Tanzania D-

Download a detailed summary of the results for this country.

Download the complete assessment for this country.

Tanzania is placed in Band D-. In relation to political corruption vulnerability, the Defence and Security Committee lacks teeth, with only two of the fourteen members from the opposition party, and it is reported to be subject to military co-optation. The National Anti-Corruption Strategy and Action Plan (NACSAP) presents a positive picture: its remit extends to defence and it has been looking to engage with civil society. Yet there are concerns over its funding and a lack of performance indicators. There are, however, regular anti-corruption assessments by the Good Governance Co-ordination Unit and other institutions (although reviewer was not privy to their reports on the defence ministry), and there is no evidence of organised crime penetrating the sector. There is limited evidence of defence budget transparency and audit of expenditure. Additionally, SUMA JKT, the army’s commercial wing, is known to be involved in gold mining that is poorly scrutinised, and has also been linked to gun running.

For finance corruption risk, the Public Finance Act controls asset disposals, but there are concerns over audit effectiveness, oversight, and transparency. The Defence and Security Committee is not given full information on secret items and programmes, and audit often excludes them. Off-budget spending is known to occur, but is again a highly opaque and non-transparent area. Meanwhile, SUMA JKT owns large enterprises that are not subject to independent scrutiny, and the organisation lacks transparency and has been linked to unauthorised private enterprise.

In the area of personnel corruption risk, there is some ministerial enthusiasm for anti-corruption, and legislation is in place to regulate behaviours vis-à-vis corruption risk but there seems to be no evidence of military prosecutions. A Code of Conduct exists for military and civilian personnel, which provides guidance on a considerable range of areas. There are also provisions for whistle-blowing, though protections in place to prevent reprisals against whistle-blowers are not trusted. The system of payment is fairly well established, routine, and timely. However, there is a lack of transparency in pay rates and personnel numbers, while relations with the ruling party are considered to be influential in the promotions process.

For operations corruption risk, there is evidence of professional training for peace-keeping forces, though whether corruption is specifically covered is uncertain. There is little evidence of operational anti-corruption training and anti-corruption in military doctrine, as well as deployment of anti-corruption monitors in the field.

In the field of procurement corruption risk, the Public Procurement Act extends to defence and security, though provisions on the scrutiny of exempt items are unclear and the Public Procurement Regulatory Authority’s reports are not made public; it is also unclear about this Authority’s efficacy. There is insufficient evidence of the use of formal strategy to guide procurement. There is also significant use of intermediaries in procurement activity – a phenomenon that has contributed to scandals in the sector. The government does not effectively punish colluding companies; some companies are known to change their name when blacklisted, raising questions of efficacy. Further, some companies are reported to regard complaining about malpractice using the formal mechanisms in place as a threat to their contracts; other companies are reported to be unaware of these mechanisms’ existence.

Research finalised: July 2012


Click here to read more