for personnel found to have taken part in forms of bribery and corruption. However, there is evidence that these measures lack effectiveness or consistency. 1. There are no formal measures in place for personnel found to have taken part in forms of bribery and corruption, although some informal measures have been implemented. 0. There are no such measures in place, or no public knowledge of such measures. There is no knowledge of any action taken against personnel despite evidence of bribery and corruption. N/A. Only select if you are confident a N/A applies, and please justify why you have selected it.
36	Is whistleblowing encouraged by the government, and are whistle-blowers in military and defence ministries afforded adequate protection from reprisal for reporting evidence of corruption, in both law and practice? <i>Answer guidelines</i>

Number	Topics, Sub-Topics, Explanations, and Questions
	4. Whistleblowing is actively encouraged. Effective legislation and mechanisms applicable to military and official personnel exist to report corruption and there is evidence that these allegations are taken seriously by the Ministry of Defence. These laws and mechanisms are vigorously implemented and there are legal measures in place to rigorously defend whistle-blowers. 3: Effective legislation and mechanisms applicable to military and official personnel exist to report corruption, and there is evidence that whistleblowing is taken seriously by MoD. These laws and mechanisms are implemented, but not strongly. Whistleblowing is encouraged, but not strongly. Whistle-blowers are afforded some protection but again, not strongly. 2: Legislation and mechanisms applicable to military and official personnel exist to report corruption, but whistleblowing is not actively encouraged, OR laws and mechanisms are not effectively implemented. The Ministry of Defence states that whistle-blowers will be protected, but this may not be strongly enforced. 1: Legislation and mechanisms applicable to military and official personnel may exist to report corruption; however, there is no evidence that they are implemented, nor is whistle-blowing actively encouraged. There is little trust among officials and personnel that they would be provided adequate protection if they reported corrupt activity. 0: No legislation or mechanisms applicable to military and official personnel exist to facilitate corruption reporting. There are no institutionalised mechanisms of whistle-blower protection. N/A. Only select if you are confident a N/A applies, and please justify why you have selected it.
37	Is special attention paid to the selection, time in post, and oversight of personnel in sensitive positions, including officials and personnel in defence procurement, contracting, financial management, and commercial management? <i>Hint: "Special attention" would mean, for example, that they are subject to specific vetting requirements, rotation of post after a limited number of years, and post-retirement restrictions (for example, a procurement officer may not take up a post with a tendering company within a clearly defined period of time). Such sensitive positions include, as a minimum, procurement officers, commercial managers, and financial managers.</i> <i>Answer guidelines</i> 4. Special attention is paid to personnel in sensitive positions. These positions are openly declared and the specific rules of conduct associated with such positions are made public. 3. Special attention is paid to personnel in sensitive positions, although there is limited clarity over the mechanisms for selection and oversight. 2. There is some evidence that special attention is paid to personnel in sensitive positions, though these positions are not declared and any specific rules of conduct associated with such positions are not made public. 1. There may be special attention paid to personnel in sensitive positions, but this is not publicly available or cannot be verified. 0. There is no evidence that special attention is paid to personnel in sensitive positions. There is no evidence of recognition that certain positions may be more open to corruption opportunities than others. N/A. Only select if you are confident a N/A applies, and please justify why you have selected it.

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	Payroll, Promotions, Appointments, Rewards There are numerous key areas of integrity spanning other aspects of personnel. Areas of particular concern include corruption involving skimming and misdirection of the payroll, favours in appointments, fees to avoid or gain selection in conscription, and misuse of reward and discipline processes. Rewarding those who can pay, giving positions or money to those who haven't earned it, and sabotaging others to preserve power are unethical practices that undermine defence and security establishments.
38	Is the number of civilian and military personnel accurately known and publicly available? <i>Hint: By 'civilian' we refer to any non-military staff recruited in defence and security institutions, for example civil servants occupying positions in the Ministry of Defence.</i> <i>Answer guidelines</i> 4. The number of civilian and military personnel is understood to be accurately known and details of numbers of personnel throughout the ministry and armed forces are made available publicly by the Ministry of Defence. 3. The number of civilian and military personnel is publicly available and likely to be correct. There may be slight shortcomings surrounding accuracy or the availability of the numbers, but these shortcomings are unlikely to reflect illicit motives. 2. The number of civilian and military personnel is thought to be known, as details of the numbers of personnel in certain areas are available publicly; however, a significant minority of personnel numbers may not be so declared or may be incorrect. 1. The number of civilian and military personnel is available from the establishment; however, the numbers are believed to be incorrect and incomplete. 0. There is no evidence that the number of civilian and military personnel is accurately known. N/A. Only select if you are confident a N/A applies, and please justify why you have selected it.
39	Are pay rates and allowances for civilian and military personnel openly published? <i>Answer guidelines</i> 4. Pay rates and allowances for all civilian and military personnel are openly published 3. Pay rates for all civilian and military personnel are openly published; however, information on allowances may not be available. 2. Pay rates are openly published only for selected civilian and military personnel; information on allowances is not available. 1. Pay rates for civilian and military personnel are available only in a cursory, abbreviated, or unreliable way; information on allowances is not available. 0. No information on pay rates or allowances is available publicly. N/A. Only select if you are confident a N/A applies, and please justify why you have selected it.

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40	Do personnel receive the correct pay on time, and is the system of payment well-established, routine, and published? <i>Answer guidelines</i> 4. Personnel receive the correct pay on time. The payment system is well-established, routine, and published, and basic pay is non-discretionary. 3. Personnel generally receive the correct pay on time. However, there may be minor shortcomings in the clarity or transparency of the payment system, and basic pay may occasionally be subject to discretionary adjustments. 2. There are occasional indications of late payment (of up to 3 months) though payments are generally of the correct amount. There are considerable shortcomings in the clarity and transparency of the payment system. 1. There are regular indications of late payment (of up to up to 3 months) and payment amounts may regularly be incorrect. The payment system is not clear or published. 0. There are widespread and significant delays in payment (of over 3 months), and personnel are not guaranteed to receive the correct salary. N/A. Only select if you are confident a N/A applies, and please justify why you have selected it.
41	Is there an established, independent, transparent, and objective appointment system for the selection of military personnel at middle and top management level? <i>Hint: For the purposes of this questionnaire, 'personnel at middle and top management level' refers to colonel level in the military and director level in the MOD. It may be difficult to find information on this question. Negative evidence could be found in, for example, stories in the media about nepotism or favouritism.</i> <i>Answer guidelines</i> 4. There is an established system for the appointment of military personnel, which requires the use of objective job descriptions and assessment processes for appointments, and oversight of this process by independent personnel. This system is published and is adhered to in practice. 3. There is an established system for the appointment of military personnel, which requires the use of objective job descriptions and assessment processes for appointments, and oversight of this process by independent personnel. This system is published and is mostly adhered to in practice, though there is evidence of cases of appointment not based purely on merit. 2. There is an established system for the appointment of military personnel, but it is not adhered to in practice and there is significant evidence of appointment not based purely on merit. 1. It is stated that a system for appointments exists; however, it is not published. There is strong evidence of appointment based not purely on merit. 0. There is no established appointment system. N/A. Only select if you are confident a N/A applies, and please justify why you have selected it.
42	Are personnel promoted through an objective, meritocratic process? Such a process would include promotion boards outside of the command chain, strong formal appraisal processes, and independent oversight.

Number	Topics, Sub-Topics, Explanations, and Questions
	<i>Answer guidelines</i> 4. Personnel promotions are effected through formal appraisal processes and promotions boards for all personnel. Such processes are publicly declared and promotions to senior ranks are open to scrutiny by independent personnel. 3. Personnel promotions are effected through formal appraisal processes and promotions boards for all personnel, though there is no evidence of independent scrutiny being paid to the promotion of senior personnel. 2. There is indication of formal processes, boards and oversight of the promotions process. While there are no indications of corruption or other inappropriate conduct in the promotions process, there may be some potential for it. 1. There is limited evidence of formal processes, boards or oversight of the promotions process and although there is potential for corruption or other inappropriate conduct in the promotions process, there is not necessarily strong evidence to suggest it occurs, OR there are formal processes in place, but evidence suggests that these are undermined. 0. There is no indication of any formal processes, boards or oversight of the promotions process. Furthermore, there may be indications of corruption or other inappropriate conduct in the promotions process. N/A. Only select if you are confident a N/A applies, and please justify why you have selected it.
	Conscription and Recruitment Corruption to avoid conscription into the military was recognised as a problem as early as Napoleonic times. Individuals may pay bribes to avoid service, or to enter preferred postings.
43	Where compulsory conscription occurs, is there a policy of not accepting bribes for avoiding conscription? Are there appropriate procedures in place to deal with such bribery, and are they applied? <i>Answer guidelines</i> 4. There is a policy and strict rules against bribery for avoiding compulsory conscription and there are effective procedures in place to act as a deterrent. There is evidence that appropriate actions or punishments are applied when bribery occurs. 3. There is a policy and rules against bribery for avoiding compulsory conscription and procedures are in place to act as an appropriate deterrent. 2. There is a policy and rules against bribery for avoiding compulsory conscription, though sanctions do not appear to be strictly enforced. There is likely to be some evidence of bribery. 1. There are guidelines against bribery for avoiding compulsory conscription, though they are not enforced. There are likely to be indications of bribery. 0. There are no known policies, rules or mechanisms against bribery for avoiding compulsory conscription. It is likely that bribery is widely practised. N/A. Only select if you are confident a N/A applies, and please justify why you have selected it.

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44	With regard to compulsory or voluntary conscription, is there a policy of refusing bribes to gain preferred postings in the recruitment process? Are there appropriate procedures in place to deal with such bribery, and are they applied? <i>Hint: Voluntary conscription here is defined as a programme of enlistment into the armed services which may be opted into or out of. It will differ in nature from normal recruitment processes as it is likely to apply to eligible citizens of a set age, to be for a defined period and involve defined activities, and / or to be an alternative to state-run programmes of civilian voluntary service.</i> Answer guidelines: 4. There is a policy and strict rules against bribery for soliciting preferred postings, and there are effective procedures in place to act as a deterrent. There is evidence that appropriate actions or punishments are applied when bribery occurs. 3. There is a policy and rules against bribery for soliciting preferred postings, and procedures are in place to act as an appropriate deterrent. 2. There is a policy and rules against bribery for soliciting preferred postings, though sanctions do not appear to be strictly enforced. There is likely to be some evidence of bribery. 1. There are guidelines against bribery for soliciting preferred postings, though they are not enforced. There are likely to be indications of bribery. 0. There are no known policies, rules or mechanisms against bribery for soliciting preferred postings. It is likely that bribery is widely practised. N/A. Only select if you are confident a N/A applies, and please justify why you have selected it.
	Salary Chain The salary chain is the long link from the national treasury right down to payment to the individual soldier. In many corrupt environments those funds are stolen or diverted en route, so that far less of the due amount finally reaches the soldier.
45	Is there evidence of 'ghost soldiers', or non-existent soldiers on the payroll? Answer guidelines: 4. No, there is no evidence of ghost soldiers; the strength of payment systems and oversight suggests that the phenomenon is unlikely to occur. 3. There is no firm evidence of ghost soldiers; however, some laxity of enforced accountability in payment systems suggests that the phenomenon could occur. 2. While there is no evidence of ghost soldiers, the lack of enforced accountability in payment systems makes it likely that the phenomenon occurs. 1. There have been cases of ghost soldiers reported in the past five years; however, the MOD or military is taking steps to reform payment systems to prevent ghost soldiers. 0. There is evidence of ghost soldiers in the past five years and there have been no concrete steps taken by the MOD or military against this phenomenon. N/A. Only select if you are confident a N/A applies, and please justify why you have selected it.

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46	Are chains of command separate from chains of payment? <i>Answer guidelines</i> 4. Chains of command are strictly separated from chains of payment throughout the ministry and armed forces. 3. It is likely that chains of command are strictly separated from chains of payment throughout the ministry and armed forces; however, this may not be a published policy. 2. Chains of command are generally separated from chains of payment, though there is evidence of exceptions in certain areas, and this is not a published policy. 1. Evidence suggests that chains of command are unlikely to be separated from chains of payment. 0. There is no evidence that chains of command are separated from chains of payment. N/A. Only select if you are confident a N/A applies, and please justify why you have selected it.
	Values and Standards Tackling corruption requires attention to the values and ethical behaviour of troops, officers and officials. Building a strong ethical culture of adherence to policies, rules, and guidelines minimises corruption risk. This is particularly relevant in defence and security establishments, which traditionally have a strong custom of compliance to written regulations.
47	Is there a Code of Conduct for all military and civilian personnel that includes, but is not limited to, guidance with respect to bribery, gifts and hospitality, conflicts of interest, and post-separation activities? <i>Hint: Where conduct standards are specified in legislation, usually this is not well communicated or is complex and difficult to read; if this is the case, the country should not score above 2 on this question. If there are separate military and civilian codes, score on the basis of the weaker one.</i> <i>Answer guidelines</i> 4. There is a Code of Conduct for all military and civilian personnel, which comprehensively covers conduct with respect to bribery, gifts and hospitality, conflicts of interest, and post-separation activities. This is available publicly. There is likely to be a robust oversight mechanism, too, though it may be confidential. 3. There is a Code of Conduct for all military and civilian personnel, which covers conduct with respect to bribery, gifts and hospitality, conflicts of interest, and post-separation activities, though it may not be comprehensive. There may not be a robust oversight mechanism. 2. There is a Code of Conduct, however, it is not comprehensive or its guidance is inadequate or lacks clarity and specificity, and there may be issues surrounding its application and distribution. 1. There is likely to be a Code of Conduct but its content, transparency, application and distribution is unclear or unknown. 0. There is no evidence of any Code of Conduct for Defence Ministry personnel which covers conduct with respect to corruption, and it is very unlikely there is one.

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	<i>N/A. Only select if you are confident a N/A applies, and please justify why you have selected it.</i>
48	Is there evidence that breaches of the Code of Conduct are effectively addressed, and are the results of prosecutions made publicly available? <i>Answer guidelines</i> 4. There are strong indications that breaches of the Code of Conduct are effectively addressed and that the results of prosecutions are made publicly available. 3. There are indications that breaches of the Code of Conduct are addressed. Results of prosecutions may or may not be publicly available. 2. There may be indications that breaches of the Code of Conduct are addressed. The results of prosecutions, however, are not made publicly available. 1. The Code of Conduct lacks credibility and as a result is not used or enforced. The results of any prosecutions are not made publicly available. 0. There is no evidence of any Code of Conduct for military and civilian defence personnel which covers conduct with respect to corruption, OR there is no evidence that any existing Code is effectively addressed. <i>N/A. Only select if you are confident a N/A applies, and please justify why you have selected it.</i>
49	Does regular anti-corruption training take place for military and civilian personnel? <i>Answer guidelines</i> 4. Regular anti-corruption training takes place. Training is given to all personnel and is repeated on at least an annual basis. 3. Regular anti-corruption training takes place. Training is given to selected personnel in very sensitive positions and is repeated on at least an annual basis. 2. Anti-corruption training takes place. Training is given to selected personnel in more sensitive positions but there is no evidence that this is regularly repeated. 1. Anti-corruption training is conducted irregularly and informally to limited personnel. 0. No anti-corruption training takes place. <i>N/A. Only select if you are confident a N/A applies, and please justify why you have selected it.</i>
50	Is there a policy to make public outcomes of the prosecution of defence services personnel for corrupt activities, and is there evidence of effective prosecutions in recent years? <i>Answer guidelines</i> 4. It is a policy for outcomes to be made public. EITHER all prosecutions taking place in recent years have been effective, OR there have been no such prosecutions, but there is no suggestion in the public domain that prosecutions have been suppressed. 3. It is a policy for outcomes to be made public. EITHER there are some examples available of effective prosecutions in recent years, OR there have been no such prosecutions but it is unclear whether prosecutions have been suppressed or ineffective.

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	2. There are examples of outcomes being made public, though no policy that they must be. There are some examples of effective prosecutions available in the public domain over recent years, though there is some public speculation and scepticism over whether other attempted prosecutions have been suppressed or inappropriately sanctioned. 1. There are few or no examples of outcomes being made public, and no policy that they must be. There are some examples of effective prosecutions available in the public domain over recent years, though there is widespread public speculation over whether other attempted prosecutions have been suppressed or inappropriately sanctioned. 0. Outcomes are not made public, and is there no evidence of effective prosecutions in recent years. N/A. Only select if you are confident a N/A applies, and please justify why you have selected it.
	Small Bribes and Favours Many citizens' experience of corruption is likely to be in the payment of small bribes in daily life. These might include payments for speeding up administrative procedures, bribes at checkpoints or payments to avoid predatory police. Policymakers who put in place a plan that focuses only on high-value corruption are unlikely to succeed; the general public needs to see benefit at a local level.
51	Are there effective measures in place to discourage facilitation payments (which are illegal in almost all countries)? <i>Answer guidelines</i> 4. Facilitation payments are strictly illegal and mechanisms to punish offenders are in place and are effectively applied. 3. Facilitation payments are strictly illegal and mechanisms are in place to punish offenders; however, these mechanisms and laws may not always be effectively applied. 2. Facilitation payments are discouraged though the legal framework for tackling these payments is not considered particularly effective, OR facilitation payments are illegal, but there is little indication that mechanisms are effectively used or capable of discouraging occasional facilitation payments. 1. There are holes and insufficiencies in laws designed to discourage facilitation payments, which are likely to be brief, unclear, or vague. It is likely that the occurrence of facilitation payments is common. 0. Facilitation payments are not discouraged. The occurrence of facilitation payments is likely to be widespread. N/A. Only select if you are confident a N/A applies, and please justify why you have selected it.
	OPERATIONS Military operations are complex—with a wide array of actors, a constantly changing environment, and often serious consequences. Their complexity means that they are rife with opportunities for corruption. The military's image during operations at home and abroad is vital in promoting and retaining public confidence and

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	respect. Operations are the context in which the general population has most face-to-face daily conduct with the military and officials. Therefore their conduct is of paramount importance.
	Disregard of Corruption in-Country When international forces intervene in a country in conflict, their approach to corruption once in theatre is critical to the success of their mission. Disregard of corruption in-country runs a high risk of being seen as complicit in it.
52	Do the armed forces have military doctrine addressing corruption as a strategic issue on operations? <i>Hint: Some countries may not make reference to the term 'corruption'. It is unproblematic if corrupt behaviours are identified more specifically and if this set of behaviours is comprehensive.</i> <i>Answer guidelines</i> 4. The country has comprehensive and detailed military doctrine addressing corruption issues for peace and conflict that may even be publicly available. 3. The country has military doctrine addressing corruption issues for peace and conflict, though there may be minor shortcomings in detail. 2. The armed forces are aware of corruption as a strategic issue for operations; however, there is no explicit doctrine on this subject. 1. The armed forces may be aware of corruption as a strategic issue for operations, but only as an aspect of governance. There is no explicit doctrine on this subject. 0. The country has no known military doctrine addressing corruption issues for peace and conflict. <i>N/A. Only select if you are confident a N/A applies, and please justify why you have selected it.</i>
53	Is there training in corruption issues for commanders at all levels in order to ensure that these commanders are clear on the corruption issues they may face during deployment? If so, is there evidence that they apply this knowledge in the field? <i>Answer guidelines</i> 4. There is comprehensive training in corruption issues for commanders at all levels. The commanders are examined on their understanding of what corruption issues they may face during deployment, and there is good evidence that they apply this knowledge in the field. 3. There is training on corruption issues for commanders at all levels. There is evidence that they apply this knowledge in the field, but there may be isolated incidences of corruption issues being mishandled by officers. 2. There is understood to be training in corruption issues for commanders. There is evidence that they apply this knowledge in the field, though there are also instances of corruption issues being mishandled by officers. 1. There is no known training for commanders; however, despite this, there is not significant evidence of corruption issues being mishandled.

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	0. The country has no known training in corruption issues for commanders. There is evidence that these officers engage in, or turn a blind eye, to corrupt activities. N/A. Only select if you are confident a N/A applies, and please justify why you have selected it.
	Corruption within Mission There are too many cases where intervention or peacekeeping forces are themselves a source of corrupt behaviour, and corruption within mission occurs. Corruption during operations is not a one-way street, and military missions must address the corruption risks in their ranks as well as those in the countries they operate in. In many countries the military is used to provide internal security, often in circumstances where the police are unable to operate.
54	Are trained professionals regularly deployed to monitor corruption risk in the field (whether deployed on operations or peacekeeping missions)? <i>Answer guidelines</i> 4. Trained professionals capable of monitoring corruption in the field are regularly deployed and regularly report on the status of corruption within mission. Their reports are made available to the public, at least in summary form. 3. Trained professionals capable of monitoring corruption in the field are regularly deployed and regularly report on the status of corruption within mission. 2. The country is understood to deploy corruption monitors though there is evidence that this deployment is irregular. 1. It is unclear whether or not corruption monitors are deployed. 0. The country deploys no personnel for corruption monitoring. N/A. Only select if you are confident a N/A applies, and please justify why you have selected it.
	Contracting In a conflict environment, the flow of money into a country represented by local contracting and logistics – whether aid money or military support – is an important part of helping to develop that country. With all the problems in a conflict situation, it is easy for corrupt contracts to be awarded, and for non-performance to be tolerated. If carried out effectively, local contracting holds the potential to be a vehicle for resuscitating the local economy. However, widespread international military contracting also runs the risk of increasing corruption.
55	Are there guidelines, and staff training, on addressing corruption risks in contracting whilst on deployed operations or peacekeeping missions? <i>Answer guidelines</i> 4. Yes, guidelines exist, and staff are specifically trained in relation to corruption risk in contracting whilst on deployed operations or peacekeeping missions.

Number	Topics, Sub-Topics, Explanations, and Questions
	3. Yes, guidelines exist, but staff are not specifically trained in relation to corruption risk in contracting whilst on deployed operations or peacekeeping missions. 2. There are known to be guidelines for addressing such corruption risks, but they may be incomplete, very general, or applied only selectively. 1. Some relevant guidelines relate to this form of corruption, at least loosely, but they are likely to be highly incomplete, very general, or applied very selectively or irregularly. 0. There are no relevant guidelines or training in place. N/A. Only select if you are confident a N/A applies, and please justify why you have selected it.
	Private Security Companies Private military contractors are a growing feature of military operations. These companies often operate without the ethical guidelines, accountability to the public, and oversight that govern most traditional armed forces—the risk of corruption is therefore high.
56	Are private military contractors employed and if so, are they subject to a similar level of scrutiny as for the armed forces? <i>Hint: Private Military Contractors (PMCs) usually refer to companies that provide operational staff to military environments. They may also be known as security contractors or private security contractors, and refer to themselves as private military corporations, private military firms, private security providers, or military service providers.</i> <i>Answer guidelines</i> 4. Private military contractors are not employed to any significant extent and effective regulations ban their use, OR, where they are employed, strong sanctions are available to punish corrupt PMCs and there is good evidence that these sanctions are applied. 3. PMCs are employed and are subject to scrutiny. Sanctions are available and have been applied to corrupt PMCs, though there may be minor shortcomings in their use. 2. Private military contractors are employed. Sanctions are available to punish corrupt PMCs though there is limited evidence that these sanctions are effectively applied, OR PMCs are not employed, but there is no evidence of regulations in place to ban their use. 1. PMCs are employed. They are subject to some scrutiny but it is generally ineffective and there is likely to be evidence of significant corruption. 0. Private military contractors are employed. There is no evidence that they are subject to scrutiny and corruption amongst these PMCs is likely to be widespread. N/A. Only select if you are confident a N/A applies, and please justify why you have selected it.
	PROCUREMENT Procurement is often cited by defence officials as the area in which corruption is greatest in the sector, with vulnerabilities at every stage. It is also the one where there is the largest range of anti-corruption tools to address the problem.

Number	Topics, Sub-Topics, Explanations, and Questions
	Government Policy Corruption risk will be particularly high where legislation exempts or ineffectively governs defence and security procurement, and where scrutiny is lacking. Government policy may be conducive to corruption where there exist privileged defence relations, questionable defence budgets, or external financing with improper payback terms.
57	Does the country have legislation covering defence and security procurement with clauses specific to corruption risks, and are any items exempt from these laws? <i>Answer guidelines</i> 4. The country has long established and well-trying legislation covering defence and security procurement. As far as can be determined, no items are exempt from these laws, OR any exempt items have a particular national importance or sensitivity and are subject to other forms of independent scrutiny. This legislation has clauses specific to corruption risks. 3. The country has legislation covering defence and security procurement. As far as can be determined, no items are exempt from these laws, OR any exempt items have a particular national importance or sensitivity and are subject to other forms of independent scrutiny. 2. The country has legislation covering defence and security procurement. There is evidence that this legislation is largely enforced and exempt procurement is generally independently scrutinised. 1. The country has legislation covering defence and security procurement. There is evidence that this legislation is often by-passed and exempt procurement is not independently scrutinised. 0. The country has no legislation covering defence and security procurement. N/A. Only select if you are confident a N/A applies, and please justify why you have selected it.
58	Is the defence procurement cycle process, from assessment of needs, through contract implementation and sign-off, all the way to asset disposal, disclosed to the public? <i>Hint: Consideration should be given not just to major defence procurement, but also to more mundane procurement, such as the purchase and supply of rations, fuel, and clothing, as well as hiring of transport and accommodation.</i> <i>Answer guidelines</i> 4. The defence procurement cycle is disclosed in detail. 3. Some elements of the defence procurement cycle are disclosed in detail; other elements, though openly disclosed, are only summarised or are otherwise less clear. 2. The defence procurement cycle is openly disclosed in summary form only. 1. The defence procurement cycle is disclosed only in a very abbreviated or general way. 0. There is no evidence that the defence procurement cycle is disclosed. It is, indeed, unlikely to have been formalised at all.

Number	Topics, Sub-Topics, Explanations, and Questions
	<i>N/A. Only select if you are confident a N/A applies, and please justify why you have selected it.</i>
59	Are defence procurement oversight mechanisms in place and are these oversight mechanisms active and transparent? <i>Answer guidelines</i> 4. Procurement oversight mechanisms are in place. They are independent formalised processes and they are transparent. There is evidence to demonstrate that they are highly active, and that this activity spans changes in governments. 3. Oversight mechanisms are in place and there is evidence that they are generally active and transparent. However, it is not clear that they are entirely independent of government and there may be shortcomings in levels of transparency. 2. Oversight mechanisms are formally in place and there is evidence that they are active. However, there is evidence that their activity may not be consistent or effective. The results of oversight activity are unlikely to be transparent. 1. Oversight mechanisms formally exist, but they are highly inactive and lack transparency. 0. There is no evidence of procurement oversight mechanisms, OR such mechanisms exist, but they are entirely non-transparent and there is no evidence that they are active. <i>N/A. Only select if you are confident a N/A applies, and please justify why you have selected it.</i>
60	Are actual and potential defence purchases made public? <i>Answer guidelines</i> 4. There is a policy to disclose defence purchases and this is made clear through annual audits. The government also publishes the plans for defence purchases for at least the next few years. (Note: Exemptions for security restricted items is an acceptable reason, but only where it is clear that the bulk of defence purchases are disclosed and this restriction is therefore credible.) 3. There is a policy to disclose defence purchases. There may be some information on forward purchase plans but this is not extensive. (Note: Exemptions for security restricted items is an acceptable reason, but only where it is clear that the bulk of defence purchases are disclosed and this restriction is therefore credible.) 2. There is evidence that many defence purchases are not made public. Security or confidentiality is often given as a reason for such secrecy but evidence suggests that this is partly, but not fully, justified. 1. There is evidence that many defence purchases are not made public and there is no security justification as to why this information is withheld. 0. Defence purchases are not made public in any sort of detail, even though an aggregate total spend may be disclosed. <i>N/A. Only select if you are confident a N/A applies, and please justify why you have selected it.</i>

Number	Topics, Sub-Topics, Explanations, and Questions
61	What procedures and standards are companies required to have – such as compliance programmes and business conduct programmes – in order to be able to bid for work for the Ministry of Defence or armed forces? <i>Answer guidelines</i> 4. Companies are required to show that they have a formal and publicly declared compliance programme and that they insist upon a supply chain that itself upholds ethical standards in order to bid for defence work. Companies with prosecutions for corrupt activities may be partially or totally barred from bidding. 3. Companies are required to show that they have a formal and publicly declared compliance programme in order to bid for defence work. 2. Companies are required to sign ‘no-corruption’ (or equivalent) clauses in all contracts with the government, but are not required to have compliance programmes in place. 1. No requirements are placed on companies beyond what is generally in company law. During the bidding process, the government does, however, make at least some reference to the need for companies to avoid corruption. 0. No requirements are placed on companies beyond what is generally in company law; no discrimination is made between companies on the grounds of integrity. N/A. Only select if you are confident a N/A applies, and please justify why you have selected it.
	Capability Gap and Requirements Definition Who defines where there is a capability gap or need for procurement? Where requirements are backed by a solid, transparent strategy, and where openly published security classifications are applied to defence procurement, we may be more comfortable that corruption prompted by exaggerated and inaccurate ‘requirements’ will be averted.
62	Are procurement requirements derived from an open, well-audited national defence and security strategy? <i>Answer guidelines</i> 4. Procurement requirements are derived from a national defence and security strategy. The strategy is openly published; there is logical flow down from strategy to individual procurements; and government audits give confidence that this is followed. 3. Procurement requirements are largely derived from a national defence and security strategy. The strategy is openly published, but there is no audit verification that this is what really happens. 2. Procurement requirements are in part derived from a national defence and security strategy. However, there is still a significant element of procurement outside of the national strategy. 1. Procurement requirements are at least formally derived from a national defence and security strategy. However, there is a large element of procurement outside of the national strategy or through opportunistic purchases. 0. There is no national strategy guiding the formulation of procurement requirements. Evidence suggests that procurement is often opportunistic.

Number	Topics, Sub-Topics, Explanations, and Questions
	<i>N/A. Only select if you are confident a N/A applies, and please justify why you have selected it.</i>
63	Are defence purchases based on clearly identified and quantified requirements? <i>Answer guidelines</i> 4. There is evidence that the Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces systematically base their purchases on clearly identified requirements. Work is undertaken to define and quantify the need for all significant purchases before the purchase procedure commences. 3. There is evidence that the Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces do base most of their purchases on clearly identified requirements. However, this is not always followed and there are occasionally opportunistic and unplanned purchases. 2. There is evidence that the Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces do base at least their major purchases on clearly identified requirements. However, this is not always followed and there are also opportunistic and unplanned purchases. 1. There is a formal procedure in place for defining purchase requirements. However, this is not routinely followed in practice and it is rare for there to be formal analysis of requirements. 0. Purchases are not based on quantification of requirements. They are often opportunistic in nature. <i>N/A. Only select if you are confident a N/A applies, and please justify why you have selected it.</i>
	Tender Solicitation, Assessment and Contract Award Corruption risk is increased where there is lack of open competition for procurement awards, where bidders are in any way favoured, and where assessment criteria are not objective or fair. Collusion between bidders poses a further risk.
64	Is defence procurement generally conducted as open competition or is there a significant element of single-sourcing (that is, without competition)? <i>Hint: There are some 'good' reasons for single sourcing: highly secret items, items where there is only one worldwide supplier, and Urgent Operational Requirements. However, these exceptions, when aggregated, would not normally be more than perhaps 10% of the total budget.</i> <i>Answer guidelines</i> 4. All defence procurement is conducted as open competition, except in clearly defined and limited circumstances. There is a relatively small component (say, 10% or less) of single-sourcing, which has to be justified to scrutinisers. 3. Defence procurement is conducted as open competition, though a significant minority of the value of contracts (say, 30%) are single-sourced, sometimes without clear justification.

Number	Topics, Sub-Topics, Explanations, and Questions
	2. Defence procurement is conducted in principle as open competition, though a significant percentage of the value of contracts—up to 50%—are single-sourced, sometimes without clear justification. (Note: based on a multi-country study in 2006, the average defence single-source procurement percentage was 50%). 1. Defence procurement is in principle conducted as open competition, but in practice a majority of defence contract value is purchased single-source. 0. There is little open competition, with most contracts being single-sourced. N/A. Only select if you are confident a N/A applies, and please justify why you have selected it.
65	Are tender boards subject to regulations and codes of conduct and are their decisions subject to independent audit to ensure due process and fairness? <i>Hint: Tender boards are committees of senior individuals who assess the procurement policy and agree on the recommended bidder. In many organisations, there will be separate tender boards for the technical assessment and the economic assessment of the bid.</i> <i>Answer guidelines</i> 4. Tender boards are subject to regulations and codes of conduct that are transparent. The country has an independent auditing function which audits tender board decisions and reports the results of these audits openly. 3. Tender boards are subject to regulations and codes of conduct that are transparent. The country has an independent auditing function which audits tender board decisions, though its reports and results are not always seen as independent and the results may not be automatically published. 2. Tender boards are understood to be subject to regulations and codes of conduct, though these are not particularly transparent. Auditing takes place when cases are contested though the results are not particularly transparent. 1. Tender boards are understood to be subject to regulations and codes of conduct, though these are not publicly available. Audits of tender board decisions are not routinely undertaken. 0. There is no transparency of tender board procedure and practice. Audits are not normally undertaken of tender boards, OR the country does not conduct competitive tenders. N/A. Only select if you are confident a N/A applies, and please justify why you have selected it.
66	Does the country have legislation in place to discourage and punish collusion between bidders for defence and security contracts? <i>Hint: Collusion is where contractors come together for the purposes of destroying competition, fixing prices, fixing solutions, or otherwise compromising the purpose of competition.</i> <i>Answer guidelines</i> 4. Laws and procedures are in place that strongly disallow collusion. As a result, it is almost unknown in the country. An offence can result in prosecution, debarment from current and future competitions, or other sanctions.

Number	Topics, Sub-Topics, Explanations, and Questions
	3. Collusion is actively discouraged by the government and there is evidence of offending companies facing punishment. However, there are occasionally cases in the press where collusion is strongly suspected. 2. Collusion is actively discouraged by the government and there is evidence of offending companies facing punishment. However, there is evidence that sanctions are often not robustly applied when collusion is evident. 1. There are national laws outlawing collusion, but no legislation specific to defence. Enforcement of measures to punish colluding companies is likely to be only weakly enforced. 0. There is no legislation specific to the defence sector, nor wider national legislation, that outlaws collusion. N/A. Only select if you are confident a N/A applies, and please justify why you have selected it.
	Contract Delivery and In-Service Support Where procurement staff are knowledgeable of suppliers' obligations in procurement contracts, and corrupt suppliers are appropriately punished, we can be more confident that procurement officials themselves are likely to be clean. This is enhanced where companies are given protection to complain about corrupt activity. It is also important that there is scrutiny of money flows during the in-service performance of equipment: corrupt exchanges may occur when payment is made for modifications and repairs.
67	Are procurement staff, in particular project and contract managers, specifically trained and empowered to ensure that defence contractors meet their obligations on reporting and delivery? <i>Answer guidelines</i> 4. Procurement staff are trained and empowered to ensure that defence contractors meet their obligations. 3. Procurement staff are trained and empowered to ensure that defence contractors meet their obligations. However, there may be minor shortcomings in the department's ability to fulfil its obligations, such as limited staff shortages. 2. Procurement staff are expected to ensure that defence contractors meet their obligations, but there is limited training and staff are rotated in and out from other functions. There are likely to be significant staff shortages. 1. Procurement staff are expected to ensure that defence contractors meet their obligations, but there is limited training and staff are rotated in and out from other functions. There are likely to be significant staff shortages. There may be evidence of undue influence from higher grades within the organisation. 0. Defence procurement staff are not organised into a professional staff department. There are likely to be significant staff shortages. There is little control or oversight of defence contractors by procurement staff, and there is likely to be evidence of undue influence from higher grades within the organisation. N/A. Only select if you are confident a N/A applies, and please justify why you have selected it.
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Number	Topics, Sub-Topics, Explanations, and Questions
	Are there mechanisms in place to allow companies to complain about perceived malpractice in procurement, and are companies protected from discrimination when they use these mechanisms? <i>Answer guidelines</i> 4. Formal mechanisms are in place to allow companies to complain about perceived malpractice in procurement. For genuine (non-malicious) complaints, companies are well protected against discrimination in future procurements. 3. Formal mechanisms are in place to allow companies to complain about perceived malpractice in procurement. However, these are only partially used as some companies believe it would be disadvantageous to complain. 2. Formal mechanisms are in place to allow companies to complain about perceived malpractice in procurement. However, these are rarely used as companies see it as dangerous to complain. 1. No formal mechanisms are in place to allow companies to complain about perceived malpractice in procurement. It is likely, though not certain, that companies are disadvantaged in future procurements if they attempt to complain. 0. No formal mechanisms are in place to allow companies to complain about perceived malpractice in procurement and there is evidence of companies that have attempted to complain being unfairly disadvantaged or debarred from future procurements. N/A. Only select if you are confident a N/A applies, and please justify why you have selected it.
69	What sanctions are used to punish the corrupt activities of a supplier? <i>Answer guidelines</i> 4. A range of sanctions are available, from procurement executive-imposed debarment to legal sanctions, including heavy fines or imprisonment. There is evidence that such sanctions are consistently applied in practice. 3. Sanctions by the procurement executive, such as prosecution or debarment, are available and such sanctions are quite regularly applied in practice. 2. Sanctions by the procurement executive, such as prosecution or debarment, are available but such sanctions are only sometimes applied in practice. 1. Sanctions by the procurement executive, such as prosecution or debarment, formally exist but are almost never applied in practice. 0. There is no evidence of any sanctions existing. N/A. Only select if you are confident a N/A applies, and please justify why you have selected it.
	Offset Contracts Offsets are arrangements when a government procuring goods or services makes the foreign supplying company reinvest a portion of the contract back into the importing country. Vulnerability to corruption arises from frequent lack of due diligence of potential improper beneficiaries, no monitoring of performance on offset contracts, no audits of what was delivered compared to pledges and no publication of offset results, benefits or performance. The complexity of offset contracts, where investment may span a variety of companies and subsidiaries, exacerbates the risk.

Number	Topics, Sub-Topics, Explanations, and Questions
70	When negotiating offset contracts, does the government specifically address corruption risk by imposing anti-corruption due diligence requirements on contractors? Does the government follow up on offset contract performance and perform audits to check performance and integrity? <i>Answer guidelines</i> 4. The government imposes stringent anti-corruption due diligence requirements on contractors during offset contract negotiations, and follows up on offset contract performance with audits. Specific attention is paid to ensuring integrity as a part of this action. 3. The government imposes anti-corruption due diligence requirements on contractors during offset contract negotiations, and follows up on offset contract performance with audits. Ensuring integrity is part of this action, but a minimal or subsidiary concern. 2. The government imposes anti-corruption due diligence requirements on contractors during offset contract negotiations, and follows up on offset contract performance with audits. However, ensuring integrity is not targeted as a part of these actions. 1. The government imposes some anti-corruption due diligence or auditing requirements on offset contracts, but there is considerable reason to doubt their effectiveness at ensuring integrity. 0. The government imposes no anti-corruption due diligence or auditing requirements on offset contracts. N/A. Only select if you are confident a N/A applies, and please justify why you have selected it.
71	Does the government make public the details of offset programmes, contracts, and performance? <i>Answer guidelines</i> 4. The government makes public a list of the contracts (including details of the investments and the supplying companies), details of the current performance of offset programmes, and copies of the contracts themselves. It also makes public the details of planned offsets contracts to enable public and civil society comment before contract award 3. The government makes public considerable detail of offset contracts and programmes, including a list of the contracts (including details of the investments and the supplying companies), and copies of the contracts themselves and substantive information of the current performance of the offset programme 2. The government makes public some details of offset contracts and programmes, including, at the least, a full list of the contracts, including details of the investments and the supplying companies 1. The government makes public only basic details of the offset programmes 0. The government is known to be involved in offset contracts and programmes, but does not make any details of them transparent N/A. Only select if you are confident a N/A applies, and please justify why you have selected it
72	Are offset contracts subject to the same level of competition regulation as the main contract?

Number	Topics, Sub-Topics, Explanations, and Questions
	<i>Answer guidelines</i> 4. All offset contracts are subject to the same level of competition regulation as the main contract. 3. Offset contracts are generally subject to the same level of competition as the main contract, though there is evidence of this level occasionally being less stringent than that applying to the main contract. 2. Offset contracts are subject to some degree of competition regulation, but less than that for the main contract. 1. Offset contracts are subject to some degree of competition regulation, but significantly less than that for the main contract. 0. Offset contracts are either not subject to any level of competition regulation or are simply not competed. N/A. Only select if you are confident a N/A applies, and please justify why you have selected it.
	Agents / Brokers Agents and brokers bring with them a variety of corruption risks. The use of undisclosed agents or middlemen is more widespread in defence than in any other industry. Whilst representatives have legitimate tasks in assisting companies to operate in unfamiliar cultures and styles of government, there is no doubt that the use of middlemen also facilitates the payment of bribes to decision makers. Nearly every case of defence sector bribery shows that an agent is the conduit through which bribes were paid. Arrangements involving agents and brokers tend to be secretive and they add an additional layer between the supplier and the supplied parties. Scrutiny of these intermediaries may be insufficient or lacking entirely.
73	How strongly does the government control the company's use of agents and intermediaries in the procurement cycle? <i>Hint: Of key interest here is whether there is a policy on their usage and whether they are subject to vetting and scrutiny; if they are forbidden, is this law strictly enforced?</i> <i>Answer guidelines</i> 4. Agents and intermediaries are strongly controlled and limited. They may be forbidden by the government. Where they are forbidden, there are controls to ensure the law is not circumvented. Where they are not forbidden, there is a clear policy on their usage, and they are subject to scrutiny. These controls are public and well known to companies. 3. Agents and intermediaries are controlled or limited. Where they are limited, there are controls to ensure the law is not circumvented. There is a policy on their usage, and they are subject to some degree of scrutiny. 2. Agents and intermediaries are used in the procurement cycle. There is some control over their usage, though probably no clear policy. 1. Agents and intermediaries are used in the procurement cycle, and although there is some degree of control over their usage, there is evidence that is frequently not enforced effectively, or not obeyed. 0. The government imposes no restrictions on the use of agents and intermediaries, or provides controls that are entirely ineffective. N/A. Only select if you are confident a N/A applies, and please justify why you have selected it.

Number	Topics, Sub-Topics, Explanations, and Questions
	Financing Package Complex and secretive financing packages, where payment timelines, rates, and terms and conditions are poorly defined, pose a clear corruption risk. In many cases the main defence contract has a high level of scrutiny, but the same is very rarely true of the financing package.
74	Are the principal aspects of the financing package surrounding major arms deals, (such as payment timelines, interest rates, commercial loans or export credit agreements) made publicly available prior to the signing of contracts? <i>Answer guidelines</i> 4. Principal aspects of the financing package surrounding major arms deals are comprehensively detailed and made publicly available prior to the signing of the contracts. 3. Most details of the financing package are made publicly available prior to the signing of the contract, though some aspects of the package are less precisely detailed than other aspects. 2. Some details of the financing package are made publicly available, and key elements such as the sums involved and the payment deadlines are included. However details on matters such as interest rates and rules and regulations surrounding default penalties are likely to be limited. 1. The existence of a financing package and the identity of the provider are normally made public, but no further details are likely to be available. 0. Details of the financing package are not publicly available. There may be no information on whether a financing package exists at all. N/A. Only select if you are confident a N/A applies, and please justify why you have selected it.
	Sub-contractors Large defence contracts involve many layers of sub-contractors. The compliance programmes of sub-contractors are usually significantly weaker than those of the platform-makers, which leads to additional potential for corruption. To ensure propriety it is prudent for a government to not only conduct appropriate due diligence on the main defence contractor, but to ensure that the main contractor conducts comparable due diligence on the sub-contractors it employs.
75	Does the government formally require that the main contractor ensures subsidiaries and sub-contractors adopt anti-corruption programmes, and is there evidence that this is enforced? <i>Hint: The main contractor will contract some elements of the work to be done to other companies, known as sub-contractors. They in turn can further contract work out. Such 'chains' of contractors are very common in the defence industry.</i> <i>Answer guidelines</i> 4. The government formally requires the main contractor to ensure that its subsidiaries and sub-contractors adopt anti-corruption programmes. There is evidence that this is enforced.

Number	Topics, Sub-Topics, Explanations, and Questions
	3. The government formally requires the main contractor to ensure that its subsidiaries and sub-contractors adopt anti-corruption programmes. There is, however, evidence that there are shortcomings in enforcement. 2. The government formally requires the main contractor to ensure that its subsidiaries and sub-contractors adopt anti-corruption programmes, but there is no evidence that this is enforced. 1. The government encourages but does not formally require the main contractor to ensure that its subsidiaries and sub-contractors adopt anti-corruption programmes. 0. There is no evidence of the government formally requiring the main contractor to ensure that its subsidiaries and sub-contractors adopt anti-corruption programmes, nor is there evidence of the government encouraging this informally. N/A. Only select if you are confident a N/A applies, and please justify why you have selected it.
	Seller Influence When procuring defence and security equipment and services, the interests of the armed forces should be the central issue. International political deals and arm-twisting can mean that the contract is awarded to a company because of its nationality, rather than its bid. To avoid corruption, it is important that the government bases procurement decisions on legitimate need, and is not pressured into purchases by sellers.
76	How common is it for defence acquisition decisions to be based on political influence by selling nations? <i>Hint: This is inevitably a difficult question. Media stories may provide a guide. Political influence by the selling nation is a common characteristic of large defence deals. Yet many governments manage to keep the decision based on technical or capability grounds.</i> <i>Answer guidelines</i> 4. Almost no acquisitions are granted as a result of political influence. There is consistent evidence that the government purchases according to military need, and this is validated by independent assessments or statements by the media that identify this specific need. 3. The bulk of evidence suggests that acquisitions are independent of political influence, yet some evidence points towards occasional incidences or small-scale purchasing that has a political element. 2. Some acquisitions are granted as a result of political influence by seller nations. Where expenditure is justified by reference to military need, there is likely to be uncertainty over how pressing this military need is. 1. Although the government may sometimes justify purchases by referring to military need, the bulk of evidence suggests that purchases are driven by political influence by seller nations. 0. Evidence suggests that it is extremely common for defence decisions to be driven by political influence by seller nations. The government is unlikely to justify military procurement by referring to military need, and may not justify its defence and security expenditure at all. N/A. Only select if you are confident a N/A applies, and please justify why you have selected it.