This country is placed in Band A

The United Kingdom’s GI ranking in Band A places it in the very low risk category for corruption in the defence and security sector. The highest risk areas are Procurement and Operations, both in Band B (low risk).

The December 2014 National Anti-Corruption Plan included a number of actions for Defence: a Fraud Defence Board has been established to identify and mitigate fraud and corruption, a comprehensive self-assessment of corruption risk has been conducted, and Transparency and Anti-Corruption doctrine for deployed operations is being updated.

Overall, strong anti-corruption systems are in place in Defence Institutions, underpinned by effective independent oversight mechanisms, including Parliamentary scrutiny. There is open engagement with civil society, robust public debate over Defence policy and personnel and procurement systems exhibit high integrity.  There are nonetheless some areas in which the UK might wish to consider further strengthening arrangements:

Operations

The UK armed forces have taken some steps to address the potentially critical threat that corruption poses to the success of military operations. Further improvements could be made, for example, by taking proactive steps to limit the potential for facilitation payments on deployed operations by introducing clear regulations governing the interpretation of S.13 Chapter 23 of the Bribery Act 2010 [1]. 

Defence procurement

The level of non-competitive contracts awarded by the UK MOD has exceeded 50% over recent years. The UK government does have various measure in place to mitigate the risk posed by the high proportion of single sourcing, most notably the Single Source Regulations Office, which serves as an independent statutory regulator of single source procurement regime in defence. Nonetheless a continuing focus on this risk is essential. The UK government might look for opportunities to increase the level of open competition or at what steps might be taken to mitigate further the risks posed by single source procurement.

Certainly, a continuing focus on training and empowering procurement staff, including requiring strong evidence of compliance programmes from contractors and their supply chains is important.  Other options might include increasing the transparency of internal audits, ensuring robust sanctions are in place to deter corrupt activity by personnel and contractors alike, and ensuring that recent changes to whistle blowing arrangements are strongly publicised and embedded. The UK might also consider sharing best practice with other partners where systems for managing high levels of single sourcing are in place, such as the Canadian Advanced Contract Award Notice process.

Export controls

Overall export control policy is strong and the standard of scrutiny by the Parliamentary Committee on Arms Export Controls (CAEC) is robust, although the Committee only reviews exports which have already taken place. At the same time, the UK continues to export arms to countries where democracy is weak and corruption a major risk; it should continue to improve the scrutiny of bribery and corruption risks, particularly in connection with government to government arrangements. 

Leadership 30
01.
score
4

Is there formal provision for effective and independent legislative scrutiny of defence policy?

Researcher4085: Defence policy is formulated by virtue of the Royal Prerogative and, as such, not enshrined in law. The Royal Prerogative provides for the Monarch (Queen) to exercise powers related to the declaration of war of the deployment of armed forces, for example. In practice these powers are only exercised on the advice of Government Ministers.

Defence policy is scrutinised by UK Parliament in a system that is generally effective and independent. Acts of Parliament concerning defence policy and including budget allocations are created with the majority approval of the legislature, comprised of the House of Commons and House of Lords, which typically votes six times on a Bill before it becomes an Act. If a Bill does not receive a majority at each of these stages it is vetoed and cannot become law.

A Bill must pass through both the House of Lords and House of Commons to become law. It can be introduced in either house and is read three times in each House. The first reading simply introduces the bill. At the second reading, typically, the Bill is voted on and requires a majority to proceed. If the Bill proceeds it then undergoes line-by-line examination by a committee (normally the Defence Select Committee if the Bill starts in the House of Commons). MPs from outside the committee can also propose amendments to the Bill. The committee then reports back to the House and MPs can debate the report and amendments before voting again on whether the Bill should proceed and which amendments should be accepted or disregarded. The Bill then has a third reading at which another vote is taken. If successful the Bill then proceeds to the next House and the process is repeated. The legislature approves Bills on the basis of one Member, one vote, which ensures sufficient independence from the executive, although the executive can influence the legislature through its party whips.

In practice, defence Bills are frequently debated and amended. The Defence Reform Act 2014, for example, was read by the House of Lords which rejected the initial Bill and proposed seven amendments to it, which the Commons was obliged to consider. The House of Commons ultimately accepted six of these and evidence of the debate is available online via Hansard. Parliament exercises budgetary power on an annual basis when it considers the Ministry of Defence's Main Supply Estimates (budget proposals).

Defence policy does not always require legislation and significant policies are often presented in White Papers and Green Papers which are subject to Parliamentary scrutiny, although this scrutiny does not follow the formal procedures that Bills are subject to. Major procurement decisions, for example, are policy decisions and not necessarily subject to legislative scrutiny although procurement can be reviewed, but not vetoed, by other scrutiny bodies such as the Defence Select Committee and the National Audit Office.

The National Audit Office has powers to &quoute;carry out examinations into the economy, efficiency and effectiveness&quoute; of designated public bodies which includes the MoD. It has powers of audit and inspection and can choose the subject and duration of its enquiries. This provides a high level of independent, evaluative scrutiny on existing policy.

In addition, there are four ways in which the Secretary of State for Defence and Defence Ministers are held to account to Parliament:

Select Committees – The main select committee is the House of Commons Defence Committee, which looks specifically at Defence. The Public Administration Committee (PASC), which reviews organisation and administration across government, and the Joint Committee on National Security Strategy (JCNSS), which reviews the Government’s National Security Strategy, both also routinely consider issues relevant to Defence. Other committees also take evidence from Defence Ministers, officials and seniors officers when relevant to their inquiries;
•tThe Public Accounts Committee (PAC) – The PAC investigates the accounting for, regularity and propriety of, public spending. It is supported by the National Audit Office (NAO);
•tParliamentary Questions (PQs) – PQs may be asked by Members of Parliament and Peers to gather information or to press for action, and which need either a spoken or a written answer;
•tParliamentary Debates – Parliamentary debates are held at the discretion of the Government or the Opposition, or may be asked for by a Member of Parliament, the House of Commons Defence Committee or Peers. Specifically, the Back Bench Business Committee (BBBC) offers greater transparency by providing an opportunity for backbench Members to bring forward debates of their choice outside of Government control 1; and
•tMinisterial Correspondence (MC) – In which Members of Parliament write direct to ministers about the concerns of their constituents or on a topic in which they have an interest. Peers also receive a formal ministerial reply if they write to minister 2.

See response to question no. 2 for relevant information on the House of Commons Defence Committee and the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament.

Therefore, score 4 has been selected given the above evidence of effective and independent legislative scrutiny of defence policy.


Comment to Government Reviewer: Agreed. Score changed from 3 to 4, comment updated and sources added.

Comment to Transparency International UK Chapter reviewer: Agreed. Score changed from 3 to 4, comment updated and sources added.

COMMENTS -+

Cabinet Office. &quoute;Legislative process: taking a Bill through Parliament&quoute;. Visited on 09/06/2014.
https://www.gov.uk/legislative-process-taking-a-bill-through-parliament
Parliament. &quoute;Making laws&quoute;. Visited on 09/06/2014.
http://www.parliament.uk/about/how/laws/
Parliament. 'Guide to the passage of a Bill'. Visited on 09/06/2014.
http://www.parliament.uk/about/how/laws/passage-bill/
Hansard: House of Commons Debate, 29 April 2014, Columns 775 - 788.
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmhansrd/cm140429/debtext/140429-0003.htm#14042952000006
National Audit Office. &quoute;Our Powers&quoute;. Accessed 08/09/2015
http://www.nao.org.uk/about-us/our-work/our-powers/
Find Law. &quoute;The Royal Prerogatives.&quoute; Accessed 08/09/2015
http://findlaw.co.uk/law/government/constitutional_law/citizens_guide_to_government/500456.html
UK Parliament. Back Bench Business Committee. [Online] Available from: http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/backbench-business-committee/how-the-backbench-business-committee-works/ [Accessed: 08th December 2014]
GOV.UK. The new operating model: how defence works. [Online] Available from: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-new-operating-model-how-defence-works [Accessed: 08th December 2014]
UK Parliament. Defence Committee - role. [Online] Available from: http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/defence-committee/role/ [Accessed: 08th December 2014]
Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament. About the Committee. [Online] Available from: http://isc.independent.gov.uk/home [Accessed: 08th December 2014]

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: Correction: Bills before the House of Parliament are not reviewed by the Defence Select Committee by default, but by a legislative committee specifically formed for the purpose of reviewing the Bill. The Defence Select Committee has autonomy in what subjects it wishes to look into and produces independent scrutiny reports.

Additionally, the National Audit Office has no power of veto but it's staff, as employees of Parliament, have access to all areas of business on behalf of the Public Accounts Committee - a powerful Committee of back benchers which exists ultimately to hold the Permanent Secretary to account for the propriety, regularity and value for money of resources voted by Parliament (not by, but on the recommendation of, government) to Defence. They can summon the Permanent Secretary to appear before them as the Accounting Officer to respond to the report of an NAO enquiry into any aspect of Defence expenditure. Although this is after the event, the process ensures that appropriate measures are taken at every stage.

Suggested score: 4

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: We believe the score should be 4

The Secretary of State for Defence and Defence Ministers are held to account to Parliament in five main ways;

•tSelect Committees – The main select committee is the House of Commons Defence Committee, which looks specifically at Defence. The Public Administration Committee (PASC), which reviews organisation and administration across government, and the Joint Committee on National Security Strategy (JCNSS), which reviews the Government’s National Security Strategy, both also routinely consider issues relevant to Defence. Other committees also take evidence from Defence Ministers, officials and seniors officers when relevant to their inquiries;
•tThe Public Accounts Committee (PAC) – The PAC investigates the accounting for, regularity and propriety of, public spending. It is supported by the National Audit Office (NAO);
•tParliamentary Questions (PQs) – PQs may be asked by Members of Parliament and Peers to gather information or to press for action, and which need either a spoken or a written answer;
•tParliamentary Debates – Parliamentary debates are held at the discretion of the Government or the Opposition, or may be asked for by a Member of Parliament, the House of Commons Defence Committee or Peers. Specifically, the Back Bench Business Committee (BBBC) offers greater transparency by providing an opportunity for backbench Members to bring forward debates of their choice outside of Government control 1; and
•tMinisterial Correspondence (MC) – In which Members of Parliament write direct to ministers about the concerns of their constituents or on a topic in which they have an interest. Peers also receive a formal ministerial reply if they write to minister 2.

The House of Commons Defence Committee (HCDC) is a cross-party Select Committee consisting of twelve Members of Parliament appointed by the House of Commons. Its purpose is to examine the expenditure, administration, and policy of the Ministry of Defence and its associated public bodies. The Committee has powers to send for persons, papers and records, to appoint specialist advisers, and to visit operational theatres or defence estate in the UK and overseas to assist with an inquiry 3.

The Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament (ISC) examines the policy, administration and expenditure of the Security Service, Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), and the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ). The ISC also provides oversight of Defence Intelligence in the Ministry of Defence. The Justice and Security Act 2013 provides for the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament to have a membership of nine, drawn from both members of House of Commons and members of the House of Lords, with none permitted to be a Minister of the Crown. The members are appointed by the Houses of Parliament, having first secured the nomination of the Prime Minister (in consultation with the Leader of the Opposition) 4.

Source(s):
1.tUK Parliament. Back Bench Business Committee. [Online] Available from: http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/backbench-business-committee/how-the-backbench-business-committee-works/ [Accessed: 08th December 2014]
2.tGOV.UK. The new operating model: how defence works. [Online] Available from: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-new-operating-model-how-defence-works [Accessed: 08th December 2014]
3.tUK Parliament. Defence Committee - role. [Online] Available from: http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/defence-committee/role/ [Accessed: 08th December 2014]
Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament. About the Committee. [Online] Available from: http://isc.independent.gov.uk/home [Accessed: 08th December 2014]

Suggested score: 4

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The reason why this is a 3 not a 4 is that in the UK defence policy, and the defence programme (ie what equipment projects and other specific items MOD spends its budget on), are not in general enshrined in law (like the Loi de Programmation in France). This is because defence activity is in general based on the royal prerogative, not legislation, though legislation is required for certain things (military law and discipline, for example, provided for in periodic Armed Forces Acts). But the defence budget, broken down into categories of expenditure, is approved by Parliament annually; major policy changes are included in White Papers that are debated in Parliament, though in general not having the formal status of statute; and Parliament holds Ministers to account just as rigorously as in other departments whose activity is more statute-based. Officials are regularly cross-questioned in detail by the Public Accounts Committee and the Defence Committee of the House of Commons. I would say the quality of Parliamentary scrutiny is high, it is effective, and the reason for a 3 not a 4 is the rather technical one that I have described.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

02.
score
4

Does the country have an identifiable and effective parliamentary defence and security committee (or similar such organisation) to exercise oversight?

Researcher4085: The UK's defence policy is scrutinised by a parliamentary select committee, an intelligence and security committee and an intelligence services commissioner. Adequate provisions are in place to consider the oversight mechanisms effective.

The Defence Select Committee is a twelve person body appointed by the House of Commons to scrutinise expenditure, administration and policy of the MoD and its Arms Length Bodies (ALBs). The committee has the same powers as other parliamentary select committees (granted by Standing Order No. 152) which include powers to summon witnesses, demand documents and appoint specialist advisers to assist its inquiries. It can select its own subjects of inquiry and investigations have no fixed minimum or maximum lengths. The committee reports to Parliament. Members of the Defence Select Committee are nominated for membership by the Committee of Selection, which is cross-party and independent of the executive. The Defence Select Committee published 15, 10 and 12 reports for the parliamentary periods of 2013-14, 2012-13, 2010-12 respectively (NOTE the final designated period is two years).

The Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) is a nine-member committee, which is established by the Justice and Security Act (JASA) 2013 and oversees the expenditure, administration, policy and, to the extent described in s.2 of JASA, operations of the Security Service (SS), the Secret Intelligence Services (SIS) and the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ). The ISC also has a mandate for broader examination of HMG intelligence and security matters. The ISC is not a parliamentary select committee since it is created by the JASA and not Standing Order no. 152. The Committee reports to Parliament although it must exclude information considered prejudicial to the activities of bodies it scrutinises. Committee members are nominated by the Prime Minister in consultation with the Leader of the Opposition and then appointed by the Houses of Parliament.

The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 mandates the creation of an Intelligence Services Commissioner who is tasked with oversight of intelligence services and activities. The commissioner is appointed by and reports to the Prime Minister who can withhold from Parliament any material he deems contrary to the public interest.

COMMENTS -+

&quoute;Standing Order of the House of Commons 2002, No. 152(2) and (4)
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200102/cmstords/27519.htm
Justice and Security Act 2013, Part 1: Oversight of Intelligence and Security Activities
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2013/18/part/1/enacted
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 s. 59 (Amended in Justice and Security Act 2013)
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/23/section/59
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2013/18/part/1/crossheading/oversight-by-the-intelligence-services-commissioner/enacted
Parliament. 'Defence Committee - role'. Visited on 09/06/2014
http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/defence-committee/role/
Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament. 'About the Committee'. Visited on 06/09/2014
http://isc.independent.gov.uk/
'Defence Committee - publications'. Visited on 06/09/2014.
http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/defence-committee/publications/&quoute;

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Fully agreed. There is also the Public Accounts Committee, which, advised by the National Audit Office, holds the Permanent Secretary (the chief MOD Civil Servant) and certain other senior official to account for the department's financial performance including value for money.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

03.
score
4

Is the country's national defence policy debated and publicly available?

Researcher4085: The UK policy process is relatively open, despite the absence of legislation enforcing transparency, and national defence is no exception. The policy process typically includes publication of an early draft of a Bill known as a Green or White Paper which gives a clear indication of the policy focus and direction but also invites participation from stakeholders and the public. An official Bill undergoes six readings, including debate in both houses and detailed scrutiny by a committee, before being passed by Royal Assent (see Q1).

All stages, debates and iterations of a Bill are published on Parliament's website and the 'Hansard' service as it moves through the policy process. The Bill tracker service allows the public to follow the progress of a Bill through every reading, committee debate and report stage of both Houses; access some, but not all, relevant records and documents while the policy process is live and view the parliamentary schedule. For example, The Defence Reform Act 2014 has 32 entries detailing its progress between its introduction on 03/07/2014 and the granting of its Royal Assent on 14/05/2014. The Citizenship (Armed Forces) Act 2014 has 11 such entries. This process is not underpinned by a single piece of legislation but by numerous Standing Orders and much of both the policy process and its transparency is also the result of parliamentary custom.

Defence policy can be introduced within existing legislative frameworks and as such no new law is required. These policies are often subject to the same or similar levels of scrutiny although this takes place outside of the same formal Parliamentary requirements. Such policy proposals are set out in White Papers and Green Papers. Significant examples include defence industrial policy (2005), the future of the nuclear deterrent (2006), the future of reserve forces (2013), and acquisition reform (2013) - the latter two entailed legislation, but described policy changes that went beyond legislation.

Comment to Peer Reviewer 1: comments and sources updated to reflect significance of policy changes. This includes citation of all four examples.

COMMENTS -+

Cabinet Office. &quoute;Legislative process: taking a Bill through Parliament&quoute;. Visited on 09/06/2014.
https://www.gov.uk/legislative-process-taking-a-bill-through-parliament
Parliament. 'Making laws'. Visited on 09/06/2014. http://www.parliament.uk/about/how/laws/
Parliament (Hansard). 'House of Commons Public Bill Committee on the Defence Reform Bill 2013-14'. Visited on 09/06/2014. http://services.parliament.uk/bills/2013-14/defencereform/committees/houseofcommonspublicbillcommitteeonthedefencereformbill201314.html
Parliament. 'Bill stages — Defence Reform Act 2014'. Visited on 09/06/2014. http://services.parliament.uk/bills/2013-14/defencereform/stages.html
Parliament. 'Bill stages — Citizenship (Armed Forces) Act 2014'. Visited on 09/06/2014.
http://services.parliament.uk/bills/2013-14/citizenshiparmedforces/stages.html
Parliament. 'Rules and Customs'. Visited on 09/06/2014. http://www.parliament.uk/about/how/role/customs/&quoute;
Ministry of Defence. &quoute;Defence Industrial Strategy: Defence White Paper&quoute;. Visited on 28/09/2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/272203/6697.pdf
The Secretary of State for Defence and The Secretary of State for Foreign. &quoute;The Future of the
United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent&quoute;. Visited on 28/09/2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/27378/DefenceWhitePaper2006_Cm6994.pdf
Ministry of Defence. &quoute;Reserves in the Future Force 2020: Valuable and Valued&quoute;. Visited on 28/09/2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/210470/Cm8655-web_FINAL.pdf.
Ministry of Defence. &quoute;Better Defence Acquisition: Improving how we procure and support Defence equipment&quoute;. Visited on 28/09/2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/206032/20130610_WP_Better_Def_Acquisition_screen_final.pdf.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The existence of a free press, academia and multiple &quoute;think tanks&quoute;, which need no encouragement to focus on/discuss Defence and Security issues in real time, is a further safeguard.

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: I agree the score but the scorer's comments concentrate almost exclusively on the scrutiny of legislation, which as I have argued in response to an earlier question covers only part of MOD's business. Major policy changes, even if they do not require legislation, are set out in green papers (making proposals) and white papers (announcing policy decisions). Examples include defence industrial policy (2005), the future of the nuclear deterrent (2006), the future of reserve forces (2013), and acquisition reform (2013) - the latter two entailed legislation, but described policy changes that went beyond legislation.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

04.
score
3

Do defence and security institutions have a policy, or evidence, of openness towards civil society organisations (CSOs) when dealing with issues of corruption? If no, is there precedent for CSO involvement in general government anti-corruption initiatives?

Researcher4085: There is evidence that defence and security institutions are seeking input from CSOs on corruption issues. Transparency International’s Defence and Security Programme (TI-DSP) has delivered anti-corruption training in the UK aimed at “the next generation of senior defence leaders”. The training material is developed in participation with the UK’s MoD’s Defence Academy and NATO. There is however a lack of available evidence that government supports and encourages this training.

The government's Anti-Corruption Plan includes the following actions for Defence: MoD to respond to Transparency International recommendations (by March 2015); MoD to implement training on the Bribery Act for MoD personnel (from August 2014); and MoD to implement the package of anti- corruption activities (by February 2015). Explicit reference is made to TI DSP recommendations published in March 2014 which included understanding the extent of the problem, providing additional training for staff and strengthening whistle-blower protection.

Transparency International UK Chapter reviewer (see below) states: &quoute;Furthermore, following commitments made at the Wales Summit, the MoD is now subjecting itself to the NATO Building Integrity process and has employed a civil society NGO - Public Concern at Work - as one available channel of reporting identified in its updated whistle-blowing policy (published internally) on 31 March 2014; it is due to be reviewed in April 2015 (this was ahead of the publication of a PAC report on the effectiveness of whistle-blowing policy across various government departments, including the MoD).

&quoute;An active dialogue is now taking place with MOD Internal Audit and various subordinate organisations (DCDC, UKDA, HQ ARRC) have also been involved in support of TI DSP activities, including the drafting of &quoute;Corruption Threats and International Missions&quoute; and including TACC components in Joint Staff College programmes and exercise scenarios. TI DSP experts have been invited to be involved, alongside other NGOs, in major exercises (e.g. ARRCADE FUSION 2013 and 2014).&quoute;

Elsewhere, calls for evidence by parliamentary select committees are open to all organisations and there is some evidence that committees are open to CSO input on defence issues generally. The House of Commons Committee on Arms Export Controls took oral evidence from Saferworld and Oxfam in its most recent report while other organisations including Campaign Against the Arms Trade, Drone Wars and Transparency International (TI) also provided written evidence. None of these submissions were clearly cited in the report that followed however. In an interview with a representative of a smaller CSO, the interviewee stated that they felt the government was not interested in meaningful engagement with their position.

Although not a defence and security institution, the International Development Select Committee recently investigated defence corruption when it looked at BAE Systems’ criminal offence of improper bookkeeping in Tanzania. The committee’s report cited and engaged with evidence by Campaign Against the Arms Trade, Global Witness, the Corner House and TI-UK.

For other examples see response to question no. 6.

Response to Transparency International UK Chapter reviewer: Agreed. Score updated to 3. Comments updated to reflect this.

DSP Comment: DSP has been invited to contribute to training delivered to students at the Royal College of Defence Studies. The audience of this course was generally mixed nationality and has been ad-hoc. The 77th Brigade, a British Army formation, have seconded one of their officers to TI-DSP in 2015 for a 8 month period. DSP also recently delivered an introductory session on Operational Transparency Accountability and Counter-Corruption (OPTACC) to members of the 77th Brigade. The UK government has also committed to program funding that focuses on building integrity training and capacity building as a part of the Building Stability Overseas Strategy. The primary implementer of this funding is the UK Defence Academy in partnership with TI-DSP.

COMMENTS -+

Transparency International Defence and Security Programme. “Training to build integrity”. Accessed 07/07/2014. http://ti-defence.org/what-we-do/235
House of Commons Committee on Arms Export Control. “First Report: Scrutiny of Arms Exports and Arms Control”, 17/07/2013. Accessed 08/07/2014. http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmquad/205/205.pdf
House of Commons International Development Select Committee. “Financial Crime and Development: Eleventh Report of the Session 2010-12”. 15/11/2011. Accessed 08/07/2014. http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmintdev/847/847.pdf
Telephone interview with a CSO member of staff, 04/07/2014.
HM Government. &quoute;UK Anti Corruption Plan.&quoute; December 2014. Accessed 09/09/2015.
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/388894/UKantiCorruptionPlan.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: The government has since published its &quoute;Anti-Corruption Plan&quoute; which includes the following actions for Defence: MoD to respond to Transparency International recommendations (by March 2015); MoD to implement training on the Bribery Act for MoD personnel (from August 2014); and MoD to implement the package of anti- corruption activities (by February 2015). Recommendations published in March 2014 included understanding the extent of the problem, providing additional training for staff and strengthening whistle-blower protection.

Furthermore, following commitments made at the Wales Summit, the MoD is now subjecting itself to the NATO Building Integrity process and has employed a civil society NGO - Public Concern at Work - as one available channel of reporting identified in its updated whistle-blowing policy (published internally) on 31 March 2014; it is due to be reviewed in April 2015 (this was ahead of the publication of a PAC report on the effectiveness of whistle-blowing policy across various government departments, including the MoD).

MOD Internal Audit and various subordinate organisations (DCDC, UKDA, HQ ARRC) have also been in contact with TI, contributing to the drafting of &quoute;Corruption Threats and International Missions&quoute; and including TACC components in Joint Staff College programmes and exercise scenarios. TI DSP experts have been invited to be involved, alongside other NGOs, in major exercises (e.g. ARRCADE FUSION 2013 and 2014).

Suggested score: 3

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: The MOD believes the score should be raised to a 3.

As part of the review of the MOD’s Whistleblowing and Raising a Concern Policy, the MOD consulted with Public Concern at Work, the whistleblowing charity.

Transparency International was involved in the Ministry of Justice consultations relating to the Bribery Act.

The Home Office will be publishing an Anti Corruption Plan in December 2014, which outlines the Government responses to countering corruption. The report states that &quoute;Cabinet Office to work with government departments, civil society organisations and academics to identify data held by the Government which could be published to improve transparency and reduce opportunities for corruption&quoute;. The Plan further states that &quoute;Cabinet Office to arrange a regular forum for civil society and business leaders to engage with the Government on corruption and bribery issues&quoute;

Suggested score: 3

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Not Qualified

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

05.
score
4

Has the country signed up to international anti-corruption instruments such as, but not exclusively or necessarily, UNCAC and the OECD Convention? (In your answer, please specify which.)

Researcher4085: The UK is a signatory to the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transaction. The convention was ratified in 1998 and came into force in 1999 while legislation implementing it (Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act) was passed in 2002. The UK has also passed the Bribery Act to implement these anti-corruption principles.

The UK signed the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) in 2003 and ratified it in 2006. According to the OECD, UK law became fully compliant with the convention when the Criminal Justice (International Cooperation) Act 1990 (Enforcement of Overseas Forfeiture Orders) Order 2005 and the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (External Requests and Orders) Order 2005 came into effect in 2006.

The UK is also a signatory to the Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption. It was ratified in 2003 and came into force in 2004 while the Additional Protocol came into force in 2005.
The Council of Europe monitors compliance with the convention through two bodies, the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) and the Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism (MONEYVAL). Neither have published monitoring and evaluation reports on the UK so evidence of this instrument compliance is limited, however, GRECO's 2013 report on Parliament, judiciary and prosecutors is broadly positive. The UK is a member of the Anti-Corruption Working Group of the G20, which was formed after the 2010 adoption of the first Anti Corruption Action Plan in Seoul.&quoute;

COMMENTS -+

OECD. 'OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions: Ratification Status as of 8 April 2014'. Visited on 06/09/2014.
http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/WGBRatificationStatus_May2014.pdf
OECD. 'OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions'. http://blog.internationalpractice.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/Convention-on-Combating-Bribery-of-Foreign-Public-Officials-in-International-Business-Transactions-Treaty-Doc.-105-43.pdf
OECD. 'Steps taken to implement and enforce the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transaction'. Visited on 06/09/2014.
http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/anti-briberyconvention/UnitedKingdom_StepsTaken_March2014.pdf
UNODC. 'United Nations Convention against Corruption Signature and Ratification Status as of 2 April 2014'. Visited on 06/09/2014. https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/signatories.html
UNODC. 'United Nations Convention against Corruption'. Visited on 06/09/2014.
https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/index.html
Council of Europe 'GRECO Members and Observers'. Visited on 06/09/2014. http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/general/members_en.asp
Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption 1999 and Additional Protocol to the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption 2003. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/273305/6958.pdf
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/173.htm
OECD. 'Seoul, Korea 2010'. Visited on 06/09/2014. http://www.oecd.org/g20/meetings/seoul/
Council of Europe, Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism (MONEYVAL). Evaluation Reports. (Accessed 19/10/12)
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/moneyval/Evaluations/Evaluation_reports_en.asp
Group of States Against Corruption, Corruption prevention in respect of members of Parliament, judges and prosecutors, 19/10/2012. (Accessed 19/10/12)
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/round4/GrecoEval4(2012)2_UnitedKingdom_EN.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

06.
score
4

Is there evidence of regular, active public debate on issues of defence? If yes, does the government participate in this debate?

Researcher4085: Public debate on defence is conducted through universities, think tanks and the media. University departments such as King's College Centre for Defence Studies (CFS) and the Department for War Studies contribute to academic and public policy research debates while the former also provides corporate consultancy. Other academic defence and security research centres include Exeter's Security and Strategy Institute (SSI) and Warwick's International Relations and Security programme. Senior academics at all of these universities have close and detailed dialogues with public sector defence bodies and the armed forces. For example, King's College CFS Director John Gearson was seconded to the House of Commons as principal advisor to the Defence Committee for five years (2002-2007). Exeter's SSI Director Sir Paul Newton was spent 38 years in the UK Army rising to rank of General before he left to found the institute in 2012. Warwick's Professor Stuart Croft has advised the FCO and DFID on radicalisation and security challenges. This institutional proximity shows that the UK academia can influence defence debates. These universities host regular debates and conferences and contribute to research on defence issues.

Defence think tanks host debates that bring together stakeholders from the armed forces, MPs, the civil service and the private sector. For example, at the time of research in June 2014 the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) hosted a public lecture on Japan's security policy by Vice Admiral Toshiyuki Ito, the Oxford Research Group hosted a conversation with Lord John Alderdice (negotiator of the 1998 Belfast Agreement with Northern Ireland), and the International Institute for Strategic Studies convened a discussion on the 'Changing International Order' with Dr Andrew Murrison MP, the Minister for International Security Strategy.

The UK news media reports on defence policy issues frequently and has also helped to reveal several reported scandals in the defence and security sector. These include alleged corruption in the BAE Al Yamamah deal, cash-for-access lobbying offered by retired senior officers and of course GCHQ's role in the NSA PRISM surveillance programme. The government's response to these reports has been mixed.

COMMENTS -+

King's College Center for Defence Studies, &quoute;Department of War Studies&quoute;. Visited on 10/06/2014.
http://www.kcl.ac.uk/sspp/departments/warstudies/research/groups/cds/index.aspx
http://www.kcl.ac.uk/sspp/departments/warstudies/index.aspx
King's College Center for Defence Studies, &quoute;Professor John Gearson biography&quoute;. Visited on 10/06/2014.
http://www.kcl.ac.uk/sspp/departments/warstudies/people/professors/gearson.aspx
Exeter University, &quoute;Security and Strategy Institute&quoute;. Visited on 10/06/2014. http://www.exeter.ac.uk/strategy/
Exeter University, &quoute;Biography of Sir Paul Newton&quoute;. Visited on 10/06/2014. http://www.exeter.ac.uk/strategy/people/paulnewton/
Warwick University's International Relations and Security programmes and Stuart Croft's key achivements. Visited on 10/06/2014.
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/pais/research/ipss/
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/pais/research/ipss/researchlinks/
Royal United Services Insitute. 'Japan’s Security Policy: A Proactive Contribution to Peace Based on the Principle of International Co-operation'. Visited on 10/06/2014.
https://www.rusi.org/events/ref:E5395B7928E117/#.U5bUxpRdUi4
Oxford Research Group 'Gabrielle Rifkind & Lord John Alderdice 'In Conversation'. Visited on 10/06/2014.
http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/publications/event/gabrielle_rifkind_lord_john_alderdice_conversation
IISS. 'The Changing International Order and NATO'. Visited on 10/06/2014.
http://www.iiss.org/en/events/events-s-calendar/the-changing-international-order-and-nato-7b7f
Kim Sengupta, &quoute;Hammond: I will ban military chiefs who break lobbying rules&quoute;, The Independent, 15/10/2012, accessed on 10/06/2014.
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/hammond-i-will-ban-military-chiefs-who-break-lobbying-rules-8211014.html

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: A further example is the annual Chief of Defence Staff lecture to RUSI, most recently the 14th on 17December 2014 (https://www.rusi.org/events/ref:E545211393622E#.VWYHgEYWt1A).

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

07.
score
3

Does the country have an openly stated and actively implemented anti-corruption policy for the defence sector?

Researcher4085: The Bribery Act and the Fraud Act together form a strong anti-corruption policy although this does not take into account the nuances of problems faced in the defence sector. The Bribery Act 2010 makes it illegal for companies to pay bribes to public and private sector employees in the UK and to foreign public officials abroad. Since its implementation in 2011, three convictions have been brought while another nine individuals are facing charges. The National Crime Agency also arrested 13 people in April 2014 on suspicion of bribery and money laundering. The magazine The Lawyer has commented on these figures and the Act’s implementation: “Fundamentally, this most recent set of prosecutions shows that enforcement of the act continues apace.” The UK has issued guidance for organisations to help them achieve full compliance with the act.

The Bribery Act does not cover fraud, which is dealt with in the Fraud Act 2006. In a post-legislative assessment of the Fraud Act conducted by the Ministry of Justice, the Crown Prosecution Service stated that the Fraud Act is a success that has simplified cases of Fraud and led to effective and diverse prosecutions. Corruption is legislated in several longstanding laws: the Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act 1889 and the Prevention of Corruption Act 1906, as amended by the Prevention of Corruption Act 1916.

The UK national Anti Corruption plan was published by the government on 18 December 2014, which includes a specific section on defence. It refers to the establishment of an &quoute;MOD Fraud Defence Board to examine fraud and corruption issues and is structured through a framework consisting of: prevention, risk, awareness, detection and enforcement&quoute;. As part of this Plan, Bribery Act training for Defence personnel is now taking place.

The MoD and Armed Forces do not have anti-corruption policies specific to the defence sector. Internal MoD guidance states that the department has a policy on fraud, theft, corruption, bribery and irregularity, document DIN 2010DIN05- 044. This has been made public after a Freedom of Information request, but there is no evidence of its implementation.

Comment to Government Reviewer: the question asks about &quoute;openly stated and actively implemented anti-corruption policy&quoute;. Your response does not indicate how the agencies in question tackle anti-corruption issues or whether they have policies in place. The MoD policy document only partially covers both corruption issues and the defence sector. Score maintained.

Comment to Transparency International UK Chapter Reviewer: Agreed. Comment updated.

COMMENTS -+

Bribery Act 2010. http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/23/contents
“From Kick-off to Kick-back: the latest Bribery Act prosecutions”, The Lawyer, 09/04/2014. Accessed 04/07/2014. http://www.thelawyer.com/from-kick-off-to-kick-back-the-latest-bribery-act-prosecutions/3019137.article
Ministry of Justice. &quoute;Bribery Act 2010 guidance&quoute;, 11/12/2012. Accessed 04/07/2014. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/bribery-act-2010-guidance
“The Evolving Laws on Bribery and Corruption in England and Wales”, Law Now, 05/02/2013. Accessed 04/07/2014. http://www.law-now.com/law-now/2009/anticorruptionevolvinglaws?cmckreg=true
Ministry of Justice. “Post-legislative assessment of the Fraud Act 2006 Memorandum to the Justice Select Committee. June 2012. Accessed 04/07/2014. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/217280/post-legislative-assessment-fraud-act-2006.pdf
HM Government. UK Anti-Corruption Plan. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-anti-corruption-plan. Accessed 28/09/2015.
Ministry of Defence. &quoute;Ministry of Defence Policy: Fraud, Theft, Bribery, Corruption, Irregularity and Waste&quoute;. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/367144/FOI2014_05558_MOD_policy_about_bribery_or_financial_irregularity.pdf. Accessed 28/09/2015.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Update: The UK national Anti Corruption plan was published by the government on 18 December 2014, which includes a specific section on defence (https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-anti-corruption-plan)

It refers to the establishment of an &quoute;MOD Fraud Defence Board to examine fraud and corruption issues and is structured through a framework consisting of: prevention, risk, awareness, detection and enforcement&quoute;. As part of this Plan, Bribery Act training for Defence personnel is now taking place.

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: The score should be 4.

The United Kingdom (UK) has a range of agencies involved in the law enforcement response to corruption including;
•tNational Crime Agency (NCA) which oversees the law enforcement response to bribery and corruption;
•tSerious Fraud Office (SFO) which leads on serious or complex and overseas cases of bribery and corruption;
•tRegional Organised Crime Units which investigate domestic corruption cases;
•tLocal Police Forces which investigate domestic corruption cases;
•tPolice Scotland and the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) which investigate domestic corruption cases;
•tCrown Prosecution Service (CPS) which advised on investigations and conducts all relevant prosecutions, other than those brought by the SFO; and
•tFinancial regulators such as the Financial Conduct Authority.

The Government will publish its UK Anti-Corruption Plan later this year, setting out the range of actions that the Government is taking to tackle corruption both in the UK and overseas.

The Ministry of Defence has policy on Fraud, Theft, Bribery, Corruption, Irregularity and Waste, which has been made publicly available following a Freedom of Information Request:, for more information, please go to: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/367144/FOI2014_05558_MOD_policy_about_bribery_or_financial_irregularity.pdf

Source(s):
GOV.UK. Serious and Organised Crime Strategy. [Online] Available from: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/248645/Serious_and_Organised_Crime_Strategy.pdf [Accessed: 08th December 2014]
DFID’s Anti Corruption Strategy for Afghanistan: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/dfids-anti-corruption-strategy-for-afghanistan [Accessed: 11/12/2014]

Suggested score: 4

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Not Qualified

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

08.
score
3

Are there independent, well-resourced, and effective institutions within defence and security tasked with building integrity and countering corruption?

Researcher4085: The MoD's newly formed anti-corruption unit called Fraud Defence replaced Defence Fraud and Analysis unit in the year 2013-14. MoD reviewer (see below) states that the headcount and funding to this &quoute;reconstituted&quoute; unit has increased, but does not give specific figures. The reviewer states: &quoute;The focus of the new team has changed considerably from investigations to undertaking a more proactive role in the prevention area – by undertaking detailed assessments of the risk of fraud in the business areas and ensuring controls are in place to minimise the risk of fraud. Another key pillar is in the area of detection where greater use is made of data analytics. In addition to Fraud Defence, the Ministry of Defence Police and the Service Police undertake a proactive fraud investigation role. There are well resourced and effective functions within the MOD tasked with building integrity and countering corruption.

Governance is in place. For example, the MOD has a Fraud Defence Board which oversees the strategy to protect defence assets, finances and reputation from fraud, corruption and theft. The Board is chaired by the Director General of Finance and consists of 2* Directors of Finance and HR across MOD. The Ministry of Defence Police is represented at the Board by an Assistant Chief Constable. Following a Board assessment, and if required, fraud (which also includes bribery and corruption) risks can be reported and raised to the Defence Board. In addition, Fraud Defence reports to the Defence Audit Committee.

MoD reviewer states the Fraud Defence is independent of management: &quoute;The Head of Fraud Defence has unfettered direct access to the Chair of the Defence Audit Committee should the Head of Fraud Defence deem this necessary. The Fraud Defence Charter provides it with necessary authority to operate as an independent unit. Members of Fraud Defence are authorised to have full, free and unrestricted access to all functions, premises, assets, personnel, records, operations and other documentation and information that the Head of Fraud Defence considers necessary to enable the team to meet its responsibilities. This includes any documents relevant to MOD held by its contractors. All staff and management (civilian or military) are obliged to render any and all assistance to Fraud Defence at all times and particularly during enquiries and fraud reviews.&quoute;

The MoD's integrity building measures include participation in NATO's Building Stability Overseas Strategy, which aims to reduce corruption by raising awareness of risks, promoting good governance and providing practical tools. While the scheme is independent of the MoD, the UK is a voluntary participant so the scheme's effectiveness should be considered limited as it cannot, for example, compel policy change, effect audits or create any binding action.

Comment to Government Reviewer: Comments updated to reflect your input and information published in 2014 annual report. Score is changed from 2 to 3. There is insufficient evidence of implementation (at this stage) to award a 4. The MoD might consider disclosing at least part of the documents it references to promote better understanding of its implementation and effectiveness. For example, it states the headcount and funding has increased but provides no figures.

COMMENTS -+

MoD Police Committee Annual Report 2012-2013, paragraph 28. Accessed 10/06/2014.
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/237712/mod_police_committee_20_13.pdf
Press Release, “Building integrity plays a “critical role” in conflict prevention says UK expert”, UK Joint Delegation to NATO, 21 November 2013. Accessed 10/06/2014.
https://www.gov.uk/government/world-location-news/building-integrity-plays-a-critical-role-in-conflict-prevention-says-uk-expert-official
MoD Police Committee Meeting: Minutes, 7 January 2013, Agenda Item 2, paragraphs 4-7. Accessed 10/06/2014.
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/246978/modpcmins_20121212.pdf
Pyman, M. and Bock, T. &quoute;Building Integrity in UK Defence&quoute;, Transparency International, March 2014.
http://www.transparency.org.uk/component/cckjseblod/?task=download&file=publication_file&id=889

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: There have been developments during the last part of 2014: the adoption of a whistle-blowing policy, adoption of the NATO BI process following the Wales Summit and the publication of the UK Anti-Corruptino Plan with its explicit obligations on Defence - including to respond to the &quoute;Building Integrity in Defence&quoute; report.

Suggested score: 3

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: The MOD believes this score is a 4.

The Assessor's statement is factually incorrect and does not reflect the arrangements at MOD.

MOD has not created a new unit. It has reconstituted the previous unit which was called Defence Fraud Analysis Unit (DFAU) to a new organisation called Fraud Defence. In 2012 MOD undertook a review of Fraud Management capability using one of the big four accountancy firms and as a result has increased its investment in this area – the headcount of the unit was increased and a number of specialists recruited externally including the appointment of a senior 1* to lead the Fraud unit. The focus of the new team has changed considerably from investigations to undertaking a more proactive role in the prevention area – by undertaking detailed assessments of the risk of fraud in the business areas and ensuring controls are in place in minimise the risk of fraud. Another key pillar is in the area of detection where greater use if made of data analytics. In addition to Fraud Defence the Ministry of Defence Police and the Service Police undertaken a proactive fraud investigation role. There are well resourced and effective functions within MOD tasked with building integrity and countering corruption.

Governance is in place. For example, the MOD has a Fraud Defence Board which oversees the strategy to protect defence assets, finances and reputation from fraud, corruption and theft. The Board is chaired by the Director General of Finance and consists of 2* Directors of Finance and HR across MOD. The Ministry of Defence Police is represented at the Board by an Assistance Chief Constable. Following a Board assessment, and if required, fraud (which also includes bribery and corruption) risks can be reported and raised to the Defence Board.

In addition, Fraud Defence reports to the Defence Audit Committee.

The MOD has Fraud Focal Point across each Top Level Budget and Arm’s Length Bodies as part of an extensive communications plan to deliver fraud awareness across MOD. In addition, the MOD has introduced a Corporate Standards review to help building integrity amongst MOD military and civilian staff.

The Fraud Defence is independent of management:

-- The Head of Fraud Defence has unfettered direct access to the Chair of the Defence Audit Committee should the Head of Fraud Defence deem this necessary.

-- The Fraud Defence Charter provides it with necessary authority to operate as an independent unit. Members of Fraud Defence are authorised to have full, free and unrestricted access to all functions, premises, assets, personnel, records, operations and other documentation and information that the Head of Fraud Defence considers necessary to enable the team to meet its responsibilities. This includes any documents relevant to MOD held by its contractors.

-- All staff and management (civilian or military) are obliged to render any and all assistance to Fraud Defence at all times and particularly during enquiries and fraud reviews.

Suggested score: 4

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Not Qualified

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

09.
score
3

Does the public trust the institutions of defence and security to tackle the issue of bribery and corruption in their establishments?

Researcher4085: Data indicates that the British public is generally mistrustful of the government and politicians and believes corruption is widespread. A 2014 Eurobarometer report on corruption shows that Europeans perceive corruption to be generally present across all industries and sectors, and that 64% of UK citizens think corruption is widespread in the country (as compared to the European average of 74%). Polls also show public trust in UK government and politics is low. 18% of the UK public trust in politicians to tell the truth, as polled by YouGov, lower than any other profession in 2013. Whilst YouGov no longer polls public trust in government, historical data shows this was 2-3% higher than trust in politicians for the five previous versions of the survey. There is no polling data on corruption mechanisms of defence and security institutions.

A string of corruption and conflict of interest scandals in the defence and security sector reported in the media have compounded the public's distrust. These include the 'Generals for hire' scandal in 2012, the fiasco around a Defence Minister and his/her associate and four arrests in what was described as the biggest armed forces corruption probe in history. These stories were published against a broader background of mistrust generated by the allegations around the Al Yamamah scandal and the revelations over the role of two major companies in the lead up to the Iraq war.

According to the Global Corruption Barometer (2013), 17% of respondents felt that the military was corrupt/extremely corrupt. This was the same as the score for Denmark (17%), slightly lower than Norway (16%) and better than France (19%), Switzerland (23%) and Germany (25%).

Score 3 has been selected given a relatively high level of trust in the military as can be seen in Global Corruption Barometer data balanced by the scandals mentioned above.

Response to all reviewers: comment updated using Global Corruption Barometer data and score changed from 1 to 3.

Response to Government Reviewer: the original comments note that there are no specific YouGov figures for defence institutions, but the figures are still helpful in understanding public trust. The Eurobarometer survey statistics you cite are not relevant to public opinion. They refer to those working in business who have experience of corruption. The paragraph on legal frameworks is also not relevant. The case studies are a few years old but this is how reputations are forged. The MOD survey cited asks questions under the heading of &quoute;Favourability&quoute; and is focused on the Armed Forces (as opposed to the MoD which scores less well on other criteria later in the survey). I question the direct relevance of the cited statistic to corruption, on which the Eurobarometer survey is exclusively focused and designed.

Response to Peer Reviewer 1: I question the relevance of this experience. Corruption can take many forms and the revolving door is an area of concern for conflicts of interest but the issue is much wider. In any event, ACOBA which 'regulates' business appointments has no legal power or force. So the 'rules 'may be tight, but it is all ultimately advice which has no statutory underpinning.

Response to peer reviewer 2: I am not convinced that the BSAS asks questions relevant to this subject. This question asks about trust in institutions and corruption in establishments. Public esteem for service men and women is certainly high but this does not apply at an institutional level. As the conclusion states:

&quoute;High public esteem for the Armed Forces is, as we have seen, in considerable contrast to the opposition that many people express towards the 2003-2009 deployment of troops in Iraq and, to a lesser degree, the continuing mission in Afghanistan. Given the extent of people's objections to these military campaigns, a striking feature of our survey findings is the public's overwhelming support for the Armed Service personnel who have served in Iraq and Afghanistan. This subtlety in public thinking and opinion about the Armed Forces and their deployment in specific military operations has not been sufficiently acknowledged previously. People clearly find little difficulty in separating the politics of military deployments from attitudes towards the service men and women who take part in them.&quoute;

COMMENTS -+

&quoute;EU Anti-Corruption Report 2014 Factsheet”. http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/organized-crime-and-human-trafficking/corruption/anti-corruption-report/docs/2014_acr_united_kingdom_factsheet_en.pdf
Ipsos MORI. “Trust in Professions” polling data. Accessed on 10/06/2014. http://www.ipsos-mori.com/researchpublications/researcharchive/15/Trust-in-Professions.aspx?view=wide
Ian Drury, “Generals 'for hire' scandal: Former top brass filmed discussing how to set up huge arms deals with the MoD”, The Daily Mail, 14/10/2012. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2217402/Generals-hire-scandal-ex-military-chiefs-filmed-boasting-help-arms-firms-win-huge-defence-deals.html
James Kirkup, “Liam Fox and Adam Werritty: an unlikely friendship”, The Daily Telegraph. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/mps-expenses/conservative-mps-expenses/8817267/Liam-Fox-and-Adam-Werritty-an-unlikely-friendship.html
Chris Hughes, “Four arrests in Armed Forces corruption probe”, Daily Mirror, 12/01/2012. http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/four-arrests-in-armed-forces-corruption-158282
David Leigh and Rob Evans, “The BAE files”, The Guardian, 21/10/2010. http://www.theguardian.com/world/bae
Paul Bignell, “Secret memos expose link between oil firms and invasion of Iraq”, The Independent, 19/04/2011. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/secret-memos-expose-link-between-oil-firms-and-invasion-of-iraq-2269610.html&quoute;

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: The researcher has ignored key data from the British Social Attitudes Survey 2012 (s/he could have also consulted earlier versions of the same survey to get similar findings). Link to survey responses relating to armed forces here: http://bsa-29.natcen.ac.uk/read-the-report/armed-forces/introduction.aspx

Researcher should follow right tab relating to sections of the survey relating the armed forces to get a full picture of public opinion, including level of public support for defence spending.

Suggested score: 3

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Not Qualified

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: We believe the score should be a 4.

We dispute the Assessor’s findings here. The example about trust in politicians that is mentioned in the original answer has nothing to do with the defence sector. Moreover, there are some very strong positives in the Eurobarometer report that have been completely ignored. The following segments from the report should have been raised:

The UK has the EU’s lowest proportion of respondents who say they have been asked to expected to pay a bribe over the previous 12 months (0%), or that they know someone who has taken bribes (7%)
15% of respondents consider corruption to be a problem of their company when doing business in the UK. The EU average is 43%. 46% of the respondents think corruption is widespread in the UK. The EU average is 75%.
It is also worth noting that the UK has had laws against corruption since the 19th century. The Bribery Act 2010 is considered stringent as it exceeded the requirements of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. There is effective cooperation among the Committee on Standards in Public Life, the Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards, the adviser on Ministerial Interests, and the Advisory Committee on Business Appointments. Furthermore, in 2013, UK law enforcement mechanisms were deemed adequate and in some way exemplary for the purposes of the United Nations Convention against Corruption. The UK’s record in prosecuting foreign bribery has evolved over time.

The examples stated by the Assessor that relate to corruption in defence and security sector are old cases.

The MOD produces an “MOD and Armed Forces Reputation Survey: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/326827/20140630-mod-reputation-survey-spring-2014.pdf
This survey shows that the public opinion strongly/tend to agree that the MOD and UK Armed Forces give the tax payer value for money.

We have demonstrated commitment that bribery and corruption in the MOD is not acceptable:
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-north-east-orkney-shetland-27395399

Suggested score: 4

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: I agree that the public - and press - disapprove of retiring military and civil servants getting jobs on retirement in the defence industry (I recall the furore you cite in your references). The rules on this are now very tight (as I know from my experience working with a defence company). But I find it very difficult to accept that people widely believe that the defence establishment is indifferent to corruption (which is what a score of 1 means). I think your score may reflect the well-known mistrust of government and politicans rather than an attitude specific to defence or even more generally to civil servants and the military. Civil servants may be held in contempt for many things these days, but not, surely, for corruption. This is a difficult judgement to document, of course, but then so is the assessor's. I would go, cautiously, for 2.

Suggested score: 2

Peer Reviewer-+

10.
score
3

Are there regular assessments by the defence ministry or another government agency of the areas of greatest corruption risk for ministry and armed forces personnel, and do they put in place measures for mitigating such risks?

Researcher4085: The UK Anti-Corruption Plan states that the MoD will conduct a departmental corruption risk assessment. It states: &quoute;The MOD Fraud Defence Board has been established to examine fraud and corruption issues and is structured through a framework consisting of: prevention, risk, awareness, detection and enforcement. The Board is currently overseeing the delivery of a package of anti-corruption activities including: • A MoD–wide corruption risk assessment. • Piloting a corruption awareness programme with the Chartered Institute of Purchasing and Supply and the Crown Commercial Service. • Awareness-raising sessions to all new recruits on fraud and corruption. • Implementing a new whistle blowing policy following a review by the charity Public Concern at Work&quoute;. No details of such a risk assessment are available.

MoD reviewer (see below) adds that lots of risk assessment procedures are in place. Reviewer states: &quoute;The MoD is committed to conduct regular corruption risk assessments and applies a corruption risk management culture. Throughout 2014, the MOD’s Fraud Defence team have conducted several Fraud (which include bribery, corruption and theft) Risk Identification & Analysis workshops across the military and civilian commands (Top Level Budgets (TLBs) and Arms Length Bodies (ALB). Risks are assessed by the staff at TLBs and ALBs, independent assessors, Fraud Defence and Defence Internal Audit. Risks are placed in a Fraud Risk Register for each TLB and ALB. The Register is owned and monitored (and therefore, regularly assessed) by their TLB/ALB with Fraud Defence in support.&quoute;

Comment to all reviewers: comments and sources updated to include information that was unpublished at time of initial research (Anti Corruption Plan) and government reviewer comments (valuable information that was not in the public domain). Score changed to 3.

COMMENTS -+

MoD Police Committee Annual Report 2012-2013, paragraph 28. Accessed 10/06/2014. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/237712/mod_police_committee_20_13.pdf
MoD Police Committee Meeting: Minutes, 7 January 2013, Agenda Item 2, paragraphs 4-7. Accessed 10/06/2014. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/246978/modpcmins_20121212.pdf
HM Government. UK Anti-Corruption Plan. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-anti-corruption-plan. Accessed 28/09/2015.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: Again, ignores important aspects. With regard to spending - on which this commentary seems to focus - SIPRI rightly acknowledges: 'In the United Kingdom, the National Audit Office (NAO) similarly reports continually highlight failures in procurement processes and escalating delays and overruns.' (source: http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/transparency).

In terms of bribery, the 2010 Bribery Act covers the armed forces - although assessments may not take place regularly. See http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-13983256 and http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200910/ldbills/003/en/10003x-a.htm

Suggested score: 2

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: Update: The 18 December 2014 UK National Anti Corruption Plan states that the Home office will produce a risk assessment template that can be used by government departments and further states that the MOD Fraud Defence Board will oversee an MOD wide risk assessment https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/388894/UKantiCorruptionPlan.pdf

By the time the index is published, the MOD will have participated in the NATO BI process and the UK Anti-Corruption Plan incorporated actions for defence. The Public Accounts committee looked explicitly at Whistle-blowing policies and practice across a number of departments, including the MOD, in its 2014 Report and the department took action to address concerns, by involving Public Concern at Work.

Suggested score: 2

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: The score should be a 3.

The MOD is committed to conduct regular corruption risk assessments and applies a corruption risk management culture. Throughout 2014, the MOD’s Fraud Defence team have conducted several Fraud (which include bribery, corruption and theft) Risk Identification & Analysis workshops across the military and civilian commands (Top Level Budgets (TLBs) and Arms Length Bodies (ALB).

Risks are assessed by the staff at TLBs and ALBs, independent assessors, Fraud Defence and Defence Internal Audit. Risks are placed in a Fraud Risk Register for each TLB and ALB. The Register is owned and monitored (and therefore, regularly assessed) by their TLB/ALB with Fraud Defence in support.

Suggested score: 3

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Not Qualified

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

11.
score
4

Does the country have a process for acquisition planning that involves clear oversight, and is it publicly available?

Researcher4085: The UK’s acquisition planning is conducted within clear frameworks such as the Defence Equipment Plan 2012-2022 and the Defence Materiel Strategy and overseen by Defence Equipment and Support (DE&S) Plus. The Acquisition Operating Framework provides resources and guidance to civil servants on how to conduct effective acquisition.

The MoD also publishes a clear overview document for MoD suppliers which collates information on the different acquisition processes, policies and regulation. This is called Defence Supplier Services.

Oversight of acquisition planning is provided by the Defence Select Committee, which reviewed procurement in 2010 and 2013 and is currently examining the collapse of the GOCO bidding process. The National Audit Office also reviews acquisition policy and has focused on major projects procurement in particular.

Comment to Government Reviewer and Peer Reviewer 1: Agreed. Comments and sources updated. Score changed to 4.

COMMENTS -+

Defence Reform Act 2014. http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2014/20/contents/enacted
MoD. “Equipment Plan 2012”. Accessed 04/07/2014. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/70258/Defence_Equipment_Plan_2012_20130130.pdf
MoD, “Acquisition Operating Framework”. 17/03/2014. Accessed 04/07/2014. https://www.gov.uk/acquisition-operating-framework#contents-of-the-aof
National Audit Office, “Ministry of Defence: Equipment plan 2012-2022”. January 2013. Accessed 04/07/2014. http://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/MOD-equipment-plan-full-report.pdf
House of Commons Defence Select Committee. “Defence Acquisition: Seventh Report of the Session 2012-2013”. http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmdfence/9/9.pdf
House of Commons Defence Select Committee. “Defence Materiel Strategy > Inquiry in progress”. Last updated 03/04/2014. Accessed 04/07/2014. http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/defence-committee/inquiries/parliament-2010/the-defence-materiel-strategy/
MoD. &quoute;Defence Supplier Services&quoute;. Accessed 08/09/2015
http://www.contracts.mod.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/s2mod21_proof.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: We believe the score should be 4. Further more, the example in the second half of the Assessor’s answer is old and irrelevant.

We have a process for acquisition planning that involves clear oversight and it is all publicly available via Defence Contracts Online. Selling to the MOD – Edition 21. [Online] Available from: http://www.contracts.mod.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/s2mod21_proof.pdf

An indicative process for competitive and non-competitive acquisition is detailed below

For Competitive Acquisition:
- Identify need;
- Issue Request for Information or Proposal;
- Develop (i.e. strategies / specification / contract procedures / tender evaluation criteria);
- Advertise requirement;
- Select tenderers (PQQs);
- Invite tenderers (tender / contract documentation complete);
- Receive tenders (Tender Board)
- Clarify and assess tenders;
- Contract approval;
- Award contract;
- Debrief tenders;
- Publish award notice;
- Manage contract.

Non-Competitive Acquisition:
- Identify need;
- Issue Request for Information or Proposal;
- Develop (i.e. strategies / specification / contract procedures / tender evaluation criteria);
- Advertise sole-source decision;
- Issue Invitation to Negotiate to supplier (tender / contract documentation complete);
- Receive tender (Commercial Officer);
- Assess tender and negotiate with supplier;
- Award contract;
- Publish award notice;
- Manage contract.

Suggested score: 4

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: I would give this a score of four. With respect, I think the lower score that the assessor gave may have confused the controversial nature of the policy (as reflected in the news report references cited) with the clarity, public availability and oversight of the process, all of which, I believe, are present in abundance. There has been intense public debate about defence acquisition but that is consistent with openness and scrutiny.

Suggested score: 4

Peer Reviewer-+

12.
score
4

Is the defence budget transparent, showing key items of expenditure? This would include comprehensive information on military R&D, training, construction, personnel expenditures, acquisitions, disposal of assets, and maintenance.

Researcher4085: The UK budget process is highly transparent and the seven key budget documents are all published. The MoD must submit estimates of its Departmental Expenditure Limits which are then scrutinised by Parliament before being approved. The majority of public bodies in the UK are required to file resource accounts under the Government Resources and Accounts Act 2000 and the MoD is no exception. Spending on items such as personnel, research and development, depreciation, impairments, conflict pool, infrastructure, among others are provided in the accounts. Accounts contain detailed accounting information. Further information is available in MoD statistical bulletins.

COMMENTS -+

Government Resources and Accounts Act 2000. http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/20/contents
UK Government &quoute;Defence departmental resources: 2013&quoute;, p54 (itemised spending). Accessed on 10/06/2014. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/defence-departmental-resources-2013
Open Budget Index 2012. &quoute;United Kingdom&quoute;. Accessed on 10/06/2014. http://internationalbudget.org/wp-content/uploads/OBI2012-UnitedKingdomCS-English.pdf
MoD. Annual Statistical Series 1 Finance Bulletin 1.03 Departmental Resources 2013. Accessed on 10/06/2014. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/279994/2013.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

12A.
score
4

Is there a legislative committee (or other appropriate body) responsible for defence budget scrutiny and analysis in an effective way, and is this body provided with detailed, extensive, and timely information on the defence budget?

Researcher4085: The Defence Committee scrutinises the expenditure, administration and policy of the MoD and its Arms Length Bodies (ALBs). It scrutinises the MoD's budgetary estimates, which are provided in its Main Supply Estimates. The Defence Committee has the necessary access to information to conduct effective scrutiny. It has the power to summon witnesses and demand documents as it sees fit. The Defence Committee provides a formal response to the Main Supply Estimates and makes conclusions and recommendations but these are not binding on the department. The Government is not obliged to follow courses of action suggested by the Defence Committee on the subject of budget or anything else, however its response to the Committee's 2013 scrutiny is indicative of open and responsible dialogue between the two parties.

There is evidence that the government occasionally overrules the Defence Select Committee. For example, it has twice rejected the recommendation to introduce a target to limit supplementary budget estimates for Armed Forces Retired Pay to 5% of the requested amount in its Main Supply Estimates. This is evidenced in its responses to the Committee’s scrutiny of it’s Main Supply Estimates for 2012-13 and 2013-14.

The National Audit Office can also conduct investigations into the &quoute;economy, efficiency and effectiveness&quoute; with which a government department executes its functions and resources and can access documents from public authorities as necessary to conduct its investigation. It is sometimes asked by the Defence Committee to review the MoD's performance. The National Audit Office cannot make binding orders on the MoD or other authorities, simply recommendations. The MoD reviewer (see below) states: &quoute;The MOD have never rejected any NAO finding. On the contrary, the MOD, has signed up and agreed to every NAO report and their findings.&quoute;

Comment to Government Reviewer: comment updated to reference your statement that the MOD has signed up and agreed to every NAO recommendation. Score raised to 4.

COMMENTS -+

Parliament. “Defence Committee - role”. Accessed on 10/06/2014. http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/defence-committee/role/
National Audit Office. “About Us”. Accessed on 10/06/2014. http://www.nao.org.uk/about-us/
Her Majesty's Treasury. “Main Supply Estimates 2013-14 (Minstry of Defence)”. Accessed on 13/06/2014. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/197767/mod_mainsupplyestimates_201314.pdf
House of Commons Defence Committee “MoD Main Supply Estimates”. Accessed on 13/06/2014. http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmdfence/517/517.pdf
Government Response to the House of Commons Defence Committee “MoD Main Supply Estimates 2013-14”. Accessed on 13/06/2014. http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmdfence/670/670.pdf&quoute;
Government Response to the House of Commons Defence Committee “MoD Main Supply Estimates 2012-13”. Accessed 05/11/14).
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmdfence/607/607.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: The score should be 4.

The MOD have never rejected any NAO finding. On the contrary, the MOD, has signed up and agreed to every NAO report and their findings.

In addition, in the latest MOD Annual Accounts the Comptroller and Auditor General (C&AG) provides a report. In his report he states that the MOD “has concluded that, in order to complete its review and conclude on whether the contracts it currently holds meet the criteria of a lease under IAS 17, Leases, further management information and supplier engagement would be required. As disclosed in its Annual Report and Accounts, the Department has, in agreement with HM Treasury, decided not to obtain more detailed information on the grounds that obtaining this would not represent value for money.”

Furthermore, the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) ensures transparency and accountability in government financial operations. The PAC takes evidence from the MOD about their actions to NAO recommendations.

Suggested score: 4

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The way the criteria are framed means that to score full marks, there would have to be means by which Parliament could scrutinise every spending proposal in advance. This is not the way the British system works. There is however intense scrutiny afterwards, and governments are held to account politically for their performance.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

12B.
score
4

Is the approved defence budget made publicly available? In practice, can citizens, civil society, and the media obtain detailed information on the defence budget?

Researcher4085: The UK budget process is highly transparent and the seven key budget documents, as defined by the Open Budget Index, are all published. The Open Budget Index awards the UK a score of 88, the third highest score of the 100 countries it reviews, and more than double the average of 43. The MoD publishes its provisional budget in its Main Supply Estimates, which are then submitted to parliament for approval and published to the public. The MoD statistics hub provides access to proactively published statistics and gives contact information for specialist researchers.

The public can access further detailed budgetary information via the the Freedom of Information Act 2000 which provides a statutory right of access to all publicly held information. National security information is absolutely exempt from disclosure by virtue of Section 23 (Information supplied by or relating to bodies dealing with security matter), which is applicable to the SS, SIS, GCHQ among others, and Section 24 (National Security). Information on defence is exempt from disclosure by virtue of Section 26. This exemption is subject to a public interest test, however, and defence budget information can be reasonably shown to be in the public interest: numerous Information Rights Tribunals and findings in the Courts have demonstrated that disclosing information that furthers the accountability of the public purse is in the public interest.

Compliance with the FOIA is reasonably good in the MoD. 2013 data shows an 83% positive record for responding to requests within the statutory timeframe of 20 days. The MoD provided full responses to 64% of requests, partial responses to 13% and 23% were refused.

COMMENTS -+

Her Majesty's Treasury. &quoute;Main Supply Estimates 2013-14 (Minstry of Defence)&quoute;. Accessed on 13/06/2014.
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/197767/mod_mainsupplyestimates_201314.pdf
Freedom of Information Act 2000, sections. 23,24 and 26. http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/36/section/23
Ministry of Justice. 'Government FOI statistics'. Accessed on 13/06/2014. https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/government-foi-statistics
Ministry of Defence. &quoute;Statistics at MOD&quoute;. Accessed on 13/06/2014. https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/ministry-of-defence/about/statistics
Open Budget Survey, &quoute;Open Budget Index 2012 - United Kingdom&quoute;. http://internationalbudget.org/wp-content/uploads/OBI2012-UnitedKingdomCS-English.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

13.
score
3

Are sources of defence income other than from central government allocation (from equipment sales or property disposal, for example) published and scrutinised?

Researcher4085: The MoD publishes its sources of income and the amounts of money it receives from &quoute;other:&quoute; sources. This income is externally audited. However a lack of detail makes public scrutiny difficult.

The MoD publishes its annual income from other sources in its annual resource accounts. In 2012-2013 it was published in the following categories: &quoute;Provision of Defence Capability Receipts and other Income&quoute; and &quoute;Operations Receipts and other Income (page 52).&quoute; These categories are not particularly helpful and there is no further detail provided by the MoD as to the breakdown of these costs.

The MOD's sources of income are subject to independent audit by the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) - head of the National Audit Office - in accordance with the Government Financial Reporting Manual (FreM) which uses the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Section 8 of the CAG's audit of the MoD 2012-2013 accounts (page 122 of the MoD's annual resource accounts) detail the MoD's income in the following categories: &quoute;Rental income - property; Receipts - personnel; Receipts from the sale of fuel; Donated Assets; Receipts - supplies and services; Receipts - NATO/UN/US/Foreign Governments; Reverse tasking [receipts for invoiced goods and/or services supplied to the Trading Funds and Qinetiq Group plc by MOD]; Dividends and income from investment property; Other income&quoute;.

The final category &quoute;Other income&quoute; is the income from Arms Length Bodies (ALBs) and in 2012-2013 other income amounted to £241,454,000. Each of the MoD's ALBs is required to submit its own resource accounts that will detail income and expenditure. However, the ALBs are not named in the accounts so it is difficult for an external organisation to review this income.

The MoD has published a financial bulletin which details the sources of external income worth approximately £1.5 billion a year between 2005/6 and 2012/13 across nine categories.

Comment to Government Reviewer: detail in financial bulletin does provide additional detail. Comment and source updated. However it does not address the point in the comments about ALB income. Score maintained.

COMMENTS -+

Ministry of Defence. &quoute;Annual Report and Accounts 2012-2013&quoute; page 52. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/222874/MOD_AR13_clean.pdf
Ministry of Defence. &quoute;Annual Statistical Series 1 Finance Bulletin 1.03 Departmental Resources 2013&quoute;. Accessed 09/09/15
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/397351/Annual_statistical_series_1_finance_bulletin_1_03_departmental_reources_2013.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: We believe the score should be 4.

The MOD publish their annual report and accounts: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/381064/MOD_AR13-14_webversion.pdf

The MOD publish Financial Bulletins where sources of income is declared e.g.: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/279994/2013.pdf

Suggested score: 4

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The mark is right but I would put the criterion the other way round: the published accounts are not itemised in detail, but there may well be intense scrutiny of individual sales or property disposals. I recall on occasion in the 1980s when the Accounting Officer was pressed hard by the Public Accounts Committee about the disposal (as a gift) of a print worth £95 from the department's picture collection.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

14.
score
3

Is there an effective internal audit process for defence ministry expenditure (that is, for example, transparent, conducted by appropriately skilled individuals, and subject to parliamentary oversight)?

Researcher4085: Internal auditing is active in the MoD and there is a strategy in place to ensure that audits are effective, which is coordinated by a senior MoD committee. However, audit transparency is limited and as such there is limited evidence of their effectiveness and the parliamentary scrutiny they are subject to.

Internal audit strategy is developed by the MoD’s Defence Audit Committee (DAC). The DAC is a sub-committee of the Defence Board, which is chaired by the Secretary of State and whose nine members are drawn from across the executive, civil service and armed forces. The MoD’s internal auditing is conducted by the Defence Internal Audit (DIA) unit and by Audit Committees (or equivalents) of each of the 7 Top Level Budget (TLBs) Holders within the department. The DIA and TLBS submit reports frequently to the DAC.

There is evidence of limited transparency of MoD audits. The MoD’s annual report briefly describes the work undertaken of the DAC and DIA in its Governance Statement. Beyond this there is little publicly available information on the DAC, the DIA or the Audit Committees (or equivalents) of TLBs. For example, the MoD’s website’s corporate reports section contains only the DAC’s terms of reference and audit reports of equal pay in the armed forces, among 203 strategic, assurance and inquiry documents.

There is evidence that government takes the findings of internal auditors into account. For example, the 2012-2013 MoD annual report states that a DIA review of risk management has been crystallised into a two year implementation plan. The DAC, which oversees the DIA, terms of reference do not include requirements to lay reports of its work before parliament.

Comment to Government Reviewer and Transparency International UK Chapter Reviewer: a score of 4 requires internal audit to be &quoute; subject to parliamentary scrutiny, and there is clear evidence that its findings are acted upon by the government.&quoute; The MoD response discusses the audit process and demonstrates it has very high internal standards. But there is no evidence of parliamentary scrutiny or evidence that its findings are acted upon by the government. The report cited in detail is only partially relevant to the question as it only addresses internal audit function.

COMMENTS -+

Ministry of Defence. “Governance statement” in 'Ministry of Defence annual report and accounts 2012-2013', p81-89.
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/222874/MOD_AR13_clean.pdf
Defence Audit Committee. “Terms of Reference for the Defence Audit Committee” for March 2013. Accessed on 25/06/2013. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/224069/20130204_mar13_dac_tors.pdf
Ministry of Defence. “Corporate Reports”. Accessed on 25/06/2014. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications?departments%5B%5D=ministry-of-defence&publication_type=corporate-reports

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: The DAC is chaired by a Non-executive member of the Defence, is composed of other Non-Executive members and is attended by the Head of IA and NAO. In accordance with International Audit standards, the Chairman of the Committee works with the Accounting Officer and Head of Internal Audit to agree audit plans and provide assurance. This is replicated in the subordinate TLB and is all reported publically in the annual Corporate Report.

A more recent &quoute;Corporate Report&quoute; for 2013/14 was published in November 2014 and includes within the Governance Statement (pages 86 to 98) a great deal of material on the activities and effectiveness of the DAC (page 93) and Internal Audit (page 95/6) - including the opinion of the Head of IA of &quoute; Limited Assurance&quoute;. Included in this is a statement on the level of compliance with Internal Audit recommendations.

Suggested score: 4

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: We believe the score should be 4.

Context:
The internal audit profession in central government is focused on evaluating the management of key risks to and the continuous improvement to the delivery of effective public services and is a key source of independent insight and assurance for Accounting Officers, Audit Committees and boards. As the title “internal” implies the function is internal to the organisation and therefore not subject to Parliamentary oversight - it is the external audit function provided by the National Audit Office which is accountable to Parliament and subject to Parliament oversight.

The work of the internal audit is governed by Public Sector Internal Audit Standards.

The MOD internal audit function comprises of 97 in house staff and complies with the Public Sector Internal Audit Standards. There is an annual audit planning process which generates the annual audit plan which is approved by the Defence Audit Committee. The planning process takes into account Board risks, TLB risk and key operational risks by reference to the audit universe and developing the annual audit plan. Other factors considered are transformation changes and internal audit’s own assessment of risks. The internal audit function has relevant skills – in house staff are complemented by a co sourcing arrangements with PricewaterhouseCoopers (spend of £7m over the last three years) to bring in specialist skills. Another key element of the co sourcing arrangements is knowledge transfer to the in house team.

CIPFA have undertaken a review of financial management at MOD which includes an assessment of the internal audit function. The report dated June 2014 states:

1.1tThe Defence Internal Audit (DIA) has made significant improvement over the last three years initiating with the “Grimstone Proposal” for the future re-shaping of the service. The service has made good progress in implementing good practice standards and subjected itself to independent external assessment by PwC. This element of self- challenge further promoted improvement to the extent that the 2013 PwC Internal Audit Quality Assessment evaluated the service as “conforming overall with good practice standards.” Our evidence points to a significantly improved and effective Internal Audit service that provides an insightful assessment of assurance in some of the most complex areas within central government operations.

2.1tThe Defence Audit Committee meets quarterly and the Chair also convenes a meeting of the Chairs of TLB Audit Committees at least twice a year. Usual attendees include the Group Head of Defence Internal Audit, the Director General Finance or PUS and a representative from the National Audit Office (NAO). We understand that there is a continuing and effective relationship between each TLB Audit Committee and the Defence Audit Committee.

2.2tThe terms of reference of the Defence Audit Committee cover a wide range of Internal Control issues including:-

§tScrutinising the integrity and reliability of the risk and assurance frameworks;
§tDealing with issues raised by assurance providers, including TLB audit committees, Defence Internal Audit and National Audit Office;
§tAssessing the effectiveness of TLB Audit Committees;
§tInforming the content of the governance statement, including recommendations on individual control issues;
§tAssess accounting policies, the Accounts and Annual Report of the Department, including the process of the review of the accounts prior to submission for external audit, the level of errors identified and management letter of representation from the NAO;
§tAssess results of Defence Internal Audit work and adequacy of management response to issues raised by both Internal Audit and NAO; and
Assess the effectiveness of anti-fraud policies, whistleblowing, processes and arrangements for special investigations (SPIs)

2.3tIn the course of its work the Defence Audit Committee receives Defence Internal Audit (DIA) reports and copies of External Audit reports and these reports are fully discussed in the Committee meetings. Internal and External Audit recommendations are followed up and close scrutiny of risk management reporting is included within the scheduled work of the committee.

2.4tThe Internal Audit Service carries out its work in accordance with Public Sector Internal Audit Standards (PSIAS) and works to the standards of for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing, issued by the Institute of Internal Auditors-UK (IIA). These encompass the mandatory elements of the IIA Standards; some additional requirements and interpretations for the UK Public Sector have also been included. The PSIAS replace the previous Government Internal Audit Standards (GIAS) which applied to government departments and agencies. Defence Internal Audit has a Charter which sets out the “…. the purpose, authority and responsibility of DIA which is the sole provider of the internal audit service in the MOD. The Charter has been approved by the PUS on the advice of the defence audit committee.”

2.5tWe would be of the view that the utilisation of PwC to provides independent assessment as well as bringing in best practice expertise, demonstrates a positive self- challenging ethos and a desire to learn from best in class best practice which is commendable.

2.6tThe Group Head of Defence Internal Audit heads up a team of some 97 staff and is supported by a Deputy Head of Defence Internal Audit who is responsible for the day-to-day programme implementation. Additionally there are four Assistant Heads of Defence Internal Audit one of whom is assigned to DE&S and the remaining three covering the rest of the TLBs. The majority of Auditors within the team are either Institute of Internal Audit (IIA) i.e. qualified or CCAB/CIMA qualified. The Group Head of Defence Internal Audit is ICAEW qualified and services on the ICAEW’s Committee on Governance.

2.7tIn relation to training there are two Auditors currently undertaking CIPFA professional examinations and the programming on training within the service includes for the supporting of two existing audit staff in pursuing IIA or CCAB/CIMA qualifications per annum. Whilst a team of 97 within Defence Internal Audit may seem high it is not excessive relative to the average ratio of Internal Auditors to all members of staff across central government. We understand that at present this is approximately 1:900 across Government, the MOD ratio is approximately 1:2,525 based on the overall full-time equivalents as at 31st of March 2013 of 181,000 Service Personnel and 64,000 Civilian Personnel totalling some 245,000.

Specialist Assistance

2.8tThere is a “call off” contract with PwC for specialist areas including complex Computer and forensic work. This includes transformational internal audit, compliance with standards and skilling issues including Cyber Security and complex project management. The Group Head of Defence Internal Audit seeks the assistance of subject matter experts rather than auditors in helping to scope complex audits. This practice provides much improved definition as well as importing the latest knowledge and skills.

Audit Plan and Risk

The MOD Defence Internal Audit Plan is a rolling three-year plan and is Risk based. The Plan format is relatively standard and Defence Internal Audit processes include for a rigorous quality assurance process. The programme covers, strategic and operational risks with a focus on ‘key risks’. The Audit Teams works with a specific DIA Audit Universe and works to a comprehensive Defence Internal Audit - Audit Manual. In essence, the Audit Plans are fully linked to Strategic Risks as well as operational risks – on capture, the Defence Audit Committee continuously monitor the Risk Databases at TLBs as well as co-ordinated HQ held central data and include emerging themes to inform the Internal Audit Plan. On a practical basis the Group Head of Internal Audit discusses and agrees the Audit Plan with the Chair of the Defence Audit Committee, the PUS and the Director General Finance. The Audit Plan is then presented to the Defence Audit Committee for endorsement and distributed to TLB Audit Committees for noting as necessary.

As highlighted within statement PR2 - Internal Control, we understand that Defence Internal Audit Reporting Recommendation compliance is regarded as high

Quality Assurance

2.9tIn respect of Quality Assurance and Performance Management - the service has processes and standards are set out in the Defence Internal Audit Manual. We understand that formal performance indicators are used to track performance and that the Defence Audit Committee is given a formal update on performance and progress at each quarterly meeting by the Group Head of Defence Internal Audit.

A sample of Internal Audit reports demonstrate a succinct and highly effective reporting style based on a robust methodology. In summary, our evidence points to a significantly improved and effective Internal Audit service that provides an insightful assessment of assurance in some of the most complex areas within central government operations

Suggested score: 4

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Not Qualified

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

15.
score
4

Is there effective and transparent external auditing of military defence expenditure?

Researcher4085: The Comptroller and Auditor General (C&AG) and his National Audit Office are responsible for the independent auditing of defence bodies. The NAO’s reports are published online and although it cannot make binding recommendations or consider follow-up mechanisms, press coverage indicates some evidence the government takes its advice into account even if it may not necessarily act in accordance. The MoD reviewer (see below) states: &quoute;The MOD have never rejected any NAO finding. On the contrary, the MOD, has signed up and agreed to every NAO report and their findings.&quoute;

The NAO’s independence and auditory powers are enshrined in the National Audit Act (NAA) 1983 (s.6 & 8 particularly) and the Budget Responsibility and National Audit Act (BRANA) 2011. The NAO is not mandated to publish all of its reports and findings, however it has a good record of proactive transparency, which is evidenced by the reports, news and information published on its website. Evidence and source material that informs its reports is available under FOIA although it may be subject to exemptions.

The MoD reviewer adds that the Public Accounts Committee further scrutinises MoD action in regard of recommendations made by the NAO. &quoute;The Public Accounts Committee (PAC) ensures transparency and accountability in government financial operations. The PAC takes evidence from the MOD about their actions to NAO recommendations. In particular, the PAC have always considered MOD’s evidence relating to the NAO reports on Major Projects and Equipment Plan Review&quoute;.

The Transparency International UK Chapter reviewer (see below) states &quoute;the annual and indeed more frequent in respect of specific enquiries, appearance of the Accounting Officer before the Public accounts Committee&quoute; provides an additional important layer of scrutiny.

Comment to Government Reviewer: Agreed. Comment and source updated. Score changed from 3 to 4.

Comment to Transparency International UK Chapter Reviewer: Agreed. Comment and source updated. Score changed from 3 to 4.

COMMENTS -+

National Audit Act 1983. http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1983/44/contents
Budget Responsibility and National Audit Act 2011. http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2011/4/contents/enacted
National Audit Office. “About Us”. Accessed on 25/06/2014. http://www.nao.org.uk/about-us/
National Audit Office. “Defence”. Accessed on 25/06/2014. http://www.nao.org.uk/search/type/report/sector/defence
James Tapsfield and Joe Churcher “Defence Secretary Philip Hammond ‘ignored’ warnings on Army cuts from Audit Office”, Western Daily Press, 12/06/2014. http://www.westerndailypress.co.uk/Warnings-ignored-Army-cuts/story-21223232-detail/story.html
Ministry of Defence. “Defence Secretary responds to Major Projects Report”. Accessed on 25/06/2014. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/defence-secretary-responds-to-major-projects-report

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: The most recent Corporate Report includes (pages 99 to 106) a statement by the Comptroller and Auditor General on the Accounts - which last year he found necessary to qualify. The evidence provided by the Assessor does not acknowledge the annual and indeed more frequent in respect of specific enquiries, appearance of the Accounting Officer before the Public accounts Committee - in public and in the presence of the media - to give evidence on the Corporate Report. These hearings are available on the PAC website and their reports attract a good deal of public/media attention.

All PAC reports are published and there is a requirement for the MOD to respond formally to recommendations setting out the action taken or offering explanations for why they are not acted upon.

Suggested score: 4

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: We believe the score should be 4.

As stated in the MOD’s response to 12A, The MOD have never rejected any NAO finding. On the contrary, the MOD, has signed up and agreed to every NAO report and their findings.

The Public Accounts Committee (PAC) ensures transparency and accountability in government financial operations. The PAC takes evidence from the MOD about their actions to NAO recommendations. In particular, the PAC have always considered MOD’s evidence relating to the NAO reports on Major Projects and Equipment Plan Review: http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/public-accounts-committee/inquiries/parliament-2010/mod-equip-plan-2013-23-major-proj-rep-2013/

For example, in the latest MOD Annual Accounts the Comptroller and Auditor General (C&AG) provides a report. With regard to his qualification of the accounting for lease type arrangements, he states that the Government Financial Reporting Manual “requires preparers of accounts to comply with International Accounting Standard (IAS) 17, Leases, to establish whether contracts contain lease-type arrangements and whether those are, in substance, either a finance or operating lease. A finance lease is a lease that transfers substantially all the risks and rewards incidental to ownership of an asset. An operating lease is any other type of lease. The classification made by preparers of accounts could have a significant impact on the financial statements.”

Suggested score: 4

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: I go along with the mark though it is slightly ungenerous because in my experience the NAO's reports are highly authoritative and it is quite a serious thing, and could put the Accounting Officer in a difficult porition, not to implement a recommendation. However, its remit covers the efficiency and effectiveness of expenditure as well as propriety and accounting accuracy, and a degree of judgment enters into the former issues. For this reason, and because it is for Ministers not the NAO to take the decisions, the implementation of the NAO's recommendations cannot be automatic, as the criterion for scoring full marks comes near to implying would be necessary.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

16.
score
4

Is there evidence that the country's defence institutions have controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country's natural resource exploitation and, if so, are these interests publicly stated and subject to scrutiny?

Researcher4085: There is no evidence in the MoD’s annual report and accounts to suggest the MoD has controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the UK’s resource exploitation. However there is also no evidence to suggest that it is statutorily prohibited from doing so.

The MoD does engage in other commercial operations, notably through its investments in the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory, the UK Hydrological Office and the Defence Support Group. The performance of the three bodies is scrutinised by the the National Audit Office(NAO) and are also subject to additional scrutiny, via annual review by the bodies' respective audit committees, which include representatives of the MoD Defence Internal Audit.

COMMENTS -+

Ministry of Defence. “Annual Report and Accounts 2012-2013”.
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/222874/MOD_AR13_clean.pdf
Defence Science and Technology Laboratory. “Annual Report 2013/2014”.
https://www.dstl.gov.uk/downloads/Dstl_Annual_Report_13_14.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The 2013/14 Corporate Report states that, on the basis of depreciated replacement cost for specialist buildings and RICS conventions for establishment of fair open market value, the figure for all land, dwellings and other buildings is less that 12Bn.

I'm not quite sure about the score as there isn't evidence of limited financial or controlling interest.

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: We believe this should be a 4. Please note that the country assessor gave us a score of 4 on the same question in their previous assessment in 2013. Please comments below:

“There is no evidence of investments in such industries by the MOD. However, the MOD does own vast estates. According to the Guardian (18th October 2010, article by Simon Rogers), the latest budget figures (2010 / 2011) are broken down into a general figure £39.46bn. This can be viewed in the light of the previous published MOD budget and it is known that the budget was reduced by 1.95%. This grand total can then be further broken down and it was documented that Defence Estates accounted for £4.66bn of the said budget. A full discussion of the Ministry's assets can be found in their Asset Management Strategy document. For instance, the document states that 'timber and timber products supplied to MOD irrespective of the method and cost of supply, directly or indirectly, for any purpose even where the use is ancillary to the main purpose of the activity (e.g. packaging or hoarding) will be procured from a legal and preferably sustainable source'. Further, a Global Witness reported on 25th October 2011, that: &quoute;The European Commission took a vital step on Tuesday towards helping millions of people in poor countries to benefit from their natural resources by proposing legislation requiring EU-based oil, gas, mining and timber companies to publicly disclose their payments to governments for each project that they invest in around the world.”

Please note that DSTL, UKHO and DSG are wholly owned trading funds of the MOD.

Suggested score: 4

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: I go along with the score, because so far as I know there is no law against MOD owning assets that exploit the country's natural resources. I am no expert in the history of the nuclear industry but MOD may well have owned assets from which nuclear fuel is derived. And as you say MOD gets agricultural rents for training land. But such examples only exist where the asset serves a defence purpose. The Treasury and the NAO. on Parliament's behalf, would deem improper any investment that is aimed primarily at earning revenue, not serving defence.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

17.
score
4

Is there evidence, for example through media investigations or prosecution reports, of a penetration of organised crime into the defence and security sector? If no, is there evidence that the government is alert and prepared for this risk?

Researcher4085: There is no evidence of penetration into defence and security sectors by organised crime interests. There is some evidence that defence bodies are alert and prepared for such risks. The National Crime Agency has strategic lead for fighting organised crime in the UK and the UK's Anti Corruption Plan details the numerous initiatives which are being put in place.

The MoD Police produce a strategic threat assessment, which according to MoD reviewer, &quoute;includes mitigating actions to counter the risks of organised crime&quoute;. National Security Vetting provides a level of protection from the penetration of organised crime interests. The MoD's Fraud Defence unit produces Fraud Alerts in relation to specific incidents which are sent out across the MoD and its suppliers, according to MoD reviewer. Finally, the MoD has its own police force which protects against and investigates organised crime infiltration.

Comment to all reviewers. Agreed. Comment and sources updated. Score changed from 3 to 4.

COMMENTS -+

HM Government. &quoute;Anti Corruption Plan&quoute;. 2014. Accessed 09/09/15.
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-anti-corruption-plan
Ministry of Defence. &quoute;National Security Vetting.&quoute; Accessed 09/09/15
https://www.gov.uk/guidance/security-vetting-and-clearance
National Crime Agency. “Organised Crime Command”. Accessed on 25/06/2014.
http://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/about-us/what-we-do/organised-crime-command
Tom Harper, “The corruption of Britain: UK’s key institutions infiltrated by criminals”, The Independent, 10/01/2014. Accessed 25/06/2014.
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/the-corruption-of-britain-uks-key-institutions-infiltrated-by-criminals-9052617.html
Tom Harper, “Revealed: How gangs used the Freemasons to corrupt police”, The Independent, 13/10/2014. Accessed 25/06/2014.
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/revealed-how-gangs-used-the-freemasons-to-corrupt-police-9054670.html
Tom Harper, “EXCLUSIVE: Secret SECOND Metropolitan Police corruption probe revealed”, The Independent, 26/03/2014. Accessed 25/06/2014.
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/exclusive-secret-second-metropolitan-police-corruption-probe-revealed-9217620.html

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: &quoute;There is no evidence that this is taking place, but nor is there evidence that the government has the capability to tackle it.&quoute;

In the 18 December 2014 National Anti Corruption Plan, defence has a specific section within the plan which provides some evidence as to the Ministry of Defence being alert to the risk of corruption by organised crime.

https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/388894/UKantiCorruptionPlan.pdf

The National Crime Agency is a dedicated and well resourced agency focused on organised crime. The Serious and Organised Crime Strategy of October 2013 sets out the government's ambition to disrupt organised crime where the threat exists. These structures sit on top of the Military Policing authorities. If there was evidence of of organised crime infiltration in defence, I believe there is evidence that the government has the capability to tackle it.

https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/serious-organised-crime-strategy

Suggested score: 4

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: We believe the score should be 4.

Part of the MOD Police’s remit is to monitor organised crime. They produce a Strategic Threat Assessment, which includes mitigating actions to counter the risks of organised crime. The MOD Police are the lead on intelligence gathering on overseas corruption.

The National Security Vetting (NSV) not only applied to MOD civilian and military staff but also to their partners. For example, The NSV will conduct financial checks to see if the new member of MOD staff or their partner were or are in the financial difficulty. If this is the case, the potential member of MOD staff could be vulnerable to pressure or bribery. This can imply pressure from organised criminals. For further information, please go to:
https://www.gov.uk/security-vetting-and-clearance

MOD’s Fraud Defence conducts risk assessments where it has highlighted the risk of collusion with organised criminals and theft of precious metals by organised criminals. Current internal controls and mitigations plans are in place to enhance our resilience to organised crime.

The Fraud Defence team produces ‘Fraud Alerts’ across MOD and to its suppliers. For example, the MOD produced a Fraud Alert on mandate fraud, which raised awareness for to look out for falsified invoices from organised criminals.

The MOD Police monitor E-Bay to stop sale of stolen MOD assets. This may include assets sold to organised criminals.

The National Crime Agency has an Organised Crime Command to deliver a co-ordinated national response to organised crime. For more information, please go to: http://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/about-us/what-we-do/organised-crime-command.

Suggested score: 4

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: I would point to two factors that provide safeguards, neither of which you mention, One is the security vetting system. All people working in senior or key positions in the defence sector, whether public employees or in industry, are security vetted - an expensive and laborious process aimed at bringing to light dubious affiliations and character flaws which cast doubt on the individual's reliability. For this reason I am confident that, more than most sectors, defence and security are (in your phrase) resistant to infiltration by organised crime. And the MOD has its own police force, which has crime investigation within its remit.

Suggested score: 4

Peer Reviewer-+

18.
score
2

Is there policing to investigate corruption and organised crime within the defence services and is there evidence of the effectiveness of this policing?

Researcher4085: The Ministry of Defence Police, together with the Fraud Defence Service, leads the MoD’s anti-corruption work. The prevention and detection of crime within the Army, Navy and Air Force is dealt with by the Service Police Authorities; the Royal Military Police (RMP), Royal Navy Police and Royal Air Force Police, respectively.

There is some evidence, albeit limited and in some cases dated, that the policing function of the defence services is effective. For example, in 2012 four defendants pled guilty to corruption charges, ten years after they were first investigated, and in 2010 a civil servant was jailed after receiving £64,000 to 'grease his palm' by a defence contractor.

The robustness and integrity of the Royal Military Police is in some doubt. In 2010, leaked emails showed that a RMP Colonel had instructed his staff to change their witness statements to remove statements about their working conditions. Another retired RMP officer turned whistleblower told the BBC in 2009 that he believes the RMP were “covering up quite serious allegations of torture and murder&quoute;. Evans writes that leaked Wikileaks cables describe 21 occasions in which British troops reportedly shot or bombed Afghan civilians, but only one of these incidents was investigated by the RMP. An inquiry concluded in December 2014 found that some allegations against soldiers deployed to Iraq were found to be baseless; however, it should be noted that this does not cover all such cases.

The RMP’s enforcement record does not appear strong in general. In Afghanistan, an investigative journalist reports that of 126 RMP investigations only 8 resulted in prosecution.

Comment to Government, Peer and Transparency International UK Chapter Reviewers: comments noted and appreciated. Comments and sources updated. Score changed from 1 to 2.

COMMENTS -+

MoD Police Committee Annual Report 2012-2013, paragraph 28. Accessed 10/06/2014.
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/237712/mod_police_committee_20_13.pdf
MoD Police Committee Meeting: Minutes, 7 January 2013, Agenda Item 2, paragraphs 4-7. Accessed 10/06/2014.
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/246978/modpcmins_20121212.pdf
Royal Military Police. “Role of the RMP”. Accessed 25/06/2014.
http://www.army.mod.uk/agc/provost/31537.aspx
Richard Norton Taylor and Ian Cobain, “British colonel keeps rank despite being branded ‘unreliable witness’”, The Guardian, 12/11/2010. Accessed 25/06/2014.
http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2010/nov/12/british-colonel-giles-iraq-inquiry
Owen Bowcott, “Iraq abuse inquiry was a ‘cover up’, whistleblower tells court”, The Guardian. 11/12/12. Accessed 25/06/2014.
http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2012/dec/11/iraq-abuse-inquiry-whistleblower-court
Innes Bowen, “Whistleblower says Army abuse not investigated”, BBC news, 11/10/09. Accessed 25/06/2014.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/8300726.stm
Rob Evans, “Afghanistan: list of investigations and prosecutions of British troops”, The Guardian, 29/03/2012. Accessed 25/06/2014.
http://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2012/mar/29/afghanistan-british-army-crimes
Serious Fraud Office. &quoute;Guilty pleas in £16 million corruption trial&quoute;. 21/02/2012. Accessed 20/09/2015.
http://www.sfo.gov.uk/press-room/latest-press-releases/press-releases-2012/guilty-pleas-in-16-million-corruption-trial.aspx
BBC. &quoute;MoD civil servant from Suffolk jailed over pay-off&quoute;. 27/05/2010. Accessed 20/09/15.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10175772
Rob Evans, “Afghanistan: list of investigations and prosecutions of British troops”, The Guardian, 29/03/2012. Accessed 25/06/2014.
http://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2012/mar/29/afghanistan-british-army-crimes
The Telegraph, Al Sweady inquiry clears British soldiers of murder and torture claims, 17 December, 2014, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/11298603/Al-Sweady-inquiry-clears-British-soldiers-of-murder-and-torture-claims.html

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: The RMP has recently been given the status of a force independent of the Chain of Command and the Provost Marshal who heads it is formally a sovereign's appointment in line with other Heads of Civilian Police Forces. All defence police forces are subject to oversight by HMICC and their investigative functions are independent of the chain of command.

We have recently seen the collapse of some of the historic allegations relating to Iraq as can be seen in the Public Enquiry report - para 740 of the executive summary at www.alsweadyinquiry.org/ Numerous media reports from December 2014 also covered it.

The suggested score could be 2 or even 3, but I have put forward 2 for now.

Suggested score: 2

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: We believe the score should be 4.

The first sentence is inaccurate. In the MOD, the term “fraud” covers all forms fraud, theft, bribery, misappropriation and corruption. We stated that is where someone is acting dishonestly and creates a risk of financial or material loss to the Department.

The Fraud Defence Service is a key component of MOD’s counter fraud strategy. The term ‘Fraud’ is used to cover all forms of fraud, theft, bribery, misappropriation and corruption. Fraud Defence provides a centre of expertise with responsibility for setting Departmental strategy and policy and coordinating initiatives to improve performance on risk assessment, prevention, detection and the creation of an anti-fraud and corruption culture across the MOD 1.

The Ministry of Defence Police (MDP) is a statutory force established by the Ministry of Defence Police Act 1987. The MDP provides a range of specialist policing capabilities to the MOD and is required to maintain a set of core capabilities which includes the prevention, investigation and detection of fraud and corruption. The MDP has a Criminal Investigation Department that works closely with the MOD Fraud Defence Service. The MOD Police Committee is appointed by the Secretary of State for Defence and provides an independent scrutiny that the MDP is delivering its policing services 2.

The Service Police Authorities (Royal Military Police (RMP), Royal Navy Police (RNP) and Royal Air Force Police) deploy as part of the field army, Navy and RAF respectively, in support of conflict, conflict prevention and post conflict operations to deliver a full range of policing capabilities. They are responsible for the prevention and detection of crime 3, 4, 5.

Source(s):
Ministry of Defence. (2014) Fraud Defence – Counter Fraud Charter.
GOV.UK. (2014) MOD Police. [Online] Available from: https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/ministry-of-defence-police. [Accessed: 10th December 2014]
British Army. Royal Military Police. [Online] Available from: http://www.army.mod.uk/agc/provost/23207.aspx [Accessed: 10th December 2014]
Royal Navy. Royal Marines Specialisations. [Online] Available from: http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/careers/royal-marines/royal-marines-specialisations [Accessed: 10th December 2014]
Royal Air Force. Force Protection – RAF Police. [Online] Available from: https://www.raf.mod.uk/recruitment/roles/force-protection/raf-police/ [Accessed: 10th December 2014]

Court martial and Crown Prosecution Data is publicly available:

http://cps.gov.uk/data/index.html
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/court-martial-results-from-the-military-court-centres
https://www.gov.uk/search?q=Court+martial
https://www.gov.uk/service-prosecuting-authority

MDP concentrate on corruption cases and have experienced officers trained and specialised in this field. They also have a network of contacts and intelligence sources that add to this. They are also well resourced to overcome the difficulties when obtaining evidence in foreign jurisdictions and in theatre. MDP have successfully investigated many corruption cases and achieved convictions as well as recovering corrupt payments through proceeds of crime legislation.

Please see links to corruption cases that MDP have investigated:

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1548808/MoD-man-accepted-200000-bribes.html

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10175772

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-17312545
http://www.sfo.gov.uk/press-room/latest-press-releases/press-releases-2012/guilty-pleas-in-16-million-corruption-trial.aspx

With regard to the reference of the cover up of allegations of murder and torture, this has been proven false at an independent inquiry: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/11298603/Al-Sweady-inquiry-clears-British-soldiers-of-murder-and-torture-claims.html

Suggested score: 4

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Not Qualified

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

19.
score
3

Are the policies, administration, and budgets of the intelligence services subject to effective, properly resourced, and independent oversight?

Researcher4085: The Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) is a nine-member committee, drawn from both Houses of Parliament, which is established by the Justice and Security Act (JASA) 2013. It oversees the expenditure, administration, policy and, to the extent described in s.2 of the JASA, operations of the Security Service, SIS, GCHQ and other intelligence bodies and operations and has powers to demand documents from these bodies. Committee members are nominated for appointment by the Prime Minister in consultation with the Leader of the Opposition. The Committee’s governance and the independence of its members under the JASA has been criticised in Parliament.

The Committee reports to Parliament although it must exclude information considered prejudicial to the activities of bodies it scrutinises, which has an impact on the quality of oversight, as has been noted by both Conservative and Labour MPs.

The ISC response to the historically important revelations that the US and UK operated secret systems to harvest and analyse vast amounts of the world’s communications data has been muted. The ISC offered a statement on GCHQ’s role in accessing data through the NSA’s PRISM but failed to respond to allegations that GCHQ operates its own system called TEMPORA. The existence of TEMPORA was revealed by whistleblower Edward Snowden and is not, to many observers, considered to be in doubt. Despite this there has been no public acknowledgement or response to allegations that GCHQ operated TEMPORA, by the ISC or Parliament.

The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 mandates the creation of an Intelligence Services Commissioner who is tasked with oversight of intelligence services and activities. The commissioner is appointed by and reports to the Prime Minister, who can withhold from Parliament any material he deems contrary to the public interest. The Home Affairs Committee (HAC) has raised concerns about the robustness of the commissioner. His role has been questioned in the report since he works part time with only one assistant and can review less than 10% of intelligence warrants (para. 166-168). There are also concerns over the robustness of his investigation methods (para 164).

Reports indicate that there are instances when the Prime Minister has refused to comment publicly on intelligence matters, and the tone of some of his public statements have also been criticised by commentators. Nevertheless, intelligence matters are not subject to Freedom of Information Act requests in any circumstances (s.23).

Response to all reviewers: some changes made to comment and sources. score changed from 2 to 3. However, enough justification has not been given to award a 4. The governance arrangements appear to be insufficiently robust. For example, the ISC and Parliament have not responded to TEMPORA allegations in the detail it required especially since public opinion was strong on the 'Snoopers Charter' bill proposed by Labour and Coalition governments. The ISC major report on Privacy and Security of this year does not even mention TEMPORA.

COMMENTS -+

Justice and Security Act 2013, s.1
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2013/18/part/1/crossheading/oversight-by-the-intelligence-and-security-committee-of-parliament/enacted
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, s.59
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/23/section/59
Freedom of Information Act 2000, s.23
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/36/section/23
Intelligence Service Commissioner Office. “Overview”. Accessed 26/06/2014.
http://isc.intelligencecommissioners.com/default.asp
House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, “Counter Terrorism: Seventeenth Report of the session 2013-14), 30/04/2014. Accessed 26/06/2014.
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmhaff/231/231.pdf
Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament. “Statement on GCHQ’s alleged interception of communications under the US PRISM programme”, 17/07/2013. Accessed 26/06/2014.
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/225459/ISC-Statement-on-GCHQ.pdf
Alex Barker and Peter Spiegel, “British PM David Cameron defends his ‘brave’ spies”, Financial Times, 25/10/2013. Accessed 26/06/2013.
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3799a066-3d88-11e3-9928-00144feab7de.html#axzz35jNnZvxN
Rowena Mason, “White House report on NSA ‘has not changed David Cameron’s view”, The Guardian, 19/12/2013. Accessed 26/06/2013.
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/dec/19/white-house-report-nsa-david-cameron-obama
Malcolm Rifkind and Henry Porter, “Henry Porter v Malcolm Rifkind: surveillance and the free society”, The Observer, 24/08/2013. Accessed 26/06/2014.
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/aug/24/rifkind-porter-debate-miranda-surveillance
Hansard. Westminster Hall: Backbench business. Intelligence and Security Services, 31/10/2013. Column 342WH – 364WH in particular. Accessed 26/06/2014.
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmhansrd/cm131031/halltext/131031h0001.htm
Alphr. 'MPs: laws on GCHQ snooping &quoute;completely useless&quoute;'. 28/06/2013. Accessed 20/09/2013.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: &quoute;There is provision for, but limited evidence of, effective, properly resourced and independent parliamentary oversight of the intelligence services’ policies, administration, and budgets.&quoute;

I would suggest a score 4 as provision certainly does exist, and there is limited publicly available evidence on the effectiveness of its oversight. As noted, provision exists in:

The Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC), drawn from both Houses of Parliament, which is established by the Justice and Security Act (JASA) 2013; and the Intelligence Services Commissioner

The points raised about allegations of partiality over the Committee chair are not serious/evidenced enough to suggest that the provision of Parliamentary oversight does not exist.

As well as the ISC there is an independent (judicial) Commissioners for Interception of Communications who also publishes regular reports.

Suggested score: 4

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: The score should be 4.

The ISC was originally established in 1994 by the Intelligence Services Act. It was recently reformed, made a Committee of Parliament and its powers reinforced by the Justice & Security Act (JASA) 2013. This is a significant improvement.

The JASA 2013 amended the status of the ISC so that it is now a joint (i.e. Commons and Lords) committee of Parliament created by statute. This provided the Committee with stronger links to Parliament, demonstrating more clearly its separation from the Executive.
Previously the Prime Minister appointed Committee members and the Chair.  However, under the Act, Parliament and not the Prime Minister makes the final decision on membership (from a list of nominees drawn up by the PM) and the ISC Members select their own Chair.
The Justice and Security Act formalised the ISC’s role in overseeing the wider intelligence community (OSCT, parts of Cabinet Office and MOD), enabled the ISC to oversee operational activities on matters of significant national interest retrospectively, and removed the power for Agency heads to withhold information from the ISC on the basis of its sensitivity.
The Government also increased the ISC’s budget – almost doubling it to £1.3m.
Please note that in the Assessor’s answer, it refers to “other intelligence bodies”. In actual fact the ISC oversees the expenditure, administration policy and, to the extent described in S.2 of the JASA, operations of M15 (not SS as stated in the answer above), SIS, GCHQ and parts of the Cabinet Office, Home Office and MOD.

Whilst Committee members are nominated for appointment by the Prime Minister in consultation with the Leader of the Opposition, it is worth noting that the Parliament appoints the ISC Members. The ISC Members select their own Chair.

With reference to the Assessor’s statement regarding the Committee’s governance, only the Prime Minister has the power to redact information from the ISC’s reports. The Government must be able to ensure that the ISC’s published reports do not contain information disclosure of which would be prejudicial to the continued discharge of the functions of the Agencies or of the wider intelligence community. The Government continues to work constructively with the ISC to ensure that as much of its reports that can be published, are published – as has been shown by the Woolwich report – the most lengthy and detailed ISC report ever.

The Committee carefully considers requests for redaction. The Agencies have to demonstrate clearly how publication of the material in question would be damaging before the Committee agree to redact it. The Committee aims to ensure that only the minimum of text is redacted from a Report. The Committee believes that it is important that Parliament and the public should be able to see where information had to be redacted. This means that the published report is the same as the clarified version sent to the Prime Minister (albeit with redaction).

With reference to TEMPORA, the Committee has stated that “it is proper to consider whether the current statutory framework governing areas to private communications remains adequate.” The ISC did investigate GCHQ’s alleged interception of communications of under the PRISM programme and cleared them of any wrongdoing. The issues of the agencies capabilities and the legal framework around them is being considered by the ISC’s Privacy and Security Inquiry – due to publish pre-purdah. This is also looking at our collective right to security versus our individual right to privacy.

On November 7th 2013, the Committee held an open evidence session with three heads of the intelligence and security agencies. This was the first time that the three heads of the agencies had given evidence on their work, their priorities and general threats to the national security of the UK in a public session. This therefore represented a significant step forward in terms of openness and transparency of the agencies.

According to the MI5 website, the work of the Security Service is overseen via ministerial, parliamentary and judicial oversight;

Ministerial oversight – Senior Ministers are responsible to Parliament for the conduct and work of the security and intelligence agencies. The Security Service Act 1989 sets out the Home Secretary’s responsibility for the Security Service (https://www.mi5.gov.uk/home/about-us/how-mi5-is-governed/oversight/ministerial-oversight.html)

Parliamentary oversight – The Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament was established under the Intelligence Services Act 1994 to examine the expenditure, administration and policy of the Security Services. The Justice and Security Act 2013 updated that ISC’s functions and the associated arrangements underpinning its oversight role. https://www.mi5.gov.uk/home/about-us/how-mi5-is-governed/oversight/parliamentary-oversight.html

Judicial oversight – Two independent Commissioners oversee the work of the Security Service and a number of other public bodies. The Commissioners are appointed under the terms of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000… The two Commissioners each submit separate annual reports to the Prime Minister about the work over the past year. The publishable portions of the reports are presented to the UK Parliament by the Prime Minister and to the Scottish Parliament by the Scottish Ministers. They are then issued as publications of the House of Commons, usually in the autumn of each year. https://www.mi5.gov.uk/home/about-us/how-mi5-is-governed/oversight/judicial-oversight.html

Intelligence Oversight

General

The UK has one of the strongest systems of checks and balances and democratic accountability for secret intelligence anywhere in the world.
Intelligence activity is already overseen by Secretaries of State, independent Commissioners, the cross-party Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament (ISC), and held to account by the independent Investigatory Powers Tribunal (IPT).
The intelligence agencies’ work is carried out in accordance with a strict legal and policy framework that ensures their activities are authorised, necessary and proportionate, and provides for rigorous oversight.

The Commissioners
The work of the intelligence agencies is also overseen by two independent Commissioners (not just the Intelligence Services Commissioner) who have both held high judicial office.
The Commissioners play a crucial role in the oversight system, providing judicial scrutiny of the use of intrusive powers by the intelligence agencies and others. They report directly to the Prime Minister, who published their reports in Parliament, but are fully independent from Government.
They are thorough, rigorous and wholly effective at holding the agencies to account. They bring with them years of judicial experience and cast a keen and critical eye over the work undertaken by intelligence agencies and public authorities. They have full and unfettered access to the agencies and their information holdings. 


Key Facts on the Commissioners

Intelligence Services Commissioner:
Is responsible for overseeing the use of intrusive powers by the Intelligence Services such as the use of surveillance, interference with property and the use of covert human intelligence sources. The PM may also direct the Commissioner to keep under review the carrying out of any aspect of the functions of the intelligence services.
He is supported by a full time Chief of Staff and will have a Deputy Chief of Staff joining in Feb 2015.
In his latest annual report he fully explained his methodology behind the number of warrants that he chooses to inspect and the reasoning about why he felt that this number was entirely sufficient.  

Interception of Communications Commissioner:
The Commissioner is responsible for oversight of interception of communications by the Intelligence Agencies and the acquisition and disclosure of communications data (also known as the “who, where and when” of a communication.)
The Commissioner is supported by an extensive team including a Chief Inspector, 9 Inspectors and 2 office staff.
In 2013 there were 2760 Interception Warrants Authorised (a reduction of 19% on 2012,) of these c.600 were looked at by an inspector.

Resourcing:
As per sections 57(7) and 59(7) of RIPA I (Home Secretary) ensure that the Commissioners have  the necessary technical facilities and staff to enable them to properly carry out their functions.
In their 2013 annual reports published this year both Commissioners stated that they were sufficiently resourced. However, recruitment has already begun for an extra member of staff for the Intelligence Services Commissioner’s office to provide extra resilience.

Suggested score: 4

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: I do believe that your mark, and comments, understate the extent to which the intelligence services are scrutinised by Parliament and accountable. You quote the fact that the Chairman of the IASC is supportive of the Intelligence Services as evidence of bias. This is a non sequitur! It would much stronger grounds for concern if he were highly critical of them. He a highly regarded parliamentarian of great experience, fully capable of taking an independent line, and his committee, as you acknowledge, are appointed after consultation with the Leader of the Opposition. The Opposition are not systematically negative about the security services and their performance, and they have (through their membership of the IASC) ample opportunity to identify concerns. I think it may be true, though, that more could be done to explain to the public how the system works.

Suggested score: 3

Peer Reviewer-+

20.
score
3

Are senior positions within the intelligence services filled on the basis of objective selection criteria, and are appointees subject to investigation of their suitability and prior conduct?

Researcher4085: The director of the Security Service is appointed by the Secretary of State of the Home Office under the terms of the Security Service Act 1989. The directors of the SIS and GCHQ are appointed by the Secretary of State of the FCO under the terms of the Intelligence Services Act 1994. All appointments are made with the agreement of the Prime Minister. But the details of the recruitment process are not established in law and a lack of publicly available information prevents full analysis of the appointment process. Recruitment appears to be robust elsewhere in these organisations, however it is hard to draw conclusions where information is limited.

There is limited information about the appointment of senior officials. On management positions, Mi5 states: “Promotion is based on merit, and in accordance with business needs, taking into account your performance, skills, abilities and potential to work effectively at the higher grade.” Other mid-level positions in the security and intelligence services are advertised openly on websites and appear to select candidates on merit after rigorous application processes. A government press release states that the newly appointed director of GCHQ was subject to a recruitment process chaired by a government security advisor but there is no information on what the process entailed or how many applicants were involved. A formal government official stated in an interview, however, that the position was advertised internally on the Government's jobs website with objective selection criteria.

No information about the Security Services or security matters is available under the Freedom of Information Act, by virtue of s.23.

Therefore, a score of 3 has been selected given the above evidence (and those presented by reviewers below) of objective criteria for appointment but with shortcomings in available information surrounding the process.

Response to reviewers: comment updated and score changed from 1 to 3.

Response to Government and Peer Reviewers: The points raised in my comments have not been sufficiently addressed in your reviews to award a higher score.

COMMENTS -+

Intelligence Services Act 1994, s.1-s.4. http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1994/13/contents
Security Services Act 1989, s.2. http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1989/5/contents
Foreign and Commonwealth Office,” Press release: Appointment of the new Director of GCHQ”, 15/04/2014. Accessed 26/06/2014. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/appointment-of-the-new-director-of-gchq
Security Service. “Enterprise Architects: Role”. Accessed 26/06/2014. https://www.mi5.gov.uk/careers/current-jobs/job.aspx?id=122
GCHQ. “Recruitment Selection Process”. Accessed 26/06/2014. http://www.gchq.gov.uk/careers/Documents/selection_process.pdf
Security Service. &quoute;Careers: Promotion and Management Positions&quoute;. Accessed 05/11/14.
https://www.mi5.gov.uk/careers/how-to-apply/promotion-and-management-positions.aspx
s.23 Freedom of Information Act.
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/36/contents
Interview with former government official, October 2015.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: For article on appointment of Chief of SIS - and description of process - see FT for 3 October 2014. FT for 15 April 2014 also describes appointment of the head of GCHQ (as does BBC news for same day); 28 Mar 2013 D Tel and BBC amongst others. Also SIS (and other websites) for open advertisement of career opportunities and explanation of development processes. All of the agencies follow Cabinet Office approved competency based process for appointments with independent (non-executive) representation on appointment panels.

I am not sure which score fits best given none of the scoring criteria fit the context well.

Suggested score: 2

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: Appointment of senior posts:

-- The Director General of MI5 role was advertised across central government, intelligence agencies, police and armed forces.
-- Candidates were invited to apply in writing, were then sifted and shortlisted and interviewed by a panel chaired by the Cabinet Secretary. The panel included an independent Non Executive Director.
-- The Home Secretary personally interviewed the shortlisted candidates before reaching her decision in consultation with the Prime Minister.

Suggested score: 4

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: Although (so far as I know) the job descriptions of the top posts in the intelligence and security services are not published openly, there is surely sufficient evidence that they are selected on the basis of suitability for the job not any kind of patronage. They are public figures nowadays, with their identities known , and appear frequently in interviews and conferences. Their qualities are therefore open for all to see. They are almost (not quite always) drawn from their own service, recruitment to which is generally open, as you acknowledge. And their appointments are announced publicly, in quite a high profile way - see the announcement, on the Web, of Andrew Parker's appointment as Head of MI5, in which the Home Secretary is quoted as saying that other candidates were considered too.

Suggested score: 4

Peer Reviewer-+

21.
score
3

Does the government have a well-scrutinised process for arms export decisions that aligns with international protocols, particularly the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)?

Researcher4085: The UK ratified the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) in April 2014. MoD reviewer (see below) states there is intention to comply in full with articles 7.1.iv, 11.5, and 15.6. The reviewer states:

&quoute;Regarding Article 7.1.iv, the consolidated EU and national arms export licensing criteria, were updated in March 2014 to reflect changes and developments in the export licence process and the impending ratification of the ATT since the criteria were last put before Parliament in October 2000. Criterion One specifically refers to the UK’s obligations under the ATT.
Regarding Article 11.5, the reason there is no evidence of implementation is because the treaty does not enter into force until 24th December 2014. As such there is no mechanism for States to share information. How States implement their obligations has been and will continue to be discussed at the preparatory conferences in the run up to the full 1st Conference of State Parties next year and at the conference itself.
Regarding Article [15.6]... We reiterate that the update to the consolidated criteria clearly states the UK’s intentions to comply with our obligations under the ATT. As with Article 11.5 there is not yet an agreed mechanism that will allow the sharing of information under ATT&quoute;.

The Parliamentary Committee on Arms Export Controls (CAEC), comprised of members from four parliamentary select committees, “examines the Government’s expenditure, administration and policy on strategic exports”, which includes the licensing of arms and controlled goods. But the committee works retrospectively and reviews exports that have already occurred, which means exports are not necessarily subject to parliamentary approval. CAEC conducts an annual inquiry which reviews the &quoute;Government's arms export control procedures and legislation, individual arms export licence decisions, arms export policies, and the UK's role in international arms control agreements&quoute;. The standard of scrutiny CAEC applies is high and the criticism of government in its reports is an indication of its robust approach.

There are shortcomings with the UK’s arms export controls. The UK continues to export arms to countries where democracies are weak or non-existent, corruption is a major issue and human rights are frequently violated. These include, for example, Belarus, DRC, Eritrea, Iran, Libya, Zimbabwe, Sri Lanka, Uzbekistan among many others, according to a 2013 report by CAEC. Despite the government’s efforts to export arms responsibly, CAEC observed that the ECO granted 3,074 export licenses worth £12 billion to 27 countries listed by the FCO as a country of human rights concern in 2013. However MoD reviewer (see below) states that more than £7 billion of the £12 billion was spent on dual use cellular equipment.

CAEC's reports have criticised the government in the past for its lax stance on corruption risks in arms export deals. For example, in 2011 the government “failed to demonstrate satisfactorily whether it assessed the risk that individual arms exports may be linked to bribery and corruption during the licence approval process&quoute; (para 155. of CAEC Report, Volume II).

The UK’s Export Control Organisation (ECO), situated in the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, regulates arms exports and other strategic goods, such as dual use items, under the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria. The consolidated criteria was reaffirmed by the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills Vince Cable in 2014. It includes the UK’s 1997 national criteria, the EU’s Code of Conduct on Arms Exports, the Export Control Act 2002, adoption of EU Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP, adoption of EU Council Regulation (EC) 1236/2005, Directive 2009/43/EC and the re-cast Council Regulation (EC) 428/2009, as well as the ATT.

Comment to Reviewers: comments noted and appreciated. Comments updated and score has been changed from 2 to 3 in line with evidence.

COMMENTS -+

Foreign and Commonwealth Office. “Press release: Foreign Secretary welcomes UK ratification of the Arms Trade Treaty”. 02/04/2014. Accessed 26/06/2014. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/foreign-secretary-welcomes-uk-ratification-of-the-arms-trade-treaty
Department for Business, Innovations and Skills. “Assessment of export license applications: criteria and policy”, 12/12/2012. Accessed 26/06/2014. https://www.gov.uk/assessment-of-export-licence-applications-criteria-and-policy
Rt Hon. Vince Cable MP, Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, “The Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria, 25/03/2014. Accessed 26/06/2014. http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-vote-office/March_2014/25%20March/1-BIS-ArmsExportLicensing.pdf
Committee on Arms Export Control. “First Report: Scrutiny of Arms Exports and Arms Control. [Volumes I, II & III]&quoute;, 17/07/2013. Accessed 26/06/2014. http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/other-committees/committee-on-arms-export-controls/publications/
Government Response to the Committee on Arms Export Control. “First Report: Scrutiny of Arms Exports and Arms Control”, October 2013. Accessed 26/06/2014. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/264089/8707.pdf
Control Against Arms Trade, 'UK Armed Export Licences', https://www.caat.org.uk/resources/export-licences/licence?region=Eritrea, Accessed 20/10/2015.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The ATT has since come into effect and HMG has made various further statements in this regard. The MOD also makes an annual report to parliament on historic arms sales.

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: The score should be 4.

The UK aims to operate one of the most robust and transparent export licence systems in the world, which is fully aligned with international protocols including the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). As Sir John Stanley, Chair of the CAEC, acknowledged in a Parliamentary debate in November 2013, “no Parliament and no Government in Europe or north America have the same timely access to detailed information as we do. That is a considerable credit to the British Parliament and to successive British Governments.” In addition, the EU and National Consolidated Criteria were updated in March 2014 to ensure that they reflected changes and developments in the export licence process and the impending ratification of the ATT. Furthermore, the UK’s confidence in its export control system was a key reason behind the decision to voluntarily apply Articles 6 and 7 of the treaty upon UK ratification in March 2014 and ahead of its entry into force.

In response to the comments from the Assessor:

You state that there are major shortcomings with the UK’s arms export controls, that they are poorly regulated and that the UK continues to exports arms to countries where democracies are weak or non-existent, where corruption is a major issue and human rights are frequently violated. You highlight Belarus, DRC, Eritrea, Iran, Libya, Zimbabwe, Sri Lanka, and Uzbekistan as specific examples.

We do not agree that the UK’s arms exports are poorly regulated. The export of all arms and military equipment is prohibited unless authorised by a licence granted by the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills. All licence applications are carefully assessed against the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria and a licence would not be granted where to do so would be a breach of the Criteria. Exporting military goods without an appropriate licence is a criminal offence, punishable by up to 10 years in prison. Action taken to enforce export controls is given in the Government’s Annual Reports on Strategic Export Controls.

Furthermore, a significant proportion of the export licences for “countries of concern” that you highlight are in fact export licences for dual-use items, they are not licences for arms. While “dual-use” is defined as “items…which can be used for both civil and military purposes” the vast majority of dual-use items are in fact commercial products for commercial or industrial end-use. In particular, of the 3074 export licenses worth £12Bn to 27 countries listed by the FCO as countries of human rights concern, one licence for dual-use items accounts for £7.7Bn of the total. As has been explained publicly on a number of occasions, this licence permitted the export of equipment and software for building public mobile phone networks in residential areas and for small businesses. Those items are subject to export control because of their encryption capability. That capability is a standard feature of the mobile phone network and the goods are for purely commercial end use. As such, using the figure of £12Bn in a criticism of UK arms export controls is misleading.

Information on all licences granted for all destinations is given in the Government’s Annual and Quarterly Reports. Licences for military goods can be identified by a “rating” with the form “MLxx”. We also provide further information on particular licences of concern in response to detailed questions from the CAEC on a quarterly basis. This information is published on the CAEC website.

You state that the CAEC publishes a single annual report and occasionally conducts inquiries.

Parliamentary scrutiny of strategic export controls in the UK is extensive. TI’s comment above does not accurately reflect the full CAEC process which is set out below:

The CAEC conduct an annual inquiry into the Government's performance and policies on arms export controls and international control arms issues. The inquiry runs throughout the year and scrutinises the Government's arms export control procedures and legislation, individual arms export licence decisions, arms export policies, and the UK's role in international arms control agreements.

This inquiry entails substantial Government engagement, including:
-- written, published responses to CAEC questions about the Government’s Quarterly Reports of export license decisions
-- written, published responses to CAEC questions about the Government’s UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report
-- annual oral evidence sessions with both the Foreign Secretary and Business Secretary (the latest sessions took place on 1 December 2014)
-- an annual Westminster Hall Debate on Arms Exports and Controls (the latest debate took place on 30 October 2014, FCO Minister Tobias Ellwood represented the Government)

The outcome of each CAEC inquiry is published annually. The latest ‘Scrutiny of Arms Exports and Arms Controls’ inquiry report (CAEC 2014 Annual Report) was published on 23 July.  Results of their current inquiry will be published in the CAEC 2015 Annual Report, which is due in March. 

The CAEC 2014 Annual Report contained 165 conclusions and recommendations (up from 92 in 2013) aimed at improving the robustness and transparency of the UK’s Strategic Arms Export Controls.  The (three-volume) report was larger and more detailed than those of previous years, reflecting the CAEC’s forensic scrutiny of the Government’s licensing operation and decision-making. 

The Government is required to respond formally to all the recommendations and conclusions in the CAEC Annual Report.  The Government’s Command Paper response to the CAEC 2014 Annual Report was published on 7 October 2014. 

The Government also has a statutory requirement under section 10 of the Export Control Act 2002 to lay before Parliament their own Annual Report on Strategic Export Controls.  The report is an historic record of developments in the UK’s strategic export control policy and activity. The latest Annual Report on Strategic Export Controls was published on 17 July 2014.

You stated that there is no evidence of implementation of ATT Articles 7.1.iv, 11.5 and 16.6 at the time of research (June 2014).

We do not agree with this statement for the following reasons:

Regarding Article 7.1.iv, the consolidated EU and national arms export licensing criteria, were updated in March 2014 to reflect changes and developments in the export licence process and the impending ratification of the ATT since the criteria were last put before Parliament in October 2000. Criterion One specifically refers to the UK’s obligations under the ATT.

Regarding Article 11.5, the reason there is no evidence of implementation is because the treaty does not enter into force until 24th December 2014. As such there is no mechanism for States to share information. How States implement their obligations has been and will continue to be discussed at the preparatory conferences in the run up to the full 1st Conference of State Parties next year and at the conference itself.

Regarding Article 16.6 there is no such article within the ATT. We assume that this is meant to refer to Article 15.6. We reiterate that the update to the consolidated criteria clearly states the UK’s intentions to comply with our obligations under the ATT. As with Article 11.5 there is not yet an agreed mechanism that will allow the sharing of information under ATT.

Finally you state that the government is unlikely to successfully implement the ATT unless it significantly revises its strategy on legislation or enforcement and that there is no indication that it plans to do either.

We do not agree. Full cross-government consultations took place ahead of UK ratification in April. All relevant departments agreed that there was no need to change the current legislation except for a small expansion of the extra-territorial control on brokering.

Suggested score: 4

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Not Qualified

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Risk management 60
22.
score
4

How effective are controls over the disposal of assets, and is information on these disposals, and the proceeds of their sale, transparent?

Researcher4085: The MoD is currently undergoing structural changes. These policies are described as the Defence Transformation Portfolio and two of them, which deal with estate disposals and strategic asset management, have implications for how Defence conducts asset disposal.

The MoD’s estate disposals are handled transparently and planned in advance. The MoD’s Defence Infrastructure Organisation (DIO) – created in 2011- is disposing of land assets which are surplus to defence requirements. Proceeds of estates disposal are classified as income in the MoD’s accounts. Disposals are planned in advance and publicly accessible through the Disposal Database reports. The database provides information on the location of the land and the expected planning use. The DIO also has a priority to carry out disposals that “generally promote development, economic activity and growth”.

The disposal of the MoD’s other assets appear to be now managed within the Strategic Asset Management Programme, according to the National Audit Office’s Reforming the Ministry of Defence report (page 33). The programme is mentioned on page 44 of the MoD’s 2012-2013 annual accounts once. However after an extensive search of the Ministry of Defence and Parliament websites, corporate reports and statistics, no documentation was found.

The Disposal Services Authority (DSA) manages the business of asset disposals. The DSA has a capital equipment sales team that sells on a government-to-government basis. The DSA works with contractors to facilitate the general sale of surplus equipment from naval and aircraft spares to clothing and ink cartridges. It also facilitates ship recycling. The DSA’s activities are briefly described in the MoD’s accounts at page 60 and page 134. Both citations are brief and provide limited, headline detail only. The DSA was formerly an independent agency that filed its own accounts but in 2008 it was brought within the accounting boundaries of the MoD, according to a DSA staff member interviewed. This has reduced the transparency of its activities.

Government Reviewer comments noted and appreciated. As per the criteria of the question, financial information on disposals in the annual report and accounts, while brief, are provided. Score raised to 4 accordingly.

COMMENTS -+

Defence Infrastructure Organisation. “Defence Infrastructure Interim Land and Property Disposal Strategy.” October 2011. Accessed 26/06/2014. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/33228/20111005MODLandDisposalStrategy.pdf
Ministry of Defence and Defence Infrastructure Organisation. “Disposal database: House of Commons report”. Last updated 9/05/2014. Accessed 26/06/2014. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/disposal-database-house-of-commons-report
Ministry of Defence. “Annual Report and Accounts 2012-2013”. 16/03/2013. Accessed 26/06/2014. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/222874/MOD_AR13_clean.pdf
National Audit Office, “Reforming the Ministry of Defence: Briefing for the Committee of Public Accounts”, February 2012. Accessed 26/06/2014. http://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/Reforming_the_MoD.pdf
Interview with DSA staff member, conducted via email. 26/06/2014 – 03/07/2014.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: We believe the score should be a 4.

The disposal of plant and equipment is managed through the DSA. Disposal of land and property is managed by the Defence Infrastructure Organisation (DIO).

The DSA uses the internal 10 year equipment plans to forecast disposals from financial perspective but relies on individual project teams to provide the advice that allows the DSA to commence its marketing activity.

The Disposal Services Authority (DSA) manages the business of equipment disposals. The DSA has a capital equipment sales team that sells on a government-to-government basis. The remainder is disposed of by its Commercial Disposal Team who will sell capital assets such as ships and aircraft, generally, through open competitive tender marketed and publicised on its .gov.uk website. The majority of inventory including vehicles is sold through contracts which are awarded following full and open competitions covering the general sale of surplus equipment from naval and aircraft spares to clothing and ink cartridges. Equipment for sale is promoted on companies individual websites all of which are linked to the DSA ‘s .gov.uk site

Financials related to the disposal of assets are documented in the MOD annual report and accounts.

Suggested score: 4

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

23.
score
4

Is independent and transparent scrutiny of asset disposals conducted by defence establishments, and are the reports of such scrutiny publicly available?

Researcher4085: There are no bodies dedicated to asset disposal scrutiny but accountability exists in the normal channels that scrutinise all aspects of the defence sector. The National Audit Office (NAO), which is independent of Parliament, audits the MoD’s accounts, which discuss the disposal of assets and estates.

The NAO can also conduct independent “examinations into the economy, efficiency and effectiveness” of defence bodies and this includes the MoD and its Arms Length Bodies (ALBs). The NAO has a right to access the records of the organisation it audits.

The Defence Select Committee also has powers to scrutinise the expenditure, administration and policy of the MoD and its ALBs. The committee can demand documents, summon witnesses and appoint advisers to assist its investigations. Both organisations publish reports in a timely manner and their websites provide regular updates on the stages and progress of inquiries.

COMMENTS -+

National Audit Act 1983. http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1983/44/contents
National Audit Office. “About Us”. Accessed on 25/06/2014. http://www.nao.org.uk/about-us/
Parliament. 'Defence Committee - role' Visited on 09/06/2014 http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/defence-committee/role/
Ministry of Defence. “Annual Report and Accounts 2012-2013”. 16/03/2013. Accessed 26/06/2014. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/222874/MOD_AR13_clean.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

24.
score
2

What percentage of defence and security expenditure in the budget year is dedicated to spending on secret items relating to national security and the intelligence services?

Researcher4085: Intelligence services are funded through the Single Intelligence Account. The Intelligence and Security Committee, which oversees the operations of the Security Service (MI5), Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) and Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) publishes the Single Intelligence Account spending in its annual report. In 2013-14 it was £2,079,000,000. The budgets of each of the agencies are not provided because publication is considered to prejudice national security. However the National Audit Office provides independent assurance of the agencies’ accounts. In 2012-13 the defence budget totalled £45,584,312,000 (Total Net Resource Outturn + Total Net Capital Outturn), meaning intelligence spending comprised 4.56% of this.

No independent commentary was found on this topic during this research, however these figures are derived from independently audited 2014 accounts. The Open Budget Index also cites 2012 security service spending at a similar level to 2014, noting its sources are HM Treasury.

Response to Government Reviewer: disagree. The score is given based on the scoring criteria. Score maintained.

COMMENTS -+

Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament. “Annual Report 2012-2013”. 10/07/2013. Accessed 26/06/2014. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/211553/31176_HC_547_ISC.PDF
Ministry of Defence. “Annual Report and Accounts 2012-2013”, pp34, 114-115. 16/07/2013. Accessed 26/06/2014.
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/222874/MOD_AR13_clean.pdf
Open Budget Survey, &quoute;Open Budget Index 2012 - United Kingdom&quoute;. http://internationalbudget.org/wp-content/uploads/UK_Questionnaire_OBS2012.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: We believe the score criteria is unfair. Given the increased threats to the UK, it is necessary to spend more to protect us. Sir Bernard Hogan-Howe, Head of the Metropolitan Police recently stated that the Met Police foiled 5 terrorist plots in the last four months. He has demanded an extra £50m to fund counter-terror operations: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/11298437/Sir-Bernard-Hogan-Howe-Britain-was-just-days-from-Sydney-style-siege.html

Suggested score: 4

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: I have no reason to doubt the figures you quote, from public sources, on the size of secret expenditure on on intelligence and security, and from this your mark derives automatically. But it is an odd sort of secrecy: the size of the secret vote is published, its contents are not. And the effect of the marking system is to make it a matter of reproof, as it were, that the UK spends significantly on intelligence and security.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

25.
score
4

Is the legislature (or the appropriate legislative committee or members of the legislature) given full information for the budget year on the spending of all secret items relating to national security and military intelligence?

Researcher4085: Each of the three intelligence agencies produces its own set of accounts in accordance with the Government Financial Reporting Manual and Treasury directions. Publication is considered by the Intelligence and Security Committee to prejudice national security so they are withheld from public view, which instead publishes a consolidated report on the activities and limited financial information of each the agencies.

To provide information on agencies activity to the legislature and the public, an aggregated set of accounts, audited by the C&AG, is published that combines the spending of the three agencies. Resource spending is itemised to include staff costs, purchase of goods and services, income from sales of goods and services, rentals, depreciation and other resource spending.

The accounts of each agency are audited by the C&AG and provided for inspection to the Chair of the Committee of Public Accounts in line with s.2(3)(b) of the Intelligence Services Act 1994.

COMMENTS -+

Intelligence Services Act 1994. http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1994/13/contents
Sir Kim Darroch, Principal Accounting Officer of the Single Intelligence Account, National Security Advisor to the Prime Minister. “Security and Intelligence Agencies Financial Statement 2012-2013”. 19/06/2013. Accessed 26/06/2014.
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/246792/0027.pdf
Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament. “Annual Report 2012-2013”. 10/07/2013. Accessed 26/06/2014. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/211553/31176_HC_547_ISC.PDF
HM Government. &quoute;Government financial reporting manual 2014 to 2015.&quoute; Accessed 05/11/14.
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/government-financial-reporting-manual

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

26.
score
3

Are audit reports of the annual accounts of the security sector (the military, police, and intelligence services) and other secret programs provided to the legislature (or relevant committee) and are they subsequently subject to parliamentary debate?

Researcher4085: A handful of legislators (the Prime Minister and the nine members of the Intelligence and Security Committee) have full access to audited accounts of the UK’s three intelligence agencies, the Security Service (SS), the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) and Government Communications Head Quarters (GCHQ). The rest of the legislature, and the public, has access to an audited financial statement that aggregates the accounts of the three agencies and provides limited detail on their resource and capital spending. There is evidence of dialogue between the government (Cabinet Office) and the Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) but no evidence of a wider debate.

The individual accounts of the three intelligence agencies are audited by the Comptroller and Auditor General (C&AG) but withheld from general publication because of the potential prejudice to national security. The C&AG presents full copies of the accounts to the Chair of the Public Accounts Committee for inspection. The ISC, which oversees the expenditure, administration, policy and some operational aspects of the three agencies also has access to the agencies' accounts.

The ISC prepares an annual report that details the work of the agencies and its own oversight activities and presents it to the Prime Minister. A redacted version of this report is published to the public. The government also publishes a response, in which a dialogue between the ISC and government position can be read. Neither the report for 2013-14 nor the response to the 2012-13 report had been published online at time of research.

The House of Commons is presented with a financial statement of the aggregated accounts of the three intelligence agencies, which is audited by the C&AG. The combined funding vehicle of the agencies is called the Single Intelligence Account. The audited statement, called the Security and Intelligence Agencies Financial Statement, outlines total spending and breaks it down into basic categories such as staff costs and purchases of goods and services. Evidence of parliamentary debate of intelligence agency budgets is limited. There are no digital Hansard records pertaining to the “Single Intelligence Account” or “Security and intelligence Agencies Financial Statement” in the Commons or Lords debates.

Response to Peer Reviewer 2: Disagree. The question relates only to secret expenditure within the security sector.

COMMENTS -+

Sir Kim Darroch, Principal Accounting Officer of the Single Intelligence Account, National Security Advisor to the Prime Minister. “Security and Intelligence Agencies Financial Statement 2012-2013”. 19/06/2013. Accessed 26/06/2014.
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/246792/0027.pdf
Intelligence Services Act 1994
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1994/13/contents
Intelligence and Security Committee. “Annual Report 2012-13”. July 2013.
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/211553/31176_HC_547_ISC.PDF
Intelligence and Security Committee. “Annual Report 2011-12”. July 2012. Accessed 26/06/2014.
http://isc.independent.gov.uk/files/2011-2012_ISC_AR.pdf
Cabinet Office. “Government Response to the Intelligence and Security Committee’s Annual Report 2011-12”. November 2012. Accessed 26/06/2014.
http://isc.independent.gov.uk/files/2011-2012_ISC_AR_Govt_Response.pdf

Google Site Search of the Hansard House of Commons Debates for Security and Intelligence Agencies financial statement. ‘site:parliament.uk/business/publications/hansard/commons/ &quoute;Security and Intelligence Agencies financial statement&quoute;’. Conducted 27/06/2014.
Google Site Search of the Hansard House of Commons Debates for Single Intelligence Account. ‘site:parliament.uk/business/publications/hansard/commons/ &quoute; Single Intelligence Account &quoute;.’ Conducted 27/06/2014.
Google Site Search of the Hansard House of Lords Debates for Single Intelligence Account. ‘site:parliament.uk/business/publications/hansard/lords/ &quoute;single intelligence account&quoute;’. Conducted 27/06/2014.
Google Site Search of the Hansard House of Lords Debates for Security and Intelligence Agencies financial statement. ‘site:parliament.uk/business/publications/hansard/lords/ &quoute;Security and Intelligence Agencies financial statement&quoute;’. Conducted 27/06/2014.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: The answer is correct if the question refers only to secret intelligence and security expenditure. Accounts for the police and military are entirely open.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

27.
score
4

Off-budget military expenditures are those that are not formally authorised within a country's official defence budget, often considered to operate through the 'back-door'. In law, are off-budget military expenditures permitted, and if so, are they exceptional occurrences that are well-controlled?

Researcher4085: All government spending is authorised through an annual Finance Bill, which is subject to parliamentary scrutiny and approval. Prior to the passing of the Bill, the Chancellor presents his Budget and four days of parliamentary debate follow. Prior to this, government departments submit budgetary estimates in Main Supply Estimate submissions, which are then incorporated into the Budget.

The budget process in the UK is considered highly transparent by independent commentators, as evidenced by the Open Budget Index. The defence budget, like all other central government departments, is subject to parliamentary scrutiny. The accounts of the MoD and its Arms Length Bodies are audited by the C&AG and his National Audit Office. Intelligence agency expenditure is also recorded through the Single Intelligence Account and audited financial statements are presented to parliament.

COMMENTS -+

Parliament. “The Budget and Parliament”. Accessed 27/06/2014.
http://www.parliament.uk/about/how/occasions/budget/
Open Budget Index. “Country Summary: United Kingdom”. Accessed 27/06/2014.
http://internationalbudget.org/wp-content/uploads/OBI2012-UnitedKingdomCS-English.pdf
National Audit Office. “History of the NAO”. Accessed 27/06/2014.
http://www.nao.org.uk/about-us/what-we-do/history-of-the-nao/

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

28.
score
N/A

In practice, are there any off-budget military expenditures? If so, does evidence suggest this involves illicit economic activity?

Researcher4085: There is no evidence of off-budget expenditure. Although there may be concerns about the transparency of spending within the military and defence budgets, these expenditures are accounted for. This does not preclude off-budget spending but the independently confirmed standard of budgetary transparency allows us to conclude it is highly unlikely.

COMMENTS -+

Parliament. “The Budget and Parliament”. Accessed 27/06/2014.
http://www.parliament.uk/about/how/occasions/budget/
Open Budget Index. “Country Summary: United Kingdom”. Accessed 27/06/2014.
http://internationalbudget.org/wp-content/uploads/OBI2012-UnitedKingdomCS-English.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

29.
score
3

In law, are there provisions regulating mechanisms for classifying information on the grounds of protecting national security, and, if so, are they subject to effective scrutiny?

Researcher4085: The UK has a strong system for classifying historical national security information but a weak one for classifying ‘live’ information. Historical information affecting national security is regulated by the Public Records Act. There is no legal framework for classifying information currently in administrative use although the Cabinet Office produces policy and guidance for public authorities to follow.

The Public Records Acts of 1958 and 1967 regulate the classification of national security information in the UK. Section 3(4) of the Act states that all public records must be transferred to the Public Record Office after 30 years unless they are required for administrative purposes or another “special reason”. The Lord Chancellor has written a guidance document, valid from 2012 to 2021, that explains the ‘special reason’ for which information can be withheld is if it “will create a real risk of prejudice to national security.” Schedule 1 outlines the persons responsible for classifying national security information (typically a Secretary of State or Chief Executive) and Schedule 2 of the document outlines the types of information that can prejudice national security. NOTE: The 30 year rule has now been reduced to 20.

There are no other legal provisions on classifying national security information. The Official Secrets Act 1989 makes it an offence to disclose information in a range of circumstances, but it contains no provisions on the classification of information.

The classification of information for administrative use is led by the Cabinet Office, which recently oversaw implementation of the new Government Security Classifications (implemented April 2014). This outlines how sensitive information is to be stored and managed. There are three categories; official, secret and top secret, which replace the old system of five levels of classification. The Cabinet Office provides guidance on how to interpret the three levels of sensitivity (pages 7-10).

The Ministry of Defence regularly publishes information it discloses under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) on its website.

Response to Government Reviewer: Accepted. Score raised to 3.

COMMENTS -+

Public Records Act 1958
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Eliz2/6-7/51/contents
Official Secrets Act 1989
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1989/6/contents Lord Chancellor, “RETENTION OF PUBLIC RECORDS UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958”. 19/12/2011. Accessed 27/06/2014.
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/219904/security-intelligence-instrument.pdf
Cabinet Office. “Government Security Classifications: April 2014”. Version 1 (October 2013). Accessed 27/06/2014.
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/251480/Government-Security-Classifications-April-2014.pdf
Home Office and Lord Taylor of Holbeach CBE. “Twenty-year rule on public records”. 17/04/2013. Accessed 27/06/2014.
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/twenty-year-rule-on-public-records
FOI responses published by MOD: week commencing 28 September 2015, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/foi-responses-published-by-mod-week-commencing-28-september-2015

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: The score should be 3.

In respect of the new Classification Policy (that replaced the Government Protective Marking Scheme) and protective security policy generally the UK has taken steps to make these arrangements transparent and accessible to everyone. Our overarching Security Policy Framework (signed off by the Cabinet Secretary on behalf of the Prime Minister) and much of the supporting guidance is now published on Gov.UK. This includes full details of the Classification Policy and a raft of FAQ type guidance notes on how it should be used in government, and also by our commercial partners. Full details of our personnel security policies, including recruitment checks and national security vetting arrangements, are also available online.

Whilst the Classification Policy itself is not a statutory regime, it is fully coherent with the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) which provides the legislative framework within which requests for HMG and other public bodies’ information should be handled. Whilst there are absolute exemptions for information generated by the Security and Intelligence Agencies, the vast majority of information can be released subject to damage tests which also take full account of the widest public interest. An independent Information Commissioner’s Office oversees organisations’ proper application of FOIA, and Information Tribunals provides a fully independent judicial process to hear appeals against decisions to withhold information from release.

Suggested score: 3

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: I think the score, from the definitions stated, is probably right, but the phrase &quoute;little control is exercised&quoute; is a little harsh, though the control is administrative rather than legal.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

30.
score
3

Do national defence and security institutions have beneficial ownership of commercial businesses? If so, how transparent are details of the operations and finances of such businesses?

Researcher4085: The MoD controls three Executive Defence Agencies that are established as trading funds: the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (DSTL), UK Hydrographic Office (UKHO) and the Defence Support Group (DSG). Each fund publishes its own set of accounts and is fully transparent about its turnover, expenses, assets and profits. Profits before tax for each body in 2012/13 were as follows:

UKHO £22m
DSTL £26m
DSG £17m

There has not been an attempt to value each body’s assets and liabilities. DSTL accounts are complex and include subsidiary companies, so it's not straightforward for a member of the general public to do this. The MoD's 2013 budget was £45.6 billion. The valuation methodology is therefore important in determining whether a 3 or 4 will be the final score outcome.

Response to all reviewers: Comments and source updated. The Peer Reviewer below has provided analysis that supports a score of 3 below.

COMMENTS -+

Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (DSTL). “Annual Report and Accounts 2012-2013”. Accessed 27/06/2014.
https://www.dstl.gov.uk/downloads/Annual%20Report%20and%20Accounts%202012_13.pdf
UK Hydrographic Office (UKHO). “Annual Report and Accounts 2012-2013”. Accessed 27/06/2014.
https://www.ukho.gov.uk/Aboutus/Documents/UKHO-AR-2012-13.pdf
Defence Support Group (DSG). “Annual Report and Accounts 2012-2013”. Accessed 27/06/2014.
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/246742/0238.pdf
Oil Pipelines Agency (OPA). “Annual Report and Accounts 2012-2013”. Accessed 27/06/2014.
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/263992/0391.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: These businesses are all transparent and are covered in the MOD Corporate Report.

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: We believe this should be a 4. (please note that TI scored this question a 4 in the previous assessment in 2013).

DSTL, UKHO and DSG are wholly owned trading funds of the MOD.

DSTL supply science and technology services to the MOD and wider government. Grant Thornton provide DSTL’s internal audit. The NAO audit DSTL’s accounts. Their annual report is located here:
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/defence-science-and-technology-laboratory-annual-report-and-accounts-2013-to-2014

UKHO produces nautical publications and services for the Royal Navy and merchant shipping, to protect lives at sea. PWC provide internal audit for UKHO. The NAO audit UKHO accounts. Their annual report is located here: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-united-kingdom-hydrographic-office-annual-report-and-accounts-2013-to-2014

DSG
DSG provides the MOD with secure access to assured onshore capacity and capability for the through life maintenance, repair, overhaul, upgrade and procurement support services for defence equipment.  Their annual report is located here: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/defence-support-group-annual-report-and-accounts-2013-to-2014

Suggested score: 4

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: I can't see exactly how this translates into an ethical judgement - the MOD's assessment of what functions it should perform in-house, what functions can most efficiently be performed through a trading fund operated by the Ministry but with outside customers, and what functions are best placed in the commercial sector, is made on grounds of efficiency and effectiveness. The performance and accounts of each are made public in detail. There is a trend towards putting more and more activities into the private sector and recently it was announced that one of the three MOD trading organisations you list, DSG, has been sold to Babcock for £140m. I can think of no others, nor do the MOD Report and Accounts mention any: there used to be many more, including the Defence Evaluation and Research Agenct, now privatised as Qinetic, and the Meteorological Office, now transferred to the Department for Business and Science.
Study of the Web-published Annual Reports and Accounts for MOD (for 2012-3) and DSTL, UKHO and DSG (for 2013-4) shows the following:
MOD: Total spending (resource and capital): £48bn (this is virtually the same as income)
Net assets: £111bn
DSTL: Total revenue: £661m
Total assets less liabilities £370m
UKHO: Total revenue: £130m
Total assets less liabilities: £125m
DSG: Revenue: £179m
Total assets less liabilities: £151m
This shows that the MOD-owned businesses account for 2% of its income and just over a half percent of its assets.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

31.
score
4

Are military-owned businesses subject to transparent independent scrutiny at a recognised international standard?

Researcher4085: The MoD’s three trading funds, the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (DSTL), UK Hydrographic Office (UKHO) and the Defence Support Group (DSG), are audited by the C&AG and his National Audit Office under the terms of the Government Trading Funds Act 1973. The audits are conducted in accordance with the International Standards on Auditing (UK and Ireland), which require National Audit Office to comply with the Auditing Practices Board’s Ethical Standards for Auditors. For the Certificate of the Comptroller and Auditor General to the Houses of Parliament o the DSTL, UKHO and DSG accounts see pages 86, 26 and 42 of each set of accounts, respectively. These accounts are published annually.

COMMENTS -+

Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (DSTL). “Annual Report and Accounts 2012-2013”. Accessed 27/06/2014.
https://www.dstl.gov.uk/downloads/Annual%20Report%20and%20Accounts%202012_13.pdf
UK Hydrographic Office (UKHO). “Annual Report and Accounts 2012-2013”. Accessed 27/06/2014.
https://www.ukho.gov.uk/Aboutus/Documents/UKHO-AR-2012-13.pdf
Defence Support Group (DSG). “Annual Report and Accounts 2012-2013”. Accessed 27/06/2014.
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/246742/0238.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

32.
score
4

Is there evidence of unauthorised private enterprise by military or other defence ministry employees? If so, what is the government's reaction to such enterprise?

Researcher4085: A review of media sources, the Parliament Defence Select Committee and Hansard and interviews with senior members of two leading relevant independent organisations indicates that there is no evidence of unauthorised private military enterprise by military or MoD employees.

COMMENTS -+

Parliament. “Hansard”. Accessed 04/07/2014.
http://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/hansard/
Defence Select Committee. “Publications”. Accessed 04/07/20914.
http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/defence-committee/publications/
Telephone interview with senior researcher at civil society organisation on 03/07/2014.
Interview with senior member of a defence and security think tank on 04/07/2014.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Policies & codes 90
34.
score
2

Do the Defence Ministry, Defence Minister, Chiefs of Defence, and Single Service Chiefs publicly commit - through, for example, speeches, media interviews, or political mandates - to anti-corruption and integrity measures?

Researcher4085: Tackling corruption in the UK is coordinated at a high level by the commitments and objectives of the national Anti Corruption Plan. UK Defence leadership also incorporates anti-corruption strategy through the Defence Audit Committee (DAC), which is a sub-committee of the Defence Board (the highest committee in the MoD). The DAC reviews the risk control, assurance and anti-corruption work of the department and formulates strategic advice for the Defence Board.

Public statements on tackling corruption and building integrity in the UK are very rare. Searches for statements by the Secretary of State, the Minister of State for the Armed Forces, and the Minister of State for Defence Equipment, Support and Technology (including Defence Exports) in particular across the UK media (specifically the Telegraph, the Guardian and the BBC) revealed no statements on corruption, bribery, facilitation payments and conflicts of interest. Similar searches for the Chief of General Staff, the First Sea Lord and the Chief of the Air Staff were also fruitless.

Response to Reviewers: comment and score updated and score changed from 1 to 2.

COMMENTS -+

Defence Audit Committee. “Terms of Reference for the Defence Audit Committee”. March 2013. Accessed 01/07/2014 https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/224069/20130204_mar13_dac_tors.pdf
Series of site searches of the Telegraph, Guardian and BBC for the names of senior defence officials and key words including anti-corruption, corruption, bribery, conflicts of interest and integrity.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: Update: The UK national anti corruption plan was published by the government on 18 December 2014, which includes a specific section on action plans for the MoD - https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-anti-corruption-plan

Commitment is very clear and this is expressed by the Accounting Officer and the Chief of Defence Annually and the Defence Fraud Board is its visible manifestation, although it may not be publically stated strongly.

This would more than satisfy &quoute;some evidence of commitment to anti-corruption and integrity measures by the Defence Ministry and senior members of the Armed Forces, though this commitment is not publicly stated&quoute; and would even satisfy a score of '3' &quoute;There is good evidence of commitment to anti-corruption and integrity measures by the Defence Ministry, and this commitment is publicly stated – though perhaps not strongly&quoute; .. but it does not meet the second test of Score 3, i.e. &quoute;There is evidence that this is reflected throughout the defence ministry and armed forces by similar commitments from senior ministry staff and senior armed forces officers, though this is again not strongly publicly stated&quoute;.

I am most inclined to go with score 3 as a suggestion.



Suggested score: 3

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: We believe the score should be a 2.

Announcement by The Prime Minister (Mr David Cameron): I am pleased to announce that I have appointed my right hon. Friend, the Minister for Business and Enterprise, as the Government’s new Anti-Corruption Champion. He will oversee the Government response to domestic and international corruption and his appointment demonstrates the Government’s continued commitment to tackling this issue both at home and abroad.
Source: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmhansrd/cm141013/wmstext/141013m0001.htm

Announcement by the Home Secretary, Theresa May:
“Organised crime often depends on bribery and corruption. And organised criminals use a range of professionals – wittingly or unwittingly – to facilitate their activity: to launder their criminal profits, to evade arrest and prosecution, to secure procurement contracts corruptly. In the next few weeks, we will publish a cross-government anti-corruption plan – clearly setting out the actions we are taking to tackle corruption both here in the UK and overseas. From stamping out corruption in the police to ensuring greater transparency over the ownership of companies, we will do more to make sure that corruption is no longer a tool of choice for organised criminals.”
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/home-secretarys-speech-on-organised-crime-at-rusi

Suggested score: 2

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Not Qualified

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

35.
score
4

Are there effective measures in place for personnel found to have taken part in forms of bribery and corruption, and is there public evidence that these measures are being carried out?

Researcher4085: Measures appear to be in place to deal with those who have taken part in bribery and corruption but a lack of available data prevents full analysis. Bribery and corruption are investigated by the Ministry of Defence Police’s (MDP) which works with the CPS or SFO to bring prosecutions. The 3 Service Police forces (Army, Navy, Air Force) refer cases to the Service Prosecuting Authority (SPA) to bring cases to prosecute cases at Court Martial or Service Civilian Court.

There is limited data available on the MDP's effectiveness because the MDP has not published an annual report online since it's 2013 reorganisation. The SPA, meanwhile, has not published a report on its website since 2009. Court Martial data is published online in a spreadsheet which shows that 159 prosecutions for fraud have taken place between 2010 and 2015, however, no information on the nature of the cases is provided so it is difficult to know whether measures are consistently applied. For example, in 2010, an Army Gunner was found guilty of 15 counts of fraud and given a suspended sentence of 35 days detention and a £75 service compensation order (row 69 of Court Martial data supplied in sources box) however elsewhere in the data a court martial conviction for fraud appears to carry a sentence of 3-12 months.

Previous reports by the MDP indicate that the former unit for investigating bribery, the Criminal Investigation Unit, was reasonably effective at bringing prosecutions. Its 2011-12 report provides a summary of successful prosecutions for which it was the investigating body. Evidence shows it had some good successes such as the prosecution of two MoD civil servants for fraud and corruption. However this information is relatively limited and does not give a perspective on the MDP’s caseload, efficiency or prosecution rate so it is difficult to judge its effectiveness.

It is important to note that academic studies, investigative journalism and NGO reports on this subject are scarce and alternative perspectives could not be located during research. In cases such as these the media is usually reporting the information as a news story and not seeking to disprove allegations. Moreover, the case above was not carried by the Guardian, the Independent or the Telegraph in 2012, although the Guardian reported on a press release released by the Serious Fraud Office in 2010.

Response to Government Reviewer: The links provided are insufficiently specific to review with the exception of the Court Martial data. The court martial data provided is useful, but it does not give a macro picture, and there remains a lack of evidence about how and why cases are brought for bribery and corruption. While more granularity would be useful, the score has been raised to 4 on the basis that there is evidence of sanctions being applied and there is no clear evidence to suggest that they aren't,

COMMENTS -+

Service Prosecuting Authority. “First Report and Business Plan”. January 2009. Accessed 02/07/2014.
http://spa.independent.gov.uk/linkedfiles/spa/report2008.pdf
Ministry of Defence Police and Guarding Agency. “Annual Report and Accounts 2011-2012”. 09/07/2012. Accessed 02/07/2014.
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/229057/0276.pdf
Henry McDonald, “Four charged with bribery at MoD base”, The Guardian, 14/02/2014.
http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2010/feb/14/four-charged-bribery-ministry-defence
gov.uk &quoute;MOD police.&quoute; Accessed 20/09/15
https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/ministry-of-defence-police

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: The score should be 4.

Please note that the MDP do not work with the SPA to bring cases to prosecution – they use the CPS or on occasion run joint investigations with the SFO who prosecute.

The Criminal Investigation Unit is actually a CID.

Court martial and Crown Prosecution Data is publicly available:

http://cps.gov.uk/data/index.html
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/court-martial-results-from-the-military-court-centres
https://www.gov.uk/search?q=Court+martial
https://www.gov.uk/service-prosecuting-authority

The MOD produces Monthly Dashboards detailing cases of bribery and corruption to senior MOD staff (of 2*/3* level).

Suggested score: 4

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: 3 is probably the right score, although the stated criterion does not quite fit: the true position is I believe that MOD deals strictly with bribery and corruption but may not have published the evidence to prove this. There are strict rules to prevent eg the acceptance of gifts or hospitality. Criminal offences are prosecuted - if they are rare, therefore rarely reported, this is scarcely evidence of a slack approach.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

36.
score
2

Is whistleblowing encouraged by the government, and are whistle-blowers in military and defence ministries afforded adequate protection from reprisal for reporting evidence of corruption, in both law and practice?

Researcher4085: Civilian and Armed Forces staff are subject to different whistleblowing policies. Civilians enjoy the right to act on their conscience and some legal protection from reprisals but neither of these extend to Service Personnel.

The MoD operates a whistleblowing policy that applies to all civil servants in the MoD and its Arms Length Bodies (ALBs). The policy was updated and internally published in March 2014. The Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 protects civilians working in the MoD and its ALBs from reprisals if they blow the whistle in the public interest.

A 2014 Public Accounts Committee(PAC) report on whistleblowing across government states: &quoute;In a survey of Ministry of Defence employees, only 40% of respondents felt they would not suffer reprisals if they raised a concern&quoute;. This suggests that there is little trust among officials that they would be provided protection when blowing the whistle. It is important to understand defence bodies are active on this issue and seeking to resolve the issue by listening to and working with the PAC and charity Public Concern at Work (see reviewer comments below).

Service Personnel are subject to the same whistleblowing policy as their civilian counterparts, however, they do not enjoy parity of protection or freedoms. Service Personnel are also excluded from the protection afforded to civilians in the Public Interest Disclosure Act. Service Personnel are forbidden from discussing work related issues with political representatives. In 2012 an MP called for civilian protections to be extended across the Armed Forces.

Comment to Transparency International UK Chapter and Government Reviewer: there is no statutory protection for service personnel. The MoD PUS letter states: &quoute;This extends to both military and civilian recognising that civilians can be afforded protection in law but the Armed Forces have no statutory protection regarding qualifying disclosures.&quoute; The MoD does not address this distinction, which is made clearly in my original comments, in its response.

Comment to Transparency International UK Chapter Reviewer: the PAC report referenced states: &quoute;In a survey of Ministry of Defence employees, only 40% of respondents felt they would not suffer reprisals if they raised a concern&quoute;. The final link provided does not appear to work. However it seems correct to score the MoD on the basis of past performance, rather than future commitments.

COMMENTS -+

Public Concern at Work. “FAQ answers > Do Whistleblowers have legal protection?”. Accessed 02/07/2014.
http://www.pcaw.org.uk/faq-answers
Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998. http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/23/contents
Ministry of Defence. “Handling matters of conscience, reporting concerns at work and ‘whistleblowing’ in the MoD – the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998” (released in response to a FOIA request). 01/12/2008. Accessed 02/07/2014. https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/31934/response/96157/attach/html/4/PRGReportingConcernsatWorkandWhistleblowingintheMOD.pdf.html
“Call to protect armed forces whistleblowers by SNP MP”, the BBC, 29/07/2012. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-19037553
Public Accounts Committee. &quoute;Whistleblowing&quoute;. 16/07/2014. Accessed 20/09/2015.
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmselect/cmpubacc/593/593.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: The government's commitment is clear and there is legal protection for whistle-blowers. MOD published, internally, a new whistle blowing policy in March 2014, and which was due for review in April 2015. It was based on advice from Public Concern at Work - which it uses - and applies to civilian and to military personnel, subject to qualification . MOD was also one of the departments which were the subject of a published PAC report on whistle-blowing in Spring 2014, http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/public-accounts-committee/news/report-whistleblowing-policy/

https://www.gov.uk/government/.../45502_Cm_8988_Accessible.pdf: this report indicates the acceptance of all PAC recommendations and commits departments to actions: steering group of permanent secretaries chaired by MOD - 7.3 refers. Military personnel have additional source of complaint about grievances to the Service Complaints Commissioner (shortly to become Ombudsman) who is a Crown appointee independent of the Chain of Command.

Suggested score: 3

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: We believe the score should be 3.

The MOD Permanent Under Secretary (PUS) is the Whistleblowing Champion. The MOD is undertaking a project to further enhance our current whistleblowing procedures, which will include an awareness campaign to encourage whistleblowing.

An internal brief that was sent to all Military and Civilian staff on 31st March 2014 to raise awareness about the new Whistleblowing and Raising a Concern Policy. The brief was written by the PUS and the Chief of Defence Personnel:


ISSUE: tPUS and CDP write to all staff about the new Whistleblowing and Raising a Concern policy
AUDIENCE: tAll Service and Civilian Personnel
TIMING: tRoutine
ACTION: tTo be briefed for Information and Action
KEYPOINTS:
Permanent Secretary, Jon Thompson and Chief of Defence Personnel, Lieutenant General Andrew Gregory have today, 31 March, written to staff about the new Whistleblowing and Raising a Concern policy. The full text of their letter can be found below.

DETAIL:

Dear colleagues
If you have a concern about wrongdoing at work we want you to have the confidence to speak up and be secure in the knowledge that it is safe and acceptable to do so. From today, Monday 31 March, the new Whistleblowing and Raising a Concern policy sets out how and when you can report a concern at work.

We want to set out our policy for circumstances where you believe the interests of others in your unit, establishment or organisation, the public or of the Department or the Services themselves are at risk as a result of wrongdoing – this can relate to past, present or imminent wrongdoing, or an attempt to cover up wrongdoing.

It is our intention to create a positive ‘whistleblowing’ culture so that you feel that concerns can be raised and dealt with quickly and professionally. This in turn can help deter and detect wrongdoing, saves lives, property, jobs, money and reputations, and reduce the chance of individuals claiming they have no recourse but to leak information particularly to the media.

The MOD is committed to ensuring that no one who raises such issues when following these procedures suffers unfairly or negatively for doing so. This extends to both military and civilian recognising that civilians can be afforded protection in law but the Armed Forces have no statutory protection regarding qualifying disclosures. It is important you are aware of the detail of the policy so you are properly protected. Providing you are acting honestly, it does not matter that you may be mistaken. However, anyone who maliciously raises a matter they know to be untrue is at risk of disciplinary action.

The key areas covered by this policy and its procedures include:
- Guidance on what is a relevant concern
- Guidance on how to raise such a concern
- Information on how it will be handled
- Information on confidentiality and anonymity
- Provision of protection and support to employees

Everyone who works in Defence has a responsibility to speak up if faced with, or having a suspicion of, wrongdoing. Equally, MOD has a duty to provide a safe and straightforward framework in which people can do this free from any threat of victimisation. Individuals, both civilian and military, therefore have a responsibility to use the system we are announcing today and MOD has an equal duty to protect them; we give our personal pledge that we will not tolerate any form of retribution taken against people using the system in good faith to raise a genuine concern.

This policy is being launched in the same week as the creation of the new Chief of Defence Personnel (CDP) organisation which is now responsible for both civilian and military HR policy. This will enable CDP to lead on developing an integrated people strategy and a ‘Whole Force’ approach to people capability.

For general policy advice and guidance please contact People Services.

Best regards
Jon Thompson
Permanent under Secretary t

Lieutenant General Andrew Gregory
Chief of Defence Personnel

Suggested score: 3

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Not Qualified

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

37.
score
3

Is special attention paid to the selection, time in post, and oversight of personnel in sensitive positions, including officials and personnel in defence procurement, contracting, financial management, and commercial management?

Researcher4085: Personnel in sensitive positions are vetted to ensure operational effectiveness, and mitigating corruption risk falls within scope of this objective. However there is limited clarity as to when and how special attention may be applied.

Personnel in militarily sensitive positions are subject to Security Clearance (SC) checks and Developed Vetting (DV). DV is described as intrusive and rigorous by both a serving officer and an academic who were both interviewed for this research. It includes analysis of personal finances, extensive reference checks and general assessment of any vulnerabilities. It is conducted at least every nine years. &quoute;Those with DV clearance are assumed to have good character and total integrity&quoute;, a defence academic said in interview.

MoD fraud prevention mechanisms include “the rotation of staff through posts, the separation of duties between those authorising and paying for work and well-established procedures for contracting for services and products” according to a Public Accounts Committee on fraud risk in MoD property management.

Army personnel must sign a Values and Standards documents, to which their behaviour is bound. &quoute;One value is integrity and once this document is signed it is assumed that personnel will not lie, steal or be otherwise disingenuous&quoute; a serving officer explained during interview. &quoute;It is a chain of command function to ensure that corruption does not occur. In respect of oversight there is thus no special attention outside the chain of command for individuals in a sensitive position.&quoute;

Response to Government Reviewer: the review comments do not provide much clarity and do not constitute &quoute;specific rules of conduct&quoute;. Such rules must also be published to score 4. Therefore, 3 remains an appropriate score.

COMMENTS -+

Committee of Public Accounts. “Ministry of Defence: The Risk of Fraud in Property Management”. 25/12/2002. Accessed 10/07/2014.
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200102/cmselect/cmpubacc/647/64702.htm
Ministry of Defence. “National Security Vetting.” 05/06/2014. Accessed 10/07/2014.
https://www.gov.uk/security-vetting-and-clearance
Army. “Values and Standards of the British Army”. 2008. Accessed 05/11/14.
http://www.army.mod.uk/documents/general/v_s_of_the_british_army.pdf
Telephone interview with Army Officer, 10/07/2014.
Interview with senior member of a defence and security think tank on 04/07/2014.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: We believe the score should be 4.

Rotation of personnel in sensitive posts
Ministry of Defence line management and command structures are required to identify posts where protracted occupancy, particularly of sensitive posts, may provide opportunity for the risk of irregularity, fraud, theft and corruption. Where, in light of risk assessment procedures, line managers decide that it would be prudent to move an individual to another post such action can be undertaken through the use of post rotation. Where, on the other hand, compelling business reasons exist to support an individual remaining in post beyond a period where risk assessment ordinarily suggests the need for a move, the continued occupation of the post by the incumbent must be approved at a level of seniority sufficient to ensure a consistent and equitable approach.

We dispute the sentence regarding the objective of SC and DV are not designed to expressly mitigate corruption risk. On the contrary, The National Security Vetting (NSV) not only applied to MOD civilian and military staff but also to their partners. For example, The NSV will conduct financial checks to see if the new member of MOD staff or their partner were or are in the financial difficulty. If this is the case, the potential member of MOD staff could be vulnerable to pressure or bribery. This can imply pressure from organised criminals. For further information, please go to:
https://www.gov.uk/security-vetting-and-clearance

Suggested score: 4

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

38.
score
4

Is the number of civilian and military personnel accurately known and publicly available?

Researcher4085: The MoD publishes the UK Armed Forces Annual Personnel Report, which provides statistics on the composition of the Army, Naval Service and Royal Air Force by rank. It provides further information on the age, gender and ethnicity of the Armed Forces. The report also analyses the intake and outflows of forces in the context of the listed criteria above. As of 1 April 2014 there were 159,630 Regular Forces personnel in the UK Armed Forces. 9.9% of these were women and 7.1 one of these were BME. The Telegraph newspaper also reports a total figure of 159,630 Armed Forces personnel.

The Reserve Forces total is 33,080 (28,860 Volunteer Reserve + 2,260 Active Regular Reserve +1,960 Sponsored Reserve). A 2014 quarterly report on personnel acknowledges that small statistical errors were made in 2013 reports in the Notes and Definitions section (p1). The number of Royal Auxillary Air Force was incorrectly underestimated by 70 while the training status of 130 Army Reserves was incorrectly recorded. Overall the data on personnel is detailed and in line with the UK Code of Practice on Statistics.

COMMENTS -+

Ministry of Defence. “UK Armed Forces Annual Personnel Report.” 21/05/2014. Accessed 30/06/2014.
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-armed-forces-annual-personnel-report-2014
Ministry of Defence. “UK Armed Forces Quarterly Personnel Report.” 15/05/2014. Accessed 30/06/2014.
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/310468/quarterly_personnel_report_apr14.pdf
Joe Shute and Mark Oliver, “Why Britain’s Armed Forces are shrinking by the day and does it really matter?”, The Telegraph. 25 June 2014. Accessed 30/06/2014.
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/10924976/Why-Britains-armed-forces-are-shrinking-by-the-day-and-does-it-really-matter.html

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

39.
score
4

Are pay rates and allowances for civilian and military personnel openly published?

Researcher4085: The pay scales of the Army, Navy and Air Force are all openly published on the respective websites of each force. The remuneration of the Armed Forces is also regularly reviewed by the Armed Forces Pay Review Body.

COMMENTS -+

Royal Air Force. “Current Pay Rates & Charges”. Accessed 30/06/2014.
http://www.raf.mod.uk/community/financial/currentpayratesandcharges.cfm
Army. “Soldier Rates of Pay – April 2013”. Accessed 30/06/2014.
http://www.army.mod.uk/documents/general/Rates_of_pay_Soldier.pdf
Army. “Officer Rates of Pay – April 2013”. Accessed 30/06/2014.
http://www.army.mod.uk/documents/general/Rates_of_Pay_Officer.pdf
Royal Navy. “Pay Details”. Accessed 30/06/2014.
http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/Careers/Pay-Benefits-and-Learning/Pay-Details#pay-by-rank
Armed Forces Pay Review Body. “About us”. Accessed 30/06/2014.
https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/armed-forces-pay-review-body/about

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

40.
score
4

Do personnel receive the correct pay on time, and is the system of payment well-established, routine, and published?

Researcher4085: The system for the remuneration of all Service Personnel is well established and was introduced in 1970, according to the RAF website. Personnel receive a standardised basic rate of pay and, in some circumstances, additional allowances and incentives. There is a lot of information published on the Army, Navy and Air Force websites about salary packages, benefits and the other financial options available to personnel. Pay is set by the Government, which takes advice from the Armed Forces Pay Review Body, which has provided a report to the Secretary of State for Defence and the Prime Minister for 43 years. The Secretary of State presents the findings of the report in a written ministerial statement to Parliament and indicates whether its recommendations are to be accepted or rejected.

There is no evidence that the Armed Forces are not paid on time. Although it is worth noting that payment delivery through the Joint Personnel Administration Centre was introduced in 2007-8 and experienced major difficulties in its first year. The Defence Select Committee observed in its annual report that the National Audit Office (C&AG) was, amidst other problems, unable to verify: “whether the allowances paid to Service personnel were correctly stated; the level of error within the Joint Personnel Administration (JPA) payroll system; and whether selected allowances and expenses paid through JPA were valid due to the lack of supporting documentation.” An MoD spokesman commented in media that: “There were problems with JPA in the first year of operation. Over the last 12 months, significant improvements have been made to the system and further training has been given to Service personnel.” Discussion of these problems is absent in subsequent reports and the problems are assumed to have been corrected.

COMMENTS -+

Army. “Joining the Army > Army Life > Pay”. Accessed 30/06/2014.
http://www.army.mod.uk/join/20097.aspx
Royal Navy. “Pay Details”. Accessed 30/06/2014.
http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/Careers/Pay-Benefits-and-Learning/Pay-Details#pay-by-rank
Armed Forces’ Pay Review Body. “Forty-Third Report 2014”. March 2014. Accessed 05/11/2014.
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/288713/AFPRB_Report_43rd_2014.pdf
Defence Committee Fifth Report. “Ministry of Defence Annual Report and Accounts 2007-08”. Accessed 05/11/14.
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmdfence/214/21402.htm
Hansard. “House of Commons Debate 13 March 2014: Column 33WS”. Accessed 05/11/14.
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmhansrd/cm140313/wmstext/140313m0001.htm#14031363000222

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

41.
score
4

Is there an established, independent, transparent, and objective appointment system for the selection of military personnel at middle and top management level?

Researcher4085: Civilian appointments are well regulated and clear processes for selection are published. Senior military appointments are overseen by the Senior Appointments Committee and the People Committee. Middle management military positions are overseen by promotion boards drawn from outside the chain of command.

The Constitutional Governance and Reform Act (CGRA) 2010 requires that appointments to the civil service “must be on merit on the basis of fair and open competition”. The Act also mandates the creation of a Civil Service Commission to oversee the civil service. By virtue of s.11 of CGRA the Commission must publish a set of recruitment principles to further outline the process of fair and open competition. These recruitment principles apply to all civilian appointments in the MoD. The 2014 principles state that all appointments must be made by a panel of two or more members and that a panel dealing with a senior appointment must contain a Civil Service Commissioner. Further, “the panel must ensure that candidates are impartially assessed against the published essential criteria (competences, skills and experience)&quoute; and it “must take the final decision on which candidate or candidates are the most meritorious” (paras 8, 10).

The MoD's How Defence Works document states the role of the Senior Appointments Committee (SAC): “The SAC is responsible for senior service appointments and aims to identify and develop the top talent across the armed forces. The members of the committee include Joint Forces Command (JFC) (to promote a joint perspective), PUS (for budgetary and management assessment of candidates) and a non-voting private-sector member (to provide an independent view).&quoute; Less senior military promotions are conducted through the use of a promotion board which is convened from outside the chain of command. Promotion is based on selection and not time in post.

The People Committee was established to provide oversight and assurance of senior appointments processes. However, according to MoD annual reports of 2013, 2014 and 2015 the People Committee has met on only three occasions in the three years since its inception (once in 2013, twice in 2014) and at these meetings the committee sometimes debates its purpose. It is not clear exactly what function the committee has served and intends to serve in future.

Comment to reviewers: comments and source updated and score changed from 3 to 4. This was always finely balanced and the People Committee is now further established (09/15) than it was at the time of initial research (06/14).

COMMENTS -+

Constitutional Governance and Reform Act (CGRA) 2010. http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/25/contents
Civil Service Commission. “Recruitment Principles 2014”. Accessed 30/06/2014. http://civilservicecommission.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Recruitment-Principles-April-2014.pdf
Ministry of Defence. “Annual Report and Accounts 2012-2013”. Accessed 30/06/2014. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/222874/MOD_AR13_clean.pdf
Telephone interview with Army Officer on 10/07/2014.
Ministry of Defence. “Annual Report and Accounts 2013-2014”. Accessed 21/09/2015.
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/381064/MOD_AR13-14_webversion.pdf
Ministry of Defence. “Annual Report and Accounts 2014-2015”. Accessed 21/09/2015.
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/445945/20150715-16-MOD-ARAc-combined-at-15-July-2015-web-ready.pdf
Ministry of Defence. “How Defence Works&quoute;. September 2014. Accessed 21/09/2015.
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/420016/20140930_24153_How_Defence_Works.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: The activities of the People Committee are further described in the latest Corporate Report which refers to the establishment of a &quoute;Peoples (sic) Board&quoute; chaired by the Chief of Defence Personnel. In the case of appointments of senior personnel, all civil service appointments are made with the involvement of the independent Civil Service Commission and are subject to formal ratification by the Prime Minister. The objective of the establishment of the People Committee - chaired by a Non-Executive Member of the Board - is explicitly to address concerns about independent oversight of senior, and less senior, appointments on the basis of robust talent management.

Suggested score: 4

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: The score should be 4.

For civilian appointments, the process is underpinned by a fair and open competition and is merit based. Moreover, this process is governed by a government wide civil service policy, which is publicly accessible and is located here: http://civilservicecommission.independent.gov.uk/publications/recruitment-guidance/. This policy also explains that jobs must be advertised publicly. We advertise through Civil Service Jobs.

For military appointments, please see “How Defence Works” pages 12 & 18 relating to appointments and promotions.

Suggested score: 4

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: The criterion for a score of 3 includes the phrase &quoute;there is evidence of cases of appointment not based purely on merit&quoute;. I am not aware of any, nor do you cite them. The criterion for 4 is awkward too - it refers to military appointments only - but taking into account civilian appointments too, I believe a score of 4 is justified.

Suggested score: 4

Peer Reviewer-+

42.
score
4

Are personnel promoted through an objective, meritocratic process? Such a process would include promotion boards outside of the command chain, strong formal appraisal processes, and independent oversight.

Researcher4085: Civilian appointments are based on fair and open competition and regulated by law. The Constitutional Governance and Reform Act (CGRA) 2010 requires that appointments to the civil service “must be on merit on the basis of fair and open competition”. The Act also mandates the creation of a Civil Service Commission to oversee the civil service. By virtue of s.11 of CGRA the Commission must publish a set of recruitment principles to further outline the process of fair and open competition. These recruitment principles apply to all civilian appointments in the MoD. The 2014 principles state that all appointments must be made by a panel of two or more members and that a panel dealing with a senior appointment must contain a Civil Service Commissioner. Further, “the panel must ensure that candidates are impartially assessed against the published essential criteria (competences, skills and experience)&quoute; and it “must take the final decision on which candidate or candidates are the most meritorious” (paras 8, 10).

Senior service personnel are promoted through a meritocratic process, which includes formal appraisal and the use of promotion boards outside the chain of command. The promotion process for every Officer rank above Captain and every Non-Commissioned Officer rank above Sergeant is as follows: all personnel receive an annual report from their Commanding Officer, which evaluates their potential and performance. A serving Army Officer interviewed for this research told me: &quoute;The reports grade officers against 12 criteria such as professional effectiveness, judgement, and intelligence. The reporting process is administered through the Joint Personal Administration Centre and all reports are submitted to the Army Personnel Centre. The reports are compiled and officers’ names are removed. A promotion board is convened from across the Army, and outside the chain of command, which then scrutinises the reports and grades them. A quality line is drawn based on the Army’s requirements and a set percentage of officers of a certain rank are promoted. This is promotion by selection. For promotion to very senior officer level, such as Brigade Commanders and above, the Army Command Group ratifies the decisions of the promotion board.&quoute;

Junior Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers are normally promoted after serving a set period of time and completion of short courses in military theory. There is no independent oversight of these promotions. The Officer also explained: &quoute;Promotion to junior ranks such as Lieutenant and Captain are done without convening a promotion board. These promotions are done within regiment by a Regimental Grading Board. Non-commissioned officer (NCO) ranks of Corporal and Sergeant are promoted by ‘cap badge’ boards. A ‘cap badge’ refers to the specialist solider unit of the NCO e.g. Royal Engineers, Artillery or Infantry. Promotions to these ranks are typically made after a solider has served a set period of time and completed other basic requirements.&quoute; The chain of command was criticised by one retired elite soldier interviewed for this research. Although it purports to be objective and uniform, it was claimed that the promotion process can be manipulated. This allegation could not be substantiated, however, the lack of independent oversight in the system could facilitate such behaviour in the lower ranks of the service.

Response to reviewers: Comment and sources updated and score revised from 3 to 4.

COMMENTS -+

Army. “British Army Structure > Ranks”. Accessed 10/07/2014.
http://www.army.mod.uk/structure/32321.aspx
Telephone interview with Army Officer on 10/07/2014.
Skype interview with retired elite soldier on 08/07/2014.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: It follows from 41 above that there is independent oversight of promotion processes for both senior military and civilian personnel. The Service Complaints Commissioner also provides an important safeguard against abuse.

Suggested score: 4

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: The score should be 4.

For civilian appointments, the process is underpinned by a fair and open competition and is merit based. Moreover, this process is governed by a government wide civil service policy, which is publicly accessible and is located here: http://civilservicecommission.independent.gov.uk/publications/recruitment-guidance/. This policy also explains that jobs must be advertised publicly. We advertise through Civil Service Jobs.

For military appointments, please see “How Defence Works” pages 12 & 18 relating to appointments and promotions.

Suggested score: 4

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: Your sources quoted deal only with the Army. For civilians, your evidence on Question 41 shows how objective the appointments system is (eg a Civil Service Commissioner has to be present at the selection of senior appointments, and the process is regulated by law). For MOD as a whole, your answer to Qn 41 describe the new People Committee, on which there is an independent non-executive, which handles senior appointments.

Suggested score: 4

Peer Reviewer-+

43.
score
N/A

Where compulsory conscription occurs, is there a policy of not accepting bribes for avoiding conscription? Are there appropriate procedures in place to deal with such bribery, and are they applied?

Researcher4085: Conscription was stopped in the UK in 1960.

COMMENTS -+

Imperial War Museum. &quoute;War Shapes Lives.&quoute; Accessed 30/06/2014.
http://archive.iwm.org.uk/server/show/ConWebDoc.1272

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

44.
score
N/A

With regard to compulsory or voluntary conscription, is there a policy of refusing bribes to gain preferred postings in the recruitment process? Are there appropriate procedures in place to deal with such bribery, and are they applied?

Researcher4085: Conscription was stopped in the UK in 1960.

COMMENTS -+

Imperial War Museum. &quoute;War Shapes Lives.&quoute; Accessed 30/06/2014.
http://archive.iwm.org.uk/server/show/ConWebDoc.1272

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

45.
score
4

Is there evidence of 'ghost soldiers', or non-existent soldiers on the payroll?

Researcher4085: The payment of all Service Personnel is administered centrally through the Joint Personnel Administration Centre (JPAC), implemented in 2006. JPAC is overseen by the Service Personnel and Veterans Agency and managed in a Public Private Partnership by a private company Electronic Defence Systems Ltd. Media reports demonstrate that the system suffered protracted teething problems, which saw personnel regularly underpaid and overpaid in 2008. Concerns about expenses fraud were raised by the National Audit Office in 2009 and both Ministry of Defence errors as well as fraud were estimated to cost £140m. There are no subsequent reports of errors, which suggests JPAC was able to solve the problems that were persistent in its early years. There has been no evidence in media reports, Defence Select Committee Reports or Hansard of ‘ghost soldiers’ on the payroll since the JPAC was established.

COMMENTS -+

Helene Mulholland, “Ainsworth rejects claims of armed forces crisis”, The Guardian, 28/01/2008. Accessed 01/07/2014.
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2008/jan/28/immigrationpolicy.uk
Thomas Harding, “MoD error and expenses fraud could total £140 million”, The Telegraph, 21/07/2009. Accessed 01/07/2014.
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/5872812/MoD-error-and-expenses-fraud-could-total-140-million.html
Service Personnel and Veterans Agency. “Who we are; what we do for you; supporting services through life”. Accessed 01/07/2014.
http://www.veterans-uk.info/latest_newsletter/who%20we%20are%20-screen.pdf
Royal Air Force Community Support. “Financial > Pay, Allowances and Pensions”. Accessed 01/07/2014.
http://www.raf.mod.uk/community/financial/payallowancesandpensions.cfm

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

46.
score
4

Are chains of command separate from chains of payment?

Researcher4085: Chains of command and pay are separate throughout the UK military. The Joint Personnel Administration Centre (JPAC) calculates and administers the salaries of the Army, Navy and RAF while also effecting deductions and authorised recoveries such as tax and National Insurance contributions. The JPAC is based in Glasgow. Civilian defence staff salaries are managed by the MoD’s People Service Centre.

Response to reviewers: comments considered and score changed from 3 to 4.

COMMENTS -+

Royal Air Force Community Support. “Financial > Pay, Allowances and Pensions”. Accessed 01/07/2014.
http://www.raf.mod.uk/community/financial/payallowancesandpensions.cfm
Ministry of Defence. “Human resources for civilians working for the Ministry of Defence”. Accessed 01/07/2014.
https://www.gov.uk/human-resources-for-civilians-working-for-the-ministry-of-defence#people-service-centre
Parliament. House of Lords Debate: 22 March 2004: Column WS31. Accessed 01/07/2014.
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200304/ldhansrd/vo040322/text/40322-49.htm

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: The commentary suggests a score of 4

Suggested score: 4

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: The score should be 4.

Chain of command are separate from chains of payment. Work continues on a new pay system, potentially for introduction in 2016. The new system would provide greater pay predictability and remove some unpopular and divisive features of Pay 2000, while retaining the fundamental characteristics of rank-based pay progression. The Allowances structure will be simplified and Service personnel will continue to be compensated for expenses incurred in the course of their duty and to provide a degree of lifestyle choice.

All senior (2-star and above) military officers (except for: the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS), Legal Branch 2-star officers, medical and dental officers and those in the Chaplaincy branches) are paid under the Performance Management and Pay System (PMPS). Depending on their performance, time in rank and position on the pay scale, individuals can be awarded a single increment or no increment, and progress accordingly up the incremental pay scale for their rank. The average value of one incremental rise under the PMPS is 2.6% of salary (2012-13: 2.6%).

Suggested score: 4

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: Your comment is correct and implies a score of 4. Your comment deals with the military only, but strictly speaking the concept of a &quoute;command chain&quoute; (in which orders have the force of law) does not apply to civilians. For civilians, one's line manager may recommend performance pay, but this is subject to criteria, and there is a clear separation between one's line management and the administration of one's pay.

Suggested score: 4

Peer Reviewer-+

47.
score
4

Is there a Code of Conduct for all military and civilian personnel that includes, but is not limited to, guidance with respect to bribery, gifts and hospitality, conflicts of interest, and post-separation activities?

Researcher4085: There is no single comprehensive code of conduct for service and civilian personnel. Discipline and regulation is administered locally by the MoD, Army, Navy and RAF.

Civilian Personnel are subject to the civil service code, which has statutory underpinning by virtue of the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010. The code covers seven principles, two of which are relevant to corruption: honesty and integrity. Civil servants are instructed to “carry out [their] fiduciary obligations responsibly (that is make sure public money and other resources are used properly and efficiently)” and “use resources only for the authorised public purposes for which they are provided.” They are warned not to “be influenced by improper pressures from others or the prospect of personal gain” or to &quoute;misuse your official position, for example by using information acquired in the course of your official duties to further your private interests or those of others... accept gifts or hospitality or receive other benefits from anyone which might reasonably be seen to compromise your personal judgement or integrity&quoute;.

The Civil Service Management Code makes clear that the Departments and agencies should incorporate in the conditions of service of their staff the Civil Service Code. The MOD does this through Vol 7 of the Personnel Manual which contains detailed rules and guidance including on handling gifts and other related issues of ethical conduct.

Service Personnel in the Army, Navy and RAF are subject to the Queen’s Regulations, which are a collection of standing orders and regulations governing personal conduct and behaviour. Each section of the forces is subject to its own set of regulations. There is some evidence that these regulations address bribery and corruption: Regulation J1003 of the Queen’s Regulations for the RAF outlines rules for dealing with gifts, hospitality, rewards and bribes for example. There are no publicly available digital copies of the regulations for the Army and Navy, according to a Freedom of Information Act response from the MoD. The regulations are available for purchase from the government’s Stationery Office but are not particularly affordable, at £78. Some editions are out of print.

Service Personnel are also subject to code of practice documents such as the Army’s Values and Standards document, which outline good practice and touch on anti-bribery and corruption principles. For example the Army’s Values and Standards document states at para 27: “Those entrusted with public and non-public funds must adhere to unswervingly the appropriate financial regulations.” Values and Standards documents also apply to Navy and RAF staff. These documents do not explicitly address anti-corruption mechanisms or outline disciplinary procedures however.

Response to Government Reviewer: The RAF regulations provided are dated 1999 (the same version which was released following FOIA request), the link to the Navy regulations appears not to work, and a link to the Army regulations would have been helpful, as you state they are in the public domain, but I did not locate them. Response to Transparency International UK Chapter reviewer: comments noted and accepted. Score changed to 4.

COMMENTS -+

WhatDoTheyKnow “Queens Regulations for the RAF > 20121017 QRRAF AL30 Pt2 U.pdf”. 7/08/2013. Accessed 01/07/2014. https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/queens_regulations_for_the_raf#incoming-417072
Civil Service. “The Civil Service Code.” 30/11/2010. Accessed 01/07/2014.
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/civil-service-code/the-civil-service-code
Army. “Values and Standards of the British Army”. January 2008. Accessed 01/07/2014.
http://www.army.mod.uk/documents/general/v_s_of_the_british_army.pdf

MOD Personnel Manual, Vol 7 on Conduct,
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/381423/MOD_Personnel_Manual_Vol_7_Conduct.pdf

Civil Service Management Code, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/civil-servants-terms-and-conditions

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: There are very clear statements of codes of conduct for all three services and for the civil service. All are consistent with the seven principles of public life. They are not all readily available publically, although they are accessible as the assessment recognises. Queen's Regulations for all three services also include explicit direction on bribery, gifts, hospitality, and post separation activities.

Suggested score: 3

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: The score should be 4.

The Queen’s Regulations for the Royal Air Force are publicly available on the RAF website via the following link:
http://www.raf.mod.uk/rafcms/mediafiles/5C146FE5_5056_A318_A8831351C830E2B4.pdf

The Queen’s Regulations for the Royal Navy are publicly available on the Royal Navy website via the following link:
http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/~/media/royal%20navy%20responsive/documents/reference%20library/br%202/201303006-brd2-home-u.pdf

The Queens Regulations for the Army is available in the public domain.

The ‘Ethos, Core Values and Standards’ for the Royal Air Force is publicly available on the RAF website via the following link:
http://www.raf.mod.uk/rafcms/mediafiles/AB5499A3_1143_EC82_2E7A5599F6DCAA55.pdf

The ‘Ethos, Values and Standards’ for the Royal Navy is publicly available on the Royal Navy website via the following link:
http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/~/media/royal%20navy%20responsive/documents/reference%20library/br%203/Br3book/an21c.pdf

The ‘Values and Standards of the British Army’ is publicly available on the Army website via the following link:
http://www.army.mod.uk/documents/general/v_s_of_the_british_army.pdf

The civil service code is located here: https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/civil-service-conduct-and-guidance

The MOD is also undertaking a review of its Corporate Standards.

Suggested score: 4

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Not Qualified

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

48.
score
3

Is there evidence that breaches of the Code of Conduct are effectively addressed ,and are the results of prosecutions made publicly available?

Researcher4085: Codes of conduct exist and there is evidence of prosecutions under them. However there are issues with transparency.

Corruption related issues are investigated by the MOD Police which has jurisdiction over all MOD personnel in the UK and incidents relating to Crown Property. Where a case proceeds to prosecution, the offender(s) will be charged and then prosecuted by the Crown Prosecution Service (in Scotland the Procurator Fiscal). The case will proceed through the civil courts.

Civilian personnel employees of the MOD are subject to the criminal law and also the Civil Service Code which sets out the standards of behaviour expected of Civil Servants. As detailed in the previous questions this supplemented by departmental rules and guidance. These rules provide guidance on the various levels of sanctions that can be applied; ranging from words of advice to dismissal.

The three Service Police (Royal Navy Police, Royal Military Police and Royal Air Force Police) are responsible for the policing and discipline of service personnel. They operate under the Armed Forces Act 2011 and have jurisdiction both in the UK and overseas in relation to service personnel. The Service Police report cases to the Service Prosecuting Authority who prosecute criminal and disciplinary cases through the Courts Martial system. These internal disciplinary systems relate to their separate codes of conduct. They do not routinely publish evidence of the results of their inquiries, which are known as summary hearings. However, summary data of Court Martial prosecutions are published as open data, which provides a measure of transparency to these proceedings.

Although not necessarily related to corruption, there have been concerns about the ability of these internal systems to address high-level wrongdoing. The Army has been criticised, for example, for protecting its chain of command at all costs. In a submission to the Defence Select Committee a serving Major claimed: “The Army is willing to cover-up mistakes, bully personnel, victimise those who complain, and harass those who are perceived to be “rocking the boat”, in order to protect the power and prestige of the chain of command.”

The service police forces, Royal Military Police, Royal Navy Police and Royal Air Force Police, are tasked with upholding UK law among service personnel on deployment outside the UK. The forces work with the Service Prosecuting Authority to bring cases for prosecution. Media reports state that of the 126 Royal Military Police investigations into the Army’s conduct in Afghanistan, only eight have resulted in prosecution.

Moreover, the threshold for the RMP to open an investigation appears high. Leaked US embassy cables describe 21 incidents when British troops allegedly shot or bombed Afghan civilians but only one of these was investigated by the RMP. The SPA does not regularly published information on prosecutions - the first report and strategy document in 2009 shows the vast majority of prosecutions were related to the Army and primarily consisted of Court Martials for AWOL and violent offences (p.38-39), the 2014/15 report, which is the next available contains gives summary data on types of cases, again main relating violent offence or drugs.

Response to Government Reviewer: comments updated and score revised.

COMMENTS -+

Defence Select Committee. “Written Evidence from Major R A McLeod R SIGNALS LLB MA JP (SCC 004)”. October 2012. Accessed 01/07/2014.
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmdfence/720/720vw04.htm
Service Prosecuting Authority. “First Report and Business Plan”. January 2009. Accessed 01/07/2014.
http://spa.independent.gov.uk/linkedfiles/spa/report2008.pdf
Rob Evans, “Afghanistan: list of investigations and prosecutions of British troops”, The Guardian Datablog, 29/03/2012.
http://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2012/mar/29/afghanistan-british-army-crimes
John-Paul Ford Rojas, “Army disciplinary hearings condemned as 'kangaroo courts'”, The Telegraph, 22/11/2012. Accessed 01/07/2014.
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/9694470/Army-disciplinary-hearings-condemned-as-kangaroo-courts.html
Ministry of Defence. &quoute;Court martial results from the military court centres.&quoute; 01/05/2015. Accessed 21/09/15.
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/court-martial-results-from-the-military-court-centres

Service Prosecuting Authority Annual Report, 2014/2015
http://spa.independent.gov.uk/linkedfiles/spa/427088spareport_aw_web_lr.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: We believe the score should be 3.

Please note that all breaches of code are prosecutable.

In England and Wales incidents of corruption are prosecuted through the Crown Courts under either the Prevention of Corruption Acts 1889 – 1916 or for cases where the commission of the offence was after 1 July 2011; then they are prosecuted under the Bribery Act 2010. Additionally a common law offence of Misconduct in a Public Office exists.

All reports of corruption or bribery reported within the MOD are investigated by the MOD Police which is an independent civilian policing body that polices the interests of the MOD. The MOD Police has jurisdiction over all MOD personnel in the UK and incidents relating to Crown Property. Where a case proceeds to prosecution, the offender(s) will be charged and then prosecuted by the Crown Prosecution Service (in Scotland the Procurator Fiscal). The case will proceed through the civil courts.

The three Service Police (Royal Navy Police, Royal Military Police and Royal Air Force Police) are responsible for the policing and discipline of service personnel. They operate under the Armed Forces Act 2011 and have jurisdiction both in the UK and overseas in relation to service personnel. The Service Police report cases to the Service Prosecuting Authority who prosecute criminal and disciplinary cases through the Courts Martial system. These Courts are not open to the public but are sometimes reported in the media.

Civilian personnel employees of the MOD are subject to the criminal law and also the Civil Service Code which sets out the standards of behaviour expected of Civil Servants. This is further enhanced by internal policy rules and guidance that provides more specific and detailed processes to be adhered to by staff at all levels. These rules provide guidance on the various levels of sanctions that can be applied; ranging from words of advice to dismissal. Where it is deemed appropriate, then parallel sanctions may be applied when dealing with a case that involves a potential criminal prosecution.

Where personnel within a private company are found guilty of corruption or bribery then criminal prosecutions would normally take place after investigation by the police or in serious cases the Serious Fraud Office together with the police. A company may report and deal with such issues internally and information on such incidents would not be available publicly. Personnel within a company who have been found guilty of corruption are normally dismissed by the company as well as being prosecuted. Depending upon the type of company concerned and their impact within the MOD, then different sanctions may be employed. For example BAE were investigated for corrupt practices, but remain a key business partner to the MOD. Commercial practices and procedures are examined, reviewed and if necessary changed to provide a more robust arrangement. The same sanctions may be applied to a smaller company or a contract may be terminated, dependant upon the impact to the department and the severity of the offences. The MOD does not hold a ‘black list’ of companies whom they will not contract with; however they do require companies to hold accreditation such as British Standard ISO9001 and will ensure that an element of open book accounting is maintained to allow MOD personnel access to provide cost assurances.
Court martial and Crown Prosecution Data is publicly available:

http://cps.gov.uk/data/index.html
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/court-martial-results-from-the-military-court-centres
https://www.gov.uk/search?q=Court+martial
https://www.gov.uk/service-prosecuting-authority

Suggested score: 3

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: I accept the score, for lack of evidence, but one should not take anecdotal allegations from news reports as evidence of wrong doing.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

49.
score
4

Does regular anti-corruption training take place for military and civilian personnel?

Researcher4085: Anti corruption training is delivered by the MoD's Fraud Defence while there are also training commitments in the National Anti Corruption Plan. Transparency International UK provides some training to the MoD such as the Building Integrity in UK Defence programme.

MoD reviewer (see below) states: &quoute;Fraud Defence delivers Fraud (which includes bribery & corruption) awareness face to face sessions to military and staff. The decision on where to deliver is risk-based. For example, we deliver to new military and civilian staff at Defence Equipment and Support. Furthermore, through the Crown Commercial Service and the Chartered Institute of Purchasing & Supply, we deliver a Procurement Fraud E-learning product to staff who work in a commercial environment.

We target our fraud awareness sessions to areas that are considered high risk of fraud, bribery and corruption, which is populated on our annual communications plan. This is based on conducting a risk assessment. The Civil Service Learning provides “Responsible For Information” training, which includes fraud, bribery and corruption awareness. It is an e-learning product that is mandatory for all civil servants to complete. It also must be completed on annual basis. In addition, the MOD has a fraud awareness e-learning product.&quoute;

The National Anti Corruption Plan includes objectives to provide counter corruption training across the public sector (para. 4.2.4), providing Bribery Act training to MoD personnel (4.5.1 - 4.5.4) and bribery and corruption training to FCO staff (7.24).

Response to Reviewers: Anti corruption plan was not published at time of research, and information on MoD internal training was not in public domain, so I thank Government and Transparency International UK chapter reviewers. Comments and sources edited. Score updated to 4.

COMMENTS -+

Pyman, M. and Bock, T. &quoute;Building Integrity in UK Defence&quoute;, Transparency International, March 2014.
http://www.transparency.org.uk/component/cckjseblod/?task=download&file=publication_file&id=889
Press Release, “Building integrity plays a “critical role” in conflict prevention says UK expert”, UK Joint Delegation to NATO, 21 November 2013. Accessed 10/06/2014.
https://www.gov.uk/government/world-location-news/building-integrity-plays-a-critical-role-in-conflict-prevention-says-uk-expert-official
HM Government. &quoute;National Anti Corruption Plan.&quoute; December 2014. Accessed 21/09/15.
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/388894/UKantiCorruptionPlan.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: 'TI-DSP has been engaged in several initiatives with the UK MOD. These have included work jointly
with, and funded by the UK Defence Academy on anti-corruption training through the Building Stability
Overseas Programme.' (source: TI Publication titled 'BUILDING INTEGRITY IN UK DEFENCE' - link here: http://www.ti-defence.org/publications/dsp-pubs/267-building-integrity-uk-defence.html).

Someone at TI should ascertain how often the training takes place - score may be upgraded to 3.

Suggested score: 2

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: The UK Anti-Corruption Action Plan refers to anti-corruption training and actions to which the MOD has committed which would be relevant here as well.

Suggested score: 2

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: We believe the score should be 3.

Fraud Defence delivers Fraud (which includes bribery & corruption) awareness face to face sessions military and staff. The decision on where to deliver is risk-based. For example, we deliver to new military and civilian staff at Defence Equipment and Support. Furthermore, through the Crown Commercial Service and the Chartered Institute of Purchasing & Supply, we deliver a Procurement Fraud E-learning product to staff who work in a commercial environment.

We target our fraud awareness sessions to areas that are considered high risk of fraud, bribery and corruption, which is populated on our annual communications plan. This is based on conducting a risk assessment.

The Civil Service Learning provides “Responsible For Information” training, which includes fraud, bribery and corruption awareness. It is an e-learning product that is mandatory for all civil servants to complete. It also must be completed on annual basis. In addition, the MOD has a fraud awareness e-learning product: http://www.da.mod.uk/prospectus/cmt/v098

Suggested score: 3

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Not Qualified

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

50.
score
4

Is there a policy to make public outcomes of the prosecution of defence services personnel for corrupt activities, and is there evidence of effective prosecutions in recent years?

Researcher4085: Prosecution outcomes are made public and the data indicates that these prosecutions are effective. Court Martial prosecutions data is freely published online as part of the government's transparency and open data initiative. The data is not presented in a format which allows easy quantification, however, data suggests there have been 159 Court Martial hearings for fraud, 131 hearings for theft, among other charges, in the period 2010 to 2015. The majority of hearings find defendants guilty. Criminal cases for corrupt activities are brought by the Crown Prosecution Service which publishes case outcomes as open data in monthly bulletins.

Comment to Government Reviewer: thank you for the links to Court Martial data. This has been a valuable contribution to the assessment here and elsewhere. Comments and sources revised and score of 4 is awarded.

COMMENTS -+

Ministry of Defence. &quoute;Court martial results from the military court centres&quoute;. Accessed 22/09/15
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/court-martial-results-from-the-military-court-centresCrown Prosecution Service. &quoute;Data&quoute;. Accessed 22/09/15
http://cps.gov.uk/data/index.html

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: See private discussion box

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: We believe the score should be 4.

Court martial and Crown Prosecution Data is publicly available:

http://cps.gov.uk/data/index.html
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/court-martial-results-from-the-military-court-centres
https://www.gov.uk/search?q=Court+martial
https://www.gov.uk/service-prosecuting-authority
The MOD is committed to investigating bribery and corruption and report on it.

Suggested score: 4

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: 2 is probably the right score (on the ground that you have found no evidence of a policy to publish) but the final sentence of the criterion for 2 does not apply - I am not aware of any evidence that there is &quoute;speculation whether attempted prosecutions have been published&quoute;.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

51.
score
2

Are there effective measures in place to discourage facilitation payments (which are illegal in almost all countries)?

Researcher4085: The Bribery Act 2010 makes facilitation payments illegal. The legislation came into force in 2011 but prosecutions for facilitation payments are yet to be made. This is partly explained by the Serious Fraud Office’s (SFO) 2011 guidance that appeared designed to support companies that would need to adjust their practices to be compliant, and which advised companies to take a staged approach to achieving full compliance. This guidance was revised in 2012 and the SFO now states it will prosecute under the Bribery Act based solely on the law. Revision of the guidance came under the new leadership.

However, the Bribery Act contains a significant potential loophole with respect to service personnel. Transparency International UK Chapter reviewer (see below) states: 'S.13 Chapter 23 of the Bribery Act 2010 sets out defences against Bribery Act offences which includes that bribery was necessary function of the armed forces while on service. Such a loophole could be used to evade all facilitation payments charged that were deemed to support mission success.

13. Defence for certain bribery offences etc.

(1) It is a defence for a person charged with a relevant bribery offence to prove that the person's conduct was necessary for—
(a) the proper exercise of any function of an intelligence service, or
(b) the proper exercise of any function of the armed forces when engaged on active service.&quoute;'

Response to Transparency International UK Chapter Reviewer: thank you for the information. Comment and source updated. Score changed from 3 to 2, to reflect the fact that facilitation payments are discourage, even if the legal framework may be of questionable effect.

COMMENTS -+

Bribery Act 2010. http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/23/contents
Kevin Robinson, &quoute;Pressure Gauge: Facilitation Payments Under the UK Bribery Act&quoute;, in Fraud Intelligence, Morgan Lewis Lawyers, 04/07/2014. Accessed 01/07/2014/
http://www.morganlewis.co.uk/index.cfm/fuseaction/publication.detail/publicationID/25136950-1d86-4cba-a4ba-58fcc9be88ce
Jonathan Russell, &quoute;Companies face bribery crackdown after new SFO rules&quoute;, The Telegraph, 09/10/2012. Accessed 01/07/2014/
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financial-crime/9596016/Companies-face-bribery-crackdown-after-new-SFO-rules.html
James Quinn, “SFO warns Bribery Act prosecutions on their way,” The Telegraph. Accessed 01/07/2014/.
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financial-crime/10401878/SFO-warns-Bribery-Act-prosecutions-on-their-way.html
Bribery Act 2010
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/23

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: I think the score is correct for the private sector (where the bribery Act is the strongest in the world on facilitation payments), but not for service personnel.

S.13 Chapter 23 of the Bribery Act 2010 sets out defences against Bribery Act offences which includes that bribery was necessary function of the armed forces while on service. Such a loophole could be used to evade all facilitation payments charges that were deemed to support mission success.

13. Defence for certain bribery offences etc.

(1) It is a defence for a person charged with a relevant bribery offence to prove that the person's conduct was necessary for—
(a) the proper exercise of any function of an intelligence service, or
(b) the proper exercise of any function of the armed forces when engaged on active service.

http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/23

Suggested score: 1

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: The score should be 4.

Court Martial data is publicly available:
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/court-martial-results-from-the-military-court-centres
https://www.gov.uk/search?q=Court+martial
https://www.gov.uk/service-prosecuting-authority

Suggested score: 4

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Not Qualified

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Training 60
52.
score
3

Do the armed forces have military doctrine addressing corruption as a strategic issue on operations?

Researcher4085: There is nothing in the formal Army doctrine that recognises corruption, bribery, fraud or conflict of interest within the Armed Forces as a risk to operational effectiveness. The RAF and the Navy’s formal doctrines do not recognise corruption, fraud, bribery or conflicts of interest within their respective doctrines.

The Army’s operations doctrine refers to corruption in context of the role it can play in fuelling an insurgency and in undermining the authority of indigenous forces and indigenous government in a military or other strategic partnership (para. 0444, 0811d, 0812 respectively). This suggests some awareness of the strategic risk of corruption but not in the context of the Army’s own operations.

The Armed Forces have elsewhere addressed the threat to operations posed by corruption. Transparency International UK Chapter reviewer (see below) states: &quoute;Our Handbook 'Corruption Threats and International Missions' has sought to address the approach to deployed operations.' This document references a guidance note from the UK’s Land Warfare Centre (LWC) which places corruption clearly in a strategic context, and sets out a number of actions that can be taken to mitigate or tackle the threat. The note aims to provide guidance to military commanders who are partnering with host nation forces and to initiate a dialogue on how to refine doctrine as it relates to counter-corruption

Extant doctrine already addresses the issue, although as Transparency International UK Defence and Security has recommended it needs to be embedded in operational doctrine and mission mandates at all levels. DCDC intends to update TACC doctrine during 2015. One of the commitments in the UK Anti-Corruption Plan is for the MOD to respond to the Transparency International UK Defence and Security recommendation to improve training for deployed operations; and it was due to respond to this by March 2015.

JDP 3-40&quoute; Security and Stabilisation: the Military Contribution&quoute; - published in 2012 - includes a supplementary guide on corruption provided by Transparency International UK Defence and Security. The First Edition of the Future Operating Environment 2035 also includes a reference to corruption and criminality and the Joint Doctrine Architecture for June 2015 includes provision for both national and NATO doctrine on corruption drawing from the Corruption Threats and International Missions Handbook and our 'Corruption: Lessons from the international mission in Afghanistan' report&quoute;.

Government reviewer (see below) adds: &quoute;The Army has produced a Land Forces Standing Order No 6100 on managing the risk of fraud and irregularity . It is an order to promulgate instructions to Formations and Units in order to articulate how MOD - wherever set out - is to be implemented within the Command.&quoute;

A senior member of a defence and security think tank said in interview that in his opinion corruption within the forces is not always treated as a strategic issue.

Response to reviewers: comments received and score updated from 1 to 3. Comments and sources revised.

COMMENTS -+

Royal Air Force. “British Air and Space Power Doctrine AP 3000 Fourth Edition.” Accessed 02/07/2014.
http://www.raf.mod.uk/rafcms/mediafiles/9E435312_5056_A318_A88F14CF6F4FC6CE.pdf
Ministry of Defence. “British Maritime Doctrine – Joint Doctrine Publication 0-10”. August 2011. Accessed 02/07/2014.
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/33699/20110816JDP0_10_BMD.pdf
Army. “Army Doctrine Publication: Operations”. November 2010. Accessed 02/07/2014.
Interview with senior member of a defence and security think tank on 04/07/2014.
Ministry of Defence. &quoute;JDP 3-40: Security and stabilisation, the military contribution&quoute;. Accessed 22/9/15
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/security-and-stabilisation-the-military-contribution--3

http://www.ti-defence.org/publications/dsp-pubs/307-corruption-threats-and-international-missions.html

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: Corruption Threat and International Missions has sought to address the approach to deployed operations. Extant doctrine already addresses the issue, although as TI DSP has recommended it needs to be embedded in operational doctrine and mission mandates at all levels. DCDC intends to update TACC doctrine during 2015. One of the commitments in the UK Anti-Corruption Plan is for the MOD to respond to the TI DSP recommendation to improve training for deployed operations; and it was due to respond to this by March 2015.

JDP 3-40&quoute; Security and Stabilisation: the Military Contribution&quoute; - published in 2012 - includes a supplementary guide on corruption provided by TI-DSP. The First Edition of the Future Operating Environment 2035 also includes a reference to corruption and criminality and the Joint Doctrine Architecture for June 2015 includes provision for both national and NATO doctrine on corruption drawing from the Handbook and the ATR.


Suggested score: 2

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: The score should be 3.

The Ministry of Defence published a guidance on Security and stabilisation, the military contribution. The guide provides an outlines on anti corruption measures (see page 90):
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/49948/jdp3_40a4.pdf

The Army has produced a Land Forces Standing Order No 6100 on managing the risk of fraud and irregularity by Lt General Sir Nicholas Carter KCB CBE DSO. It is an order to promulgate instructions to Formations and Units in order to articulate how MOD - wherever set out - is to be implemented within the Command. A copy is available.

Suggested score: 3

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Not Qualified

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

53.
score
2

Is there training in corruption issues for commanders at all levels in order to ensure that these commanders are clear on the corruption issues they may face during deployment? If so, is there evidence that they apply this knowledge in the field?

Researcher4085: Armed Forces formal doctrine does not recognise corruption as a strategic issue although there is recognition of corruption in other formal contexts. Training and guidance on recognising corruption is administered by the MoD on the basis of where risk is greatest. Government reviewer (see below) states: &quoute;Fraud Defence delivers Fraud (which includes bribery & corruption) awareness face to face sessions to military and staff. The decision on where to deliver is risk-based. For example, we deliver to new military and civilian staff at Defence Equipment and Support. Furthermore, through the Crown Commercial Service and the Chartered Institute of Purchasing & Supply, we deliver a Procurement Fraud E-learning product to staff who work in a commercial environment. We target our fraud awareness sessions to areas that are considered high risk of fraud, bribery and corruption, which is populated on our annual communications plan. This is based on conducting a risk assessment.&quoute;

The primary theatre of deployment for service personnel is Afghanistan, where corruption is rife. Corruption, in some instances, will be recognised as a threat to operational effectiveness and, according to a servicing Officer who has served in Afghanistan, training may be provided in certain circumstances. It is likely to be delivered on an ad-hoc basis however. Evidence of this training and its effectiveness is not publicly available.

Response to reviewers: Comments and sources revised in light of the Government Reviewer's comments on the provision of training. However, weight should still be given to the interview with serving Army Officer who was sceptical about quality and quantity of training provided in Afghanistan. Score changed from 1 to 2.

COMMENTS -+

Telephone interview with Army Officer conducted on 10/07/2014.
Army. “Army Doctrine Publication: Operations”. November 2010. Accessed 10/07/2014.
Royal Air Force. “British Air and Space Power Doctrine AP 3000 Fourth Edition.” Accessed 02/07/2014.
http://www.raf.mod.uk/rafcms/mediafiles/9E435312_5056_A318_A88F14CF6F4FC6CE.pdf
Ministry of Defence. “British Maritime Doctrine – Joint Doctrine Publication 0-10”. August 2011. Accessed 02/07/2014.
Ministry of Defence. &quoute;JDP 3-40: Security and stabilisation, the military contribution&quoute;. Accessed 22/9/15
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/security-and-stabilisation-the-military-contribution--3

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: 'Although officers are provided with anti-corruption training to be relayed to foreign (most recently, Afghan) troops, and some UK officers undertake NATO’s Building Integrity training, there is no publicly available evidence that the UK Armed Forces have a systematic process to provide anti-corruption training to their staff on a regular and formal basis. There is only limited evidence to suggest that the UK MOD deploys appropriately trained personnel to monitor corruption in the field. Certain members of the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) are deployed to the mission in Afghanistan to monitor the award and delivery of contracts, but this does not necessarily involve monitoring corruption risk.' (Source: TI 2014 Publication, 'Building Integrity in UK Defence').

Suggested score: 3

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: As mentioned in the comments for Question 52,Corruption Threat and International Missions has sought to address the approach to deployed operations. Extant doctrine already addresses the issue, although as TI DSP has recommended it needs to be embedded in operational doctrine and mission mnadates at all levels. DCDC intends to update TACC doctrine during 2015. One of the commitments in the UK Anti-Corruption Plan is for the MOD to respond to the TI DSP recommendation to improve training for deployed operations; and it was due to respond to this by March 2015.

JDP 3-40&quoute; Security and Stabilisation: the Military Contribution&quoute; - published in 2012 - includes a supplementary guide on corruption provided by TI-DSP. The First Edition of the Future Operating Environment 2035 also includes a reference to corruption and criminality and the Joint Doctrine Architecture for June 2015 includes provision for both national and NATO doctrine on corruption drawing from the Handbook and the ATR.

Suggested score: 2

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: The score should be 3.

Fraud Defence delivers Fraud (which includes bribery & corruption) awareness face to face sessions military and staff. The decision on where to deliver is risk-based. For example, we deliver to new military and civilian staff at Defence Equipment and Support. Furthermore, through the Crown Commercial Service and the Chartered Institute of Purchasing & Supply, we deliver a Procurement Fraud E-learning product to staff who work in a commercial environment.

We target our fraud awareness sessions to areas that are considered high risk of fraud, bribery and corruption, which is populated on our annual communications plan. This is based on conducting a risk assessment.

The Civil Service Learning provides “Responsible For Information” training, which includes fraud, bribery and corruption awareness. It is an e-learning product that is mandatory for all civil servants to complete. It also must be completed on annual basis. In addition, the MOD has a fraud awareness e-learning product: http://www.da.mod.uk/prospectus/cmt/v098

Suggested score: 3

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Not Qualified

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

54.
score
2

Are trained professionals regularly deployed to monitor corruption risk in the field (whether deployed on operations or peacekeeping missions)?

Researcher4085: The MoD’s guidance on security and stabilisation outlines measures that can be taken to counter corruption in the field. Although the extent to which these measures are effectively deployed remains unknown.

An interview with an ex-serviceman was concerned that the dispatch of auditors to the field in Afghanistan, where he served three tours, was not governed by a systematic policy but instead undertaken at the discretion of commanding officers. He also raised concerns about the quality of audits, which in his experience, were sometimes simply an interview with the commanding officer and a tour of the military property and facilities. He said that these audits were sometimes just a question of &quoute;box ticking&quoute;.

Transparency International UK Chapter reviewer states that some international efforts to monitor corruption risk in the field in Afghanistan included the UK. Chapter reviewer (see below) states: “While questions can be raised about its effectiveness, in Afghanistan the Combined Joint Inter-Agency Task Force (CJIATF) or &quoute;Shafafiyat&quoute; was established to monitor corruption risks from a perspective of funding the insurgency. CJIATF would have included UK representation. Its stated mission was to synchronise and focus strategic Counter Corruption, Counter Narcotics, Counter Threat Finance, and &quoute;No Contracting with the Enemy&quoute; activities in order to deny resources to the nefarious actors and enhance transparency and accountability within the government of Afghanistan. However, it appears to focus on the threat to ISAF posed by corruption of Afghan actors, rather than the threat posed by corruption or corrupt payments by ISAF personnel.”

Response to reviewers: reviewer comments considered. Comments and sources updated and score is changed from 1 to 2.

COMMENTS -+

Ministry of Defence. &quoute;JDP 3-40: Security and stabilisation, the military contribution&quoute;. Accessed 22/9/15
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/security-and-stabilisation-the-military-contribution--3
Skype interview with retired elite soldier on 08/07/2014.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: FURTHER DETAIL: While questions can be raised about its effectiveness, in Afghanistan the Combined Joint Inter-Agency Task Force (CJIATF) or &quoute;Shafafiyat&quoute; was established to monitor corruption risks from a perspective of funding the insurgency. CJIATF would have included UK representation. Its stated mission was to synchronise and focus strategic Counter Corruption, Counter Narcotics, Counter Threat Finance, and &quoute;No Contracting with the Enemy&quoute; activities in order to deny resources to the nefarious actors and enhance transparency and accountability within the government of Afghanistan. However, it appears to focus on the threat to ISAF posed by corruption of Afghan actors, rather than the threat posed by corruption or corrupt payments by ISAF personnel.

http://www.rs.nato.int/subordinate-commands/combined-joint-interagency-task-force-afghanistan/index.php

Recent exercises scenarios have embraced TACC issues, specifically, HCSC and the Joint Staff College ad HQ ARRC (ARRCADE FUSION 2013 and 2014.

In addition to Shafafiyat there was also a Threat Finance Unit in HQ ISAF which was populated by investigators and forensic accountants which assembled intelligence to inform commanders on threat actors in the OC space (as the insurgency was often funded by drugs trafficking).

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: See MOD answer to Question 55. The Ministry of Defence published a guidance on Security and stabilisation, the military contribution. The guide provides an outline of anti corruption measures on deployed operations (see page 90):

https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/49948/jdp3_40a4.pdf

Suggested score: 3

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Not Qualified

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

55.
score
4

Are there guidelines, and staff training, on addressing corruption risks in contracting whilst on deployed operations or peacekeeping missions?

Researcher4085: An Officer who has served in Afghanistan and was interviewed for this research stated that pre-deployment guidance on cultural awareness and the risks posed to operations in the field is extensive. Government reviewer (see below) states:

&quoute;The MOD provide Compact Disc ROMs to military officers (acting as focal points/overseers on specific contracts), which contains training on how to operate alongside contractors. This covers the subject of bribery, gifts and hospitality. Once they complete the training, each officer receives a certificate for evidence. Each military officer must complete this training before they can engage with contractors on deployed operations.

MOD Commercial Officers as part of our Civil Secretariat teams who will undertake placement and determination of contracts within the theatre of operations must also complete this training.MOD Commercial Officers must also undertake all the training required to gain a MOD Commercial Licence.&quoute;

Response to Government Reviewer: Agreed. Comment updated and score revised from 2 to 4.

COMMENTS -+

Army. “Army Doctrine Publication: Operations”. November 2010. Accessed 10/07/2014.
Telephone interview with Army Officer conducted on 10/07/2014.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: JDP 3-40&quoute; Security and Stabilisation: the Military Contribution&quoute; - published in 2012 - includes a supplementary guide on corruption provided by TI-DSP which would be relevant here.

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: The MOD provide Compact Disc ROMs to military officers (acting as focal points/overseers on specific contracts), which contains training on how to operate alongside contractors. This covers the subject of bribery, gifts and hospitality. Once they complete the training, each officer receives a certificate for evidence. Each military officer must complete this training before they can engage with contractors on deployed operations.

MOD Commercial Officers as part of our Civil Secretariat teams who will undertake placement and determination of contracts within the theatre of operations must also complete this training.

MOD Commercial Officers must also undertake all the training required to gain a MOD Commercial Licence.

Suggested score: 4

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Not Qualified

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

56.
score
3

Private Military Contractors (PMCs) usually refer to companies that provide operational staff to military environments. They may also be known as security contractors or private security contractors, and refer to themselves as private military corporations, private military firms, private security providers, or military service providers.

Researcher4085: The UK’s Ministry of Defence (MoD), Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and Department for International Development (DFID) use PMCs to provide logistics and security, according to the University of Denver’s Private Security Monitor. The MoD states that PMCs are subject to service discipline while on deployment. Government reviewer (see below) states: &quoute;The MOD has a policy on MOD CONTRACTOR SUPPORT TO OPERATIONS (CSO):Incorporating Sponsored Reserve, Contractors on Deployed Operations and Private Security Companies).

Whilst on deployed operations, CONDO (Contractors ON Deployed Operations) Personnel are subject to service discipline and this is designated as CSSD (Civilians Subject to Service Discipline) under Section 15(7) of the Armed Forces Act 2006. CONDO Personnel’s employment contract makes reference to the CSSD.

The MOD monitors and supervises these CONDO Personnel and conduct contract management visits.&quoute;

UK PMCs are not formally regulated by the government however, as the Private Security Act 2001 applies only to domestic companies. The UK Government has struggled with the question of how to regulate PMCs effectively. The FCO published a Green Paper in 2002 and has consulted on the issue since but has not made substantial progress toward establishing a system of regulation. However, the MoD has developed a set of procedures to ensure PMC activity is broadly consistent with its existing obligations. Government reviewer (see below) states: &quoute;The process for approving the use of Private Security Contractors (PSC) either directly or by contractors is managed through a 2-Star (senior level staff) PSC Committee. There is a requirement to consider procedures to monitor the use of PSCs, both those directly contracted by MOD and those sub-contracted by contractors to MOD, including the investigation of any allegations of misconduct. As a signatory of the Montreux Document, and a state contracting with PSCs, the UK may also be under a legal obligation to investigate and prosecute allegations of wrongdoing by PSCs.&quoute;

A system of PMC self-regulation exists but this does not appear to be robust. Some UK PMCs participate in a government backed self-regulation initiative convened in Switzerland. The UK, US, Swedish, Australian and Swiss governments were the founding signatories to the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers (ICoC). ICoC is a voluntary measure to which PMCs can sign up to and apply to be certified as meeting a criteria of professional standards. The ICoC is supported by a “global oversight mechanism, named the ICoC Association (ICoCA)”, which is a not-for-profit based in Geneva and launched in September 2013. ICoCA’s Board of Directors is drawn from government, industry and civil society. The organisation is tasked with certifying and monitoring PMCs and developing standards of practice. It is unclear how ICoCA will monitor PMCs effectively, whether it has any enforcement powers and how or whether it will liaise with regulatory or prosecution offices in other states. ICoCA's focus is on developing and raising standards but it appears to have no powers to enforce sanctions on non-compliant bodies.

Response to Reviewers. Comments noted. Comments and sources updated and score is revised from 2 to 3.

COMMENTS -+

Private Security Act 2001, para 26. http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/12/contents
Mark Symonds MP, “Written Statement to Parliament: International Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers Association”, 15/10/2013. Accessed 08/07/2014. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/international-code-of-conduct-for-private-security-providers-association
Foreign and Commonwealth Office. “Private Military Companies: Options for Regulation”. February 2002. Accessed 08/07/2014. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/228598/0577.pdf
University of Denver. “Private Security Monitor > National Regulations: United Kingdom”. Accessed 08/07/2014. http://psm.du.edu/national_regulation/united_kingdom t
International Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers. “Homepage”. Accessed 08/07/2014. http://www.icoc-psp.org/
BBC Iplayer Radio 4. “Thinking Allowed: Private military security; whisky tourism”. 19/03/2012. Accessed 08/07/2014.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: While the assessment is correct about the effectiveness of regulation, all PMCs are subject to contractual sanctions on performance which could be invoked if corruption is detected. The focus of the ICoC is about how companies conduct themselves in respect of Human Rights compliance, not specifically about corruption - although they are required to operate in accordance with &quoute;all applicable laws&quoute;. The only mention of corruption in the Code is to the checks they are required to conduct on their &quoute;staff who have to carry weapons as part of their duties&quoute;; this includes whether they have been convicted of a &quoute;disqualifying&quoute; crime, which includes bribery and corruption. I am not sure that 1.0 is the right score as it states that &quoute;...there is likely to be evidence of significant corruption&quoute;. 2.0 - &quoute;sanctions are available to punish corrupt PMCs. Though there is no evidence that these sanctions are effectively applied&quoute; is closer to the position.

Suggested score: 2

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: The MOD has a policy on MOD CONTRACTOR SUPPORT TO OPERATIONS (CSO):Incorporating Sponsored Reserve, Contractors on Deployed Operations and Private Security Companies).

Whilst on deployed operations, CONDO (Contractors ON Deployed Operations) Personnel are subject to service discipline and this is designated as CSSD (Civilians Subject to Service Discipline) under Section 15(7) of the Armed Forces Act 2006. CONDO Personnel’s employment contract makes reference to the CSSD.

The MOD monitors and supervises thee CONDO Personnel and conduct contract management visits.

The Procurement process of CONDO goes through the same scrutiny is the MOD Procurement process of the 6 phases of CADMID/T as detailed in the MOD response to Question 58.

CONDO Personnel are security cleared to BPSS, CTC or SC and for urgent operation requirements, a Risk Balance Case Assessment.

The process for approving the use of Private Security Contractors (PSC) either directly or by contractors is managed through a 2-Star (senior level staff) PSC Committee. There is a requirement to consider procedures to monitor the use of PSCs, both those directly contracted by MOD and those sub-contracted by contractors to MOD, including the investigation of any allegations of misconduct. As a signatory of the Montreux Document, and a state contracting with PSCs, the UK may also be under a legal obligation to investigate and prosecute allegations of wrongdoing by PSCs.

Suggested score: 4

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Not Qualified

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

Personnel 50
57.
score
4

Does the country have legislation covering defence and security procurement and are there any items exempt from these laws?

Researcher4085: As the Government Reviewer states, Defence and security procurement in the United Kingdom (UK) is subject the Common, Statute and European Law.

The UK has newly implemented procurement legislation (2011) which emanates from the EU. Some items are exempt from the terms of this law, for example, when issues such as public security are at stake but these circumstances appear to be limited and externally scrutinised.

The Defence and Security Public Contracts Regulations 2011 implement the EU directive of the same name in the UK. The Regulations aim to facilitate business based on five principles; (a) non discrimination on the ground of nationality within the EU, (b) equal treatment of all EU suppliers, (c) public transparency of the procurement process, (d) mutual recognition and (e) proportionality.

But the Regulations do not apply to all military procurement. The Treaty of the Functioning European Union (TFEU), which established and underpins the European Union, provides for “treaty exemptions” - instances when the five principles above do not need to be observed.

States can justify their decision to procure outside the Regulations on grounds such as public security (see Articles 36, 51, 52, 62, 346 TFEU for full details.) There are established protocols for seeking to apply a treaty exemption outlined by the MoD, which advises they can only be used in exceptional circumstances. It also warns that civil servants seeking to use a treaty exemption &quoute;must be aware that our use of treaty exemptions will come under increasing scrutiny from the [European] Commission&quoute;. The European Commission monitors the application of the Regulations, and all other EU law, through a complaints system and its own initiative and publishes findings in annual report.

The provisions of the 2010 Bribery Act are relevant to Service and Civilian personnel who have contact with external bodies including commercial organisations and foreign governments. The Act sets out four types of criminal offence; offences of bribing another person, offences relating to being bribed, bribery of a foreign public official and failure of a commercial organisation to prevent bribery.

Response to Government Reviewer: Agreed. Comments and sources updated. Score revised from 3 to 4.

COMMENTS -+

Defence and Security Public Contracts Regulations 2011
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2011/1848/regulation/23/made
Ministry of Defence. “The Defence and Security Public Contracts Regulations: Chapter 4 – Treaty Exemptions.” 21/08/2011. Accessed 02/07/2014.
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/27654/dspcr_chapter4_treaty_exempt7oct.pdf
The Treaty of the Functioning European Union (TFEU). Accessed 06/11/14.
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/ALL/?uri=CELEX:12012E/TXT
European Commission. &quoute;30th Annual Report on monitoring the application of EU law 2012&quoute;. 23/10/13. Accessed 06/11/14.
http://ec.europa.eu/eu_law/docs/docs_infringements/annual_report_30/sg_annual_report_monitoring_eu_law_131023.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: We believe the score should be 4. We comply with the model answer:

Defence and security procurement in the United Kingdom (UK) is subject the Common, Statute and European Law.

All public procurement in the UK is subject to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). In procurement terms, the TFEU seeks to ensure a free market in goods, services and works across the European Union (EU). The TFEU creates an obligation for the Ministry of Defence (MOD) to adhere to certain principles when seeking to procure anything. These are; non-discrimination, equal treatment, transparency, mutual recognition and proportionality. The relevant EU Directives (the Classic Directive, the Defence Directive and the Remedies Directive) have been implemented into UK law through the following UK regulations;

The Defence and Security Public Contracts Regulations 2011 – These transpose the Defence Directive for advertising requirements, treaty exemptions / general exclusions and procurement procedures relating to military and sensitive procurements with effect from 21 August 2011. The MOD uses these Regulations for buying defence and security goods, services and works.

The Public Contracts Regulations 2006 – These transpose the Classic Directive and relevant provisions of the Remedies Directive for advertising requirements, treaty exemptions / general exclusions and procurement procedures relating to non-military and non-sensitive procurements. The MOD uses these Regulations and associated case law for the acquisition of civilian goods, works and services.

One or other of these Regulations apply to all MOD procurements unless the particular requirement is covered by a treaty exemption or is below a specified financial threshold.

There are a number of other Treaty, Public Procurement, Contract and Information laws that are not specific but are relevant to defence and security procurements, these are detailed below;

Competition and Fair Trade Legislation – There are various statue laws controlling the creation of monopolies and prohibiting restrictive trade and anti-competitive practices including; the Fair Trading Act 1973, the Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1973, the Competition Acts 1980 and 1998, and the Enterprise Act 2002.

Unfair Contract Terms Act 1997 – This Act is aimed principally at protecting against unfair commercial practices.

Sale of Goods Act 1979, Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982 and Sale and Supply of Goods Act 1994 – These Acts set out a number of implied terms to protect the consumer.

Late Payment of Commercial Debts (Interest) Act 1998 – This Act encourages the timely payment of bills and invoices.

Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOI) –The FOI Act creates a general right of access to information and data held by the MOD, and places a legal obligation on the MOD to provide information. It also applies to information that is held by another party on behalf of the MOD such as a contractor. All commercial information held by the MOD falls within the scope of the FOI Act.

Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations (TUPE) 2006 – The TUPE Regulations preserve the continuity of employment and terms and conditions of employees who are transferred to a new employer as a result of a transfer of a business (or undertaking) as a going concern, or a service provision change such as outsourcing or change of contractor following a contract re-let.

Bribery Act 2010 – The provisions of the Act are relevant to Service and Civilian personnel who have contact with external bodies including commercial organisations and foreign governments. The Act sets out four types of criminal offence; offences of bribing another person, offences relating to being bribed, bribery of a foreign public official and failure of a commercial organisation to prevent bribery.

Equality Act 2010 – The Act applies to recruitment, career progression, terms of employment and the services the MOD provides to employees, families of the armed forces and members of the public. The MOD must ensure that its requirements do no have a discriminatory effect on those who receive its service.

Source(s):
Ministry of Defence. (2014) DE&S Commercial Awareness Guide. Part 2 The Legal Context for Contracting in the MOD. p. 7-9.

Suggested score: 4

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

58.
score
4

Is the defence procurement cycle process, from assessment of needs, through contract implementation and sign-off, all the way to asset disposal, disclosed to the public?

Researcher4085: Where the Defence and Security Public Contracts Regulations 2011 apply, the procurement process must be transparent. Further, the government’s transparency agenda requires departments including the MoD to publish information on contract tenders, government contracts and monthly departmental spends with suppliers. These are published through accessible portals to which the public has access. The data is of high quality and regularly updated.

Government reviewer (see below for full detail) states: &quoute;two variants of the acquisition lifecycle are: ‘CADMID’ for the acquisition of equipment capability; and ‘CADMIT’ for the provision of services. The CADMID cycle comprises six acquisition phases (Concept, Assessment, Demonstration, Manufacture, In-Service, Disposal)...The ‘CADMIT’ cycle also comprises six acquisition phases (Concept, Assessment, Demonstration, Migration, In-Service, Termination).&quoute;

The MoD is exempt from publishing some information in this framework however; data that relates to ‘war like stores’. When the government’s transparency agenda was launched in 2010, the Cabinet Office agreed that all ‘war like stores’ could be exempt from publication, initially for one year. This included items such as firearms, munitions, toxic or radioactive agents (see 'Ministry of Defence and MoD family spend' report for full details).

In response to a written Parliamentary Question by an MP, the Cabinet Office's leading ministry on transparency, stated: &quoute;There are no immediate plans to lift the temporary exemption from publication for Ministry of Defence contracts associated with war like stores.&quoute; There is no publicly available evidence to suggest this position has changed, noting the MoD’s last three set of annual accounts mention the transparency initiative but not the ‘war like stores’ exemptions the department has applied for. Analysis of the April 2014 departmental spend suggests these items are still excluded.

Asset disposals are managed by the DSA. Formerly an agency, a staff member explained in interview, the DSA became part of the MoD in 2008, which has reduced the transparency around it since the body no longer files a set of accounts independently. Infrastructure asset disposals are managed by the DIO which publishes detailed information about its planned land disposals, purchasing clients and the probable future use of the land.

Response to Government Reviewer: The Defence procurement cycle is highly transparent, except when war like stores are concerned. The Cabinet Office requested a 12 month exemption, but appeared to have taken no further action four year later. That said Failure to disclose specific purchases is a different issue to that of disclosing the process, and the process is available in detail.

COMMENTS -+

Defence and Security Public Contracts Regulations 2011
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2011/1848/regulation/23/made
Ministry of Defence and The Rt Hon Philip Hammond MP. “Ministry of Defence and MOD family spend.” 31/05/2010. Accessed 03/07/2014.
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/ministry-of-defence-and-mod-family-spend
Data.gov.uk. “Ministry of Defence Finance Transparency – £25,000 and GPC”. Accessed 03/07/2014.
http://data.gov.uk/dataset/financial-transactions-data-mod@2011-11-30T15%3A12%3A18.896946
Contracts Finder. “Advanced Search”. Accessed 03/07/2014.
https://online.contractsfinder.businesslink.gov.uk/Search%20Contracts.aspx?site=1000&lang=en
Disposal Services Authority. “About the DSA”. Accessed 03/07/2014.
https://www.gov.uk/government/groups/disposal-services-authority
Defence Infrastructure Organisation. “About us”. Accessed 03/07/2014.
https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/defence-infrastructure-organisation/about
Interview with DSA staff member, conducted via email. 26/06/2014 – 03/07/2014.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: The UK MOD Acquisition Operating Framework is published and provides guidance on all aspects of the CADMID cycle.

Suggested score: 4

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: The score should be 4.

The two variants of the acquisition lifecycle are:

‘CADMID’ for the acquisition of equipment capability; and
‘CADMIT’ for the provision of services.

The CADMID cycle comprises six acquisition phases (Concept, Assessment, Demonstration, Manufacture, In-Service, Disposal). The basic activities of each phase are as follows;

Concept
- Produce a statement of the outputs that users require from the system, framed as a User Requirements Document (URD);
- Form the delivery team;
- Involve industry;
- Identify technology and procurement options for meeting the requirement that merit further investigations;
- Obtain funding and agree plan for the Assessment (in detail) and subsequent stages (in outline), identifying performance, cost and time boundaries within which it is to be conducted;
- Initiate the Through Life Management Plan (TLMP);
- Continuously monitor concept maturity and, when appropriate, construct and submit an Initial Gate Business Case seeking approval for the Assessment Stage within time, cost and performance boundaries.

Assessment
- Produce the System Requirements Document (SRD), defining what the system must do to meet user needs as stated in the URD;
- Establish and maintain the linkage between user and system requirements;
- Identify the most cost-effective technological and procurement solution;
- Reduce the risk to a level consistent with delivering an acceptable level of system performance to tightly controlled time and cost parameters;
- Refine the TLMP, including detailed plans for the Demonstration phase;
- Continuously monitor project maturity and, when appropriate, construct a Main Gate Business Case seeking approval for the project within tightly defined performance, time and cost boundaries.

Demonstration
- Eliminate progressively the development risk and fix performance targets for manufacture, ensuring there is consistency between the final selected solution and the SRD and URD;
- Place contract(s) to meet the SRD;
- Demonstrate the ability to produce integrated capability.

Manufacture
- Deliver the solution to the military requirement within the time and cost limits;
- Conduct System Acceptance to confirm that the system satisfies the SRD and URD, as agreed at Main Gate;
- Transfer the lead customer function to the User, for equipment.

In-Service
- Confirm the Defence capability provided by the system is available for operational use, to the extent defined at Main Gate, and declare the In-Service Date (ISD);
- Provide effective support to the front line;
- Maintain levels of performance within agreed parameters, whilst driving down the cost of annual ownership;
- Carry out any agreed upgrades or improvements, refits or acquisition increments.

Disposal
- Carry out plans for efficient, effective and safe disposal of the equipment.

The ‘CADMIT’ cycle also comprises six acquisition phases (Concept, Assessment, Demonstration, Migration, In-Service, Termination). The basic activities of the Concept, Assessment, Demonstration and In-Service phases are the same as described above for the ‘CADMID’ cycle. The basic activities of the Migration and Termination phases are as follows;

Migration
- Migrate to the new service;
- Manufacture / build assets if appropriate;
- Deliver the solution to the requirement within the time and cost limits;
- Handover the services / assets to the user / customer;
- Confirm the acquired capability is available for operational use, to the extent defined at Main Gate, and declare the In-Service Date (ISD).

Termination
- Carry out the termination / closure of the estate, service, or business information system contract in accordance with the TLMP. Dispose of any assets, migrate data to follow-on systems 1.

Source(s):
Defence Contracts Online. Selling to the MOD – Edition 21. [Online] Available from: http://www.contracts.mod.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/s2mod21_proof.pdf [Accessed: 09th December 2014]

The defence procurement cycle is disclosed in detail and can be accessed via : Defence Contracts Online. Selling to the MOD – Edition 21. [Online] Available from: http://www.contracts.mod.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/s2mod21_proof.pdf

Or the Acquisition Operating Framework: https://www.gov.uk/acquisition-operating-framework

Suggested score: 4

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

59.
score
4

Are defence procurement oversight mechanisms in place and are these oversight mechanisms active and transparent?

Researcher4085: Procurement is overseen by the Investment Approvals Committee (IAC), which reports to the Defence Board, the highest committee in the MoD ('How Defence Works', para 30). A 2012 National Audit Office review of the IAC was generally positive. It concluded that the IAC is an authoritative body that successfully controls all departmental spending which is supported by good staff with the right expertise. The NAO commented that the IAC, by creating scrutiny reports, is improving the evidence base with which it can make decisions although the committee could do more to record its key considerations in decision making processes. While the approvals process was found to be “largely independent” the NAO expressed some concerns about the lack of a conflicts of interest policies.

Government reviewer (see below) states: &quoute;The National Audit Office also found (HC816 and HC817 of session 2013-14) that the Department’s Cost Assurance and Analysis Service (CAAS) provides independent cost management advice to aid in budget setting and investment decision-making, and challenges technical assumptions. CAAS supports the Department’s new quarterly review process through its independent view of procurement costs and schedules. It also conducts investigations into proposals from Industry to identify potential areas of cost reduction, over-estimates, inefficiencies and double-counting.&quoute;

Further independent scrutiny can be conducted by the National Audit Office and parliamentary Public Accounts Committee.

Response to reviewers: Score raised to 4 as all criteria for the score are fulfilled - &quoute;Procurement oversight mechanisms are in place. They are independent formalised processes and they are transparent. There is evidence to demonstrate that they are highly active, and that this activity spans changes in governments&quoute;.

COMMENTS -+

National Audit Office, “Observations on the Ministry of Defence major investment approval process”. December 2012. Accessed 03/07/2014.
http://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/MoD_investment_approval_process.pdf
Ministry of Defence. “How Defence Works”. 01/04/2014.
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/302419/20140409-how-defence-works.pdf
House of Commons. &quoute;Public Accounts Committee&quoute;. Accessed 23/09/15.
http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/public-accounts-committee/

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Not Qualified

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: The score should be a 4.

Procurement is overseen by the Investment Approvals Committee (IAC), which reports to the Defence Board, the highest committee in the MoD ('How Defence Works', para 30). A 2012 National Audit Office review of the IAC concluded that, following changes made in 2011, the IAC and subordinate processes are best practice in the oversight of project and business case management and approval. It concluded that the IAC is an authoritative body that successfully controls all departmental spending which is supported by good staff with the right expertise. The teams supporting the IAC are independent, non-advocate subject matter experts that scrutinise evidence provided by project teams and ensure that IAC remains focussed on evidence based decision-making.

The National Audit Office also found (HC816 and HC817 of session 2013-14) that the Department’s Cost Assurance and Analysis Service (CAAS) provides independent cost management advice to aid in budget setting and investment decision-making, and challenges technical assumptions. CAAS supports the Department’s new quarterly review process through its independent view of procurement costs and schedules. It also conducts investigations into proposals from Industry to identify potential areas of cost reduction, over-estimates, inefficiencies and double-counting.

Suggested score: 4

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: The National Audit Office, which is independent of Government, makes frequent reports on procurement (eg its annual Major Projects Reports, of which the latest was published on 13 Feb 2014) and the Public Accounts Committee frequently investigates and reports on procurement issues, interviewing the Permanent Under-Secretary and the Chief of Defence Materiel.

Suggested score: 4

Peer Reviewer-+

60.
score
4

Are actual and potential defence purchases made public?

Researcher4085: The MoD publishes all departmental spending above £25,000. Items relating to ‘war like stores’ – a substantial amount of data - are exempt from this list but the data is otherwise comprehensive and of high quality. Contract tenders and the general procurement plans of the MoD are made public. The Defence Contracts Bulletin is a monthly MoD publication that provides access to “all MoD contracts above £10,000… the MoD’s ongoing and upcoming equipment projects…[and] future MOD requirements”.

Government reviewer (see below) states: &quoute;Given the nature of some of the procurements the MOD undertakes, the Efficiency Reform Group (ERG) and Her Majesty’s Treasury (HMT) have agreed and granted a number of exemptions to publication for some tenders and contracts which, if released into the public domain, could compromise National Security, the security of those who work for or with the MOD, the capability and effectiveness of our Armed Forces, or the legitimate commercial interests of both the MOD and those we contract with. These exemptions are periodically reviewed by the ERG. If the ERG considers that the MOD is inappropriately applying the exemptions, they will be withdrawn and the MOD will be required to comply with the ERG guidance on publication in full 3.

During the period 1st July 2014 – 30th September 2014;

-- 349 contracts were awarded. 45 of these were exempt from publication on the basis of warlike stores and information exempt under Section 23 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000;
-- 171 tenders were published. 40 of these were exempt from publication on the basis of warlike stores and information exempt under Section 23 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000;
-- 86% of the contracts placed during this period were for the value of £10,000 and over.

The MOD maintains a full record of the award procedure in a contract file, including tender submissions, contracts and any subsequent changes made to them.&quoute;

Response to Government Reviewer: comments and sources updated. Score revised from 3 to 4 on the basis that it appears the bulk of defence purchases are disclosed.

COMMENTS -+

Data.gov.uk. “Ministry of Defence Finance Transparency – £25,000 and GPC”. Accessed 03/07/2014.
http://data.gov.uk/dataset/financial-transactions-data-mod@2011-11-30T15%3A12%3A18.896946
Ministry of Defence and The Rt Hon Philip Hammond MP. “Ministry of Defence and MOD family spend.” 31/05/2010. Accessed 03/07/2014.
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/ministry-of-defence-and-mod-family-spend
Defence Contracts Online. “Defence Contracts Bulletin”. Accessed 03/07/2014.
http://www.contracts.mod.uk/publication/
Ministry of Defence. (2014) DE&S Commercial Awareness Guide. Part 5 Processes and Tools. p. 15.
Ministry of Defence. (2014) Advertising Commercial Policy Statement.
Ministry of Defence. (2014) Transparency: Publication of Tenders and Contracts Commercial Policy Statement.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: The score should be a 4. We comply with the model answer:

The Ministry of Defence (MOD) advertises all competitive requirements valued above £10,000 (not subject to exemption or redaction) and non-competitive requirements above £40,000 (not subject to exemption or redaction) before and after contract award. The requirements are advertised in one or more of four official internet portals depending on their nature and value. The portals are:

-- Defence Contracts Online (DCO);
-- Official Journal of the European Union;
-- European Defence Agency Electronic Bulletin Board; and
-- Contracts Finder 1.

Requirements which meet the financial threshold are also published in the MOD Defence Contract Bulletin available on subscription 2.

Given the nature of some of the procurements the MOD undertakes, the Efficiency Reform Group (ERG) and Her Majesty’s Treasury (HMT) have agreed and granted a number of exemptions to publication for some tenders and contracts which, if released into the public domain, could compromise National Security, the security of those who work for or with the MOD, the capability and effectiveness of our Armed Forces, or the legitimate commercial interests of both the MOD and those we contract with. These exemptions are periodically reviewed by the ERG. If the ERG considers that the MOD is inappropriately applying the exemptions, they will be withdrawn and the MOD will be required to comply with the ERG guidance on publication in full 3.

During the period 1st July 2014 – 30th September 2014;

-- 349 contracts were awarded. 45 of these were exempt from publication on the basis of warlike stores and information exempt under Section 23 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000;
-- 171 tenders were published. 40 of these were exempt from publication on the basis of warlike stores and information exempt under Section 23 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000;
-- 86% of the contracts placed during this period were for the value of £10,000 and over.

The MOD maintains a full record of the award procedure in a contract file, including tender submissions, contracts and any subsequent changes made to them.

Source(s):
1 - Ministry of Defence. (2014) DE&S Commercial Awareness Guide. Part 5 Processes and Tools. p. 15.
2 - Ministry of Defence. (2014) Advertising Commercial Policy Statement.
3 - Ministry of Defence. (2014) Transparency: Publication of Tenders and Contracts Commercial Policy Statement.


All Ministry of Defence (MOD) tenders which meet the criteria and not subject to exemption, are published in the Official Journal of the European Union (OJEU).

Additionally, the Ministry of Defence Contracts Online (MOD DCO) portal provides all suppliers and potential suppliers with free online access to relevant tender and contract opportunities with a value over £10,000. A fortnightly Ministry of Defence Contracts Bulletin (MOD DCB) is also available on subscription which contains contract announcements with a value of over £111,676. Both contain the following contract notices which provide information to industry on procurements which are exempt from the OJEU procedures.

In summary;
-- Prior Information Notices (PIN) advise the market of forthcoming procurements;
-- Requests for Information (RFI) may be used to obtain information which may inform procurement strategy decisions;
-- Contract Notices seek expressions of interest for competitive requirements;
-- Voluntary Transparency Notices (VTN) announce non-competitive requirements to advertise subcontract opportunities and allow challenge to single source strategies;
-- Contract Bidders Notices identify which organisations have been invited to tender for the requirement.

All relevant MOD tender and contract notices which meet the criteria are also advertised on the Government Contract Finder portal to maximise the number of opportunities visible.

To help increase industry awareness of the MOD’s future requirements, the MOD conducts Industry Days in order to give information to potential suppliers about possible future purchases and contract opportunities. The events are advertised on the Contracts Online portal and Defence Contracts Bulletin.

Source(s):
Defence Contracts Online. Selling to the MOD – Edition 21. [Online] Available from: http://www.contracts.mod.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/s2mod21_proof.pdf [Accessed: 09th December 2014]

Suggested score: 4

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: The comments appear better suited to score 4 rather than 3.

Suggested score: 4

Peer Reviewer-+

61.
score
2

What procedures and standards are companies required to have - such as compliance programmes and business conduct programmes - in order to be able to bid for work for the Ministry of Defence or armed forces?

Researcher4085: Although there is significant work to ensure MoD contractors do not engage in corrupt activities, there is no evidence that this includes a formal compliance program. The Supplier Selection Policy of the Commercial Toolkit within the MoD’s Acquisition Operating Framework states that commercial suppliers must posses “good standing” but does not stipulate the formal adoption of a compliance program. Good standing is further elaborated on the Supplier Selection: Excluding Ineligible Suppliers document. MoD contractors must have signed a Statement in Relation to Good Standing before signing a contract with the MoD. The statement is designed to ensure that no representatives of the organisation have a criminal conviction for offences related to fraud, bribery, organised crime and other related offences. However, the statement does not require contractors to take forward-looking preventative measures such as adopting a compliance programme.

MoD contractors are also vetted and must pass Security Clearance, which is designed to ensure that contractors have integrity. Sometime they must complete a Dynamic Pre-Qualification Questionnaire, which can but is not always required to include questions on integrity and compliance. The MoD’s Financial Policy Management Manual contains a chapter on sound governance but there is nothing in this section which discusses contractors’ requirements to run formal compliance programmes.

Government reviewer (see below) states: &quoute;The MOD requires all suppliers to declare any convictions for acts such as bribery using a Pre Qualification Questionnaire or the Statement Relating to Good Standing. Bidding companies are not required to have an ethics programme in order to bid for work with the Ministry of Defence&quoute;.

Response to Government Reviewer: the threshold for a score of 3 is clear. &quoute;Companies are required to show that they have a formal and publicly declared compliance programme&quoute;. My research indicates that companies are not required to do so, and your comments do not clarify this position. Score maintained.

COMMENTS -+

MoD. “Acquisition Operating Framework: Supplier Selection Policy”. 01/04/2014. Accessed 13/07/2014. [NB: Access must be requested from MoD]. https://www.aof.mod.uk/aofcontent/tactical/toolkit/downloadsindexed/suppsel/suppsel_cps.pdf?zoom_highlight=bribery#search=&quoute;bribery&quoute;
MoD. Acquisition Operating Framework: Supplier Selection: Excluding Ineligible Suppliers”. 01/06/2014. Accessed 13/07/2014. [Access must be requested from MoD]
https://www.aof.mod.uk/aofcontent/tactical/toolkit/downloadsindexed/suppsel_excl/suppsel_excl_cps.pdf?zoom_highlight=bribery#search=&quoute;bribery&quoute;
MoD. “National Security Vetting.” 05/06/2014. Accessed 13/07/2014.
https://www.gov.uk/security-vetting-and-clearance
MoD. “Procurement: Dynamic Pre-Qualification Questionnaire”.
MoD. “Financial Policy Management Manual (Joint Service Publication 462).” March 2014. Accessed 13/07/2014.
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/303207/jsp_462_april_14.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: The score should be 3.

All dealings between the MOD, its suppliers and potential suppliers must be, and be seen to be, on an ethical basis. The MOD has a zero tolerance towards fraud, theft and corruption. Everyone involved in acquisition should be impartial, equitable and even-handed in all dealings with suppliers, without any conflict of interest – and behave with integrity, free of any accusation of having been influenced, for example, by gifts or hospitality. The MOD requires all suppliers to declare any convictions for acts such as bribery using a Pre Qualification Questionnaire or the Statement Relating to Good Standing. Bidding companies are not required to have an ethics programme in order to bid for work with the Ministry of Defence.

Suggested score: 3

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

62.
score
4

Are procurement requirements derived from an open, well-audited national defence and security strategy?

Researcher4085: The MoD’s ten year Equipment Plan, which is devised in context of the Strategic Defence and Security Review 2010 and the Future Force 2020 policy, outlines the UK defence needs for the next ten years. It contains plans for £164 billion of procurement, representing the large majority of the MoD’s equipment and support needs.

The MoD's annual reports describe the procurement it has undertaken in a given year with reference, which can be referenced against the equipment plan (paras 7.12-7.15 in 2013-14). Scrutiny of MoD procurement practice and strategy is provided by the Defence Committee, National Audit Office and Public Accounts Committee.

The MoD purchases equipment outside of its strategic plan. This spending is classified as Urgent Operational Requirements (UORs) and is funded by the Government Special Reserve &quoute;to address urgent and unforeseen capability gaps in support of current or imminent military operations.&quoute; £8 billion has been spent on UORs since 2001 (7.16).

The equipment plan is updated annually so that it reflects changes to risks and strategy and always looks ahead a full ten years. The annual plan is audited by the National Audit Office (NAO). The NAO’s audit of the 2013 plan was broadly positive although it raised concerns about the costing of overspend risks. It stated: “the Department’s treatment of risk and uncertainty needs to be improved before we can have confidence that the contingency provision [of £8 billion] is sufficient.” The NAO's 2014 review of the equipment plan restated concerns that &quoute;Project teams continue to be over-optimistic in their forecasts of both procurement and support costs(para 9).&quoute;

The Chair of the Public Accounts Committee has raised concerns about the MoD's overspend risk analysis and contingency planning. Previous major projects have risen in cost by up to 40% and the Chair has stated that on this basis the full costs of spending are not within the Equipment Plan and that the contingency provision of £8billion is insufficient.

COMMENTS -+

Ministry of Defence. “The Defence Equipment Plan 2013”. 12/02/2014. Accessed 07/07/2014.
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/279440/defence_equipment_plan_2013.pdf
National Audit Office. “Ministry of Defence: Equipment Plan 2013 to 2023”. 13/02/2014. Accessed 07/07/2014.
http://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/Equipment-Plan-2013-to-2023.pdf
Richard Norton-Taylor, “Trident subs, aircraft carriers and drones on MoD's £160bn shopping list”, 31/01/13.
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/jan/31/trident-uk-military-shopping-list
National Audit Office. “Ministry of Defence: Major Projects Report 2014 and Equipment Plan 2014 to 2024”. 13/01/2015. Accessed 23/09/2015.
Ministry of Defence. &quoute;Annual Report and Accounts 2013-14&quoute;. Accessed 23/09/15
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/381064/MOD_AR13-14_webversion.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

63.
score
4

Are defence purchases based on clearly identified and quantified requirements?

Researcher4085: The MoD’s equipment strategy is developed on a rolling ten-year basis and in line with long term strategic thinking on defence needs contained in policies such as Army 2020 and the Strategic Defence and Security Review. Annual equipment plan reports are published that detail the specific challenges and requirements of each year and are broken down by sector.

The MoD’s performance is audited by the National Audit Office, which provides a response to the equipment plan and reviews spending in its annual accounts.

COMMENTS -+

Ministry of Defence. “The Defence Equipment Plan 2013”. 12/02/2014. Accessed 07/07/2014.
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/279440/defence_equipment_plan_2013.pdf
Army. “British Army Structure > Army 2020”. Accessed 07/07/2014.
http://www.army.mod.uk/structure/33449.aspx
Ministry of Defence. “Annual Report and Accounts 2012-2013”.
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/222874/MOD_AR13_clean.pdf
Cabinet Office and National Security and Intelligence. “The strategic defence and security review: securing Britain in an age of uncertainty.” 19/10/2010. Accessed 07/07/2014.
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-strategic-defence-and-security-review-securing-britain-in-an-age-of-uncertainty

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

64.
score
2

Is defence procurement generally conducted as open competition or is there a significant element of single-sourcing (that is, without competition)?

Researcher4085: MoD statistics for 2012/13 show that, by value, 59% of MoD HQ contracts were placed non-competitively. The report states this is a “particularly high” figure, which is caused by a number of high value equipment contracts being let with a couple of companies. However, a review of the past five years demonstrates that the value of non-competitive contracts has averaged at 52%.

Single Source Procurement underwent significant reform in 2014. The Defence Reform Act was granted Royal Assent in May 2014 and provides a new statutory framework for single source procurement, which includes the creation of an oversight body, the Single Source Regulations Office (SSRO). However, the Financial Times reported in September 2015 that the impact of the office has been limited. It states: both the MoD and private sector have so far proved reluctant to engage with the new regulatory regime: just three of 61 single-source contracts awarded this year have fallen under the SSRO’s remit because the others were classified as extensions or amendments to existing contracts,&quoute;.

Response to Government Reviewer: my scoring based on MoD statistical information and the assessment criteria. Your response is outside the scope of the assessment criteria and the figure of 45% is not sourced.

Response to chapter reviewer: The Financial Times report indicates that the SSRO has had minimal impact since its introduction in 2014. Comments edited to reflect this. Score based on the average of non-competitive contracts of 52%.

COMMENTS -+

Ministry of Defence. “Table 1.01.05 New Contracts Placed: By Type (page 18) in
Annual Statistical Series 1: Finance Bulletin 1.01: Trade, Industry and Contracts 2013”. 01/08/2013. Accessed 05/07/2014.
https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/defence-reform-act-2014
Ministry of Defence. “Defence Reform Act 2014: Part 2: Single Source Procurement Reform”. 15/05/2014. Accessed 05/07/2014.
https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/defence-reform-act-2014
Sam Jones, &quoute;UK government defence deals subject to sweeping review&quoute;, Financial Times, 06/09/2015
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/63ee7aae-5471-11e5-b029-b9d50a74fd14.html#ixzz3mXsaX25W

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: The Single Source Regulations to which the assessment refers came into effect in December 2014. It's effectiveness needs to be assessed by the Assessor as it has now been running for a few months. Many of the non-competitively placed contracts in fact apply to long term in service support from the supplier as a consequence of a decision to outsource much front line logistic support a decade or so ago. All major new equipment programmes are subject to a robust competitive process but this is not reflected in the metric.

A good summary of current thinking around the Total Support Force is on Page 18 and after of the RUSI article at https://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/02_UK_Defence_Acquisition.pdf. The Defence Reform Act has already put the Office in place and it both rigourously scrutinises and controls single source procurements.

Suggested score: 2

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: We believe the score should be 4 because we disagree with the scoring methodology.

The single source contracts are at 45% of all contracts and we only carry out sovereign capability.

Our commercial awareness guide states:
“Non-competitive procurement should only be used under specifically defined, restricted circumstances. These can include Defence Strategic considerations such as national security, security of supply and operational sovereignty, matters of Operational urgency, and where competition is not available. The structure of the market can also have an impact on our ability to compete – for example where the requirement can only be met by a sole supplier with unique and specialist technology, Intellectual Property, or where it is evident that the cost of running a competition is more than the benefit we will get from competing.”

“The decision on whether to pursue a competitive or non-competitive approach is made by the acquisition team when developing the procurement strategy and they will need evidence to justify the chosen approach in the Business Case.”

The Single Source Regulations Office has been implemented. Terms of their governance is located here:
https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/single-source-regulations-office/about/our-governance

Suggested score: 4

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: Your mark follows from the statistics you quote. But the high proportion of non-competitive contracts follows from the structure of the industry and also from the fact that during the life of a major equipment there are many follow-on contracts for spares and support. The MOD's emphasis is on competition where practicable.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

65.
score
3

Are tender boards subject to regulations and codes of conduct and are their decisions subject to independent audit to ensure due process and fairness?

Researcher4085: The MoD’s Commercial Policy Statement on tenders board states that tender boards must be used “to ensure fairness, impartiality and confidentiality in the treatment of tenders”. Compliance with these principles is a legal obligation established by the Treaty of the Function of the European Union, European Procurement Directives and the Defence and Security Public Contracts Regulation 2011. Tender boards are composed of MoD independent commercial officers. Boards are localised across the MoD subject to the procurement requirements of different departments and operations.

The policy outlined in the Commercial Policy Statement forms the basis of all procedures developed with localised tender boards. The policy statement includes measures to ensure impartiality (paras 6-14 of the statement). The statement indicates that tender board paperwork is kept in a locked box which provides an audit trail when disputes arise. This implies that audits may not be routinely undertaken for other purposes. There is no evidence of published audits of disputes. The policy statement adds: “Responsibility for ensuring that local procedures comply with the CPS rests with a commercial officer, not lower than band C1, in the management chain of the local area” and makes no further mention of tender board audits. This implies that oversight exists for implementing tender board principles but does not seem to extend to routine formal audits.

All civilians working in tender board roles are subject to the Civil Service Code of Conduct, which impels civil servants to be honest and impartial, and has statutory force by virtue of the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010. Service Personnel working in tendering are subject to the Queen’s Regulations of their respective Force but the Regulations are not easily accessible. There are no digital copies in circulation and a printed version retails at £78.

Response to Government Reviewer: my comments discuss the Civil Service code of conduct. Score maintained.

COMMENTS -+

MoD. Commercial Policy Statement: Tender Boards. 01/11/14. Accessed 07/11/14. (Registration via the Acquisition Operating Framework required).
Defence and Security Public Contracts Regulation 2011
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2011/1848/regulation/4/made
https://www.aof.mod.uk/aofcontent/tactical/toolkit/downloadsindexed/ten_brd/tenbrd_cps.pdf
Civil Service. “The Civil Service Code.” 30/11/2010. Accessed 01/07/2014.
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/civil-service-code/the-civil-service-code
Section 5, Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/25/section/5
MoD. “Defence and Security Public Contracts Regulations 2011 Chapter 15 - Conducting the Tendering Exercise [guidance]”. 23/07/13. Accessed on 07/11/14.
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/27666/DSPCR_Chapter15_conduct_tender20130723.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: Members of the tender boards are bound by the Civil Service code of conduct.

The tender boards have an appeals process for potential Suppliers who disagree with the board decision.

Suggested score: 4

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Not Qualified

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

66.
score
4

Does the country have legislation in place to discourage and punish collusion between bidders for defence and security contracts?

Researcher4085: Chapter I of the Competition Act 1998 outlaws anti-competitive behaviour. In Europe anti-competitiveness is prohibited by Article 101 of the Treaty of the Function European Union (TFEU). According to Pinsent Masons guidance on OutLaw.com, a breach of Chapter I or Article 101 can have serious consequences, which include fines of up to 10% of group global turnover, the disqualifications of company directors, and nullification of agreements that contained anticompetitive provisions and criminal sanctions. The Competition Commission, established by the Competition Act 1998, was replaced in 2014 by the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA), which also took over functions of the Office of Fair Trading. The CMA has not published annual accounts or a report at time of research.

There is some evidence of offending companies facing punishment. In its 2013-14 report the Competition Commission stated it had conducted five market investigations, 13 merger inquiries, two regulatory appeals and three reviews of undertakings and orders for that year. The Serious Fraud Office (SFO) also has a remit to investigate and prosecute cases of complex fraud, bribery and corruption. The SFO achieved 11 convictions and had 76 cases in progress at year end of 2013-14 according to its annual report.

COMMENTS -+

Competition Act 1998
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/41/contents
Article 101 of the Treaty of the Function European Union (TFEU)
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:12008E101
Pinsent Masons Out Law. “EU & Competition > Competition law – the basics.” Accessed 05/07/2014.
http://www.out-law.com/page-5811
Competition and Markets Authority. “About us”. Accessed 05/07/2014.
https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/competition-and-markets-authority/about
COMPETITION COMMISSION “ANNUAL REPORT & ACCOUNTS 2013-2014”. Accessed 07/11/14.
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/322811/40626_2902424_Web_Accessible_v1.1.pdf
Serious Fraud Office “Annual Report and Accounts 2013 - 14”. 30/06/14. Accessed 07/11/14.
http://www.sfo.gov.uk/media/274080/sfo%20ar-2014%20sps-26-6.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

67.
score
3

Are procurement staff, in particular project and contract managers, specifically trained and empowered to ensure that defence contractors meet their obligations on reporting and delivery?

Researcher4085: There is no publicly available evidence that MoD staff are provided with specialist training to ensure contractors meet their reporting and delivery obligations. However, government reviewer (see below) states: &quoute;The MOD policy is that for all members of the MOD Commercial function are to undertake appropriate professional training according to their grade and role. This includes undertaking the CIPS (Chartered Institute of Purchasing and Supply (CIPS).&quoute;

There are also significant resources available to staff, for example, the Acquisition Operating Framework which includes guidance on contract administration and the Commercial Process and Governance unit in the MoD’s Commercial Services department. There are processes of monitoring in place up to and including the Public Accounts Committee.


The National Audit Office is a longstanding critic of contract management across government. A 2014 statement prefacing a report on contract management states: &quoute;Following the discovery of widespread and deep-rooted weaknesses in the government’s management of contracts it is starting to improve how it manages its contracts.&quoute; The NAO report observes that the MoD, along with three other Whitehall departments, are &quoute;the most advanced in their change programmes&quoute;, but the MoD is also criticised throughout the report.

Response to reviewers: Government and Peer Reviewer: Comment updated and sources added. Score revised from 2 to 3 as a result of MoD training and NAO criticisms.

COMMENTS -+

MoD, “Acquisition Operating Framework”. 17/03/2014. Accessed 04/07/2014.
https://www.gov.uk/acquisition-operating-framework#contents-of-the-aof
MoD.” Ministry of Defence Commercial: Commercial Services includes the following teams”. 12/12/2012. Accessed 05/07/2014. https://www.gov.uk/ministry-of-defence-commercial
NAO. &quoute;Cabinet Office: Transforming government’s contract management&quoute;. 4-/9/14. Accessed 23/09/15.
http://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Cabinet-office-cross-government-transforming-governments-contract-management.pdf
Centre for Defence Acquisition and Technology, www.da.mod.uk, Accessed 16/10/2015.
Cranfield university, www.cranfield.ac.uk/about/.../schools.../cranfield-defence-and-security, Accessed 16/10/2015.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: The assessment refers to the Acquisition Operating Framework which includes procedures for commercial processes at the centre of which are obligations on suppliers to report and deliver. The processes of monitoring right up to and including the Public Accounts Committee are in place. The MOD makes an annual Major Projects Report to the PAC on which the Accounting Officer is interrogated.

www.da.mod.uk › ... › Centre for Defence Acquisition and Technology; www.cranfield.ac.uk/about/.../schools.../cranfield-defence-and-security/ both describe the extensive training that is available to both MOD and industry.

However, it is also a well recognised position of NAO and Cabinet Office that commercial skills and contract management skills and training across Whitehall are poor. See for example: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-29074187.

The suggested score put forward takes both of the above into account.

Suggested score: 3

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: The score should be 4.

The MOD policy is that for all members of the MOD Commercial function are to undertake appropriate professional training according to their grade and role. This includes undertaking the CIPS (Chartered Institute of Purchasing and Supply (CIPS).

Details about MOD’s professional development can be access on the MOD Commercial Toolkit via the “Selling to the MOD” document: http://www.contracts.mod.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/s2mod21_proof.pdf

Suggested score: 4

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Not Qualified

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

68.
score
4

Are there mechanisms in place to allow companies to complain about perceived malpractice in procurement, and are companies protected from discrimination when they use these mechanisms?

Researcher4085: Legal protection in the form of immunity and leniency is afforded to members of cartels who come forward with evidence of malpractice in respect of “price fixing, market sharing, bid rigging and the fixing of output quotas and/or restrictions.” These protections are enshrined in the Competition Act 1998 and endorsed in the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) Leniency Policy. Note: the policy was written by the now-closed Office for Fair Trading (OFT) but has now been adopted by the CMA which discharges the OFT’s functions.

Government reviewer (see below) states: &quoute;With regard to procurements placed under the Public Contract Regulations (PCR) 2006 and Defence Security Public Contracts Regulations (DSPCR) 2011, individuals, companies and/or Member States have access to a European Commission infractions process when it is believed that a contracting authority may not have met legal obligations under the European Union (EU) rules. The infractions process requires the Member State to address, with supporting evidence, the charge of alleged malpractice to a process and timetable set by the EU. The EU will then decide if there is a case to answer.

By way of an example; an anonymous complaint alleged that the Ministry of Defence (MOD) was in breach of EU Law because it had extended the scope and value of a contract placed with a supplier a number of times. The complainant was of the opinion that the MOD was in breach of EU competition law by adopting this approach which avoided the need to recomplete the whole requirement, thus giving the original contractor an unfair advantage. The MOD’s position was that the entire extended requirements could not have been reasonably foreseen at the outset. The case was considered by the EU, they found that no breach of EU law had taken place and there was no further case for the MOD to answer.&quoute;

The Ministry of Defence Police operates a toll-free Fraud Hotline, which companies can use to report malpractice. Its website states: “Anyone can report suspicions of theft or deception to the MOD Fraud hotline: 0800 161 3665… Allegations are always treated seriously and, if appropriate, investigated by CID officers.” There is no evidence that a company would be protected from outcomes arising from a fraud, theft or deception investigation in practice.

Government reviewer (see below) also states: &quoute;The ‘Mystery Shopper Scheme’ was launched in the UK by the Prime Minister and the Minister for the Cabinet Office in February 2011 to allow concerns about public procurement processes and practice to be raised by Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs), and other suppliers, including charitable and voluntary organisations and social enterprises.

The scheme’s role is to assist contracting authorities in implementing good procurement policy and practice. The Cabinet Office investigates their concerns, making recommendations where necessary, and publishes the results of cases on GOV.UK.

As an example, the MOD was subject to spot check 234. The Cabinet Office advised that documentation on the Contracts Finder was illegible. To resolve the concern the MOD project team provided revised redacted documents in a more legible format.

Additionally, in ‘Mystery Shopper’ case 721 the Cabinet Office received a query from the supply chain concerning the requirements for a supplier to MOD being required to pay subcontractor invoices within 30 days. The MOD agency concerned confirmed that the supplier in question was required to pass down 30 day payment to their supply chain and also provided details of how the subcontractors can report concerns about late payments in confidence to them.&quoute;

Response to Government Reviewer: Agreed. Score updated from 3 to 4.

COMMENTS -+

Ministry of Defence. “MoD Police”. 22/05/2014. Accessed 07/07/2014.
https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/ministry-of-defence-police
Competitions and Markets Authority. “Cartels: confess and apply for leniency”. 31/03/2014. Accessed 07/07/2014.
https://www.gov.uk/cartels-confess-and-apply-for-leniency
Competition and Markets Authority. “Leniency and no-action applications in cartel cases.” 12/03/2014. Accessed 07/07/2014.
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/leniency-and-no-action-applications-in-cartel-cases
The Public Contracts Regulation 2006, http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2006/5/pdfs/uksi_20060005_en.pdf, Accessed 14/10/2015.
The EU Defence and Security Public Contracts Regulations (DSPCR) 2011, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-european-union-defence-and-security-public-contracts-regulations-dspcr-2011, Accessed 14/10/2015.
Mystery Shopper: scope and remit, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/mystery-shopper-scope-and-remit, Accessed 14/10/2015.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Not Qualified

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: The score should be 4.

With regard to procurements placed under the Public Contract Regulations (PCR) 2006 and Defence Security Public Contracts Regulations (DSPCR) 2011, individuals, companies and/or Member States have access to a European Commission infractions process when it is believed that a contracting authority may not have met legal obligations under the European Union (EU) rules. The infractions process requires the Member State to address, with supporting evidence, the charge of alleged malpractice to a process and timetable set by the EU. The EU will then decide if there is a case to answer.

By way of an example; an anonymous complaint alleged that the Ministry of Defence (MOD) was in breach of EU Law because it had extended the scope and value of a contract placed with a supplier a number of times. The complainant was of the opinion that the MOD was in breach of EU competition law by adopting this approach which avoided the need to recomplete the whole requirement, thus giving the original contractor an unfair advantage. The MOD’s position was that the entire extended requirements could not have been reasonably foreseen at the outset. The case was considered by the EU, they found that no breach of EU law had taken place and there was no further case for the MOD to answer.

The ‘Mystery Shopper Scheme’ was launched in the UK by the Prime Minister and the Minister for the Cabinet Office in February 2011 to allow concerns about public procurement processes and practice to be raised by Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs), and other suppliers, including charitable and voluntary organisations and social enterprises.

The scheme’s role is to assist contracting authorities in implementing good procurement policy and practice. The Cabinet Office investigates there concerns, making recommendations where necessary, and publishes the results of cases on GOV.UK.

In February 2014 the Government extended the ‘Mystery Shopper’ scheme to carry out spot checks on procurement processes as well as continuing to deal with referrals raised by SME’s and other concerned suppliers. The objective is to raise the commercial capability of contracting authorities through their adoption of good procurement policy and practice and ensuring that public procurements do not impose unnecessary barriers to small businesses when bidding for public contracts. Spot checks are undertaken by examining procurement documents, usually online, on procurement protocols and checking for compliance with the relevant procurement policy notes.

As an example, the MOD was subject to spot check 234. The Cabinet Office advised that documentation on the Contracts Finder was illegible. To resolve the concern the MOD project team provided revised redacted documents in a more legible format.

Additionally, in ‘Mystery Shopper’ case 721 the Cabinet Office received a query from the supply chain concerning the requirements for a supplier to MOD being required to pay subcontractor invoices within 30 days. The MOD agency concerned confirmed that the supplier in question was required to pass down 30 day payment to their supply chain and also provided details of how the subcontractors can report concerns about late payments in confidence to them.

Suggested score: 4

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree with Comments

Comment: I'm not sure of the evidence that &quoute;some companies believe that it would be disadvantageous to complain&quoute; (as the marking criterion says) but I dare say this is true.

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

69.
score
3

What sanctions are used to punish the corrupt activities of a supplier?

Researcher4085: Public authorities are legally banned from contracting with defence companies convicted of corruption offences. Section 23 of the Defence and Security Public Contracts Regulations prohibits a contracting authority from working with an economic partner who has been convicted of bribery, corruption, fraud and money laundering, (23(e),(f),(g) and (i) respectively, and a range of other related offences such as involvement in organised crime or the proceeds of crime. Individuals prosecuted under the Bribery Act 2010, Fraud Act 2006 and Prevention of Corruption Act 1906 face jail terms of up to 10, and 7 years respectively, and/or monetary penalties. These sanctions may not always be enforced. For example, the Serious Fraud Office discontinued prosecutions against a company after it agreed to pay a monetary fine of £30m following bribery allegations in Tanzania. This left many issues of the case unsatisfactorily resolved.

Response to Government Reviewer:whilst the case is some years old it is indicative of inconsistent application in the past. The score is maintained on the basis that the SFO is assessed not to have the required resources and teeth to enforce sanctions consistently to warrant the award of score 4.

COMMENTS -+

Section 23 of the Defence and Security Public Contracts Regulations. http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2011/1848/contents/made
Section 11 of the Bribery Act 2010. http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/23/contents
Sections 6, 7, 9 & 11 of the Fraud Act 2006. http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/35/contents
Section 1 of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1906. http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Edw7/6/34/contents
Ben Taylor, “BAE payment to Tanzania undermines justice and accountability”, The Guardian Poverty Matters Blog, 20/03/2013. Accessed 07/07/2014. http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2012/mar/20/bae-payment-tanzania-justice-accountability

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: This score should be 4.

The case referred in the response above is old.

As stated the UK has range of sanctions to punish suppliers engaged in corrupt acts. Please see the Serious Fraud Office list of historical cases and cases in progress: http://www.sfo.gov.uk/our-work/our-cases/case-progress/rolls-royce.aspx

Suggested score: 4

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

70.
score
N/A

When negotiating offset contracts, does the government specifically address corruption risk by imposing due diligence requirements on contractors? Does the government follow up on offset contract performance and perform audits to check performance and integrity?

Researcher4085: The UK does not participate in offset schemes. Offsets contravene the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), that is, the principles of non-discrimination and equal treatment of suppliers, according to the European Commission's Directorate General for Internal Markets and Services. UK offset guidance shows compliance with this principle. The MoD’s guide to the Defence and Security Public Contracts Regulations (DSPCRs) 2011 states: “When placing a contract under the new Regulations, you must not: a. actively seek offers of industrial participation or offset as part of the tendering procedure; or b. include industrial participation or offset in either the award criteria or contract conditions.” There does appear to be room for interpretation within this however, as the DSPCRs do not explicitly mention offsets. The opinion of the European Commissioner is that they are impermissible unless executed in accordance with Article 346 of the TFEU. Article 346 provides that “no Member State shall be obliged to supply information the disclosure of which it considers contrary to the essential interests of its security”.

An independent expert who was interviewed for this research considered it unlikely that the UK is using offsets at all. In the event that the UK is using offsets, it is likely information is not being published on them on grounds of compromising national security. The European Commission (EC) keeps applications of Article 346 under close scrutiny and discourages its use however. MoD guidance states: “Whilst you can still apply Article 346 TFEU, our approach to applying the exemption is much more likely to come under the scrutiny after the new Regulations come into force. The European Commission has stated its intent to monitor the effects of the new Regulations more closely than was the case for previous EU Directives.”

COMMENTS -+

Defence and Security Public Contracts Regulations (DSPCRs) 2011. http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2011/1848/contents/made
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 2009, Article 346. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:12012E/TXT
Ministry of Defence. “The Defence and Security Public Contracts Regulations 2011” (government briefing paper), paras 44-47. Accessed 04/07/2014.
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/35925/dsd_govt_awareness_guide.pdf
Interview with senior member of a defence and security think tank on 04/07/2014.
Directorate General Internal Markets and Services. “Directive 2009/81/EC on the award of contracts in the fields of defence and security Guidance Note Offsets”. Accessed 06/11/14.
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/publicprocurement/docs/defence/guide-offsets_en.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

71.
score
N/A

Does the government make public the details of offset programmes, contracts, and performance?

Researcher4085: As indicated in the previous question, there is no evidence to suggest the UK government participates in offset schemes. Obligations under the Treaty for the Function European Union (TFEU) and the Defence and Security Public Contracts Regulations (DSPCRs) 2011 appear to prevent their use and experts interviewed have also indicated it is unlikely.

COMMENTS -+

Defence and Security Public Contracts Regulations (DSPCRs) 2011 http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2011/1848/contents/made
Article 346 Treaty for the Function European Union
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:12012E/TXT
Ministry of Defence. Paragraphs 44-47 of “The Defence and Security Public Contracts Regulations 2011” (government briefing paper). Accessed 04/07/2014.
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/35925/dsd_govt_awareness_guide.pdf
Interview with senior member of a defence and security think tank on 04/07/2014.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

72.
score
N/A

Are offset contracts subject to the same level of competition regulation as the main contract?

Researcher4085: As per Q70, the UK does not appear to engage in offset contracts.

COMMENTS -+

Defence and Security Public Contracts Regulations (DSPCRs) 2011 http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2011/1848/contents/made
Article 346 Treaty for the Function European Union
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:12012E/TXT
Ministry of Defence. Paragraphs 44-47 of “The Defence and Security Public Contracts Regulations 2011” (government briefing paper). Accessed 04/07/2014.
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/35925/dsd_govt_awareness_guide.pdf
Interview in person with Fellow at Royal United Services Institute on 04/07/2014.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

73.
score
3

How strongly does the government control the company's use of agents and intermediaries in the procurement cycle?

Researcher4085: The use of agents and brokers in UK defence procurement does not appear to be legally prohibited, however the MoD imposes conditions under which brokers can be employed. Government reviewer (see below) states: &quoute;The majority of Ministry of Defence (MOD) contracts are let with ‘Public Limited’ and ‘Private Limited’ companies. However, the MOD ‘Company Legal Status’ Commercial Policy Statement sets out the circumstances under which MOD Commercial staff may encounter “agents” and “intermediaries” and how to ensure contracts are let on a proper and legal basis with the least possible risk to the MOD.&quoute;

Procurement is generally conducted in line with TFEU principles of open competition, non-discrimination and transparency (implemented in the Defence and Security Public Contracts Regulations 2011), which the use of brokers could be seen to obstruct. Agents and brokers who export military and dual-use goods from the UK are subject to the Export Control Act 2002. There does not appear to be equivalent legislation for domestic brokers.

The UK’s Bribery Act 2010, a key piece of anti-corruption legislation, states that an organisation may be liable if a person associated with it pays bribes with the intention of gaining advantage for the business. Agents and brokers would qualify as persons associated with a business. This helps to ensure that brokers, if they are used, cannot work around the law and makes it harder for companies to use agents as a means of circumventing their anti-corruption responsibilities.

Response to Government Reviewer: agree. Comment updated and score changed from 2 to 3.

COMMENTS -+

Department for Business, Innovation and Skills. “Guidance: Export Control Act 2002”. 06/09/2012. Accessed 08/07/2014. https://www.gov.uk/export-control-act-2002
Export Control Act 2002. http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2002/28/contents
Ministry of Justice. “The Bribery Act 2010: Guidance”. March 2011. Accessed 08/07/2014.
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/181762/bribery-act-2010-guidance.pdf
Bribery Act 2010. http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/23/contents  
Ministry of Defence. “The Defence and Security Public Contracts Regulations 2011: Chapter 1 – Overview”. 23/01/2014. Accessed 08/07/2014. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/274735/20140123_dspcr_c1_overview.pdf
Ministry of Defence. (2014) Company Legal Status Commercial Policy Statement.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: The score should be 4.

Please note in the previous TI GI assessment, the UK scored 3 for the same question.

The MOD does not use agents or brokers.

The majority of Ministry of Defence (MOD) contracts are let with ‘Public Limited’ and ‘Private Limited’ companies. However, the MOD ‘Company Legal Status’ Commercial Policy Statement sets out the circumstances under which MOD Commercial staff may encounter “agents” and “intermediaries” and how to ensure contracts are let on a proper and legal basis with the least possible risk to the MOD.

Source(s):
Ministry of Defence. (2014) Company Legal Status Commercial Policy Statement.

Suggested score: 4

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Not Qualified

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

74.
score
2

Are the principal aspects of the financing package surrounding major arms deals, (such as payment timelines, interest rates, commercial loans or export credit agreements) made publicly available prior to the signing of contracts?

Researcher4085: Key information about the total spend on procurement and the date of planned spend is published in the MoD’s Defence Equipment Plan. This report does not include detailed information such as payment schedules or interest rates. The MoD does not appear to publish detailed information on prospective contracts ahead of signing them although further data could potentially be accessed with the Freedom of Information Act. MoD contract tenders are published online to encourage bidding, although the site is aimed at businesses only and requires commercial information from the user to register. The MoD also published a fortnightly magazine on its contracting opportunities available on subscription for £295 a year. Although not 'public', this could be a potential source of additional pre-signature contract information.

Response to Government Reviewer: Information appreciated and comments updated to remove information relating to PFIs as they do not finance major arms deals. It would be helpful to inspect sources (policy documents or examples) which demonstrate how financing packages are detailed and in the public domain as this information could not be found. On this basis, score is maintained.

COMMENTS -+

Ministry of Defence. “The Defence Equipment Plan 2013”. 12/02/2014. Accessed 07/07/2014.
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/279440/defence_equipment_plan_2013.pdf
MoD. &quoute;Defence Contracts Online&quoute;. Accessed 07/11/14.
http://www.contracts.mod.uk/uk-mod-contracts/
Simon Rogers and James Ball, “PFI contracts: the full list,” The Guardian Datablog, 05/07/2012. Accessed 09/07/2014. http://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2012/jul/05/pfi-contracts-list

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: The score should be 4.

We do not provide finance to our suppliers – we pay them for delivery.  We do not accept that there is a ‘significant blind spot’ in our financing as the total cost, duration and unitary charge will be public domain and the governance and approvals processes we have in place are thorough as is our competition and sole source policy.  

Furthermore, English contract law precludes penalties so we don’t have any of those.

In addressing the PFI reference, we do need to advise that no “major arms deals” have been financed through the PFI so its questionable whether the reference to PFI procurements is appropriate against the question posed.  While some MOD equipment projects have been procured using PFI these relate to support arrangements (e.g. air cargo, heavy equipment transporter), communications (Skynet, Naval Comms) or training facilities (eg Medium Support Helicopter Air Training Facility) and not “major arms”.  

In relation to the points made about PFI contracts the MOD provides annually to HM Treasury (HMT), an extensive return on the details of each of its PFI deals and this is consistent across Government.  As a consequence what is published in the public domain in relation to MOD PFI contracts is as directed by HMT and the same therefore as for all Government Departments.  We do not understand the comment “but rarely further information about whether the MOD incurred extra costs during the year, which often happens”.  Where there is a need to make a change to a PFI contract then the cost of this change is reflected in the annual unitary charge payment to which you refer.

Suggested score: 4

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

75.
score
2

Does the government formally require that the main contractor ensures subsidiaries and sub-contractors adopt anti-corruption programmes, and is there evidence that this is enforced?

Researcher4085: The MoD's Acquisition Operating Framework (AOF) is an extensive manual that instructs defence employees on how to procure goods efficiently and in line with policy. Government reviewer (see below) states: &quoute;The DEFCON 520, which is publicly available via the Acquisition Operating Framework, provides an overview on the “Corrupt Gifts and Payments of Commission”. It details the responsibilities of the Contractor, its employees, agents and subcontractors to comply with this DEFCON.&quoute;

MoD guidance on DEFCON 520 states: “[DEFCON 520] Prohibits a contractor from offering or giving to any Crown Servant a gift or consideration as an inducement in connection with the placing of a contract or entering into any MOD contract, in connection with which any undisclosed commission has been paid or will be payable (page 11).” It implies that subcontractors can have their contracts terminated for breaches of DEFCON 520. The guidance states: “Where the MOD considers seeking the termination of a subcontract, account must be taken of the contractor's contractual liabilities to the MOD, in particular where the subcontractor is a single source supplier. Where the MOD seeks the termination of a subcontract there will be an obligation on the MOD to support the contractor by providing evidence to support his case against the subcontractor (page 12).”

The Bribery Act 2010 aims to ensure that organisations cannot contract out of their liability for the payment of bribes, which serves as an incentive for companies to ensure that their sub-contractors employ anti-corruption procedures.

Response to Government Reviewer: Comment updated regarding the DEFCON 520 guidance. However, this does not amount to requiring an anti-corruption programme be in place and there is no publicly available evidence related to the quality of enforcement of DEFCON 520. Score maintained.

COMMENTS -+

Bribery Act 2010.
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/23/contents
MoD. “Acquisition Operating Framework”. Accessed 13/07/2014. [Access must be requested from MoD].
https://www.aof.mod.uk
Ministry of Defence. &quoute;MOD Defence Conditions Guide: Defcon compliance > DEFCON 520&quoute;. Accessed 23/9/15.
http://www.metasums.co.uk/uploads/asset_file/MOD%20Defence%20Conditions%20Guide.pdf

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: This should be 3. The obligation is to the main contractors, who are committed to anti corruption. The MOD holds the main contractor to account.

The DEFCON 520, which is publicly available via the Acquisition Operating Framework, provides an overview on the “Corrupt Gifts and Payments of Commission”. It details the responsibilities of the Contractor, its employees, agents and subcontractors to comply with this DEFCON.

Suggested score: 3

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Peer Reviewer-+

76.
score
4

How common is it for defence acquisition decisions to be based on political influence by selling nations?

Researcher4085: Based on analysis of the available information it does not appear that the political influence of selling nations is a factor in UK defence procurement. This does not preclude the possibility of some influence although an independent expert said in interview that he believes it is unlikely. UK defence purchases are conducted within clear policy frameworks such as the 10-year Defence Equipment Plan. Information on purchases and contracts are published, in line with the TFEU principles, except when the transactions are for ‘war like stores’. MoD procurement methodologies include the Lowest Compliant Bid (LCB), which is the cheapest bid that meets all the stated criteria and Best Value, which involves more value judgements about the process. Both systems are well-established and subject to departmental oversight and scrutiny of the Investment Approvals Committee.

Response to Peer Reviewer 1: agree with your comments. The context fits a score of 4 more accurately. There appears to be no evidence of foreign political influence on defence acquisition. Score updated from 3 to 4.

COMMENTS -+

Ministry of Defence. “The Defence Equipment Plan 2013”. 12/02/2014. Accessed 07/07/2014.
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/279440/defence_equipment_plan_2013.pdf
Ministry of Defence and The Rt Hon Philip Hammond MP. “Ministry of Defence and MOD family spend.” 31/05/2010. Accessed 03/07/2014. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/ministry-of-defence-and-mod-family-spend
Telephone interview with senior researcher at civil society organisation on 03/07/2014.

SOURCES -+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Researcher + Peer Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

TI Reviewer-+

Opinion: Agree

Comment:

Suggested score:

Government Reviewer-+

Opinion: Disagree

Comment: I think your comments - with which I agree - point to a 4. This accords with my own experience.

Suggested score: 4

Peer Reviewer-+